

**THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF
AUSTRALIA IN THE WAR
OF 1914-1918**

**VOLUME II
THE STORY OF ANZAC:
FROM 4 MAY, 1915
TO THE EVACUATION**

THE STORY OF ANZAC

FROM 4 MAY, 1915, TO THE EVACUATION
OF THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

BY
C. E. W. BEAN

With 524 illustrations and maps

Eleventh Edition

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PREFACE

THE material upon which this volume is based was obtained from the official war-diaries and other records of the A.I.F. contained in the Australian War Memorial, from the notes and diaries of the writer, and from numerous answers of officers and men of the A.I.F. and others to inquiries made of them while the work was in progress.

It is obvious that in a work so compiled reference to the authority for any particular statement is generally impossible. The writer can only acknowledge his deep gratitude to those who have at various times assisted him in connection with the present volume. In particular he desires to acknowledge the constant help afforded by Major J. L. Treloar (Director), Mr. A. G. Pretty (Acting-Director), and the staff of the Australian War Memorial. He has also been assisted by the following, among others:

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Among the more important books and writings consulted in the compilation of Volume II have been—

The Dardanelles Commission Reports; The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report): House of Lords, Volume XIX, 1915; Naval and Military Despatches; Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches; Sir Ian Hamilton's Despatches; Gallipoli Diary, by Sir Ian Hamilton; *The Life of Lord Kitchener*, by Sir George Arthur; *The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener*, by Reginald Viscount Esher; *The Dardanelles*, by Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell; *Naval Operations*, by Sir Julian S. Corbett; *The World Crisis, 1915*, by The Right Hon. Winston S. Churchill; *A History of the Great War*, by John Buchan; *The Dardanelles Campaign*, by H. W. Nevins; *What of the Dardanelles?*, by Captain Granville Fortescue; *Soldiers of the Prophet*, by Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. R. Murphy; *Joffre. La Première Crise du Commandement*, by Mermeix; *Venizelos*, by Herbert Adams Gibbons; *Out of My Life*, by Marshal von Hindenburg; *My War Memoirs*, by General Ludendorff;

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The present volume, in common with all those published since Volume I, has been indexed by Mr. J. Balfour; the inset sketch maps (in which the north, unless otherwise shown, is at the top of the map) are the work of Mr. P. R. Wightman

C. E. W. B.

TUGGRANONG,

FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY.

9th July, 1924.

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CHRONOLOGY FROM 30th APRIL, 1915. TO 8th JANUARY, 1916

(*Italic type indicates events dealt with in this volume.*)

- 1915.
- April 30—Australian submarine *AE 2* sunk in Sea of Marmora.
- May 2—Russian fleet shells forts on the Bosphorus.
 „ 6—*Second Battle of Krithia begins.*
 „ 9—Battle of Aubers Ridge; French attack N.E. of Arras.
 „ 17—Austro-Germans cross the San River.
 „ 19—*Turkish attack at Anzac defeated.*
 „ 23—Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary.
 „ 25—Formation of Coalition Ministry in Britain.
- June 3—Austro-Germans retake Przemyśl. British capture Amara.
 „ 4—Third Battle of Krithia begins.
 „ 13—Greek general elections: Venizelists win.
 „ 22—Austrians retake Lemberg.
 „ 26—German Crown Prince attacks in Argonne.
 „ 29—Austro-Germans advance towards the Vistula and Bug Rivers.
- July 2—Battle for Carso Plateau in Italy begins.
 „ 6—Anglo-French conference at Calais.
 „ 13—Austro-German offensive from the Baltic to Bukovina begins.
 „ 17—Secret treaty between Bulgaria and Germany signed.
 „ 30—Russians fall back along entire line. Italian offensive in Trentino resumed.
- Aug. 5—Germans occupy Ivangorod and Warsaw.
 „ 6—*Battles of Lone Pine and Sari Bair begin.*
 „ 7—*Landing at Suvla Bay.*
 „ 20—Italy declares war on Turkey.
 „ 21—*Battle of Scimitar Hill and first attack on Hill 60 (Anzac) begin.*
 „ 22—Venizelos accepts Premiership of Greece.
 „ 25—Germans occupy Brest-Litovsk.
 „ 27—*Second attack on Hill 60 begins.*
- Sept. 2—Germans capture Grodno. "*Southland*" torpedoed.
 „ 18—Fall of Vilna and Russian retreat towards Minsk
 „ 21—Mobilisation of Bulgarian Army ordered.
 „ 25—Allied offensive on Western Front begins (Battles of Loos and Champagne). Turco-Bulgarian agreement signed.
 „ 28—Battle of Kut.

- Oct. 1—Concentration of Austro-German forces along Serbian frontier.
 „ 3—Concentration of Bulgarian forces. Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria.
 „ 5—Allied troops land in Salonica. Venizelos resigns.
 „ 7—New Greek Cabinet formed under Zaimis.
 „ 8—Austrians enter Belgrade.
 „ 11—Bulgars attack Serbians. Lord Derby produces British recruiting scheme.
 „ 12—Greece refuses Serbia's appeal.
 „ 13—Delcassé resigns from French Cabinet.
 „ 14—Bulgaria declares war on Serbia.
 „ 15—State of war between Bulgaria and Great Britain.
 „ 17—*Sir Ian Hamilton relinquishes command of M.E.F.*
 „ 19—Italy declares war on Bulgaria.
 „ 27—*Sir Charles Monro assumes command of M.E.F.*
 „ 28—Briand succeeds Viviani as Prime Minister of France.
- Nov. 4—Greek Cabinet defeated—Skouloudis appointed Premier.
 „ 5—Fall of Nish after three days' fighting.
 „ 13—*Lord Kitchener lands at Anzac.*
 „ 19—"Pacific" blockade of Greece proclaimed by Allies.
 „ 20—Lord Kitchener interviews Greek King and Government
 „ 22—Battle of Ctesiphon (Mesopotamia) begins.
 „ 25—British retreat from Ctesiphon to Kut.
- Dec. 3—Joffre appointed Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies.
 „ 5—Monastir evacuated. Siege of Kut begins.
 „ 6—First meeting of Allied War Council (in Paris).
 „ 7—*British Government orders Evacuation of Anzac and Suvla.*
 „ 10—Allied War Council decides to hold Salonica.
 „ 15—Sir Douglas Haig succeeds Sir John French in command of the British Armies in France.
 „ 20—*Evacuation of Suvla and Anzac completed.*
 „ 21—Sir William Robertson appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
- 1916
 Jan. 8—*Evacuation of Helles completed.*


CHAPTER I

THE STRUGGLE FOR KRITHIA

At the beginning of May, 1915, both the forces which had landed a week earlier on the Gallipoli Peninsula had secured a foothold. But neither had approached its objective. Even the positions intended to be reached by the covering forces, namely, Achi Baba at Helles and the "Third" ridge at Anzac, had not been attained. The British had gradually advanced two miles, nearly half of the projected first stage; the Anzac troops remained where all except a few advanced elements had from the earliest hours been ordered to entrench—that is to say, on the "Second" ridge. Of this the main prominence, Baby 700, had been lost in the fierce struggle following the Landing, and the enemy had gained a footing on the almost equally important 400 Plateau and on all parts of the Second ridge between the two. The result was that, while the British foothold at Helles might at the beginning of May be considered secure, that at Anzac, where the enemy dominated the centre of the position, was still tactically unsafe.¹

The clear reasoning by which Sir Ian Hamilton, about May 2nd, decided temporarily to abandon the attempt to advance from Anzac, and to concentrate upon achieving the first stage of the advance from Helles—the taking of Achi Baba—has already been discussed.² As has been shown, the endeavour to reach this peak in the first few days, while the Landing at Anzac was still diverting the enemy's whole local reserve, had failed.

In front of Krithia and the Kereves Dere Turkish trenches



¹ According to Amin Bey (in the preface to the Turkish edition of Liman von Sanders' *Fünf Jahre Türkei*) the Turks had lost at Anzac in this first stage 199 officers and 13,955 men. As against this the casualties of the Anzac troops are given by him as 8,000, which number is approximately correct.

² Vol I, pp 601-2, 604-5

had already begun to spread across the Peninsula. Hamilton's new decision was to make use of all available force, break through this incomplete line, and advance to Achi Baba before the Turks had brought up sufficient other reserves to prevent him.

For success he now looked largely to his artillery. In recent fighting in France the Germans had prepared the way for advances of infantry by systematically destroying with shell-fire the opposing trenches, while the French as regularly protected their assaulting troops by placing in front of them a curtain of shell-fire as they advanced. By March, 1915, the British also had amassed sufficient shells to pulverise the German trenches on a narrow front at Neuve Chapelle; and, though the annihilating bombardments and elaborate "barrages" of later years were still undeveloped, commanders were leaning more and more upon their artillery in almost all tactical difficulties. Crudely stated, the general notion was that no trench-line well furnished with machine-guns could be approached by infantry until the guns had been destroyed or silenced by artillery fire.

Hamilton's small army at Helles possessed few guns in proportion to the numbers of its infantry, but a fair number in proportion to the narrow front occupied. On the other hand its shell-supply consisted, on May 5th, of only 48,000 rounds for the British field-guns and 1,800 for the field-howitzers, a store which later in the war would have been entirely consumed in a single minor assault. Moreover, these shells, being almost entirely shrapnel—a man-killing projectile—would not avail to destroy trenches, and in any case at least 10,000 rounds would have to be kept in hand for emergencies. Meanwhile the guns of the fleet, on which the expedition had mainly depended, could afford to expend only 5,800 rounds of heavier than 12-pounder weight before Constantinople was reached, and of these only a third could be safely spent upon the capture of Achi Baba. The British shell-supply would therefore not permit Hamilton to contemplate any such bombardment as that of Neuve Chapelle. The artillery of the French Division was far better provided, especially with high-explosive shell.

In these circumstances Hamilton himself strongly inclined to a well-recognised, but totally different, method of neutralising the enemy machine-guns during the long approach of his troops towards the Turkish position—that of a “night advance.” “It would be good tactics,” he held, “. to cross the danger zone by night and overthrow the enemy in the grey dawn.” On the other hand General Hunter-Weston, who with the 29th Division would have to carry it out, was much opposed to a night operation. In the darkness there was always a danger that the different parts of the line might lose direction and touch, and even become engaged with one another. “Hunter-Weston says that so many regimental officers have been lost,” writes Hamilton,³ “he fears for the company-leading at night:—for that, most searching of military tests, nothing but the best will do.”

For these reasons the army commander, as on other occasions, bowed his own more imaginative judgment to that of a subordinate, and, despite the shortage of ammunition, determined to rely solely upon bombardment. A few days later, when the mistake had been proved and Hunter-Weston could devise no other remedy than to repeat it, the Commander-in-Chief lacked either the perception or the crude strength to overrule him.

Having decided to throw all his available strength into this blow, Hamilton, early on May 3rd, summoned to G.H.Q. General Birdwood, one of whose two divisions, the N.Z. & A., was that morning still engaged in the second costly but unsuccessful attack upon Baby 700. After explaining to him the vital nature of his new decision, the Commander-in-Chief asked him to send to Helles on the same evening as much of the Anzac force as he could spare. Birdwood's divisions—the 1st Australian and the N.Z. & A.—though much reduced, had been reinforced by portions of two British naval brigades; some of the light horse and mounted rifles had also been summoned from Egypt. He therefore undertook to release two of his own infantry brigades. Much of his artillery being still on the ships, twenty Anzac field-guns⁴ were also ordered to reinforce the British artillery at Helles.

³ *Gallipoli Diary, Vol I, p. 201.*

⁴ The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Batteries, A.F.A., and 3rd Battery, N.Z.F.A. These served at Helles for several months as part of the British artillery. (*See p. 63.*)

Returning to Anzac, Birdwood sent for Bridges and Godley, the commanders of his two divisions, and asked each to withdraw at once from the line his most effective brigade. Bridges chose the 2nd,⁵ commanded by Colonel M'Cay. In the N.Z. & A. Division the only brigade which could possibly be sent was that of the New Zealand infantry. Although the Otago Battalion had been heavily engaged in the previous night's attack on Baby 700, the brigade still numbered 2,493; the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, the strength of which had been given on May 2nd as 3,430, was after that fight estimated at no more than 1,811.

The order to withdraw the troops had already been sent out and the Otago Battalion and part of the Canterbury, just emerging from the battle, had been directed to the Beach, when the move was postponed by G.H.Q. The twenty guns, however, were sent on May 4th, and on the same day the arrival of the Fusilier brigade of the 42nd (East Lancashire Territorial) Division, for which he was waiting, enabled Hamilton to determine that the great attempt should be launched on the morning of May 6th. The reinforcement from Anzac was therefore ordered to move south on the night of the 5th. "I am sending my two best brigades," Birdwood telegraphed.


It was obviously important that the Turks should have no inkling of this transfer, since it would lead them to guess both that the Anzac line had been weakened and that an attack was impending at Helles. It was therefore planned that the troops should embark immediately after nightfall and, making the two-hours' sea-journey during the dark, should be in bivouac at Helles before daylight. By careful arrangement the brigades, with the "bearer sub-divisions" of their respective field ambulances, were relieved, rationed, equipped, and at dusk concentrated beside their boats and lighters at specially marked embarking-points. Unfortunately the destroyers and fleet-sweepers⁶ which were to carry them were delayed by heavy seas, although Anzac Cove was as usual protected from the wind. On the Beach, since fires were impossible, the troops sat shivering until midnight, when the

⁵ The 1st had 2,874 men—as against 2,568 of the 2nd—but its commander, Gen. Walker, was newly-appointed and a British officer, whereas M'Cay was an Australian whose leadership, Bridges thought, had been considerably improved by the past week's experience in the field. Moreover, M'Cay's brigade was less disorganised than the 1st.

⁶ Swift packet-boats from England temporarily fitted for mine-sweeping with the fleet.

New Zealanders began to embark. It was plain daylight before the last of the fleet-sweepers carrying the Australians left for Helles.

It was thus 5 a.m. on May 6th when these vessels with their crowded freight, all intensely interested in the changed surroundings, picked their way through the battleships lying off the toe of the Peninsula, past "W" Beach to "V" Beach, where, close under the shattered stone bastions and battered village of Sedd-el-Bahr, the stranded *River Clyde* had been joined to the shore with moored lighters to form a pier. Several shells from the low Asiatic coast, which could be seen two and a half miles southwards, fell beside the boats as they drifted up to her. Filing from the pontoons across the powdered white cart-tracks, past Greek and French porters, the Australians marched in companies up the road, and, after climbing the slope from the beach, were suddenly brought within sight of a field of operations which were to prove utterly different from those on the forbidding heights at Anzac. Before them the white road wound down a gentle hillside, between olive-trees, to a wide undulating depression shaped somewhat like a spoon. Beyond this, rising again gently, the country culminated five miles away in a peak whose two broad, almost human, shoulders reached across the Peninsula. Instantly the troops recognised it as Achi Baba, whose crest they had for days been eagerly watching from the other side for any sign of the British advance. In contrast to the dry dwarf-holly of Anzac, the depression before them was sprinkled with elms rising from rich fields of green wheat, and beyond these spread wide patches of open heath. On the gradual slope below the left of the peak lay a row of windmills beside the small white town of Krithia.



In the lap of this country was proceeding an action such as most Australians in their boyhood had seen in those "bird's-eye views" of battles which appeared so often in the illustrated newspapers of the nineteenth century. In the


foreground, on the very crest above the beach,⁷ was a French field-battery, emplaced in the bushes close beside the road. British field-guns were ranged across country behind hedges and other cover. In the distance, about half-way to Achi Baba, their occasional shells, bursting in fleecy puffs, clearly marked the line of the Turkish positions. Up the road jingled teams of British gun-horses. French soldiers in light blue, in khaki with red trousers, or in white fatigue-jackets, were driving waggons drawn by mules or grey Flemish horses down to their lines on the right, where, between dense groves of cypress, showed the blue water of the Dardanelles. The Australian companies moved a few hundred yards into the valley to a place where five slender white-stone water-towers rose from the flats. To the left of these, in a field of green wheat fringed by elms and watered by a tiny muddy stream, Colonel M'Cay gave the order to dig in. "They can see you from Achi Baba," he said, pointing to the peak, which showed between the trees. "They'll have shrapnel on to you in a few minutes."

The lines dug themselves shallow shelters,⁸ heaping the turf in tall breastworks, since water was struck at eighteen inches. Meanwhile the camp was not shelled. While they were digging in, it became known that an order had been received stating that the battle would begin at 11 a.m., and at that hour the Australians, settling under the elms, heard it open. During this and the following day, when reinforcements had been drilled, platoons reorganised, and a few fatigues performed, the men were free to stroll through meadows knee-deep in poppies, purple lupin, white daisies, and yellow flowers, and, in the glorious weather which lasted throughout this battle and indeed through most of the campaign, to watch the fight from a knoll behind the Haji Ayub Farm. To those who had grown accustomed to surprise attacks at dawn or dusk on narrow crests where fighting was from one steep gully to another, the setting of this battle was as unreal as that of a drama upon the stage.

The front line at Helles had not been materially changed since the fighting on April 28th (officially known as the

⁷ Much to the surprise of the Anzac troops who had been picturing the battle as having approached Achi Baba.

⁸ See Vol. XII, plate 67.



THE 2ND AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE LANDING AT THE *RIVER CLYDE* PIER, CAPE HELLES,
6TH MAY, 1915

One of the fleet-sweepers which brought the brigade from Anzac can be seen close alongside the *River Clyde*. In the distance on the left a warship at the mouth of the straits, on the right, a large French transport, anchored warships, and smaller craft.

Turkish fort and gun



Slope to
"V" Beach

MAJOR W. E. H. CASS AND MEN OF 2ND BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS WAITING NEAR THE FORT ON
CAPE HELLES, ABOVE "V" BEACH, AFTER LANDING ON 6TH MAY, 1915

Major Cass

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G958

To face p 7

"First Battle of Krithia"), when the 29th Division had made its chief advance. Liman von Sanders had reinforced his 9th Division—the original garrison—with the 7th and parts of the 5th and of the 11th of his own army, and with the 10th and 15th, sent to him from elsewhere. Counter-attacking at night to avoid the fire of the warships, the Turks had on May 1st and 2nd penetrated the right of the line, held by the French, on the heights above Morto Bay, and had at one time pierced the British front adjoining it. On the night of May 3rd the black Senegalese troops, next to the British, fell back almost to Morto Bay, leaving some of the guns exposed. The French next day regained their trenches, but the Senegalese had been so shaken and the French so exhausted by these constant attacks upon them, that the 2nd British Naval Brigade was lent to relieve their left in the Kanli Dere. The Turks on their side had lost heavily, and Liman von Sanders therefore reluctantly ordered that both at Anzac and Helles the effort to drive the invaders into the sea should be abandoned and the Turkish army should stand on the defensive. His plan now was to contest every inch of ground, and to avoid the warships' fire by advancing the Turkish line so close to that of the allies that the ships could not safely bombard it. This new policy can scarcely have been inaugurated when the day of Hamilton's offensive arrived.

By May 4th the Turkish counter-attack had ended. Next day the natural impatience of Lord Kitchener for a further attempt upon Achi Baba was again expressed in a telegram urging Hamilton not to wait for the arrival of the 2nd French Division. The Commander-in-Chief had already come to this decision. The reinforcements upon which he was counting for the coming battle were—

Lancashire Fusilier Brigade—first to arrive of the 42nd (East Lancs. Territorial) Division.

New Zealand Infantry Brigade.

2nd Australian Infantry Brigade.

29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

Part of 2nd Division (French Expeditionary Corps), if arriving in time.

Two other brigades of the East Lancashire Territorials were also to reach Helles within a few days, but these were

not actually engaged. The 29th Indian Brigade was eventually retained in reserve, in consequence of some doubt as to the attitude of the Mohammedans. Of the existing divisions at Helles, the 29th had been temporarily reduced to two brigades,⁹ and the Royal Naval Division was practically without troops, one of its brigades having been lent to the French, and half of each of the others being at Anzac. The force was therefore reorganised for the coming battle as follows:—

29th Division (Major-General Hunter-Weston)—

87th Brigade.

88th Brigade.

Lancashire Fusilier Brigade (of 42nd Territorial Division).

29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

“Composite” Division (Major-General Paris¹⁰ and staff of Royal Naval Division)—

“Composite” Brigade (1st Lancashire Fusiliers—29th Division; Drake Battalion—naval; Plymouth Battalion—marine).

New Zealand Infantry Brigade.

2nd Australian Infantry Brigade.

The French 2nd Division, on its arrival under General Bailloud, was employed by d'Amade as a separate division, acting in close touch with the 2nd British Naval Brigade, which was temporarily lent to him.


As has been already explained, the Turks were at this time endeavouring with all haste to establish a line of defence across the Peninsula, but the new policy of creeping to close quarters had hardly yet been put into practice. Their left, or southern, flank lay upon the long spur which, springing from Achi Baba itself, formed the western side of the Kereves Dere (“Celery Valley”) and hid that valley from the French. Across the top of this spur the Turks had already dug one

⁹ The 86th Brigade, having suffered very heavily, was split up between the two. Its strength, on April 30, was 1,886:

	Officers.	Men.
2nd Royal Fusiliers	12	481
1st Lancashire Fusiliers ..	11	399
1st Royal Munster Fusiliers ..	12	506
1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers ..	1	374
	36	1,850

¹⁰ Maj.-Gen. Sir A. Paris, K.C.B., p.s.c., Commanded Roy. Nav. Div., 1914/16; b. 9 Nov., 1861. Died, 30 Oct., 1937.

strong position. Echeloned to the right rear of this, beside the main road which ran up the centre of the Peninsula past Krithia, they were making another. Farther north again, across the long spur leading to Krithia, was a third. Other positions, isolated and hastily dug, existed in the scrub and occasional fir-copses in front of this line of main defence, and, while these were being completed, a well-concealed line of Turkish infantry with sharpshooters was maintained forward in the scrub. Six or seven




Turkish field-batteries and a battery of howitzers were on, or behind, the two shoulders of Achi Baba. Before the enemy's observing-officers on that height the whole foot of the Peninsula lay spread out like a map.

The line which the Turks were thus entrenching was, except opposite the French, at some distance from the line of the allies, the British having in most parts about a mile to traverse before they could come to holts with the enemy or even seriously press him. So open was the landscape that almost the whole of this space was exposed to fire, not only from the Turkish batteries, but from the rifles and machine-guns along most of the enemy's line. It was across this No-Man's Land that Hamilton had desired to move his troops in the dark, while Hunter-Weston preferred daylight and the covering fire of artillery.

Hamilton's general plan was not, in the first instance, to attack the Turks along the whole front, but to make his main thrust through Krithia on the western or British side of the Peninsula—this attack being delivered by the 29th Division—while the French launched a separate thrust up the eastern side. These two distinct advances were to be directed up certain strips of land into which this part of the Peninsula had been divided by nature. The country, rising gently towards the Turks, was separated by three small streams into four long and somewhat raised fingers of open land. The westernmost stream flowed from the corresponding

shoulder of Achi Baba down a deep rugged nullah, known as the "Gully Ravine" (Sighin Dere). As the Mediterranean coast lay parallel, and only a few hundred yards distant, this stream, which eventually ran into it,¹¹ cut off a long straight peninsula of high ground, 200 to 500 yards in width, which may here be called the "Ravine Spur." Half-way down this, and on its seaward side, was the steep crevice known as "Old 'Y' Beach," where an isolated portion of the 29th Division had landed, not very far from Krithia, on April 25th, but had been taken off a few days later.



Between this ravine and the next—the Krithia Nullah, nearly a mile away—was a strip of land at the upper end of which lay Krithia. This, to be distinguished in this narrative as the "Krithia Spur," was somewhat broken by a number of runnels descending at intervals into the Krithia Nullah and causing the ground to form a succession of small gullies and rises on which were several straggling copses of fir. The next strip, between the Krithia Nullah and the Kanli Dere ("Bloody Valley"), ran evenly, with a width of from 500 to 700 yards, down the centre of the Peninsula to the fields where the Australians were camped. Up this strip, which may be called the "Central Spur," went the road from Sedd-el-Bahr to Krithia, keeping almost the whole way near the edge of the Kanli Dere. Beyond the elms near the Australian camp and a small scrubby wood which adjoined them, the same road ran through a featureless, slightly swelling, grassy moorland. No runnels broke the dry even surface of the Central Spur.


The easternmost of the four strips—that between the Kanli



¹¹ At "Gully Beach" or "New 'Y' Beach."

Dere and the Dardanelles—was the highest, and was more irregular in shape, running obliquely across the front of the French, who were thus barred at the outset from the Kereves Dere lying behind it. For convenience it may be known as the "Kereves Spur." Immediately in front of the French, who had a foothold on its slopes, it swelled to the height known to the Turks as "Kemal Bey Tepe," which at this time was the immediate object of all the French attacks.


Hamilton's plan aimed at seizing Achi Baba by a left-hand thrust by the British along the two strips nearest to the Ægean coast—the Ravine and Krithia Spurs. The attack was to be made in three stages. In the first, the British were to advance to a line about a mile from Krithia, where they would be directly in front of the supposed position of the Turkish trenches defending the village. In the second phase they were to pierce these defences, while their left swung forward past Krithia to the western shoulder of Achi Baba, with the result that the British line would face half-inland towards that height. In the final movement, this line was to advance and seize the peak. Meanwhile the French, making a separate assault on the right, were in the first stage to seize Kemal Bey Tepe; in the second, to remain there as a pivot; in the third, to cross the Kereves Dere and take the spur beyond it, when their left would again join with the right of the British.



It will be seen that no attack was to be made along the narrow open strip which has been referred to as the Central Spur. On this, which would be completely exposed to fire from the higher fingers on either side of it, was placed the "Composite" Brigade, with the duty of maintaining touch between the British advance on the left and that of the French on the right. By arrangement the French also kept the 2nd Royal Naval Brigade slightly behind their left, in the Kanli Dere, in order to strengthen what had proved a vulnerable


point—that of junction of the two forces. It is needless to say that the details of these somewhat complicated plans were practically unknown to the regimental officers and men of the two Anzac brigades, and probably to most of the other fighting troops, but it was realised that the force was engaged in a general advance of the whole line upon Krithia and Achi Baba. Hamilton's order issued on May 5th was: "The advance against the Achi Baba position will be resumed on May 6th at 11 a.m." At 10.30 on that day the bombardment by the land artillery began. Its chief ingredients on the British front were slow fire by two 6-inch howitzers against a point near Old "Y" Beach, where a Turkish redoubt was supposed to exist in front of the Lancashire Territorials on the Ravine Spur, and the shelling by two others of a fir-copse which was believed to contain trenches likely to obstruct the 88th Brigade on the Krithia Spur. At 11 a.m. the remaining British guns, about eighty in number, which had been firing a few registering shots, opened fire against various areas, shooting when their observers reported any obstacles likely to obstruct the infantry. With such assistance as this afforded, the infantry advanced.

Upon the Ravine Spur the Lancashire Territorials, after advancing several hundred yards, came to a point near Old "Y" Beach where unseen machine-guns made further progress completely impossible. Failure attended all attempts at that point during the day. The 88th Brigade, advancing up the next spur (the Krithia Spur), found its left stopped by the same fire from across the gully. Its right, on the inland slope, was greatly hampered by two other unseen Turkish machine-guns, believed to be in a straggling copse of fir-trees. The 88th entered this wood, but was driven out again, and by the afternoon was definitely stopped and digging in. The British attack was thus held up. On the other flank, the French, assisted by their own field-guns firing high-explosive



shell, swarmed at the outset over the nearer part of Kemal Bay Tepe; but if any reached the sandy parapet of the main Turkish redoubt which fringed the crest, they were thrown out by counter-attack, and Turkish reinforcements were presently seen creeping not only along this trench but also down into the low scrub in front of it in the Kanli Dere, facing the Naval brigade. All day isolated Frenchmen, the remnants of parties which had advanced farthest, ran back across the smooth slope of the height, only to be struck down by Turkish machine-guns in the Kanli Dere. The Hood (naval) Battalion, which had gone forward with the French, retired with them. On the Central Spur, between the British and the French, the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers of the Composite Brigade advanced, as ordered, some 400 yards and connected the two forces.

Such was the position on the night of May 6th. The first of the three stages had not been achieved, and it is doubtful if anywhere, except where the French were at close quarters, an occupied Turkish trench had been reached or approached. The staff of the 29th Division realised that they had as yet been in touch only with advanced bodies of the enemy; but so inadequate was the map that positions could not be accurately




recorded, and both the 29th and the French thought themselves to have advanced considerably farther than was actually the case. The 88th Brigade, for example, gave its position as barely half-a-mile from Krithia, while the French, who by a night attack retook part of the ground won and lost in the morning, reported themselves as being half-a-mile beyond the point actually reached. It therefore appeared to Hamilton that sufficient progress had been made with the first phase to allow of the commencement of the second—the seizure of the Turkish trenches and the right-wheel through Krithia. As a preliminary measure, the hidden machine-guns which impeded the Fusilier brigade were, if possible, to be heavily bombarded from sea and land, so that, if not destroyed, they

could be rushed at the outset of the attack. The advance was to be thus resumed at 10 a.m. on May 7th.

At that hour, after bombardment, the Territorials attempted to advance, but the same machine-guns swept them back and, firing across the Ravine, again stopped the left of the 88th Brigade on the Krithia Spur. The centre of the 88th again reached the fir-trees, but was driven out. Its right advanced 200 yards. Since by 2 o'clock the attack had become stationary, the 87th Brigade, which had been intended for a later phase, was put in to help forward both the others, its place being taken by the New Zealand brigade, which was brought round near to Gully Beach. But when at 4.45, after a quarter of an hour's renewed bombardment from ships and shore, the troops went forward, the same machine-guns still barred the advance. The 87th made no progress of importance. The 88th for the third time entered the fir-trees, and apparently was again driven out. The French made some headway, but it is doubtful if they penetrated any trench except the first on the Kereves Spur. As before, both 29th Division and French believed themselves farther forward than they were, and Hamilton, while informing Kitchener of the failure to reach Achi Baba, added that the 87th Brigade had pressed the enemy almost to Krithia. But so slight in reality had been the progress upon May 7th that the Composite Brigade connecting the two flanks remained in the trench which it had dug the day before.

At dark Hunter-Weston recommended to Hamilton that the attempt already made on the 6th, and twice on the 7th, should be repeated on the 8th, but with the 87th Brigade on the Ravine Spur in place of the exhausted Territorials, and the New Zealand brigade attacking on the Krithia Spur instead of the 88th. He further recommended that the Indian and Australian brigades should be held in readiness to assault Achi Baba as soon as the hills behind Krithia were taken, and that the battle should be resumed at 10 a.m.

This recommendation was adopted by Hamilton. It was arranged that the suspected position of the Turkish machine-guns north of "Y" Beach should be again bombarded, the *Queen Elizabeth*, as before, joining in. It was vaguely reported that the machine-guns which had checked the Territorials were on top of a cliff overlooking the Old "Y" Beach,




THE CAPE HELLES AREA, SHOWING THE ADVANCE OF THE ALLIED ARMY TOWARDS ACHI BABA IN THE SECOND BATTLE OF KRITHIA, 6TH, 7TH, AND 8TH MAY, 1915

and that the most advanced British troops appeared to be at the southern end of the same beach.

At 9.45 on May 8th fire was opened against the suspected area for a quarter of an hour with the few howitzers available. At 10.15 the ships' guns and field artillery bombarded for a further quarter of an hour such Turkish works as had been located along the whole front, but especially the nest of machine-guns which had now to be dealt with by the 87th Brigade. It was no longer ordered that this nest should be directly attacked, but small parties were to be pushed forward after the bombardment to discover whether an attack was then feasible. The morning's operation, therefore, resolved itself into a frontal advance by a single brigade—the New Zealand infantry—up the Krithia Spur. The hour was to be 10.30.

During the previous afternoon the New Zealanders had been marched across the toe of the Peninsula to the cliffs south of Gully Beach, overlooking the Ravine up which their staff was warned that they would probably be moved. On the slopes leading to the Ravine Brigadier-General Marshall,¹² of the 87th Brigade, himself met the battalions and ordered them temporarily to entrench there. At this stage the brigade was transferred from the Composite to the 29th Division. Shortly after dusk orders came for the Wellington and Auckland Battalions to support during the night the 87th and 88th Brigades respectively. Wellington was accordingly marched up the Ravine, past mule-trains and Indians, finally clambering up a steep angle to some trenches which led out of the eastern edge of the gully. It was from these that the advance of May 6th had begun, and they now formed part of the reserve line across the battlefield. Finding that in the sector allotted to him there was insufficient room for all his companies, Colonel Malone, a New Zealand farmer of powerful




¹² Lieut-Gen Sir W. R. Marshall, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I. Commanded III Indian Army Corps, Mesopotamia, 1916/17; Mesopot. Exped. Force 1917/19. Officer of British Regular Army; of Durham, Eng.; b. Fountains House, Durham, 29 Oct., 1865. Died 29 May, 1939.

personality who commanded the Wellingtons, sent back the Ruahine company to the gully. Wellington thus occupied, in reserve, the left of the Krithia Spur; Auckland similarly held the centre; after daylight next morning Canterbury began to move up to the right, with its flank on the Krithia Nullah. The Otago Battalion, which had suffered heavily on Baby 700 at Anzac, remained in reserve.

It was 8.30 a.m. on May 8th when the staff of the New Zealand brigade received from the 29th Division detailed orders for the attack. The brigade was then at least 500 yards in rear of the front line, to which it could have been led without any difficulty or loss during the hours of darkness, so that the troops could have attacked the enemy unexpectedly "in the grey dawn." As it was, the approach had now to be made across the open by daylight, a course which not only involved much loss in traversing ground already won but also gave the enemy half-an-hour's warning of the attack.

The brigadier, Colonel Johnston, at once moved his headquarters up to a ruined hut slightly in rear of the reserve trenches; and at 10.10 he issued to his three battalions at the reserve line (Wellington—Auckland—Canterbury) the order to deploy in rear of the British front, so as to pass through it when the bombardment stopped at 10.30, and attack Krithia. Canterbury, which had just come up on the right, was directed by word of mouth to hasten on at once. This it did, its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Brown,¹⁸ explaining to his officers that he could tell them no more than the instruction implied. Wellington and Auckland, however, either mistaking the intention of the order or through lack of time, moved at 10.30 from the reserve trenches.

At that hour the bombardment ceased, and it became the duty of the forward observing-officers of the field artillery (including the Australian and New Zealand



¹⁸ Brig.-Gen. C. H. J. Brown, D.S.O. Commanded 1st N.Z. Inf. Bde., 1917. Officer of the N.Z. Staff Corps, of Greymouth, N.Z.; b. Christchurch, N.Z., 8 May, 1872. Killed in action, 8 June, 1917.

batteries) to lay their guns by telephone from time to time on to any obstacle impeding the troops. As Wellington and Auckland moved from the reserve position, each company throwing out its successive platoons in skirmishing line, the Turkish shrapnel opened upon them. Bullets from long distance flew past, but the casualties in no way affected the steady advance. Canterbury, already lying behind the British front 500 yards ahead of the Reserve Trench, waited for the rest of the line to come up.

The advance of the left battalion (Wellington) lay up the western edge of the spur, where it ran high and bare, shutting out from the rest of the brigade any view of the Gully Ravine and the sea. As the troops passed over the front trench—very late, since at this point they had been required to cover nearly 1,000 yards from the reserve line—the Essex Regiment cheered them. The rifle and machine-gun fire of the enemy increased heavily. The left of the battalion was on the seaward slope, and, as the lines climbed the open ridge, a fire, growing in intensity, came from across the Gully Ravine, where the same machine-guns which had stopped the Fusiliers had the New Zealand left in full view. The company on that flank (Taranaki) was checked, and could only lie facing these guns across the valley; consequently the centre of the battalion also, after advancing 300 yards from the British front line, was stopped by order of its officers.

Ahead of Auckland and Canterbury on the centre and right of the spur, beyond the British line, lay the straggling length of Fir Wood which for two days had checked the 29th Division. The centre of the copse had to be approached over an open patch which first fell gently and then rose to a pine-covered knoll. This ground, which had once been cultivated but was then covered by a rich growth of red poppies and large white daisies, had been named by the British the "Daisy Field." Its deadliness was made clear to the Aucklanders, as they faced it, by many warnings from the British troops in the front trenches, who had suffered in previous attempts to cross it. Upon the Aucklanders also, as they crossed the British trench, the enemy poured a heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. It seems, however, to have come at first from the Turkish trenches on the higher parts of the spur, and was being sufficiently subdued by the artillery to permit of the

leading platoons passing the Daisy Field. Before the rest could follow, however, the fusillade from the Fir Wood and elsewhere became intense. Parties constantly tried to cross the field, but every time, when they were half-way over, they were seen to stumble and fall. Some men rose again and staggered on; but almost always the dust raised by machine-gun bullets sprang from the ground near by, followed, and caught them. Not more than one in ten of the supports who attempted to cross reached the other side in safety. The few who succeeded gathered into a small creek-bed running towards the enemy, and lay there unable either to advance or to retire. The rest fell back, shaken, into the British front line, where during the morning they were reinforced by two companies of the Otago Battalion.

Auckland having been thus checked, the neighbouring flank of Wellington also was forced to stop, being in the air some 200 yards in front of the Essex trench. On the right of the spur Colonel Brown, who had held back the leading company of Canterbury, waiting for Auckland, had eventually at 10.50 launched Major Brereton and the first company from the advanced trench of the Munster Fusiliers. It was met by tremendous fire. Brereton himself being severely wounded. A few men reached the hollow to which the scouts had already gone forward, but most of the battalion was unable to advance beyond the Munsters' trench.

Thus by midday the New Zealand brigade had come to a standstill, having lost heavily and gained ground only on the left. No Turkish line had thus far been met with, although in the opinion of the divisional staff the left and centre of the New Zealanders were now in close contact with the main entrenchments. But Hamilton's whole battle-line was again stationary. The French 1st Division—which this day attempted to cross the mouth of the Kereves Dere and subdue the deadly fire from that region—had not succeeded; the 2nd Division, which was concentrating behind the 2nd Naval Brigade on the French left, had not yet launched itself against Kemal Bey Tepe.

About 3 p.m. General Hunter-Weston ordered the New Zealand brigade to repeat its attack at 5.30. No alteration of plan was proposed; the brigade, of which Auckland, at least, had been severely shaken, was to renew in daylight its

isolated advance. Colonel Johnston, telephoning to the headquarters of the division, protested that this could only lead to the destruction of his force, but the directions issued to him were definite. The two remaining companies of Otago were therefore ordered into the line between Wellington and Auckland. The Ruahine company of Wellington, which by some mistake had previously been left behind, was ordered up to the same point; and a draft of New Zealand reinforcements from Egypt, consisting of 21 officers and 833 men, who with some 350 Australians had arrived from Anzac during the morning, was put into the Reserve Trench as a support. The whole remaining strength of the brigade had thus been brought up for its effort when, at about 4.30, a message was received cancelling the previous order and substituting one for a general advance by the whole allied line.

What had happened was that in the morning Sir Ian Hamilton himself had come ashore and established his headquarters above "W" Beach close beside General Paris of the Composite Division, and not far from Hunter-Weston. The morning attack by the New Zealanders being within sight of all these headquarters, he knew that his left had failed. As for his right, d'Amade had informed him that the trenches facing the French left could not be taken by frontal attack, and must be outflanked by the British capturing Krithia. At 3.45 p.m. the French commander further reported that the advance of the 2nd French Division in that sector had been stopped until such time as the attack upon Krithia succeeded. On the extreme right the 1st French Division was also held up by a battery on the Asiatic shore.

Hamilton was clearly faced by a most critical situation. Some of his advisers held that the force had done all it could.¹⁴ Such a decision, however, would mean that the expedition, after a final trial with its full present military strength, had proved unable to accomplish the first stage of its intended progress. That failure he was unwilling yet to admit. It was true that the shell-supply, always small, was rapidly approaching the point beyond which it could not be reduced, and that in two and a half days' fighting the Turkish line had not yet been reached or even seen by most of the troops.

¹⁴ Sir Ian Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. I, p. 211. Possibly the opinion was expressed by Hunter-Weston in forwarding Johnston's protest.


But the opinion was still held that, if once it were reached and pierced, the whole Turkish front would collapse. Hamilton therefore resolved to make one more attempt. "At 4 o'clock," he says, "I issued orders that the whole line, reinforced by the Australians, should, on the stroke of 5.30, fix bayonets and storm Krithia and Achi Baba." The heavy artillery and ships' guns were, at 5.15, to bombard the enemy's lines in front of Krithia for fifteen minutes. The field-guns were then—so far, of course, as their ammunition supply allowed—to maintain a severe fire with shrapnel throughout the advance of the infantry.

This grand assault was, therefore, to differ from all previous phases of the battle in one respect—it was to include an advance not only up the spurs on the right and left, but also up the Central Spur, across which the Composite Brigade had so far merely acted as a connecting link. When he ordered it, Hamilton was aware that the Australian brigade had, according to his orders given that morning, just reached the Krithia Nullah, and was now lying in close reserve. To it the duty of advancing up the Central Spur was therefore allotted.


The formation of these momentous decisions at that late hour was, of course, unknown to the fighting troops. For example, the supporting companies of the Canterbury Battalion were in the act of digging themselves shelters for the night behind the British trench when the first warning arrived that they were to attack again in half-an-hour.

The Australian brigade was even less prepared. During May 6th and 7th, while it was camped in the pleasant valley, Colonel M'Cay and Major Cass—the brigadier and his brigade-major—and several of the battalion commanders had passed much of the time in watching the battle. From a knoll half-a-mile ahead of the bivouac they had seen the costly advances of the British upon Fir Wood, and the advance and retreat of the French over Kemal Bey Tepe. They had thus learned much concerning the general conditions, but little of the plans and dispositions or of their results. At midday on the 7th a warning had been received that the brigade might be required to support the French left. Nothing came of this, but during the afternoon the New Zealand brigade had been observed moving from its bivouac, to be stationed, it was

understood, in reserve to the 29th Division. When the battle opened on May 8th no Australian knew that the New Zealanders were engaged; but at 11.15 a message was received from General Paris, commanding the Composite Division, that the 2nd Brigade was to move to the left to a rear area in the Krithia Nullah and act in support of the 29th Division or the 29th Indian Brigade, if necessary. M'Cay at once sent Major Bennett, second-in-command of the 6th, and Captain Hogan,¹⁵ the brigade machine-gun officer, to reconnoitre the new position and the route to it. As these officers on their return reported that the movement would be within full sight of slopes occupied by the enemy, M'Cay moved his brigade in artillery formation, the 6th Battalion leading.



This was, since the departure from Egypt, the first occasion on which an Australian brigade had been manœuvred in the open, but it was remarked that the companies answered every order with almost automatic precision. Since the new position allotted to the brigade was reported by Bennett to be in view of the enemy, M'Cay moved his troops half-a-mile farther forward along the creek, where the land was depressed and screened from view. Here, where the reserve line, manned by the Indian infantry brigade, ran into the creek, the 6th camped in old trenches or "slits" on the eastern bank. Brigade headquarters was 300 yards in rear of the 6th, with the 7th and 5th at similar intervals behind headquarters, and the 8th in rear of a slight rise on the side of the creek opposite to the 5th. Near the 8th was the detachment of the 2nd Field Ambulance.



¹⁵ Maj F V Hogan; 6th Bn. Importer, of Henty, N S W, b Parkville, Vic, 17 Sept., 1888.

It was about 3.45 when the brigade reached this position. M'Cay, taking with him Colonel Gartside, who temporarily commanded the 7th,¹⁶ crossed the nullah and walked forward to visit the New Zealand brigadier on the opposite slope of the valley. Meanwhile the men were set to dig themselves shelters for the night and to cook the evening meal. The newly-arrived reinforcements were being distributed to their companies. The conditions were quiet, except when a Turkish battery, as was expected, burst several salvoes over the 6th, one shell-case killing a sergeant. The 6th observed that the men of the 88th Brigade, in the reserve line opposite them, were lining the trenches as if holding them against the enemy. This seemed to indicate that they could be at no great distance from the fighting area. Tea, however, was nearly ready when, at 4.55, a message brought by orderly to brigade headquarters was handed to Major Cass. It read:

You will be required to attack at 5.30 p.m. precisely between the valley you are now in and the valley just S.E. of (the) Krithia-Sedd-el-Bahr road. Move forward at once until you are in line with N.Z. brigade on your left and your right on the valley S.E. of Krithia road. This will be in advance of the Composite Brigade trenches. The Composite Brigade under Colonel Casson¹⁷ will support you. Your objective is the ridge beyond Krithia, with your right somewhat thrown back to join hands with the French or 2nd Naval Brigade who are at present on the French left. From G.O.C. Composite Division, Hill 138, 4.20 p.m.

This message, received at such short notice that it was doubtful whether it was humanly possible to comply with it, flung an infantry brigade of the A.I.F. for the first and only time in the earlier years of the war into an ordered attack across open country. It then fell to men and officers to perform on the battlefield, without time for any thought, the movements for an open attack which they had constantly practised at Mena. Cass sent messengers at once to warn the battalions to be ready to move upon one minute's notice, and then started, message in hand, to find M'Cay, who was still away with Gartside. Meeting them on their way back, about 300 yards from headquarters, he handed the order to the brigadier, who read it hurriedly as he returned. At 5.5 p.m.,

¹⁶ Col. Elliott having been wounded at Anzac.

¹⁷ Brig - Gen. H. G. Casson, C.B., C.M.G. Officer of British Regular Army; b. 11 Jan., 1866.


in their dusty trench, crowded with half-a-dozen officers and signallers of the brigade staff, M'Cay and Cass sat down to write the order for the brigade. As they did so, a call came on the telephone. It was from General Paris, who explained to M'Cay that the Commander-in-Chief wanted the line to go forward with as much display as possible, in order to give encouragement to the French. "Have you any bands with you?" he inquired. M'Cay said there were none. "Well, have you any colours? You have bayonets, at any rate," said Paris, adding that Sir Ian Hamilton wished as much use as possible to be made of this weapon. M'Cay remarked that he did not know whether it would be possible to carry out the order in time. "It has got to be done," answered Paris.

It thus became necessary for the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, most of which at 5.5 was settling down for the night at a distance of from half to three-quarters of a mile behind the front, to be in line with the New Zealanders and advancing in attack at 5.30. Cass's warning reached the 6th and 7th Battalions at 5. In the 6th, Major Bennett, hurrying round the companies, which were at their tea, told the men to put on their packs and other kit, get their tools, and then continue their meal. In the 7th, Gartside had given his companies two minutes in which to fall in.

Between 5.10 and 5.20 M'Cay's operation order reached the battalion commanders. This, hurriedly written, informed them that the brigade was to attack between the valley it was now in and that running east of the Krithia road; that the 6th and 7th would form the front line and supports, the 6th being on the left and the 7th on the right, while the 8th and 5th would form a general reserve "moving forward direct to their front."

The distance between the Krithia and Kanli Nullahs was, by the map, 1,000 yards, although actually little more than 500. The commanders of the two leading battalions understood that each would have to occupy 500 yards—that is to say, half the spur. Each moved with two companies in line and two in support. Colonel McNicoll of the 6th, who was at tea with Major Bennett when the final order arrived, sent the latter to move off the companies. Bennett informed the company

commanders of the order in which they were to move and the front they were to occupy, and then, leaving them to explain to their juniors what they could, hurried at the head of the battalion up the creek towards the enemy. Almost at once he turned the leading company at right angles up the steep bank on to the curving moorland, instructing it to continue in that direction until half-way across the Central Spur, and then to turn to its left and advance.¹⁸ The other companies following in accordance with his orders, the 6th Battalion was very quickly deployed across half the spur in six widely extended lines—three composed of the leading and three of the supporting companies. As these got into position, they at once went forward, Bennett leading the supporting companies, with which also went Colonel McNicoll.



Meanwhile the 7th was hurrying to reach its position on the right of the 6th. As soon as its first company had been formed up, Colonel Gartside had ordered Captain Weddell¹⁹ to lead off the two front companies of the 7th and advance on the right of the 6th, occupying a front of 500 yards. "You are about to attack the enemy," he said. This was the first intimation the company officers had received concerning any operation projected that day. In what direction it was to be made neither they nor Gartside yet knew.

At this moment, about half-way between the assembling 6th and 7th, the small staff of brigade headquarters was also in motion. "We'll have to hurry up to get there in time," said M'Cay. Turning, he saw the front companies of the 7th in the act of passing their picks and shovels to the rear companies, which were to carry them. "They'll be late," he commented to Cass. "Go along and hurry them up."

¹⁸ Bennett ordered each platoon of the right-hand company to go straight across the spur until its last man was 250 yards in, and then to turn to the left. The platoons of the left-hand company were similarly told to occupy the 250 yards nearest the creek, both then turning left, went forward in line. Each company had been reorganised in three platoons of about 50 men each.

¹⁹ Maj. R. H. Weddell; 7th Bn. University student; b. 26 Dec., 1882.



THE 8TH BATTALION ON THE AFTERNOON OF 8TH MAY, 1915, DIGGING IN AT ITS NEW BIVOUAC
IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE RECEIPT OF THE ORDER TO ATTACK

Lent by Colaris Studios, Melbourne



"Krithia Spur."

Position of
Krithia
Nullah
(hidden).

"Central Spur."


Fir Wood.

Position of
Krithia
Nullah
(hidden)

AFTER THE FIGHT—THE LEFT FLANK OF THE AUSTRALIAN FRONT LINE (LATER KNOWN AS THE FRONT TRENCH OF THE REDOUT LINE) AT CAPE HELLES ON 9TH MAY, 1915

The view is towards the New Zealanders and the Fir Wood

Cass accordingly hastened to Colonel Gartside, who told him that he did not know in what direction they were to move. "Go half-right for 700 yards," was the answer, "until you come to a road, and then turn to your front." He was returning to headquarters when M'Cay called again, "They don't know where to go. Lead them yourself." Thus it happened that the brigade-major placed himself at the head of the right battalion, while the brigadier, hurrying on with his staff, came upon the 6th just moving into position, and led forward the left.




The slight depression in which the 2nd Australian Brigade had been camped was to a large extent screened from the enemy by a few scattered olive-trees upon its forward edge. It was to this point that the British had advanced before May 6th, and the trenches of what was now the reserve line therefore lay there. As the battalions assembled, the covering bombardment opened, and, while the 7th was diagonally crossing this hollow and the 6th filing into position on the left front, the air behind them suddenly became filled with the detonations of the British heavy guns. So long, however, as the troops were hidden from the enemy, the Turkish guns were silent.

But as the 7th passed the edge of the depression and stepped over the Reserve Trench, knocking down the dry earth upon the men of the 14th Sikhs who filled it, the whole line came out upon the unbroken moorland in full view of the distant Achi Baba. At this point the 7th broke into "artillery formation,"²⁰ every platoon dividing into four small separate columns, each of eight or ten men. A minute later, continuing its diagonal movement, the battalion found to its right front the straight white line of the Krithia road, newly remade by the Turks. On the other side of the road the spur dipped to the Kanli Dere, beyond which rose the bare

²⁰ In this case "lines of sections."

hillside up which the French were to move. Here Cass swung the 7th half-left, so as to advance directly up the heath, keeping the road upon his right. To his left front, about 250 yards ahead, was the 6th Battalion, advancing in extended lines. About that moment the British bombardment slackened. It was 5.30 p.m. The two battalions were occupying exactly the frontage intended, and were only a few hundred yards short of the position in which, at that hour, they were ordered to be.²¹



Turkish bullets, coming from a long distance, were now whistling thickly overhead and through the lines. Between the dry grass-blades and low tufts of dingy herbage the dust began to rise in spurts like the sea at the commencement of a thunder-shower. Brigade headquarters and the 6th had already been moving for two minutes across the level when the Turkish guns opened. The first salvo from the enemy, long expected, whistled high past the 6th and burst over the scouts of the 7th, just emerging from the trees.

The fire came apparently from one four-gun Turkish field-battery, which, evidently served as quickly as the gunners could load, kept its shells bursting well back just in front of the trees. Salvo after salvo fell over small columns of the 7th, whipping up the dust into pink clouds and completely hiding those in rear. Nevertheless, as the haze cleared, the groups were seen issuing from it still in formation, trudging steadily forward. One signaller beside Weddell received a shrapnel burst full in the face; but for the most part the companies escaped almost without loss.

The 6th and 7th were now advancing at a rapid walking pace against a growing storm of rifle-fire. Here and there a man, half unconsciously, carried his shovel, blade upwards,

²¹ It was about this moment that Capt. Gutteridge, medical officer of the 7th, who on arrival at the bivouac had walked across the Krithia Nullah to obtain some preliminary information from the New Zealanders, happened to look across the creek, and there saw the whole of his own brigade advancing against the enemy.

to his left or right front as if to ward off the hail which was whistling past, coming mainly, it seemed at this time, from the left. The British artillery, which for a space had slackened, was now answering the Turkish guns, and through the uproar could be distinguished the almost continuous rustle of shells high overhead. Covered by this fire, loaded with full marching kit, heads down as if into a tempest, hurried the Australian brigade. As the Turkish rifle-fire grew, the whole of the artillery columns of the 7th extended simultaneously into line.²² Almost immediately afterwards the leading wave found to its surprise, running through the scrub ahead of it, the red parapet of a continuous trench. This was seen to be occupied by British soldiers, and the heavily loaded Australians, as they reached it, either jumped in or flung themselves on the surface behind its parapet. It was officially known as the "Composite Brigade's Trench," and had been dug across the Central Spur by the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and the Drake Battalion to connect the British and French advances of May 6th; but from that moment it has been known among Australians as the "Tommies' Trench."

The existence of some such front line ahead of them had been known to M'Cay and Gartside, who had walked thither.²³ But to most it came as a complete surprise, and, as they lay down, panting after the hurry of the advance, they wondered whether they were to reinforce this line or to go farther.

Beside two solitary olive-trees near the left of the trench the brigadier temporarily established his headquarters. Of the three signallers who had followed him, unwinding the telephone wire from a reel, one had been wounded, but they had brought the telephone to the trench. About three minutes later, other lines of the 6th and 7th having come up meanwhile and flung themselves down, the brigadier scrambled on to the parapet, periscope in hand. "Now then, Australians!" he said. "Which of you men are Australians? Come on, Australians!"

The fire from the front had by this time become very heavy. The bullets were knocking showers of earth from the

²² To a large extent this movement, magnificent to watch, appears to have been prompted by the intelligence of the men themselves

²³ After leaving Col Johnston, M'Cay through his field-glasses had from this point scanned the country ahead. The "Tommies' Trench" was later known at Helles as the "Australian Trench"

parapet into the faces of the men below, and spurts of dust rose thickly from every part of the plain. But as the cry ran up the trench—"On Australians! Come on, Australians!"—men scrambled from every part over its dry parapet. At the top many stood for an instant, one foot on each wall, gripping their rifles and glaring at the dry heath and distant hills, endeavouring to descry some sign of the enemy who was thus lashing them. Then they flung themselves forward into the storm.

The eyes of the whole battlefield were fastened upon this advance, and much has been written of it. On the neighbouring spur many of the New Zealanders, now launching their own assault, turned for an instant to gaze upon the lines reaching and leaving the Tommies' Trench. Far back, at the headquarters above the beaches, clusters of officers and men watched the irregular lines of small figures alternately moving forward and flinging themselves down, the gaps in them becoming obvious. The advance was from first to last a rush, and its speed and the men's heavy loads had made necessary the pause at the Tommies' Trench. Yet M'Cay was anxious to get the lines forward from the trench, and, walking continually along its parapet, under heavy fire, seeking the officers as they arrived there, he made his driving force felt throughout. One after another, Major Bennett, Colonel McNicoll, Colonel Wanliss, and many others were met by him there and urged forward. Such speed was undoubtedly one means of accomplishing the difficult approach which had so far baffled the force. But one consequence of it was that the lines which left the Tommies' Trench were no longer duly organised in their proper platoons and sections, but for the most part contained men from several of the lines which were resting there. Companies and platoons were thenceforth mixed, and, although they hurried forward by long rushes, the alternate platoons or sections did not until the final stages give covering fire at each stage while their neighbours advanced. Whether they would have escaped more lightly had this form of attack, so often practised, been employed, cannot now be known. The haste of the movement, the tremendous fire from in front and both flanks, and the fact that they themselves could see no enemy to fire at, and had no notion whether he was near or

far away, banished every idea except that of getting swiftly forward.

Since bullets were raining more thickly, the advance from the Tommies' Trench became swifter than before. Men were continually dropping, and after a hundred yards the leading line flung itself down to take breath. The 6th was now led by its company officers, Major Wells and Lieutenant Keiran.²⁴ The 7th, however, was still headed by the brigade-major, Cass, who, seeing the 6th advance, led its sister battalion with the same cry of "Come on, Australians!" The organisation of the 7th was better preserved than that of the 6th, and when Cass had gone fifty yards Captain Rupert Henderson followed him with its second line. Cass made it his business to keep the 7th in line with the 6th. When the 6th went down, down went the 7th; when the 6th rose—"Come on, Seventh!" he cried, "the Sixth are on the move!" After two long stages at a rapid walk, the fire came more fiercely and from closer range, and the sections began to double shorter distances in small groups. Many of the officers were hit. In the 7th, advancing precisely as they had been trained to do, Lieutenants Wale²⁵ and Carmichael²⁶ were killed, and Lieutenant J. A. K. Johnston²⁷ mortally wounded, in the first or second rush. Lieutenant Scanlan was hit through the chest and Lieutenant Fraser²⁸ through the head within 200 yards of the Tommies' Trench. Captain Hunter—a famous Victorian athlete—was wounded and then hit again and killed. In the 6th, both the leading company commanders—Wells (the same who had charge of part of the line on the 400 Plateau on April 25th) and Keiran, a born leader of men—were mortally wounded. Fragments of their companies were still being led by Lieutenant Biggsley,²⁹ an officer newly-

²⁴ Lieut. R. C. Keiran; 6th Bn. Grain salesman; of Fitzroy, Vic.; b. Fitzroy, 23 Nov., 1888. Died of wounds, 9 May, 1915. (Keiran had been medically rejected when recruiting first opened, but had afterwards been accepted as a sergeant in the 7th Bn., and later transferred to the 6th.)

²⁵ Lieut. P. G. Wale, 7th Bn. Bank clerk, of Euroa, Vic.; b. Benalla, Vic., 26 Oct., 1894. Died of wounds, 8 May, 1915.

²⁶ Lieut. T. McL. Carmichael; 7th Bn. School teacher; of Yarrawonga, Vic.; b. Bundalong, Vic., 4 June, 1892. Died of wounds, 8 May, 1915.

²⁷ Lieut. J. A. K. Johnston; 7th Bn. Engineer; of Williamstown, Vic.; b. Warrnambool, Vic., 8 Aug., 1883. Died of wounds, 19 May, 1915.

²⁸ Capt A. Fraser, M.C.; 38th Bn. Member of Aust. Permanent Forces; of South Yarra, Vic.; b. Barony, Glasgow, Scotland, 19 Oct., 1880.

²⁹ Lieut. H. A. Biggsley; 6th Bn. Law clerk; of Albert Park, Vic.; b. Sale, Vic., 13 Dec., 1885. Killed in action, 18 July, 1915.

arrived from Australia, and Lieutenant Binns,³⁰ who, with some of the N.C.O's, were now taking on their men by small parties in short alternate rushes with covering fire.

Now at last the Turkish trench became visible about 600 yards ahead of the 6th. Few noticed it during their advance, but when they lay firing the dust from its parapet could be seen, lashed from time to time by the bursts of British shrapnel. Yet it was not from this trench that the enemy fire was mainly coming, but partly from Turkish skirmishers lying 200 yards in front of it,³¹ whose line was untouched by the shelling, and partly from rifles and machine-guns on the flanks. On the right also, in front of the 7th, a short section of yellow parapet could be seen, partly hidden in a low belt of bushes adjoining the Krithia road 350 yards ahead. Upon this parapet Cass directed the small party of the 7th to fire as they flung themselves down at the end of each rush. Constantly exposing himself, as did the other officers, he had walked across the road and was standing correcting the men's aim when he was struck down by a bullet which pierced his breast. Lying beside the road he sent word by a wounded man to Captain Henderson, instructing him to take over the advancing line. After two further rushes Henderson, rising to his knees to look through his glasses, was himself shot through the head. Lieutenant Heron,³² who had been slightly wounded beside him, and Captain Weddell, then the only officers remaining on the right front, continued to help forward each others' troops by covering fire. The line was now very thin. Men were dropping at every rush, and only scattered twos and threes from the rear were reinforcing them. But the notion of those at the front was that they would continue so to advance until they either came to holts with the Turks or reached the distant Achi Baba. They had by this

³⁰ Capt. P. Binns, M.C.; 6th Bn. Warehouseman; of Guildford, Vic.; b. Williamstown, Vic., 22 Aug., 1890. Died at sea, 8 July, 1917.

³¹ A series of shallow rifle-pits, situated along an old furrow at the edge of a patch of long disused cultivation, was observed by the Australian Historical Mission in 1919. In each of them there appeared to be lying the clips of about 100 cartridges. This screen of Turks extended along the whole front. Lieut. Heron, on the right flank, directed the fire of his men on a bush 250 yards ahead, whereupon half-a-dozen of the enemy bolted from the place. It was while watching this bush through his glasses that Heron was hit.

³² Capt. W. L. Heron; 59th Bn. University student; of East St. Kilda, Vic.; b. Middle Brighton, Vic., 20 July, 1894.

time disappeared from the view of those in the Tommies' Trench, and their further progress clearly depended upon their being reinforced by the supports, to whom the narrative must now turn.

The supporting lines of the 6th and 7th arrived at the Tommies' Trench in the teeth of the furious fusillade evoked by those which preceded them. Both in front and rear of the trench men were dropping very fast, the field being sprinkled with their bodies. The brigadier was anxiously watching the arrival of the supporting lines. "Come on," he shouted, walking towards them and waving his periscope. "Run!" The succeeding lines of the 6th and 7th, and the head of the 8th and 5th, came on with great rapidity. In each case, after a few minutes' breathing space, they were led forward with a shout of "Come on, Australians!" Where there was no officer, an N.C.O. or a private took them on. "Come on, chaps!" said one, "we've got to get it some time—we can't stay here always," and scrambled out, followed by those around him.

Major Bennett, with the supporting companies of the 6th, having been told by the brigadier not to stop at the trench, led straight on, first at a steady walk, afterwards by long rushes. Great numbers of the supports were hit. Colonel McNicoll, after being knocked down by a bullet as he rose from the Tommies' Trench, was seriously wounded 250 yards farther on. Captain Borwick was hit, and hit again as he lay on the ground. After 400 yards Colonel Gartside³³ of the 7th was mortally wounded. Lieutenants Pozzi³⁴ and Dangerfield,³⁵ of Borwick's company, were killed and Captain Lowe³⁶ wounded, but Major Bennett was still untouched. He now began to come upon men in twos and threes, lying down, and obviously belonging to the lines which had preceded him. Advancing now by very short stages, he took them ahead with him until, about 500 yards from the Tommies' Trench, he found machine-gun fire sweeping not

³³ Gartside is said to have been rising to lead a further rush, saying, "Come on, boys, I know it's deadly, but we must get on," when he was struck in the abdomen by machine-gun bullets.

³⁴ Lieut. L. L. Pozzi; 6th Bn. Mechanical engineer; of Fitzroy, Vic.; b. Fitzroy, Jan., 1893. Killed in action, 8 May, 1915.


³⁵ Lieut. J. G. Dangerfield; 6th Bn. Clerk; of North Melbourne; b. Moonee Ponds, Vic., 12 Jan., 1888. Killed in action, 8 May, 1915.

³⁶ Maj. C. R. Lowe, V.D.; 6th Bn.; b. 8 Nov., 1871.

only from ahead but from both flanks. In front the bare ground dipped imperceptibly and then rose to Krithia on the left, in front to Achi Baba. There was no sign of anyone ahead, and Bennett had now with him only some twenty men. He presently perceived others to his right. C.Q.M.S. Johnstone³⁷ at great risk crawled across to him, and he himself reached Lieutenant Biggsley, who told him that no Australians were beyond them.

From this stage the control of the brigade's front rested chiefly with Major Bennett, junior though he was. On either side of him there appeared to be detached parties of the 6th and 7th lying down and firing from the line they had reached, which was manifestly the high-water mark of the advance. He passed word to the flanks to report if they were in touch with other troops. From the left came: "Not in touch with anyone." As it was now clear that, if this line were to advance, its extermination could only be a matter of minutes, Bennett gave the order to dig in at the position then reached. Small parties which presently came up under Sergeant Carne³⁸ and others ran to fill gaps reported in the centre; and Bennett shortly afterwards discovered Lieutenant Binns with a few of the 6th lying 200 yards to his left, thus extending that flank to the Krithia Nullah.³⁹

Meanwhile the right flank, after Cass had been wounded and most other officers had fallen, was carried forward largely by its N.C.O's, Sergeants Poole and Young,⁴⁰ for example,




³⁷ Capt. F. D. Johnstone; 58th Bn. Boot machinist; of North Fitzroy, Vic.; b. Maryborough, Vic., 16 Oct., 1884.

³⁸ Capt. A. G. Carne, M.C.; 6th Bn. University student; of Adelaide and Melbourne; b. Samoa, 27 Aug., 1888.

³⁹ Patrols were sent out after dark—among others one under Capt W. S. Ham (8th Bn.) on the left and another under Sgt. Eades (7th Bn.) on the right—but no party of Australians was found in front of the line. Though some dead of the 6th were afterwards stated to have been lying close in front of one section, there remains no doubt that Bennett's inference was correct.

⁴⁰ Both were killed shortly afterwards. The name of Sgt. Young, though he had actually been promoted on this day, had not passed through orders, and the rank was therefore not officially given to him.




ADVANCE OF THE 2ND AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE AT HELLES ON
8TH MAY, 1915

The approximate position of units at 5.30 p.m. is shown in full red; that at 6.30 is shown by *hachuring*. (British troops and trenches, red; Turkish, blue Height contours, 2 metres)

directing the fire with perfect control. The shells of the British artillery were bursting well on the enemy's parapet not far ahead, but the Turkish fire seemed to be coming from nearer, and also from the scrub in the head of the Kanli Dere past which the right was now brushing, and from the slope of Kemal Bey Tepe beyond. Major Cass, as he lay on the far (or east) side of the road, which here had been newly banked a few inches above the heath, observed a bullet strike the bank and a shrub on the same side fall over, indicating that there must be Turks on that flank and that the 7th was in danger of advancing past them. He craned his neck to see if the French were coming up the valley, but nothing moved in it or on the slope of Kemal Bey Tepe. The right was completely unprotected. Cass, who was now hit a second time through shoulder and chest, called to some passing men to fetch to him two officers of the 5th, pointed out to them the danger, and ordered them to move to the right of the 7th and protect it.

This the 5th did. As its leading lines crossed the road, bending back so as to face the valley and firing into the scrub there, a few figures jumped up and bolted through the bushes. These and half-a-dozen who similarly bolted from farther left were the only Turks seen on the Australian front that day;⁴¹ for at this stage Weddell, seeing that the 6th had stopped and that the British shells were now bursting close in front, ordered the 7th to stop also. Captain Grills, who with some of the supports had pushed out to the right of the road, was swung back to guard the flank, where the leading lines of the 5th under Lieutenant Lillie also dug in. By Weddell's order, every alternate man fired while his neighbour dug.

Thus at about 6.30, with both flanks far "in the air," the front line of the 2nd Brigade became stationary. The main Turkish trenches were, at some points, at last in view, but



⁴¹ See note 31, on p 30

still 400 yards distant; and the foremost Australian troops were digging in—that is, scraping with fingers and entrenching tools as they lay, often with their full packs placed before them as a parapet. The dusk was approaching, and if M'Cay was to carry out the order given to him, to pierce the enemy's line, it could only at this stage be done by reorganisation and the use of his last supporting troops. But, though supports continued to reach the front, it was with excessive loss. The officers, necessarily exposing themselves in directing their men, were almost all hit, as were very many N.C.O's.⁴² All this M'Cay at the Tommies' Trench could not know, since, except for an occasional glimpse of the latest supports advancing in long rushes and then throwing themselves down, no sign of fighting could be seen from that position. But the fire from ahead never ceased, and everywhere on the moorland the tumbled khaki of the fallen,⁴³ and an occasional figure attempting to limp or crawl back to the Tommies' Trench, showed that the casualties must be heavy. Some wounded man had brought back the rumour that both Colonels McNicoll and Gartside had been hit; but no other news came, and after the 6th, 7th, and 5th, and a portion of the 8th, had passed, there appeared to be a long pause in the advance of the main body of the 8th with which M'Cay had promised to support McNicoll. He rightly judged that the lines in front could only reach their distant objective if constantly reinforced, and he now feared that, if unsupported, the front line might fall back, an event which would be fatal to any chance of success. He therefore sent his orderly officer, Lieutenant Hastie,⁴⁴ to Colonel Bolton of the 8th. "Tell him to come on without stopping at trenches," he said. "The fight will be lost if he doesn't come up." Then, chafing at his own inability to influence the issue from the Tommies' Trench, he assembled his headquarters staff—now reduced to Staff-Sergeant Monks⁴⁵ and two signallers, who with a volunteer from the

⁴² Of the few officers of the 7th who arrived near the front the adjutant, Capt C. Finlayson, was severely wounded as he reached it; Lieut. C. H. Swift in the last rush, Lieuts. Heron, S. M. De Ravin, and J. M. West shortly after they had begun to dig in. Heron had been hit by shrapnel at the Landing and had just returned from hospital.

⁴³ See Vol. XII, plate 68.

⁴⁴ Maj. T. Hastie, M.C.; 5th Bn. Grocery manager, of Clifton Hill, Vic.; b. Euroa, Vic., 1 Apr., 1894.

⁴⁵ Staff-Sgt. W. G. Monks (No. 1, 2nd Inf. Bde. H.Q.) Member of Aust. Permanent Forces; of Melbourne. b. Launceston, Tas., 28 Nov., 1887. Killed in action, 8 May, 1915.

8th unrolled the telephone wire behind him—and strode towards the front. This small group had advanced alone for 400 yards in the face of heavy fire when Monks was shot through the heart. A second signaller had been wounded. After pushing on a little farther M'Cay saw ahead of him the scanty front line of the 6th. Seventy yards in rear of it he placed his headquarters, his two remaining men scraping a small shelter behind which they set up the telephone. As they dug, one of them, the volunteer of the 8th, was mortally wounded.

M'Cay, though his new position gave him no more power to influence the situation, could now at least see it for himself. The stone houses of Krithia were still 2,000 yards away; all movement of his front line had ceased; and there was clearly not the least chance of the brigade achieving Hamilton's designs. The small portion of it which M'Cay had not already sent to the front would presently find its way forward under its own commanders without his being able to direct its movement, and, when it came to a stop, the thrust of the Australian brigade would have ended. M'Cay's telephone gave him communication with General Paris's headquarters near "W" Beach, and at 7.35, as soon as he knew the precise position, he informed the general.

Meanwhile the advance of the two supporting battalions—the 5th and 8th—was gradually strengthening the front line. Most of the 5th, which on its way to the 'Tommies' Trench had suffered considerably through shrapnel,⁴⁶ had been personally directed by M'Cay to reinforce the right, where, as already related, it strengthened the flank on the edge of the Kanli Dere.⁴⁷ In its swift advance it had lost almost as heavily as the two leading battalions.⁴⁸ Colonel Wanliss placed his own headquarters beside the Krithia road, 100 yards in

⁴⁶ The 5th was at that time advancing in artillery formation.

⁴⁷ The order of the battalion was broken up in the advance, partly in consequence of the fact that it was its *left* company which M'Cay directed Wanliss to take to the right, while about the same time, unaware of Wanliss's dispositions, he ordered the *right* company to advance to the left.

⁴⁸ Lieut. H. T. Elder, its signalling officer, who since the Landing had acted, practically single-handed, as the staff of the battalion, was killed while advancing, as were Lieuts. J. D. Newham, V. L. Saltau, and W. H. McLeod, all newly-promoted from sergeant's rank. Lieut. C. B. Hamilton was mortally hit as he went forward, and Capt. J. Walstab and several other officers had been wounded before the front was reached. (Elder belonged to Hawksburn, Vic.; Newham to Brighton, Vic.; Saltau to Prahran and Warrnambool, Vic.; McLeod to Windsor, Vic.; Hamilton to Murrumbidgee, Vic., and Walstab to Casterton, Vic.)

rear of the 7th, and, as the later lines of his battalion came up, set them to dig a support trench abreast of him.

The 8th, while assembling, had lost its adjutant, Captain A. H. Possingham, a fine officer of the permanent staff, who fell killed by a stray bullet; shortly after the advance began its second-in-command, Lieutenant-Colonel Field, was shot in the jaw. As the battalion crossed the nullah at a fork near the old brigade headquarters, part of its leading companies attached themselves to the left of the 5th, and, hurrying on, became merged in the front line. Another part appears to have been led by one of M'Cay's messengers, Captain Hogan, the brigade machine-gun officer, across the battlefield towards the threatened right flank. Hogan and Lieutenants Couve⁴⁹ and Catron⁵⁰ were hit, but some of the 8th eventually reached the right, where Captain Cowper,⁵¹ not far from Grills of the 7th and Lillie of the 5th, organised protection for that dangerously exposed flank. The rear companies were at the old bivouac of the 6th⁵² when they received the brigadier's order to hurry forward. Moving up under cover of darkness, they reinforced both front and support lines with slight loss.

Such was the advance of the 2nd Brigade at Krithia. In its actual attack, lasting little over an hour, it had moved 1,000 yards across open moorland under heavy fusillade, the second half of the advance—beyond the Tommies' Trench—being made in the teeth of rifle and machine-gun fire such as Australians seldom again encountered during the war. Although in that short space they had lost 1,000 men, the advancing lines had shown not the least sign of wavering. On neither flank was the rest of Hamilton's line as yet in touch with them.

On the Krithia Spur to the left of the 2nd Brigade the New Zealand infantry, already heavily tried in the morning, had been directed to make a second effort. Colonel Malone, of the Wellingtons, characteristically ignored the order, pointing out that Wellington was ahead of the rest of the line, and that

⁴⁹ Lieut. H. T. L. Couve, 8th Bn. Civil servant; b. Dandenong, Vic., 1889. Killed in action, 8 May, 1915.


⁵⁰ Capt. J. E. T. Catron, M.C.; 8th Bn. Commercial traveller; of Geelong, Vic.; b. Kilmore, Vic., 9 Feb., 1891.

⁵¹ Maj. G. A. C. Cowper; Aust. Flying Corps. Estate agent; b. 4 March, 1882.

⁵² The 8th had been previously ordered to move "into trenches vacated by the 6th Battalion and await further orders."

there could be no further advance until some movement was made on the Ravine Spur. The responsible British officer on that spur objected as strongly as Malone to the renewal of an attempt which had so often proved futile and costly. After some delay⁵³ a company of the South Wales Borderers endeavoured to advance, but was stopped with heavy loss by the machine-guns, estimated at five in number, which had defeated every previous effort.

The line from Wellington to the extreme left therefore made no progress. But the right half-company of Wellington, together with Auckland, now reinforced by Otago, attacked at 5.30.⁵⁴ In this second attempt, magnificently led, the line advanced in some places beyond the Daisy Field, but almost all the officers were hit, and the position reached was enfiladed from the main Turkish line. The troops again suffered very heavily, and eventually, through an unauthorised order, fell back to their starting-point. On the right, next to the Australians, the Canterbury Battalion advanced under heavy fire for some 300 yards between the Fir Wood and the Krithia Nullah. But at dusk the right flank company, advancing up the nullah-bed, was not yet in touch with the Australian flank.



The whole left flank was thus, like the Australians in the centre, held up at least 400 yards from any main line of the enemy. On the right the troops next to the Australians—the 2nd (British) Naval Brigade, temporarily acting as part of the French force—had been given no order to attack; but somewhat after 5.30 the newly-arrived 2nd Division of the French moved through it, and assaulted Kemal Bey Tepe. This movement was anxiously watched by many in the Australian firing line, who could see waves of blue-uniformed men sweep forward through others receding, until their figures appeared


⁵³ At 6 p.m. the 87th Brigade reported to the 29th Division that, the order having only been received at 5, its attack had not yet started.

⁵⁴ The Ruahine company of Wellington, ordered up at 5 p.m. by Malone, strayed to its right, and, contrary to his intention, went forward with this attack, suffering heavily.

on the horizon, lunging down from the parapet with their long bayonets into the trench from which the Turks had already begun to flee. The French Colonial Brigade had succeeded in taking Kemal Bey Tepe, and, never, although heavily counter-attacked, were the French driven from this height overlooking the Kereves Dere. But between the Australian right and the French on the hill east of the Kanli Dere there was at dusk a dangerous gap.⁵⁵ Signs of a considerable enemy force were constantly observed on that slope almost in continuation of the Australian flank, and the fire from that direction had been exceedingly heavy.⁵⁶

As daylight faded, Hamilton knew that the great effort of his army had failed. Before 7 o'clock an order was sent to all parts of the front to push on till dark and secure a good line for the night. This message marked the end of the battle. But before it was sent the power of influencing the course of the action had passed from the brigadiers to the officers and N.C.O's in the new front line which was already being established. All that M'Cay or other commanders could do was to ensure that the line occupied by their troops should be made safe.

At dusk M'Cay's chief anxiety was to secure his flanks against counter-attack. Personally traversing the front line, he found both left and right exposed. Major Tupman,* in charge of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers in the Tommies' Trench, at once promised to reinforce and to dig a support line on the left. That flank, however, became secure when at 9 p.m. the Canterbury Battalion of New Zealanders, finishing its advance up the nullah after dark almost without casualties, gained touch with M'Cay's left and continued the line to the Fir Wood. His right, though further strengthened



⁵⁵ If any portion of the 2nd French Division was intended to attack in the Kanli Dere, between Kemal Bey Tepe and the Australians, it went astray. At about 6 o'clock a company of French infantry, advancing rapidly in blue greatcoats with fully loaded packs, came up to the Tommies' Trench behind the 5th Battalion, entirely out of the French sector, and remained there.

⁵⁶ Sgt H. H. Young (afterwards Capt.), a famous Victorian rifleman, and other snipers were shooting at Turks on this hill next day at 700 yards.

* Col. J. A. Tupman, O.B.E.; Royal Marines. Bde-Major, 1st Naval Bde., R.N. Div., 1915/16. Of Taunton, Somerset, Eng.; b Portsmouth, Eng., 1 Nov., 1868. Died, 27 Oct., 1938.

by a machine-gun of the 5th⁵⁷ and by the reinforcements of the 7th who had arrived that day under Captain C. H. Permezel,⁵⁸ was until midnight completely open. But at that hour Sergeant Kuring⁵⁹ of the 8th, sent to reconnoitre the previously empty gully, found there a thin line of the Drake Battalion commencing to entrench. During the night the 2nd Naval Brigade, also advancing up the Gully, connected with the left of the French on Kemal Bey Tepe. Thus, by the final movements of Canterbury⁶⁰ and the naval battalions, carried out in the dark almost without loss, a strong line was completed across the Peninsula.

The advance having ended, the army was left to reckon the cost. As darkness fell, the battlefield for half-a-mile behind the foremost line was filled with the cries of the wounded; especially was this the case on the narrow grassland behind the 2nd Brigade. From every part went up the thin wavering call of the wounded for stretcher-bearers. A large proportion had been hit in stomach or intestines—the most painful form of wound, and one from which, under Gallipoli conditions, scarcely any man recovered. The position was made more difficult by the fact that the dressing-station of the 2nd Field Ambulance under Captain Chambers⁶¹ was necessarily a mile back from the firing line under a shallow bank. Even there the patients were hit again by stray bullets as they lay; but the task of the regimental stretcher-bearers—to clear all the wounded to the dressing-station during the darkness—was almost impossible. Many men had been hit before reaching the Tommies' Trench, and the calls of these, whenever they heard the voices or feet of passing men, naturally first attracted the bearers. Meanwhile for 500 yards in front of that trench the wounded were lying far more thickly. Some of those near it had been brought to

⁵⁷ Under Lieut. Capes, shortly afterwards dangerously wounded.

⁵⁸ Capt. C. H. Permezel; 7th Bn. Clerk; of Melbourne; b Hawthorn, Vic., 22 May, 1892. Died of wounds, 14 July, 1915.

⁵⁹ Maj H. A. Kuring; 59th Bn. Master baker; of Carisbrook, Vic; b Ullina, Vic, 15 March, 1895.

⁶⁰ Maj A. C. Temperley, brigade-major of the New Zealanders, going personally round the New Zealand firing line, as McCay had done in the case of the Australian, found it in touch from end to end. In passing through an opening in the fir-trees he and Col. Brown narrowly escaped capture by a line of men—who proved to be Turks—then digging at its farther end.

⁶¹ Lieut.-Col. R. W. Chambers, D.S.O. Commanded 11th Fld Amb., 1917/18. Medical practitioner, of Sandringham, Vic.; b. Melbourne, 1 Jan., 1890.

shelter by the British and other soldiers there⁶² But when the night was well advanced the bearers had scarcely yet reached the Tommies' Trench. About midnight, therefore, M'Cay sent back instructions that the area near the front was to be cleared first. Captain Black, medical officer of the 6th, was already working in his aid-post near the Tommies' Trench, and Captain Gutteridge of the 7th far up the Krithia Creek. At 4 a.m. Captain Mathison of the 5th, who himself had been searching the ground near the Tommies' Trench, took forward a large party of bearers. Through these measures most of the wounded were brought into shelter before dawn, when work in the open became impossible. Meanwhile the task of evacuating them from the dressing-station had been almost as difficult, since "W" Beach was two miles away and there was no provision for their carriage except the bearers of the 2nd Field Ambulance. Before long the wounded lying on the grassy space were so numerous that the lanterns of the doctor and orderlies barely reached the white faces on the outskirts. As men were being hit, Captain Chambers endeavoured to obtain some of the numerous Indian carts to carry the wounded, a method eventually adopted next day.

The losses of both Anzac brigades had been heavy. In the New Zealand infantry, which went in 2,676 strong, excluding 854 reinforcements, they were as follows:—

		Officers.		Other Ranks.		Missing.	Totals.
		Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.		
Auckland	..	5	9	21	150	61	246
Canterbury	..	3	2	49	131	21	206
Otago	..	1	6	15	53	27	102
Wellington	..	2	7	24	155	25	213
N.Z. Medical Corps		—	2	—	1	—	3
Brigade H.Q.	..	—	—	—	1	—	1
Totals	..	11	26	109	491	134	771

⁶² The patience of the wounded in and around this trench was astonishing. As they lay craving water above all things, some soldier, carrying a supply to the firing line, poured a little in a mess-tin, explaining that the rest was needed "for the boys up there." One after another the wounded and dying merely moistened their lips with it and then passed it so that there might be enough for all. Those at the front line were equally patient, though asking continually if the stretcher-bearers were near. "You won't see them to-night—they're rarer than gold," replied some thoughtless youngster. "You might let us think we will," was the faint retort. Many of the stretcher-bearers had been continuously carrying British and Australian wounded since shortly after noon on the day before.

In the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, which went in about 2,900 strong, the losses were—

	Officers.		Other Ranks.		Missing.	Totals.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.		
5th Bn.	3	7	26	97	61	194
6th Bn.	8	6	77	147	127	365
7th Bn.	3	13	40	133	88	277
8th Bn.	2	3	23	130	59	217
Brigade H.Q. ..	—	3	—	—	—	3
Totals	16	32	166	507	335	1,056

Some of the casualties in the brigade headquarters staff appear to have been included among the other totals. In both brigades the missing were either killed or wounded. No men were taken prisoners.

In the 6th only one of the original combatant officers, Major Bennett, was now left, and of those promoted from the ranks since the Landing four were killed in this advance. Even the reinforcements who had arrived that day had been used, and many were now casualties, some having fought with their companies, while others were sent to reinforce the line, or to carry food, water, and ammunition during the night. Of the surgeons, Captain Mathison—one of the most brilliant of the younger Australian scientists, who was temporarily attached to the 5th—was mortally wounded while, after a day and night's incessant work, he was resting outside his aid-post. All members of the brigade staff whom M'Cay had taken with him in the advance were hit, and at 2 a.m. his own leg was broken by a bullet. Colonel Bolton of the 8th took command.⁶³

No counter-attack was made by the enemy upon the British front. His own loss had been too heavy. Moreover the Turkish staff inferred that Hamilton's attack had been intended to break through on the Krithia side, and, since it had been brought to a standstill by the fire of the front-line troops⁶⁴ before it reached their positions, a counter-stroke was unnecessary. Strong representations were made to Liman von

⁶³ As only the brigade signalling officer, Capt. R. H. Goold (of Elsternwick, Vic.), at the old headquarters was now unwounded, Bolton temporarily obtained as his brigade-major Maj. W. Wilberforce, of the 1st Naval Brigade.

⁶⁴ Kiazim Pasha has stated that the defence of Krithia on May 6, 7, and 8 fell chiefly upon (10th Div.) 1 and 2/29th Regt., (15th Div.) 2/56th Regt., (7th Div.) 2/19th Regt., (9th Div.) 1 and 4/26th Regt., (5th Div.) 15th Regt.; and that the infantry actually in front of Krithia on May 8 comprised (9th Div.) 2/25th Regt., (7th Div.) 1/20th Regt., and (15th Div.) 2/56th Regt. The Turkish artillery then at Helles (on either side of Achı Baba) is given as seven field-batteries and a six-gun battery of 4.7-in. (12-cm.) howitzers. The *Short History* published by the Turkish staff, however, speaks of the Turkish left and right as being held by the 7th and 9th Divs. respectively.

Sanders by Turkish officers, in this and the following weeks, to withdraw the front from the Krithia lowlands to Achi Baba, but he refused, holding to his principle that all ground must be defended.

Throughout the night following the battle the enemy was obviously apprehensive that he would be attacked again under cover of darkness. Periodically he broke into violent outbursts of fire, during which his rifle-flashes winked in a continuous necklace across the Peninsula, showing to many of the troops for the first time the position of the Turkish line. Though this fire was tremendous in volume, it was almost harmless, scarcely interfering with the work of Hamilton's force. The Australian support line was digging in the open with picks and shovels, while carrying parties moved freely over the field throughout the night. In the Australian firing line there were officers who believed that during those hours their front could have advanced several hundred yards and dug in with scarcely a casualty. It was also recognised by many that the advance made at such cost during daylight could have been accomplished after dark almost without loss. In each of the Anzac brigades one ill result was a growing conviction that they had been needlessly sacrificed; in the case of the 2nd Brigade, the blame quickly, but quite wrongly, settled upon M'Cay. He had, it is true, driven his troops hard, and perhaps too swiftly for good order; in personally directing almost every company he had put needless pressure upon eager men. These things lost him the popularity which his great personal bravery might have gained. But the plan of attack was not his. He but vigorously carried out his part of the plans for the Second Battle of Krithia, which, limiting themselves almost to the routine of an Aldershot field-day, in three days expended an army in merely approaching the enemy.

The army with its full available strength having failed, the younger spirits in the navy were eager to make a further attempt. They urged that, by using destroyers with naval crews to sweep the mines, they might still force the Dardanelles. Admiral de Robeck, though not convinced, cabled on May 10th to London offering to attempt the passage, but indicating his opinion that, even if the fleet got through, the result would not be decisive. When the Admiralty, five days later, refused to



British area

Kanli Dere

French area

THE ROAD FROM "V" BEACH DOWN WHICH THE 2ND BRIGADE MARCHED
TO ITS BIVOUAC

The bivouac was to the left of the road opposite the Water Towers
The view is up the Kanli Dere to Achi Baba

Taken by Capt. J. H. Newmarch, 4th Div. Artillery

Kemal Bey Tepe

The Narrows (hidden)

Asiatic shore



French bivouacs

THE STRAITS FROM MORTO BAY, SHOWING THE FRENCH AREA

The French line lay upon the distant hill on the left.

Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. G971

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Position of Krithia (on horizon).

Achi Baba.

Position of
enemy
skirmishers

The
Vineyard



VIEW FROM THE AUSTRALIAN PARAPET ON MAY 9TH, SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ENEMY'S SKIRMISHERS AND OF THE VINEYARD (PART OF THE ENEMY'S MAIN TRENCH-LINE)

*Taken by Sgt J D Rogers, 6th Bn
Aust War Memorial Collection No G966b*



Major Bennett

MAJOR H. G. BENNETT IN HIS HEADQUARTERS IN THE FRONT LINE AT HELLES, 9TH MAY, 1915

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G967.

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sanction the attempt, only one course remained for Hamilton—to ask for more troops.

There the story of the principal effort, that of the force at Helles, must for the moment rest. The two Anzac brigades were relieved from the line on the night of May 11th,⁶⁵ and returned to their own force a week later. The position which the Australians had reached remained the front line until May 27th and 28th, when the Manchester Territorials advanced some 200 yards farther under cover of darkness, scarcely losing a man. The trenches dug by the Australians became the second, or "Redoubt," line,⁶⁶ and the old Indian Reserve Trench—from which the attack upon Krithia started—was the third, or "Eski," line. On the nights of May 27th and 28th the front at the Daisy Field and Fir Wood also was carried forward by the 29th Division and Territorials, with more difficulty but slight loss. On the night of May 12th the machine-gun redoubt on the Ravine Spur was rushed by the 6th Gurkha Rifles. Having thus at last approached the enemy's line under cover of darkness, the British in a daylight assault on June 4th captured many Turkish trenches, among others that which had faced the Australians, but which remained from that time onward the British front line. The patch of "scrub" around the yellow parapet by the roadside, upon which Cass was directing fire when he was hit, became known as the "Vineyard." Through it the fighting ranged backwards and forwards until the end of the campaign.

⁶⁵ A pessimistic report from the acting-bridagier had caused Gen Paris to ask Sir Ian Hamilton for the immediate relief of the Australian brigade—which was refused. As a matter of fact, despite their heavy losses, the men's spirits on the morning after the attack were high; the hiss of bullets placed no such strain on the nerves as did the artillery barrages afterwards experienced in France. The cry of the wounded throughout the night had been a more demoralising influence. But the men were proud of their achievement, and the outstanding effect on their spirits at the moment was an increase of confidence between Australian and New Zealand soldiers, and a marked desire on the part of each to have the others beside them in action.


⁶⁶ The first map of this line, carefully compiled immediately after the fight by Capt Grills, shows that the front trench of the Redoubt line was dug by the men in the Australian firing line, and the second trench by the Australian supports. The otherwise excellent map in *The Royal Naval Division* by Douglas Jerrold is to this extent inaccurate.

CHAPTER II

THE CHANGE TO TRENCH-WARFARE AT ANZAC

HAMILTON's instructions to Birdwood on May 1st were: "Until you receive further orders, no general advance is to be initiated by you. . . . But this is not to preclude any forward movements which may be usefully undertaken with a view to occupying such points as may facilitate your advance . . . hereafter and meanwhile compel the enemy to maintain a large force in your front. By this means you will relieve pressure on the troops in the southern portion of the Peninsula, which is your present rôle."

The two strongest Anzac brigades having been sent to Helles, it became necessary for Birdwood to hold the line as best he could with the assistance of the two half-brigades of the Royal Naval Division which had been left him in place of them. The N.Z. & A. Division, now reduced to one brigade—the 4th Australian—occupied the most difficult sector of the line. Birdwood therefore allotted to it all the naval troops, whose combined strength was only that of one full brigade. As the result, the N.Z. & A. remained two brigades strong, while the 1st Australian Division now also comprised only two. This garrison of 14,500 (10,400 actual rifles) with some 30 guns in position was much the weakest that ever, during these months, defended Anzac. In order to make the fullest use of it, the whole line was divided into four sections,¹ of which the Left and Left Central were held by the N.Z. & A. Division under General Godley, and the Right Central and Right by the 1st Australian Division under General Bridges. The brigadier² of the infantry of each section became also the section commander, the section-engineers and




¹ These sections were actually numbered from the south northwards 1, 2, 3 and 4, but to avoid confusion they are here termed Right, Right Central, Left Central, and Left.

² Or senior brigadier, when there were more than one

artillery being placed under his orders. As this system, with modifications, continued until the Evacuation, it is necessary to give a brief description of the sections.

The Left Section, which had been that of the New Zealanders, began at the extreme north with two isolated posts established by them on the coastal foot-hills,³ the nearer being known as "No. 1 Outpost" and the farther as "No. 2." Their garrisons, though out of touch by day, were during those hours protected by the warships, whose fire the enemy feared. The main line of the New Zealand section had been established along Walker's Ridge, the old goat-track which led steeply up it from the North Beach having been transformed into a winding road cut immediately in rear of the crest. High on this spur, behind the knoll and gap where Tulloch had first fought, the brigadier had retained his headquarters exactly where they had been first established by Braund⁴ in the struggle of the Landing. Not far beyond this, where Walker's Ridge ran into the main range at Russell's Top, the



New Zealanders had succeeded under the eyes of the enemy in digging their front line across the narrow summit to the steep wooded edge at Monash Valley. Here their sentries looked over the successive ridges inland, between one of which and the mountains of Asia could be seen the haze overlying the Dardanelles, though nowhere the water itself. Along the edge of Russell's Top they had bent back their trench for some distance, so as to hang over Monash Valley; there the Left Section ended. Opposite its centre Russell's Top narrowed to The Nek, held by the Turks, beyond which the crest rose to Baby 700 and, hidden behind it, the other summits of the range, all in the enemy's hands. The direct line of advance against those summits had thus been barred by the Turkish


³ See p 179

⁴ See (for Tulloch) *Vol I*, pp 287-91; (for Braund) *idem*, pp 333-5, 471, 509
The trench on the summit also was that partly dug by the 2nd Bn.

trench sixty yards in front of the New Zealanders, who, in order to approach it more closely, were proposing to sap forward and eventually to connect the sap-heads by a new front line. In addition there was occupied on May 9th on the seaward side of the Top an advanced knuckle (known as "Turks' Point"), which subsequently proved a position of great advantage

The line, which in the New Zealand section had run roughly eastward, now turned southward and leapt 250 yards across the western branch of Monash Valley to Pope's Hill. Here began the Left Central Section, in which Monash's 4th Australian Brigade had been struggling to establish an even more difficult foothold. The post on Pope's Hill lay, as it were, upon an island or peninsula in the fork between the two branches. A hundred and fifty yards farther south, on the Second ridge, separated from Pope's by the eastern branch of the valley, lay Quinn's, the apex of the Anzac position. This post, little over half-a-mile from the sea, was the farthest inland. Thence the troops held a line of trenches for a mile and a quarter south-westwards along the Second ridge to the sea, thus occupying what was roughly a triangle, with coast-line for base, one side running due east for half-a-mile, and the other south and south-west for a mile and a half. It was the difficult apex of this triangle (Pope's, Quinn's, Courtney's, and the gaps at the head of Monash Valley) which formed the Left Central Section.


At the beginning of May the exact compass bearing of Monash's sector from that of the New Zealanders had been uncertain, and on May 8th, when it was proposed to connect the two by sapping between Pope's and Russell's Top, the staff had to exhibit flags at the nearest points of the two positions in order to make sure of them. It was realised that only by means of such a sap down the lofty exposed side of Russell's Top could movement in daylight between the two positions be rendered possible. The avenue (known as "Bully



Beef Sap") which was eventually carried, partly by tunnelling, down the almost sheer hillside, was until the end of the campaign the only practicable direct approach by day from the front of the Left to that of the Left Central. Further, as an obvious precaution in case the garrisons were ever driven from the head of Monash Valley, an inner line of defence was dug 400 yards in rear down both its sides, from the Top to Courtney's. By tunnelling the troops gradually connected Quinn's, Courtney's, and Steele's, which had at first been detached from each other; but this connection existed only in the front line, the folds in the valley-side that sheltered the headquarters of the post and the bivouacs of the garrisons remaining without union.

At Courtney's on the Second ridge the Left Central Section and the sector of the N.Z. & A. Division ended; at the next post, Steele's, the Right Central Section and the holding of the 1st Australian Division began. The 1st Division's line was now practically continuous. Men of the 1st Brigade were sapping across one small gap on MacLaurin's Hill, where on May 7th there remained five yards to be completed. A further negligible interval at the "nick" of Wire Gully remained to the end of the campaign filled only with barbed wire.⁵ South of this, across the 400 Plateau, the trenches were now continuous.

In the last of the four sections, the Right, which began immediately south of the 400 Plateau and ran along Bolton's Ridge to a point above the sea, the troops, as on the extreme left, had been comparatively uninterrupted, and their trenches were consequently deep and secure. A few posts on the steep




⁵ See Vol I, pp. 350-1. On a day in May men sitting in their dugouts above Bridges' Road (the valley on the Anzac side of this gap) saw a solitary Turk with a number of waterbottles slung round him standing in this "nick" above them and looking down on the scene as if dazed. He had evidently been sent to bring water to the Turkish trenches, and, making his way up the wrong gully, had found himself in the Australian lines. He dived back and escaped down the enemy's side of the hill, a few shots ringing after him.

slope above the shore connected the trench-line with a wire entanglement upon the beach, which formed the extreme right flank.

The enemy had at this stage approached the Anzac line very closely at Russell's Top and in the two Central Sections, but especially in that of Monash's brigade—the Left Central. Here the Turks were on the Second ridge with the Australians, each holding their own side of the hill. At Quinn's the voices of men speaking could be heard in the opposing trenches, across a crest the width of a tennis court and almost as level.

In the Right Central Section also the enemy was on the Second ridge at German Officers', but only tentatively as yet on the 400 Plateau. He appeared to hold the edges of its spurs and gullies; but his main position was farther back on Gun (i.e., the Third) and Mortar Ridges. In the Left and Right Sections, both on the wild coastal spurs north of Walker's Ridge and among the ridges south of Lone Pine, he as yet appeared only in small numbers, since any concentrations by day were liable to be discovered and shelled by the warships.

From the first day the proximity of the opposing fronts in the two Central Sections forced the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps to engage in an unceasing struggle to extend its foothold. This had been established in the Battle of the Landing by a line of men who simply lay exposed on the crest by day and dug by night; but, when once most of a trench-line had been dug and communication cut through to it, almost all further extensions were made by sapping, that is to say, by working from inside the existing trenches. At such places as Quinn's, Courtney's, Pope's, and Steele's the foothold was at first so slight that, while the men in the firing line occupied a trench a few yards beyond the crest, the supports were maintained on the slope immediately behind it. There they remained night and day, repeatedly, on the receipt



of alarms, fixing bayonets and preparing to rush over the summit to meet the enemy as he advanced, or to drive him out of the front trench if he should have taken it. But early in May the sap-heads, which were pushed out from all parts of the front, began to be joined laterally to form a new and advanced front line, the old front-trench becoming now the support-trench. Thus not only were the early rifle-pits transformed into a deep and practically continuous line, but in most parts a new front-trench began to extend parallel to and a few yards in advance of it, with numerous short communication trenches like the rungs of a ladder connecting the two.

Such was the Anzac line early in May. Its garrison after the two brigades sailed for Helles was:

Left Area (N.Z. & A. Div.)—

Left Section (previously held by N.Z. Inf. Bde.)—
Naval Bde. (Brig.-Gen. Mercer).


Left Central Section—4th Aust. Inf. Bde. (Col Monash), reinforced by Marine Bde. (Brig.-Gen. Trotman). Gen. Trotman,⁶ being senior, commanded the section.

Right Area (1st Aust. Div.)—

Right Central Section—1st Aust. Inf. Bde. (Brig.-Gen. Walker).

Right Section—3rd Aust. Inf. Bde. (Col. Sinclair-MacLagan).

It will be seen that, after the departure of the two brigades for Helles, all the troops had to garrison the line. Even the beach parties, which by day unloaded stores under Lieutenant Littler, had now at night to occupy the innermost defences upon Plugge's Plateau, previously held by Mercer's Naval Brigade. Except for a few troops held for local support immediately behind such posts as Quinn's, there was no reserve. Birdwood and Godley were both especially anxious concerning the security of the Left Central



⁶ Gen. Sir Charles N. Trotman, K.C.B.; R.M.L.I.; of Salisbury, Wilts., Eng.:
b. Burcombe, Wilts., 28 Apr., 1864. Died 11 March 1929.

Section, which was recognised as the most difficult on the front. It is true that an advance of the enemy on Russell's Top (in the Left Section) would have been more dangerous; but it was less probable, since the foothold there was deep and the attacking Turks would be exposed to naval fire. In the Left Central Section, on the other hand, the 4th Brigade was holding the bare edge of the hillside at three unconnected posts—Pope's, Quinn's, and Courtney's—with the Turks on higher positions half-encircling them. The training of this brigade had been somewhat shorter than that of the others; its staff was more largely "civilian," and had been subjected to the heavy strain of conducting the adverse fighting on May 2nd and 3rd, when its battalions had suffered heavily in the unsuccessful attempt to seize Baby 700. "I shall be a little anxious," Birdwood informed Hamilton, when sending away his two strongest brigades, "while I have to rely on the 4th Australians and naval battalions." For a time mixed garrisons drawn from both these held the posts in the Left Central sector.

During this interval, however, when the Anzac garrison was at its lowest in numbers, the enemy did not fling his strength against it; for Liman von Sanders "after the first two weeks," as he himself writes, "of bloody fighting"¹ had given to Essad Pasha almost the identical order which Hamilton had sent to Birdwood, namely, to refrain for the present from any general attack.

The tasks of the opposing armies at Anzac thus became for the first time those of trench-warfare. They differed from those of later years in France in that the troops immediately behind the line (and in early stages the garrison of the firing line itself) had not only to guard the position but to undertake the intensified work of sapping, tunnelling, and digging in every direction to extend their tenure; while all except the front-line troops had also to cut roads along the hillsides behind their positions, and to carry ammunition, rations, and water to the trenches on the crests. Though such "fatigues" were heavier and more continuous than in later years, there were rarely any periods of even nominal rest; and the fact that the Turks needed at any time only to rush the invaders off a few yards of hillcrest, in order to hurl them from their

¹ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 95.



Dead Man's
Ridge

Bloody Angle
(Monash Valley
East Branch)

Left of
Quinn's

Monash Valley Fork of Monash Valley

THE HEAD OF MONASH VALLEY, SHOWING HOW THE ANZAC LINE LEAPT FROM RUSSELL'S TOP TO POPE'S AND THENCE TO QUINN'S

No firing line existed across the intervening valleys, which lay open to both sides
Inset Firing a Garland trench-mortar at Anzac

Taken by Capt H. Jacobs, 1st Bn Aust War Memorial Collection No C1917

Inset Taken by Chaplain the Rev E N Merrington, Aust War Memorial Collection No C2686



D Dead Man's Ridge (Turkish), P Pope's, Q Quinn's

POPE'S AND QUINN'S SEEN FROM RUSSELL'S TOP

The crests of Pope's and Dead Man's Ridge are, for clearness, outlined in ink

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1004



POPE'S AND RUSSELL'S TOP SEEN FROM QUINN'S

The view is the reverse of that shown above, Quinn's in foreground, Pope's in the middle distance, and Russell's Top on the horizon on the left

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1005

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foothold, caused the tension in the front line to be far greater than the A.I.F. experienced in any other theatre of war. The effort to burrow forward and increase the narrow foothold never ceased, night or day, until the Evacuation, and the strain of holding it against surprise resulted in the lines being crowded in a manner hardly ever practised after the troops had left Gallipoli. The front and support trenches were, as a rule, each fully manned by different companies of the battalions holding the various sectors; the reserve companies of the same battalions, which were employed as carrying or digging parties during the day, slept at night close behind the support lines in their greatcoats and with their arms. At all times of anxiety—which were frequent—any troops which happened to be in “rest” were liable to be moved up night after night to positions in rear of important posts. After dark in some sectors the men lay so thickly in the old trenches, or on the wide tracks behind the lines, that it was often difficult for a messenger to pick his way without treading on their sleeping bodies.

In its main incidents, however, the life was identical with that afterwards experienced in the trenches of France. That is to say, it was confined by the walls of the trench and the barrier of the enemy's line, both almost as impassable as the “Ocean” which bounded the ancient world. In these deep narrow alleys the front-line troops and supports lived as completely enclosed as in the lanes of a city, having their habitations along them in niches undercut in the wall, sometimes curtained by hanging blankets or waterproof sheets. Meanwhile the company and battalion headquarters, the medical aid-post, the quartermaster's store, and other offices became gradually as fixed and recognised as the public offices of a metropolis. The bivouacs on slopes behind the lines resembled the clustered booths at a great fair. In some respects most men came to regard the routine as one of city life.

The actual system of manning the line, which was garrisoned more heavily at night than by day, may be illustrated by two examples. In the sector held by one company of infantry opposite part of Johnston's Jolly the routine was—by day: only one platoon (perhaps thirty-five men) in the new front line; a second in the old firing line (by that time the

support line); the two others bivouacked in a communication trench further in rear and employed in fatigues in the neighbourhood. At night: two platoons in the new firing line; one in the old; and only one sleeping in the communication trench. Similarly in the Pimple salient, opposite Lone Pine, in a length of the front line containing five bays (of 8 yards each) there were by day thirty-five men, seven in each bay. If the enemy had attacked by day, these would have been helped by the men who happened to be performing the regular fatigues in the neighbourhood, all of whom must take their rifles and equipment to their working-places. At night, on the other hand, the front-line garrison was increased to eight in each bay, half of whom were allowed to sleep. In addition there were in the Pimple in later months two machine-guns always mounted in hidden positions, and four others ready to be mounted, with two men always standing by each to keep watch. The garrison of the Pimple was also at that time supported every night by two companies from the reserve which came up and slept close behind the line.

During the early months the Anzac troops, largely in consequence of Birdwood's advice in the days of the Landing to let the Turk waste his ammunition but to save theirs, allowed the enemy to do all the firing at night, while their own sentries silently watched over the parapet. Till the end of the war the Australian troops seldom threw a flare, leaving it to the enemy to illuminate No-Man's Land for them if he pleased, but preferring themselves to keep watch in the dark. But this contemptuous attitude was abruptly changed in Gallipoli so far as night-firing was concerned, by the discovery that the inaction permitted the enemy's patrols to move freely in No-Man's Land. A report even went that barbed-wire flung out in front of the Australian trenches opposite the Jolly, and not "anchored," was twice removed at night by the Turks.⁸ Sentries were thenceforward ordered to maintain an intermittent sniping fire throughout the dark hours.

As in France, it was only a proportion of the troops in each bay of the front line who kept watch—normally a sentry (or a sniper and his observer) by day, and two sentries by night. As early as May 5th some of the trenches were, in the opinion

⁸ There was no actual foundation for this.

of the Staff, becoming so deep as to be difficult to defend if attacked, and orders were issued that a fire-step or bench must be prepared, by standing on which men could shoot over the parapet, or at least through loop-holes, or climb out to make or meet a charge. It was enjoined that loop-holes must be made in the parapet so that as many riflemen as possible could fire through them without exposing their heads. By day, when these improvements had been made, the sentry in each bay stood observing through his periscope or through a loop-hole; but during dark men could safely look over the parapet. For an hour or more in the night, usually about dawn—the hour at which an attack was most probable—the whole garrison of the front line was ordered to “stand-to” on the fire-steps looking out towards the Turkish line. For months together it was only during these intervals that many of the troops ever gazed on No-Man’s Land, or the enemy’s trenches, or the longed-for country beyond. The whole area in advance of the front line became clothed with the mystery of the unexplored, to venture into most parts of which, even for an instant, was by day certain death, and by night perilous. On rare occasions a man exposed himself with impunity—for example a Turk, who one day had accidentally pitched his shovel from German Officers’ Trench, calmly got out, picked it up, and returned before any Australian shot at him. But such immunity was the rarest of chances. Once the enemy had established his line close to any part of the front, the daylight watch could only be kept through periscopes or, with great caution, through loop-holes.

An acute trench-warfare was carried on by means of snipers, trench-mortars, artillery, machine-guns, and, at certain posts, bombing and mining. These activities did not begin to reach their keenest until slightly after the time with which this chapter mainly deals; they will therefore be touched on later. But a branch of trench-warfare for which there was more scope at this time than afterwards was the patrolling of No-Man’s Land. In the earlier stages this had to be done incessantly, in order to locate the enemy’s positions and to discover what he was about. At the beginning of May the Anzac Turks, like those at Helles, occupied positions in the scrub only partly entrenched, and relied largely upon snipers

firing from nests in the bushes. But they were working to connect up their lines; and the Anzac force, seeing new parapets daily extending through the low growth, soon began to realise that it was in danger of being completely hemmed in on the land side by earthworks. This caused the divisional commanders to become anxious lest, at points where they desired to advance the line, even slight progress might become impossible without heavy fighting. A further cause of uneasiness was the fact that in certain places the Turkish parapet began to rise in hummocks, resembling the mounds on a gold-field, which immediately created a suspicion that the enemy was engaged in something beyond mere trench-digging. The section-commanders suspected that these heaps were either the earth from tunnels in course of excavation towards the Australian line, or were *épaulements* from behind which the enemy might suddenly open with artillery at point-blank range. In order to settle these doubts patrol enterprises were undertaken.


In the narrow bullet-swept No-Man's Land between the opposing trenches of the two Central Sections there was even at night little opportunity for such scouting. When the Australians were afterwards transferred to France, they found No-Man's Land peopled every night by patrols of both sides, endeavouring by sight and sound to ascertain the intention of their opponents. But at such positions as Quinn's or parts of Russell's Top these enterprises were out of the question, and both Australian and naval battalions lost men in attempting them. Between Courtney's and Steele's, however, where the ground in front of the trenches dipped, two or three men of the 14th did creep by night down the gully as far as a small stone hut. It had been suspected that this might be used by snipers or to cover earth excavated in mining, but it was found empty, except for the bodies of five dead Turks. The same gully was frequently visited by Sergeant Harry Freame, of the 1st Battalion, then in Steele's,⁹ who discovered that the trenches could be safely left at night through a hole broken by mistake in the tunnel then being driven between Steele's and Courtney's. This opening being in a slight scrubby depression, a patrol could crawl from it without showing against the sky-line. It was consequently used as a sally-port

⁹ See Vol XII, plate 89

for several dangerous scouting expeditions against the important work known as "German Officers' Trench," which the Turks were beginning to dig about 100 yards from Steele's.

Farther south, on the two lobes of the 400 Plateau,¹⁰ although No-Man's Land was at this time fairly wide, the surface was so flat and exposed to machine-gun fire that patrolling was highly dangerous. Nevertheless, when the enemy was observed sapping only 120 yards distant, on the northern edge of the Jolly, it was at once decided to send by night a party to discover the nature of his works. Accordingly on May 8th thirty volunteers of the 4th Battalion under Lieutenant Fanning crept out at 10 p.m. upon what was really the first trench-raid attempted by Australian troops. The line crawled forward in the dark, constantly passing the dead who lay there thickly.¹¹ At ten yards from the newly-dug Turkish trenches Fanning found that only half his men were in touch with him. From the enemy's line came the sound of laughing and singing, and the rifle flashes showed that the Turks were firing occasional unaimed shots into the air. But the position was well garrisoned, and, as there was no prospect of successfully rushing it, Fanning withdrew his party.

Some of the men who went upon this enterprise thought that, while lying in No-Man's Land, they could hear coming from underground the rumbling of a truck on rails. A similar report was also made by men of the 3rd Battalion, south of the 4th. A patch of new earth suggestive of a sap-head had appeared in the scrub facing the 3rd, but a patrol found it to be only the scar made by a shrapnel



¹⁰ Johnston's Jolly and Lone Pine. To gain ground on the northern lobe (the Jolly) Maj. Heane's company of the 4th Battalion tunnelled forward to the outpost position originally held by Loutit (*Vol I, p. 528*), which thenceforward became part of the front line.

¹¹ The advance was not discovered by the main body of the enemy, but one man, Pte. A. Campbell (of Bathurst, N.S.W.), was shot through the head, apparently by a stray bullet. His mate, by name Cliffe (of Port Hacking, N.S.W.), picking him up and carrying him, as he thought, to the Australian line, ran upon a Turk. The two grappled and Cliffe seized his opponent's rifle and tripped him, but other Turks of the patrol rushed the Australian and made him prisoner. This incident passed unobserved by the main body of either side.

shell. It being, however, still thought possible that the Turks were mining from the head of Owen's Gully, into which the Australians could not see, a combined patrol of the 2nd and 3rd was sent thither, but found no sign of recent digging. A little farther south, where an earthwork could be seen out in the scrub on Lone Pine, seven men of the 2nd under Sergeant Scott¹² crept out from the Pimple salient past the square clearing of the Daisy Patch, for 150 yards on to the Pine. At this stage intense fire broke out from a Turkish position 350 yards beyond, no less than five machine-guns joining in. The enemy had probably seen a party of the 11th, similarly sent to occupy a knoll near the southern edge of the Pine. Neither party was able to proceed, but the volume of fire made it clear that the Turks were now present in great strength on the plateau at a point some 450 yards east of the Australian trenches at the Pimple.

While the outstanding condition of the Anzac front was the tension along the central sector, on the two flanks movement was comparatively free. Here, as has been explained, the enemy could not concentrate by day for fear of the warships. Indeed, south of Lone Pine he did not at this stage appear to maintain a single machine-gun, and his first visible line of trenches was that which could be seen running along the horizon at Gun Ridge, 900 yards distant. The four intervening spurs were occupied only by his patrols and snipers, and it was not until May 12th that scouts of the 3rd Brigade, pushing to Weir and Pine Ridges, found Turks entrenching there. In the early days the garrison of the Right Section was therefore able to send its patrols nightly far down the valleys towards Gaba Tepe. A similar freedom on the northern flank led to enterprises of the utmost importance, which will be described in due course.

¹² Sgt W. H. Scott (No 564, 2nd Bn). Draper; of Eastwood, N.S.W.; b. Sydney, 3 June, 1894. Died of wounds, 8 Aug., 1915

CHAPTER III

THE ANZAC ARTILLERY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE 400 PLATEAU

It has been mentioned that at the beginning of May a large proportion of the Australian and New Zealand artillery had not yet come into action. The reason was that the artillery staffs, to which the duty of finding gun-positions had been entirely left, had been unable to discover suitable ones in the rugged Anzac area. When nearly two weeks had elapsed since the Landing, less than half the guns of the army corps were in use, the rest being still in their ships. The artillery of the corps comprised sixty-four pieces in all, viz.:—

7th Indian Mountain	{	21st Battery	Six 10-pdr. guns
Artillery Brigade	{	26th Battery	Six „ „ „
			Total: Twelve 10-pdrs.

1st Australian Division—

1st Brigade—1st Battery	}	Each battery comprising four 18-pdr. guns
2nd Battery		
3rd Battery		
2nd Brigade—4th Battery		
5th Battery		
6th Battery		
3rd Brigade—7th Battery	}	
8th Battery		
9th Battery		

Total: Thirty-six 18-pdrs.

New Zealand and Australian Division—

1st N.Z. Battery	}	Each comprising four 18-pdr. guns
2nd N.Z. Battery		
3rd N.Z. Battery		
N.Z. Howitzer Battery		Four 4.5-inch howitzers

Total: Twelve 18-pdr. guns
and four 4.5 howitzers

Of these the two mountain-batteries, which had been landed with the covering force, had been in action since the first day. Their small guns were so designed that all the parts could be carried on pack-mules and the batteries rapidly

moved to any position to which a mule could climb. When, therefore, the 26th was forced out of action on April 25th, with losses in officers, men, and material so heavy that only four of its guns could be manned, two of these, under Lieutenant Rossiter,¹ were sent that evening up precipitous slopes to Plugge's Plateau, which rose for 300 feet almost sheer from the Beach. Here they were joined by two guns of the sister battery, the 21st, and so constituted a four-gun battery firing upon the heights of the main range north of the New Zealand front. The remaining guns of the 21st Battery, placed near the lower end of Shrapnel Gully, provided a second battery firing at the same heights. The two other active guns of the 26th Battery, under Lieutenant Whitting, were sent next day to a third position, a spur of Bolton's Ridge on the right flank, where they overlooked Gala Tepe.

When on April 27th the two divisions of the army corps were completely ashore and working under their own commanders, the Indian mountain-batteries were allotted, the 26th to the N.Z. & A., and the 21st to the 1st Australian Division. The 21st Battery placed its six guns in Shrapnel Gully, still firing for the time being against the enemy facing the N.Z. & A. The 26th kept Rossiter's section (two guns) on Plugge's Plateau, removed Whitting's to another position on Bolton's—from which it could conveniently fire northward upon the inland slopes of the main range—and with the help of twenty drivers of an Australian ammunition column² got its two unmanned guns into action, under Major Bruce,³ on the rugged razor-edge of Walker's Ridge, from which they fired northwards along the seaward slopes of the same range. A section of the 21st Battery, under Lieutenant Rawson,⁴ was transferred to Bolton's to fire south-east or north. The position of the mountain-batteries at the beginning of May therefore was this—26th Battery: two

¹ Lieut.-Col. F. N. C. Rossiter, M.B.E., M.C.; R.G.A.; b. Exwick, Devonshire, Eng. 25 Oct., 1888.

² The 3rd Bde. Ammn. Col. A month later, on May 29, two of these men, still fighting as members of the 26th (Jacob's) Mtn. Bty., were killed. They were Gnr. J. E. Le Masurier (of Jersey. Channel Islands), and M. McDonnell (of Brisbane).

³ Maj. J. E. L. Bruce, R.A.; b. Rangoon, Burma, 10 Jan., 1870. Killed in action, 29 May, 1915.

⁴ Brigadier C. D. Rawson, D.S.O., p.s.c.; R.G.A.; b. Coimbatore, Madras residency, India, 22 Oct., 1883.

Overhead traverse
(against enfilade fire)



(In left-hand wall)
Soldiers' sleeping shelter or "pozzys" covered by waterproof sheet

Fire step

Step.

SECTION OF AN ANZAC FIRE-TRENCH NEAR STEELE'S POST,
SHOWING TWO RECESSES AND ILLUSTRATING THE GREAT DEPTH
OF THE TRENCHES AND THE NECESSITY OF FIRE-STEPS



A GUN OF THE 1ST BATTERY, AUSTRALIAN FIELD ARTILLERY, IN ACTION
DURING MAY, 1915, AT HELLES

Lent by Maj C A Clowes, 2nd Div Artillery



THE NAVAL ARTILLERY OBSERVATION-POST ON BOLTON'S HILL, 3RD MAY,
1915

Officers of the Australian artillery directing the warships' fire.


Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No G940

To face p 59.

guns on Walker's, two on Plugge's, two on Bolton's, all firing north or north-eastward; 21st Battery: four guns in Shrapnel Gully, firing north or north-east. Two on Bolton's, firing south, east, or north. The last two were the only mountain-guns which really covered targets in front of the 1st Australian Division, the other ten firing mainly upon positions facing the N.Z. & A.

The N.Z. & A. Division had also at its command the four batteries of New Zealand field artillery. Of these the howitzers, being the most useful in mountainous country, had been landed on April 26th. Although the 2nd New Zealand Battery was disembarked on the 27th, no suitable position was found for it until April 30th, when two of its guns were hauled by hand up the newly-made road to Plugge's and emplaced near Rossiter's mountain-guns. From that time it became the special protection of Quinn's Post, 950 yards distant. The 1st New Zealand Battery, which landed that day, could as yet be used only along the Beach, no possible emplacement having been found elsewhere in the precipitous New Zealand sector. The 3rd was still in its ship when, on May 4th, it was sent with four Australian batteries to Cape Helles.

It has already been explained that, of the mountain artillery allotted to the 1st Australian Division, only two guns—Rawson's—were firing against the enemy facing their division, while the rest covered the heights at the end of Monash Valley; of the Australian artillery proper there had been emplaced, by May 5th, only nine guns. The knoll at the southern end of the Beach, which was occupied on April 25th by one field-gun of the 4th Battery, and within a few days by two more guns of the 4th and two of the 5th, became the position of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade under Colonel G. J. Johnston; meanwhile the site which Rosenthal had originally discovered for the 7th Battery on Bolton's Ridge remained the only one occupied by his brigade (the 3rd). This position on the right



was not indeed one in which artillery would normally be employed, and Rosenthal had been compelled to use the whole force of his thrusting personality to get it approved; but at least it was a ridge to which guns could be dragged, and from which they could be fired to assist the infantry and affect the course of the fighting. They were emplaced immediately behind the actual firing line, each of the four being directed towards a different point of the compass, so that together they covered all the country round the southern flank. On the other hand Johnston's five guns near the mouth of Shrapnel Gully fired chiefly upon the slopes of the main range beyond the N.Z. & A. Division, frequently searching for the troublesome enemy batteries concealed there, and for snipers shooting down Monash Valley. From the first, therefore, the front of the N.Z. & A. Division was fairly well covered by artillery. But of the nine emplaced Australian field-guns not one could burst its shell upon the summits of Lone Pine, Johnston's Jolly, or German Officers' Ridge, the vital sector of the line of their own division. At the beginning of May the remaining twenty-seven Australian guns were not in use, and, though the rest of the 4th and 5th Batteries had landed and the 8th was being brought ashore, the entire 1st Brigade and all the guns of the 6th and 9th Batteries were still in their ships. It was at this stage that the call arrived for additional batteries at Cape Helles, where the advance had proceeded sufficiently to allow of the employment of a large force of artillery,⁵ and where the country was suitable for field-guns. As a result the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Batteries, Australian Field Artillery, and the 3rd New Zealand Battery were sent thither to take part in the impending thrust towards Achi Baba.⁶

Not only had General Bridges thus lost the use of sixteen of his guns, but of the fifteen—nine of field and six of mountain artillery—which had by May 1st been emplaced in his half of the Anzac area, only two were in such a position that they could attempt to deal with the Turkish works on the 400 Plateau, upon which he most urgently required them to

⁵ The first guns in action at Helles had been a few horse-artillery batteries of the 29th Div which landed on April 27 and 28, but all the remaining guns of that division were now being rapidly disembarked.


⁶ G.H.Q. appears to have asked for all the Australian guns not then on shore. Gen Bridges, however, pointed out that one N.Z. battery was still afloat, and he was therefore allowed to retain the 9th Australian Battery, the 3rd New Zealand Battery going in its place.

fire. When on May 1st the Turks attacked the marines along the whole centre of the Australian line, the Shrapnel Gully guns, although little over half-a-mile from the assault and firing over that part of the line, were unable to interfere with the enemy. Yet it chanced that this was the very sector upon which General Bridges, for another urgent reason, desired at the beginning of May the assistance of his artillery.

At that time, after Hamilton's order to stand on the defensive, the commander of the 1st Australian Division concentrated all his energy upon obtaining a suitable foothold for the resumption of the offensive which, he never doubted, would shortly come. He was eager for that movement, and was convinced (as probably was Birdwood also at this time) that a preliminary to it must be the capture of Gaba Tepe. To this project both Colonel MacLagan, who commanded the sector nearest to Gaba Tepe, and Colonel White, the chief of Bridges' staff, were strongly opposed. Bridges nevertheless reconnoitred the promontory with these two officers in a destroyer on May 8th.

But if an advance upon Gaba Tepe, or indeed anywhere within two miles south of the 400 Plateau, was to have a chance of success, then the 400 Plateau or at least its southern lobe—Lone Pine—must first be occupied. "Until we are firmly established on the plateau," Bridges stated in an order of May 6th, "we cannot attempt to capture Gaba Tepe." For this reason he was impatient to

push forward to the eastern end of the plateau while it was still occupied but weakly, if at all, by the enemy.⁷ When at the beginning of May in his daily visit to this sector he observed increasing signs of Turkish intrusion upon the vital space




⁷ Lone Pine could have been occupied previously, had Bridges or his staff been aware of the situation on the nights of April 25 and 26. On each of these the whole of Lone Pine was temporarily in the possession of the 1st Australian Division; but in consequence of the disorganisation caused by the very heavy losses, the nature of the previous fighting, and the inexperience of both troops and staffs, the position on the plateau was at the time unknown not only at the headquarters of the division but also at those of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, which were responsible for that sector.

on its summit, he became exceedingly restive. The mounds of newly-dug soil, both upon Johnston's Jolly and Lone Pine (where earth could be seen heaped around the stump of the solitary pine-tree), were becoming so conspicuous that it seemed that something more than mere trench-digging must be in progress there. On May 3rd it was reported from the line farther north, which was suffering from Turkish shrapnel, that signs could be detected of an enemy field-gun only 600 yards distant, behind Lone Pine. Next day Bridges, visiting the line with Birdwood, could see for himself apparent preparations by the enemy for emplacing a gun in that position.

On May 5th the trenches of the 1st Brigade on MacLaurin's Hill were shelled by a gun at close range, and were afterwards battered daily by the fire of others which the Turks had brought up to Mortar Ridge, only 700 yards distant. The MacLaurin's Hill trenches were also enfiladed at point-blank range by a gun emplaced behind Lone Pine, and although the enemy had at this time no high-explosive shells, his shrapnel and common shell, sweeping at this range down the length of that position, not only killed and wounded a number of men and damaged the trenches, but kept the garrison under a heavy strain.

The guns causing this trouble were difficult to locate, being well dug-in and fired from under the cover of heavy épaulements, which were beyond the power of the infantry to damage. Trench-mortars, which were coming into extended use in France, could probably have interfered with them, but it was not until May 12th that the first rudimentary trench-mortar was introduced at Anzac, and even this was but an improvised weapon of doubtful precision, consisting merely of a length of tube or pipe, from which, by the explosion of diminutive bags of black gunpowder, a "jam-tin" bomb could be fired. The arm to which the infantry looked in order to meet the increasing annoyance of these Turkish guns was therefore the artillery of their own army corps. Bridges also turned to



his artillery, but with a different object—to keep the enemy from making that encroachment which neither infantry patrols nor the fire of small arms could prevent. But although the enemy's artillery had been hauled almost into the front line in order to batter the Australian trenches, not one gun of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps was yet in position to fire effectively upon the Turkish works opposite the most important part of Bridges' line.

The apparent slowness of the artillery to afford this help was not due to lack of eagerness. Colonel Hobbs, the commander of the Australian artillery, and his staff searched constantly for battery-positions; and the batteries themselves, which, except for one of the 1st Brigade, consisted either of militia or of men without previous military service, were especially zealous to give active proof of their training. On April 25th or 26th every Australian battery except the 9th had found some pretext for contriving to get one or more of its guns to the Beach; twenty-six of the thirty-six Australian field-pieces had reached the shore, but had for the most part been necessarily sent back, since no position had yet been found for them. This eagerness extended to the men of the ammunition columns, those on the spot welcoming every chance of relieving or supplementing the guns' crews, and those at Alexandria frequently breaking away from the units in Egypt to come as stowaways to Anzac. Nor was the delay due to any marked lack of training. The four Australian batteries sent to Cape Helles fought with efficiency as part of the artillery of the 29th Division, in whose records there appears immediate approbation of their work. The batteries supporting the Australian infantry at Anzac were probably not inferior to those at Helles. But the Anzac area was unsuitable for field artillery, and the difficulty which confronted the field-artillery staff was unrealised by most of the infantry commanders, who expected the guns to be emplaced near the front line, to be at once fired direct, like so many shot-guns, at any target—men or earthworks—pointed out, and to destroy it.

The infantry, which saw a heap of earth, daily increasing, 300 yards in front of the firing line, and regarded it as the obvious duty of their divisional artillery to come forward and demolish it, did not realise that such a task was not normal or

even possible for field artillery. In the first place the field-gun was primarily a weapon designed to destroy men and not defences. For that reason it was furnished mainly with shrapnel shell, projecting man-killing pellets and useless against defences. It is true that, as a secondary measure, a proportion of "common shell" was provided for use against field-works, and that at a later stage there was substituted in increasing proportion high-explosive shell, which was gradually perfected so as to be useful against men both in the open and in trenches. But high-explosive for field-guns did not reach Anzac until late in June, and then at first only in quantities sufficient for experiment. In the earlier stages of the campaign, therefore, field-guns did not possess even the moderate effectiveness against earthworks which they afterwards attained.

In the second place, although the training of the artillery provided both for the direct and indirect fire^a of field-guns against targets immediately in front of them, experience had shown that fire from the flank was more effective than from the front. Especially was this the case in a position so mountainous as that at Anzac, and so narrow that the batteries could nowhere be held back more than half-a-mile from the front line, while the enemy was not so restricted. In the narrow area available to the Anzac commanders there was only one effective method for the employment of field artillery—to emplace the guns so as to cover not the section of front line nearest to them, but some sector at a distance to right or left. At Anzac this meant that the guns in the 1st Australian Division's area should cover the N.Z. & A. Division's front, and *vice versa*. But even if each division had from the first sought gun-positions in the neighbouring division's territory, so small was the whole area originally occupied, so abrupt were its heights and so close the opposing lines, that there were few points within it where a field-gun



Theoretical gun positions for Anzac

^a See Glossary, Vol I, pp. 611 and 614

could be emplaced at a sufficient distance from the front line to enable its shell to clear the crest held by friendly troops and to burst upon the hostile position. A shrapnel shell, fired from a valley so close to the line and timed to burst at so short a range, projected its pellets upwards or forwards into the air, and not upon the enemy in No-Man's Land. If the elevation were lessened, the shell would hit the crest on the near side occupied by friends. Complaints of such an occurrence were indeed frequently made, though not always with justification.⁹

Obviously therefore field-guns—throwing their shells with a trajectory which was flat compared with that of howitzers¹⁰—were the wrong weapon for such a mountainous area, and howitzers, although with reduced charges they could in most places reach the enemy's front line, had to fling their shell so low that its impact, almost at the vertex of its curve, was often insufficient to detonate the fuse and it consequently failed to burst. Moreover at this time, as has been seen, the only howitzers at Anzac were four belonging to the New Zealand field artillery.




Diagram illustrating the difficulties for guns and howitzers at Anzac

Bridges was himself an officer of artillery, highly trained in theory, and well aware that the field artillery could not readily be employed in country for which only mountain artillery was suitable. Nevertheless he evinced extreme impatience at what appeared to him the slowness of his artillery staff in grasping and overcoming these difficulties. His decision, as expressed in an order of May 6th drawing the attention of infantry, artillery, and engineers to the necessity for improving the foothold upon the 400 Plateau, was: "Field-guns are to be brought into a more forward position."

⁹ The shells complained of sometimes came from enflading Turkish batteries. The Turks possessed mountain-batteries bought from the New Zealand Government before the war and firing a shell identical with that of the Indian mountain-guns. Their cases were sometimes produced by the infantry as evidence of erratic fire of friendly guns.

¹⁰ See *Vol. I*, Glossary, under *High Velocity Cannon*.

A Turkish trench is being prepared within 400 yards of this salient (the Pimple, opposite Lone Pine), and it is imperative that this should be stopped." If the guns could not be effectively used according to the latest theories of field-artillery warfare, he wanted them employed at once, as were Rosenthal's, in positions where they could instantly deal with the Turkish works which now threatened to prevent his occupation of the 400 Plateau. The enemy had placed a gun on Lone Pine, and he argued that, if the Turks were able to batter parts of the front line of his division at 600 yards' range, it should be possible for his own artillery to act with as good effect. He consequently ordered its commander to bring forward his guns.


This led to what promised to be a serious difference between Bridges and the commander of his artillery. Colonel Hobbs was a militia officer, who had been a keen student of artillery warfare. Though bodily a small and delicate man, he had since the Landing spent almost the whole of every day with his brigade-major—a British officer, Major Anderson¹¹—climbing the Anzac hills on foot in search of suitable gun-positions. "A way must be found up these hills," wrote Anderson in his diary on April 29th. "Guns must go near the firing line." Some sort of road must, however, be constructed up the heights before field-guns could be dragged thither. Rawson's mountain-guns, packed upon mules, went forward on that day to the depression known as "Brown's Dip," at the junction of the 400 Plateau and Bolton's Ridge, with the object of destroying Turkish observation-posts and machine-guns on Lone Pine, 450 yards distant. Rawson found that at such a range this could only be done by using half the usual charge and guessing the necessary elevation and length of fuse, a device which yielded moderate success.

But the problem which would confront field artillery in or near Rawson's position was far more difficult than his. The only way in which field-guns could be employed in that neighbourhood with any prospect of hitting the Turkish works was by running them forward on to the actual summit of the 400 Plateau within sight of the Turkish trenches. Such a step would be very different from the placing of Rosenthal's

¹¹ Brig.-Gen. S. M. Anderson, D.S.O. Commanded 1st Div. Art., 1917/18. Officer of British Regular Army; b. 23 Sept., 1879.

guns on Bolton's Hill, a position still 750 to 1,000 yards from the nearest enemy strong-point and not commanded by Turkish guns or observers at a much higher level. An advanced battery on the 400 Plateau would have to face, at 400 yards, two strong-points of the enemy, and would be under the eyes of Turkish observers on the whole semicircle of heights to the north and east, who might subject it to a storm of shell-fire similar to that which on April 25th drove the 26th Mountain Battery from this very summit.

On the night of May 1st, however, in order to assist in the N.Z. & A. Division's attack upon Baby 700, two guns of Major Bessell-Browne's 8th Battery were hauled by a great number of men on drag-ropes up slopes of sixty degrees to a point below the crest of the 400 Plateau. While the guns were still in that neighbourhood Bridges, in the course of his daily visits to his front, discovered a position in which he considered they might suitably be emplaced so as to fire upon Lone Pine. The site proposed was none other than the Pimple, the salient protruding for 150 yards across the flat summit towards the earthworks which he wished to demolish. Accordingly on May 3rd he instructed Hobbs to have Bessell-Browne's battery stationed there. During the following night Browne moved his guns to a position hurriedly dug for them on the summit, but when day broke they were found to be standing out in full view of the Turkish lines. They were at once covered with bushes and left until nightfall, when they were withdrawn. Notwithstanding



these manifest difficulties Bridges was still determined that batteries should be placed on the 400 Plateau; during the following morning he took to that place Brigadier-General Cunliffe Owen, Birdwood's chief artillery officer, and urged that the guns should be thrust still closer to the firing line. He then went in person to Browne's battery,¹² and explained

¹² Accompanied by Gen Walker of the 1st Brigade, whose line on this plateau was now being daily battered by the Turkish gun on Lone Pine

to Browne his decision that the enemy works on the Pine must be immediately bombarded.

As a result, at 4 o'clock the same afternoon, in full view of the Turks to the north, the crews of the two guns of the 8th Battery, hauling on drag-ropes, ran forward their pieces for a hundred yards on to the crest and into the trenches of the infantry. There they pulled down the sandbags which had till then screened them from Lone Pine, and, crouching beside their weapons, each gun's crew fired as rapidly as possible fourteen shots at 450 yards' range into the new earthworks. Rifle-fire broke out from the Turkish trenches, and the enemy began to feel for the guns with his shrapnel. But the movement had surprised him, and, before his fire became accurate, both guns had expended their ammunition and had been withdrawn without a casualty.

Though this feat may have had some moral effect upon the garrison of the enemy trenches, and though it served as an answer to the bombardment of General Walker's line, the damage to the Turkish earthworks was negligible. The only shells then possessed by Australian guns were shrapnel and a small proportion of common shell, the weak explosions of which, especially with flat trajectory and upon trenches directly in front, could do no more than knock in a few sandbags from the parapet upon the Turks working below. The only moderately effective method of employing such shell against soldiers in trenches was to fire it in enfilade. It was in this manner that the enemy gun behind Lone Pine was harassing Walker's front, but no such effect could have been produced by the bombardment ordered by Bridges. A few Turks may for the moment have been frightened from their work, and the Lone Pine battery may even have temporarily refrained from shooting lest this outburst might be renewed, but it is doubtful if work upon the Turkish trenches was delayed for an hour.

Bridges was nevertheless determined that the bombardment should be at once repeated. Hobbs, who looked upon it as a misuse of his artillery, was loath to renew it, and urged upon the general that it would mean the loss of the guns' crews, but Bridges did not conceal his contempt for such arguments. On May 6th, therefore, at the same hour as on the previous day, the same guns were run forward by their

crews, amongst whom was Hobbs's own son,¹³ and twenty rounds were fired, again without loss. Bridges then instructed Hobbs to have the operation carried out a third time at sunset. Accordingly at 7 o'clock it was repeated. On this occasion the Turks were quicker in their reply, having now registered their guns on the position; but the Australian crews, by their swiftness and by lying flat under heavy fire, escaped with a loss of two men wounded.¹⁴

The experiment proved that the extension of the Turkish trenches upon Lone Pine could not be prevented by field artillery directly in front, firing shrapnel. Nevertheless Bridges maintained his pressure upon the staff to get the guns forward. It was at this juncture that there took place the reorganisation of the line into four sectors, each under a brigadier of the infantry. Under this arrangement all the artillery at Anzac was divided between the respective sections, the commanders of which had the right of calling upon their allotted guns to fire as required. Of the Australian artillery Rosenthal's 3rd Brigade, being on Bolton's Hill, was instructed to support MacLagan in the Right Section; the Shrapnel Gully guns, belonging to Johnston's 2nd Brigade, were allotted to Walker in the Right Central; Bessell-Browne's guns at Brown's Dip, being employed against the 400 Plateau in the Right Central sector, were transferred from Rosenthal to Johnston. The duty of the Australian artillery was specifically laid down by Bridges. Whenever the commander of the infantry pointed out a target—such as the enemy trenches on Lone Pine or the Jolly—upon which he desired the guns to fire, it became the duty of the artillery staff to find a place from which that target could be shot at. It was then the business of the engineers, with infantry working-parties, to make the emplacement and a road by which the gun could be dragged up to it. Except with special precautions, a gun was never to fire at targets other than those on the front of the section to which it was allotted. Johnston's headquarters was now moved close to that of General Walker, so that both the Australian artillery brigades had their headquarters near

¹³ Maj J. M. Hobbs M C; 5th Div. Art. Architectural student; of Perth, W Aust; b Perth, 4th June, 1896.

¹⁴ Sgt J. R. Braidwood (of Kelmscott, W. Aust) and Gnr D. L. Lovell (of East Perth, W Aust.).

those of the respective brigadiers of the infantry, and were in close communication with them.¹⁵

It followed that special efforts were immediately made to ensure that the artillery allotted to each section should be so placed as to protect that section's front. On the right Rosenthal's guns were already in such a position; but in the Right Central Section, since none of the allotted batteries could protect the sector without a special enterprise such as that just narrated, steps were immediately taken to haul more guns from Shrapnel Gully to positions in the front line from which it was hoped they would be able to achieve that purpose. Those of Major Phillips's¹⁶ 4th Battery, which had been man-handled on to the western end of the 400 Plateau on May 5th in order to fire north-eastwards at the main range, were left in that situation. But Browne's 8th Battery was again thrust forward into a position—this time carefully prepared—in the infantry trenches at the farthest point of the Pimple;¹⁷ and, since he could not deal with the advanced Turkish field-pieces which enfiladed the trenches farther north, an attempt was made to emplace a gun of Major Caddy's¹⁸ 5th Battery in the firing line on the edge of the plateau near Wire Gully. The target with which it was desired to deal was, like most others in this sector, on the same ridge as that held by the Australians, and only a few hundred yards distant, though slightly on the farther side of the crest. The new gun-position must therefore necessarily be highly placed. The épaulements were duly constructed, a road was made, and before dawn on May 8th the field-piece was dragged into position by 160 men. But the emplacement was hopelessly exposed. Before the gun opened Sergeant Cantor¹⁹ was shot through the head by

¹⁵ It is interesting to contrast these early methods, by which it was attempted to make the guns at Anzac a trench-weapon of the infantry, with those adopted in Flanders in 1917, when the infantry followed a barrage planned by the staff of the artillery, which was then independent and in effect controlled the movements of the infantry. In 1918 the artillery and infantry reassumed a relationship midway between these extremes.


¹⁶ Maj.-Gen. O. F. Phillips, C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded 2nd Div. Art. 1917/19, Quartermaster-General, Australia, 1934/39. Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces, of Sydney, b. Warwick, Q'land, 9 June, 1882.

¹⁷ Browne's emplacements were immediately behind the firing-line in the Pimple. When the guns were about to fire, notice was given to the infantry; part of the sandbag parapet of the front trench was then temporarily pulled down, leaving a sort of embrasure through which the guns fired across the flat summit.

¹⁸ Col. H. O. Caddy, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 13th A.F.A. Bde., 1916/18. Warehouseman; of St Kilda, Vic; b. South Yarra, Vic., 2 May, 1882. Died, 17 Apr. 1935.


¹⁹ Sgt. B. Cantor (No. 993, 5th Bty. A.F.A.). Cabinetmaker; of Collingwood, Vic. b. Collingwood, 21 May, 1892. Killed in action, 8 May, 1915.

the Turks on Johnston's Jolly, 300 yards distant. This piece was therefore withdrawn. During the night of May 9th another belonging to the same battery was hauled up Bridges' Road in order to be stationed, if possible, on the narrow crest of MacLaurin's Hill in the actual trenches into which the enemy's Lone Pine gun regularly fired. A hundred men of the infantry were detailed to dig the emplacement. But it proved completely open to the Turks, and was at once seen and shelled by a battery on the main range. Sergeant Arthur,²⁰ of the gun-detachment, while endeavouring to improve the gun-pit, was shot in the head. Major Fergusson, of the 21st Mountain Battery, proceeded to the ridge, but could find no position suitable even for a mountain-gun,²¹ and, after inspecting the place,



²⁰ Sgt. C. E. P. Arthur (No. 905, 5th Bty., A.F.A.), Butcher; of Brighton, Vic., b. Yarragon, Vic, Apr, 1895 Killed in action, 10 May, 1915

²¹ At a later stage, when the infantry and engineers had completed a network of tunnels between Courtney's and Steele's, Gen. Godley obtained leave to have a mountain-gun emplaced in one of them with the object of suddenly opening fire upon two enemy guns, which fired from similar tunnels excavated in Mortar Ridge. Accordingly on June 19 a gun of Lieut. Thom's section of the 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery was placed in the tunnels near Courtney's, at the top of the gully between that post and Steele's, and not far above the old snipers' trench referred to on pp. 241-2. But the port hole, which had been covered by a piece of sacking, was detected by the Turks; and the gun had not yet fired when, at 9 a.m. on June 21, one of the enemy guns on Mortar Ridge opened on the emplacement, which lay directly in front of them at 400 yards' range. Thom gallantly unmasked his piece, and he and his Indian gun's crew fought a duel with the Turks. Although their shells broke in his tunnel, and he himself was knocked over by one explosion, he placed seventeen shells inside the enemy's port-holes, temporarily silencing both guns and destroying their embrasures. (A Turkish officer recalled this incident to members of the Australian Historical Mission visiting Gallipoli in 1919, and spoke with admiration of the promptitude of the Indian gun's crew.) A small length of the Australian tunnel, however, had been blown in. Thom's gun, which had been under the fire of other enemy batteries, was withdrawn and not returned to this position; but the Turkish embrasures on Mortar Ridge, which could not be effectively fired upon by field- or mountain-guns from any other emplacement at Anzac, were repaired and presently reoccupied,



Colonel Johnston,²² commanding the New Zealand artillery, cancelled an order that one of his guns should be taken thither. The emplacement was consequently filled in with sandbags and reconverted into an infantry trench. On May 11th, 12th, and 14th the Turkish gun at Lone Pine fired directly into the place, killing or wounding several of the infantry.

In the meantime Browne's battery in the Pimple, and also Phillips's farther back upon the plateau, had been observed and accurately registered by the Turkish guns which overlooked them from the main range. As soon as Browne moved into the salient, a shell burst among the men of a gun-detachment, killing one and wounding four. On May 10th, when the northern gun of this battery opened fire from its point of vantage upon 200 Turks stealing towards Quinn's Post, a Turkish battery immediately put one shell through its shield and three in the gun-pit. Phillips's battery, though less exposed, had no sooner registered upon the trenches and concealed battery on Baby 700 than the Turkish guns found it, and Lieutenant Wolfenden²³ and a gunner²⁴ were killed and four men wounded. The next night Phillips's guns were removed to a position affording better cover, but still high on the plateau. Here they were repeatedly shelled; one was hit on May 29th, when Lieutenant Siddall²⁵ was killed; another was hit the next day. But in this position Phillips remained, his battery covering the inland slopes of the range and exercising an important influence later in the campaign.

The advanced Turkish guns which were so grievously harassing the Australian portion of the front had not yet been dealt with. Several of the enemy's field-pieces were responsible for this bombardment—one behind Lone Pine, firing northwards on to MacLaurin's Hill, and two upon Mortar Ridge, firing from the trenches through a secret embrasure which the Anzac observers could not at this time discover.²⁶ The failure of the attempt to emplace Caddy's guns in the

²² Brig.-Gen. G. N. Johnston, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded N.Z. Art., 1914/18. Officer of British Regular Army; of Glasgow, Scotland; b. Quebec, Canada, 2 Aug., 1868.

²³ Lieut. C. W. Wolfenden; 4th Bty., A.F.A. Duntroon graduate; of Malvern, Vic.; b. Prahran, Vic., 23 March, 1894. Killed in action, 7 May, 1915.

²⁴ Gnr D. C. Beulke (No. 879, 4th Bty, A.F.A.) Bank clerk, of Moorabbin, Vic.; b. Bendigo, Vic., 1892. Killed in action, 7 May, 1915.

²⁵ Lieut. N. Siddall; 4th Bty A.F.A. Warehouseman; of Elsternwick, Vic.; b. Elsternwick, 24 June, 1891. Killed in action, 29 May 1915.

²⁶ These guns fired on Courtney's and Steele's. Another gun behind Johnston's Jolly enfiladed Quinn's.


firing line proved to Colonel Hobbs the impossibility of finding, within the area allotted to the 1st Australian Division, any position whence field-guns could sufficiently depress their muzzles to shell these ridges. He now realised that the only positions from which they could be reached were not in the area occupied by his own division, but on the still higher ground held by the N.Z. & A.

Had the organisation of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps been free from defect, there is no doubt that, as soon as the corps became stationary, the whole of its artillery would have been co-ordinated by a strong central command. A system might thus have been imposed whereby either the guns of each division could be emplaced in the other division's area, or each commander would have been regularly charged with the protection of his neighbour's front. At Cape Helles, from the first, the staff of the 29th Division was given control of all the artillery operating in the British area. At Anzac the only authority who could so have controlled all the guns of the army corps was the chief of Birdwood's artillery staff, Brigadier-General Cunliffe Owen. But he in the early weeks was concerned largely with the guns of the navy, and in effect the artillery of each division and the mountain artillery were left free to do as best they could, each on its own initiative. Occupying three separate headquarters, the respective staffs constantly assisted each other in dealing with targets out of their own sector; but the method of common action was circuitous. On one occasion, for example, when the infantry of one division asked for artillery fire upon an enemy working-party, the request failed to reach the proper observing-officer of the other division until next day, when the enemy work had been completed.

When Hobbs found that no gun in the Australian area could shell Lone Pine or Johnston's Jolly, Colonel Johnston, commanding the New Zealand artillery, undertook to help him. On May 9th the observer of one of the New Zealand batteries for the first time definitely saw, from the lofty summit of Russell's Top, the Turkish Lone Pine gun. The New Zealand howitzers, which on a previous occasion had flung their shells into the gullies behind the Pine, were turned upon it, but with uncertain effect. The New Zealand commander thereupon undertook to deal with it in the same manner as Caddy's

battery had attempted to do, namely, by hauling a gun into the Australian front line on MacLaurin's Hill; but, when by much labour of the infantry an emplacement had been prepared and a road constructed to it, this position also was found to be too open to allow of its being occupied.

The summit of Plugge's Plateau not being sufficiently lofty to overlook the Second ridge, there remained but one summit which afforded the necessary elevation. This was the highest crest within the Anzac lines—the long backbone of Russell's Top. Its central northern heights completely overlooked the Turkish position on the Second ridge—from the Chess-board to the 400 Plateau—and Hobbs was convinced that, though greatly exposed, it afforded the only platform from which the enemy's front opposite the 1st Australian Division could be shelled. Johnston, after personally reconnoitring the summit, took the same view, and on May 14th decided to have the 1st New Zealand Battery hauled to a position near the Sphinx. Three days later, a road having been made and épaulements hurriedly constructed and concealed with bushes,²⁷ the eighteen-pounders were dragged up. On the previous day the 26th Indian Mountain Battery had succeeded in getting one of its guns, under Lieutenant Whitting, into the



Positions in which attempts were made to emplace guns to cover the Right Central Section—

- (1) Shrapnel Gully batteries (too low).
- (2) Rawson's mountain-guns (fairly successful with light charges).
- (3) Browne's guns in firing line (successful at a cost).
- (4) Caddy's gun (too exposed).
- (5) Caddy's and N.Z. guns (too exposed).
- (6) N.Z. howitzers (succeeded, but short of ammunition).
- (7) Guns on Plugge's (could not reach target).
- (8) 1st N.Z. Battery on Russell's (succeeded).
- (9) Whitting's mountain-gun (succeeded).

²⁷ See plate at p. 75. The enemy appears to have called this position "The High Mounds," probably in reference to the four prominent emplacements of the 1st N.Z. Battery.

Plugge's



M'CAY'S HILL, SHOWING PART OF THE ROAD MADE AT THE BEGINNING OF MAY IN ORDER TO
HAUL THE ARTILLERY OF THE 1st DIVISION ON TO THE 400 PLATEAU

Browne's battery (8th) was hauled past this point and emplaced farther to the right on the summit, firing towards the right of the picture. Phillips's battery (4th) was dug into the crest here shown and fired against Baby 700 and the heights beyond. Part of Burgess's battery (9th) was emplaced on the same crest, but fired towards the reader

Taken by P. F. E. Schull, Esq.
Aust. War Memorial Collection No. 42019

To face p. 74



VIEW FROM HUGHES'S BATTERY (7TH), SHOWING THE FRONT LINE OF THE
INFANTRY

Beyond are the enemy's trenches on Sumpers Ridge and the 400 Plateau.

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G930



BUSHES COVERING A GUN OF THE 1ST BATTERY, NEW ZEALAND FIELD
ARTILLERY, IN ITS EXPOSED POSITION ON RUSSELL'S TOP

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1073

To face p 75

500 0 500 1000 1500 YDS



POSITIONS OF THE ANZAC ARTILLERY AT THE END OF MAY, 1915
British guns and line, red, Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

deep trenches on the edge of the Top overlooking Monash Valley. The summit of the 400 Plateau lay beneath its muzzle, and the covered emplacements of the Lone Pine field-piece were in full view. Whitting burst a shell inside the port-hole of this piece, and, when two days later it again opened from under cover, he again hit the port-hole and temporarily silenced the gun.

From that time it became recognised that the artillery protecting the Australian line on the 400 Plateau was that of the other division—the guns on Russell's Top and the howitzers beneath Ari Burnu. But no corresponding adjustment was made in the system of command, and the arrangements for communication remained cumbrous. At the end of the month the respective artillery staffs were still conferring as to the best method of dealing with the enemy battery on Lone Pine. Eventually the fire of a trench-mortar of Japanese manufacture, four of which reached Anzac on May 20th, combined with that of the guns on Russell's Top, sufficiently suppressed it; later in the campaign both this and the battery upon Johnston's Jolly were removed by the Turks. It was not, however, until the Battle of Lone Pine that the 1st New Zealand Battery, with a direct telephone line to the Pimple and one of its officers observing in the front line of the 1st Australian Division, proved a deadly instrument against the Turks on the 400 Plateau. Conversely, the field-batteries which protected the N.Z. & A. sector by firing against the slopes of Baby 700 and the range behind it, and which during the main fighting of August were placed under the orders of the New Zealand artillery staff, were those of the Australians upon the 400 Plateau. These were Browne's, which had originally been placed there to deal with targets 400 yards from its front, and Phillips's. Caddy's 5th Battery, which moved to better positions overlooking Shrapnel Gully, continued to attend mainly to the head of Monash Valley, as did also Captain Trenchard's²⁸ mountain-battery in Shrapnel Gully and the New Zealand and mountain-guns on Plugge's Plateau. Thus was eventually solved, as far as was possible, the problem of protecting with artillery the two Central Sections of the Anzac line.

²⁸ Maj G. B B Trenchard; R.G.A.; of Dorsetshire, Eng.; b London, 15 June, 1885.

The problem of the Right Section, in which Rosenthal's guns overlooked the country from the south of Lone Pine to Gaba Tepe, was very different. Here the trench-lines were not close to one another, and, the danger of a sudden and powerful attack being small, the artillery was for the most part required to deal with the enemy's comparatively distant batteries in the low undulations of the Olive Grove between Gaba Tepe and Maidos.


On May 5th there was first remarked the fire of a Turkish battery from a then unascertained position. This battery, afterwards known as "Beachy Bill," was during the campaign reputed to have caused over 1,000 casualties on the Beach alone. The early shell-fire upon the Beach and boats approaching it came from a battery on the neck of the Gaba Tepe promontory, the shrapnel sweeping along the foreshore from the direct flank. This battery was destroyed or driven out of action, chiefly by the fire of the *Bacchante*,²⁹ and only a few short bursts of shelling were ever again received from Gaba Tepe itself. The fire by which the enemy attempted to harass the work on the Beach during the week following the Landing came from batteries directly inland. The shrapnel, however, was burst at such a height that it had little effect. Piles of biscuit and ammunition boxes, medical comforts, bales of fodder, which now rose in stacks on the strand, formed sufficient protection for men waiting on various duties. Meanwhile the beach parties continued to work without regarding the shell, and the mules and horses, then picqueted in long lines down the centre of the strand, appeared mostly to receive only slight wounds from occasional pellets.

On May 5th Colonel Rosenthal in the Right Section had obtained leave to bring ashore the guns of the 9th Battery—the second of the two allotted to his area—its commander, Major Burgess,³⁰ and his men having long since been ashore relieving the personnel of the 7th Battery on Bolton's Ridge. Burgess, who on this day had been sent by Rosenthal to look for possible positions and observing-stations,

²⁹ Assisted by the Australian field-gun emplaced on the evening of April 25.

³⁰ Maj.-Gen. Sir W. L. H. Sinclair-Burgess, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded 4th Aust. Div. Arty., 1917/19, N.Z. Military Forces, 1931/37. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Wellington, N.Z.; b. Longsight, Eng., 18 Feb., 1880.

was making this search when Bessell-Browne's and Phillips's batteries on the 400 Plateau were engaged in their first bombardment of Lone Pine and Baby 700. A sharp reply was drawn from Turkish guns, including a battery somewhere to the southward, which was observed to be firing—for the first time at Anzac—a high-explosive shell. Burgess discovered the direction of the fire and, having made his way back to Bolton's Hill, was making his report to Rosenthal, when heavy shell-fire was brought to bear by the same new battery upon the Bolton's Ridge (Hughes's) guns, very close to Rosenthal's headquarters. Captain Leslie⁸¹ and Lieutenant Ross,⁸² with two guns' crews of the 7th Battery, though completely exposed in their position in the firing line, gallantly turned their pieces against the hidden position, east of Gaba Tepe, from which the bombardment seemed to be coming, and continued to fire until it ceased; but in the meantime a shell, bursting in the headquarters dugout, had wounded both Rosenthal and Burgess.



Next morning the same guns opened again, shelling Phillips's and Hughes's batteries as well as the whole right of Anzac. The camp of the 3rd Field Ambulance was swept with shrapnel, patients being killed and Colonel Marshall, the second officer on Bridges' medical staff, wounded. In the large southern dépôt of food-supplies newly-formed near Brighton Beach the shells played havoc, twenty mules being killed and several men hit. The Bolton's Ridge guns again answered this battery, but Leslie and Ross were unable to locate it definitely, and could only search with their shells the concealed slopes beyond the Asmak Dere, where they believed it to be. Leslie was mortally wounded and died during the morning. The shelling temporarily ceased; but on the same

⁸¹ Capt. W. A. Leslie; 7th Bty., A.F.A. Accountant; of Brisbane; b. Hamilton, Q'land, 19 Aug., 1887. Died of wounds, 6 May, 1915.

⁸² Maj. P. J. Ross, M.C.; 11th A.F.A. Bde. Public servant, of Toowoomba, Q'land, b. Toowoomba, 31 Dec., 1885.

day a development occurred which brought the new battery to the knowledge of everyone in the area.

Early in the afternoon of May 6th the comparative quiet of the Beach was interrupted by several ranging shots coming from the south-east. At first these fell near Hell Spit at the southern end of the cove. Then range was gradually lengthened to reach the crowded Beach itself, which was systematically lashed with shrapnel. Men quickly found shelter behind the stacks of stores and in dugouts on the hill-side, but numbers of the horses and mules tied to the picquet-lines were being hit. The Turkish guns were shooting excellently, lengthening their range by fifty yards at each burst, and it was apparent that the mule-lines at the southern end of the Beach were within view of those directing the fire of the battery. About half of the Indian drivers fled; the remainder, though not knowing what action to take, stood bravely by their animals. Some officer gave the order to untether the mules and lead them southwards, a proceeding which only increased the danger. In the midst of the bursting shells were stacks of ammunition for the field-guns; around them were men of the Australian ammunition columns and beach parties, clearing them as fast as they could into safety. At the moment when the Indian mule-drivers had their animals entangled with the stores and picqueting ropes, and great confusion prevailed, Colonel Lesslie, of the corps staff, came among them and, shouting in Hindustani and working as usual in his shirt-sleeves, turned the animals up the gullies. With him were Captain Alexander³³ of the Indian Mule Cart Corps, Captains Brian Onslow and Foster, A'sD.C. to Birdwood and Bridges, and an Indian officer and several natives of the Cart Corps. These and a few others gradually led the mules clear of the shell-fire. In doing so Foster was wounded. Major Young,³⁴ Senior Supply Officer in the 1st Australian Division, and a number of others were hit during the bombardment, while thirty-four mules were killed and fourteen horses out of the twenty-four which had been landed.

Those on the Beach believed that these shells came from Gaba Tepe, and the *Bacchante* accordingly steamed

³³ Lieut.-Col. H. M. Alexander, D.S.O., O.B.E. Officer of Indian Regular Army; b. 1 Feb. 1881.

³⁴ Maj. D. P. Young, 1st Remount Unit Public servant, of Hobart; b. Hobart, 17 Oct. 1874.

in and fired at that position. But one of the fuses picked up showed that the shrapnel had been timed to burst at 5,900 metres from the gun, a fact which indicated that the battery must be farther south, beyond the Asmak Dere, and that it was undoubtedly the same that had previously shelled Hughes's battery on Bolton's Ridge.

On May 7th, for the third consecutive day, Hughes's guns were shelled, this time by a battery of old 5 9-inch howitzers as well as by those which had been previously firing. The 7th Battery again fought them, and endeavoured to direct upon them the fire of the navy as well. The enemy's guns shelled the Beach also, though not so heavily as before. Although the mule-lines had now been moved by General Birdwood's order into the gullies of Ari Burnu, strings of animals were on the shore waiting to be loaded. When the first shells burst, this time near the headquarters of the army corps, some of the Indian drivers again deserted their charges, leaving it to staff officers, men of the beach parties, army service corps, ammunition columns, and others to remove them, while Birdwood himself stood at the mouth of Anzac Gully directing. The second shell killed the Yeoman of Signals near by. In the midst of this fire men of the ammunition columns and beach parties removed to shelter the stores of ammunition which till then had been piled on the Beach.

On the following day the same enemy battery opened for the fourth time. Browne's and Phillips's positions were shelled from both north and south, one gun in each battery being hit and put out of action. The Bolton's Ridge battery, as before, replied to the fire, but Ross's gun was hit by a shell. The Beach was for a while violently bombarded, many mules being killed and seventy-four³⁵ having to be shipped away for veterinary treatment. This heavy loss led Birdwood to order that in future all transfers of stores from the Beach must be carried out at night. A number of the mules were now picqueted in the gully in which Bridges had his headquarters, and were so crowded round his offices that he was driven to take a step which he would otherwise have been slow to adopt—that of moving his headquarters to a less heavily shelled position on terraces leading off Anzac Gully, high on


³⁵ This figure included some sick mules.

the slope to Plugge's Plateau. Since Anzac Gully was free from animals, Birdwood retained his headquarters at its foot near the centre of the Beach.

The bombardment on the Beach on May 6th and 8th was so severe that strong efforts were made to prevent its recurrence. But, though it was by this time realised that the battery causing the trouble was behind the crest of a gentle rise in the plain south-east of Gaba Tepe, its exact position was still uncertain. Emplaced on a long gentle slope, half-concealed by what appeared from Anzac to be a number of scattered olive-trees—in reality stunted oaks—the guns could, when shelled, easily be moved to alternative positions. Moreover the heavy battery was strongly protected in pits so dug in an irregular echelon that if one gun were under fire another could be worked. "For days past," wrote Colonel Hobbs on May 14th, "the enemy has been shelling along the Beach. . . . I have endeavoured with frequent bursts of fire to silence these guns, which are firing from the direction of Olive Grove, but with little success. We cannot positively locate them."

It was useless to attempt to fight this carefully concealed battery with Hughes's two southern guns, standing out on the summit of Bolton's. Colonel Hobbs advised that howitzers, with aeroplanes to observe the effect of their fire, were necessary if the Olive Grove guns were to be destroyed. Of these requirements, aeroplanes were not immediately available at Anzac; but two old 6-inch howitzers of the Royal Malta Artillery, with crews of marine artillerymen, were landed during May, and one was placed in Shrapnel Gully in order to deal with the Olive Grove. These weapons, however, were erratic, and their antiquated shells, of which only 130 could be procured for each weapon, frequently failed to burst. They therefore proved of little use against this or any other target, and it was clear that the Olive Grove battery must be fought mainly with field-guns, occasionally assisted by the navy. For this purpose it was not necessary to place guns on the hilltops, since the target, being distant, could be reached by artillery firing from behind the Anzac hillcrests. Colonel Hobbs therefore caused two guns of Burgess's 9th Battery to be stationed on a lower spur of Bolton's Ridge 350 yards

in rear of Hughes's battery, and a third on a spur of M'Cay's Hill not far above Brighton Beach. On May 17th Major Burgess returned from hospital,³⁶ and two days later his remaining gun was emplaced in a covered position on top of M'Cay's Hill, firing through a casement in the face of the cliff. With these four guns Burgess fought the Olive Grove batteries until the end of the campaign.³⁷ It was, however, found impossible to destroy the batteries, though their position was



located with fair accuracy through the disturbance caused in the air by the blast of the discharge—known to artillerymen as the “flash”—which was observed under the trees of the Olive Grove. It was also known that from behind that crest at least two separate batteries were operating. Farther inland were emplaced two old 5.9-in. howitzers, while nearer the sea was a battery of six 4.2-in. guns, of which four regularly fired on Anzac and two on ships and tugs in the offing. In addition to these, in the early part of the campaign, two 4.2 howitzers used to fire from a position nearer the sea behind the Gaba Tepe promontory, while a single gun was kept in the quarry on the nearer face of Gaba Tepe itself. This last was originally watched by the *Bacchante*;³⁸ but on one occasion, when coming in to silence it, she grounded slightly, and the duty of watching it was eventually assumed by Rawson's section of the 21st Mountain Battery. So keen was the watch kept upon all enemy guns situated on or near Gaba Tepe itself, that in the later stages of the campaign they fired little, if at all. But the Olive Grove batteries burst their shells daily on the Beach until the end. Though frequently subjected from the sea and land to bombardments heavier than many of those which destroyed batteries in France, they were

³⁶ See p. 77

³⁷ See Vol. XII, plate 79.

³⁸ See Vol. XII, plate 86.


scarcely affected, invariably opening again the moment the bombardment ceased.³⁹

It thus came about that in the Right Section at Anzac, from the middle of May onwards, the guns thrust forward into the front line were rarely fired, the sector depending, except in emergencies, upon a battery in a more normal position in rear. The same was the case in the Right Central Section, and for the same reason. Whenever the advanced batteries on Bolton's Hill or the Pimple were fired, they instantly drew answering fire upon themselves and the infantry around them. Occasionally—for example upon the request of General Walker for a bombardment at dawn on May 27th—Browne's guns opened fire on Johnston's Jolly and Lone Pine, at 400 and 175 yards respectively. The reply was usually almost instantaneous. On the occasion mentioned the Turks three times hit the emplacements, fortunately just after the guns had been withdrawn, and two days later opened with a field-piece from their front trench at Johnston's Jolly, putting one of Browne's guns out of action for half the day. Damage to guns was a serious matter where the base was so distant.⁴⁰ For these reasons, in the case of both Hughes's and Browne's batteries some of the guns were eventually withdrawn to emplacements slightly in rear of the original positions. The other batteries, exposed though most of them were, had to remain in position for want of any possible alternative station. So completely under Turkish observation were many of them that at an early date they were accurately registered by the enemy and were fired upon as soon as they opened. After the first succession of heavy bombardments to which the batteries of Phillips, Browne, and Hughes had been subjected from the 5th to the 10th of May, Hobbs had informed Bridges that any gun he could emplace on the right must be completely dominated from the main range, and would certainly be destroyed as soon as it started to fire. But, although during part at least of the campaign three of the Turkish batteries

³⁹ Emplacements for fifty-five guns existed in the Olive Grove. The Australian Historical Mission visiting the position in 1919 found the ground about the central emplacements broken by shell-holes to an extent reminiscent of the battlefields of France.

⁴⁰ Many guns were repaired at Anzac by replacing damaged parts with parts of another previously injured. In June one of Bessell-Browne's eighteen-pounders was thus composed of parts of three guns. Weapons more seriously damaged, if they could not be repaired on board the warships, were sent to Alexandria.

250 0 250 500 YDS



Hunter Rogers

THE TURKISH BATTERY-POSITIONS AT THE OLIVE GROVE

Some of the emplacements here shown are alternative. The positions of the old 5.9-inch howitzers are marked 1 and 2. At 3 and 4 were guns which fired at Anzac. Some of those at 5 usually fired at the shipping. (Turkish trenches and positions, blue. Height contours 2 metres)

P Pope's
C Courtney's
D Dead Man's Ridge
Ch-Ch Chessboard
Q Quinn's TQ Turkish Quinn's
M Mortar Ridge

Russell's Top

The Nek

Baby 700

Chunuk Bair



GOT German Officers' Trench

TC Turkish Courtney's

THE HEAD OF MONASH VALLEY AS VIEWED FROM THE TURKISH POSITION AT GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH

This shows how Courtney's and Quinn's were exposed to rear and flanking fire from Dead Man's Ridge and the Chessboard. (The Anzac line lay along the ridge through "C" to "Q" and thence leapt back to "P" and Russell's. For the sake of clearness parts of the edges of the valleys have been whitened. It should be realised that there he hidden behind the edges deep valleys whose beds, if shown, would approach—and, on the left, pass—the bottom of the page.)

Just Head Memorial Official Photo. Nos. 60702-20-2.
Taken in 1919



LIEUTENANT ROSS'S GUN OF HUGHES'S BATTERY (7TH)
IN ACTION IN THE FIRING LINE ON BOLTON'S 28TH
JUNE, 1915

First War Memorial Official Photo No G1660



THE SAME GUN BEING WITHDRAWN UPON THE GERMANS
BURSTING A SHELL IN THE GUN-PIT

First War Memorial Official Photo No G1061

To face p 83

at Anzac were manned by Germans; and though the enemy's shooting was prompt and accurate, and the Australian gun-pits were often damaged, the beams broken, and parapets blown down; yet the batteries had necessarily to remain in their exposed positions. The guns, though constantly hit, were for the most part repaired locally, and during May only three Australian field-pieces were damaged beyond such repair.

As the Anzac guns must inevitably be exposed, a plan was devised for avoiding the concentrated reply to which individual batteries were subjected the moment they opened. It was arranged that, when certain exposed batteries were about to fire, the whole artillery of the corps should engage its respective targets simultaneously. This method succeeded fairly well for several days, but was difficult to organise, and naturally became impossible when, on May 23rd, by order from G.H.Q., the ammunition expenditure for each field-gun was actually cut down to two rounds per day. The system eventually employed, when firing from a battery-position likely to be bombarded, was that of setting a second battery to watch the Turkish guns from which fire was expected. When, for example, Phillips was about to fire against the end of Monash Valley, he would first ask Caddy to bombard slowly a particular Turkish battery behind Baby 700, which otherwise would inevitably shell him as soon as he began. Similarly, if Ross's gun in Hughes's battery was about to fire southwards, another gun must watch the crest of Gun Ridge, due east, for the first sign of fire from the Turkish battery there, which, if unchecked, would immediately place its shells in Ross's gun-pit. In some batteries one gun was kept constantly loaded and trained upon the particular target which it was required to watch. One of the Indian mountain-guns, for example, was kept trained upon a Turkish field-piece which occasionally opened from Gaba Tepe against Hughes's battery and the naval observation-station on Bolton's Hill. The Turkish weapon was kept in a quarry, and, before firing, had to be run out by its crew. So close was the watch maintained that the appearance of the arm and shoulder of a Turk at the edge of the quarry became the recognised signal for the firing of the Indian gun. By these means on normal days the Anzac batteries were able to fire even from exposed

positions with a fair measure of safety. Thus on the morning of May 14th Lieutenant Rawson, of the 21st Indian Mountain Battery, discovered in the Turkish trenches what appeared to be a gun-emplacement newly-constructed with the purpose of enfilading Quinn's Post at short range. Having forthwith chosen a site in the Australian trenches from which he could fire at it, Rawson had a gun-pit dug there; arranging that the rest of the artillery at Anzac should at the same time open on its several targets, he pulled down the infantry parapet and bombarded the Turkish position, destroying the emplacement. Though firing from the front line for half-an-hour, the crew of his gun suffered no casualties.

The manner in which the guns at Anzac were forced to cover one another may be illustrated by the following example. On the morning of July 9th a Turkish battery at the southern end of Gun Ridge, not far from Gaba Tepe, opened a rapid and accurate fire upon a post on the right flank of the Anzac trenches. Hughes's 7th Battery upon Bolton's at once engaged it. The right section of the Turkish battery in the Olive Grove thereupon turned upon Hughes. Burgess's 9th Battery immediately attacked the Olive Grove. Another Turkish battery on Gun Ridge, known as the "Wineglass Battery," promptly turned upon Burgess. Bessell-Browne's 8th Battery as promptly opened on the Wineglass. This silenced the Wineglass, and enabled two of Burgess's guns to assist Hughes in suppressing the fire of the Turkish battery which had first opened.

Under such conditions and in such situations the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps contrived to maintain, by the middle of May, some forty guns and six howitzers. The artillery had in the first place been compelled, largely by the driving force of General Bridges, to attempt the use of positions most of which were difficult and many impossible. "Some of the 18-pounder guns," wrote Hamilton's chief artillery officer. ". . . have been hauled up into positions such as field-guns can never have attempted to occupy before in any campaign." In the second place the artillery commanders had been impelled, by considerations normal in their branch of warfare, to contrive for themselves a somewhat crude co-ordination. Finally, since it was impossible

to shelter many of its batteries, the artillery was driven to rely upon the watchfulness and courage of its own officers and men for partial protection against the well-concealed Turkish artillery to which they themselves were completely exposed. The result was that, although the Anzac guns could not on battle days prevent the enemy from pouring in a fire as heavy as his limited ammunition supply would allow, yet the Turkish artillery could never, except in the case of a few field-pieces exposed in the firing line, suppress the Anzac guns.


To return to the general position at the beginning of May. Although Bridges had thrust forward his guns largely with the object of keeping the Turks off the 400 Plateau, it was soon proved that the available artillery could not for a moment prevent their encroachment. It became clear that if the line of the infantry must be advanced, as Bridges urged, to the eastern edge of the plateau, only the infantry itself could effect that object. The measures by which he proposed to hasten this advance, without undertaking any heavy assault, will be told in due course. For the time being the tension along the front of the 1st Australian Division was that of sniping, mining, and sapping. All open activity now centred in that sector of the other division's line which from the first was recognised by both sides as the weak point of the Anzac defences—the head of Monash Valley, and, in particular, Quinn's Post.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF MONASH VALLEY

WHILE both the Turks and the 1st Australian Division were strengthening their respective footings upon opposite sides of the 400 Plateau, the heights spanning the head of Monash Valley, which had been attacked on May 2nd by the N.Z. & A. Division, remained still in the hands of the enemy. As has already been explained, from the scrub-covered summit of Baby 700 the Turks looked straight down Monash Valley, up which ran all communication to the posts at Pope's, Quinn's, Courtney's, and Steele's. It had seemed clear that the position of the invaders must remain highly dangerous until they could seize this height. But the attempt upon May 2nd had completely failed, and during the following days the Turks had crept forward into the trenches dug that night by the 13th and 16th Battalions, and had thus established themselves on the Bloody Angle and Chessboard to the immediate left of Quinn's. Men on the roadway along the bottom of the valley began to be struck by bullets which came with deadly accuracy and from manifestly point-blank range, and it was presently realised that a Turkish sniper, or possibly more than one, must be lying in some hidden position on Dead Man's Ridge, the last spur jutting into the eastern branch of the valley, beyond Pope's and opposite to Quinn's. To this position the white track lay open at a range of from 280 to 500 yards.


This sniping, however, was as yet spasmodic, since Dead Man's was not an easy position for the enemy to occupy. Any Turk who showed on its bare summit would be immediately shot by the Australian sentries at Pope's only 100 yards away, or by the New Zealanders who overlooked it from Russell's Top. Though every day the few snipers who succeeded in ensconcing themselves either there or on the neighbouring



slopes killed or wounded men in the valley, communication was still carried on at all hours simply by treating this fire as if it did not exist.

In the posts themselves, however, at the head of the valley, the enemy's fire was at this time extremely deadly, and at least in Quinn's the garrison could only hold on by keeping its head down. As this post now became for a month the centre of almost all the fighting at Anzac, it is necessary to explain more particularly the nature of this indentation, of which only an outline has thus far been given.

Quinn's, the last fold but one in the eastern branch of Monash Valley, was the farthest Anzac post along the valley; the last of all—the Bloody Angle—had been vacant since Captain Jacobs of the 1st Battalion and his party had fallen back from it to Dead Man's Ridge and Pope's on the night of the Landing. Quinn's had been held through that wild night by a handful of New Zealanders and Australians under Major Dawson of the Auckland Battalion, who was reinforced during the dark by a New Zealand machine-gun under Lieutenant Conway.¹ But it was then an impossible position for a machine-gun, inasmuch as the opposing forces were each clinging to the edge of their own slope, forty yards apart, with a slight crest between them. About dawn Conway had taken his gun farther south to a flanking position near Courtney's, from which he could cover Quinn's. But meanwhile Dawson had been severely wounded and carried down the valley, and his force dwindled to about a third of its original numbers. As daylight grew, this handful found itself isolated in the otherwise empty valley-head, the nearest troops of its own side being several hundred yards in rear at Pope's and Courtney's, while the scrub of the Chessboard on its left and on Russell's top in its rear was occupied by the enemy. Men were being shot from behind,



HEAD OF MONASH VALLEY

Anzac positions - shaded (trenches —)
 Turkish " - white (" ----)
 1 Dead Man's Ridge 2 Bloody Angle
 3 Quinn's 4 Courtney's

¹ Maj. A. E. Conway; Canterbury Bn. Asst. clerk in law courts; of Greymouth, N.Z.; b Reefton, N.Z., 7 Apr., 1891

and shortly before dawn, the position being apparently quite untenable, the garrison withdrew.

It happened that about this hour Captain Jacobs's small party, which had been discovered at Pope's by Colonel Dobbin of the 1st, was being withdrawn to rejoin that battalion. As it reached the fork of the valley, where the stream-beds leading to Pope's and Quinn's meet, the little force retiring from Quinn's ran into it. Looking up that now empty branch of the valley, and realising the importance of the left shoulder of Quinn's, which protruded into it, Dobbin gave directions that it must be reoccupied. Accordingly the united party, now about sixty strong, clambered up the recess. As it reached the top, a nasty fire was opened upon it from the rear. In view of the smallness of his party Dobbin hesitated, and once more withdrew it; but again, as he was leaving the valley, its importance appealed to him, and he sent Jacobs to hold the position until he himself could despatch reinforcements to him. Jacobs and his handful of New Zealanders and Australians thereupon returned to the top. The fire from the rear drove them forward a few feet into the scrub on the crest, and here, partly screened by the bushes, they scratched themselves a trench a yard or so from the edge of the slope.

Lying thus on the left shoulder of the recess the garrison found itself for the time being isolated. Several yards of the slope immediately behind the trench were completely exposed to Turkish fire at short range from the rear, and, from this time onwards throughout the campaign, were closely watched. The promised reinforcement from the 1st Battalion did not immediately arrive. But suddenly there clambered to the trench a scout of the 1st Battalion, Lance-Corporal F'reame, who had been sent by Dobbin to obtain news of the party. Finding the garrison much exhausted and without water, both the scout and a New Zealander fetched a supply from the foot of the hill. F'reame then dashed down the recess again, carrying his report to his colonel. As he reached the foot of the slope his voice was heard calling out "All right." Not till afterwards did the party learn that he had been twice wounded during the descent.

Early on the morning of April 26th the 13th Battalion of the 4th Brigade was sent up Monash Valley to reinforce the

15th and 16th, parts of which were already fighting at the head of it. As the 13th turned into Monash Valley, Colonel Burnage, its commander, and Captain Durrant, his adjutant, climbed to MacLagan's headquarters on MacLaurin's Hill to obtain their orders. MacLagan pointed out to them the two dangerous gaps—one at the head of each branch of the valley—and indicated how weak was the line holding Quinn's and how it was being shot at from the rear by Turks on Russell's Top. He told Burnage to strengthen Quinn's and Pope's, and to clear Russell's of the enemy. This action Burnage proceeded to undertake. One company reinforced the 16th at Pope's; the attempted advance of another on Russell's, under Major Herring, has already been narrated;² a third under Captain Forsythe, a veteran of the war in South Africa, was sent to Quinn's; and a portion of another, including a platoon under Lieutenant Marks, was almost immediately sent from Pope's to reinforce him.

The track to Quinn's, after leaving the toe of Pope's on the left, led for some distance up the watercourse forming the bed of the right, or eastern, branch of Monash Valley. About 120 yards beyond the toe of Pope's, just when Waterfall Gully and the shoulder of Dead Man's Ridge began to appear on the left of the valley, the path branched sharply up the indentation on the right, at the summit of which Quinn's Post lay. A little way up the hill the runnel, now serving for a path, branched round the foot of a minor knuckle, which divided the indentation into two halves. The main track led up the left branch, near the top of which it again forked, this upper fork becoming afterwards the most marked feature in rear of Quinn's.³ Near the head of the left branch of this fork, at the extreme left, or northern, shoulder of Quinn's, was Jacobs's position. Forsythe occupied the same half of the indentation, but a little nearer to the centre; Marks filled a gap between the two, which he found occupied only by Sergeant Shapley⁴ and one man. A few short communication trenches, a yard or two in length, were dug to the rear slope of the hill; but that slope was so dangerous that these were mere

² *Vol. I*, pp. 500-2.

³ See plates at pp 51 187, and 220, and *Vol. XII*, No. 76. At the fork was headquarters

⁴ Sgt. E. A. Shapley (No. 676, 13th Bn). Station bookkeeper; of Melbourne; b. Hawthorn, Vic., 10 Apr., 1891. Died of wounds, 29 Apr., 1915.

"death-traps." So perilous was the approach from the rear that, when once a party was in the line, it was practically cut off except at night. Beyond observing that a few men had reached his neighbourhood, Jacobs, completely worn out, did not even realise for several days that the position had been reinforced. During the same time Forsythe was unaware of Jacobs's existence, though he knew that the remnant of an original garrison—consisting of a few men from almost every battalion in the army corps—was still somewhere on his left. The Turks were close on the other side of the crest, and on April 26th and 27th, in the repeated charges made by the troops at Quinn's (as also at Courtney's and Steele's) to clear their immediate front, Forsythe lost two of his subalterns, H. T. Watkins^a killed and F. G. Granger^b wounded.

As has been explained, the indentation was divided into two by a minor knuckle, or knoll, running like a buttress up its centre. The main position was to the left of this knuckle, and it was up the left gully that lay the chief path of approach—later transformed into a wide shallow communication trench. The central knuckle itself was always a death-trap, and the sections of the post to north and south of it were at first completely separated. When a further reinforcement—two companies of the 14th under Major Adams—was sent to Quinn's on April 27th, its main concern appears to have been with the southern corner of the post. Adams was wounded, and it was not till next day that his successor got into touch with either Jacobs or Forsythe. Captain Hoggart and a number of men of the 14th were lost, being mostly struck down by machine-gun fire while trying to dig in. The 14th (Victorian) Battalion was hampered by a certain feebleness of some of its senior officers, and about this time there occurred some alleged default which caused bad blood between it and the 15th (Queensland). The event left an unfortunate tradition, which, encouraged by foolish partisans, persisted until after the Evacuation.

On April 29th the 14th at Quinn's was relieved by six officers and 220 men of the 15th, now collected from other parts of the line under Captain Quinn. Jacobs, with his

^a Lieut. H. T. Watkins; 13th Bn. Agricultural experimentalist; of Richmond, N S W.; b. North Sydney, 7 Oct., 1894. Killed in action, 27 Apr., 1915.

^b Lieut. F. G. Granger; 13th Bn. Duntroon graduate; b. 28 June, 1895.

remnant, was withdrawn; Marks, who, in his short trench, had lost some 6 men killed and 20 wounded, was also withdrawn on May 1st. But Forsythe's company remained in occupation of the left shoulder of the recess, and, since all its subalterns except one, Lieutenant Binnie,⁷ had been hit, Marks was immediately sent back to it. Thus for a period Forsythe's company held the left of Quinn's, and Quinn's company the centre and right.

The gallant defence of the centre and right of the post during the ensuing week by Quinn's company (and especially by Lieutenants Frank Armstrong and L. Collin) has already been narrated.⁸ The story has also been told of the constant Turkish attacks ending on May 1st, and of the first organised attempt by the Anzac troops on May 2nd to thrust the enemy from his positions overlooking Monash Valley. The right flank of that attack brushed past the extreme left of Quinn's, which was not itself involved. But the mere strain of holding the post was equivalent to that of a battle. Stray men from the other companies, who had served there, used to speak in awestruck tones of the bombs which the enemy threw. Stories were related of Turkish attacks during which the garrison fired until rifles jammed with the heat and bayonets became twisted. Men passing the fork of Monash Valley, and seeing and hearing the bombs bursting up at Quinn's, used to glance at the place (as one of them said) "as a man looks at a haunted house."

Within a week of the Landing most of the isolated fire-trenches immediately above the edge of the slope had been joined, and in certain places short saps or tunnels had been driven, from the heads of which a further firing line was being made. But the right half of the firing line had not yet been connected with the left. Here, where the knoll before-mentioned intervened, there was still on May 9th a gap of several yards. The post was thus divided into a northern and southern sector, each of which was about this time further divided into three sub-sections. These were numbered from the right—Nos. 1, 2, and 3 being in the right

⁷ Lieut. G. W. Binnie; 13th Bn. Merchant; of Brighton, Vic.; b. Brighton, 6 May, 1885. Killed in action, 3 May, 1915.

⁸ *Vol. I*, pp. 579-81. Lieut. D. S. Freeman (of Cootamundra, N.S.W.) was killed in the first week in May.

half of the post, and 4, 5, and 6 in the left.⁹ It became the practice to place a subaltern in charge of each sub-section, while a more senior officer usually commanded each half of the post. Starting from the extreme left, where Jacobs and Marks had originally been stationed, No. 6 Subsection was a trench some fourteen yards in length, fairly deep, and about five feet wide. To keep out fire from the back a heavy parados of sandbags was at some time built along its rear. Its left extremity was blocked with sandbags, probably by the men under Marks, who, on the night of May 3rd, filled in the nearest trench dug by the 16th during its unsuccessful attack on May 2nd. There were niches in the rear wall of the trench in which men could sit, and one or two recesses in the front wall also. The enemy's opposing line was slightly over the crest, out of sight and about thirty yards distant. The right end of No. 6 was blocked with sandbags, but a hole in this barricade—the only means of exit or approach in this sub-section—enabled men to crawl through into No. 5.

No. 5 Subsection was about twenty-six yards long. It had once consisted of two short trenches, but the partition had been cut through, leaving a narrow passage. The channel of entrance to this sub-section was a low tunnel, with its opening near the hole into No. 6 and leading to a support trench and to a communication trench running down the hill to the rear. The left end of No. 5 near the tunnel was very wide and exposed, and was known as "The Death-Trap."

The front line of No. 5 was at this time connected with that of No. 4 only by a deviation through the support trench. It was at the southern end of No. 4 that the trenches began to come into very close proximity to those of the enemy, the nearest point being in the dangerous bomb-swept angle of No. 3. A communication trench led up to the support trench of No. 4, whence two low tunnels—afterwards a system of eight—gave access to the front line.

About fifteen yards from where No. 4 Subsection ended and No. 3 began there was, when all the trenches were eventually connected, a veritable meeting of the ways. The

⁹ See sketch on p. 202.

front line was here slightly indented; the support trenches from both flanks of No. 3 led into it; the main communication trench ran up from the rear. The support trenches were ultimately roofed over, and the place (which had been referred to by one who knew it as "The Five Ways") became a centre of dark alleys. About ten feet to the right of the indentation was a curved section of front line, afterwards made ragged by Turkish bombing and, since men usually passed through it at a run, known as "The Racecourse." This formed one of The Five Ways and was the sector which ran closest to the Turkish trenches, the enemy occupying at the end of May several positions only five or six yards from its parapet, while his main front trench was but seventeen yards distant. South of this the front of Quinn's bent back at an angle, and Nos. 2 and 1 Subsections gradually receded from the enemy, No. 1, next to Courtney's, being a comparatively comfortable position overlooking the gully. Communication with Nos. 1 and 2 was at first through No. 3; later, when a tunnel was driven to Courtney's, it was through that tunnel and so to Monash Valley.

The trench system here described developed gradually during the first three weeks of May, but even when it was complete the summit of the rear slope at Quinn's was everywhere dangerous ground. Especially so were the knoll in the right centre¹⁰ and the short communication trench originally dug on the left. Thus on the morning after the attack of May 2nd, when a few men from the flank of the 16th fell back and jumped into the left of Quinn's, at least five of them were hit while running through this communication trench; and on the same day Lieutenant Binnie, in coming up the same trench, after showing two officers round the post, was shot through the heart. As has been explained, Dead Man's Ridge looked into this post from its left rear, at a distance of 100 yards; the Chessboard overlooked it from the left; German Officers' Ridge enfiladed it from its direct right;¹¹ some thirty yards from its front the Turks held the reverse slope of the same ridge and were sapping daily closer. Up the long hidden valley leading past the Turkish side of the

¹⁰ See Vol. XII, plate 76.

¹¹ See plate at p. 82, also Vol. I, p. 578, and plates at pp. 571 and 587.

ridge ran one of the enemy's covered ways of approach to the Chessboard and Baby 700. The Turks had therefore an easy means of moving troops from either flank to their trenches opposite the post, while the fact that Quinn's lay lower than the ridges on either side made it impossible for the garrison to raise their heads to the level of the parapets either to observe or to fire. Troops new to the post always suffered heavily. For example, a detachment of marines, which together with the 16th Battalion eventually relieved Quinn and Forsythe, lost at day-break of May 8th no less than nine men killed or wounded by fire from the Chessboard or Dead Man's Ridge. Similarly the 16th had at once lost Lieutenant Kretchmar,¹² mortally hit through the head, and Major Baker,¹³ shot through the lung. Moreover at the beginning of the campaign the trenches of Quinn's and Courtney's were constantly mistaken for those of the enemy, and Captain Jess of the 4th Brigade was employed for several days in visiting all the posts in this corner and ensuring that the occupants of each should recognise the trenches of the posts on their flanks. Several months after the Landing shots were still fired into Quinn's from the Australian trenches at the Pimple.

Since it was death for any man to show his head, the only alternative in observing was to use periscopes, but these were shot down at once unless most cautiously exposed. The 16th had its whole allotment shot away immediately, and though they were now being rapidly manufactured on the Beach, they were still rare in the trenches. "They are invaluable," wrote Major Tilney in pressing for three more to be sent to Quinn's. Even when the supply began to increase, they were shot down by snipers on the Chessboard so quickly that it was difficult to keep one unbroken long enough to detect the faint whirl of dust below the muzzle of the enemy's rifle, indicating the point from which the shots came. So long as the Turks could maintain this watch over the position, it was impossible to answer such fire.

At this stage, therefore, the situation at Quinn's was that the Australians must keep their heads down, while the Turks

¹² Lieut. E. H. Kretchmar; 16th Bn. Accountant; of Geraldton, W. Aust., b Auckland, N.Z., 28 Apr., 1883. Killed in action, 6 May, 1915.

¹³ Col. E. K. Baker, V D.; 16th Bn. Clerk and draughtsman; of St. Peters, S. Aust.; b Adelaide, 26 Dec. 1875.

above them, both to left and right, were able to hold theirs up. That is to say, the enemy at this point had established a superiority of fire which it seemed impossible to combat. "It is noticeable," said General Godley in an order of May 2nd, "that the superiority of fire all along the line belongs to the enemy." He pointed out that this was partly due to the Turkish methods of sharp-shooting, and must be met by similar methods. But no sniping system had yet been organised on the Australian side, and it was barely possible to fire a rifle in Quinn's Post during the day. The 15th, when they came to the post, remarked that the Turks in the nearest trenches merely held their rifles above their heads and fired into space. The 15th themselves fired very little, the sentries merely sitting in the recesses in the back or front wall of the trench. Such few shots as they did fire were aimed as best was possible in the manner thus adopted by the Turks.¹⁴ As the enemy, only thirty yards away, might at any moment rush the position, the front trenches were, by order of Birdwood himself, to be left comparatively shallow, so that the garrison might in an instant man the parapet.

The strain of such a precarious method of defence was increased by the bombs now regularly thrown at the post by the Turks. Bombing was still entirely strange to the Anzac soldiers, and this sector, being so far the only one in which they were regularly confronted with it, was regarded with especial dislike. Although at this stage almost all the enemy's bombs fell short of the trenches, the fact that no reply could be made to them imposed a severe tension on the garrison. It was true that "jam-tin" bombs were now being manufactured by several sections of Australian and New Zealand engineers, who, together with some British seamen, worked at Corps Headquarters on the Beach; but no regular supply even of these clumsy missiles began until the end of the first week in May, and they were regarded with much suspicion when they came to hand. Thus on May 7th Major Quinn came up to Lieutenant Little¹⁵ in No. 6 Subsection carrying two bombs, and instructed him not to throw them

¹⁴ This method was probably nowhere else regularly practised by Australians, although often by the enemy.

¹⁵ Lieut. E. M. Little; 15th Bn. School teacher; of Brisbane; b. Barcaldine, Q'land, 6 July, 1893.

needlessly, as the supply was very small. Little and his men put the dangerous objects in safe resting-places and left them scrupulously alone until, during the night, an alarm occurred. No one knew how a bomb should be thrown, but a Queenslander who had been a miner in civil life volunteered to make the experiment. He slit the fuse at the top; placed a match in the slit at right-angles to the fuse; lit the match, and, as soon as the fuse sparked, threw the bomb. After a considerable interval—the fuses at that time being far too long—it exploded. The other bomb was preserved intact until morning. The Turks, on the other hand, had by order of Liman von Sanders been trained in throwing their well-designed “cricket-ball” bombs, of which throughout the campaign they appeared to possess an inexhaustible supply.

The garrison at Quinn's, for whom the throwing of each grenade was an experiment, was thus forced to recognise that the enemy had the local mastery in bombing, as he had in rifle-fire. It knew also that, if it became isolated and surrounded by a rush of the enemy, there was every possibility that the guns of its own side would be turned upon its position. There was little at any time for it to do, except to sit low in its trenches and wait. Yet few officers or men of the Quinn's garrison ever doubted that, if attacked, they would retain the position.

Such were the circumstances under which Forsythe's company of the 13th and Quinn's of the 15th, which had been sent to this post on Tuesday and Wednesday, April 27th and 28th, were still holding it on Tuesday, May 4th. It was almost impossible under such conditions that these trenches should progress as rapidly or systematically as was the case elsewhere. Special working parties could not be spared by the 4th Brigade, whose scattered companies were not released from other sectors until the end of April, and had then to be thrown into the costly attack of May 2nd. Moreover the N.Z. & A. Division included only one field company, consisting of New Zealand engineers. The greater part of this, as well as the chief engineer of the division, were daily engaged at Quinn's and the other posts at the head of the valley; but, though an additional half-company was borrowed from the 1st Australian Division, so many were the tasks in that vital area that Quinn's could receive no special supervision, nor, probably,

was it at that time sufficiently inspected by the staff to ensure the continuous performance of the work there planned.

On the afternoon of May 4th, as part of the reorganisation after the departure of the two infantry brigades to Helles, the 16th Battalion—now very weak—and 200 of the marines, who had also suffered heavily, were at last sent to relieve Forsythe's and Quinn's companies, which had held the place for no less than a week. During the progress of this operation General Godley was present; Forsythe's company had come out, and the "change-over" had already been partly completed, when the enemy burst a bomb in No. 2 Subsection, wounding five of the nine marines who were holding it. The remaining four rushed to the rear, spreading the alarm that an attack was imminent. Godley, who was on the slope behind the post and was unaware of its dangerous areas, ordered the supports to man the central knoll. Forsythe shouted a warning, but not in time to prevent some of the men reaching the summit, where they were shot by an enemy machine-gun which opened immediately from the flank. The incident had again proved that a relief in dangerous sectors could not be safely entrusted to young, raw, and over-strained troops. Forsythe's weary men were at once turned back into the trenches, to remain there until the marines became accustomed to them,¹⁶ and Godley, impressed by the danger, ordered that the supports at Courtney's, Quinn's, and Pope's must bivouac and sleep higher up the slope.

Eventually, early on May 5th, Quinn's and Forsythe's men left the post to the 16th Battalion and marines, the whole being under the command of Colonel Pope. Pope's was similarly held by 100 marines and 100 of the 13th, under Colonel Burnage. Courtney's was to be garrisoned exclusively by the 14th; the 15th, and the remainder of the Marine Brigade, were held in local reserve. Brigadier-General Trotman, of the marines, commanded the section, Colonel Monash, of the 4th Brigade, acting under him. Monash endeavoured to relieve the strain on the garrison of Quinn's by arranging that the front-line troops there should serve only for short periods of duty, each turn being followed by an equal period of rest. To

¹⁶ Some of the 16th who served next week in Quinn's with the marines spoke of them, especially of the N.C.O's, as good mates and brave soldiers.

this end he now laid it down that, while the 13th should permanently garrison Pope's, and the 14th Courtney's, the 15th and 16th should alternate every forty-eight hours at Quinn's. In accordance with this arrangement the 15th, after bivouacking for two days on the somewhat dangerous slopes of Monash Valley, returned to Quinn's Post on the evening of May 6th. But at this stage the 16th was ordered to detach 200 men to work upon the Beach, and since it comprised only 293 officers and men all told, the next relief could not be carried out in due time. The system was, however, subsequently reverted to, and became the routine for the valley.

Quinn's was so close to the Turkish position on the same ridge that it was safe from enemy artillery unless the Turks could emplace a gun directly on its flank. On the morning of May 9th such a gun opened from the rear of Johnston's Jolly, bursting its shells along the shallow trenches of the post, destroying twenty-five yards of parapet and killing and wounding men.¹⁷ On the same day the Turkish saps on the other side of the crest began to approach so closely that the fire of bombs became markedly heavier, although most of them still fell short of the trenches. Moreover, apprehension of a further danger was beginning to be felt. Except for a few parched twigs and stumps the scrub had now mostly been shot away, and the parapet of the Turkish trenches on the other side of the narrow spur could here and there be seen. At one point there had been observed a mound suggesting the heap about the mouth of a mine-shaft. As it seemed probable that the enemy might attempt to undermine and blow up Quinn's, it was decided on May 5th to take the precaution of driving in from the rear slope three tunnels, in which listeners might be placed to detect any sound of mining on the part of the enemy, and from which, if any were heard, he might be countermined. These were accordingly begun on May 8th by the New Zealand engineers. Working with entrenching tools, and carrying back the "spoil" in sandbags, the sappers could make but slow progress, but on May 9th their work was sufficiently advanced to enable them to "listen." No sounds

¹⁷ An officer of the N.Z. engineers had his leg shattered; two men were buried beneath the tumbled earth and several others were hit. Lieut. K. H. Anderson (of Hobart and Zeehan, Tas.), who had arrived only a few hours before, was killed

of enemy mining were heard, and Major Carter,¹⁸ then commanding in the trenches, reported that the mound over the supposed mine-shaft might be only a machine-gun position.

Even if the Turkish works were only trenches, their existence so close to the front of Quinn's naturally caused great anxiety to General Godley, who considered the post a crucial one¹⁹ and was exceedingly desirous to obtain information as to the strength of the Turks and the nature of their works at that point. Early on the morning of the 9th he visited Monash Valley²⁰ to make inquiries, and on returning to his headquarters telephoned to Monash orders for a reconnaissance to be made from Quinn's Post during the ensuing night. The arrangements were left to Colonel Cannan, whose battalion at Quinn's would have to carry it out. "The general says we must find out what is going on behind the Turks' high parapet," said Cannan to his junior officers when dictating his order. "We are to send out scouts or to make a reconnaissance in force. There is only one thing to do, for you know what chance scouts have out there." He decided to seize the opposing trenches by means of three assaulting parties, totalling about 100 men, viz.:

Left Party—Officer and twenty-five;

Centre Party—Officer and forty-five;

Right Party—Officer and twenty-five.

As it had been made clear by Godley that any captured trenches were, if possible, to be held, Cannan arranged that the attacking force should be followed by three digging parties, totalling a further forty-nine men, who were to make the

¹⁸ Lieut.-Col. H. R. Carter, 15th Bn. Company manager and consular agent for France; of Brisbane; b. Brisbane, 31 Jan., 1875. Died, 14 July, 1934.

¹⁹ It was sometimes argued that Quinn's was not a vital position, inasmuch as its loss might not have made it necessary to evacuate the other posts in Monash Valley. The argument was academic to this extent, that no commander was likely to evacuate Quinn's in order to test its truth.

²⁰ He there conferred with Gen. Trotman, Col. Monash, Maj. Festing (brigade-major to Trotman), and all the battalion commanders of the 4th Brigade. Col. Cannan of the 15th, then occupying the post, was of opinion that the Turks were not in great strength, and with this some of his officers agreed, it being thought that the enemy's main force had been sent to meet the heavy attacks in progress at Helles. But to test such suppositions by patrolling was, in this sector, impossible. Such an attempt had been made from Pope's by the 15th Battalion on the night of May 8, in order to ascertain the position of the Turks close in front on Dead Man's Ridge. A sergeant and four corporals had been sent out and had succeeded in reaching the old trenches of the 13th on that ridge, but they were then heavily fired upon from several directions, the sergeant being killed and three of the others severely wounded, one not returning. At Quinn's patrolling was out of the question.

captured trenches suitable for defence and to dig three communication trenches to them. The making of communication trenches was an urgent work, since it was certain that no man would be able to cross the crest in the open after dawn. Unless, therefore, these trenches were finished before day-break, the men in the captured position would be completely cut off from supplies and reinforcements.

The whole operation was strictly in accordance with the policy laid down by G.H.Q. of making minor attacks on the Anzac front. With it began the series of fierce local assaults and counter-assaults which continued for a month at this most precarious post in the Anzac line—the Anzac leaders endeavouring to improve what appeared to be an almost impossible position, the enemy attempting to take advantage of its weakness in order to break the line at its most vulnerable point. As this was the heaviest of these attacks, and was typical of them all, the arrangements made for it may be described in some detail.


At 5 p.m. Cannan called together all his officers at the headquarters of Quinn's and explained the plans, particularly stressing two points—first, that the commander of each party should inform the post-headquarters of all difficulties (for which purpose three messengers were to be sent with each); second, that as soon as any commander decided that a captured Turkish trench was suitable for holding as a front line, it should at once be made defensible by transferring its parapet to the opposite side. With this object every man was to carry two empty sandbags, and his entrenching tool stuck in his belt ready for immediate use. As soon as a party-commander decided which enemy trench was to be occupied, he was to set alternate men working and firing, and was to send for the digging party either to improve the fire-trench or to dig the communication trench—whichever work appeared more urgent. The signal for the attack was to be a long burst of fire from the 13th Battalion's machine-gun at Pope's. In order to ensure surprise, there was to be no cheer, but the troops were to creep over their parapet and then, when the leader of each party rose, to rise with him and dash to the Turkish line.

Cannan, after explaining these plans, allowed them to be discussed. Thereupon one young Tasmanian officer,

Lieutenant Hinman,²¹ urged a strong objection to the whole undertaking, pointing out that in the morning following the assault the Australians would certainly be driven out of any captured trenches by the Turkish machine-guns, which would enfilade them from both flanks. Cannan answered that the object was reconnaissance. If the trenches could not be taken or held, the commander of the party must use his discretion as to withdrawing, it being understood that the desire was to hold all advanced positions wherever possible. The main thing was that the battalion should do what it was asked to do. He warned his officers not to allow useless firing, and then ordered that lots should be drawn among the juniors for the leadership of the three assaulting parties and of the central digging party. The lots fell thus: Left Party—Lieutenant H. G. Smith;²² Centre Party—Lieutenant F. C. Youden;²³ Right Party—Lieutenant H. P. Armstrong.²⁴

Of the digging parties the central (twenty-four men) was placed under Lieutenant Frank Armstrong, the left and right (eleven men each) under sergeants. All the parties were to assemble in the front line of Quinn's, the only other troops in which would be a number of picked men to act as garrison during the fight. The rest of the 15th was to be in the support trenches, and Cannan was informed that he could, if necessary, call upon the 16th also for support. The assault was to be made at 9 p.m. In the meantime the officers returned to their companies and for the most part gave their men an outline of the plan.

For that part of the 15th which had not previously been in Quinn's the hours before the action were full of strange experience. Shortly after dark



²¹ Lieut. A. G. Hinman; 15th Bn. Mining engineer, of Launceston and Waratah, Tas.; b. Launceston, 10 June, 1890. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915.


²² Lieut. H. G. Smith; 15th Bn. Farmer; of Ayr, Q'land; b. Daylesford, Vic., 1894. Died of wounds, 10 May, 1915.

²³ Lieut. F. C. Youden; 15th Bn. Musician; of Bundaberg, Q'land; b. Glasgow, Scotland, 1882. Killed in action, 8 Aug., 1915.

²⁴ Lieut. H. P. Armstrong; 15th Bn. Clerk; of Townsville, Q'land, b. Townsville, 24 Feb., 1891. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915. Member of the Australian team at Bisley, 1913.

four star-shells or flares were, for the first time, fired from the Turkish reserve line on Mortar Ridge, lighting up all the summits and slopes around Courtney's and Mule Valley. The enemy then burst into heavy rifle-fire, and, since this might indicate that he had some suspicion of the impending attack, the assault was postponed for an hour. For what seemed an eternity the men waited, while the Turkish bullets thumped the other side of the parapet. At 10 the start was again postponed until 10.45, at which hour there was heard the pre-arranged burst of machine-gun fire on the left at Pope's. The leaders and their men crawled over the parapet. In doing so Youden, commanding the centre party, and seven of his men were hit. When all were out, Sergeant Hunter,³⁵ Youden's second-in-command, rose and called out, and all the assaulting parties rushed forward. A few scattered shots were heard, followed by shouts as the centre party reached the front Turkish trench. Then there broke from all the head of the valley the tremendous roar of rifle-fire which always accompanied any activity at Quinn's. At the start about fifty yards separated the flanks of the assaulting parties. Word almost immediately came back from the commanders of the left and centre that they had driven the Turks from their trench, and that their own men were now digging. But the officer in charge of the right of Quinn's reported that on his front there was no sign of life, and he feared that the right party had been destroyed.

The centre party had charged across No-Man's Land, at one point crossing a shallow trench, which either had been lately begun by the Turks or was an old trench abandoned. It may have been occupied by a listening-post, for a Turk lying in or near it shot at one of the signallers as they ran forward, but was himself killed by the next man with his pick. Almost immediately the enemy's high front-line parapet was reached



³⁵ Sgt. R. A. Hunter, M.M. (No. 451, 15th Bn.). Miner; of Maryborough, Q'land; b Maryborough, 17 March, 1892.

About twenty of the Turks behind it were shot or bayoneted. Others fled, chased by one gallant Queenslander, Private Byrne,²⁶ who was never seen again. In the meantime one of the party's messengers, Private Toft²⁷—who crossed No-Man's Land many times that night—ran back to Quinn's with the news that Youden had been shot. Hearing this, Frank Armstrong, who was waiting with his digging party, decided to go forward at once and take command, leaving his men in charge of Lieutenant Sampson.²⁸

Armstrong found the centre party occupying about fifty yards of the old Turkish front line. Its parapet—now at the men's backs—was largely composed of ammunition-boxes filled with earth,²⁹ and was nearly three feet high, but the trench itself was only three feet deep, straight, and without parados. The men of the 15th were therefore much exposed. Parallel to it at some distance there ran a further Turkish trench, beyond which lay the long valley between Mortar Ridge and this. Armstrong decided to hold the line he then occupied. He therefore sent for Sampson's digging party, which, distributed along the trench, at once began to transpose the parapet. Though the enemy's fire was heavy, it was scattered and not withering. Armstrong's main cause of anxiety now was that he had no touch with either the left or the right party. He consequently conferred with Sampson and asked him to see if the right party was in the same trench.

Making his way from the centre party southwards along the captured trench, Sampson found thirty yards of it completely empty. He next came upon two of the enemy, who were so busily engaged in firing at Quinn's that they did not observe him, and were easily shot with his revolver. Immediately after passing them he stumbled upon three wounded Australians, who proved to belong to the right party. On being asked where it was, they replied: "Chasing Turks down the gully." Shots, shouts, and din coming from that direction evidenced the fact.

²⁶ Pte. H. F. Byrne (No. 417, 15th Bn.). Labourer; b. Maryborough, Q'land. 1885. Killed in action, 9 May, 1915.

²⁷ Capt. J. P. G. Toft, M.C., M.M.; 15th Bn. Public servant; of Bundaberg, Q'land, b. Bundaberg, 11 Nov., 1894.

²⁸ Maj. B. Sampson, D.S.O.; 15th Bn. Timber yard manager; of Launceston, Tas; b. Launceston, 30 March, 1882.

²⁹ The loop-holes in it were oblique

Sampson reconnoitred the empty trench. In it or along its edge lay some thirty dead Turks, evidently killed by the missing party. The trench itself was shallow, un-traversed, and almost straight—a fact which supported the probability that it would be swept next day by fire from the enemy's flanking posts. It ran direct to the edge of Mule Valley, where it ended. Near this point two communication trenches led up from a maze of trenches and pits farther down the slope. In front the scrub, which here clothed the crest, reached for some thirty yards to the edge of the long valley. The right digging party presently arrived—Sampson having sent one of the wounded to fetch it—and with it came thirty men under Corporal Vincent.³⁰ These Sampson distributed along the trench, until they connected with the flank of the centre party, special posts being stationed at the head of the two Turkish communication saps. Then, all being perfectly quiet on this flank, he went northwards and reported the position, first to Armstrong, and then to Colonel Cannan at Quinn's.


So far, despite the first somewhat alarming report that the right party had been destroyed, the attack had developed exceedingly well. On receiving that ill report at 11 p.m. Cannan had asked for two companies of the 16th, the whole of which battalion shortly afterwards came up and waited on the slope in rear of the support trenches. One of its platoons³¹ was sent out to strengthen the right, but before its arrival there, most of the missing party under H. P. Armstrong had returned. It appeared that advancing in silence with the bayonet they had completely surprised the enemy. After passing a couple of tents, killing the occupants, the party swept round into the valley behind the Turkish Quinn's. On the slope was a company or more of Turks, asleep in their blankets. No alarm had yet been given, but it was considered that the numbers of the enemy were far too great to allow of quarter being safely given. Some of the Turks bolted to the rear. The rest were shot or bayoneted. In a headquarters, in which a candle flickered, four or five were killed about the telephone. The Queenslanders smashed the instruments, cut the wires, and collected the papers, which they afterwards

³⁰ Cpl. R. Suckling (served as No. 508, R. Vincent, 15th Bn.). Actor; b. Christ church, N.Z., 1885. Killed in action, 9/10 May, 1915.

³¹ Apparently that under Lieut G C Curlew (of Fremantle, W. Aust.).

passed to Armstrong. On the declivity beside several dug-outs was a heap of spoil, and above it the mouth of a tunnel, into which Corporal Tickner³² fired, but without drawing a reply. According to one account, after the valley had been cleared of Turks and picqueted, a messenger reached Armstrong warning him that he was too far advanced. At all events he reassembled his party and returned to the Australian line. The raid had no doubt crushed the enemy's local defence system upon that flank of Quinn's. The Queenslanders had lost few men,³³ and eventually, reinforced by some of Lieutenant Svensen's³⁴ men from the right trench of Quinn's, helped to garrison its proper section of the new line, while Svensen strung out other men across No-Man's Land to dig a communication trench from the right of Quinn's to the captured position.

The communication trench leading from Quinn's to Frank Armstrong's central party was also progressing. Sampson, after returning with his message to Cannan, had been ordered to superintend this task, and had lined out across No-Man's Land the garrison of Nos. 2 and 3 Subsections of Quinn's together with twenty marines. Unaimed bullets were flying thickly, but they only served to speed the work. Similarly a third line of men had been distributed between the left of Quinn's and the captured trench. This last area, however, was close to the strongly occupied Turkish positions on the Chessboard, and the fire being heavy, the digging party fell back on Quinn's and attempted to sap from there. But since this process would obviously be too slow, Lieutenant Hinman—the same who had urged objections to the whole enterprise, and who was that



³² Lieut. M. R. Tickner, D.C.M.; 19th Bn. Clerk, b. Sydney, 22 July, 1892. Killed in action, 20 Sept., 1917.

³³ According to Pte. H. J. Myles (of Rockhampton, Q'land), who was one of the party. Another account states that 9 of the 20 men were never heard of again.

³⁴ Lieut. N. T. Svensen, 15th Bn. Draughtsman, of South Brisbane, b. Larvik, Norway, 27 Sept., 1878.

night in charge of No. 6 Subsection of Quinn's—took his men out into the open to continue the work. "It's perfectly safe," he said. A few minutes later he was killed by a bullet through the head. Nevertheless the men remained digging across the old No-Man's Land, Lieutenant Little, who now succeeded Hinman in Quinn's, superintending their work. Thus by midnight all three communication trenches were being speedily dug across the old No-Man's Land, in each case by men working in the open.

Although gallant men continually risked their lives to ensure that headquarters should be kept fully informed,³⁵ the intelligence which reached Cannan was disconnected and fragmentary. Eventually Captain Harry,³⁶ acting adjutant of the 15th, volunteered to bring news of each party. After reporting that all was well with the left and right, he again went forward to find Frank Armstrong of the centre party. He reached the trench, but was never seen again.

As a matter of fact the position of the centre party was by no means so secure as it appeared to be. The number of men now in its trench was so great that they could scarcely move, much less dig. The enemy's parapet had been found to be composed largely of rotting bodies, which the Turks had evidently thrust from their trench and covered with a few inches of soil. This fact, and the absence of materials, had resulted in little progress being made in the transference of the parapet to the other side of the trench, and when the space became crowded all work was stopped. The men merely fired heavily—as new troops are inclined to do—although the targets were but vague. Meanwhile Frank Armstrong endeavoured to relieve the congestion by having his wounded men carried across No-Man's Land to Quinn's.


When this task had been partly completed he sent one of the men engaged in it, Corporal Craven,³⁷ to renew touch with the right party under H. P. Armstrong. Making his way over the top, Craven found part of the trench empty, and then

³⁵ Pte. W. Gordon (of Townsville, Q'land), for example, was several times wounded when upon such errands.

³⁶ Capt. S. W. Harry, 15th Bn. Town clerk, b. 9 Feb., 1882. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915.

³⁷ Brig. J. Craven, DCM; 14th Bn Seaman, of Brisbane; b Halifax, Yorks., Eng., 4 May, 1894.

ran suddenly into a body of Turks occupying either the captured trench or—as it seemed to him—one nearer to Quinn's Post and actually in rear of Armstrong's line. It was possible that he had lost his way, since he could see a light burning in some Turkish company headquarters down the slope behind the enemy, but in any case the Turks were now manifestly between the centre and right parties. They flung a shower of bombs at him, one of which knocked him into an empty trench. With difficulty he found his bearings and reached Quinn's, from which he made his way back to Frank Armstrong, who thus learned for the first time that he was cut off from the right party. With the left he had never obtained touch. He had at different times sent back two of his sergeants, Stormonth³⁸ and Sparks,³⁹ to report the fact. In consequence Colonel Cannan despatched to him Lieutenant Harwood,⁴⁰ with thirty men of the 16th, and ordered patrols to be sent by the centre party towards the left and *vice versa*. As no word of these came back, Major Margolin⁴¹ was next sent with a further thirty under orders to enter Frank



Armstrong's trench and advance along it to the left, so as to link up. But on reaching Armstrong's trench Margolin found it so crowded that there was no room for his men, who had to lie down outside. Stumbling upon Harwood's party lying in the same manner in the old No-Man's Land, he set it to assist in digging the central communication trench. Then, since his own men were being uselessly killed, he returned to Cannan, and was instructed to withdraw them. Searching the space between the trenches with a faithful assistant,

³⁸ Capt S. L. Stormonth; 15th Bn. Clerk of petty sessions; of Toowoomba and Nambour, Q'land; b. Killarney, Q'land, 17 Apr., 1888. Died, 13 Sept., 1935.

³⁹ Lieut J. E. Sparks; 15th Bn. Clerk, of Manly, N.S.W.; b. Ipswich, Q'land, 1894.

⁴⁰ Maj. (temp. Lieut.-Col.) R. Harwood, D.S.O. Commanded 16th Bn., temp., 1917/18. Farmer; b. Fremantle, W. Aust., 17 Oct., 1878.

⁴¹ Lieut.-Col. E. L. Margolin, D.S.O. Merchant; of Collie, W. Aust., b. Bielgorod, Central Russia, 26 March, 1875.

Signaller Silas,⁴² he succeeded in getting forty men of the 16th back to Quinn's.

It was exactly at this time, between 2 and 3 a.m., that Lieutenant Sampson and three of his men, working upon the central communication trench, were hit by shots of which the flashes came from the section of trench immediately north of the centre party, where the left party was believed to be. Imagining that the left party was firing on him, Sampson ran towards the flashes, shouting at the men there not to shoot. The answer was further shots and bombs. Realising that there must be enemy in the trench, Sampson crept southwards to Frank Armstrong, and found that he was aware of it, and that these Turks had begun to attack him heavily. Armstrong had hurriedly built a barricade of sandbags across the trench, but the Turks were employing bombs, and his own men had none. He could not possibly drive them out without assistance, and he asked Sampson to explain this to Cannan.

Cannan had already received the information, and knew precisely where these Turks were.⁴³ How they came to be there was not at the time known to him, but it is certain that a Turkish communication trench ran in at some point between the central and left parties and that the enemy was now pouring his men through this avenue of approach. When the Australian assault had first been launched, and the survivors of the enemy garrison had rushed back to the long valley, possibly carrying the supports with them, a certain number had remained at or near the head of this communication trench. They had since been shooting all Australians who approached it, and they were now being reinforced. The Turkish command took a serious view of the loss of the post, and at least one reserve battalion was hurried forward, possibly with some additional assistance from the immediate flanks.⁴⁴ It was in the early hours of the morning, as these

⁴² Pte Ellis Silas (No 634, 16th Bn), b London, Eng., 13 Aug., 1884 (Silas, who was an art student, afterwards painted several pictures of incidents of the early fighting at Quinn's and Pope's, as he saw them. These pictures are in the Australian War Memorial Collection)

⁴³ Capt. J. A. Good (of Devonport, Tas) was returning from headquarters towards the place where he believed the centre party to be, when some circumstance roused his suspicion. He crawled to the edge of the trench and called in a low voice for Armstrong. The only answer was a muttering of low guttural voices, which he realised to be those of the enemy. He made his way back to headquarters with the news.


⁴⁴ A mountain-gun is also said to have been dragged by the enemy up the valley to within fifty yards of the captured position

troops commenced to arrive, that the enemy began his counter-attack. From his position between the centre and left parties bombs began to be thrown, while other troops, lining each side of the communication trench, were firing on the Australians with their rifles.

Cannan was not as yet aware of this heavy attack. But dawn was approaching, and it was clearly imperative that the enemy intervening between the left and centre should be immediately ejected. He therefore ordered Captain Townshend⁴⁵ of the 16th, who had reached Anzac that day, to take all available men of that battalion and charge the section occupied by the Turks. With these—about forty in all—was sent a platoon of the 13th under Lieutenant Marks which had been hurriedly summoned from Pope's Hill. It chanced that Sampson, returning through the trenches of Quinn's with news of Armstrong's plight, met Townshend proceeding with Major Margolin to his starting-point, and informed them the direction of the enemy.

The presence of the intervening Turks was known also to the left party. Several officers besides Smith, the original leader, had gone forward to that sector. Of these Hinman had been killed. Lieutenant Collin, starting forward with one companion, had veered too far to the left, missed the trench, and was never heard of again. Lieutenant Wareham⁴⁶ also had gone forward. About 2 a.m.

Cannan had sent for Lieutenant Little, in charge of No. 6 Subsection of Quinn's, and ordered him to take a number of men to the extreme left and safeguard that flank by digging a trench between the left of Smith's party and the edge of the Bloody Angle. Crawling forward, Little reached the end of the line, and there found



⁴⁵ Capt. S. E. Townshend; 16th Bn. Registrar, University of W. Aust.; of Sydney and Perth; b. Mackay, Q'land, 29 June, 1885. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915.

⁴⁶ Lieut. E. G. Wareham; 15th Bn. Customs clerk; of Brisbane; b. Townsville, Q'land, 21 July, 1890. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915.

an Australian sentry, who kept shooting round a slight bend of the trench, firing into the wall in order to prevent the enemy from surprising the flank. Being at very close quarters, Little's party could not entrench from the surface, but began to sap at high pressure, the man at the "face" being constantly relieved by the others. The trench had the usual high Turkish parapet, but no parados. The flashes of the enemy's rifles were very close in front, certainly coming from a support trench, although this was not realised at the time by the Australians, who were firing by the method usual at Quinn's, that is to say, holding the rifle above the head and guessing the direction. Having ordered several volleys—the men rising and firing aimed shots—Little tried to discover who was on his right. Getting no satisfactory answer, he asked for Lieutenants Smith or Wareham. The reply was: "Both dead." Wareham had apparently been killed while firing at a Turkish officer; Smith had been mortally wounded. Making his way along the trench he found a corporal, H. O. Broadbent.⁴⁷ The sap was narrow and so crowded that movement was impossible; but Broadbent said that he believed there were Turks in it farther to the right. A few minutes later a cheer was heard, and in the dim light men were faintly seen charging from the rear precisely towards the position to which Broadbent referred. What happened next is not certain. Some of the men believed the enemy was attacking them from the rear. Shots were fired at them—possibly some by the Australians, certainly many by the Turks. Some of the figures fell. There was a cry: "Don't fire—they're our own men." The charge was finished—with what effect those on the flanks could not at the moment tell.


It was Townshend's charge. With him was a subaltern of the 16th, a Duntroon boy, Lieutenant Durston;⁴⁸ Lieutenant Marks, whose platoon had been hurriedly sent from Pope's before their commander was awakened, only caught up his men as they were scrambling out in the dark over the parapet of Quinn's. Someone ordered: "Fix your bayonet." He did so. A voice said: "When I call 'Australia for ever,'

⁴⁷ Cpl H O Broadbent (No 264, 15th Bn) Clerk; of Greenwich, N.S.W., and Rockhampton, Q'land, b. Redfern, N.S.W., 11 Sept., 1892. Died of wounds, 27 Nov., 1915.

⁴⁸ Lieut. N. H. Durston, 16th Bn Duntroon graduate; of Poowong, Vic; b Northcote, Vic., 11 March, 1893. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915.

charge boys." Marks asked "Who's that?" The voice replied: "Captain Townshend." "We're all ready," said Marks, and the next moment they had rushed forward. A number pitched headlong. Durston was killed, Townshend was hit through the foot and immediately afterwards killed as Sergeant Cross⁴⁹ was carrying him back. Marks, Cross (who had returned to the front), and some of the rest found themselves lying under the Turkish parapet. From the enemy's side of it came a few bombs, of which a sergeant named Scott⁵⁰ threw back one. Marks and another man attempted to fire into the trench by pushing their rifles over the top. As they were too few to capture the place, Marks sent a bandsman, Collopy,⁵¹ for reinforcements. Fifteen minutes later, as none arrived, he told his men to "number off." Receiving only three answers, and seeing that it was useless to lie where they were, he passed the word: "When I say go, we'll retire." He gave the signal, and, with his men, ran back to Quinn's.

Some time before this, bombs had begun to fall behind the left party also. Corporal Broadbent's men at first imagined these to be thrown by their own men at Quinn's. Lieutenant Little, who happened to be writing a report to Colonel Cannan, received at that juncture a periscope, for which he had sent. Putting it up, he saw immediately beyond the parapet the grey light of dawn glinting from the tips of Turkish bayonets. "I put the periscope down," he wrote long afterwards, "and was about to write that the enemy were just under our noses, when I was amazed to see the whole line to my right rise as one man and retire. For a moment that seemed like eternity I stood looking towards the men on the left, afraid that they had not



⁴⁹ Sgt. W. A. Cross, D.C.M. (No. 712, 13th Bn.), was a clergyman who served in the infantry; b. Christchurch, N.Z., 1875.

⁵⁰ Sgt. H. Scott (No. 787, 13th Bn.). Locomotive fireman; of Wallsend, N.S.W.; b. Wallsend, 26 Sept., 1805. Killed in action, 21 Aug., 1915.

⁵¹ Cpl. C. R. Collopy (No. 483, 45th Bn.). Farmer, b. Emmaville, N.S.W., 1886.

seen the withdrawal. Then, to my joy, I saw them rise and go back."

There seems little doubt that the word given by Marks had been passed, as often happened, beyond the flanks of his immediate party, or at any rate that the line farther north had seen his retirement and followed it. Just as the men came in, Colonel Cannan and Captain Jess were endeavouring to organise a charge by the marines, their last reserve, against the sector held by the Turks. Frank Armstrong, who had come back from the centre party to report to Cannan, had estimated that he could hold on until this charge was made. But the left having now withdrawn, a charge intended to connect with it would be futile. Meanwhile the enemy was vigorously bombing the centre party, who had no bombs and could only attempt vainly to shoot their opponents over the top of the trench. In doing so they exposed themselves to machine-gun fire, which, as daylight increased, came from front, both flanks, and right and left rear. More than once they were stung by the bombs into charging over the top towards the communication trenches from which came the enemy and his bombs, but machine-gun fire was immediately turned upon these brave attempts. The Turks now held saps leading not only to Armstrong's left but to his right, although it was chiefly through the former that riflemen and bombers were being poured. Having no bombs with which to reply, the Australians could not, by any means then known to warfare, resist this attack, and they realised it. Finally Armstrong—whose orders were now to act as he thought best—after consulting with his sergeant, Sparks, directed the centre party to withdraw. As the result of what was perhaps the heaviest task of its kind ever undertaken by Australian troops, all three communication trenches were before dawn cut through to the captured trench. While each of them gave good cover, the central was the safest. Through this the wounded of the corresponding party were carried back, and then the rest withdrew, Frank Armstrong remaining to the last and then himself running with Sparks across No-Man's Land. The right party under H. P. Armstrong had not been seriously attacked, and had somewhat improved its trench, but, when the centre retired, Cannan necessarily ordered its withdrawal. Its commander saw his men into the communication trench before leaving.

The stream of fire which swept the crest of Quinn's during the withdrawal in daylight was very different from the ill-directed shooting in the night. A machine-gun somewhere on Baby 700 was firing short bursts down the trench which the Australians were quitting, and bombs were bursting in it continuously. Numbers of men were hit; of the centre party Sergeant Weston⁵² and Corporal MacDonald⁵³ were killed by a single bullet. Lieutenant Svensen, who was building a barricade to block the right communication trench after the last man had passed through, was wounded the moment he raised his head to see if any were left. Lieutenant Casey,⁵⁴ his junior, was similarly hit. A moment later H. P. Armstrong, looking to see if all his men had entered the right communication trench, was shot through the head.⁵⁵ Frank Armstrong, last of his party to reach Quinn's, was acutely distressed for his men. "All my boys are killed or wounded out there," he said, and at once endeavoured to climb out and see if any wounded remained. The men with him tried to pull him down, but he struggled to the parapet and was killed.

The Turkish bayonets had been observed moving along their recaptured trench as the Australians vacated it. The defences on Baby 700 bristled with them. The din of bombs was tremendous, and, as usual, the conviction of those on the spot was that a counter-attack by the Turks was imminent. The officers and non-commissioned officers of the 15th having been mostly killed or wounded, some of the reinforcements lately arrived from Australia, who were now garrisoning the front line, began to show unsteadiness, and in one trench a sentry had to be posted to prevent stragglers from leaving it. But the trained soldiers, though worn out, were firm. Little, sent by Cannan to steady the men on the left, found No. 5 Subsection empty and only a handful in No. 6. He asked "if they would 'stick it.'" They were too weary to reply, but there was no doubt as to their determination.

The enemy's counter-attack stopped, as usual, with the recapture of his trenches. Had he possessed sufficient confidence,

⁵² Sgt. G. E. Weston (No. 841, 15th Bn.). Sheep farmer; b. Wigston, Leicestershire, Eng., 15 March, 1873. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915.

⁵³ Cpl. R. MacDonald (No. 708, 15th Bn.). Labourer; b. Glasgow, Scotland, 1882. Killed in action, 10 May, 1915.

⁵⁴ Lieut. L. G. Casey; 15th Bn. Public servant; b. 16 March, 1894.


⁵⁵ The documents captured in the Turkish headquarters were lost with him.

as soon as those trenches were reoccupied, to withdraw his reserves, his loss would probably have been slight. But, according to his wont, his movements were slow and clumsy. The 5th Turkish Division (less the 15th Regiment) had been brought into this sector since the fighting on the previous Sunday, and about day-break a large body of these troops was brought up into the valley behind Quinn's. As daylight increased the observers for Bessell-Browne's 8th Battery at the Pimple perceived some 200 of these Turks creeping forward. Browne's guns opened at 1,150 yards, bursting their shrapnel over them, but after the first six shots a Turkish battery placed three shells directly into his gun-pit and stopped his fire. Major Sykes's⁵⁶ 2nd New Zealand Field Battery, now emplaced on Plugge's and overlooking Quinn's at a range of 950 yards, fired 100 shells into the crowded enemy, the fuses being timed to burst almost directly above the Australian trenches, so that the projected pellets swept the narrow No-Man's Land and the Turkish valley beyond.⁵⁷ During this time a constant fire of bombs was maintained by the enemy and did not cease till 7.30. But No-Man's Land was still too wide for bombing, and it is said that only one actually fell into the trenches of the post.

The Australian loss in this "reconnaissance" amounted to 14 officers and 193 men, of whom 10 officers and a large proportion of the men were killed. According to the plans the original assault was to be delivered by 100 men followed by 50 in the working parties, and it was afterwards sometimes stated that only a "sortie" had been intended, and that the number of troops drawn into the fight was much greater than was contemplated by the staff. But the orders left no doubt that captured trenches were to be held, if possible; and if they were to be held, then it was necessary for the local

⁵⁶ Lieut.-Col. F. B. Sykes, D.S.O. Commanded and N.Z. F.A. Bde., 1915/18. Officer of British Regular Army, of Gainford, Durham, Eng.; b. Lucknow, India, 18 Dec., 1873.

⁵⁷ The following note was afterwards found in the diary of the commander of the 3/13th Turkish Regt. (apparently killed on May 19): "In the attack made during the night of Monday the 27 April, 1331 (i.e., 10 May, 1915) by the two battalions from the 14th and 72nd Regts., 600 were killed and 2,000 wounded." Another translation rendered this note: "The 14th Regt. and the 2/72nd Regt. had 600 killed and 2,000 wounded," and it was consequently assumed by the Anzac Corps staff that these figures represented the Turkish loss. The entry certainly relates to this action, but if the first version is correct it may refer to the loss supposed to have been inflicted on the Australians. The estimate is almost certainly a gross exaggeration, even if the Turkish loss is referred to. Thirty six Turks were made prisoners.



QUINN'S POST, SHOWING THE SITUATION SHORTLY BEFORE DAWN ON 10TH MAY, 1915

British troops and trenches, red, Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

commanders to employ their reserves when the fate of the fight was at issue. At a point so crucial as Quinn's there was no limit to the reserves which might be required. The only way in which the losses could be curtailed was by the superior authority specifically limiting the number of troops to be employed. This course was adopted in some of the later raids, but was naturally impossible if trenches were to be held after capture. Even in the case of a raid, if the fight proved deadly and the ground became littered with wounded whom there was a chance of bringing in, no orders ever succeeded in preventing brave men from going out and endeavouring to rescue them.

This Sunday attack, like that made by the same brigade on the same day of the previous week, was completely fruitless. The troops had been heavily tried, and a belief, possibly correct, gained currency among them that the Turkish trenches had been deliberately constructed without traverses so as to form a trap for any assaulting party. The report of the annihilating fire which swept every exposed portion of this crest became widespread, and the memory of it had a marked effect upon most of the troops who had been subjected to it. Just as in civil life a man may bear some heavy trial, but, having successfully borne it, ever afterwards shudders at any symptoms or circumstances which remind him of it, so men who had once fought in the open at Quinn's, however gallantly, underwent a heavy strain if they were ordered to repeat their effort. Although many would face it bravely, the careless readiness to "take their chance," which was so valuable an attribute of the Australian soldier, had disappeared. For the first time, though only gradually, their leaders began to realise that, in a war which imposed such stresses upon men, veteran troops were not always the most effective. Units which had once been engaged at Quinn's were apt to be less successful if thrown in a second time. Although this fight had shown that Australian troops, like all others, were steadier if trained than if untrained, yet in the long run the local commanders, who knew their men, tended to use fresh troops, if any were available, for operations requiring recklessness. There was also growing, among those soldiers who knew Quinn's, a well-founded conviction that local attacks from this point were useless; that it was so dominated by the spurs on either side

that the only prospect of success lay in a general advance of the whole flank, "swamping" not only the Turkish Quinn's but also all the higher positions on either side which made it untenable to the invaders. Incidentally this reconnaissance made it certain that the Turks were mining towards Quinn's; but though many of the troops realised that fact, the information did not at the time deeply impress the staff.

On the day following this unsuccessful attack Colonel Monash appealed directly to General Godley to allow both the 15th and 16th Battalions, which had taken part, to be relieved by the marines, who, with the exception of one platoon, had not been employed by Colonel Cannan in the fighting. The reply was that this, being a post of vital importance, must be held by a sufficient garrison of Australian troops under a specially selected officer. Its defence therefore continued to fall alternately on the 15th and 16th, each, with an equal number of marines, occupying it for forty-eight hours. But already news had been received of the approaching arrival of troops by which Godley proposed to relieve the strain upon the 4th Brigade.

On May 10th came word that the 1st Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigades—both belonging to the N.Z. & A. Division—would almost immediately reach Anzac for service as infantry. The New Zealand infantry was still at Cape Helles; but the 1st Light Horse Brigade, landing on the morning of May 12th, was ordered at once to relieve General Trotman's marines in Monash Valley. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles on the next day took the place of General Mercer's naval brigade on Walker's Ridge and Russell's Top. The two British naval brigades left Anzac immediately for Helles, thus enabling the Royal Naval Division to be at last re-formed. Young and but partly trained, thrown without preparation into a terrible struggle, over-trying, gallantly but often needlessly exposing themselves, they had suffered heavily, and their dead lay thickly among the Australians and New Zealanders upon those dreadful heights.

The 1st and 2nd Regiments of the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, each slightly less than 500 strong, landed on May 12th under a spasmodic shell-fire from the Turkish batteries at the Olive Grove, and were presently led over the southern shoulder of the Beach into Shrapnel Gully. The

3rd followed them the next day. These regiments were composed of a fine class of men, mostly coming from farms or from sheep or cattle stations; but many of them were very young and almost all entirely inexperienced. So raw indeed were they that when, during their transfer to the Beach, two shrapnel shells, with a shriek like a steam siren, burst over the water near them, some of the men thought that their own troops ashore were "having a game" with them. They were undeceived only when a man in one of the punts slid into the bottom, wounded. As they moved, wondering, past the traffic on the Beach and into Shrapnel Gully, they were again observed from Gaba Tepe, and the gully was consequently bombarded, fortunately too late to harm them. On the slopes of the valley the two regiments dug in under a light sniping fire from the distant Baby 700, to which they were exposed. Here they suffered their first casualties. While they were settling in the scrub an order was issued that at noon on the following day the 1st Regiment was to "take over" Pope's Hill, and the 2nd Regiment Quinn's; but, before so doing, batches of five officers and five N.C.O's from each regiment were to visit the two posts, Colonel Chauvel and the brigade staff being shown round them by Colonel Monash during the afternoon of the 12th. On returning from that reconnaissance Chauvel took over command of the section, and at noon on the following day the 1st Light Horse moved into Pope's and the 2nd into Quinn's, the 13th and 15th Battalions respectively leaving the trenches as soon as the light horsemen were in position.

Pope's Hill was by this time a comparatively comfortable post. All fear of Turkish snipers penetrating along Russell's Top in its rear had definitely passed, since the New Zealand trenches could now be clearly seen topping the near edge of that crest. The bottom of the valley between was occupied nightly by a patrol. On the crest of Pope's the original trench was being gradually extended towards the left, and a new firing line was being formed by connecting three saps driven for fifteen yards to the forward slope of the spur. In front of this both sides could creep forward nightly into Waterfall Gully, between Pope's and Dead Man's, and the enemy frequently threw bombs in that quarter. Down parts of the western branch of Monash Valley behind the post the sniping

of Turks from the head of the valley was deadly. Nevertheless Pope's was safeguarded by the fact that most of the enemy's trenches opposite, on the Chessboard and Baby 700, were completely commanded by the New Zealand position on Russell's Top. The 1st Light Horse Regiment therefore took over a fairly secure position.

Far different was the case of the 2nd, which from noon onwards was charged with the defence of Quinn's. These Queenslanders included many who were little more than boys. At 11 o'clock they had filed through the valley, looking up at the burrows and chutes of newly-dug earth near the crest, which they vaguely understood to be "the trenches." Climbing the steep path up the last occupied fold, they dived through a narrow tunnelled trench, and were led along the front line to their stations. One of them asked the tired men of the 15th, who seemed almost too exhausted for speech, what it was like up there. "You may get a few bombs," was the reply. The infantry then withdrew, and the 2nd Regiment was left in occupation.

For the most part the light horsemen laid their rifles against the side of the trench, sat down on their overcoats, and waited. A few periscopes had been transferred to them, and the possessors began to study the narrow strip of bullet-torn and shrivelled scrub and, in certain places, the low sandbags of the Turkish trench—now in parts only twenty yards distant—which showed in the upper glass. The infantry garrison of Quinn's had learned by experience not to keep periscopes over the parapet for more than a few seconds together, and even then to make but the slightest exposure of the tops. But the light horse had not been so advised, and theirs were consequently shattered by bullets almost as soon as they were put up. After that, having nothing better to do, the men opened their "bully-beef" tins and began their midday meal.

The infantry had learned to talk only in whispers in certain parts of Quinn's, since the Turks would hear them and throw bombs at the sound. But the newcomers had received no proper warning, and their banter flew along the trenches. The result was that in one section, as they ate their dinner, they observed an object flit across the strip of daylight above them, and then roll back into the trench. The man nearest shouted, "Look out—there's a bomb!" All

dived away from it, and a few seconds later it exploded in the empty bay. A little later another, which lay fizzing on the parapet, knocked down one of the sandbags on to the back of a man below, causing him and those around to laugh.


From that time the falling of bombs into the trenches became fairly constant. The fuses were fortunately somewhat long, and there was time for the light horsemen to avoid the explosion by flinging themselves away. In one part the infantry, before leaving, had told the newcomers that it was possible to catch the bombs and hurl them back before they burst. This hint spread along the front, and the Queenslanders began to play at throwing the missiles back, as if it were a game. But it was not long before the enemy, realising that their own grenades were being returned, began to cut the fuses shorter, and one gallant youngster, flushed with the game, picked up a bomb, which immediately blew off his hand. He came down the trench with a dazed expression, holding the stump of his wrist, from which the sinews were hanging down. A further hint had been obtained from the infantry. Some Australian miner experienced in handling explosives⁵⁸ had initiated a system of smothering the explosion of the grenades by flinging over them a thick overcoat, or falling upon them with a partly-filled sandbag. This device was adopted with success. Nevertheless from time to time a bomb was missed, or two fell together, and the men nearest to them were torn with terrible wounds.⁵⁹ These were then and there bound up, as best was possible, with the "first field dressings" which each man carried, and the wounded were then passed out to the rear.

The explanation of this heavy bombing was simple. The three communication trenches dug during the night of May 9th from Quinn's to the Turkish trenches still remained. That on the right had been blocked by sandbags about half-way out, and, being shallow, constituted no danger. But the central trench, although partly destroyed, and blocked with sandbags at its nearer end, still offered a safe approach to the enemy, while that on the left had not been barricaded at all. The central and left trenches thus formed an extension of

⁵⁸ According to one account Pte J R Cliffe (of Sydney), 13th Bn

⁵⁹ Sgt D O Butler (of Kilcoy, Q'land) was dangerously wounded by a bomb after an overcoat had been thrown over it. He died on 7 Jan., 1927

the enemy's front, through which his bombers could creep half-way to Quinn's and throw their grenades with certainty. Possibly the rawness of the garrison may have induced the enemy to intensify his bombing.⁶⁰ In any case the throwing continued, driving the Australians to and fro along their front trench, until one big Queenslander, by name David Browning,⁶¹ who had been especially angered by a wound on both sides of his face, in which particles of iron were still embedded, went to the rear and, obtaining there an armful of the new "jam-tin" bombs, carried them to the point where the central communication trench had been blocked. Though like his fellows, he knew nothing about bombs, he lit the fuses and threw one after another as rapidly as possible in the direction in which the Turkish bombers apparently were. Their fire ceased, and the respite continued during most of the ensuing night.



During that night the 2nd Regiment, not knowing what might follow, crammed its men into the trenches, so that the front was densely packed with troops, all intensely on the alert. All night long the open communication trench on the left, which led from Quinn's directly into the Turkish position with only a bend⁶² and a few low sandbags separating the two sides, was guarded by two youngsters, Troopers J. H. Butler⁶³ and Stark.⁶⁴ These had to lie flat behind the sandbags, one with three or four bombs, and the other with his finger on the trigger watching the bend in the sap. Immediately before dawn they descried over the edge of the trench the skull-cap of a Turk, apparently one of a party relieving the enemy's

⁶⁰ It was a tradition that soon after the 2nd entered the trenches the Turks shouted: "All right you 2nd Light Horse—we know you're there." Many similar reports, equally unlikely, had from the first been current at Quinn's

⁶¹ Dvr. D. Browning, M.M. (No. 301, A.A.S.C.). Farmer; of Chinchilla, Q'land; b. Blayney, N.S.W., 26 March, 1891.


⁶² Lieut. Little on May 9 had wisely caused this trench to be dug with a bend in it to serve as a traverse

⁶³ Lieut. J. H. Butler; No. 1 Sqn., Aust. Flying Corps. Jackaroo; of Hobart, Tas., and Darling Downs, Q'land; b. Bellerive, Tas., 19 Jan., 1894. Died 30 Apr., 1924

⁶⁴ Sgt. J. L. Stark (No. 387, 49th Bn.). Bank clerk; of Toowoomba, Q'land; b. Morton, Brisbane, 1 Jan. 1894. Killed in action, 1 Apr., 1918

sentry-group a few yards away.⁶⁵ During the night the light horse at Pope's—as happened invariably with troops new to the trenches—fired a great deal, and the enemy, apprehending attack, broke out constantly into tremendous fusillades. But the respite from bombs continued, and no attack was made.

At dawn on the 14th the bombing again became exceedingly severe. The 2nd had by that afternoon suffered a loss of two officers, Lieutenants Boyd⁶⁶ and Hinton,⁶⁷ and thirty-two men wounded. The holding of Quinn's was becoming a nightmare, and it appeared a vital matter to destroy the old communication trenches from which the bomb-throwing was maintained. Shortly after noon General Birdwood, with General Godley and Colonel Chauvel, visited the post, and it was decided that Colonel Cannan and the 15th Battalion, who had had much experience of the position, should immediately relieve the 2nd Regiment, but that one squadron of the regiment, under Major Graham,⁶⁸ should remain with a view to launching an assault during the night and filling in the central communication trench from which the grenades mainly came. One half of the squadron was to seize the enemy's front trench; the other half was to follow in its rear with picks and shovels, fill in the communication trench at its junction with the Turkish front line, and destroy as much of that line as possible by pulling down its parapet. Then, having removed any discovered bomb-supply, both parties were to return before daylight. It was particularly ordered that no troops except the squadron detailed were to leave Quinn's Post.




⁶⁵ Shortly afterwards a naval intelligence officer, creeping to the Australian sentries in this trench, called to the enemy in Turkish for five minutes and urged them to surrender. His message was received in complete silence. A stout answer to it was thrown into Quinn's Post next day.

⁶⁶ Capt E. E. G. Boyd; 2nd L.H. Regt. Engineering student; of Mount Moigan, Q'land, b. WallSEND, N.S.W., 20 Nov., 1893.

⁶⁷ Lieut H. G. Hinton; 2nd L.H. Regt. Commercial traveller, of Brisbane; b. Brisbane, 23 Feb., 1879. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁶⁸ Maj D. M. L. Graham; 2nd L.H. Regt. Sugar farmer, of Ayr, Q'land; b. Upper Calliope Station, Port Curtis district, Q'land, 8 Feb., 1873. Killed in action, 15 May, 1915.

50 0 50 100 150 200 YDS



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AIR-PHOTOGRAPH OF THE OPPOSING LINES AT POPE'S, QUINN'S,
COURTNEY'S, AND GERMAN OFFICERS'

*British Air Force Photograph taken about September 1915
Avst War Memorial Collection No. 61534d*

To face p. 122



A TRENCH AT QUINN'S, SHOWING AN OLD OPENING
BLOCKED BY SANDBAGS AND A TUNNELLED COMMUNICATION
TRENCH

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No 61027



COLONEL H. G. CHAUVEL AND THE STAFF OF THE 1ST
LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE AT HEADQUARTERS IN MONASH
VALLEY

In the background is Courtney's Post, on the opposite
side of the valley

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1328 To face p 123

Cannan and Graham arranged that both the assaulting and digging half-squadrons should be divided into right and left parties, to attack on the right and left of the central communication trench respectively. The arrangement was—

Left assaulting party—30 men under Lieutenant Ogilvy;⁶⁹

Left digging party—20 men under Lieutenant Potts;⁷⁰

Right assaulting party—30 men under Captain Birkbeck;⁷¹

Right digging party—20 men under Major Graham.

In addition ten stretcher-bearers were attached to the left party and ten to the right. To avoid unnecessary casualties Cannan ordered that neither digging party should go over the parapet until a message had been received that the enemy's trench had been taken. As the 15th knew the ground, it was to provide guides and messengers from among those who had participated in the assault of the previous Sunday.

At the hour chosen by Graham—1.45 on the morning of Saturday, May 15th—the Queenslanders began to clamber out. They were keen, and had showered with their questions the infantry who had been in the Turkish trenches in the previous attack. The front trench of Quinn's was deep, and the infantry helped the light horsemen in places by hoisting them on to the parapet. The first few were lying on the sandbags waiting, while the others were being given a "leg up," when the sputtering of the first Turkish bomb was heard: the light horsemen had been seen by the enemy. The fire increased. As they stood up to charge across the fifteen or twenty yards of No-Man's Land, there broke out a fusillade so heavy that few reached the enemy's position.

Since the last attack, the Turks had not only heavily manned this position and maintained a tense vigilance, but had also improved the scheme for its defence. The fighting of May 9th had scarcely finished when two enemy officers, supposed at the time to be Germans, were observed


⁶⁹ Capt. A. J. Ogilvy; 2nd L.H. Regt. Farmer; of Berwick, Vic.; b. 22 March, 1874.

⁷⁰ Lieut. P. Potts; 2nd L.H. Regt. Business manager; of Sydney; b. Orange, N.S.W., 10 Dec., 1879.


⁷¹ Maj. G. Birkbeck, D.S.O.; 2nd L.H. Regt. Civil servant; of Mackay, Q'land; b. Brisbane, 15 March, 1876.

making a survey from the trench—subsequently named after them "German Officers'"—on the next knuckle southwards along the same ridge, 250 yards distant from the centre of Quinn's. On this spur, at a point which was to the south-west—that is, actually in rear—of the Australian post at Quinn's, the Turks had been seen, later in the same day, vigorously digging emplacements. It was at the time supposed that these were designed for field-guns, but they proved later to contain machine-guns, which looked at point-blank range straight up the No-Man's Land between Quinn's and the Turkish trenches facing it. These guns, though situated in German Officers' Trench, had as their sole duty the defence of the Turkish post opposite Quinn's, and, with other machine-guns on the Chessboard similarly firing from the north, they could make the passing of that few yards of No-Man's Land practically impossible. At a later stage the constant attacks upon these guns more than once forced the enemy to make slight variations in their positions. Nevertheless they remained till the end of the campaign the chief defence of the Turkish Quinn's.

The existence of these guns had not yet been definitely ascertained by the Australians at the time of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment's attack, and it is possible that they were not yet in their prepared position. However that may be, the enemy opposite Quinn's was on the alert, and the thirty light horsemen, who at the hour for the attack dashed forward south of the communication trench, were met by such rifle-fire and bombing that only two or three succeeded in reaching the Turkish trenches. The enemy ran back from their front line, but, as it was clearly useless for a handful of Australians to stay there, the Queenslanders were ordered into the old communication trench. They retired along its course, dragging some of the wounded who had fallen in or near it. The right digging party was not sent out.



The left party, which for some reason attacked several minutes later than the right, met with tremendous fire as it left the trench. Two machine-guns to the north, where the Turks held a higher position facing directly down No-Man's Land, were now firing, but the men, bending low, managed to run forward. They were in such obvious difficulties that Lieutenant Potts, commanding the digging party, could hardly prevent some of his own men from running forward to assist them. Presently the expected messenger came back to say that Lieutenant Ogilvy had given the order to retire and, if possible, bring in the wounded. Heads were seen moving along the old communication trench towards the post, and an order was given not to fire on them. They proved to be Lieutenant Ogilvy and some of his men.



The men who had been specially detailed for the endeavour to bring in the wounded dashed out almost to the Turkish parapet, and tried to fetch such as were lying there. Nothing was to be gained by allowing either of the digging parties to go out; but, when he saw his men falling, Major Graham himself scrambled up and ran forward to help them. Many in the digging parties did the same. After assisting to bring in four, the gallant commander was himself mortally hit.¹²

Thus after a further week's interval a third attack from Quinn's had failed. The attempt had been made by troops who had landed only two days before and were new to the post. It had been hoped that the trenches would be taken as easily as on the previous Sunday, but the Turks were found fully prepared, and the resulting loss, if considered in proportion to the numbers engaged, had been heavier than ever before. The affair had been over in twenty minutes. Of the 60 who had originally gone out, and their rescuers,

¹² When daylight came, two wounded Australians were observed still lying under the Turkish parapet; but while the means of rescuing them were being considered the Turks opened fire and killed both. A third, lying in the Bloody Angle within 20 yards of the Chessboard, was brought in during the day by Cpl F. G. Crisp (of Bowral, N.S.W.), 1st L.H. Regt., who on seeing him there had offered to go out

25 were killed and 21 wounded. The report brought back—that the Turks had at once retired from their front line, which was then swept almost immediately by machine-guns from the north—strengthened the general suspicion that the enemy's trenches facing Quinn's were in the nature of a trap. Some even believed that the purpose of the excessive bombing had been to tempt the Australian garrison to charge. Others were convinced that the increased numbers and readiness of the enemy indicated that he himself had been about to deliver an attack. But the probable explanation of all these circumstances is that the weekly attacks upon him had caused the enemy to become more nervous, vigilant, and energetic, and had induced him to strengthen his garrison and increase the provision of machine-guns on either flank.

The sortie of May 15th, like those of May 2nd and 9th, effected nothing. After a few hours desultory bombing was renewed, to be met by the method previously in use, namely, the smothering of the bombs with a sandbag or overcoat and the occasional throwing of a "jam-tin" in reply. The 15th Battalion and Graham's squadron were at once relieved by the 16th and a squadron of the newly-arrived 3rd Light Horse Regiment. Though it had been proved that these troops, completely raw, could be trusted to defend such a position, the cost was too heavy; and after this experience care was taken that if a raw unit was sent into Quinn's it should always at first be accompanied by seasoned troops. An additional supply of bombs was sent up from the Beach. The only measures by which the strain on the garrison could be alleviated were those previously adopted—the changing of the men every forty-eight hours, and the gradual improvement of the trenches with the help of the engineers.

The experience of the war of 1914-1918 proved it possible to hold by entrenchment many points which were to all appearance completely dominated by enemy positions, and in the long run more was effected at Quinn's by entrenching than by all the bloody local assaults undertaken from that post. At the beginning of May the single New Zealand field company of engineers had but half its strength working upon Quinn's and Pope's, cutting tracks up the hillside and improving the trenches. On May 3rd another section of the


company was sent thither, leaving only one working on the remainder of the New Zealand position. Next day a section of engineers was borrowed from the 1st Australian Division for work in Monash Valley, and on May 8th another. In order to afford some shelter in Quinn's from the increased bombing after the assault of May 9th, the engineers began to roof parts of the trenches with such timber as could be obtained from the limited supply in the beach *dépôt*. When the New Zealand Mounted Rifles arrived, bringing their own field troop of engineers, the remaining section of the original New Zealand Field Company joined the rest of its unit, and the whole then became camped on Pope's Hill. After the failure of the 2nd Regiment's attack, more timber was hurried into Quinn's. But the trenches were still narrow and difficult to work in, and much time was necessarily occupied in merely repairing the damage caused by bombs.

Although three weeks had now passed, each ending in a bloody attack at the head of Monash Valley, the situation in that valley had not improved. The heights spanning its head, which early on April 25th Colonel MacLagan had realized to be the key of the Anzac position, were still firmly in the enemy's possession, and the more strongly he was established there, the heavier and more accurate became the sniping down the valley. During the night of May 5th, and occasionally on later nights, a machine-gun was fired down it, but the main shooting was during the day-time, when a stream of ration-carriers and other Australian fatigue parties constantly filed along the old stream-bed, which had long since become a road. Though the traffic was never totally stopped during the whole day, the resulting loss of men began to cause a considerable drain upon the force. The sniping was most severe in the early hours, when the sun was behind the Turks, and it was a common occurrence for twenty or thirty men to be hit during the morning.



MONASH VALLEY
Anzac positions shaded. Turkish white.
1 Dead Man's Ridge 2 Bloody Angle

To combat this fire a part of the 2nd Australian Field Company commenced on May 5th the building of high barriers of sandbags, five feet thick, at intervals along the road up the valley. These were intended to serve the same purpose as the traverses in a communication trench, and were built alternately on left and right. But the intervals were long, and stretches between lay fully open to Dead Man's Ridge. In order to mask some of the open reaches, wires were stretched above the path and screens of brushwood hung from them.



Barricades in Monash Valley and the communication trench eventually made
 1 Headquarters of Section
 2 Dead Man's Ridge from which fire came

As, however, the fighting crystallised into trench-warfare, in which—except at such exposed points—the figure or even the head of an enemy was rarely seen by either side, observation became very keen. Such signs as smoke, or the throwing of shovelfuls of earth on to the parapet, were likely to draw shell-fire. Any man peering over the parapet for more than a few seconds, or looking out several times from the same spot, was in great danger of being shot through the head. Even the exposing of periscopes needed caution, not only because they were still precious, but because by the splintering of the upper glass several men were injured in the eyes. Both General Bridges and General Walker constantly had their periscopes struck, and on May 14th General Birdwood, when looking through one at Quinn's, was grazed on the head by part of a bullet deflected from the upper mirror.⁷³

Early on May 15th, in the morning following the attack by the 2nd Light Horse, the sniping down Monash Valley, in spite of the traverses, became severe. Several men running between those barriers were hit. It happened that on this morning Bridges had asked permission to visit Chauvel's headquarters in the valley,⁷⁴ which was in the N.Z. & A.

⁷³ In the following December part of the nickel covering of this bullet was discovered in the wound, and had to be removed.

⁷⁴ This visit was made partly to return a visit from Chauvel, and partly to obtain information as to the defences in the Left Central Section. Bridges started from his own headquarters after breakfast—i.e., about 9 a.m.

Division's sector. As he went up the road with Colonel White and Lieutenant Casey (his A.D.C.) they met Major William Glasgow,⁷⁵ of the 1st Light Horse Regiment, with some of his men on their way down. "Be careful of the next corner," he said, "I have lost five men there to-day." Such warnings, which were constantly heard by anyone visiting the trenches, were usually little heeded. But this particular officer was not one who would give idle advice. When, therefore, they reached a traverse 200 yards below Chauvel's headquarters, and some men behind the next barrier advised them to run to it, General Bridges, to the surprise of his companions, adopted the suggestion. His ordinary practice had been to expose himself without regard for danger, laughing down at his staff when they took cover, and asking "what they were getting down there for?" But he had apparently begun to realise that this impunity could not continue.⁷⁶

On this day, probably guessing from a certain vague tension in the valley that the danger was real, he acted upon the advice tendered. The party ran three or four times between barriers, until they reached the one below Steele's Post. Behind this was the dressing-station of Captain Thompson of the 1st Battalion. After talking a few minutes and lighting a cigarette Bridges went on, Thompson warning him to be careful. The general's long legs disappeared in the scrub round the traverse, and the others were preparing to follow, when there was some sort of stir, and Thompson ran out to find Bridges lying with a huge bullet-hole through his thigh. Both femoral artery and vein had been cut, and, though Thompson instantly stopped the bleeding, the loss of blood had been very great. As they brought the general back into the shelter of the traverse, strangely changed from the bronzed healthy man who had passed a few seconds before, he said weakly, "Don't carry me down—I don't want any of your stretcher-bearers hit."

Colonel White had the traffic in the gully stopped, so that it should be clear to the Turks that the only movement was

⁷⁵ Afterwards Maj.-Gen. Sir T. W. Glasgow, commanding 1st Aust. Div.

⁷⁶ A few days previously, when a shrapnel shell had burst very near, Col. Howse, one of his few intimate friends, had said, "General, you'll be caught if you go risking any more of those." Next day, when Col. White during a burst of shell-fire advised his chief not to "give the Turks the chance they wanted," Bridges had consented to take cover till the shelling was over.

the carrying of a wounded man, and then the party moved slowly to the Beach. The Turks, whether by accident or by a forbearance which they sometimes showed, did not fire upon it. Bridges was taken at once to the hospital ship *Gascon*. But the whole blood-supply to the limb had been cut off, and nothing could save his life except complete amputation at the thigh, an operation which, it was considered, to a man of his years, must prove fatal. Before the *Gascon* left for Alexandria he knew he was dying. "Anyhow," he said to Colonel Ryan, "anyhow, I have commanded an Australian Division for nine months." He died before the ship reached port. His body was brought to Australia⁷⁷ and buried on the hill above the military college at Duntroon, which he had founded.

Bridges' habit of exposing himself to danger had made it from the first unlikely that he would survive many months of fighting. Had he done so, it is probable that he would have emerged the greatest of Australia's soldiers, as he was certainly the most profound of her military students. His powerful mind and great knowledge were supported by outstanding moral and physical courage, and also by a ruthless driving force, rare in students. Only in Haig and Allenby did Australians meet any commander whose forcefulness equalled that of Bridges. His defect as a leader—the inability to display those qualities which would make the ordinary man love and follow him—was finding its compensation in the conspicuous bravery with which, since the Landing, he had won the admiration of the troops.

Upon Bridges' death the command of the 1st Australian Division temporarily passed, in accordance with the general expectation of those at Anzac, to Brigadier-General H. B. Walker, of the 1st Infantry Brigade, an officer who, by his directness, his fighting qualities, and his consideration for his men, had in a few weeks much endeared himself to the troops. This promotion left vacant the command of the 1st Brigade. Most of the battalions of the division were at this time commanded by officers who were either rather too old to possess the necessary vigour, or had been newly promoted in place of those killed, wounded, or unequal to the test of war. General Birdwood therefore asked G.H.Q. for a British officer,

⁷⁷ Upon a suggestion made in Parliament by the Hon. Littleton E. Groom.

and Colonel Nevill Smyth, previously commanding a district in Egypt, was sent to him. Smyth had won the Victoria Cross in a previous war, and this made it probable that he possessed the chief qualification for leading Australian troops. As the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade also had temporarily lost its brigadier—Colonel M'Cay—G.H.Q. sent to Anzac, in addition to Smyth, a British brigadier-general who happened for various reasons to be superfluous elsewhere and for whom it desired at the moment to find a convenient appointment. But though General Walker, now commanding the 1st Division in which the newcomer would serve, was himself an Englishman, he believed that Australian troops should when possible be commanded by their countrymen. "I don't know him," he said of the proposed brigadier, "and I don't see why I should have him." In view of his opposition the officer in question was withdrawn, and Colonel Wanliss, of the 5th Battalion, commanded the brigade until M'Cay's return.

There was still vacant the administrative command of the Australian Imperial Force with which Bridges had been charged. Sir Ian Hamilton telegraphed to Australia his recommendation that General Birdwood should undertake that function. In Australia the Government, immediately upon hearing of Bridges' death, had decided (the British War Office concurring) to send Colonel Legge, then its Chief of Staff, to take command of the 1st Division. It gave him also Bridges' powers in the A.I.F., but assented to their being exercised by Birdwood "in the absence of the general officer commanding it."

CHAPTER V

THE TURKISH ATTACK OF MAY 19TH

ALTHOUGH about May 5th von Sanders had ordered the Turkish forces both at Helles and Anzac to stand on the defensive, yet, after the failure of the British attempt to penetrate near Krithia, he determined upon one more effort to rid himself of one of the two invading forces before either could gather strength for a new blow. There remained the question which of the two he should attack. The strong attempt made by the Turks at Helles from May 1st to 3rd, after temporarily piercing the allied line, had failed disastrously, the allies having ample foothold and not merely restoring but improving their position by a counter-stroke. At Anzac, on the other hand, the foothold of the invaders was so slight that, in the opinion of the Turkish staff, a trifling success must drive them back to the sea. "The position at Anzac," wrote the chief of the Turkish general staff¹ after the war, "was without parallel in history. The opposing trenches were so close together, and the line of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was very close to the sea. Consequently they were much confined, and would make every effort to enlarge their position. It was therefore better for the Turks to have the initiative and attack before the British attacked. . . . If this attack succeeded, a force of some four or five Turkish divisions would be freed and available to deal with Sedd-el-Bahr (*i.e.*, the force at Helles). The proximity of the trenches was an advantage in making a surprise attack." Moreover at Anzac the Turks would not be open, as they had been at Helles, to the fire of the allied warships on both flanks and even in rear. For these reasons von Sanders decided, as he himself states,² to drive away his enemy from Anzac at least by "one last decisive attack." Fresh Turkish troops for this offensive became available about the middle of May. There had now been sent to Helles, in addition to the original garrison of the 9th Division, the 4th,

¹ Kiazim Pasha, who at the time of the events was chief of staff to Liman von Sanders, and who courteously answered a number of questions put to him by the Australian Historical Mission in 1919.

² Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, pp. 98-100. The Turkish *Short History*, however, states definitely that the attack was ordered by "the Commander-in-Chief (Enver) . . . after a visit to the Dardanelles front on May 11th."

7th, 10th, 13th, 15th, and parts of the 5th and 11th. The only reinforcements so far directed to Anzac since the first week had been the 16th Division. On May 16th, however, there reached von Sanders what he describes as "the quite well trained" 2nd Division of the I Turkish Army Corps, which till then had been garrisoning Constantinople. Apparently contrary to the advice of Essad, who wanted to reinforce Mustafa Kemal and attack the Anzac left,³ von Sanders decided to throw this division against the centre, while the rest of the force to right and left attacked simultaneously. The day appointed was May 19th. "The plan," writes Kiazim Pasha, "was to attack before day-break, drive the Anzac troops from their trenches, and follow them down to the sea." The Turkish troops were to be secretly massed during the night of the 18th, and at 3.30, while it was still dark, were to rush at all points and at the same moment across the narrow space separating the opposing lines.

At the Landing Essad Pasha, till then commanding the garrison of the Peninsula, had been sent to Helles, and until early in May all Turkish forces at Anzac were under Mustafa Kemal Bey, commanding the 19th Division. One after another the reinforcements had on arrival been attached to his division, his original force being thus increased apparently as follows:

April 25th—	19th Division, 57th Regiment 72nd (Arab) Regiment 77th (Arab) Regiment 27th Regiment (from 9th Division)
Before counter-attack, April 27th—	33rd Regiment (from 11th Division) 64th Regiment (Army troops, Fifth Army)
Before counter-attack, May 1st—	125th Regiment (16th Division) 13th Regiment (5th Division)

³ According to the *Short History* published by the Turkish General Staff.

Of his own division the two Arab regiments, being little esteemed by the Turks, had been posted on the extreme flanks—the 72nd to watch and garrison the foot-hills north of Walker's Ridge, and the 77th to occupy Gaba Tepe. Meanwhile the 57th, with which Kemal had made his original counter-attack on April 25th, had ever since held the heights spanning the head of Monash Valley, facing Russell's Top, Pope's, and, at first, Quinn's. It had lost heavily, especially in officers, and had now been relieved at Quinn's by the 5th Division.⁴

The 5th Turkish Division (13th and 14th Regiments) had been thrown piecemeal into the heavy fighting at Quinn's, suffering considerable loss. It still held that position and German Officers' Trench. Of the 16th Division one regiment, the 125th, had reached Anzac at the end of April, and the remainder (47th and 48th Regiments) during the first fortnight of May. Together with the 33rd Regiment it appears to have held the 400 Plateau and its southern spurs.

The 2nd Division,⁵ on which von Sanders chiefly relied, was brought down on May 15th to Chanak, and on the day preceding the attack was ferried across to Akbashi Liman, some six miles distant by road from Boghali and nine from Anzac. Thence it marched at once to the front. The enemy appears to have regarded German Officers' Ridge (Merkez Tepe or "Central Hill") as the exact centre of the line, and the 2nd Division was put in to attack immediately south of it, in full strength, upon Johnston's Jolly. The main assault was thus to be made as follows:

5th Division (from Turkish Quinn's and German Officers' Trench).

2nd Division (from Johnston's Jolly).

16th Division and 33rd Regiment (from Lone Pine and southern spurs).


On the northern flank the 19th Division would assault from its position across the main range at the head of Monash Valley, from the Chessboard to the sea; and similarly, on the extreme southern flank, the detached 77th (Arab) Regiment.

⁴The 19th Division now also included the other Turkish regiment which had played so great a part in the first day's fighting—the 27th (formerly of the 9th Division), the original garrison of Gaba Tepe and Ari Burnu. Of the other detached regiments the 33rd had suffered heavily on April 27. Of the 64th little is heard, and it was at the time believed to be in reserve to Essad's force.

⁵Under Hassan Askeri Bey

Essad Pasha, who had by this time resumed charge of the zone, taking over Mustafa Kemal's headquarters on Scrubby knoll, was in chief command. Kemal, who now controlled only the 19th Division, occupied the headquarters previously established by the 57th Regiment, behind Battleship Hill.

During the night of May 18th the final dispositions were carried out. The actual infantry numbered about 42,000.⁶ "The divisions," says Kiazim Pasha, "were good. The 2nd and 16th were fresh; the other two had taken part in all the previous fighting."⁷ To make good the losses, reinforcements had been hurriedly sent down from Constantinople; these included numbers of grey-uniformed



military *gendarmes* and drafts belonging to regiments other than those which were at Anzac. Many of them arrived at the last moment, including a number of young officer-cadets sent to the 19th Division from the training-school at the capital. Numbers of these only reached their battalions on the eve of the fight, and all that they knew was that an attack was to be made in the morning. A few old howitzers of very early pattern from Constantinople appear to have come to hand early in May.⁸ But even including these, the enemy's total artillery at Anzac is said to have amounted only to six mountain- and four field-batteries, one of 5.9-inch howitzers, for which ammunition was short, and another of 8-inch howitzers or mortars. This equipment was far too weak for effective bombardment even according to the standards of those days, and the only real hope of the Turks therefore lay in achieving a surprise. Nevertheless, apparently with the traditional purpose of subjecting the nerve of his opponents to strain before attacking them, Essad Pasha arranged that

⁶ Amin Bey (Preface to *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, Turkish Edition) says that the attack "was made in dense lines on a front of 1½-2 miles by four divisions numbering 47,000 men" But Kiazim Pasha puts the strength at only "30,000 rifles."

⁷ The 5th Division, though not actually engaged in fighting at the Landing, was part of the original garrison of the Peninsula, having been employed at Bulair during the feint attack before being sent to Anzac.

⁸ Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 99.

during the 18th his heavy guns should fire on portions of the Anzac line, and that at 5 p.m. his whole artillery should open a bombardment as heavy as possible, and continue it until nightfall. The Turks had shelled Anzac in much the same way, though less severely, on May 6th and 8th and other dates, but without attacking, and therefore this action would not of itself indicate any intention to assault.

Until May 18th the secrecy of the Turkish plans had been well preserved. On May 16th Major Villiers-Stuart, chief intelligence officer of General Birdwood's staff, knew only of the presence of the 5th and 19th Divisions and of the 33rd Regiment. He had heard of Essad Pasha's return to Boghali, but had not discovered the pending arrival of reinforcements. "There is no evidence," runs the last entry in his diary, "to show that we have any new units opposing us. . . . There might be from 15,000 to 20,000."

On the day following that upon which this entry was made, the enemy's artillery became active. By one of the shell-bursts at Courtney's Post Villiers-Stuart himself was killed. A few shells of larger calibre than any yet fired by the Turks fell about the Pimple salient on the 400 Plateau. A new field-gun was observed on Lone Pine. On the northern flank a new battery opened from somewhere in the direction of Anafarta, bursting its shells on the New Zealanders at Russell's Top and Walker's Ridge. Shortly after dawn on May 18th a sharp bombardment fell for about an hour upon the Australian trenches on the 400 Plateau.

On May 18th, for the first time since the Landing, the Turkish rifle-fire at Anzac dwindled, until for minutes together scarcely a shot was fired. Sniping almost ceased, and so quiet was the day that in the Australian and New Zealand lines it was repeatedly asked what the Turks were planning. In places men were seen moving along the enemy's trenches, and observers in the right section descried on the distant summit of the Kilid Bahr Plateau what appeared to be a group of staff officers reconnoitring the position. The strange peacefulness of the day was for a long time broken only by the activity of the newly-emplaced Turkish 8-inch howitzer on Chunuk Bair, which regularly threw its heavy shell into Courtney's Post and the head of Monash Valley. At 5 p.m., however, the enemy opened from all sides the heaviest

bombardment yet experienced at Anzac. This storm fell chiefly upon the Australian line from the Pimple northwards to Courtney's, the shells arriving from south, east, and north. The orderly room of the 2nd Battalion was hit; from a position on Mortar Ridge three guns were fired against the line of the 1st Brigade on MacLaurin's Hill, their crews and the officers directing them being plainly visible from Scott's Trench, which they enfiladed at 600 yards range. Colonel Owen, a gallant but somewhat anxious officer, then temporarily commanding the brigade, reported that the situation was grave, and urgently asked for artillery fire upon this enemy. Such assistance could not at the moment be arranged, but a promise was given that at dawn the New Zealand and mountain-guns on Russell's Top would be turned upon it.




SS Scott's Tr Turkish Bty

In the meantime there had reached corps headquarters reports which pointed almost with certainty to an imminent attack by the Turks. It chanced that the 1st New Zealand Battery, which had only two days before been dragged to the summit of Russell's Top, stood at this time in need of information concerning the guns and camps behind Lone Pine upon which it was to fire. No British or French aeroplane had for many days visited Anzac, and Birdwood therefore asked G.H.Q., which was now on the island of Imbros, that a machine might be sent up to observe these guns and bivouacs, as well as those at the Olive Grove, Boghali, and elsewhere; at the same time he suggested that it would be well for such an air-reconnaissance of his front to be made every few days. An aeroplane was duly sent from Imbros on May 17th, but no exceptional movement on the part of the Turks was observed. On May 18th, however, the naval authorities had arranged for the *Canopus* to shell an enemy cruiser which had been firing at Anzac from the straits, and Lieutenant Thomson,⁹ of the Royal Naval Air Service, flew from

⁹ Lieut.-Col. G. L. Thomson, D.S.C., D.F.C., R.A.F. Of Effingham, Surrey, Eng., b. 27 Mar., 1884.

Imbros to direct the fire. The "shoot" failed, the guns of the *Canopus* not having sufficient range; but as Thomson flew over the Peninsula, he perceived that two of the valleys east of the Anzac line were packed with Turkish troops, densely crowded upon the sheltered slopes. For a considerable time he circled over them, endeavouring, without success, to turn the fire of the *Canopus* upon them. At about 2.30 p.m. he returned to Imbros and reported what he had seen. A second aeroplane was at once despatched to confirm this report. The pilot discovered troops in process of landing from four small steamers at Akbashi Liman, and other newly-arrived bodies bivouacked with their transport on the neighbouring hills.



The report of the second aeroplane was immediately telegraphed to Anzac. By 5.15 p.m. Colonel Skeen, chief of Birdwood's staff, had warned the commanders of both divisions to be on the alert for a night attack, and to consider the advisability of ordering the troops to stand to arms earlier than the usual hour. Shortly after dark there arrived from the battleship *Triumph* an additional warning, to the effect that considerable bodies of mounted troops and guns had been seen moving from the north and east of Krithia towards the coast. This, it was considered, might indicate that the Turks were bringing troops from Helles to Anzac.¹⁰

In consequence of these warnings all troops at Anzac were instructed to stand to arms at 3 a.m. instead of at 3.30, the usual hour. At Quinn's and Courtney's an attempt, which it proved impossible to carry out, was made to guard against

¹⁰ The evidence of an impending attack appeared to be strengthened by a telegraphed message mysteriously received on the night of May 17 at the signal office of the 1st Australian Division from an artillery line connected with one of the brigades. This, purporting to come from an enemy, foreshadowed an attempt on the following day with mines and big guns to drive the garrison of Anzac into the sea. Until discovered several years later to have been a hoax, the incident remained a mystery to Australian intelligence officers. It was often instanced as the only one of all the supposed cases of secret enemy activity in the lines for which a simple explanation could not be given.

Scrubby
Knoll

Mortar
Ridge

German
Officers'
Trench

Mortar
Ridge

German
Officers'
Trench



Barbed-wire in front of Steele's

NO-MAN'S LAND AT GERMAN OFFICERS', ACROSS WHICH THE 5TH TURKISH DIVISION ATTEMPTED
TO ATTACK ON MAY 10TH

Photographed during the armistice of May 24th from Steele's Inset The old battle
outpost (see pp. 117, 165)

Taken by Capt H Jacobs, 1st Bn
Aust War Memorial Collection Nos C2040 and (insert) A1003



THE SLOPE IN FRONT OF COURTNEY'S, AS SEEN FROM THE PARAPET OF QUINN'S DURING THE
ARMISTICE OF MAY 24TH

The Australian and Turkish burial parties occupy the same position as that of the enemy
who attacked Courtney's at dawn on May 19th

Taken by Cpl H. J. Miles 15th Bn
Aust War Memorial Collection No. A2001

sudden attack by throwing out from the trenches barbed-wire on "knife-rests" (or *chevaux-de-frise*). Loose wire was, however, laid in front of some other parts of the line.

It is not known whether, in addition to their other reasons for making the attack, the Turks had discovered the weakness of the force which had previously resulted from the absence of the two Anzac brigades at Cape Helles. If so, they acted too late. Had the attempt been made a week earlier, it would have found the line held by only 14,827 men (with a rifle strength of 10,610) and 42 guns. The whole of the Left Section, including Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts, Walker's Ridge, and the vital position of Russell's Top, would have been held by a weak Naval Brigade, 1,612 strong, and the line would have been without reserves. But during the intervening week there had arrived the 1st Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigades, besides the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, which on May 16th had returned from Helles. The force had thus by the night of May 18th been increased to 17,356 men (12,540 rifles) with 43 guns.¹¹ The 2nd Australian Brigade, which in consequence of its heavy losses at Helles was retained in reserve, was camped near the junction of Shrapnel and Monash Valleys. On the night of May 18th it was ordered to dispose two of its battalions so as to form an inner line of defence in case of need. As a further precaution guides were sent to it from all battalions of the 1st Brigade, in order that it might, if necessary, be hurried to support any position in the Right Central Section—the very sector, as it happened, against which the Turks intended to make their main attack. Concerning the defence of the Right Section there was no anxiety.

So, during the night of May 18th, while the Turkish troops were being silently crowded into and in rear of their front trenches in preparation for their secret attack before dawn, on the other side of the same crests the rifles had been carefully cleaned and oiled, and officers and orderlies were now hurrying among the sleeping supports to ensure that everything should be in readiness to meet the expected assault. At


¹¹ In addition there had arrived the machine-gun sections of the 2nd and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades, and of the 4th Light Horse and Otago Mounted Rifles Regiments. Each section was under a Duntroon graduate, and the whole was kept as a corps reserve under Capt. W. H. Hastings. Most of these regiments were then on the sea, approaching Anzac.

11.35 the moon went down. Ten minutes later, following upon the explosion of a bomb at Quinn's Post, the Turkish rifle-fire suddenly increased until its roar surpassed that of any fusillade which the Australian troops experienced in the war. Along the whole Anzac line the assumption for the moment was that this must be the prelude of the attack. At the signal office of the 1st Division overlooking the Beach General Walker and a few staff officers, wakened by the noise, stood in the light of a horn lantern waiting for reports which had been hurriedly called for from all battalions. At 12.10 a.m., as the fire slackened, the answers began to come in. The 3rd Brigade and three battalions of the 1st had nothing to report. As the 2nd Battalion, which held the exposed salient of the Pimple, had not yet replied, Walker asked it specifically to report as to the significance of the outburst. "It is only the Turks firing," was the answer. What had actually happened, as is now known, was that the crowded troops in the enemy's front trenches had fallen a prey to some alarm, possibly caused by the attempt to throw out wire at Quinn's, and had broken into an unpremeditated fusillade. The excitement gradually died. Except for some uneasiness at Quinn's, where bombs were being thrown as usual, the night again became tranquil. In the Anzac front trenches, in which the normal "groups" of some eight men under an N.C.O. manned every bay, the sentries on the fire-steps looked out over the parapet at the silent No-Man's Land, while the rest of the group, like the supports behind them, slept. Shortly before 3 a.m. the sleeping men were awakened, and in their overcoats, with bayonets fixed, lined the front and support trenches, while the reserves formed up and waited in the valleys. The dawn was near, and the impression began to grow that, as on many previous occasions, the alarm had been a false one.

Scarcely, however, were the trenches manned before the men of the 4th Battalion on either side of Wire Gully saw figures in motion down the valley between Johnston's Jolly and German Officers' Ridge. The sky was, for that hour, exceptionally clear, and the pale light could be seen reflected from sheaves of long thin Turkish bayonets. From the Australian line two shots rang out, and then a shout. Fire was opened from the trenches overlooking the gully, and the alarm was thus given.


What had been seen was undoubtedly the deployment of the leading battalions of the 5th Turkish Division, which, issuing from behind Mortar Ridge past the rear of the 400 Plateau, were about to attack on German Officers' Ridge. In the narrow space behind the plateau and the end of Mortar Ridge there must have been assembled during the night no less than three Turkish divisions, the 2nd, 5th, and 16th.

German Officers' Ridge being too narrow to screen the assembling of a large body, it was necessary for the 5th to make its move thither immediately before the projected rush. When the men were seen, the actual assault had not commenced, for the cry of "Allah," with which the Turks invariably



accompanied a charge, had not yet been raised. Though fire was opened upon them by the 1st Battalion on MacLaurin's Hill and by the 4th about Wire Gully, they continued to advance in the dark up the valleys on both sides of that ridge and upon the ridge itself. While the 5th Turkish Division was thus advancing, and a few minutes after its movement had first been detected, the leading companies of the 2nd were seen issuing from the Turkish trenches on Johnston's Jolly, and the first lines of the 16th were


simultaneously observed moving upon Lone Pine. A tremendous volume of rifle-fire at once met them. The summit of the plateau, though scrubby, was almost as level as a tennis court, and the nearest Turkish trenches upon it were then nearly 200 yards distant from the Australian line. On Johnston's Jolly the oncoming 2nd appeared



bewildered by the fire poured into it. The men were completely new to the complicated area into which they had been

thrust during the dark, and the main part, without apparent purpose, moved diagonally to its right across the front of the 4th Battalion, exposing itself to an annihilating fire of rifles and machine-guns. Such as survived either swerved into Wire Gully, ran back to their trenches, or sank into the scrub between the lines. Further waves emerged from time to time on the Jolly, each attempting by rushes to carry the attack farther. But with the daylight all movement ceased, except that of isolated men trying here and there to regain their trenches.


On the Lone Pine lobe of the plateau the attack by the 16th Turkish Division met with much the same experience. But between the Pine and the Jolly, where the surface dipped at the head of Owen's Gully and was therefore untouched by the stream of fire which swept continuously over the two summits, the first assault was not so quickly checked. At this point the Australian staff, in order to reduce the too pronounced salient of the Pimple, had planned a new front line, part of which was now being sapped northwards by the 2nd Battalion, starting from the Pimple, while the 3rd Battalion farther north dug southwards to meet them. These two saps had not yet joined, but projected towards one another with a space of fifty yards still remaining between them. Both were strongly held, the old firing line some distance in rear serving as a sort of support trench.



At this point the attack seems to have been made by three battalions of the 48th Turkish Regiment (16th Division) debouching from Owen's Gully. In spite of the withering fire which met them, the leading Turks pressed on, and some passed through the space between the sap-heads. At this moment the machine-gun in the 3rd Battalion sap jammed, and three or four of the enemy stood on the parapet and began firing into the trench. They were at once shot from the old line in rear of the saps, as were those who penetrated into the gap. The moment was one of tense excitement, the

Australians in the 3rd Battalion sap under Major McConaghy and Lieutenant L. W. Street¹² standing their ground. "You have the worst end of the stick," shouted McConaghy. "We'll give you hell—come on! they're running away; they're got their backs turned." The excited Australians climbed above the trench, regardless of themselves, and sat astride the parapet shooting as fast as they could into the copious target. As further lines emerged from the head of Owen's Gully, shouting "Allah!," fire was poured into them, the Australians meanwhile waving their hats and shouting tags of their Egyptian slang: "Eggs-a-cook," "Bucksheesh." "Saida—play you again next Saturday," cried one, as the enemy turned.

At the head of the 2nd Battalion sap the fighting was equally severe. A certain number of Turks reached the parapet and were shot there, while three jumped into the trench. One was shot by Lieutenant Barton; the other two killed him, but in their turn were immediately shot dead. Several bombs were thrown into the 2nd Battalion trenches, the wire in front of which scarcely interfered with the enemy. At the time of the attack Colonel E. S. Brown (Braund's successor in the 2nd Battalion) and Major Bessell-Browne (commanding the 8th Battery) were standing in the Pimple close to the battery-position. Seeing a couple of the enemy in the sap and a Turkish officer upon the parapet, Browne, fearing lest the salient might be lost, ordered his men to remove the breech-blocks and sights from the forward guns. In order to fire these guns, part of the parapet of the infantry-trench would have had to be lowered, and this was—probably with good reason—considered impracticable. Thus, in the very emergency in which justification might have been expected for the emplacement of guns in that salient, they were not fired. A call for reinforcements arising,



¹² Lieut L. W. Street; 3rd Bn. Law student; of Sydney, b. Sydney, 9 June, 1893. Killed in action, 19 May, 1915.

the artillerymen with their rifles joined the infantry in manning the trenches.


It was still too dark for the other batteries commanding the plateau to open. Whitting's mountain-gun on Russell's Top had fired one shell at midnight, during the Turkish fusillade; in consequence of the difficulty of keeping the correct line and avoiding the Australian trenches, no further shots were fired so long as it was dark. Nevertheless, with few machine-guns to assist and the artillery as yet silent, the cool well-controlled fusillade of the infantry annihilated each attack. The Turks made at least four successive efforts to carry through their charge, each wave starting forward with shouts and the blowing of bugles. In order that the repulse might be more decisive, officers of the 1st Australian Division all along the line were forcing their men to hold their fire until the targets were so close that the effect was overwhelming. Thus in the Pimple, Lieutenant G. W. Brown, of the 2nd Battalion, seeing some fifty of the enemy approaching his flank, deliberately kept his men shooting upon other Turks in front until this party was within fifty yards, when he suddenly turned the fire upon them. Few of their number escaped. Similarly, opposite the 3rd Battalion could be seen a tall Turk with a stick, driving his men out of the trenches. An Australian officer prevented his men from firing until the whole of this line had left the trench, when it was mown down by a machine-gun, the tall officer falling with the rest. At the beginning of the attack it was observed that the Turks of the 2nd Division, on meeting with a check, had for the most part continued to advance in sections, about a dozen at a time, flinging themselves down at intervals to allow those behind to fire over their heads, and then again rushing forward. But under the overwhelming fire which met them the spirit soon faded out of the assault. Bravely enough, the sections stumbled blindly ahead to be shot down. The attack of the 2nd and 16th Divisions across the twin lobes of the 400 Plateau had thus been utterly defeated. A few individuals had reached the line on the southern lobe; on the northern, of the brave 2nd Division the nearest fell some ten yards from the Australian parapet.

According to the Turkish plans, part of the 16th Division was also to assault from the spurs and valleys south of the


plateau That attack would fall upon the line of MacLagan's 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade on Bolton's Ridge. This line began with the 11th Battalion south of the Pimple; the 10th continued it past the edge of the Wheatfield on the summit of Bolton's, whence the 12th and 9th carried it to the sea. MacLagan's front looked out over the four minor scrub-covered ridges and intervening gullies which ran southward from the more lofty side of the Pine. Here the assaulting regiment of the 16th Division was for some reason late. As dawn broke, the expectant groups of the 11th Australian Battalion, manning their trenches, saw running across the high shoulder of the plateau the figures of the Turks who were attacking the Pimple. About the same time, from a sap which protruded along the side of Lone Pine across the head of the first minor gully, the 11th perceived that the gully-side was crowded with the enemy, apparently waiting below the crest with fixed bayonets for the order to charge. Farther south the sentries of the 12th, keeping watch from a sap projecting towards the same gully, reported that Turks were moving upon the spur in front of them. Between the 11th and 12th, the 10th, looking out through the Wheatfield, in which the crop was about three feet high, perceived a movement among the long blades. Upon all these targets fire was opened. Nevertheless movement continued in the Wheatfield, officers of the 12th farther south being able to make out through glasses dim forms of the enemy creeping through the corn to attack the 10th. The fire of the flanking company of the 12th was "switched" suddenly upon the Wheatfield. This



1000 YDS
— Anzac front line
" Position of 11 Bn



caused the enemy in the southern part of the corn to start up and bunch together; but a determined charge was made through the field by two lines of Turks. Only three men reached the parapet of the 10th Battalion, and these were killed there. Here, as everywhere else, further efforts were made by Turkish officers to carry forward the attack in renewed rushes. Some ten minutes after the commencement, however, the northern gun of Hughes's battery opened from the firing line, as in the days of the Landing, sweeping the front of the Australian line at point-blank range and tossing the wheat and tufts of scrub into the air with its shrapnel. At daylight the surviving enemy crept back to the nearest gully, on the western side of which, believing it to be sheltered, they crowded together with their supports. Farther north, however, the 2nd Battalion looked straight down this valley from the Pimple. In the increasing light the crowd in it was detected, and a machine-gun of the 11th under Sergeant Hallahan, stationed in the Pimple, was turned upon them. From the forward sap of the 11th, which commanded the valley, Captain Leane and two men,¹³ firing with rifles from daylight until noon, also caused great loss. The attack among the spurs south of Lone Pine had therefore failed as completely as that on the summit.



On the extreme southern flank what was intended to be a simultaneous assault was made by the 77th (Arab) Regiment against the 9th Battalion. This began soon after that of the 16th Division. The rifle-fire of the 9th gradually swept it away, the nearest of the enemy being killed as they reached the light belt of barbed-wire which had been laid in front of the trenches.

¹³ One of these was Pte. Reid (of Coolgardie, W. Aust.). Great numbers of Turkish dead were found in Allah Gully during the armistice of May 24. When the Australian Historical Mission was exploring the area in 1919, there was perceived from some distance a white streak upon this valley-side. On examination it was found that a washaway opposite the southern end of Silt Spur, and immediately north of the northern corner of the Wheatfield, was white with the bones of Turks. Doubtless some of the dead had been buried there during the armistice.

Age Group	Number of People
0-14	1800
15-24	1600
25-34	1400
35-44	1200
45-54	1000
55-64	800
65-74	600
75-84	400
85-94	200
95-104	100




WIGHTMAN

THE TURKISH ATTACK UPON ANZAC, 19TH MAY, 1915

The arrows indicate approximately the foremost positions reached by the Turks. (British troops and trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours 10 metres.)

From the centre of the line southward the attempt to rush the Anzac trenches had thus met with immediate disaster. In the northern half it had fared little better. It may be clearest to describe it from the centre northwards. The main assault in this sector was that of the 5th Division—the same which was first detected, and which was left in this narrative at the stage when it was pressing forward in the dark up the valleys on both sides of German Officers' Ridge.¹⁴ This narrow knuckle protruded in front of the line of the 1st Battalion on MacLaurin's Hill. On its southern slope in Wire Gully the Turkish dead, as seen later in the morning, appeared to lie thicker than on any other part of the front. A machine-gun of the 4th Battalion continued firing from the southern side of the gully with terrible effect.


Another gun, belonging to the 2nd, emplaced on the northern side on top of the sandbag barricade which divided the front trench on MacLaurin's from the abandoned battle-outpost in Wire Gully, was destroyed—apparently by a Turkish bomb—almost as soon as it opened. Two of its crew were killed, and a line of the enemy, swarming over the disused trench, reached the front line behind it. The Turks in some places crept so close without being discovered that one of them, rising suddenly on the parapet with the loose barbed-wire from the entanglement still hanging from his shoulder, bayoneted a man of the 1st through the arm. After thrusting at an officer who evaded him, he was lunging at a third when he was shot. Another bayoneted a sentry. Nevertheless the line had barely reached the 1st Battalion's parapet when it was driven back to the shelter of the old outpost-trench, which gradually became filled with the dead and wounded, as well as with a few who, as the light increased, feigned death. All subsequent assaults on this side of the knuckle were met by an accurate fire of machine-guns and rifles from the 4th Battalion on both sides of Wire



¹⁴ See p 141

Gully, and made no headway.¹⁵ A few of the enemy in the gully bravely attempted to crawl up its opposite slope in order to silence the machine-gun at the crest, but were shot down by Milligan's post on the other side, one of the duties of that post being the protection of this gun. For nearly two hours the men in this part of the line were shooting almost as fast as they could load. At length, towards 5 o'clock, the enemy's efforts in Wire Gully ceased for the time being, the survivors endeavouring to dig themselves into cover on German Officers' Ridge.

Meanwhile that portion of the 5th Division which had advanced up Mule Valley on the northern side of German Officers' Ridge had found in front of it the comparatively gentle rise which was topped by Courtney's Post. Here the attack was probably fiercer than anywhere else. Courtney's afforded to the 14th Battalion, which held it, no such level field of fire as existed on the Pine or Jolly or even German Officers'. From its very parapet the ground dipped, and the scrubby and somewhat broken slope provided the enemy with a chance of approach.¹⁶ On this slope, therefore, a considerable force managed to assemble, and at about 4 o'clock a rush was made in mass. Watchers at Quinn's could see the rifle-flashes of the two sides as they faced each other at short range. A section of the enemy's line, reaching the summit, suddenly hurled its bombs into a trench-bay, killing two of the nine or ten men who held it, wounding two others, and filling the trench with smoke and dust. In the confusion a number of Turks leapt into the bay, the remaining




¹⁵ From the trench occupied by Lieut. Milligan's platoon immediately north of the gully the Turks could be seen attempting to file out over the parapet of a trench near the farther end of German Officers' Ridge. Many rifles were trained on them, Milligan standing by his men and counting the Turks as they issued: "One out—got him; two out—got him, three out—got him, four, five out—get that man, somebody." Milligan's men were shooting as at a kangaroo drive; one of them appeared to be hitting a Turk with every shot.

¹⁶ See plates at pp 82 and 139. On at least one occasion during the early fighting at Anzac a section of Australian trench between Courtney's and Steele's had been for a short time occupied by the Turks.

Australians recoiling along the trench. A dozen yards of the firing line, immediately above the edge of Monash Valley, thus became filled with the enemy.

The Turks, however, held only one bay. They were unable to move southwards along the trench without passing the mouth of a communication sap, up which some of the 14th were firing warning shots. Neither could they move northwards, since a private, by name Jacka,¹⁷ had taken up position in the next bay, crouching on the fire-step immediately beyond the traverse and firing warning shots into the back wall of the trench on that side also. Opposite Jacka there opened another communication sap, in which Lieutenant Boyle,¹⁸ a Duntroon boy, endeavouring to get sight of the enemy, had been hit. Up this trench also came Lieutenant Hamilton,¹⁹ another Duntrooner, who, hearing shouts of "Turks in the front line," ran forward, revolver in hand, and fired at them as they jumped into the bay, until one of them shot him through the head. At battalion headquarters on the rear slope was heard a cry of "Officer wanted." Major Rankine sent Lieutenant Crabbe²⁰ to see what was the matter. As he ran up the same trench a shout from Jacka, still crouched behind the traverse, warned him not to enter the firing line. Crabbe asked Jacka whether, if given support, he would charge the Turks. "Yes—I want two or three," was the reply. In the communication trench behind Crabbe were several men, among them Lance-Corporal Howard²¹ and Privates De Arango²² and Poliness,²³ all of



Portion of Courtney's Post

¹⁷ Capt. A. Jacka, V.C., M.C.; 14th Bn. Employee, Vic. State Forests Dept.; of Wedderburn, Vic.; b. Winchelsea District, Geelong, Vic., 10 Jan., 1893. Died 17 Jan., 1932.

¹⁸ Lieut.-Col. H. N. Boyle, p.s.c., 14th Bn. Duntroon graduate, of East Brunswick, Vic.; b. Abbotsford, Vic., 28 Dec., 1895.

¹⁹ Lieut. W. H. Hamilton; 14th Bn. Duntroon graduate; of Ballarat, Vic.; b. Natimuk, Vic., 24 May, 1894. Killed in action, 19 May, 1915.

²⁰ Lieut. K. G. W. Crabbe; 14th Bn. Clerk; of St. Kilda, Vic.; b. Balacava, Vic., 28 July, 1894. Killed in action, 21 Aug., 1915.

²¹ Cpl. W. D. Howard (No. 73, 14th Bn.). Driller; of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Bendigo, 1891.

²² Lieut. S. De Arango; 14th Bn. Of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Bendigo, 1894.


²³ Pte. F. E. Poliness (No. 114, 14th Bn.). Clerk; of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Geelong, Vic., 18 Dec., 1893.

Bendigo, to which district Jacka also belonged. Upon these undertaking to back him up, Jacka jumped from behind his traverse to the communication trench, and led them in, bayonets fixed.

It was still fairly dark, and, turning into the bay, Jacka sprang across the trench on to the fire-step, where, clinging close to the wall, he missed the first shots from the Turks; Howard, who came next, was struck. The second and third men fell, preventing the passage of those behind, and Jacka, finding himself unsupported, leapt back to the communication trench.

The first attempt to oust the Turks having failed, Crabbe arranged that a feint should be made from the same end, while Jacka, having previously gone round by another communication trench to the farther side of the bay, should leap in upon the Turks from their rear. This was accordingly done.

Allowing time for Jacka to reach his position, the party threw two bombs (obtained for the purpose from brigade headquarters) in the direction of the Turks, and commenced firing into the trench-wall ahead. Neither bomb exploded in the bay—one rolled beyond, and the other cannoned off into the farther communication trench—but they created smoke and




noise under cover of which Jacka leapt over the parapet, shot five of the Turks, and bayoneted two. The remainder scrambled out, Poliness at the other end shooting at them as they crept from the parapet.²⁴ On entering the position, which was piled with the dead of both sides, Crabbe found Jacka with an unlighted cigarette in his mouth, and flushed with the excitement of the preceding hour. "I managed to get the beggars, Sir," he said.

Thus by 5 o'clock the attack on German Officers' Ridge also had failed at every point. Of the assault north of this, to be made by the flank of the 5th Division at Quinn's and by

²⁴ For this action Jacka received the Victoria Cross

the 19th at the head of Monash Valley and on Russell's Top, the Turkish staff does not appear to have expected so much. After the wild burst of fire at midnight had subsided, the night became still, except for the invariable firing and bombing at Quinn's. Shortly after 3 o'clock, however, the picquet of light horsemen in the otherwise empty valley between Pope's and Russell's, finding a party of Turks coming down the valley, opened fire and checked them. A few minutes later heavy firing was heard on the front of the 1st Australian Division, and almost immediately afterwards several hundred Turks, shouting "Allah," charged towards Pope's and the Top. The right of Pope's was protected by the deep Waterfall Gully, but about a company of the enemy rushed towards the left of the post. The 1st Light Horse Regiment, which with a squadron of the 3rd formed the garrison, fired coolly, and only three Turks reached the parapet.

On Russell's Top, held by the Auckland Regiment of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the trenches were very incomplete, the three saps towards The Nek not having yet been connected, and some of them being narrow, deep, and without a fire-step. They were nevertheless manned, and on this night an officer had been placed in charge of each, while the supports had been ordered to sleep in the main trenches. When the enemy charged, the nearest defenders were a few of the Auckland Regiment in the left sap, which projected straight towards him. The Turks fired their rifles and threw bombs as they rushed, while the Aucklanders, who had not before been in a serious fight, fired at the flashes, but without being able to stop the advance. As the Turks passed down both sides of the sap, the men in it faced each way and continued to fire. Three rushes of the enemy along its western side were one after another swept away by their rifles and by a machine-gun of the Wellington Regiment. On the centre and inland side of the Top, on the other hand, the




Aucklanders clambered out of their deep trenches and lay behind a cross-sap firing. The enemy just failed to reach this line, the survivors throwing themselves down and the two sides shooting at very close range. Then part of the Auckland supports—and with them the firing line—charged. Before this onslaught the Turks ran back, the New Zealanders following them.

It was at such a juncture—just when the effort of the enemy wavered—that, in old-time battles, the defender often delivered his counter-stroke, and, seizing a moment of moral ascendancy, turned the tide of the conflict against the attacker by an advance of his whole line. In almost every battle of this war also, moments occurred when those in the actual firing line were convinced that such a counter-stroke would be overwhelming. But the extent of the battlefields, and the distance of the commander from his front, appear to have made the problem of ascertaining when that moment has arrived, and of organising an instantaneous and effective counter-assault, insoluble by any discovered system of communications. The only chance lay in having a plan already prepared, but on this occasion neither the corps nor either division had one. The handful of Aucklanders who followed the running Turks through the scrub were met by a growing fire from Baby 700. Having cleared the space in front of the trenches, they therefore returned to their own line. About a company of the retiring enemy sheltered in the shallow head of Monash Valley, which was hidden from the New Zealanders. Here they were afterwards seen from Pope's, whence the light horsemen, by exposing themselves above the parapet, were able to fire into them.

Quinn's, the most vulnerable post in the line, had not been attacked at the same time as those on either side of it. On this night it was held by the 15th Battalion together with thirty men of the 2nd Light Horse Regiment, the 16th having been relieved at noon the day before. When the fusillade broke out at midnight, two companies of the 16th were moved up to the post as a precaution. At 3.30 there was heard the sound of the attacks on either flank, but opposite Quinn's nothing stirred. During the previous week its defence had been greatly strengthened, partly by the digging of additional communication trenches and the roofing of a support trench near

the centre, but mainly by the carefully considered placing of machine-guns in the posts to its left and right. The machine-guns of the N.Z. & A. Division had since the Landing been employed on a highly effective system, being no longer distributed among the battalions but concentrated under the brigade machine-gun officers. In the case of the New Zealand and 4th Australian Infantry Brigades the officers in question were two experts obtained by New Zealand from England before the war—Captains Wallingford²⁵ and Rose.²⁶ The stationing of a number of machine-guns to defend Russell's Top and Walker's Ridge had been entrusted to Wallingford; Rose, during the second week in May, placed ten others so as to defend the head of Monash Valley. Of these, four on the edge of Russell's commanded the hillside beyond Pope's at the head of the valley; three on Pope's and another in rear of Steele's covered much the same ground; one on the right of Pope's enfiladed No-Man's Land at Quinn's from the left, while another at Courtney's enfiladed it from the right. By arranging for a flag to be shown at a certain hour in the front line at Quinn's, Rose had determined the extent to which these guns could safely sweep the front of that post. He further asked permission to place two machine-guns at Steele's on the left of the area belonging to the 1st Australian Division. In forwarding this request Godley pointed out that each unit could often be best defended by its neighbour, and asked that officers of each division might visit adjoining posts of the other in order to arrange for mutual support. This suggestion was carried out, with the result that each post in the Anzac line at the head of Monash Valley was protected by a system of cross-fire of machine-



²⁵ Maj. J. A. Wallingford, M.C.; Auckland Bn. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Auckland, N.Z.; b. Woolwich, Eng., 25 Jan., 1872.

²⁶ Lt.-Col. J. M. Rose, M.C. Commanded 1st N.Z. M.G. Coy., 1916. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Palmerston North, N.Z.; b. Drainie, Elgin, Morayshire, Scotland, 1 Aug., 1865.

guns from the posts on either flank.²⁷ An overwhelming force of fire was therefore in readiness for any attack upon Quinn's. At that point, however, the enemy at first confined himself to throwing bombs continuously from the old central communication trench of the 15th Battalion in No-Man's Land. But part of the support trench had now been roofed; and the sergeant in charge of a portion of this sector, by name Tom Dann,²⁸ was able to keep most of his men under cover while he and Lance-Corporal Storey,²⁹ standing in the almost empty line, bombed the Turks, at times climbing on to the parapet in order to aim their missiles to better purpose. At the same time there were signs that the enemy intended eventually to attack. About dawn the fire of rifles and machine-guns grew in intensity until its volume was tremendous. Dust, stones, and other débris knocked into the air by the bullets were showered upon the men in the trenches. Bayonet tips were smashed, and the periscopes of the N.C.O's keeping watch were splintered. In No. 3 Subsection a lad named Broome,³⁰ fresh from Rockhampton Grammar School, was pluckily endeavouring to answer this fire by the method in vogue at Quinn's—holding the rifle above him—when he was shot through the head. The majority kept low, waiting, since they had been warned—though few needed such a warning—to expect attack the instant the fire ceased. At 4.20, when, with shouts of "Allah," bunches of the enemy scrambled out of the trenches facing the right, the 15th in that section rose as one man, and, firing coolly and rapidly, blew the attack away. Two or three times the enemy attempted to come on, each time with less chance of success. Meanwhile in the centre of Quinn's the whirlwind of fire sweeping the crest never permitted such an attempt. It is true that Lieutenant Little and Lance-Corporal Chippendale,³¹ jumping to obtain a

²⁷ The enemy protected his posts along the Anzac front in the same manner.

²⁸ Lieut. T. Dann; 15th Bn. Selector; of Pearamon, Q'land; b Bexley, Kent, Eng., 17 Sept., 1882. (Dann, who was wounded on three occasions in Gallipoli, was discharged as medically unfit, but within a few months he re-enlisted as a private. He was subsequently twice wounded in France.)

²⁹ Cpl. F. Storey (No. 199, 15th Bn.). Customs officer; of Brisbane; b. Brisbane, 1891. Killed in action, 8 Aug., 1915.

³⁰ Pte. G. G. Broome (No. 265, 15th Bn.). Electrical engineering student; of Rockhampton, Q'land; b. Rockhampton, 4 Aug., 1896. Killed in action, 19 May, 1915.

³¹ L/Cpl. R. Chippendale (No. 562, 15th Bn.). Foreman labourer; of Brisbane; b. Clayton-le-Moors, Lancs., Eng., 5 Oct., 1885.

momentary glimpse (since periscopes were useless), saw several of the enemy lying low only a few feet distant, but one or two bombs put an end to any danger. Similarly on the left of Quinn's any Turk who attempted to run across the open exposed himself immediately to the machine-guns at Pope's. But as the light grew, Lieutenant Sparks, in charge of No. 6 Subsection, perceived that the enemy had during the night sapped out diagonally into the old left-flank communication trench of May 9th, joining it at a point only a few yards from Quinn's. Above the parapet of the new trench could be seen numbers of bayonet points. Sparks proceeded to bomb this enemy. His own hand was presently blown off, but his men cleared the sap.

In addition to other means for the defence of Quinn's, Sykes's 2nd New Zealand Battery on Plugge's Plateau, commencing to fire in the half-light at 4.15, was bursting its shrapnel at short range in the face of the Turks. Such in short were the conditions that, though the front lines were at one point only fifteen yards apart, and though the three shallow communication trenches, dug upon May 9th, still actually connected the two, not one Turk succeeded in crossing that narrow space.

After the first onslaught had failed along the whole Anzac line, the enemy continued at various points to throw forward bodies of troops. He used little covering fire, and to the Australians the fight was now child's-play. Men sat on the parapet and fired as at driven game. Lance-Corporal C. B. Gray⁸² of the 9th, a famous marksman, firing off his left shoulder, was reputed to have hit twenty-eight Turks with successive shots. All along the trenches infantrymen whose station was not in the firing line were begging for a place on the fire-step, offering in jest sums of money for a "place" which they knew no money could buy. In Sergeant Richardson's⁸³ platoon of the 12th two men fought each other for several minutes in the trench because one would not give room. For their

⁸² L/Cpl. C. B. Gray (No 512, 9th Bn). Bushman; of Marton district, N.Z.; b. Fruithlands, Central Otago, N.Z. 14 Jan. 1893. Killed in action, 28 June, 1915.

⁸³ Capt. C. N. Richardson, M.C., 12th Bn. Carpenter, of Scottsdale, Tas.; b. Scottsdale, 8 Aug., 1892.

part, the surviving Turks, as the rushes gradually ceased, lay out in the scrub shooting or waiting for others to reinforce them. As day began to shine through the long wisps of mist and smoke which trailed across the battlefield, they everywhere attempted, singly or a few at a time, to regain their trenches. A deadly aimed fire followed them. On the Jolly the enemy in one trench refused to allow the retiring men to enter it.

The Anzac troops were thus turning the enemy's defeat into disaster; but, if they regarded this shooting as sport, they were ready to pay for it. Dawn found the whole garrison firing from the parapets, the men often sitting on the traverses without the least regard for their own safety. But as the attacks waned and the light increased, there came from the enemy close at hand in the scrub as well as from his trenches a fire which grew in accuracy. Many of the defenders, realising that it was time for heads to be withdrawn below the parapets, began to take cover and shoot only through the loop-holes which by this time had been made in the parapets of all fire-trenches. For others the sport of shooting at the occasionally fleeing Turks was too alluring. A considerable number at this stage lost their lives. Captain Wallack,⁸⁴ who had been in temporary command of the 2nd Battalion after Colonel Braund's death, was killed in the 2nd Battalion sap, and Lieutenant L. W. Street at the head of that of the 3rd Battalion. On the right of Quinn's, where numbers of the 15th were exposing themselves in order to shoot at the enemy retreating from Courtney's,⁸⁵ a Turkish machine-gun from the Chessboard killed three Australians and wounded seven with a single burst. Similarly on the left of Pope's a number of light horsemen, exposing themselves to fire at the enemy who crowded the head of Monash Valley, were killed by a machine-gun suddenly turned upon them from another direction.

⁸⁴ Capt. G. T. Wallack; 2nd Bn Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces; of Sydney; b. Hobart, 18 Nov., 1885. Killed in action, 19 May, 1915.

⁸⁵ At this point Sgt A. E. Musgrave (of Bathurst, N.S.W.), a noted marksman, continued to shoot with deadly effect from behind a steel loophole-plate until an enemy machine-gun was turned upon and wounded him.

By 5 o'clock von Sanders' attempt to rush the Anzac lines had everywhere not merely failed but resulted in ruinous loss. The whole attack had been swept away, mainly by the rifle-fire of the ordinary garrison; except as a precaution at Quinn's, the Anzac reserves had not been called upon. By 5 o'clock there remained for the Turks not the slightest chance of even local success. But the subsequent action of the enemy's commanders resulted in still further losses. It is almost certain that the reason for their procedure was the sending back of a report, foolishly magnified, that the Anzac trenches had been entered at all points. Though in a sense true, this was utterly misleading, the superior commander being induced to believe that some of his troops had gained a useful foothold, and consequently to launch others in support of them when such a step could only end in useless slaughter. At all events there is some evidence that orders were given for a renewal of the assault, to be preceded at 5 o'clock by a sharp bombardment upon the Anzac line from Courtney's southwards. At that hour the enemy's guns at the Olive Grove, and those at Lone Pine, opened heavily; salvoes were also fired by a new battery, the flashes of which could be plainly seen behind Anderson Knoll on Gun Ridge, 1,500 yards from Bolton's. Most of the Anzac batteries likewise opened when the light became sufficient, the slopes at the head of Monash Valley being shelled by every field-piece which could bear upon them. Little attention could be paid to the Turkish batteries, and they continued their bombardment during the day regardless of counter-fire.⁵⁶ Even the Turkish gun

⁵⁶ The new enemy battery on Anderson Knoll was immediately shelled by the *Triumph's* guns, directed on to it by the observing officers on Bolton's. The three observing officers in this post, Lieuts. C. A. Clowes, T. A. J. Playfair, and Capt. Rawson, were knocked down by one of the Turkish battery's salvoes, Playfair being seriously wounded. Subsequently, while Rawson was at the Pimple, Clowes assisted Subadar Mit Singh to lay one of the mountain-guns also on to this battery. Nevertheless it continued to fire during the day. About the time when this battery first appeared, the enemy was observed from the Pimple to be engaged about an ammunition waggon, possibly belonging to the Lone Pine battery, which was then firing from behind the hill. For some reason this vehicle had actually been dragged on to the summit, and Turks were endeavouring to haul it away, first with horses and, when fire prevented this, with men on dragropes. One of Rawson's mountain-guns, hurriedly brought on mules to the firing line in the Pimple, with its first three shots knocked the waggon in two. The gun then opened on such of the Turkish infantry as were to be seen on the plateau, until high-explosive shell falling about it from the Olive Grove forced its withdrawal.

at Gaba Tepe, although a mountain-gun³⁷ was continuously laid on it, was fired at intervals.

The shrapnel-fire upon the 400 Plateau was severe enough to cause the commander of the 3rd Battalion to withdraw his men temporarily from the forward sap. Shells were still falling when the enemy was observed sending more lines of men into his trenches on the 400 Plateau. Fresh troops were also accumulating behind Johnston's Jolly. Others were at this time observed on the march from Anafarta in the north, as well as through a covered way over Gun Ridge in the east, while south of Anzac there was a constant movement across the valley which, from the field of brilliant red poppies near its mouth, was called "Poppy Valley." During several hours there followed spasmodic renewals of the attack. About 5.25 the 5th Division, and probably the 2nd, again attempted to advance near German Officers' Ridge and Johnston's Jolly. The lines of Turkish infantry, in deploying, filed out at right angles to the Australian front, moving across instead of towards it. About the same time from behind Johnston's Jolly appeared numbers of the enemy, flung out "like handfuls of peas," as one eye-witness described it, on to the flat at the foot of Wire Gully, and then advancing in extended order up the valley.³⁸ The same overwhelming rifle and machine-gun fire which had met the previous attack swept away this one also.

³⁷ During this episode an illustration occurred of the magnificent spirit of the Indian artillerymen. While the gun of the 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery was waiting for the Gaba Tepe gun, a new Turkish battery of two guns opened upon its position. All the crew were under cover, except two, who were stationed at intervals between the observation station and the gun-pit for the purpose of passing verbal directions. The task of the party was as far as possible to prevent the Gaba Tepe gun from enfilading the Australian infantry in the Right Section, and to that end orders continued to be passed regularly in spite of the Turkish fire. A member of the battery passing down the trench observed that one of the men there, Karm Singh, was holding one hand over his eyes. "What is wrong, Karm Singh?" he asked. "Don't worry," was the reply, "I am quite able to pass messages." The other, passing on, mentioned the matter to a native officer. Nothing more was thought of it at the time, but later, when the firing was over, they came back to Karm Singh and found that a shrapnel pellet had passed through both his eyes. Taken to the hospital, he asked the medical officer: "Sahib, shall I have my sight?" Knowing that this was impossible, the doctor answered: "Perhaps, after a time, with one eye." "It is nothing," said Karm Singh. "Have I not eaten your salt and taken your bread?"


³⁸ They were coming from perfect shelter (in the area behind the Jolly) into torrential rifle-fire. On one occasion there emerged with them round the corner an officer on horseback. The exposed ground was, of course, no place for a horseman, and, suddenly realising that the Australian line faced him at the head of the valley, he dug his heels into his mount and disappeared.

Similar attempts were made at intervals until 10 o'clock by individual Turkish officers to lead their men against Pope's and Quinn's. These efforts, though lifeless, were exceedingly gallant, since the men who made them must have climbed out of trenches already crowded with dead and wounded. On the right of Quinn's the enemy emerged at least four times, and at 9.30 an officer at the head of thirty men actually reached the junction of Quinn's and Courtney's, being killed on the parapet.³⁰

The batteries of Sykes, Phillips, and Bessell-Browne, two New Zealand howitzers, several mountain-guns, and numerous machine-guns were now kept trained upon this region. The sole task of one mountain-gun was to fire continuously upon the head of the empty valley between Pope's and Russell's Top, while Sykes's shot in the same manner between Pope's and Quinn's. It was now observed that the Turkish soldiers would not follow when their leaders leaped on to the parapet, and many officers thus sacrificed themselves in vain. In the 1st Battalion of the 57th Turkish Regiment, facing the right of Pope's, five out of six young cadet-officers who had joined the regiment from Constantinople on the previous evening now lay dead upon their own parapet.

A further attack might also have been attempted from The Nek had not the New Zealanders in Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts, who had hardly been disturbed during the night, perceived at sunrise large numbers of the enemy crowded high up in the head of Malone's Gully, apparently in readiness for another assault on Russell's Top. From No. 1 Outpost a squadron of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, with one machine-gun, poured into the rear of this mass such a fusillade that it presently broke and fled. Consequently—apart



1000 YDS
1 N^o1 Post 2 N^o2 Post  Turks
F Fisherman's Hut


³⁰ So close was the fighting that Capt. Sampson and Lieuts. Leitch and W. T. Mundell were shooting with their revolvers. On the left of Quinn's, which was guarded by a machine-gun at Pope's, the enemy could not come so near, this machine-gun at a single sweep cutting down some thirty who made the attempt.

from Quinn's—Courtney's and German Officers' were the only points where hostile activity continued after 8 o'clock. Even there the Turkish troops were merely being driven by their officers over the parapets to be almost immediately shot down. As late as 10 o'clock an officer could still be seen endeavouring to rally them near the junction of Mule and Wire Gullies; but the men with whom he was dealing were bolting like rabbits from one burrow to another. Without rifles, without helmets—some without tunics—in twos and threes they scrambled round the foot of German Officers' Ridge from north to south and *vice versa*, only to meet fire whichever way they ran. Everywhere in the Turkish communication trenches on the northern front could now be seen tokens of the withdrawal of the enemy's crowded forces from the forward trenches, the dust whipped up by the Australian and New Zealand machine-gun bullets following them in small clouds along the parapets. There were signs that masses of broken troops were crowded behind Johnston's Jolly and Lone Pine and in the trenches. Colonel Owen, of the 1st Brigade, fearing that these portended a renewal of the attack, urgently called for artillery fire upon them. But it is probable that the enemy's real reason for packing his trenches was that he feared—as an unsuccessful attacker always did—an immediate counter-stroke.

Although the N.Z. & A. Division all day forwarded to the field- and mountain-batteries urgent requests to fire upon the 400 Plateau, such were the difficulties of the artillery at Anzac that the crowded enemy in Legge Valley escaped with a comparatively light bombardment from the New Zealand howitzers and Whitting's mountain-gun.⁴⁰ But the slaughter was already sufficiently great to secure the complete safety of Anzac. Of the 42,000 Turkish troops who had hemmed

⁴⁰ The urgent request for artillery fire upon the 400 Plateau, made by Col. Hobbs of the Australian artillery, duly went its circuitous course to the New Zealand and mountain batteries, which alone could fire on this summit. Two mountain-guns under Lieut. J. H. Thom endeavoured, by using the light star-shell charges, to drop projectiles into Mule Valley behind German Officers' Ridge, through which the Turks were retiring. But the difficulty of firing upon Johnston's Jolly was complicated by a misunderstanding as to which trench Johnston's Jolly was. All day it was doubtful whether the 1st New Zealand Battery was firing upon the right position. About noon Capt. F. L. Biddle (of East Melbourne, Vic.), of the Australian artillery, was sent to assist the New Zealand observers on Russell's Top in determining which position was the Jolly, but the difficulty could not even then be solved, and on the following day it was still found necessary to send a New Zealand officer to the trenches opposite the Jolly in order to identify it.

in the position at dawn, some 10,000 had before noon been killed or wounded. The loss had been heaviest on German Officers' Ridge, where the 5th Division had advanced in face of the machine-gun fire which swept the summit and both slopes. According to a Turkish statement the 19th Division, which apparently suffered least, had 339 killed and 755 wounded. The names given by the enemy to the Anzac hills almost certainly tell the story of this fight. Lone Pine became Kanli Sirt, "Bloody Ridge"; Johnston's Jolly—Kirmezi Sirt, "Red Ridge"; No-Man's Land near the Pimple—Shehidlar Tepe, "Martyrs' Hill"; Plugge's Plateau, on which were Sykes's and Rossiter's batteries—Khain Tepe, "Treacherous Hill."



Not all who lay in No-Man's Land after this fight were killed or wounded; a proportion, as normally happens, were feigning death, and eventually crept away. Any disused trench or pot-hole in No-Man's Land was crowded with survivors, mostly wounded. Here and there in the scrub some staunch veteran continued to fire at the Anzac line throughout the day.⁴¹ But while some thus survived between the opposing trenches, the dead and wounded lay everywhere in hundreds. Many of those nearest to the Anzac line had been shattered by the terrible wounds inflicted by modern bullets at short ranges. No sound came from that dreadful space; but here and there some wounded or dying man, silently lying without help or any hope of it under the sun which glared from a cloudless sky, turned painfully from one side to the other, or slowly raised an arm towards heaven. The Anzac troops had lost only 160 killed and 468 wounded. At last they had been fighting, not an invisible enemy, but one who came forward to be shot until the men shooting were almost tired of slaughter.

⁴¹ There appeared to be no lack of courage in the Turkish officers or men. One officer, who had been lying with a line of men, calmly walked back during a quiet interval to the nearest Turkish trench; after endeavouring to induce its garrison to advance and support his party, he ran back to his men, and later succeeded again in returning to the main trench.

After that morning the fierce hatred of the Turk, which had possessed them since the Landing, disappeared. Until then he had been the unseen enemy whose murderous fire had swept away the attacking lines on Baby 700, at Quinn's, and on the 400 Plateau. But on May 19th it had at last been possible to hit back. After the terrible punishment inflicted upon the brave but futile assaults all bitterness faded. Moreover, seeing the dreadful nature of the wounds inflicted by their own bullets at short range, the troops were less ready to believe—as they had done previously—that the wounds of their own men were caused by "explosive" bullets. The Turks had displayed an admirable manliness. When by order of the intelligence authorities interpreters called out to them that they would be kindly treated if they surrendered, the invitation was frequently answered by a bomb or a bullet. Upon a somewhat effusive written message to the same effect being thrown to the enemy at Quinn's by order of the higher commanders—a task which the Australian soldier always detested—the reply on one occasion came: "You think there are no true Turks left. But there are Turks, and Turks' sons!" When a prisoner was led up to the trenches to call out to his comrades to surrender, the voice of a Turkish officer replied: "Who are you? Are you a prisoner? Well, then, go away and don't talk." The prisoner obeyed. This staunchness on the part of the enemy, and the fact that he always refrained from shelling hospital ships, and sometimes from firing on parties carrying wounded men, quickly won the respect of his adversaries.⁴² From this morning onwards the attitude of the Anzac troops towards the individual Turks was rather that of opponents in a friendly game.

So easily was this defeat inflicted that its importance was for a few hours not fully realised by the Anzac leaders. The attacks had been wrecked mainly by rifle-fire—the eighteen-pounders expending 1,361 rounds, the howitzers 143, the mountain-guns 1,410, but the rifles and machine-guns 948,000. Although considerable reserves had been in readiness—the

⁴² Liman von Sanders was at one with the Turkish commanders in issuing stringent orders against firing on the Red Cross flag. Many German officers serving in Turkey also observed the principles of humanity. The testimony of the few captured Australians clearly shows that, while the rules of war were respected by most educated Turks, it was the German officers who frequently stood between the prisoners and the savagery of another class of Turkish soldier.

2nd Brigade in Shrapnel Gully; the 13th Battalion and half of the 16th, and the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiments in Monash Valley; part of the Mounted Rifles Brigade on Russell's Top—only one company of the 16th and a squadron of light horse had been moved, these being sent by way of precaution to Quinn's.⁴³ Not until members of the staff actually saw the numbers of dead and wounded lying in front of every sector was it recognised that this attack had been planned on a scale far greater than that of any previous assault at Anzac.

The question of a counter-stroke had, however, early suggested itself to General Birdwood, whose spirit always favoured the offensive. As the right seemed to be least heavily engaged, he had at 5.25 a.m. suggested to General Walker that, if the line upon the 400 Plateau was being hard pressed, a counter-stroke should be made from Bolton's against the Turkish flank. But the assault on the plateau had then ended, and Colonel MacLagan, commanding the Right Section, greatly disliked the notion of his troops advancing into the low ridges south of the Pine, especially in face of the heavy and continuous shell-fire which was then being maintained from the Olive Grove. General Walker and Colonel White felt that they had missed the chance for a general attack, but were opposed to a sectional one. Birdwood therefore abandoned the notion. Yet so clearly did the Turkish defeat appear to invite a counter-stroke, that at 3.15 p.m. G.H.Q. ordered him to seize any opportunity for delivering one.⁴⁴ Shortly before this order was received General Godley, impressed by the same considerations, had ordered 100 men of the Wellington Mounted Rifles to raid the enemy's front trench at The Nek. All batteries bearing upon Baby 700 had been asked to support the attack at 3 p.m. But the first few men who had climbed from the trench were met with such a volume of fire that certain annihilation appeared to await the attacking party if allowed to proceed. The local commander

⁴³ During the morning, in anticipation of further assault, two companies from the 2nd Brigade were sent to support the line on the 400 Plateau, and the machine-guns of the divisional Light Horse and 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades—the regiments themselves being still upon the sea—were distributed throughout the line.

⁴⁴ A counter-stroke by the whole line similarly ordered on May 2 at Helles appears to have met with little success.

had therefore stopped the attempt.⁴⁵ Seeing that at dawn, when the enemy was actually running away, the New Zealanders who attempted to follow had been prevented by machine-gun fire, there can be little doubt that by the afternoon the enemy was perfectly prepared to meet a counter-stroke. Birdwood accordingly advised G.H.Q. that it was difficult to gain ground at Anzac without a general assault. On this advice the notion of a counter-stroke was abandoned.

The Turkish gun-fire upon Anzac remained heavy throughout the day. The strain of battle tended, as always, to make men anticipate that further attack was imminent, and the intelligence staff, having induced a few of the enemy in No-Man's Land to surrender, learned from one of them, an unnerved boy straight from a military school, that a still heavier assault was about to be delivered.⁴⁶ A request was accordingly made to G.H.Q. that the return of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which was still at Helles, might be hastened. The brigade embarked that night, and the small steamers transporting it were off Anzac before dawn. All sections of the line had meanwhile been warned to be prepared for further attack. But on the enemy's side the defeat had been far too decisive, and the exhaustion too complete, to allow of further aggression. There the only thought was of a possible counter-stroke by the Anzac troops.

The presence of several thousand dead between the crowded lines now became a matter of real anxiety to the Anzac leaders. Already in some sectors the acrid stench of corpses was never absent. The conditions threatened to become intolerable for the troops, while the medical authorities foresaw that the dead would become a breeding-ground of flies and consequently of pestilence. A few of the enemy's wounded still remained on May 20th between the lines, and throughout the force there was a desire to help these men, who were slowly dying beneath the eyes of all. It was certain that the Turks must be eager for the burial of their


⁴⁵ The outburst of Turkish fire, spreading along the lines, gave rise to the belief that the Turks also had been about to attack.

⁴⁶ The first accurate map of the Anzac area was also obtained from the body of an officer mortally wounded on the parapet. It was the new Turkish large-scale map, only recently produced. From it and from others captured at Helles, and copied in Egypt there was compiled an excellent map, which was forthwith furnished to the allied forces. The Turks were greatly astonished upon capturing one of these copies within a few weeks of their first receipt of the original

comrades,⁴⁷ and, if further time were wasted, the wounded must die. The movement for an armistice originated partly with Captain Hon. Aubrey Herbert,⁴⁸ attached to Godley's staff, a chivalrous Englishman, who on May 20th obtained leave to go to Sir Ian Hamilton and personally press the suggestion already made by Birdwood. Hamilton, apprehensive of enemy propaganda, forbade Birdwood to open formal negotiations, but added that, if the enemy commenced the negotiations or made a genuine movement to succour his wounded or bury the dead under a Red Crescent flag, he was not to be fired on.

But while Herbert was still away the first steps had been independently taken. Some of the Turks who had surrendered stated that in their trench—the old battle-outpost in Wire Gully—there still lay a number of men seriously wounded.⁴⁹ Colonel Owen, temporarily commanding the 1st Brigade, proceeded to the adjoining trench on MacLaurin's Hill. "We should not be British," he said, "if we did not attempt to get those men in." Several bystanders at once volunteered for the task, but Owen decided that a Red Cross flag should first be hoisted. It was instantly shot down by the enemy, who put two bullets through the staff. But immediately afterwards a Turkish messenger, running from German Officers' Trench, panted out what proved to be an apology for firing on the Red Cross, of the meaning of which, he said, many of the Turkish soldiers were ignorant.

Thereupon an informal armistice took place, Red Crescent flags being raised at intervals along the enemy's line, and stretcher-bearers



⁴⁷ It was assumed that the Turkish troops would feel this desire from motives of reverence, and the German staff because the sight of the uncared-for dead must have an embittering and depressing influence upon the army. A Turkish order captured at Helles in July enjoined that the "bodies of the martyrs" (i.e., the Turkish dead) were to be taken to places distant from the trenches and buried, while "the carcasses of the enemy" were to be gathered into a big pit and burned.

⁴⁸ Lieut.-Col. the Hon. A. N. H. M. Herbert, b. 3 Apr., 1880. M.P., Yeovil Division of Somerset, Eng., 1918/23. Died of illness, 26 Sept., 1923.

⁴⁹ See plate at p. 138.

coming out. As by then it was growing late and there was obvious danger of irregularities, General Walker—who happened to witness the incident—after sending a message to Birdwood, strode in person across No-Man's Land to see for himself that no improper advantage was taken by the enemy.⁵⁰ As he stood exchanging cigarettes with several Turkish officers and chatting in French, one of the enemy began to collect rifles from the dead. Walker thereupon, after giving the Turks ten minutes to return to their trenches, closed the informal truce, arranging that, if an armistice were desired by either side, it should be formally asked for at a parley to be held an hour later at the same spot.

This informal truce was probably the only possible means of saving the few remaining wounded, but it involved natural misunderstandings, by which other lives were probably lost. This misfortune arose from the fact that in some sectors one side or the other, being unaware of any arrangement, suspected treachery. Each, by way of precaution, manned its trenches; and when the 3rd Australian Brigade, which had heard no word of any truce, observed at 7 p.m. numerous Turkish stretcher parties suddenly advancing with white flags, while the defences behind them bristled with bayonets, a report was sent to Birdwood that the enemy was treacherously massing. At 7.15 the 9th Battalion opened fire, to which the enemy's artillery sharply replied. Thus when the hour for the suggested parley arrived a bombardment was proceeding and no flag of truce appeared. The whole incident was interpreted by the A. & N.Z. Corps staff as an attempt by the enemy to make a perfidious attack. The garrison, now increased to 19,776 by the return of the New Zealand infantry from Helles and by the arrival of the 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, was again warned to expect a night-assault, and, as a preventive, the whole Anzac artillery bombarded the Turkish positions at dawn. Again both night and dawn passed without alarm.

Fortunately during the informal truce a written message from Anzac headquarters had been passed to the enemy independently of the verbal arrangement. It stated that, if

⁵⁰ Gen. Walker was accompanied by Capt. J. S. S. Anderson (of Sydney), Staff Captain of the 1st Brigade.

an armistice were desired, it must be formally arranged through an envoy sent along the beach from Gaba Tepe. These terms were accepted, and, after negotiations on two days at Birdwood's headquarters, an agreement was made for an armistice for the burial of the dead on May 24th. During the intervening nights Anzac patrols gathered large numbers of rifles from the dead in order to prevent the Turks from obtaining them at the armistice. At 7.30 a.m. on May 24th firing ceased,⁵¹ and burial parties worked all day between the lines, each side interring the dead found in its own half of No-Man's Land. The written conditions were honourably observed, and, except for the burial parties, the troops in most sectors were kept in their trenches, observing only through loop-holes. Meanwhile, however, the higher staffs on each side seized the opportunity to make a thorough survey of the territory of their opponents. A few small irregularities—such as the improving of loop-holes or trenches—were remarked on both sides. The narrow No-Man's Land at Quinn's was crowded with the workers,⁵² and here, taking a hint from some of their officers, the Australian party buried the Turkish dead in the nearer portion of the three old communication trenches leading from Quinn's to the Turkish lines, thus filling in that half of them. In the case of the left trench the Turks were observed to be doing the same. A protest was eventually made by the enemy, but by that time the work had been finished. The old battle-outpost in Wire Gully was similarly filled up. Throughout the day the Anzac burial parties chaffed the enemy with crude tags of Arabic, exchanged souvenirs, and, when at 4.30 both sides retired to

⁵¹ A Turkish sniper, who had not heard of the agreement, shot two Australians before this could be prevented. A Turkish 8-inch howitzer also fired, but was stopped by a hurried message to Gaba Tepe. Watching the course taken by the messenger, after he thought that he was hidden from view, Maj. Burgess obtained a clue to the position upon Gaba Tepe of the observing station for this gun. The howitzer itself was in an unascertained position east of Anzac; when it was desired to silence it, Burgess fired at its observing station.

⁵² The Australian garrison had been told not to show their heads, but at an early stage the men in No. 3 Subsection of Quinn's, observing through periscopes, found themselves looking into the eyes of a bearded Turk and a fair-haired officer who were calmly surveying the place through an opening in the Turkish parapet. Several Australians signed to them to put their heads down, but they merely smiled, and another Turk soon joined them. Later the No-Man's Land became crowded with the men of the rival burial parties, who worked and fraternised not ten yards from each other's trenches. If the Turk had desired to rush Quinn's Post that day, nothing could have prevented him. The few coils of wire and *chevaux-de-frise*, which had been thrown out and anchored lest the enemy should drag them away, were completely useless.

their trenches, parted as friends. The shot which renewed the conflict was not fired till 4.45, when a Turkish sniper opened.

Such were the battle of May 19th and its immediate sequels. So decisive had been that repulse that not until the closing phase of the campaign was the notion of a further general assault in this zone ever again entertained by the enemy. "The Turkish casualties were much heavier than was expected," wrote Kiazim Pasha four years later.⁵³ "After May 19th it was realised that the British defence at Anzac was too strong to enable us to effect anything against it without heavy artillery with plenty of ammunition; and, realising that our position also was⁵⁴ very strong in defence, two weak divisions were left in the trenches and the other two withdrawn." The divisions left were Mustafa Kemal's—the 19th, which, taking over the Turkish Quinn's and German Officers' from the shattered 5th, occupied the northern half of the line; and the 16th, which occupied the southern half, being charged with the construction of positions of great strength on the Jolly and Lone Pine. The 77th Regiment still held the extreme southern flank. The 5th Division was withdrawn, to rest in the Anzac ranges. The 2nd was first sent to the zone south of Gaba Tepe, and from there was quickly sucked into the tremendous fighting which occurred at Helles during the following month.

⁵³ In the answers kindly furnished to the Australian Historical Mission.

⁵⁴ The author has taken the liberty of transposing these two words, as they thus clearly express the intended meaning. The Turkish reply says "was also"

CHAPTER VI

THE OPEN FLANK AT ANZAC

THE depression of the Turkish troops after their disastrous attack upon Anzac, and the consequent discontent with their German allies, would probably have been more serious had it not been for a development which, occurring at this date, gave them the most striking evidence of valuable support from Germany. This was the arrival of submarines.

Early in May Vice-Admiral de Robeck was warned from the Admiralty that an enemy submarine had passed the Straits of Gibraltar. On May 10th most of the transports were ordered by the admiral to leave Helles and Anzac, and on the following day Sir Ian Hamilton was informed that the G.H.Q. ship *Arcadian* must move to harbour in one of the islands, and that headquarters might possibly have to land. Until this time the whole fleet of transports, containing almost all the artillery horses, the waggons and horses of all units, and a great part of the transport-train of the divisions, had been riding at anchor off Helles and Anzac for the convenience of the troops to whom they belonged. Birdwood had on May 5th asked leave to return the 6,100 horses in his thirty ships to Alexandria. But before a decision was reached the admiral ordered all ships to port. On May 11th seventeen transports left Anzac. Two days later a trawler captain reported that he had seen a submarine north of Imbros. All the remaining transports were immediately ordered to seek the harbour at Lemnos, which had been carefully protected against submarines. Several ships unloading necessary supplies were allowed to stay near at hand in Kephalos Harbour, Imbros; of the larger warships two old battleships, the *London* and *Triumph*, and the cruiser *Dartmouth* alone remained. Admiral Thursby with the *Queen* was at the same time sent by the Admiralty to the Adriatic. At Anzac the crowd of large steamers in the offing, which had till then given to the roadstead the appearance of Sydney Harbour or Port Phillip at the busiest season, suddenly vanished. There was established a daily service of trawlers or fleet-sweepers, to carry men and stores at fixed hours to and from Lemnos, Imbros, and

the landing-places. Leave was obtained for an occasional transport or storeship to lie off Anzac at night; but most cargoes of men and goods were transferred to smaller steamers in Mudros Harbour, which henceforth became a great transshipping port. Except for the three guarding warships, a few moored barges, occasional trawlers or water-carriers, and one hospital ship—with her red cross by day and her row of green lights brilliantly reflected in the calm water all night—the sea off Anzac and Helles was deserted.

On May 22nd those on the Anzac hillsides, for whom the roadstead was a stage upon which new scenes were constantly set, saw the two battleships and the cruiser *Bacchante*, together with several destroyers, suddenly spring into swift motion and, taking a zigzag course, escort towards Imbros the four or five transports remaining. A submarine had been reported on the coast north of Anzac. Having seen the transports to safety, the warships returned. The same afternoon the submarine was thought to have been seen off North Beach opposite Walker's Ridge. The naval authorities were doubtful of this report, floating kerosene-tins being constantly mistaken for periscopes. Nevertheless the guardships were reduced to two, and from that date a transport was rarely seen at Anzac, the supply-ships either transferring their cargoes at Imbros or lying off Anzac only in the dusk.¹

At noon on May 25th the battleship *Triumph*, lying off Gaba Tepe with her torpedo nets out, was hit by a torpedo from a German submarine;² within fifteen minutes she turned bottom upwards, and sank half-an-hour later under the eyes of both armies. Every small naval steamboat in the roadstead cast loose its tow of barges or dropped some other task and headed for the spot. By the fine handling of a destroyer, which remained pressed alongside the heeling ship, slowly drawing clear only when she was actually taking her final list, almost the entire crew was saved. A Turkish battery fired some shells at the rescuing boats, but an order appears to have been given for this shooting to cease. Meanwhile Turks

¹ On the following day H.M.S. *Albion*, standing in too close to Gaba Tepe, grounded, but, while the guns on one side of the ship were continuously fired in the direction of the Olive Grove, a hawser was passed from the *Canopus*, and she was towed off an hour later. See Vol. XII, plate 74. For *Triumph*, see pl. 75.

² It is certain that the periscope of this submarine was seen from Pope's Hill several minutes before the torpedo was fired, and also afterwards, when it moved slowly west. But the men on Pope's had, of course, no means of transmitting this information in time to be of value.

and Australians watched from every hillside, the garrison of Gaba Tepe promontory standing in the open, until a few rounds from Burgess's guns sent them to their trenches.

Two days later the *Majestic* was similarly sunk at Helles. From that time forth all large warships, and even cruisers, were withdrawn from their stations upon the Gallipoli coast. The fleet of transports had departed to Imbros, Mudros, and Alexandria. At Anzac, after the flanks had been left for one night without any naval watch, two destroyers took position as flank guards to north and south respectively. When next a larger warship—the *Doris*, of 5,600 tons displacement—visited Anzac for a hurried bombardment, she came singly, and carefully guarded by destroyers, which presently escorted her back to Imbros.

Thus at the end of the first month of the campaign the support of the ships' heavy guns, in reliance on which the Gallipoli campaign had been undertaken, was almost entirely withdrawn. But except that Lemnos, and to a minor extent Imbros, became ports of transshipment, requiring the control rather of a great commercial mind^a than of regular naval and military officers, the course of the campaign was little affected. The comparative ineffectiveness of the fleet's heavy guns in battle against an enemy in trenches was becoming clear not only to the Turks but to the naval authorities. Except for the shriek of the high-velocity projectile and the noise and dust of the explosion, the naval high-explosive shells had little result in disturbing the enemy in the field. Instead of splitting into numerous small man-killing fragments, as did the light high-explosive shells of field artillery, they broke into half-a-dozen great flakes, which flew harmlessly over. Against machine-guns and trenches, wrote de Robeck, the Navy could do little. "The effect of the British naval artillery was moral without being material," states the Turkish staff, speaking of the fighting at the Landing, in which the naval guns had their greatest influence. The moral effect upon the enemy's troops diminished rapidly as the Turkish troops came to realise the comparative harmlessness of these shells. The

^a Hamilton endeavoured, without entire success, to obtain the services of a military officer capable of rising to the requirements of this situation. Even the experienced officers eventually sent to him appeared to lack the necessary imagination or resourcefulness. Whether a commercial man could have acquired a grasp of the necessary military details is a matter for conjecture.

results upon buildings at Chanak, Maidos, and Anafarta were more destructive, but even these were soon found to be much lighter than was anticipated. "At first," explained a Turkish officer some years later to the Australian Historical Mission, "we thought that all towns like Maidos would have to be evacuated. But we found that Kojadere was quite livable. The howitzers which you afterwards got were very much worse."

Churchill's estimate of the power of naval guns had already been proved false before the larger ships were forced into port by the enemy's submarines. Their efficacy had been further limited by their slender supply of ammunition. After the Second Battle of Krithia the normal expenditure of ammunition for each ship, as for each land battery, was cut down to a few rounds daily. Thus the *Triumph*, after firing a few shots to obtain the range of the Olive Grove batteries on May 8th, had to cease fire as soon as she began to hit the target, her daily allotment of shells being exhausted.

The material effect of the withdrawal of the large "covering ships" was therefore by no means so disastrous as might have been anticipated. Although, with only two destroyers in the offing instead of several battleships, the sea appeared strangely empty, yet it was soon found that on ordinary days these guardians were as valuable as the larger vessels; they carried out the minor bombardments quite as effectively. If somewhat heavier fire was demanded, it was generally afforded by special ships which were now being sent from Great Britain—monitors and old cruisers protected by new devices against torpedoes; if any formidable bombardment was required, the big ships came out as of old, whatever the danger, returning to harbour when the need for them had passed. Not only the naval harbours at Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and Mitylene, but the roadsteads off the landing-places on Gallipoli, were rendered fairly secure from submarines by means of nets and minefields. At the same time the Navy, in performance of its normal functions, contrived that only one large vessel actually carrying troops to Mudros was sunk during the campaign. Meanwhile the British submarines were carrying the offensive into Turkish waters. The first to reach the Sea of Marmora, the

Australian submarine *AE 2*,⁴ was sunk by a Turkish torpedo-boat near Marmora Island; but the British submarines *E 11* and *E 14*, in a series of successful raids, greatly harassed the enemy's communications, and even opened fire with their small guns in the harbour of Constantinople itself.

Nevertheless the withdrawal of the fleet greatly strengthened the morale of the Turks. The Germans could not have given their allies better evidence of their effective support than by sinking two battleships under the eyes of the armies and within a fortnight completely clearing the sea previously crowded with transports. The attempts made by the British intelligence staff, in the shape of messages thrown into the trenches or scattered from aeroplanes, to persuade the Turks that Germany was deceiving them, were worse than useless in the face of such proofs to the contrary. It was only by degrees that the enemy, as well as the Anzac troops, came to realise that the small warships which henceforth kept watch over the open country on each flank sufficed to fill the same rôle as the more powerful ships which they replaced. It was by them that both flanks were kept open; and into that comparatively empty country there were made from the Anzac side at about this time several reconnaissances which had immensely important results.

It has been already stated that both on the northern and southern flanks, where the enemy for fear of the guarding warships did not yet approach the sea, patrols were able at night-time to explore for a considerable distance the region in front of the trenches. On the southern flank patrols from the battalions of the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade crept every night along the seaward spur of Bolton's, sometimes as far as the Gaba Tepe wire, or through the still empty valleys south of Lone Pine, in order to get touch with the enemy who was only now beginning to entrench on Pine or Weir Ridge. Turkish patrols moved nightly in the same valleys, and occasionally the scouts would hear a patrol of the other making its way through the bushes; in a few instances they met and opened fire, but as the real object was to ascertain how far the enemy was distant, what he was doing at night, and, especially, whether he was preparing to attack, such fighting was if possible avoided.

⁴ See Vol. IX, ch. 18.

When the Olive Grove batteries first opened and their exact position was still a mystery, several attempts were made by patrols to discover it. So troublesome were these guns that the further intention was entertained of stealing through the Turkish lines in order to spike them, although probably little relief would have been obtained even if the weapons had been actually destroyed. On May 7th two men lay out all night endeavouring to discover the position; two days later a sergeant, with eighteen men of the 12th Battalion and a bombardier of the artillery, crept from the 9th Battalion's post on the beach south of Anzac upon an attempt to spike the guns.

After making their way for 300 yards, they were fired on. The sortie having been discovered, the sergeant ordered a withdrawal; but five of the men, believing that a small party could get through, pretended not to have heard the order. They accordingly continued along the spur bordering the sea; but as they were still probably too many for concealment, and as moreover they had only five biscuits and one bottle of water between them, it was presently decided that two should be sent back. The remainder, 500 yards south of the lines, turned inland.

The party now consisted of three, all Tasmanians of Launceston—Bombardier Orchard,⁵ a warehouseman, Private Harrington,⁶ a fruit-grower, and Sergeant Will,⁷ a bank clerk. Immediately after turning, they heard a rustling in the bush close in front; probably it was a sniper going to his post. They judged that the best course was to push on. Crouching as they went, they passed several old trenches, apparently dug in the Balkan War, all empty. On the second crest they came under the searchlight of the flank-guard ship, laid steadily all night long; but by crawling over the summits of rises they escaped observation. In due time they reached the creek in Legge Valley, three-quarters of a mile from its mouth. It was fringed with thick bushes, but they managed to find a crossing, which had been much used by men and animals. Higher up the valley was the



⁵ Lieut. A. A. Orchard, M.C.; 43rd Bty., A.F.A. Warehouse salesman; of Launceston, Tas.; b. Launceston, 24 July, 1888.

⁶ Capt. A. D. L. Harrington; 9th London Regt. Orchardist; of Exeter, Tas.; b. Westbury, Tas., 28 Apr., 1891.

⁷ Lieut. J. H. Will, M.M.; 12th Bn. Bank clerk; of Launceston, Tas.; b. Launceston, 19 May, 1895.

main Turkish line opposite Anzac. Close above them rose Gun Ridge. Climbing one of its pine-covered spurs, the three found themselves on its summit, within sight, as they believed, of their goal on the Mairdos flats. Looking for a place in which to hide during the day, they found a pit recently scooped, probably by a sniper. In this they lay, covering themselves with scrub.


As day began to break, their field-glasses showed them, to their disappointment, that another finger of Gun Ridge intervened. On the Anzac side of them Legge Valley was veiled with what proved to be the smoke from the cooking-fires of a Turkish force camped upon ledges behind Pine Ridge. The camp gradually stirred. A senior officer emerged from his dugout and washed in a basin, one man fetching his breakfast, another holding his coat. About 8 o'clock the stir gradually ceased, the Turks vanished to their work, and the three Tasmanians began to look out for a route in the other direction—to the Olive Grove batteries. At that moment, slightly beyond the next spur, a Turkish gun fired. Two men on the crest near by were signalling to the battery, which was clearly one of those on Gun Ridge. Further progress being impossible, the three lay low during the day; after dusk, having cut the telephone wire to the Turkish battery, as they had been ordered to do, they crept back. Once, as their feet sounded on the bed of a dry gully, a Turkish sniper fired three shots at short range. As they approached their own lines, they found Turkish snipers close ahead of them, and the fire from both sides was hot. But, as before, when



in danger they pushed on, and, after lying till dawn close to the searchlight beam, walked to the Australian outpost on the beach, which was expecting them. Orchard and Will were immediately taken out to the *Bacchante*, the former to point out an observation post which he had located on Gaba Tepe, while the latter from the ship's crow's-nest endeavoured to indicate the Turkish bivouac. On that day the bivouac was blurred by the rain, but the observation post was apparently destroyed.

General Bridges was greatly pleased by the achievement of the Tasmanians, as he was by any vigorous attempt to overcome difficulties. Since they had gone so far without encountering a Turkish line, it appeared that no continuous line yet existed on this flank. Accordingly, on the night of May 13th, a further attempt was made to reach the Olive Grove guns. On this occasion Will and Orchard again went out, together with the intelligence officer on Bridges' staff, Major T. A. Blamey. This time, after they had crossed the first ridge, they heard intermittent coughing at some distance ahead of them. Conjecturing that they were running into a sentry in a line of outposts thrown out from Gaba Tepe, they veered northwards and then again struck inland. As they approached the foot of Pine Ridge, a party of the enemy shuffled past, apparently without seeing them. After a pause Blamey moved his party again, and was almost on the foot of Pine Ridge when what appeared to be the same Turks came back towards them. The Australians lay silent, trusting that the enemy might pass, when from the hill-foot ahead a sentry challenged the approaching Turks, who answered, hesitated, and then came on in line, close together, with bayonets fixed and pointed almost into the ground.

The Australians had no wish to fire, but the leading Turk, passing actually between Blamey and Orchard, suddenly raised his rifle to bayonet the latter. Blamey shot him, Orchard at



the same time shooting the sentry. The rest of the enemy crowded together, the Australians pouring a swift fire into them. Most of the Turks fell. Amid shouts and commotion spreading along what appeared to be a line of Turkish sentries extending towards Gaba Tepe, Blamey's party withdrew. A quarter of an hour after it had reached the Anzac lines, a force of Turks advanced to the sea-side ridge and began firing heavily at the shore.*


This reconnaissance made it appear probable that the Turks now maintained a chain of sentries south of Anzac, possibly induced to do so by the previous cutting of their telephone wire. Moreover that area was so open, and the scene of so much traffic, that there was little chance of parties successfully creeping through; consequently, although patrolling continued nightly down the nearer valleys, no further attempt was made on this flank to penetrate the enemy's line and reconnoitre in the rear of it. On the northern flank, where the broken nature of the country might seem to make a strong Turkish garrison unnecessary, there was far more chance for such enterprises.

North of Anzac the spurs of the main range ran down to the sea in ridges which became longer and in general loftier as the chain receded from the *Ægean*. The spurs nearest to Anzac, immediately north of Walker's Ridge, were those which sloped from the nearest summit of the range—Baby 700—and which have been likened in the previous volume to the four fingers of a hand or the talons of a dragon's paw. Their bare precipitous sides and razor-edged crests afforded no possible access to the range.⁹ Beyond them lay a far more important and lofty ridge, descending directly from Chunuk Bair. This outstanding spur, which sprang from a point close to the actual summit and continued through several foot-hills almost to the shore, was known to the Turks as *Shahin Sirt* ("Falcon Hill") and to the British as "*Rhododendron Ridge*." Beyond it

* During the negotiations for the armistice of May 24 Blamey incidentally asked one of the Turkish envoys whether he had heard of an attack made by an Australian party on this night. The Australians, he said, imagined that they had killed about twenty-five Turks (an intentional over-estimate). The Turkish officer replied: "No, only about six." He said the Turks had estimated the attacking party at twenty-five men.

⁹ These are shown in *Vol. XII, plates 112 A and B*. From Battleship Hill (between Baby 700 and Chunuk Bair) no spur led down to the sea.

lay a long and somewhat lower spur, an adjunct of its own, afterwards known as "Bauchop's Hill," with which it connected near Chunuk Bair. On the farther side of this was a nightmare of contorted spurs and valleys, converging upon one another and contributing their several torrent-beds to the Aghyl Dere, which eventually issued through other spurs to the sea. From the last summit before Hill 971 a narrow broken ridge ran down to end in Damakjelic Bair, a comparatively gentle hill near the Suvla plain and the shore. Finally, north-east of this, from the summit of 971 itself, sprang the loftiest spur of all, Abdel Rahman Bair, which descended almost due north into the Suvla plain. One other high ridge, Chifte Tepe ("Double Hill"), ran down north-eastwards from the same summit, the town of Southern Anafarta¹⁰ lying at its foot. But this was beyond the horizon of the Anzac operations, of which the north-eastern limit was until the end of the campaign the lofty backbone of Abdel Rahman Bair. Beyond Damakjelic Bair lay the Suvla plain, stretching from Suvla Bay and its adjoining Salt Lake on the west towards the two villages of Anafarta at its eastern end. From it rose three minor heights—near Nibrunesi Point the little hump of Lala Baba, separating part of Suvla Bay from the Salt Lake, and immediately inland of the lake the two rounded "Chocolate Hills"; inland of the Chocolate Hills the steeper heights of Ismail Oglu Tepe, upon whose corrugated sides




- 1 Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971)
- 2 Hill Q
- 3 Chunuk Bair
- 4 Battleship Hill
- 5 Baby 700
- A-A-A Abdel Rahman Bair
- D Damakjelic Bair
- B-B Bauchop's Hill
- P Old No. 3 Post
- R Rhododendron Ridge
- S Rhododendron Spur
- W Walker's Ridge
- M Mortar Ridge

¹⁰ For clearness Kuchuk ("Little") and Büyük ("Great") Anafarta are referred to in this volume as Northern and Southern Anafarta respectively.

were certain angular markings which caused them to be called by the British the "W' Hills." The Chocolate Hills were circuitously connected with the "W" hills by a curved ridge lying to the north of each and known as "Scimitar Hill." This system of minor heights divided the Suvla lowlands into two parts—the plains of Southern and Northern Anafarta. Beyond the northern half of the plain lay a semi-circle of heights almost as massive as those of Hill 971; north of this again was the steep inlet of Ejelmer Bay, with a valley leading inland to the plain of Turshten Keui, which itself was separated only by a neck in the hills from Northern Anafarta.

On the two spurs immediately north of Walker's Ridge the New Zealanders had established certain outposts already mentioned, namely, No. 1 on the extreme seaward end of the southernmost spur leading to Baby 700, and No. 2 on the seaward end of the main foot-hill of Rhododendron, the most important of the spurs.¹¹ The enemy also had established several posts in these ridges.



1000 YDS
1 No 1 Post 2 No 2 Post
F Fisherman's Hut

¹¹ These posts had been first established on April 30, when the Nelson company of the Canterbury Battalion, under Maj. Brereton, was sent to occupy them after dark in order to cover a field-gun thrust forward near the beach. The posts had at first been heavily sniped at by a machine-gun and sharpshooters on the main ridge, among others Pte. A. R. Fellowes (of Wakefield, N.Z.) being killed and Lieut. F. Starnes (of Lower Monterey, N.Z.) wounded. But the machine-gun was located and subdued by fire, and the posts became well established. They were precisely opposite the three boats of the 7th and 12th Battalions which had been riddled at the Landing, and the knolls occupied by Brereton were those from which these boats had been fired upon. Judging from the heaps of cartridge cases found there, Maj. Brereton estimated that at the Landing, or immediately after, the Turks must have had a machine-gun on Fisherman's Hut Knoll, and two upon No. 2 Outpost. The dead, still in the boats and on the beach, were buried by the New Zealanders, and the boats' timbers used for making shelters.

After the New Zealand infantry was sent with its brigade to Helles, Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts had been held by the Deal Battalion of marines. On May 9th a patrol of marines, exploring the Chailak Dere ("Crevised Valley"), which ran out immediately north of No. 2, had come upon a garrisoned Turkish trench barring the way up the gully. But so crevised and precipitous were the spurs, so tortuous and narrow the valleys, so dense with scrub every slope which was not sheer weather-worn gravel, that it was for the most part impossible either from the sea or from the posts to judge what other points were occupied by the enemy. At first sight the country seemed impassable.

On May 13th the newly-arrived New Zealand Mounted Rifles took over these positions from the Deal Battalion, and from that day there commenced incessant scouting in the ridges. On the first night Major Hutton¹² and 100 men of the Canterbury Regiment, which held the outposts, were landed at Nibrunesi Point from a destroyer. They discovered that the mound of Lala Baba had been entrenched, apparently with the intention of resisting any landing at Suvla Bay, but that the trenches were empty. A telephone wire led to the place, but no Turks were seen. About May 19th the British balloon-ship observed a few Turks on the point, but a further raid on May 25th found it empty—the cape being clearly used intermittently as an observation-post for the "Anafarta" battery when firing on the Beach.

As has been explained, the two outposts occupied by the Canterbury Mounted Rifles looked up at the right flank and rear of the Turkish trenches upon The Nek and Baby 700. It appeared possible that some way should be found of climbing to the main ridge so as to reach it in rear of the enemy defending those key positions. With this object, as soon as the mounted rifles arrived, Major Overton¹³—a farmer of Canterbury, in New Zealand, to whom Brigadier-General Russell¹⁴ entrusted the organising of the brigade scouting—was sent to discover any practicable route.

¹² Lieut.-Col. G. F. Hutton, D.S.O., Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Commanded Otago Bn., 1916. Of Christchurch, N.Z.; b. Shelton, Notts, Eng., 6 Apr., 1884.

¹³ Maj. P. J. Overton, Canterbury Mtd. Rifles. Sheep farmer; of Greta, North Canterbury, N.Z.; b. Christchurch, N.Z., 3 Feb., 1877. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

¹⁴ Maj.-Gen. Sir A. H. Russell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Commanded N.Z. Div., 1916/19. Farmer; of Hastings, N.Z.; b. Napier, N.Z., 23 Feb., 1868.

On May 15th, taking with him a corporal by name Denton,¹⁵ he crept at dawn from No. 1 Outpost, crossed the bed of the Sazli Dere,¹⁶ which ran between the two posts, and followed its northern branch, which led straight into the steep foot-hills of Rhododendron Ridge, dividing that ridge into two and terminating abruptly in the heart of the spur. Up the southern spur Overton worked in daylight, and by 1 o'clock he and Denton had reached the head of the Sazli on Rhododendron Ridge. Thence, moving 500 yards up the broad sloping back of that eminence, they attained a point not far



1000 YDS
1 No 1 Post 2 Chunuk Bair
3 The Farm 4 Bauchop's Hill
← Route of Overton & Denton

from where Bauchop's Hill connected with it. Here Overton perceived, a quarter of a mile ahead of him, on an apex of the ridge, a Turkish trench. Above that point the ridge fell slightly, and then rose again to the gently-sloping southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair. The seaward face of Chunuk Bair was very steep; but a third of the way down it there intervened a shelf, on which was a field¹⁷ containing a stone hut, known to the British as "The Farm," but really an old sheep-fold (Turkish "Aghyl"). The valleys below and to the north of this shelf—the northern and southern Aghyl Dere and their branches—were perhaps the steepest and most complicated in the whole seaward slope of the range. But The Farm, the steep slope and summit above it, and the saddle in which Rhododendron Ridge ended, were grassy and almost bare of scrub. Overton observed three trenches: one on the saddle, large enough to hold perhaps fifty men; another on the slope of Chunuk Bair for thirty men; a third on the summit itself for about ten. None but these could be seen, and they had been dug for some time and were apparently unoccupied. At that moment no enemy was visible, but later

¹⁵ Capt. T. J. Denton; Canterbury Mtd. Rifles. Member of N.Z. Permanent Forces. of Blenheim, N.Z.; b. Carcoar, N.S.W., 7 Nov., 1888.

¹⁶ The name of this gully is Sazli Beit Dere ("Seaweed Valley"), but as it was widely known to the Anzac troops by the shorter name, the latter has been adopted in the text.

¹⁷ Turkish Sari Tarla—"Yellow Field."

in the day Overton and Denton, as they walked back, met several small parties and had to lie low while these passed.

It was clear to Overton that the crest and sides of most of the spurs leading to this part of the range were such as rendered the passage of troops impossible. "All the ridges between streams are razorbacks," he reported, and ". . . the slopes of the valleys are covered with thick scrub, impassable for troops by night and difficult by day." But, he wrote, "the beds of the streams are passable for troops"; Rhododendron Ridge was "of an open nature, passable day or night by troops in skirmishing order"; and the hill from The Farm upwards was "easily passable." Any force first seizing the summit of Chunuk Bair and then turning southwards would have the remaining defences of the spur at its mercy.

By this bold exploration at least one new avenue of approach to the most important summit of the range had been discovered. It happened that about this time a certain number of Greek civilians wandered from the north into the Anzac line at No. 2 Outpost.¹⁸ On May 13th there began to come in several civilians from the Peninsula itself. Many of the villages had contained a Greek population; but the Turks had cleared the inhabitants out of Maidos and other towns near the scene of fighting, and were beginning to move them from the more distant villages. The goods of these people had been requisitioned by the Turks until they had little left, and they themselves fled for more security towards the British lines.

From the tales of these refugees it became clear that the district north of Anzac was almost devoid of troops. Those Turkish forces which had at first been detained there from fear of a landing farther north, had now been sent to the front, and, except for a patrol which kept watch from the hills near Suvla, a few observation parties, a small guard of *gendarmes* at Ejelmer Bay and possibly a few other points, and such troops as were maintained in the foot-hills immediately beyond the Anzac flank, the country appeared to be

¹⁸ The first Greeks, who arrived when the marines were still holding the post, had come apparently from Thrace during the night by a sailing craft and, having landed near Suvla, had walked southwards. It was conjectured that they were seeking opportunities to spy or to trade. A caique sailed in next day with another batch of seventy-one aboard. All these were sent away.

unguarded. Not far from Northern Anafarta the Turks about this time emplaced the battery generally known as the "Anafarta" guns, which began to enfilade the Beach from the north in much the same way as the Olive Grove did from the south. These guns, which were ascertained to be within a certain area in the "W" Hills, daily killed and wounded a number of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles on Walker's Ridge, and the mounted rifles were accordingly prompted to locate them by sending out patrols similar to those carried out by the three Tasmanians towards the Olive Grove. On May 16th Lieutenant Blackett,¹⁹ of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, made a first reconnaissance in this direction. Eight days later a small patrol left No. 2 Outpost after dark with the intention of creeping along the coast, crossing the Suvla plain, and reaching this battery; but after proceeding little more than half-a-mile the party was detected, fired on, and forced to return singly. On the 27th a party of five volunteers made a further attempt to reach and "destroy" the guns, but again failed. Finally, after the set of the moon on the night of June 20th, Blackett, with a native guide, an interpreter, and a trooper of the mounted rifles, was taken on a trawler by Lieutenant Giffard,²⁰ of the British Navy, and landed by night at a quiet point in the steep coast-line immediately north of Suvla Bay. The party made its way inland, and Blackett succeeded in reaching a position from which, as he lay eating his sandwiches, he watched the crew of one of the Turkish guns in this neighbourhood at work about their emplacement. He returned to the coast and was picked up during the night.

The Anafarta battery now fired regularly upon Walker's Ridge, and on Reserve Gully below the Sphinx. According to some estimates it had by the



¹⁹ Maj G R. Blackett, M.C.; Canterbury Mtd Rifles. Accountant, of Wellington and Nelson, N.Z., b Te Rahu, Waikato, N.Z., 28 May, 1889.

²⁰ Commr. F Giffard; commanded the trawlers which usually assisted Anzac.


date of Blackett's expedition caused 750 casualties on Anzac Beach. Though this was a considerable exaggeration, so troublesome were these guns that Birdwood for a moment entertained a notion of secretly landing half a regiment where Blackett had been put ashore, in order to make a swift advance through this lightly-guarded area, destroy the Anafarta battery, and re-embark. The proposal, however, was shortly afterwards dropped, for the reason that the Anzac commander had come to envisage a far more important undertaking, which this minor enterprise might have imperilled.

In spite of the order received from Hamilton on May 1st—that he must not undertake a general advance, but rather relieve pressure upon the force at Helles—Birdwood had ever since the Landing been looking for the best plan of advancing when a proper time should come. Since the return of the two brigades from Helles the strength of his force had been steadily increasing. Whereas on May 9th the Anzac garrison, including the two naval brigades, had numbered only 14,431 men (or 10,355 rifles), by May 28th he had 25,003 (19,395 rifles). Seeing that the Turkish attack on May 19th had been shattered with ease by about 10,000 rifles (the 2,500 in reserve not being called upon), this force was considerably greater than was required to hold the Anzac position. The whole of Birdwood's troops, including the newly-arrived 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, were by temperament fitted for an offensive, and to keep them upon a cramped defensive inside the narrow boundaries of Anzac appeared a needless waste of strength.

Yet to contemplate a frontal advance through the successive lines of Turkish trenches which now seamed the encircling ridges along the greater part of the front, was becoming daily more impossible. The knuckles of the Second ridge, beyond them Mortar and Pine Ridges, and, farthest back, Gun Ridge, were each surmounted with continuous works of great strength. Across the slopes of Baby 700 the Turkish lines ran like wrinkles upon an old man's forehead. The enemy's defence at Anzac was, as the Turkish staff realised, a most formidable one. Against the second and third lines, upon Mortar and Gun Ridges respectively, no frontal attack could be made without having heavy fire brought upon it not only

from the flank but from the rear. As for the enemy's flanks, the northern rested upon the apparently impassable ridges and ravines north of Anzac, while the southern, near the Gaba Tepe-Maidos plain, could not be attacked with hope of success so long as the hill-masses of 971 remained untaken. Farther south the Kilid Bahr Plateau, frowning over these lowlands, was now so traversed with trenches that it appeared more formidable than Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971) itself.

When, however, the reports from Greeks and from Overton made it clear that the Turkish commander was relying upon the roughness of the country north of Anzac, and was consequently leaving it lightly guarded, Birdwood and Skeen, his able chief-of-staff, began at once to think of those comparatively unguarded ridges and valleys as the best route of advance.²¹ The New Zealand Mounted Rifles, boldly and successfully scouting through them day and night, not only suggested that they were not really impassable, but also ascertained the Turkish posts and bivouacs and discovered the practicable routes. Birdwood, who possessed a sound judgment of men, became impressed with the capacity of his troops to find their way through these ridges, and realised that, far from being averse to the attempt, they would welcome the chance of fighting in more or less virgin country where few trenches as yet existed. Skeen, an officer of great ingenuity and always an optimist, now concentrated almost his entire attention upon the left flank, spending day after day scanning from the outposts or from Walker's Ridge the tangled country to the north, or bending over his maps with Overton and other scouts, going minutely into details of the routes, the gullies, ridges, the water, and the Turkish positions. On May 27th Overton sent out three parties to explore other




1000 YDS
—Anzac trench line
= Turkish trench lines
1 Anzac Cove 2 Gun Ridge

²¹ Birdwood and Skeen—as well as Gen. Russell and his brigade-major, Powles (of Wellington, N.Z.)—had been interested in Overton's original enterprise at the time when it was being carried out.

routes to the main ridge. The first, under Lieutenant Finlayson,²² turned up the Sazli Dere, but was fired on and returned; the second, under Captain N. F. Hastings,²³ worked up the bottom of the Chailak Dere, and, slipping between Turkish posts on the hills, reached the point where that valley began rapidly to ascend to the head of Rhododendron Ridge. Here, as day was beginning to dawn, Hastings found a strong picquet of Turks ahead of him, and could go no farther.

The third party, under Overton himself, turned up the next valley. This was the Aghyl Dere, and the heights on either side of its mouth appeared to be entrenched but to be occupied only by sentries during the day-time. Overton watched a party of 150 Turkish infantry passing down the valley at sunset to occupy these positions, and then himself slipped past them along the hillside. He noted that a northern branch of the *dere* ran off to his left. He himself followed the southern branch,



1 Overton 2 Hastings 3 Finlayson


which seemed to lead up to The Farm on Chunuk Bair. But when nearing the main range he ran upon a sheep-fold, deep in the valley, around which there seemed to be a bivouac of the Turkish troops who by night manned the posts. If these posts were first rushed, he reported, a force could move up the valley to "Hill Q"²⁴. The evidence of the scouts was amplified by the corps staff, minutely cross-examining every refugee or deserter who came into the lines.

Thus—probably even while Bridges was still thinking of the future offensive as commencing with an attack upon Gaba Tepe, and while Godley had in view the possible taking of Baby 700 by an advance to the 400 Plateau on the one hand and from the northern ridges on the other—Birdwood and

²² Maj A. C. M. Finlayson, M.C.; Auckland Mtd. Rifles. Farmer, of Kamo, Whangarei, N.Z.; b. Aponga, N.Z., 2 Dec., 1891.

²³ Maj N. F. Hastings, D.S.O.; Wellington Mtd. Rifles Engineer; of Petone, N.Z.; b. Auckland, N.Z., 12 July, 1885. Died of wounds, 9 Aug., 1915.

²⁴ Overton's report says "Hill Q," but his map makes it probable that he did not then distinguish between "Q" and Chunuk Bair.



SARI BAIR SHOWING THE HEIGHTS RECONNOITRED BY THE NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES AND DIRECTION OF BIRDWOOD'S PROPOSED OFFENSIVE

Reproduced, by permission, from a model made by *Ms Justice Ferguson*
 Photolithographed by *N S W Government Printer*



THE REAR OF QUINN'S POST



The fire-trench and roofs of bomb-proofs can be seen on the summit in the centre of the picture.

Taken by P. F. E. Smith, Fsq.
Aust. War Memorial Collection No. 42000

Skeen had already envisaged a wide sweep by several columns from Anzac along the shore to the north, thence striking suddenly inland up the ravines and ridges, and possibly from the Suvla plain, against the most important heights of the main ridge itself. It is true that the opinions formed by the scouts were often adverse. Hastings, for example, reported that, with detachments of Turks holding the heights on either side, an advance up the Chailak Dere would be impossible. Overton, though he suggested that these posts could, as a preliminary, be rushed, afterwards became discouraged upon finding that the Turks were increasing their force in those hills. Nevertheless Birdwood and Skeen, while meeting these difficulties by special provision, held steadily to their plan.

Birdwood did not consider the summits of the range as in themselves a final objective. Their capture was to be followed by a general advance against the main Turkish line on Gun Ridge. To this, he believed, the capture of Gaba Tepe was also a necessary preliminary. His scheme therefore was that the sweeping movement to the north and the minor attack upon Gaba Tepe in the south should be carried out simultaneously, thus securing both flanks and leaving the advance to Gun Ridge to be undertaken a couple of days later, when a further division had been landed for it.²⁵


One point of importance became clear to him at an early stage in the conception of this plan. Going in a destroyer to Suvla Bay, he and Skeen observed, as



²⁵ According to Birdwood's original plan this advance was to be made (as shown in the marginal sketch) by three simultaneous movements—one down Gun Ridge from the newly-won position on the main ridge in the north, a second by part of the 1st Australian Division across the 400 Plateau, a third by the new division south-eastward across the low southern spurs of the 400 Plateau.

had also Overton,²⁶ that Hill 971 (Koja Chemen Tepe) was separated from the line of summits farther south by a sharp break in the chain, so precipitous as to suggest that a deep chasm intervened. Reluctantly, therefore, they discarded at this stage the idea of including it among their objectives. They restricted the proposed advance to the crest immediately south of it, including Chunuk Bair and two summits of about the same height, which stood above the tangled ravines at the head of the various branches of the Aghyl Dere. These twin heights were unnamed on the map, but since they fell within its square "238 Q,"²⁷ they were known as "Hill Q." The plan was that columns advancing up Rhododendron Ridge and various valleys should seize Chunuk Bair and "Q." Part of the force would then immediately turn southwards and advance down the crest of the ridge towards Battleship Hill, Baby 700, and The Nek, while the reinforced garrison of the Anzac trenches broke out towards Baby 700 to meet it. A line would thus be obtained along the main ridge from Hill Q to the old Anzac position; the further advance from Anzac eastwards towards Maidos could then proceed as contemplated.

By the end of May this scheme had been definitely worked out in secret by Birdwood and Skeen; and when, on May 30th, Sir Ian Hamilton visited Anzac, Birdwood seems to have taken the opportunity of urging upon him the possibility of seizing the main heights



by some such sweeping movement to the north.²⁸ Birdwood returned to G.H.Q. with his chief in order to discuss other matters, and appears to have laid before him on the same

²⁶ A copy of a sketch made by him on May 28 indicates this.

²⁷ The two summits were not marked on the first map supplied to Hamilton's force. They were known by the Turks as Abdul Yere ("Abdul Hill") and Besim Sirta ("Besim Ridge"). The gap between Abdul Yere and 971 seems to have been Kurt Gchid ("Wolf's Pass").

²⁸ Birdwood may have mentioned it a few days previously and been asked by Hamilton to place it on paper.

day a written statement containing the first clear formulation of his scheme.

In this document (dated May 30th) Birdwood and Skeen, after tracing their plan, estimated that 12,500 riflemen would be required in order to hold the existing lines and to assault Gaba Tepe, and between 7,000 and 8,000 for the sweeping attack on the main ridge. To provide these it would be necessary to obtain reinforcements amounting to from 3,000 to 4,000. Birdwood wrote—


The country here (north of Anzac) is most difficult—far more so even than any we have occupied so far. It is broken up by many and deep ravines. There are a large number of precipices, and there is thick scrub everywhere. The enemy have entrenched this part also, but so far not to such an extent as they have entrenched elsewhere. I hope by attacking over this area by night on a really broad front we may be able to “rattle” the Turks as we did when first effecting our landing here. For this a certain element of surprise is necessary, as they hold interior lines, and could well reinforce the crest line before we could reach it. I realise that, owing to the difficulties of the country, a night attack will involve a certain number of troops losing their way. This, however, is not a matter of consequence, as they will know they all have to press upwards. . . .

For this difficult attack he proposed to use the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, who already held that flank and were scouting through the country, and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which had been in reserve since it returned from Helles. For the 3,000 or 4,000 reinforcements he suggested the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade, then at Cape Helles. “It is an ideal country for Gurkhas,” he wrote, “and if I could have that brigade when it has completed its present work, it would seem to be employed to best advantage.”

Hamilton's decision upon this plan, which Birdwood hoped to carry out in June, was (as will be explained later) not known for some days. In the meantime Birdwood took steps to encourage the Turks to believe that they were to be attacked on the southern flank of Anzac. On May 27th he ordered the 1st Australian Division to keep up active patrolling and to undertake small enterprises “with the object of making the enemy apprehensive as regards this flank.” Accordingly on that night a party of sixty-three men of the 9th Battalion, under Lieutenant Wilder,²⁹ went out near the southern shore,

²⁹ Afterwards Lieut.-Col. M. Wilder-Nehgan, C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M. (*see Vol. I, p. 357*).

making towards a trench occupied by the enemy on the ridge which overlooked the beach three-quarters of a mile beyond the flank. By arrangement, the destroyer *Rattlesnake* lay off the coast at this hour, and, turning her searchlight on to the coastal spur, moved it slowly southward. Aboard her was Lieutenant Plant, of the 9th, who pointed out the trench to be taken. As soon as the beam shone upon it, the *Rattlesnake* poured in twenty rounds of high-explosive and shrapnel. Wilder, a dashing leader who, when orderly-room sergeant, had acted as adjutant of his battalion at the Landing, and who had shown capacity to command at a difficult moment on May 19th, kept his party closely following the beam of light. After shelling the trench the destroyer turned both her searchlight and guns



suddenly on to the long communication sap leading to it from the direction of Gaba Tepe. At the same moment Wilder led his party swiftly up the hill to the trench. They found in it about twenty Turks, somewhat dazed by the destroyer's fire. Wilder's men, using only the bayonet in order to avoid noise, killed six, captured one, and returned to the lines without a casualty. The attack certainly caused the enemy to expect activity upon this flank. When a similar raid was made by the 9th three weeks later against the same trench, the enemy fled upon the first alarm. The Turkish patrols also appear to have been strengthened, for several sharp encounters occurred during June, one party of the 5th Light Horse Regiment under Lieutenant Hanly⁸⁰ being almost surrounded and its commander killed.

While Birdwood was endeavouring by these means to make the Turks believe that an operation was impending upon the southern flank, he observed with some uneasiness that they were pushing out their works towards the north. On May

⁸⁰ Lieut. J. M. Hanly; 5th L.H. Regt. Farmer and grazier; b. 18 May, 1875. Killed in action, 6 June, 1915.

26th it was remarked that a trench along the summit from Baby 700 towards Chunuk Bair had been much extended; and on the following day new entrenchments were seen in the spurs leading from the range to the shore. These were some of the very ridges in which the proposed operations would take place, and though the earthworks were not yet such as to wreck the plan, each new one would certainly make it more difficult of accomplishment. The most annoying step was probably the secret establishment, on the night of May 26th, of a Turkish post on the very foot-hill upon which lay No. 2 Outpost, though at the other end of it, 450 yards separating the two. This hill was a long hog-backed one, its summit at one point narrowing to a neck, beyond which, out of sight of No. 2, the enemy's trench was discovered on the morning of May 27th. The situation was not without anxiety for the garrison of the post, and it was therefore decided—by whose command is not recorded—to seize the enemy's trench.



Troops were available, since the New Zealand Mounted Rifles had now been relieved upon Russell's Top by the newly-arrived 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. In addition the Otago Mounted Rifles (divisional cavalry of the N.Z. & A. Division) reached Anzac on the 28th, and at once relieved the Canterbury Mounted Rifles as garrison of the two outposts.⁸¹ A great part of the Mounted Rifles Brigade was thus resting. But, since it was important that the attack should be led by troops who knew the ridge on which they were to operate, a squadron of Canterbury, who were still garrisoning the posts, was detailed for the first assault. After dark upon May 28th this squadron, under Major Acton-Adams,⁸² crept out from No. 2 and rushed the earthworks. Its garrison, about twenty

⁸¹ A squadron of the Otago Mounted Rifles had arrived previously.

⁸² Maj. (temp Lieut-Col) P. M. Acton-Adams, D.S.O. Commanded Canterbury Mtd. Rifles, temply, 1916, 1918. Sheep farmer; of Christchurch, N.Z.; b. Nelson, N.Z., 13 July, 1878.

Turks, fled. The Canterburys were followed by a squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles under Major Dick.³³ These carried picks and shovels, and, as soon as the post was taken, set to work to alter and deepen the trenches for their own use. Canterbury was then withdrawn, and the Wellington squadron was left to improve and garrison the trench. While only one man had been killed and five wounded, an awkward impediment to the future advance up the range had apparently been removed. The captured position was named No. 3 Outpost.

At dawn on the 29th, however, the Wellingtons in the post found it impossible to continue digging, since the narrow hill which they occupied, protruding far into wild country occupied by the Turks, was completely overlooked by the next knoll on the same spur—a small plateau with precipitous sides, known as "Table Top"—and also by the heights of Rhododendron. From the scrub came a perpetual sniping fire, from which it was impossible to obtain cover except by keeping low in the trench. This involved danger, since on either side of the new post were steep gullies in which the enemy might at any time assemble, observation from the distant Anzac line into these tortuous valleys being quite impossible.


It was hardly likely that such an experienced opponent as Mustafa Kemal Bey, whose divisional headquarters were a few yards on the farther side of the main range, would let slip the opportunity thus presented to him. After dark on May 29th Major Dick's troops were relieved by another squadron of the Wellington Mounted Rifles under Major Chambers.³⁴ No sooner had the former returned to the beach than a body of Turks surrounded and attacked the new garrison. A troop of Major Elmslie's³⁵ squadron of the Wellingtons was lying ready to reinforce in case of need, but it came in touch with the Turks only 150 yards from No. 2 Outpost, the enemy having now intervened between that post and the newly-captured No. 3. The remainder of Elmslie's squadron was at once sent forward, but found the intervening Turks in such strength that its advance was stopped at

³³ Lieut.-Col. C. Dick, Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Farmer; b N.Z., 17 Feb., 1881.

³⁴ Maj. S. Chambers; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Farmer; of Havelock North, N.Z.; b Havelock North, 29 Jan., 1887. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

³⁵ Maj. J. M. Elmslie; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Farmer, of Waverley, N.Z.; b. Waverley, 21 Aug., 1876. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

the neck between the two posts. The Turks were at this time in the ravines on either side of the new post and also in rear of it. Elmslie's squadron appeared to have cleared them out of the southern gully, but it was unable to move on to the crest, and was forced to cling to the top of the slope. Before midnight telephonic communication with the advanced post ceased.



No. 3 Outpost was now completely cut off and surrounded, the Turks during the night digging themselves a trench across the hilltop in rear of it. While these held off the relieving squadron, another body, assembling in the Chailak Dere on the northern side of the hill, attacked the post. Shortly before dawn the New Zealanders at Nos. 1 and 2 became aware that No. 3 was being heavily bombed. Inasmuch as its parapet rested on the brink of the semi-precipitous hillsides, it was possible for numbers of the enemy to creep almost to its edge without interference. When day broke the garrison was able to signal with flags. It was still holding out, and Major Dick's squadron was sent forward with orders to assist Elmslie's in getting through. But it was held up at the same point. Captain N. F. Hastings, who was guiding one party, endeavoured to creep up the southern ravine to the edge of the post, and succeeded in getting to within a few yards of it; but the noise of the fighting drowned his shouts, and he was unable to attract the attention of the garrison. As daylight drew on, the distant Turks near Baby 700 observed the reinforcing squadrons, and with rifle-fire pinned them down to the neck in the hill, the crest being so commanded from the higher ridge that no New Zealander could appear upon it. From one of the hills a gun was firing at short range on to the post. The troops on the left of Anzac were spectators of this scene, the two relieving squadrons being clearly in view lining the nearer edge of the hillcrest, while the only figures which moved on its surface were occasional Turks hopping

through the scrub to their intervening position. This movement was kept down as far as possible by turning the fire of the Indian mountain-guns and New Zealand machine-guns upon the crest, while the 9th Light Horse, holding Walker's Ridge, were ordered to keep up a continuous fire as best they could at 1,400 yards range.³⁶ In these circumstances General Russell decided that any further attempt to relieve the post must be postponed until dark.

Shortly before dusk Major Chambers signalled from the post that the northern end of his trench, overlooking the Chailak Dere, had been so destroyed by constant bombing that he could no longer prevent the Turks from entering it; ten minutes later he reported that the enemy was in that part of his position. The mounted rifles possessed no bombs, and throughout the fight had to rely upon their rifles alone. Nevertheless these Turks were driven out; but the situation was acute. Of five officers and ninety-three men in the new outpost, Lieutenants Cameron³⁷ and Emerson³⁸ and twelve men had been killed, and Major Chambers and fourteen men wounded; the remainder had been fighting for thirty-six hours.³⁹ Urgent orders were accordingly given by General Russell to press forward the relief. The Wellingtons still had the Turks between them and the garrison. But two squadrons of Canterbury, under Major Overton, were also sent forward, and Major Hutton, commanding one of them, chanced on his way to meet Captain Hastings, who told him of the approach to the post by way of the southern ravine. Following that route, Hutton found it free from fire. About 10 p.m. some of the beleaguered garrison at the southern end of the post saw in the moonlight troops



³⁶ While carrying out this order Lieut. S. A. McWilliam (of Williamstown and Riddell, Vic.), a Duntroon graduate newly arrived with his regiment, was shot dead by a Turkish sniper from the spurs of Baby 700.

³⁷ Lieut. N. D. Cameron; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Farmer; of Masterton, N.Z.; b Masterton, 26 Aug., 1894. Killed in action, 30 May, 1915.

³⁸ Lieut. P. T. Emerson; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Meat inspector; of Wellington, N.Z.; b. Blenheim, N.Z., 1879. Killed in action, 30 May, 1915.

³⁹ Lieut. C. Watt (of Kimbolton, N.Z.), who was with the relieving squadrons, was also killed.

approaching, and Captain Spragg,⁴⁰ having assured himself that they were New Zealanders, allowed them to come up. Thus the Wellington East Coast squadron, which had been isolated for nearly two days, was relieved and withdrew, carrying its wounded.⁴¹

If the Turks assailing the post had attacked with determination the garrison must have been overwhelmed.⁴² There was indeed evidence about that time of some movement of Turkish reinforcements towards this flank from Baby 700 and possibly from Anafarta. But on the situation being reported to General Russell, he permitted Lieutenant-Colonel Meldrum,⁴³ of the Wellington Regiment, to withdraw the garrison if he thought fit. This decision was not at first approved by General Godley, who considered that, if reinforced, the post might still be maintained. Russell, however, urged that it was in an unsuitable position, and, the question having been referred to General Birdwood, leave was given for the withdrawal.

In the meantime the lull at the post had ended. Rifle and machine-gun fire was poured upon it, and at its northern end, which had been blown in, the bombing was resumed. The Turks began to creep round both flanks. In places they were only ten yards from the post, which within a few minutes they could have again surrounded, when Major Hutton wisely decided to bring out his wounded and leave the post. It was as the last troop was moving out that Overton arrived with the definite order for withdrawal.

Within two or three minutes the Turks had discovered the movement, scrambled over the empty trenches, and were hurrying after the retiring troops in an attempt to rush them into the sea and seize the two outposts. The New Zealanders were making for the little knoll of Fisherman's Hut, lying

⁴⁰ Colonel C. R. Spragg; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Farmer and meat inspector, of Gisborne, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, N.Z., 19 Feb., 1880. Died 30 Aug., 1939.


⁴¹ Maj. Chambers's squadron was the 9th, Wellington East Coast; Maj. Dick's the 6th, Manawatu; Maj. Elmslie's the 2nd, Wellington West Coast; and Maj. Hutton's the 10th, Nelson.

⁴² These hills were garrisoned by the 72nd (Arab) Regiment, which possibly made this attack.

⁴³ Brig.-Gen. W. Meldrum, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded N.Z. Mtd. Rifles Bde, 1917/19. Solicitor: cf. Hunterville and New Plymouth, N.Z.; b. Kamo, North Auckland, N.Z., 28 July, 1865.

between Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts. As the last of them reached it, some of the enemy, following with shouts, almost caught up with them, and tried to rush the hillside, but were driven off by a few New Zealanders, who turned on them with the bayonet.⁴⁴ Others of the enemy could be seen in the moonlight jumping over the scrub in the valley between the posts. But the Auckland Mounted Rifles, well-rested troops, had by this time been brought up, and the whole brigade was holding the three knolls and the communication trench connecting them. Bursts of rapid fire poured into the scrub checked the Turks, who about dawn withdrew to the recaptured No. 3 Outpost. As daylight advanced it was seen that they had stripped some of the dead New Zealanders and flung them from their trenches; the naked body of one hung head downwards on the cliff below the parapet. This incident greatly embittered the troops.⁴⁵

The casualties, twenty-six killed and sixty-five wounded, were not heavy for so sharp a fight. Two days later a new "No. 3" post was established a few hundred yards north of No. 2 on the same foot-hill, the trenches recaptured by the Turks being henceforth called "Old No. 3." The loss of the old outpost was in itself no disadvantage. But the fighting had turned the attention of the enemy to the very quarter from which Birdwood and Skeen most wished it to be diverted. For days afterwards the earth from the Turkish shovels could be seen constantly flying above the earthworks of Old No. 3, and a strong barbed-wire entanglement shortly appeared in front of it. Simultaneously trenches broke out upon the almost inaccessible




⁴⁴ Twenty dead Turks were afterwards found on this slope, as well as the body of one New Zealand officer, who had evidently been killed shortly after the Landing, but whose identity could not be established.

⁴⁵ The body may have been stripped in order to obtain the clothes and boots. This constantly happened in Gallipoli. Lieut. Shout, of the 1st Battalion, when patrolling, found the Turks endeavouring to remove the equipment of Australian soldiers even where the trenches were close. In France the boots were often taken from Australian dead by the Germans.

Table Top, which, like Old No. 3, stood full in the way of an advance up Rhododendron Ridge. New trenches also came into existence on Chunuk Bair. On June 1st Overton, who was in constant observation, reported his conviction that since the attack on Old No. 3 the Turkish force north of Anzac had been greatly increased. The country was now "so carefully picqueted by the Turks that the first movement of troops in that direction will at once be detected. . . . I am now of opinion that any attack made by us on 971 and Q" (meaning Chunuk Bair) "is doomed to fail, as the element of surprise will be lacking."

Birdwood and Skeen were not shaken by this report, though it increased their anxiety. Birdwood at once warned Hamilton, adding that each extension of the enemy's trenches on that flank rendered the scheme of a sweeping movement more difficult of fulfilment. From that time forth any enterprise which might prompt the Turks to increase their defences in these foot-hills was carefully avoided. While patrolling was encouraged, the endeavour was made to lull the enemy into the notion that in those ranges he was completely secure. The steps taken to deal with the new strongholds upon Table Top and Old No. 3 will be described in due course.

While this struggle on the northern flank, important in its bearing on the future, was in progress, a fight involving imminent danger had again broken out at Quinn's.



CHAPTER VII

MAY 29TH—THE TURKS BREAK INTO QUINN'S

DURING the week following the crushing defeat of the Turkish attack of May 19th there had existed along the whole Anzac front a stillness never previously experienced. The rifle-shooting by day decreased to a few shots every minute. The spirit of the enemy seemed to have faded away. At the same time he could not fail to appreciate the opportunity which still existed at the head of Monash Valley. A slight success at that place might go far towards ensuring the very result for which on May 19th he had fruitlessly lost 10,000 men. His appreciation of the position in that valley was shown by the fact that on May 21st he endeavoured to place two guns at the head of its western branch, immediately above The Nek.¹ Their crews were detected at work around them, apparently preparing to sweep the gully. Phillips's and Caddy's batteries at once blew one field-piece into the air, the Turks withdrawing the other. Next day, when they tried to replace it, Phillips knocked over the second gun, and the attempt was never repeated. But the ordinary sniping with rifles down the valley presently recurred, and became far more active than ever before. There is no doubt that during the armistice of May 24th the higher Turkish staff, surveying from Baby 700 the whole Anzac area, was impressed with the extraordinary opportunity which the position at Quinn's afforded them. Turkish burial parties, standing in front of that post, had looked over the Australian trenches straight down the slope in rear.² The sentries, stationed by agreement along the centre of No-Man's Land, stood all day on the edge of the Bloody Angle and The Nek, taking in a full view of all that passed up and down Monash Valley. The deductions from what could there be seen were obvious. On the following day the enemy was found to have established himself more firmly on Dead Man's Ridge; twenty-four hours later, on May 26th, his snipers opened from a new trench at the

¹ The Turks had previously used this position as an observation-post.

² According to the statement of a Turk subsequently captured, Mustafa Kemal that day worked as sergeant with one of the burial parties.

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
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head of the valley near The Nek. So heavy and accurate was the sharp-shooting early that morning that some fifty men in the valley near Pope's were hit. Phillips's guns and the mountain-battery in the Australian area were turned upon the trench, and by 11 o'clock the fire was suppressed.³

But, unknown to most of the Anzac garrison, the enemy was already aiming against this most vulnerable angle a blow far more difficult to parry. Ever since the 15th Battalion's sortie on May 9th, some of those who took part were certain that the Turks were mining towards Quinn's, and the news that a mine-tunnel had during that night been discovered opposite the right of the post was reported to headquarters.⁴ The New Zealand engineers were already taking counter-measures by sinking in the front trench three holes or shafts, twelve or fifteen feet deep, in which they maintained men listening for any sounds of Turkish mining. These measures seem to have been considered by the authorities a sufficient precaution for the time being.

But the men of the 15th and 16th Battalions, which in turn garrisoned Quinn's, included a large proportion of miners—those of the 15th from Mount Morgan, Charters Towers, and other fields in Queensland, and from the Tasmanian tin mines; those of the 16th from the goldfields and other mines of Western and South Australia. These big, staunch fellows, though genial and often humorous, were hard-grained men, accustomed to form their own opinions, and not afraid to express them. Those of the 15th had not forgotten the positive reports of their own men on May 9th. With their special knowledge they perceived how easily and quickly the enemy could undermine Quinn's, driving from the farther



³On the previous day the 6-inch howitzer in Shrapnel Gully had similarly fired at the trench upon Dead Man's Ridge. But at that short range the impact was insufficient to explode most of the shells.

⁴It is to be noted that the Turkish General Staff gives the date of commencement of mining as "after the attack of May 11." Probably May 9-10 is meant. But the Turkish records are often inaccurate, and the report of those who saw the tunnel or tunnels is fairly definite.

side of the ridge deep tunnels by which he could presently blow the whole post into the air. In spite of the confidence of the authorities, some of these men took their own precautions. So it was that on May 17th a man of the 15th, by name Slack, who was "listening" for his own part by lying on the floor of a small forward sap in the sub-section next to his own, near the right centre of Quinn's, distinctly heard the steady, persistent, muffled knocking of the enemy's picks. The sound was faint, but definite. Slack summoned his company sergeant-major, Williams,⁵ and the company commander, Sampson. Both heard the sound, and it was duly reported.

Little notice, however, was taken of this by the authorities, who probably mistrusted the information. It was not generally realised at this stage of the war that the military engineer, while skilled in the general application of engineering to warfare, was necessarily a novice in the technique of some special branches, including that of mining. The leaders of the New Zealand Engineers were mainly officers of the Royal Engineers, highly trained and gallant men, but the miners of the 15th were not in the least deflected from their own opinions by those of any other authority. During the night of May 17th a large proportion of Sampson's company individually visited the sap from which mining could be heard, and their verdict, expressed in their own words, was: "Jacko"—*i.e.*, the Turk—"is getting under us."

The Turkish attack of May 19th gave even the miners something else to think of. The intention of the enemy had actually been to explode this mine on May 19th as a prelude to that assault. But he was without skilled miners or suitable tools, and his tunnels were consequently still incomplete. Meanwhile, so far as the surface works were concerned, Quinn's had been considerably strengthened. Soon after taking command in the valley, Colonel Chauvel of the 1st Light Horse Brigade had reorganised its defences. In view of the precarious nature of the posts, and the need for getting continuous work carried out on them, he had appointed for each position a permanent commander, together with a staff which would not be changed at every relief. The

⁵ C.S.M. T. Williams (No. 553, 15th Bn.). Labourer; of Brisbane; b Cork, Ireland 1878. Died of wounds, 12 Aug., 1915.

staffs in question were thus composed: At Pope's (where the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Horse Regiments followed each other in weekly reliefs),

Commandant—Lieutenant-Colonel Rowell,^a 3rd Light Horse Regiment;

Second-in-Command—Major Glasgow, 2nd Light Horse Regiment;

Adjutant—Lieutenant Nettleton,⁷ 1st Light Horse Regiment;

at Courtney's (held continuously by the 14th Battalion), the commander and staff of the battalion; at Quinn's (where the 15th and 16th Battalions relieved one another every forty-eight hours),

Commandant—Lieutenant-Colonel Cannan, 15th Battalion (appointed on account of his knowledge of the post);

Second-in-Command—Major Tilney, 16th Battalion;

Adjutant—Lieutenant McSharry,⁸ 2nd Light Horse Regiment.

In order to complete the numbers necessary for the garrison of Quinn's, a detachment of the 13th Battalion was usually added; and on May 20th, in consequence of a suggestion from Godley, since Quinn's Post was "more trying than any other," the 13th was placed on the regular roster for the post.

The chief object of this reorganisation was to ensure continuous trench-improvement. At Quinn's an ordered scheme of work was now drawn up. Six New Zealand engineers⁹ superintended the infantry working in the six sub-sections, while McSharry, the post-adjutant, acted as works' officer. They were hampered by lack of wood and iron, of which little had reached Anzac—and even this, largely through ignorance of the needs of the front line, was sometimes used unduly for offices or quarters of various staffs near the beach. Thus in No. 3 Subsection of Quinn's, the apex of which was


^a Lieut.-Col. F. M. Rowell. Commanded 3rd L.H. Regt. 1914/15. Civil servant; of Lockley's, S. Aust.; b. Lockley's, 5 Apr., 1876. Died of illness, 8 Aug., 1915.

⁷ Lieut. B. P. Nettleton; 1st L.H. Regt. Merchant; of Sydney; b. Sydney, 15 March, 1889. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.


⁸ Lieut.-Col. T. P. McSharry, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 15th Bn. 1916/18. Surveyor; of Brisbane; b. Reid River, Townsville, Q'land, 9 Aug., 1884. Died of wounds, 6 Aug., 1918.

⁹ These were under Sgt C. H. W. Thom (of Brisbane).

now but fifteen yards from the Turkish trenches, the enemy's bombs not only fell in the front line, but rolled down the rear slope into the two short, deep support trenches of that subsection, close behind the apex. Three out of every four of the men in the support trenches were supposed to be sleeping, the remainder being on guard to rouse them in case of assault, so that they could reinforce the front. Since




men who should have been resting were thus being wounded and killed, it was decided to roof the southernmost support trench and enlarge it to form a covered chamber, in which the men could lie without fear of bombs. Wood and iron being practically unobtainable through the recognised channels, fifty men under an officer were sent at dead of night to Captain Littler, who was in charge of the beach parties, and of whom that particular officer had formerly been a ship-mate. The party returned to Quinn's carrying thirty-six sheets of galvanised iron and some heavy timber. With this the support trench was forthwith roofed, the iron being then covered with two feet of earth. The trench had been widened, and now formed a "bomb-proof" chamber, capable of holding fifty men. That they might reach the front line quickly in case of alarm, three short exits were left, one opening into the front line and the others to communication



trenches. When once the chamber had been finished, it was possible for the front trench of this dangerous sector to be lightly held—say, by an officer and half-a-dozen men—the remainder resting in safety in the bomb-proof ready to reinforce instantly if required. The northern support trench

Map No. 7




THE CENTRAL SUB-SECTIONS OF QUINN'S POST AT THE TIME OF THE TURKISH ATTACK OF 29TH MAY, 1915


British troops and trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 2 metres

of the sector, which was only slightly less dangerous, was similarly covered, and connected with the firing line by three short tunnels. The two bomb-proofs, almost adjoining one another at the point where the Australian trenches ran closest to those of the enemy, considerably strengthened the position.

Meanwhile the private opinion of the miner-infantry concerning the underground defences of the post remained unchanged. Some of them were convinced that they could hear the Turkish picks undermining their position. This is the apprehension which has most power to demoralise a garrison in stationary warfare—as strong perhaps as, in battle, that of being subjected to their own shell-fire. When the suspicion becomes a certainty, the strain tends to be unbearable. The certainty of the enemy's



tunnelling, however, was as yet realised by few of the troops, the engineer officers did not believe it, and Slack and his comrades were of metal too tough to let their knowledge affect their nerves. Nor were they to be put off by official scepticism. Slack (known to his mates as "Old Ganger")¹⁰ daily dogged his company commander,



prophesying the destruction of Quinn's unless his warnings were heeded. When on May 23rd his battalion returned to the post, the picking first faintly heard by him could now be detected at three points. Next day, during the armistice, many in that neighbourhood caught the muffled

¹⁰ Cpl. J. Slack, M.M. (No. 654, 15th Bn.). Railway ganger; b. Wellington, N.S.W., 1870. (He was a tall, sinewy fellow, older than most, with the humorous, kindly wrinkles of the typical miner, and had constantly refused promotion in the A.I.F. He had mined all over Australia, and of late had managed a small Tasmanian tin "show.")

sounds; but it was not until the early morning of May 25th that the listener in the engineers' gallery in No. 3 Subsection reported that he could hear the enemy mining.

Vigorous steps were then taken in haste; the chief engineer of the division hurried to the spot; the listener in his tiny gallery put in an auger. The Turkish picks immediately ceased. Five experienced miners, being consulted, said that the sounds came from within a few feet and immediately below the listening-gallery. The obvious counter-measure was to blow in the Turkish tunnel by firing a *camouflet*, that is, a countermine not sufficiently powerful to break the surface but powerful enough to crush the enemy tunnel. A light charge was accordingly put into the nearest listening-gallery. It was then securely backed with sandbags or "tamped." At 5.30 p.m., after much consideration, the mine was at length fired, the garrison being withdrawn from its neighbourhood, while the 15th Battalion, which had just been relieved, was sent back to man the rear slope in case the Turks attacked. The surface was not broken by the explosion. Several yards of trench were shaken in, and it was judged that the head of the Turkish tunnel had been destroyed.

Mining was now undertaken on a very different scale. Over and above the three small listening-holes, five offensive tunnels were begun, which would serve as listening-galleries also. Miners were called for from the 4th Infantry and 1st Light Horse Brigades, and some forty or fifty—among them "Old Ganger" Slack—were immediately set to work. The earth was at first carried back in sandbags through the already congested trenches of the post. This inconvenience was presently avoided by driving a large tunnel into the hillside in rear of the crest and twenty feet below it. The tunnel served as an approach, and the subterranean galleries were then extended from it.

But by this time the enemy's mining had proceeded so far that it was an almost superhuman task to forestall him. No sooner had the new galleries been begun than, early on May 27th, the Turks were again heard at work directly beneath one of them. As far as could be judged, their miners were then actually engaged in tamping a mine preparatory to exploding it. A second countermine was hurriedly prepared,

containing 15 lb. of gun-cotton. The 15th Battalion was again brought up, and the mine was fired at 10 a.m. It was reported that cries were heard after the explosion, and this countermine also was therefore judged to have been successful. At midnight, however, picking was again heard, this time in two places. Two of the new galleries nearest to the sounds were accordingly charged. The 15th Battalion was for a third time brought up, and at 2.30 a.m. on May 28th one of the mines was exploded. By an oversight the 15th was left waiting on the hillside during the rest of the night, although the other mine was not fired. Two more galleries were begun during the day. About 6 p.m. a tapping was again heard, and when "Old Ganger" Slack came off duty with the rest of his shift, he called in at the headquarters of his company, on the hillside near the fork of Monash Valley, and told the three young officers that the countermining had been too late. The blowing up of Quinn's Post, he said, was now only a matter of hours.

That night Quinn's was garrisoned by 350 men of the 13th Battalion together with 100 of the 10th Light Horse. Colonel Cannan, the permanent commandant of the post, had been invited by Sir Ian Hamilton to the G.H.Q. ship *Arcadian* for two days' rest,¹¹ and in his absence Colonel Burnage of the 13th had charge. Burnage had taken with him Lieutenant Marks as his adjutant, but Lieutenant McSharry, the permanent adjutant, also remained on the post. The local reserve was the 15th Battalion, bivouacked on the hillside near the fork of Monash Valley, the nearest company being opposite the fork, and the others farther away on either side of the valley. The remaining reserves were—first, the 16th Battalion, local reserve to Pope's and now organised in two companies;¹² second, the remaining company of the 13th Battalion, bivouacked farther down Monash Valley; finally, the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Regiments and part of the 10th.

¹¹ Col. Monash also had been given two days' rest at G.H.Q., but had just returned.

¹² The strength of the 4th Inf. Bde. at this date was:

H.Q.	40
13th Bn.	679
14th Bn.	661
15th Bn.	502
16th Bn.	411

2,293

This last had been detached from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade on Russell's Top, and provided 100 men each for Quinn's and Pope's, the remainder being camped in Monash Valley.

The night had almost passed when, at 3.20 a.m., some of the nearer companies of reserve troops sleeping in Monash Valley were waked (as one of them afterwards wrote) "by a series of loud and heavy explosions which shook the valley. Immediately cries and yells came from the direction of Quinn's Post, to be drowned almost at once by a tornado of rifle-fire and salvoes of shrapnel bursting overhead." The company commanders of the 15th, obtaining their orders from Major Carter, its acting commander, hurried their companies, each as soon as it was assembled,¹³ up the path towards Quinn's. A messenger from Chauvel had already reached Carter with the verbal message that Quinn's had been blown up, that the Turks were in it, and that the 15th was to turn them out. The leading company doubled up the gully, through the enemy's shrapnel, under scattered rifle-fire from the Bloody Angle, and so up the steep path, past a few sheltering stragglers and frightened men—an incident inseparable from any such fight. At the junction of the two main communication trenches, near the headquarters of the post, were standing Colonel Burnage and his adjutant, Marks. Above them on the hillside were men all looking towards the skyline, which was hazy with the dust of bursting bombs. The second company of the 15th came up a few minutes later, the rest of the battalion following. Shortly after it there moved one of the two companies of the 16th, under Major Mansbridge,¹⁴ who had been directed by Chauvel to proceed a short distance up the Bloody Angle by way of a demonstration, in order to counter a reported attempt of the enemy to creep round that flank of Quinn's. The other, under Major Margolin, moved to the slope behind Quinn's, up which also hastened the reserve portion of the 13th under Major Durrant.

¹³ The men of course slept with their boots on, and companies could be turned out with extraordinary rapidity.

¹⁴ Lieut.-Col. W. O. Mansbridge, D.S.O. Commanded 44th Bn. 1916/17. Civil servant; of Coolgardie district, W. Aust.; b. Chester, Eng., 13 Jan., 1872.

There was thus quickly brought to the slope in rear of Quinn's a very strong body of reserves. As these arrived, the situation appeared to them to be the most critical that had occurred at Anzac since the evening of April 25th. When the second company of the 15th neared the post, it saw the company which had preceded it climbing the hill on its right, and to all appearance getting immediately into heavy fighting. One of the leading officers, Lieutenant Leitch,¹⁸ was already coming down the slope, his wrist almost shot away. Wounded were streaming past, among them, on a stretcher, Colonel Burnage himself.

What had happened was this. Although some of the countermines fired by the engineers had been successful, killing and wounding a number of Turkish tunnellers, nevertheless the enemy resumed work upon the head of one gallery which the engineers thought they had destroyed on May 27th, and by the following night this mine was judged ready for firing. The 5th Turkish Division, which had suffered great loss upon May 19th, was still holding the position, and its 14th Regiment was to follow up the explosion by seizing Quinn's. Apparently one battalion armed with bombs was to make the assault, a second battalion supporting it if successful. The attack was to be delivered under cover of heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from the flanks, and assisted by a feint upon Russell's Top. The Turkish guns were also to open a sharp fire.

At 3.20 many of the 13th Battalion holding Quinn's were flung to the ground by a heavy buffet. The earth rocked. There was a muffled roar. For a moment a harsh red light glowed overhead from the brilliantly-lit underside of a low cloud. Through this glare black masses flew skyward. Darkness instantly followed. Presently earth and débris began to fall from the sky, half-burying men, so that they had to struggle to free their limbs. The mine had exploded close outside the parapet of No. 3 Subsection, and the whole garrison of that part of the front trench, as well as the miners in the neighbouring tunnel, were buried and killed. The front trench and parts of the communication trenches were almost

¹⁸ Lieut. A. E. G. Leitch; 15th Bn. School teacher; b. South Melbourne, Vic., 1873.

filled by the breaking down of their walls and the shower of débris. Amid a wild fire of shrapnel, rifles, and machine-guns, Turkish bombs began to burst in such showers as had never before been seen at Anzac. The supports in the bomb-proofs of No. 3 in the immediate neighbourhood of the explosion came out of their shelters dazed, some tumbling out to the flanks, others to the rear.

In that most terrifying of all predicaments in which a soldier can find himself, the garrison of the front line on either flank of the destroyed sector stood unflinching. But, following the explosion, a party of the enemy entered the practically empty No. 3 Subsection. The moon was at the full, and from Pope's the attacking Turks could be clearly seen walking across No-Man's Land. One tall man (who could easily have been shot from Pope's but for the fear that he might possibly be an Australian) stood coolly lighting his bombs and throwing them into the trench. Then the enemy leapt into Quinn's. The first thing that some of the stunned Australians on the flank of the explosion heard, on coming to themselves, was the sound of gruff voices close to them speaking in an unknown language.

Entering the post on either side of the mine-crater, the enemy pushed forward at once into the bomb-proofs. The darkness of these was intense; but, feeling their way through them, Turks presently began to emerge into the communication trenches leading downhill towards the rear of the post. From the northern bomb-proof they came along the trench leading to the post-headquarters; and from the southern, along that which ran out to the rear of No. 2 Subsection.

The garrison of No. 2 was that day in charge of Lieutenant Fletcher,¹⁶ a newly-commissioned officer of the 13th; No. 1—the section next to Courtney's—was under Lieutenant Perry.¹⁷ Amid the flashes of bombs, momentarily lighting the curtain of acrid smoke; amid the dust, confusion, and noise resembling that caused by the crashing floors in some great city conflagration; Fletcher and his men

¹⁶ Capt. B. G. W. Fletcher; 13th Bn. Clerk; of Mosman, N.S.W.; b. Kingston, N.S.W., 6 Aug., 1890. Killed in action, 11 Apr., 1917.

¹⁷ Lieut.-Col. S. L. Perry D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 48th Bn. 1918/19; b. Sydney, 23 Aug., 1890.

observed that the Turks were penetrating the post on their left and getting behind them. Some of the men clambered into the open above the support trench, and from there began shooting in the direction of the invaders. Farther south Perry—who kept a very cool head—perceived that the garrison was standing entirely firm, shooting at point-blank range, and realised that the enemy could not hope to penetrate, except at the point where a number of the defenders had been killed by the explosion. He therefore went towards the sector which the Turks had entered, and, establishing himself at a trench junction which afforded a good view of the rear, at once ascertained that the enemy was in the southern bomb-proof. He thereupon called to the supports, who had come out of the bomb-proof, to watch the exit which led from it into the nearest communication trench. No sooner had he done so than the Turks began to come out. Their leader was immediately shot, and the remainder jumped back into the chamber and from within fired furiously through the exit. The southern bomb-proof, as has been described, had three exits—one to the front line, and two to communication trenches. One of the latter had now been barred to the enemy, and, as Perry could tell by the continuous rifle-fire at the other end of the post that the Australians there were holding their own, he instantly determined to turn the tables on the assaulting Turks by cutting off their retreat. Leading a few of his men along the front line, of which the sides had in places fallen in, he set them behind a heap of this earth to watch the main exit from the bomb-proof. This would make it impossible for the enemy, when he saw that he was beaten, to escape to his own lines. Perry himself was cut off from communication with any one north of him, since the Turks intervened. But he had little anxiety, being able to draw his ammunition through the next post to the south, Courtney's, and to send messages by the same route to headquarters.

Thus, on the southern flank, the Turks were from the first securely held. To the north, by shooting along the front line from the point of entry, they killed any men of its garrison who were exposed to them. But the trench here also had been half-blocked by the explosion; and behind the tumbled earth at one of its bends the Australians were firmly

established. Thus the northern half of the garrison, under Forsythe of the 13th, though also temporarily cut off from communication, was holding its own with confidence.

The way, however, was open to the enemy to advance from the centre of the post down the communication trenches into Monash Valley. As has already been explained,¹⁸ the headquarters of Quinn's was on the slope immediately in rear of the trenches. The track to the position, climbing to near the top of the steep runnel in which the post was situated, forked like the letter "Y,"¹⁹ the left branch ascending to No. 4 Subsection, some forty yards above, and the right to No. 3, which was at about the same distance. The latter branch led to the bomb-proofs. At the fork, where in normal times messengers from either flank could swiftly reach it, was headquarters.


On this morning Lieutenant McSharry, the permanent adjutant, who had been awakened twenty minutes before time by his batman, had been sitting on the bank of the main track when the heavy bump of the explosion either threw him or caused him to jump down on to the pathway. Though the subsequent shower of falling earth had buried him to the knees, he had struggled free, when he observed the fuses of the enemy's bombs flying continuously over the sky-line.

The staff of the post had always expected that, by a mine or other means, the Turks would some day force their way into Quinn's, and had often discussed the best means of ousting them. McSharry had determined on his own action. He went straight to the bomb-store—a dugout in the left branch of the communication trench. On his way he saw some of the men from No. 3 tumbling out of the support trench. "Come on, Australia!" he called, and they at once rallied. He took from the store a number of bombs and a candle, which he placed in a tin; then, with his batman and one man of the 13th, to whom he handed his rifle, he climbed over the open above the fork to a point from which they could easily throw their missiles into the support trench. The fuses of these crude "jam-tins" required to be kindled with a candle or a cigarette-end. McSharry was lighting the

¹⁸ See pp. 89 and 206.


¹⁹ See plates at pp. 50 and 220

candle inside the tin when down the communication trench on his right came a file of Turks. The leader was advancing confidently, but those behind him, about a dozen in number, seemed to be without enthusiasm, peering through the half-dark. The leading Turks had passed McSharry and were already some eight yards down the communication trench when they caught sight of the three Australians. Most of the Turkish heads disappeared



at once below the side of the trench, but the leader took aim over the parapet and fired, the bullet passing through McSharry's hat.²⁰ At the same time the men with McSharry began throwing their bombs into the communication trench—first one or two singly, then half-a-dozen in quick succession. The trench was wide, and it was the easiest matter to "lob" the jam-tins into it. The Turks in the main position above, hearing the noise, and not realising that their comrades were below, began to throw their bombs in the same direction. One survivor scrambled from the trench and ran back to the post; the rest were killed.

The enemy in Quinn's now found themselves in a short section of front and support trench, the former being half-filled with loose earth so as to form a series of depressions. Of these the farthest on each flank was firmly held by Australians, while the support trench was practically all roofed over and comprised two intensely dark bomb-proofs, from which three communication trenches ran



²⁰ This felt hat was an example of the irregularities of the "Anzac uniform" McSharry had cut off most of its brim, and much fun used to be made of his "Irish hat with the little brim"

towards the rear. The Turks manned the bomb-proofs, and with much vigour succeeded in making loop-holes in the southern one, through which they could look out on the slope above headquarters and cover it with their fire. But it was mainly on bombs that they had relied, bringing with them what seemed to be an endless supply, together with a number of small oil-lamps with which to light the fuses. Twenty minutes after the first attack a body of Turkish reinforcements managed to charge across No-Man's Land, apparently carrying a further supply of bombs. In consequence of the great length of their fuses those which were showered into the front trenches were almost harmless, the men of the 13th finding that there was ample time to pick them up and fling them back. But numbers, rolling like cricket-balls down the communication trenches, burst among the Australian supports, who had by that time begun to arrive and were watching at a short distance down the hill.

Such was the position when the leading company of the 15th, hurrying from Monash Valley, panted up the slope to where Colonel Burnage and Lieutenant Marks were standing near the damaged headquarters of the post. They knew little of what was happening, save that a number of men, rallied on the slope above them, were holding back with bomb-fire some enemy occupying the centre of the position. "Are you the 15th?" Burnage asked. "The Turks are in the post, and you must charge and drive them out." While he was explaining to the company commander where the enemy were, a bomb exploded at his feet, severely wounding not only him²¹ but also Lieutenant Koch,²² an officer of the reinforcements, and Marks, who was standing near. At this moment McSharry arrived, and from then onwards, although seniors were present at subsequent stages, it was this young officer who, with his thorough knowledge of the post and eminent coolness and decision, most fully grasped and controlled the situation.

²¹ Burnage had not always been a popular officer; but in Gallipoli he had won the affection of his men by the fact that whenever his battalion was engaged he had been in the midst or the front of it. They cheered him as he was carried down the slope.

²² Capt. H. R. Koch, M.C.; 15th Bn. Jackeroo; of Barfield Station, *via* Banana, Q'land, b. Rockhampton, Q'land, 25 Aug., 1885.

In a few words McSharry gave Captain Sampson, who commanded the leading company, the information he required, and they decided that the company should reinforce the two flanks, which were holding firm. Sampson sent Lieutenant Leitch with two platoons up the slope on the right. As they topped the slope, Leitch and several of his men were hit by the machine-gun fire and rifle-fire from the north. Sampson, who with the remainder of the company dashed northwards across the rear of the post, came under similar heavy fire from the south. Making his way up the communication trench to the front line of No. 4, he found that, while a portion of this sub-section was held by the garrison, at a bend of the trench to the right were lying three or four Australian dead, and beyond this the front line was held by the Turks. Obtaining a few "jam-tins," the reinforced garrison now cleared the rest of No. 4 and part of No. 3. But along most of that sub-section the front trench ran perfectly straight into the maze of dark alleys at the centre of the post, and unerring fire from that end made it for the time being impossible to clear the front line further.

Meanwhile, at the headquarters of the post, Colonel Pope had arrived to take command in place of Colonel Burnage. An instruction had been received from General Godley that the lost trenches must be retaken at all costs, and the orders issued by one or other of the senior commanders to almost every arriving company of reinforcements were that it must charge and drive the Turks from the post. As the morning went on, several inquiries reached Quinn's through Colonel Monash's headquarters as to whether the troops had yet charged and retaken the lost trenches. But McSharry, and some of the younger officers who had lived in the post, though at least as determined to recapture it, perceived what some of the seniors did not—that although it was easy to order a charge, it was most difficult to decide how or in what direction a charge could be launched which would in any way help to clear out the enemy; while it was certain that movement on to the crest meant the annihilation of any troops who attempted it. McSharry, like Perry, grasped the fact that

the intruding Turks had now been "bottled" in the bomb-proofs and damaged front line, in which they could do little harm and must shortly surrender or be killed. He realised that with the advance of daylight the enemy's last chance of sending reinforcements had vanished. At 3.50 the guns of Sykes's 2nd New Zealand Battery on Plugge's had begun to sweep with their shrapnel the narrow No-Man's Land and the Turkish trenches. It was then still so dark, and the target so narrow, that many shells burst in rear of Quinn's, wounding a number of the defenders, including Captains Forsythe and Jackson.²³ Nevertheless, the fire was invaluable as a protection to the post. In addition the machine-guns on Pope's could now distinguish friend from enemy, and their fire made it impossible for any except a few individuals to make the perilous journey across No-Man's Land in the open, while they could easily be prevented by bombs from digging a communication trench. To McSharry, very cool in the thick of the fight, it seemed obvious that the one efficacious plan for dealing with the Turks then in Quinn's was by filtering men into the trenches on either side of them to attack them from both flanks through the trenches.

When Captain Hill²⁴ of the 15th, leading the second company of the supports, reached the post-headquarters and was ordered to "take a hundred men and clear the trenches with the bayonet," the situation had not yet become so secure. Nevertheless, when he hurried thence towards the trenches and asked where the charge was to be made, McSharry told him that there was no need to charge over the crest. Hill also, though as transport officer of his battalion he had only landed with his men a week before, had served in Quinn's, and knew well what were the chances of troops crossing that deadly sky-line. Even on the rear slope, anywhere near the crest, they were completely exposed to fire except when moving through communication trenches. He therefore decided to retake the lost sector as McSharry advised, not by charging over the roof of the bomb-proofs and so into the front line—

²³ Maj.-Gen. R. E. Jackson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.A. & Q.M.G., 3rd Aust. Div., 1917/18. Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces; of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Crow's Nest, Q'land, 1 Jan., 1886.

²⁴ Brig. J. Hill, M.C.; 15th Bn. Schoolmaster, of Rockhampton, Q'land, b. Cambuslang, Lanarkshire, Scotland, 12 Apr., 1888


which he knew to involve almost certain destruction—but by forming up his men behind the left of the post, as near to the crest as they could safely go, and then charging diagonally across the rear slope into the communication trenches and bomb-proofs held by the enemy. From these he intended to fight his way through to the front line.

He accordingly led his men up the slope on the left, to a point where a bullet grazing his scalp informed him that the limit of safe ground had been reached. Some of his troops, who had fought previously in Quinn's, seemed nervous of that dreaded crest. Realising that recklessness was required for this task, Hill bethought him of the men of the regimental transport whom he had previously commanded. These were tall, wiry fellows from the bush and western plains of Queensland, horsemen from birth, who had all stubbornly undergone a military sentence in Egypt for refusing to remove the unauthorised cocks' feathers from their hats. On landing at Anzac they had asked Lieutenant Little if they might belong to his platoon, and he had gladly agreed. Hill now sent for Little, who at once went to fetch his men. "Come on, transport," he said. "They want you to show them how to do it." The men grinned and followed keenly, being eager that their mates should now see them sharing the danger.

Major Quinn had by this time arrived and taken over from McSharry the duty of direction. Hill and Little drew up their men in two lines at right angles to the trenches. When they were ready, Quinn blew his whistle, and Hill's line dashed forward. A second or two later Quinn similarly sent forward Little.


The moment Hill's men raised a cheer, there broke out a tempest of Turkish bombs surpassing anything known at Anzac. The tangle of trenches in the narrow "Y" below the bomb-proofs was covered with flashes and dust. Some of the men dashed on, into and over saps, till they reached the crest. Others attained one or other of the communication trenches. Hill, after rushing nine yards across the open, turned up a trench which ended in the left bomb-proof. As

he reached the dark entrance, two rifles flashed, but the shots missed. Cramming himself against the wall outside, he emptied his rifle into the interior. As nothing stirred, he entered and found two of the enemy lying dead. Boxes of rifle ammunition and bombs and two small flags of blue silk showed that the place had been heavily occupied, but the enemy had fled. Hill fired into each of the tunnels leading to the firing line. One was blocked by a dead Turk, but Hill crawled along another and peered into the front line.



The front trench was bare of any living thing. The tumbled earth half filled it, and on this were lying numbers of the enemy, dead. But from the right there came bullets which caused him hurriedly to withdraw. He had seen enough to know that the front trench could not in any case be safely occupied until it was cleared. He therefore set his men to creep forward as he had done, and to build across it a barricade, from behind which bombs could be thrown so as to clear another sector.

Meanwhile Little's party, following Hill, had been driven by the Turkish bomb-fire to the right and left of No. 3. There, on the rear slope close behind the front line, they remained firing at a few of the enemy who were partially exposed to them while running backwards or forwards across No-Man's Land. It was certain death to stand up, but Little's party held on in spite of a certain amount of rifle- and bomb-fire, crouching below the crest, though with no very definite object. At length, seeing Major Carter



standing lower down the hill, Little called to him to send some bombs. These were an unaccustomed weapon, but Little asked for them rather in order to feel himself doing something. Then, throwing bombs freely, the party gradually approached the entrance of the second, or right-hand, bomb-proof. This seemed to be strongly held; but the enemy in it was being suppressed by men firing at the loop-holes, only one Turk, apparently, replying by shooting through the side of the chamber. At this juncture a sergeant, by name Simon,²⁵ suggested to Little that they should attempt to rush the place. That venture seemed too desperate, but Simon, Little, and a youngster by name Traise²⁶ crept closer, until Simon, from the trench by the entrance, actually slipped a bomb through the loop-hole. There was a scuffle inside, followed by an explosion. The fire from the loop-hole ceased.

Little's action in bombing back the enemy was, though at the time he had not known it, precisely the operation required. He seems to have been joined by a party under McSharry, which was keeping up a rapid bomb-fire with some newly-arrived stick-bombs.²⁷ This largely helped to clear the front line.

All engaged at this point now realised that, except for a few Turks isolated in some part of the nest of trenches around the right bomb-proof, the post had been cleared. Hill came out of the trenches and called to Little to direct his bombardment into No-Man's Land, so as to prevent the enemy from reinforcing. There were still occasional signs of Turks bolting over the open, and the Australians were cutting the bomb-fuses short, since in throwing at running men they needed a quick explosion.²⁸ A bomb which Little threw at a Turk in No-Man's Land exploded as it hit the ground. The next one burst in his own hand. With his face cut to ribbons, blinded, his chest and knee torn, his arm a bleeding stump, he was supported to the rear. "We've got them beaten all right,"

²⁵ Lieut. E. W. Simon, M.M.; 15th Bn. School teacher; of Toowong, Q'land; b. Coomera, Q'land, 29 Dec., 1895.

²⁶ Pte. J. H. Traise (No. 354, 15th Bn.). Warehouse assistant; b. Paddington, Q'land, 1893. Killed in action, 29 May, 1915.

²⁷ These were devised to explode on percussion. But some of the throwers, being completely uninstructed, omitted to take out the safety pins, and consequently their missiles failed to explode. The supply of "jam-tins" was comparatively ample, since, although one small store was buried by the mine explosion, 150 were borrowed from the 1st Australian Division.

²⁸ The procedure was to cut away half the fuse, light the stump of it, and then, when it sparked, hold it for a moment before throwing. This ensured a burst within about two seconds.

he said to Durrant; and then had himself taken to Major Carter in order to impress upon that officer the need for rewarding Sergeant Simon's work.

Hill, having the enemy now completely cut off in a defined space, had just sent a report to headquarters when to his astonishment he heard that another charge was being prepared. What had happened was that Colonel Chauvel, commanding the Left Central Section, after sending Colonel Pope to the post, had decided to proceed thither himself, lest the change of command at such a juncture might lead to confusion. Leaving Colonel Monash in charge in the valley, he had reached Quinn's about 5 o'clock, while Hill's attack through the trenches was in progress. Standing with Pope and Durrant, only a few yards below the scene of the action, Chauvel had waited for the result of McSharry's and Hill's operations. But though for an hour the bomb-fighting had been continuous, and a stream of men gashed with ugly wounds trickled constantly down Monash Valley, yet the Turks still held part of the trenches. In one company of the garrison four officers—Captain Forsythe and Lieutenants A. F. Smith,²⁹ Vine-Hall,³⁰ and Hartnell-Sinclair³¹ had been wounded. All this time the hillside in rear of the post was crowded with supports,³² smoking, chatting, and laughing as they waited their turn for any work which might be necessary. Thirty yards above them were Little's bombers; a few yards higher still, unceasingly watched by Turkish riflemen and machine-gunners on a semi-circle of surrounding ridges, was the edge of the bare crest over which it was deadly peril to venture. Immediately beyond that edge lay a portion of the front line of Quinn's, still believed to be in possession of the enemy. Other means of reaching it had been tried. There remained the plan of charging straight up the slope, over the roof of the bomb-proof, and so into it. The bombers were still cutting off the Turks from succour or retreat, but there were signs that the enemy intended to attack on the left. Godley had ordered that

²⁹ Lieut. A. F. Smith; 13th Bn. Auctioneer and general agent; of Sydney; b. Gloucester, N.S.W., 23 Oct., 1885.

³⁰ Lieut. N. F. Vine-Hall; 13th Bn. Wool buyer; of North Sydney, N.S.W.; b. Neutral Bay, N.S.W., 27 March, 1888. Died of wounds, 3 June, 1915.


³¹ Lieut. H. Hartnell-Sinclair; 13th Bn. Clerk, of Paddington, N.S.W.; b. Wandsworth, Eng., 26 Jan., 1885. Died of wounds, 9 Aug., 1915.

³² Vol. XII, plate 76.

the trench must be retaken at all costs, and Chauvel, who had shown conspicuous coolness throughout this crisis, himself concluded that the first counter-attack had failed, and that the risk of charging over the roof of the bomb-proof must now be faced. He accordingly gave this order personally to Major Quinn.

The next reserve waiting on the slope comprised Quinn's own company and Herring's of the 13th. Colonel Pope called those officers together and settled the plan for the charge. About 150 men were stationed in three lines, fifty in each, Quinn's on the left, Herring's on the right.³³ Pope's own expectation (he wrote afterwards) was that a Turkish machine-gun which swept the crest "would mow down my first two waves and leave only the third to deal with the Turks in the fire-trench." Hill did not succeed in convincing Chauvel that the effort was unnecessary. McSharry, however, who was beside Quinn, persisted in urging that to charge over the crest was to throw away lives to no purpose, since the small remnant of the enemy was now being driven to submission by attack through the trenches. Quinn went several times to Pope and obtained permission for the charge to be delayed, but eventually further postponement was refused. Returning to McSharry, who still urged the other method, Quinn twice placed his whistle between his teeth as if to give the signal, but removed it again, deciding to go to the front line and reconnoitre it for himself before he ordered his men to charge. Taking McSharry, he walked straight up the main communication trench to the heart of No. 3, and was turning into the front line when a shot came along it from behind, and he fell back dead, almost into McSharry's arms.

Quinn had walked into the straight section of trench previously described, along



³³ In one of these lines, in consequence of a quarrel caused by a man of the 15th pushing one of the 13th (or *vice versa*), the two fought with fists. After some moments they realised the position, and resumed their place in the line.

which the Turks were shooting. This trench happened to run directly into the southern bomb-proof, and it was probably from that shelter that the shot came. Quinn's death delayed the charge, but Herring was about to give the signal, when—about 6 o'clock—a furious burst from the enemy's machine-guns at German Officers' Trench raised clouds of dust from the crest. To go into that storm was annihilation; but almost immediately afterwards, to the surprise of the waiting line, the fire slackened and almost ceased. Herring gave the word, and the men dashed over the crest. It was a gallant spectacle, and hundreds looking on from Pope's Hill and from the slope behind Quinn's expected to see the brave line swept away by machine-gun fire. To the astonishment of all, few men fell. By some strange chance the enemy had chosen that moment to launch an attack upon the left of Quinn's. As he issued from his trenches, the whirlwind of fire preceding his assault stopped. The Turkish machine-guns at German Officers' could not shoot for fear of hitting their own men. The Australian attacking party was thus practically unharmed; and the men of the 15th on the left from the edge of the crest poured a heavy fire into the emerging Turks. Those of the 13th on the right, with Lieutenant Pulling,³⁴ Sergeant Scott,³⁵ Corporal Howden,³⁶ and others at their head, jumped into the front line beyond the bomb-proof. Several were shot at its exits, which it was still impossible to pass. But they garrisoned part of the vacant trench. Others, reaching sectors already overcrowded, returned.

The charge having been made, and the section of front line, which had previously been commanded only by Perry's riflemen, having been reoccupied, it was assumed at post-head-quarters that the fight was over and, in accordance with an order from General Godley, working parties were sent up to reconstruct the wrecked trenches. It was then found that men were shot when attempting to pass certain points in the post. As a matter of fact, the position had not been altered by the charge. The enemy were still in the southern bomb-proof, no more subdued than before, and anyone

³⁴ Lieut. C. W. L. Pulling; 13th Bn. School teacher, b. Bowral, N.S.W., 14 Aug., 1891. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

³⁵ See note on p. 111.

³⁶ Maj. H. C. Howden, M.C.; 48th Bn. Commercial traveller; of Northcote, Vic.; b. Preston, Vic., 1890. Died of wounds, 5 July, 1917.




QUINN'S, SHOWING SUPPORTS GATHERED ON THE SLOPE IN REAR OF THE POST ON 29TH MAY, 1915
(The small crosses mark the position of the waiting troops.)

Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. G1003

To face p 220

attempting to pass its exits was killed. The linguists among Perry's men exhausted their Arabic in the endeavour to entice the Turks to give themselves up. Perry then wrote a message explaining this position and flung it to the rear of the post, from which he was still cut off. Upon this, as a further sign to the enemy to surrender, white handkerchiefs were tied to bayonets and dangled by Major Herring and others near the mouth of the southern bomb-proof.



About the same time Hill, who had now cleared the tunnels of the northern bomb-proof, heard the enemy calling in the southern one. As the sounds appeared to be plaintive, he most bravely walked through a tunnel into the chamber occupied by the Turks. At the same moment two Australian privates³⁷ entered at the other end, with bayonets fixed and eyes peering into the darkness. Crowded against the wall, shrinking from the bayonets with which the two Australians, fresh from the sunlight, were unconsciously prodding them, were seventeen Turkish soldiers. The officer who had accompanied them had some time before attempted to make his way back to the Turkish trenches, and had not returned. Bombs had exploded among them—twenty-three of their dead lay in the trenches and the bomb-proof, of which the floor, walls, and roof were scattered with the torn remains of their comrades. The wretched survivors were terror-stricken, apprehending the fate too often reserved by their own people for any wounded enemy who fell into their hands. But the waiting Australians slapped them on the back and offered them cigarettes as they marched down the hill.³⁸

It was about 8 a.m. when the Turks surrendered, and with their capture the fighting ceased. Chauvel had by then

³⁷ One of these men appears to have been L/Cpl C Grimson (of Yullundry and Hornsby, N S W), 1st L.H. Regt

³⁸ The Turks showed their relief by seizing and kissing the hands of their opponents, one of them embracing Maj. Tilney, who stood next to Chauvel, on both cheeks


summoned the 10th Light Horse, the last reserve in the Left Central Section, and Godley had taken the precaution of sending to Monash Valley the Canterbury Battalion also. The struggle had cost the Australians 33 killed and 178 wounded, almost all within the narrow limits of Quinn's Post. Eleven men of the 13th were found covered by the earth of the explosion, by the shock of which they had been killed. The ascertained losses of the enemy amounted to between 50 and 60 killed, and their total casualties in the Quinn's area were probably about 300.³⁹ The weak feint attack which had been simultaneously made upon Russell's Top, where a few Turkish bomb-throwers advanced and threw grenades into the trench of the 9th Light Horse, had been easily repulsed.

After the fight the front trench of No. 3 Subsection at Quinn's was too much obstructed with fallen earth to be immediately reoccupied. The heads of the communication trenches were therefore held by sentries, while working parties laboured all day to clear and build up the broken trench-walls. The 13th Battalion was relieved during the morning, and 200 men of the 15th were put in, together with 65 of the 10th Light Horse under Lieutenant Kidd,⁴⁰ and 165 New Zealanders of the Canterbury Battalion. Before this fight General Godley had already decided to employ the New Zealand Infantry Brigade—then resting beneath the Sphinx after its return from Helles—in order to withdraw the heavily-trying 4th Brigade for a rest. Orders were now given for this relief to be hastened. The New Zealanders supplied part of the working parties, and by dark all but four yards of the front trench had been repaired. At dusk it was discovered that the enemy also had been busily working in his trenches, and a strange structure of timber and sandbags (which prisoners explained to be a bomb-proof necessitated by the increased bombing by the Australians) appeared over a Turkish trench at the north of Quinn's. The Anzac artillery was turned upon it, causing some damage. Two more important works, however, were discovered at the same time

³⁹ The estimate made by the A & N.Z. Army Corps staff—600 killed and 2,000 wounded—was certainly, as often happened, enormously exaggerated.


⁴⁰ Maj. T. A. Kidd; 10th L.H. Regt. Accountant; of Geraldton, W. Aust.; b. Stawell, Vic., 17 May, 1879.

almost touching the front line of Quinn's, which had been most heavily bombed all day from some position very close to it. These structures were reported by the front-line officers at dusk, but their importance does not seem to have been realised till dawn of May 30th, when it was perceived that the enemy had erected in or near his mine-crater a formidable gallery of wood and sandbags, eight feet high and fifteen in length. Colonel Pope, still acting as commandant, hurried forward to view this blockhouse, and



General Godley, greatly disturbed by his report, ordered him to seize and destroy the structure. It was then ascertained⁴¹ that the second Turkish position was thirty yards to the left of this, in the crater of the old mine fired by the engineers on May 28th,

which had broken the surface of No-Man's Land. It had been fortified with sandbags, which could be seen about six yards from the edge of Quinn's. Pope decided to send a party against this (which he designated "Work B") simultaneously with the assault upon the other




(known as "Work A"). The troops allotted to him were the garrison of Quinn's and his own battalion, the 16th.

The attack was arranged to take place at 1.5 p.m., by daylight. It has been explained that exposure even for a few seconds at Quinn's meant instant and deadly peril. Nevertheless, when Pope informed Lieutenant Kidd,

⁴¹ Reconnaissance was made by Col Pope and Lieut O. L. Davey (of Kent Town, S. Aust.), the officer controlling the Quinn's miners. Observation was no easy matter in consequence of the continuous bombing of No. 3 Subsection.

commanding the detachment of the 10th Light Horse, that he wanted sixty men of that regiment to make the attack, and two officers to lead them, the immediate reply was—"Put me down for one and Colpitts⁴² (a brother officer) for the other." These two were accordingly chosen, to each being allotted a sergeant and thirty men. Two smaller working parties, of the Canterbury Battalion, were also organised, and Kidd was ordered to hold out until these could be sent to demolish the structures. If they could not be sent over the top, tunnels must be made. Meanwhile, in accordance with the practice at Quinn's, the trenches were to be packed as a precaution against counter-attack. To cover the assault, bombing was to be kept up by the garrison, and the enemy's flanking machine-guns were to be suppressed by the artillery and machine-guns which normally supported Quinn's.

Of the meaning of such "covering fire" the history of the A.I.F. contains no better illustration than that afforded by an incident which occurred on this day. The 1st Australian Division had undertaken to smother at the critical moment a Turkish machine-gun north of Quinn's which ordinarily swept the front of that post. The trenches of the Chessboard, in which it was emplaced, could be seen from the rear of Steele's. A special emplacement was therefore to be built on the southern shoulder of Steele's, in order to permit one of the 1st Battalion's machine-guns to fire across the rear of its own post up Monash Valley against the Turkish gun. The attack was almost due to start, when General Walker, of the 1st Division, visiting Steele's, found that this emplacement had not yet been prepared. Since time would not then permit of elaborate concealment, sandbags were hurriedly piled to form an embrasure, in which the Australian machine-gun was hurriedly mounted a few minutes before 1 o'clock.



⁴² Maj J. W. Colpitts; Aust Provost Corps Farmer, of Winchester, W. Aust.;
b Blyth, Northumberland, Eng., 25 Nov., 1874

The moment the attack started, Private Arnott,⁴³ a young "compulsory trainee" in the Commonwealth Citizen Forces, directed the fire of his gun upon the Turkish weapon, and quickly killed or drove away its crew. Meanwhile his corporal, Bint,⁴⁴ discovered a second hostile gun, which he pointed out to the boy. While the latter was shooting at it, the first Turkish gun came into action again, and one of the two was turned upon him, searching for his loop-hole, which topped the white cliff behind Steele's. While Arnott endeavoured to smother the second Turkish gun, General Walker and others, looking on across the recess of Steele's, saw the stream of hostile bullets cutting the cliff face close beside Arnott, travelling down one side of the opening, across the cliff below it, back again up the side, and finally across the top of the loop-hole, ripping the bags and tumbling them from the parapet. The boy did not even for a moment relax his fire. His gun needed adjustment, and he was leaning forward to effect this, when several bullets entered his jaw, blowing away the teeth on one side and almost cutting his face in half. But during a critical time he had diverted the fire of one enemy machine-gun, if not two, from the attacking party at Quinn's to himself.⁴⁵



At 1.5 the onlookers on the other crests saw the two attacking parties scramble from Quinn's and stand looking down into some enemy work, bombing, shooting, and lunging with bayonets; then, as they jumped in and were lost to view, there broke out the inevitable tempest of rifle-fire and

⁴³ Pte. T. Arnott, D.C.M. (No 74, 1st Bn.). Pattern maker; b. Sydney, 1894.

⁴⁴ Cpl. C. A. Bint (No. 77; 1st. Bn.). Painter, of Canley Vale, N.S.W.; b. Balham, London, Eng., 6 Aug., 1878. Died, 10 Dec., 1930.

⁴⁵ The rest of the crew managed to dismount the gun, thus preventing its destruction. Arnott was carried round to the medical aid-post at Steele's, where Gen. Walker told him that he would be recommended for the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Those who looked on were surprised to see the boy pull himself together and faintly salute Walker. At the beginning of the fight Pte. R. Cumming (of Sydney), another trainee, also fired the gun, but was displaced by Arnott, the latter being "number one" of the crew. Pte. C P M Sharpe (of Sydney) also was wounded.

bombing, which continued for several hours. As no sign could be seen of the Australians, the rumour went round that they had been annihilated. But by that time there had been received in Quinn's a message thrown in a cartridge-case by Colpitts, not ten yards away. It ran:—

I have seven men left. No sandbags. Want support, but think it is only sacrificing more men to send supports. Will try to dig in and hold on, leaving it to you to decide *re* supports. Good luck. Ten casualties.

Pope's answer was to instruct him to do as much damage as possible and then retire. In order to assist, Pope sent out ten New Zealanders of the digging party. Only half of them reached the crater, one falling into it dead and another severely wounded. At 3.5 a further note came from Colpitts:—

Please tunnel through as fast as possible. Would rush back, but don't like the idea of abandoning my wounded. Suggest you have plenty of supports ready to come to our assistance in case of a counter-attack which enemy appear to be preparing. Have done all damage possible.

Both attacks had reached the enemy's works, which proved to be not two, but three, in number. That facing Colpitts was a crater, the nearer edge of which had been built up with huge Turkish sandbags as large as sacks of chaff. Kidd's was found to be a small crescent-shaped trench, dug apparently on the Anzac side of a shallow crater. But south of this again Kidd's party had stumbled into a third work, not mentioned in the orders, consisting of a short trench connected with the Turkish front line by a sap roofed over with baulks of timber, sandbags, and earth. This almost touched Kidd's trench, and at the moment of the rush the Turks were apparently working to connect the two, but a foot of earth still remained between them.

In Kidd's trench had been a Turkish bombing party. After a short sharp bayonet-duel some of the surviving enemy scuttled off through a tunnel in the back of the trench. Others were shot scrambling over the parapets. Twenty-two of Kidd's party and one captured Turk found themselves squeezed into a trench so small that movement was impossible. Shouting, and the flash of bayonets a few yards to their right,

showed that their nine comrades were fighting in some previously unsuspected position; but the parties had no periscopes, the hail of bullets sweeping the surface made observation impossible, and before there was time to concert measures the inevitable counter-attack had begun.

The crater which formed the horizon for Kidd's party now served as a natural "catchment" for the enemy's bombs. Having themselves been given only sixteen bombs (which were the first that most of them had seen), the light horsemen⁴⁶ for several hours successfully carried on the fight by throwing back every Turkish bomb which fell into or on the edge of their trench. Eventually, however, two of these missiles, burying themselves under some débris, could not be found in time, and exploded, wounding many in the trench.⁴⁷ In addition, the strain caused by this manner of combat, and by the continuous noise, dust, and acrid smoke, was exceedingly heavy.

About 4 o'clock Kidd's party saw bayonets moving in the third work, south of them; and presently rifle muzzles, appearing over the edge of the trench, began to fire along it. The men, thinking their comrades were firing on them in error, called out. But the rifles were those of Turks. The light horsemen in the "third" work, having almost all been hit, had passed back to Quinn's the most seriously injured, and had then themselves retired. The enemy who had reoccupied the position now suddenly leapt out and attempted to surround Kidd's men, every one of whom had been wounded, so that few could still handle a rifle. The light horsemen took the only course possible—to rush back to Quinn's. As they rose, the Turks fell back. Every man from the trench reached Quinn's,⁴⁸ but so dazed and overstrained that Colonel Pope


⁴⁶ Lieut. Kidd has recorded that Cpl. B. M. Fenwick (of Perth, W. Aust.) was especially prominent in bomb-throwing.

⁴⁷ None were killed. Tpr. R. G. Hann (of Fremantle, W. Aust.) was wounded in the eyes.

⁴⁸ An incident, interesting in its sidelight upon the mentality of the Turkish soldier, is recorded. The captured Turk and the light horsemen had become very friendly. He was given water, cigarettes, and biscuit, and in return offered his sour-bread ration. When the trench was being evacuated he was left at liberty. But seeing a Turk attempting to bayonet one of the troopers, who was hampered by his wound in leaving the trench, he seized a rifle and shot the attacker. He thus saved the Australian's life, but was immediately killed by his own side.

was unable to obtain from them a coherent description of "Work A," which still remained something of a mystery.

Colpitts' party succeeded in keeping "Work B." Twelve Australians had reached it, most of the Turks scurrying away through a shallow communication trench. Here also heavy bombing had immediately followed, and the light horsemen, catching the grenades like so many cricket-balls, had succeeded in throwing most of them back. Colpitts himself, observing that the communication trench seemed to lead towards Kidd's position, crawled along it, until, hearing shouts, he saw before him what appeared to be Kidd's crater crowded with Turkish bayonets and head-gear. Although observed, he regained his trench, and prepared his men to meet the then threatening counter-attack.⁴⁹ But the enemy did not reach the northern crater. By this time the wounded in it were desperately in need of assistance, one, Trooper Reid,⁵⁰ dying, and the others appealing for water of which there was none to give them. But tunnelling had now commenced, the Quinn's miners and men of the Canterbury Battalion working from one end and Colpitts' party at the other. When the sound of picks could be already heard through the earth, Pope called in Colpitts and the survivors. Lieutenant Le Mottée⁵¹ with six volunteers, mostly of the Canterbury Battalion, gallantly ran out to take their place, and about 11.30 broke through into the tunnel from Quinn's. The wounded were removed; and



⁴⁹ Against Colpitts' orders his batman, Tpr. F. S. Prentice (of Katanning, W Aust.), had followed him in the attack. Now, shot through the knee, Prentice seized the rifle of the dead New Zealander, and propped himself against the side of the crater, ready to shoot.

⁵⁰ Pte. R. M. Reid (No. 186, 10th L.H. Regt.). Bank clerk, b Staffordshire, Eng., 1887. Killed in action, 30 May, 1915.

⁵¹ Maj. J. B. Le Mottée; Canterbury Bn. Soldier; of Greymouth, N.Z., b Hull, Yorks., Eng., 18 Feb., 1893.

"Work B," roofed to form a bombing or listening post, was thenceforth connected with Quinn's.⁵²

At this stage the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, which for five weeks had fought continuously at the head of Monash Valley, was withdrawn to a sheltered reserve area on the slopes below the Sphinx. Quinn's and Courtney's were handed over to the New Zealand infantry, the 1st Light Horse Brigade remaining at Pope's.

⁵² Le Mottée's party, which had been instructed to convert the crater into a bomb-proof by covering it with timber, had almost finished its task when, about dawn on May 31, a Turkish bomb burst in the position, killing Sgt. D. N. H. Downie (of Nagambie, Vic.), an Australian engineer who was one of the volunteers, and Pte. G. C. Willetts (of Hokitika, N.Z.) of the Canterbury Battalion, and wounding all the rest but two. The crater was temporarily abandoned, but was immediately reoccupied by Lieut. D. A. Jackson (of Perth, W. Aust.), and a few of the 10th Light Horse, who dashed out to it over the top. The instructions given to this party were to take no offensive action. Until May 31 it lay quietly in the position, although during that night a Turk passed so close that he could have been bayoneted. On the same night, communication through the tunnel being now well established, the position was handed over to the New Zealanders then occupying Quinn's.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IN MONASH VALLEY


THE gradual transfer to the New Zealand infantry of Quinn's and Courtney's Posts, between May 29th and 31st, was a matter of considerable interest in view of the supposed difference in the character of the troops. A common opinion, not infrequently expressed among the Australians themselves, was that, if the Australians tended to brilliance in action, the New Zealanders possessed an orderly steadiness of outstanding value. This conception was based on experience in camp, but it is doubtful if close observers of the behaviour of the two contingents in actual fighting throughout the war could have drawn any distinction at all. The majority of the men themselves drew none whatever; each trusted the other exactly as they trusted their fellow-countrymen. But this notion undoubtedly coloured the expectations of the higher staff, where Australians or New Zealanders were concerned, both in Gallipoli and afterwards in France.

Upon taking over Quinn's the New Zealanders at first inherited the strife following the Turkish attack of May 29th. On May 30th they assisted, as has been related, in solving the problem of the mine-crater seized by Colpitts—"Work B." But "Work A" and the neighbouring crater of the exploded Turkish mine remained in Turkish hands. Colonel Pope, who had not yet handed over the command, determined that a further attack should be made after dark that evening by the 10th Light Horse, which still provided part of the garrison. Lieutenant-Colonel N. M. Brazier¹ was accordingly ordered to provide 100 men to rush the crater and blockhouse. He in turn requested that 100 of the 14th Battalion, garrisoning Courtney's, should make a simultaneous sortie to capture the Turkish machine-gun in German Officers', which he considered to be the chief obstacle. This also was arranged. But both attacks were afterwards countermanded as being likely to delay the urgent work of repairing the damaged trenches at Quinn's. During the night of the 30th, however, an order

¹ Lieut.-Col. N. M. Brazier. Commanded 10th L.H. Regt. 1914/15. Pastoralist and surveyor; of Kirup district, W. Aust.; b. Eaglehawk, Vic., 15 Oct., 1866.

was received from General Godley that the sandbag and timber erection must be either occupied or destroyed before morning. Pope decided, as a new method of attack, to blow it up with explosives. But when he and his engineer officer, Lieutenant Croker,² endeavoured in the moonlight to locate the structure, they could find no trace of it, and concluded that it had been removed by the enemy. Nevertheless, when daylight arrived, its timbers were seen covering the end of the communication sap leading from the crater to the Turkish trenches. Pope concluded that they had been re-erected, and determined that the best course now was to seize and fortify the crater.

This operation was attempted in the afternoon by a sergeant and six men of the Canterbury Battalion. But the moment they crept from the trenches they found themselves exposed to fire from loop-holes in the structure, and, as these looked straight into the crater, the plan failed. Immediately after dark another plan was tried, a similar party going out to attack the construction from its blind side, after which another party was to occupy the crater. Since there were no loop-holes on the northern side, the first party succeeded in reaching the work, which they found to be now a strongly-timbered rectangular blockhouse, projecting into the crater and commanding it like a fort. From the blind side the New Zealanders essayed to block the nearest loop-holes with sandbags, but these slid down into the crater. The whole party then dug at the building with picks, pushing and hacking it without avail, the heavy timbers interlaced with wire, and the roof of sleepers, sandbags, and barbed-wire being too strong. All the while the enemy inside was firing harmlessly through the loop-holes into the crater. A more dangerous fire came from the direction of German Officers'




² Maj G. N. Croker, M.C.; 1st Div. Engrs. Civil engineer; of Brisbane; b. St. Arnaud, Vic., 28 May, 1887.

Ridge, 200 yards distant, and after vainly endeavouring for ten minutes to pull down the blockhouse the party returned.

Since the crater was commanded by the New Zealanders—although they could not enter it—the blockhouse was now the only danger. The most obvious means of destroying it was by undermining and blowing it up. But the timber necessary for tunnelling in this shattered ground was not available. Chauvel's opinion was that the structure should be destroyed with gun-cotton laid against it, but the senior engineer on the spot advised that any explosion heavy enough to destroy it would also damage part of Quinn's. On the other hand, General Birdwood's chief engineer, Colonel de Lotbinière, pointed out that a charge laid on top would demolish it without affecting the neighbouring trenches, and he ordered this to be done.

On June 1st two New Zealand engineers then working at Quinn's, Lance-Corporal Fear³ and Sapper Hodges,⁴ volunteered to lay the charge. At 10 p.m., after being prevented once by heavy fire, they crept out, taking 12 lb. of gun-cotton together with electric apparatus as well as time-fuses.

Clearing the earth from the blind side of the blockhouse, they fastened the charge against it, while the Turks inside were all the time firing in another direction. After thirty-five minutes' work the two men lit the time-fuse, hiding the flame of their match inside a haversack. They had no sooner jumped back into Quinn's than the gun-cotton exploded. Scarcely any damage



was done to the trenches at Quinn's, but on crawling out to the crater the New Zealanders found it filled with a mass of broken beams and tumbled earth, amidst which lay the enemy dead. A party was in readiness to rush out and fortify the position, but the enemy's fusillade was instantaneous and so

³ Cpl. F. J. H. Fear, D.C.M.; N.Z. Engrs. Cheese factory manager; of Wellington, N.Z.; b. Kilbirnie, Wellington, 28 Nov., 1887. Killed in action, 20 Sept., 1916.

⁴ Spr. E. A. Hodges, D.C.M.; N.Z. Engrs. Motor mechanic; b. Northampton, Eng., 1888.

heavy that this project failed. As tunnelling through the crumbled soil was likely to prove a very slow process, General Godley agreed that, provided the crater had been denied to the enemy, the action need not continue.


Activity at Quinn's now temporarily relaxed. The New Zealand infantry was comparatively fresh, having been given a fortnight's rest since the Second Battle of Krithia. The 1st New Zealand Field Company, which had been almost entirely responsible for the engineering in this difficult sector, was relieved for a few days by the 3rd Australian Field Company. Quinn's and Courtney's were therefore now held mainly by fresh troops. These had at hand a supply of bombs which, though not yet sufficient, had so greatly increased that at times it seemed almost to equal that of the enemy. The chief engineer of the N.Z. & A. Division noted on May 31st: "Manufacture of hand-grenades well organised and going satisfactorily." Above all, the alarming events of May 29th had caused the Anzac staff to take swift measures to overcome any danger from enemy mining. On that day Birdwood ordered the 1st Australian Division to make an urgent inquiry for men and officers experienced in mining. As a result two mining engineers and 100 miners from the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade were sent to Monash Valley by 1 p.m., and a similar force from the 3rd Brigade at 3 p.m. These men, collected from most of the mining areas in Australia, were detached from their battalions, and, being organised under mining engineers, formed what were practically special mining units, which were eventually placed under the command of Major Edmonds⁵ of the 13th Battalion. Tunnelling was begun on May 29th from Pope's and Courtney's as well as from Quinn's Post. By June 8th 160 miners were employed beneath Quinn's, 50 at Pope's, and 50 at Courtney's. A few enemy workings which were detected approaching Quinn's on June 13th, 16th, and 26th were blown in by *camouflets*, and on June 24th the tunnellers exploded their first offensive mine—one charged with 37 lb. of gun-cotton. From that time it was the Turk who was forced to defend himself, and the Australian miner who attacked.

⁵ Maj. J. N. Edmonds; 13th Bn. School teacher, of Sydney, b Sydney, 3 March, 1875.

In all probability the conditions at Quinn's would thus have become easier for its new garrison had not a circumstance unconnected with the situation in Monash Valley occasioned the renewal of heavy fighting. On June 3rd there arrived at Anzac from G.H.Q. an officer with a secret despatch which contained instructions relating to an important attack to be made at Helles; the date was to be notified later. In this communication Birdwood was asked to arrange for some sort of feint to be made at Anzac, in order to prevent any portion of the Turkish force in that quarter from being sent to oppose the thrust at Helles. At 6.40 on the same afternoon he was informed by telegram that the attack was to be made on the following day. Birdwood had by then decided that the main feint should take the form of an attempt by the New Zealand infantry to seize and hold the section of Turkish trench facing the centre of Quinn's Post, while the 1st Australian Division was to help this attack by capturing or destroying the machine-gun at German Officers'.

Hamilton's notification of the date arrived too late to allow of the feint being delivered before the thrust at Helles took place. But it was considered that a demonstration on the night of June 4th might still be useful in preventing assistance from being sent by the Turks at Anzac. The New Zealanders were therefore ordered to attack from Quinn's, the hour fixed for this movement and for the Australian raid against the machine-gun in German Officers' being 11 p.m. On Russell's Top a patrol was to create a diversion by throwing bombs, if possible, into the Turkish trenches at The Nek. On the far right of Anzac there was also to be undertaken, earlier in the night, a separate enterprise against a Turkish post in the "Twin Trenches," between Anzac and Gaba Tepe.

The plan of the main attack at Quinn's differed from those on previous occasions in only one respect, namely, its greater



elaboration of detail as the result of experience. As usual, the trenches of the post were to be crowded by the garrison—in this instance the Auckland Battalion—while the reserve battalion (Canterbury) was to remain ready, with bayonets fixed, on the rear slope. But on this occasion the attacking troops were not merely divided into an assaulting party (of sixty men) and working parties (totalling forty-six), but these were sub-divided into sections charged with particular tasks.⁶ At the hour fixed for the raid all the guns which bore upon that area were to begin bombarding the Turkish communications leading to the neighbourhood of Quinn's, thus to some extent cutting off the Turkish post, or at least rendering it more difficult for the enemy to reinforce it.

At about 10.30 on the morning of June 4th the warships supporting the British attack were seen from Anzac to move across the horizon from Imbros to the distant toe of the Peninsula, and begin the bombardment which preceded the assault. Shells were observed bursting upon the hills above Krithia. After several hours the ships withdrew, but during the day no news arrived of the progress of the attempt at Helles.

That night the attacking party of New Zealand infantry, drawn half from the Canterbury Battalion and half from the Auckland, assembled in Quinn's. Volunteers had been called for, but so many offered that it was necessary for the commanding officers to make a selection. The night was a quiet one. Five minutes before the attack a sputtering rifle-fire, probably caused by the raid against German Officers' Trench, broke out near Courtney's. This had hardly subsided, when at 11 o'clock the Auckland and Canterbury parties made their rush from Quinn's. As usual,

⁶ A party of ten was to build a loop-holed traverse or barricade across the right of the captured trench; another was to do the same on the left; a third was to destroy with gun-cotton bombs the portion of trench beyond these traverses. Other parties of ten, on right and left, were to pass forward tools, sandbags, and material to the traverse-builders. Three men on either flank were to dig communication trenches from Quinn's. These plans were explained to those concerned, and they were also shown the points from which they were to start. As experience had proved that a possible leakage of men or miscarriage of plans might occur through soldiers leaving the front to help back wounded comrades, Col Chauvel ordered that "on no pretence whatsoever" was any one in the assaulting or working parties to touch a wounded man. That duty was to be carried out entirely by the allotted stretcher-bearers.

a few quick shots broke the silence; the firing thickened; machine-guns joined in; and within half-a-minute the head of the valley was roaring with sound.

Twenty-seven of Auckland were attacking to the left of the old crater "A" (entered by Kidd on May 30th), and thirty-three of Canterbury to its right. The left of Canterbury, running forward near the centre of attack, found themselves looking down into a length of open trench in which a dozen Turks were firing from the loop-holes.⁷ These, however, were immediately shot or bayoneted. But the portion of the Canterburys who took possession discovered that there were no other New Zealanders to right or left. On searching for these Lieutenant Stewart⁸ found that the right of the attack, under Sergeant Rodger,⁹ had run over the covered front line without knowing it, and had leapt into the Turkish support trench, which was open. Rodger's men, who had surprised and killed a few of the enemy, were found by Stewart in that trench, with the right working party duly building the barricade. In rear of them there appeared some of the enemy, probably those who had been passed over and who were now attempting to escape. These were shot, but in the tangle of the situation it is probable that some of the New Zealanders, being confused with the enemy, were fired upon by their own men. Fire was turned upon the backs of Rodger's troops by enemy in the line which they had overrun; it also hampered the men of another working party,¹⁰ now endeavouring to carry sandbags forward to Rodger. Stewart met this



⁷ A sentry of the enemy, looking up, and mistaking the leading New Zealander for a friend, reached out his hand and helped him into the trench. Then, seeing his mistake, he called a neighbour who stabbed the intruder with a knife.

⁸ Col. H. Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 2nd Canterbury Bn., 1916/18. Professor of classics, Canterbury College, University of New Zealand; of Christchurch, N.Z.; b. Premnay, Aberdeenshire, Scotland, 1 Sept., 1884. Died 22 Sept., 1934.



⁹ Capt. W. J. Rodger, M.C., D.C.M.; Canterbury Bn. Carpenter; of Christchurch, N.Z.; b. Christchurch, 2 July, 1887.

¹⁰ See footnote on p. 235.

danger by hurrying back to his own party in the first trench. and leading them along it southwards against the Turks who were causing the trouble. These were lurking under some head-cover, but their courage had been shaken, and, having surrendered upon demand, they were sent back to Quinn's.

For some minutes following the assault a scattered fighting continued in the trenches, odd Turks appearing round various corners or from the heads of communication saps. These were eventually shot, and the situation became clearer. The position of the Auckland party on the left was still unknown, but Stewart became certain that the first trench entered and held by his men was the Turkish "firing line" which the assaulting troops had been intended to occupy. No communication sap had yet been found connecting it with the second trench captured by Rodger. He therefore ordered Rodger to fall back into the first trench.


Before this order had been carried out, the situation was altered by the discovery of the presence of the Auckland party, under Lieutenant Vear,¹¹ in the first trench, slightly north of Stewart's. The two parties had been separated by a few Turks holding out under some head-cover. These had been afraid to surrender, one who attempted to do so having been accidentally shot. When they eventually gave in, it was found that from their covered sector a tunnel¹² ran back to the Turkish support trench occupied by Rodger's party.



¹¹ Lieut. W. T. H. Vear; Auckland Bn. Clerk; of Auckland, N.Z.; b. Auckland, 15 Oct., 1891.

¹² A second tunnel was discovered running west to a bombing pit near Quinn's.

As this tunnel now formed a channel of communication between the New Zealanders in the first and second trenches, Stewart forthwith reversed his decision to withdraw Rodger from the latter. The second trench was a position of much greater value than the first, since it afforded some view into the valley beyond, through which the enemy's local communications passed. Rodger held about 60 yards of this line, between two communication trenches leading into the Turkish valley, and Stewart about 100 yards of the trench in rear. The New Zealanders finished their loop-holed barricades on both flanks in both trenches. They also built protection in their rear against fire from the Chessboard. The dreaded machine-gun in German Officers', though troublesome to the parties carrying material through No-Man's Land, was harmless to those in the captured position. One communication sap—running through from crater "A"—had been completed, and a second was being dug. Turks who approached the barricades were shot, and their bombers were suppressed by bombs thrown in return; their wounded could be seen passing down into the valley.¹³ Sandbags, timber, and corrugated iron were being carried into the captured trenches in order to extend the overhead-cover as a protection against bomb attacks, though the parties carrying these materials were being subjected to dangerous machine-gun fire, coming apparently from the right, where the Australian raid at 11 p.m. against the machine-gun had failed.¹⁴




¹³ Stewart would probably have seized a further sector on the right of the first trench, where there were Turks, but Sgt.-Maj. Grey, who was in charge there, told him that further advance had been forbidden by Col. Brown.

¹⁴ A close watch, however, had been kept from Steele's for the suspected machine-gun in German Officers', which, at any rate since 1.30 a.m., did not appear to have fired. The careful brigade-major of the New Zealanders, Maj. Temperley, after himself visiting the trenches, reported that the machine-gun, which he believed would, if not suppressed, defeat the attack, appeared to be not at German Officers' but half or three-quarters of a mile away, down Mule Valley—so distant that it could not be distinctly heard. Both he and his brigadier, Col. Johnston, greatly doubted whether the gun then firing was in German Officers'.

Thus the Turkish Quinn's seemed at last to have been secured through the orderly methods of the New Zealanders. The enfilading machine-gun fire was now almost the sole cause of anxiety to the higher staffs, and the 1st Australian Division was asked whether it would make another effort to suppress it. That division was already so engaged, by subjecting German Officers' Trench to fire from a Japanese trench-mortar. It was now close upon moonrise, and the difficulty of raiding No-Man's Land had greatly increased. Nevertheless, on receipt of the New Zealand request, an undertaking was at once given that 100 men of the 1st Battalion would almost immediately go out and endeavour to silence the gun. The raid which followed will presently be described. Whether or not this particular machine-gun was destroyed, the course of the fighting at Quinn's was not affected by it. At 2.25 the New Zealand position, held by 120 men, was still being strengthened; more sandbags were being sent for. Stewart, who was wounded, had been succeeded by Lieutenant Dobson.¹⁵ General Godley sent a message that the captured trenches must be held "at all costs."

At 3.30 the enemy, concentrating from the direction of the Chess-board, made an attack with bombs upon the left of the Aucklanders in the first trench. At the same time a fierce machine-gun fire



was opened from the Chessboard. As day began to break this bombing increased. The white and black smoke of the explosions spurted perpetually from the narrow crest. Red dust, fragments of sandbags, timber, and tools were flung constantly into the air. The shriek, crash, and pungent reek of high-explosive pervaded the whole area. The enemy was employing, besides hand grenades, a hidden mortar throwing a much larger bomb, the bursts of which were indicated by blacker and denser smoke. Every blade of vegetation had

¹⁵ Maj. D. Dobson, M.C.; Canterbury, Bn. Solicitor's clerk; of Christchurch, N.Z.; b. Napier, N.Z.; 8 June, 1893.


long since been swept from the crest, where the scorched earth lay bare, tumbled this way and that in pink and brown heaps by the mine-craters and trenches. From the rear of the post men with ghastly wounds covering half their bodies began to trickle down the path to Monash Valley. From Pope's sheaves of enemy bayonets could be seen moving along the trenches towards Quinn's, and a message was received by Major Glasgow, asking him to render all possible assistance. He had six machine-guns covering the crest, but the Turks whose bayonets could be seen were themselves under cover, and, unless they came into the open to attack Quinn's itself, little could be done beyond occasionally ripping the sandbags above their heads. As on previous occasions, the enemy in counter-attacking his lost trenches did not expose himself, but, from sap-heads and corners which his opponents did not know, flung his bombs into trenches with which he was himself familiar. Three or four Turkish grenades frequently fell in quick succession into the same trench. The Anzac bomb-supply, though increasing, was not yet adequate to meet such an onslaught. A message came from the front asking for someone who knew how to throw the big "Lotbinière" bombs, but at the moment no expert was at hand. The high-strung speech and action of officers and men who came on occasional errands from the front gave clear evidence of the strain existing there. Colonel Brown was himself in the trenches, working in his shirt-sleeves among his men. All the while long planks and sheets of galvanised iron could be seen moving in slow procession through the Quinn's trenches to the engineers, who were still making a desperate effort to render the captured position tenable.

At 5 o'clock the left was driven in. The Turks then needed only to work down the empty line and seize the communication trench in order completely to cut off their remaining opponents. To avoid this occurrence, the New Zealanders were hurriedly withdrawn to Quinn's, and the enemy reoccupied his old front line. The endeavour of the New Zealanders had failed in the same manner as had every previous assault. Of the comparatively small numbers involved, one officer and 23 men had been killed, and 7 officers and 82

men wounded. The Turks lost apparently some 50 killed, possibly 150 wounded, and about 30 men captured.

The subsidiary raid undertaken by the 1st Australian Division against German Officers' was an enterprise not much less formidable. German Officers' Trench lay on the minor spur projecting in front of Steele's Post and MacLaurin's Hill—the sector held by the 1st Battalion. It came up from Wire Gully on the south, circled the Turkish end of the knuckle, and receded again into Mule Valley on the north, being therefore shaped like a horseshoe, of which the two ends lay in the valleys, while the curve approached the Australian trenches on the hilltop. It was from the north-western bend, overlooking the northern valley, that a machine-gun had been previously seen to fire.

For the first raid upon this gun at 11 o'clock a plan had been adopted somewhat similar to that by which the block-house "A" at Quinn's had recently been destroyed. A party of eight selected men, under Lieutenant G. A. Street of the 1st Battalion, was to issue from Steele's and creep to the machine-gun position. Sergeant Freame,¹⁶ a trusted scout, formed one of the party, and the enterprise really depended on his ability to lead the patrol along a route chosen by himself. In the roof of the shallow tunnel between Steele's and Courtney's was a hole, previously mentioned,¹⁷ where the tunnellers, who generally dug just below the roots of the grass, had accidentally broken through into the head of the gully. This being in ground almost hidden from the enemy, it was possible to creep unseen down the gully, the only enemy trench within sight being an old excavation in the depression itself, some ten yards from the hole, and known (like many others) as "the snipers' trench." This old work, at least



¹⁶ Sgt. Harry Freame was the son of an Australian, W. H. Freame, who went to Japan as a teacher of English and married a daughter of the house of Kitagawa. Harry Freame, after receiving an English education at Osaka, served under Diaz in Mexico, and as a scout in German East Africa. He was probably the most trusted scout at Anzac. After the war he returned to farming in Australia.

¹⁷ See p. 54.

in day-time, was unoccupied. Freame's plan was to lead the party past it, keeping in hidden ground until he was beneath the corner of German Officers'. There he would reconnoitre an approach, and two engineers would then creep forward with explosives and blow up the machine-gun.

The party had climbed through the opening, and Freame and Street, who were in front, were actually putting their legs over the parapet of the old snipers' post, when they perceived in it a number of dark forms looking up at them. A row of Turks was crouching in the bottom of the work, apparently dumb with terror. The forms began to rise. Freame and Street swung their legs out of the trench, crawled back a few yards, and conferred. Their own party, instead of lying flat as it should have done, was clumped together waiting in the dark. Freame saw that the attempted surprise had utterly failed, and advised Street to get the men back, while he himself lay in an old rifle-pit with his revolver, to hold back the Turks if necessary. But these were still crouching in the snipers' trench, whence they fired their rifles wildly into the air, afraid at first to look over. After a short time, however, they began to creep out and crawl forward. Freame had with him four bombs. He now threw them at intervals, but all failed to explode. The rest of his party having by then withdrawn to their tunnel, Freame followed them and regained it without hurt. By 11.24 all were back in their trenches.¹⁸

The raid had failed, and at 12.55 the N.Z. & A. Division informed the 1st Australian that the men in Quinn's were being heavily enfiladed from their right, that is to say, from the direction of the still undestroyed machine-gun. As the firing of several Japanese trench-mortar bombs did not appear to have remedied the trouble, Colonel White at 1.55 arranged with the 1st Brigade that two parties, each consisting of fifty men of the 1st Battalion, should go out before moonrise—the first party to destroy the machine-gun in German Officers', and the second to make for "the snipers' trench" in order to bayonet any Turks who might now be found there.

¹⁸ The discovery that "the snipers' trench" close to the gap between Courtney's and Steele's was occupied by Turks caused some anxiety to the staff of the 1st Australian Division. The gully-head was eventually occupied by tunnelling and then opening concealed loop-holes from the tunnels.

Major Kindon, then commanding the 1st, ordered Lieutenant Longfield Lloyd¹⁹ to lead the first fifty men and Lieutenant Wells²⁰ the supporting party.

As the moon was about to rise, and in moonlight the forms of the raiders would be clearly seen, it was advisable that the attack should be delivered immediately. But the engineers with the gun-cotton had been sent back to their bivouac when the earlier raid failed, and much time was occupied in recalling them. At 2.34, the moon having risen and the engineers not yet having arrived, Kindon asked if the attempt might be made without them, the party undertaking to disable the gun by shooting into it. This was agreed to, and at 2.55 Lloyd and the first party of fifty men scrambled out of their trench.

The raiders, while waiting to start, had been watching for the flash of the machine-gun, but during that time it had not fired. When they went over the parapet, Lloyd, with ten men, made in what he knew to be its direction,²¹ while the remainder ran towards the front of the trench. Some tripped and fell in the coils of plain "French" wire in front of the Australian lines, but, since German Officers' was only 50 yards distant, the leaders were half-way across before the Turks opened fire, and had reached it before the fusillade became heavy. Some came upon it at points where it was entirely roofed with heavy timbers. Others, striking upon an open length, could see here and there Turks standing at the loop-holes, but no machine-gun. As the fusillade rapidly increased, many of the raiders fired a few hurried shots into the trench, kicked down some of the heavy sandbags, and then, since there appeared nothing else to be done, ran back to their own lines. The second party was then in the act of leaving Steele's, and, finding the first men returning, came back



¹⁹ Lieut.-Col. E. E. L. Lloyd, M.C.; 1st Bn. Bank official; of Sydney; b Sydney, 13 Sept., 1890.

²⁰ Capt. H. Wells; 1st Bn. Tramway inspector, b. Shepherd's Bush, London, 24 Oct., 1876.

²¹ Sgt. Freame, watching from Steele's during this raid, stated that he saw two machine-guns firing from German Officers' Ridge. Information from Turkish sources makes it certain that two guns were there shortly afterwards, if not at this date.

with them. Meanwhile Lloyd and several others had reached the north-western angle. The shadow in its interior was deep, but Turks could be seen at the loop-holes, and Lloyd, standing on the parapet, emptied his revolver into them. One of the men near him, Lance-Corporal Davis,²² whom he had directed to search for the machine-gun, discovered what appeared to be the weapon in question at a loop-hole near the corner of the trench. After firing three rounds at its lock from a distance of 5 feet, he thrust his rifle into the loop-hole itself and fired three more. Within less than five minutes of starting the party was back, with the exception of a few of the more seriously wounded, who were being lifted into the trench. In those few minutes, of some seventy who left Steele's Post, 4 were killed and 28 wounded, of whom one died. Most of the wounds had been inflicted by machine-gun fire sweeping the level No-Man's Land from the flanks.

Of the other "demonstrations" carried out during the same night, that on Russell's Top was successfully undertaken by sixteen volunteers of the 9th Light Horse, who crept out and threw bombs into the northern end of the Turkish trench at The Nek. The parties sent out by the 12th Battalion to raid a post south of Anzac found it abandoned by the enemy.²³

Such were the local results of the demonstration designed to prevent the despatch of any Turkish force on June 5th to Helles. Patrols sent out at all points on the night of the 4th reported the enemy's trenches fully manned. The higher commanders thereupon issued congratulatory orders, assuring their troops that their action had accomplished its object by detaining the enemy's forces at Anzac. Nevertheless, on June 5th long columns of troops were observed passing southwards across the distant landscape.²⁴ It would manifestly be wrong to conclude from this that no action should have been taken at Anzac to detain the enemy's forces there. It is unthinkable that the British should have been allowed to cast

²² Cpl. C. Davis, D.C.M. (No. 457, 1st Bn.). Carpenter, b. Tewkesbury, Gloucestershire, Eng., 1892.

²³ The post in question was on one of the spurs south of the 400 Plateau.

²⁴ A similar movement had been observed on June 3. Possibly the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Anzac, which followed the battle of May 19, was in progress.

their strength against the Turks in the south without some endeavour being made to lighten their task. But to judge what form of feint will at a particular moment deceive the enemy—so that he believes some important position, other than that really attacked, to be endangered—is one of the most difficult problems confronting any commander. The experience of Australian troops throughout the war was that the enemy might be deceived by the making of general preparations apparently preliminary to an important offensive; but that, if the feint was to be pushed farther than mere preparation, the only sure method was actually to deliver the blow on a scale large enough to give him reasonable grounds for apprehension. In the case of the assault of June 4th at Quinn's, it may be doubted if the enemy's arrangements were in any way affected by this repetition of a local thrust at a point where acute fighting was now normal. As for the local consequences, the staff of the N.Z. & A. Division attributed the failure to a stoppage in the supply of bombs. It was also thought that if, as was intended, bombing parties had thoroughly destroyed with gun-cotton grenades the Turkish trenches on each flank of the captured portion, the enemy's counter-attack could not have been so sudden and overwhelming.²⁵ Moreover, the New Zealanders had left in Turkish possession the bomb-proof shelters constructed or strengthened by them during their occupation, together with a certain amount of timber and material. It was a military tradition—and in general a sound one—that before a position was given up to the enemy all useful material should be removed or destroyed. General Birdwood was more opposed even than most professional soldiers to leaving the least relic of British stores or equipment in the enemy's hands. After the fighting of June 4th he issued an order calling attention to the fact that, when a withdrawal became necessary, arms and equipment were sometimes left behind. Should this occur, the order continued, "it is up to the divisional commander concerned to consider what can be done to recover these on the first occasion."


²⁵ Seeing the manner in which the trenches at Quinn's were shattered by constant bombing, the authorities were at this time inclined to regard the grenade—and especially the big Lotbinière "hairbrush" bombs—as a means of breaking down and filling-in trenches

This form of words practically amounted to an instruction to the N.Z. & A. Division to attempt the recovery of the lost stores. Moreover the two communication trenches which had been dug across No-Man's Land were still an inconvenience, although a part of each was in possession of the garrison of Quinn's. On June 7th, therefore, General Godley ordered that the Turkish trench facing the centre of Quinn's should be retaken the same evening, the bomb-proofs destroyed, and the lost material as far as possible recovered. The plan of the assault was almost identical with that of its predecessor; but, when once this trench had been taken, and those on either flank of it bombed, and barricades built, the working parties were to destroy the captured trench and any saps or bomb-proof posts which might exist between the lines, and then retire, bringing back all material. The troops were drawn from the Auckland Battalion, then holding Quinn's.

The men were met by heavy fire as soon as they scrambled out. The strain of the fighting on June 4th had been heavy, and the New Zealanders, like the Australians before them, were beginning to question what purpose was served by continuing these expensive minor attacks on the same narrow front. Moreover the notion of expending many lives merely for the sake of dismantling trenches and recovering lost material aroused no enthusiasm. The small assaulting party on the right charged forward, but could not face the fusillade, and was driven back, its officer, Lieutenant Westmacott,²⁸ being severely wounded. A central party under a non-commissioned officer was to creep out by the right communication trench dug during the last attack. But this detachment was met by Turkish bombing, and, the leader being wounded, the remainder did not advance. Of the left assaulting party of 15, 3 reached the enemy's trench, followed by 9 of the working party carrying sandbags. Once there, they found little opposition, and began building the left barricade; but as, in accordance with orders, the working party carried no rifles, their position was very weak. A non-commissioned officer returned with this information,

²⁸ Lieut. R W Westmacott, Auckland Bn. Clerk; of Auckland, N.Z.; b. St. German's, Cornwall, Eng., 28 March, 1892.

and Lieutenant-Colonel Young,²⁷ then commanding Quinn's Post, ordered a further charge to be made on the right. Again the fire was so heavy that the men, although they advanced from the trenches, were unable to face it. Young then sent forward an N.C.O. and twenty men of the Canterbury Battalion with orders to reinforce the left party and then work to the right down the enemy's trench. This they did, but soon found their way barred by Turks. Young was about to despatch a further small reinforcement to assist, when all the men in the captured trench fell back. In this affair an officer and 12 men had been killed, and an officer and 24 men wounded. The position remained exactly as before, except that after this raid the old bomb-proof shelter "A" was reoccupied by the Turks.



After this failure the policy of repeatedly attacking on a narrow front from the apex of the Anzac salient was abandoned. Blockhouse "A" was blown up by a mine on June 13th. On June 9th the Auckland Battalion was relieved by Wellington, which had been holding Courtney's. Wellington now undertook—for a time unaided—the garrisoning of Quinn's, the Hawkes Bay and Ruahine companies alternating daily with Taranaki and Wellington West Coast in holding the front line. At the same time the commander of the battalion, Colonel Malone, became commandant of the post.

Malone's arrival marked a complete change in the conditions, both at Courtney's and at Quinn's. A man of powerful will and of especial directness and simplicity, he enforced a strict orderliness, however great the effort needed to attain it. At Courtney's, during the few days after his battalion had relieved the 14th, he had abolished the haphazard bivouacs which everywhere pitted the rear slope. In their place he had substituted close behind the crest a series of

²⁷ Maj Gen. R. Young, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded 3rd N.Z. (Rifles) Bde., 1917; 1st N.Z. Inf. Bde., 1917/18; 2nd N.Z. Inf. Bde., 1918/19; N.Z. Military Forces, 1923/31. Dentist, of Marton, N.Z., b Sunderland, Eng., 5 Jan., 1877.

straight wide terraces which ever afterwards marked this indentation.²⁸ His task was the easier inasmuch as galvanised iron and timber were now for the first time sent to the sector in moderate quantities. As the engineers appeared to him to be slow in setting up a number of iron loop-hole plates provided for Courtney's, he had caused the whole of them to be erected by his infantry. The immediate result had been that the Turkish sniping upon Courtney's was completely beaten.

At Quinn's, on the night of his arrival, Malone caused to be opened up in the front parapet a number of loop-holes which had been closed by previous garrisons. The following day the two companies that were not on front-line duty were employed in what he called "tidying" the slope behind the post, and in cutting terraces on the sheltered side near the summit. Within a short time these, neatly roofed with iron and sandbags, made a clean and comfortable bivouac for the supports. Below was headquarters, looking on to a small terrace, on which the colonel occasionally entertained at tea some of the frequent visitors. On the walls of headquarters were a few pictures, and he spoke of obtaining others for his men. If he had had roses, he used to say, he would have planted them on the terraces. "The art of warfare," he would add, "lies in the cultivation of the domestic virtues."

At the beginning of June a step had been taken to deal with the sniping in Monash Valley. When the New Zealand brigade arrived, traffic up the gully had at times been impossible in daylight. Malone, then at Courtney's, selected a well-known sportsman in his battalion, Lieutenant Grace,²⁹ to organise the local snipers for the purpose of subduing this fire, and a few days later this officer was placed by Colonel Chauvel in charge of a detachment of picked riflemen, who were to be responsible for the general safety in Monash Valley. Placing these men in pairs in concealed positions about the valley, Grace began systematically to mark down and shoot the Turkish snipers at its head. Each observer lay all day with his telescope, and beside him the sniper with his rifle, watching some small area of the enemy's trench or territory so closely that they could eventually mark

²⁸ See plate at p. 252.

²⁹ Lieut. T. M. P. Grace; Wellington Bn. Civil servant; of Wellington, N.Z.; b. Pukawa, Lake Taupo, N.Z., 11 July, 1890. Killed in action, 8 Aug., 1915.

the least alteration in it. Within a few weeks the enemy's sniping had been so completely suppressed that traffic in the valley went uninterrupted throughout the day.

Thus early in June two of the main problems of the Anzac position were at least temporarily solved. The first arose out of the enemy's command of Monash Valley. It is true that what had been called "the key of Anzac" was still in the hands of the Turks, and the Anzac position probably remained until the end of the campaign theoretically untenable. From Baby 700 and two of its spurs—the Chessboard and Dead Man's Ridge—the enemy still looked straight down the valley and commanded the rear of every post on its eastern slope. The building of barricades had not stopped the perpetual losses, and a long communication trench had therefore been dug up the gully slightly to one side of the track. But by the time this was finished a more effective remedy had been found. Grace's snipers, posted throughout the valley, placed a barrier as impenetrable as any earthwork between the traffic in Monash Valley and the Turks whose trenches overlooked it. Thenceforward, provided the snipers were first warned, even a convoy of mules could go to the supply dépôt near the head of the gully at midday without a shot being fired at it. The conditions were so reversed that, whereas the track had previously been dangerous only by day and safe by night, it now became safe by day and dangerous only after dark; for the enemy's snipers, silenced during daylight, now laid their rifles on to certain points in the hope of catching wayfarers at night.

The second problem which now troubled the Anzac leaders less acutely was that of Quinn's. In five weeks, since the first costly attempt to seize Baby 700, the Turks opposite Quinn's had been attacked in two heavy assaults and two raids. Each of these had failed with severe loss. The enemy held most of the crest, and the Anzac troops were still clinging to the edge, from which it had at first seemed that they might at any moment be driven by a determined rush of the enemy. Among the Turks, as well as throughout the British forces, the report of the extraordinary conditions existing at Quinn's—or, as the Turks called it, Bomba Sirt ("Bomb Ridge")—was widespread. Even neutral attachés and German war

correspondents were brought to view—from a distance—this corner where the trenches were in places only five to seven metres apart, and where the bomb-fighting never ceased during the campaign.⁸⁰ One Turkish battalion commander, who was in hospital and had seen Anzac only on the day of the Landing, would not believe that such conditions could exist. "If so," he argued, as did many others who heard it, "why do we not throw the English back from the post?" Upon his return he immediately went to see the position for himself, and was at first impressed with the opportunity for a successful attack by the Turks. After more experience he became convinced that it was impossible.

In all probability the chief obstacle in the way of any Turkish success at Quinn's was the extreme readiness of an overwhelming force of machine-guns in the flanking posts. Of these guns, six were now maintained at Pope's and nine at Courtney's, besides a number upon Russell's Top and one or more belonging to the 1st Australian Division at Steele's.⁸¹ Those at Courtney's were in June placed under one specialist officer, Captain Rose, and those at Pope's under another, Captain W. H. Hastings. But apart from the efficiency of the flanking protection, and of that afforded by specially allotted artillery, the defensive power of the Quinn's garrison itself was about this time greatly augmented. Besides Grace's snipers, who worked under the headquarters of the section, other marksmen were kept permanently at the respective posts under the control of the post commanders. These men became specialists in the study of their limited targets, with the result that the Turks, who had been accustomed to observe the Anzac positions from the open or through loop-holes, were now forced to use periscopes in the endeavour to discover from what position the fire came. But whenever a Turkish periscope appeared it was immediately shot through.

This result was greatly helped by the invention of the periscope rifle. On May 19th Major Blamey, going round the front trench of the Pimple during the last hours of the Turkish attack, had observed two men of the 2nd Battalion

⁸⁰ Among the Turks the general report, which contained an element of truth, was that the Turkish trenches had been several times attacked by the "English," who had then been bombed from each side, while the Turkish machine-guns, enfilading No-Man's Land, prevented them from getting out again.

⁸¹ The Anzac machine-gunners were at first hardly alive to the need for concealing their guns. The enemy was very skilful at doing so.

engrossed with a framework of broken box-wood and wire, attached to a rifle, which they were endeavouring to lay on the parapet. "An arrangement so that you can hit without being hit," one of them explained. It was a device for aiming a rifle by means of a periscope so fixed that the upper glass looked along the sights, while the sniper gazed into the lower one. Blamey believed that the device might be valuable, and the inventor, Lance-Corporal Beech,³² was afterwards brought to headquarters to apply it to a number of rifles. By May 26th a factory was started on the Beach. The first periscope rifle had been taken into Quinn's on the previous day, the man who carried it up the path remarking to the puzzled onlookers, "I'm tired of fightin' Turks; I'm goin' to play them cricket." It was tested at many posts, and at ranges up to 200 or 300 yards was found to be an accurate and deadly weapon. From that time it was constantly used by the Anzac troops wherever the trenches were close. A certain number were sent to Helles and also later to Suvla, but they were not there put to any great service, nor did the enemy, when he discovered and imitated the device, make any appreciable use of it.³³ But at Quinn's, where previously the garrison could scarcely fire a shot by day, it helped to beat down the enemy's sniping, so that it became possible to fire from the loop-holes and even, for a few seconds at a time, to look over the parapet.

Thus, though Quinn's itself was more than half-surrounded and entirely commanded, a definite superiority of fire was at last obtained. It was the Turks who now found it perilous, even at German Officers' Trench, to show their heads for an instant by day above the parapet, and their troops were eventually forbidden to do so.³⁴

The Turkish superiority in bombing also gradually vanished after Malone's advent at Quinn's. Protection from

³² Sgt. W. C. B. Beech (No. 1066, 2nd Bn.). Builder's foreman; of Sydney; b. Wellington, Shropshire, Eng., 1878. Died 22 Sept., 1920.

³³ Periscope rifles appear to have been first used by the Turks about August 20.

³⁴ Those who were strangers to this part of the line seldom realised the danger. About this time, for example, the commander of the 125th Turkish Regt., holding Johnston's Jolly, sent his aide-de-camp to German Officers' to reconnoitre. The A D C, being inquisitive concerning Quinn's, desired to look at it from the emplacement of the machine-gun which fired from the angle of German Officers' Trench. But this gun was by then so well marked by the Anzac snipers that it was only used on emergencies, and the Turkish sergeant in charge warned the young officer not to look from the emplacement. The latter disregarded his advice, and was shot dead through the centre of the forehead.

grenades had already been afforded by roofing over many of the support trenches. Malone now took advantage of the comparatively quiet week which followed the sortie of June 7th to cause lengths of the front line also, in Nos. 3 and 4 Subsections, to be rapidly covered in by the engineers, so that, after throwing bombs, the garrison could shelter before the enemy returned the fire. At the same time screens of wire-netting,³⁵ sloping on wooden frames, were erected in front of those open bays which were liable to be most heavily bombed—a precaution which almost completely protected the firing line from enemy grenades. Meanwhile Malone encouraged his men to maintain a constant and harassing bomb-throwing, which soon rendered untenable the close position from which the worst of the enemy's bombing had previously come. As the supply of grenades increased and the men became accustomed to handle them, the New Zealand bomb-throwing gradually equalled, and in the end dominated, that of the Turks. On June 13th the two companies of the Wellington Battalion then in the trenches threw 170 bombs. Next day one company threw 212, and on later occasions more than 300 were sometimes expended. During the afternoon of June 25th the New Zealand bombs set fire to the head-cover of the Turkish trench nearest to Quinn's. For three hours, while the Turks attempted to extinguish the flames, the New Zealanders bombed them. On July 7th the head-cover again caught fire and burned until the next day.

During the same period, as has been already related, the tables had also been turned upon the enemy underground. The Australian miners, who had fired their first offensive mine near the front Turkish trench on June 24th, exploded four more on the 27th³⁶ and a sixth on the 30th.

The result of all this was that the conditions at Quinn's, like those in Monash Valley, were almost exactly reversed. During July the Turks permanently abandoned their front trench opposite No. 3 Subsection, and manned only their support trench, with, possibly, some advanced bombing-posts. The ground between the lines was tumbled with mine-craters as if by a giant's plough. On the Anzac side this position was no longer the least comfortable in the line, whereas on that

³⁵ The thumb-nail photograph at p 625 was taken through this netting.

³⁶ Charged with 100 lb ammonal, 70 lb ammonal, 30 lb gun-cotton, and 20 lb ammonal respectively; on June 30, 100 lb. (no record as to kind of explosive).



TERRACES AND SHELTERS BUILT BY COLONEL MALONE AT QUINN'S

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1024



DEAD MAN'S RIDGE (THE FARTHEST CLIFF) FROM MOUTH OF SHRAPNEL GULLY

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1293



THE DAILY TRAFFIC UP MONASH VALLEY

*Taken by Tpr D S Maxwell, 3rd LH Regt
Aust War Memorial Collection No A893*

To face p 252.



SILT SPUR SEEN FROM THE OLD LINE, SHOWING THE "SPOIL" FROM THE 11TH BATTALION WORKS

*Taken by R Q M S G H Monnell, 23rd Bn
Aust War Memorial Collection No C3677*

of the enemy the drain caused by his constant losses became a matter of serious perplexity. The extreme tension called for intelligent watchfulness, and the Turkish soldiers, although staunch, were not clever. At one time their sentries at the more important posts were supplied with periscopes; but it was found that, where the lines ran close, periscopes attracted bombs, and therefore, at any rate at German Officers', they were abolished and watch had to be kept through loop-holes. Many of these, however, had to be forbidden in consequence of the regularity with which the Anzac snipers shot into them, and the sentries were thus restricted to those openings which were known to be safe. Lacking intelligence, they tended to watch only the space directly in front of them, and could not be trusted to observe to right or left. Turkish commanders therefore found that the only means of ensuring the safety of their posts was to keep their front and support lines heavily manned in readiness for any emergency. The trenches were normally crowded, with the consequence that wherever bombs were constantly thrown, as at Quinn's, the Turkish casualties were always high. Owing to these losses the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 57th Regiment, which, like the Wellington and Canterbury Battalions on the Anzac side, alternated weekly as the garrison of Bomba Sirt, were sometimes forced to relieve each other at shorter intervals.

In the end the Turkish staff seriously considered whether the Quinn's Ridge should not be abandoned and the line withdrawn to a more comfortable position on Mortar Ridge. On the other hand Bomba Sirt, expensive though it was, offered the Turks obvious advantages for any attack which they might in future contemplate. In order to preserve these chances the notion of withdrawal was finally rejected.

CHAPTER IX

THE GROWTH OF THE ANZAC LINE


ALTHOUGH the head of Monash Valley was during the early summer the only scene of any serious local offensive, the whole Anzac position was so narrow and so overlooked that the vital task of digging to improve it took on somewhat the aspect of a battle. This work, which occupied the months of May, June, and July, involved a sum of labour which was never quite equalled in the later experience of the A.I.F.

Next after the head of Monash Valley, the sector in which it appeared most urgent to increase the foothold was the 400 Plateau. At any rate this view had been taken by Bridges when, early in May, the first signs of the enemy were seen on the Jolly and Lone Pine, though still from 300 to 400 yards distant. As has been explained, Bridges' first measure had been to haul a portion of his artillery up to that summit. When this failed to check the intrusion, he was driven back upon the laborious process of sapping.

Sapping—that is to say, extending a trench or tunnel by working from within it—is comparatively slow work, since only one man at a time can pick at the narrow “face.” It is far quicker to “entrench”—that is, to dig from the surface of the ground, since a line of men can thus work simultaneously. It was by entrenching that, on April 26th, the salient known as the “Pimple” had been formed on the 400 Plateau.¹ But

that process was entirely precluded by the fire which now met anything that stirred upon the Anzac front from Walker's Ridge to the Pine. Bridges resolved to increase his hold on the plateau by thrusting forward still farther the Pimple salient. but the problem was especially difficult. A salient, however valuable, tends to be a costly and dangerous position,

since it is generally exposed to fire from both flanks as well



¹ See Vol. I, pp. 492-3.


as from the front. It would therefore be hazardous to push forward its apex without first advancing the line on either side.

North of the Pimple, opposite the Jolly lobe of the plateau, this blunting of the angle had already been begun. It should be explained that the line on the plateau was held, from May to August, by General Walker's 1st Brigade, which at this date also held MacLaurin's Hill farther north. The dispositions in the early summer were, from north to south—

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| MacLaurin's Hill— | 1st Battalion (opposite German Officers' Ridge). |
| 400 Plateau--- | 4th Battalion (opposite Wire Gully and Jolly). |
| | 3rd Battalion (opposite Jolly and Owen's Gully). |
| | 2nd Battalion (in Pimple opposite Lone Pine). |


Farther south came the 3rd Brigade, facing the lower ridges not yet entrenched by the Turks. The 2nd Brigade was from May 5th to 17th absent at Helles, and for three weeks after its return was in reserve, training its reinforcements on the hillsides in the lower half of Shrapnel Gully. The work of blunting the re-entrant north of the Pimple salient therefore fell to the 3rd and 2nd Battalions north and south respectively of the head of Owen's Gully.

By Bridges' directions each of these started a sap leading towards the head of that gully, the 3rd Battalion sap running southwards, and that of the 2nd northwards to meet it. It was these saps, then approaching one another, which were reached by the attacking Turks on May 19th. Three others, to act as communication trenches, were dug forward to them from the re-entrant. At 10 on the night of May 25th the two main saps were broken through into each other and, on its northern side, the Pimple salient was almost straightened out.



On the southern side of the plateau the land lay differently, the Australian line being faced by a number of minor ridges, each lower than the side of Lone Pine from which they sprang, and also lower than Bolton's. These were the ridges and gullies on which the Turks, when attacking in the early days, had been mown down by Rosenthal's guns. No definite posts had, at the beginning of May, been established there, but a few old trenches existed, dug by each side,² and many Turkish dead lay in the scrub. The 11th Battalion (of the 3rd Brigade) held the northern end of the Australian sector facing these ridges, and Captain Leane—the same who two days before had led the raid upon Gaba Tepe—obtained leave on May 6th to bury some of the bodies. He took out a party by day, unarmed, and used several of these old trenches as graves for the enemy's dead. The Turks did not fire upon this party, although they could be seen watching it.


The existence of one of these old Turkish trenches, immediately south of the Pimple, appeared to Bridges to offer an opportunity for blunting the re-entrant on that side. This earthwork (he wrote on May 6th) "could easily be taken by night, and connected on the south to the present trench. By doing this the tedious sapping with the same object would be obviated." On the following day, taking with him MacLagan and Walker, he visited the line in that area—which happened to be occupied by Drake Brockman's company of the 11th—and decided that a still quicker method would be to dig a detached post at the head of the first minor ridge, the one upon which Leane's party had been working on the previous day. He therefore instructed Drake Brockman to have the redoubt established that night; and, to ensure that the work should be exactly



² Lieut Hooper of the 5th Bn. had previously been ordered—possibly by Bridges—to go out 150 yards by night and dig a circular redoubt. The redoubt was half-finished when the beam of a warship's searchlight was turned upon the party, and the work had to be abandoned.

where it was required, he ordered that an officer of engineers should first go out in daylight and mark its line with pegs. At that moment there came up the trench Captain Bage,³ a regular officer of the Royal Australian Engineers, well known in the Commonwealth as a member of Mawson's Australasian expedition to the Antarctic. "Here's the man," cried Bridges, and directed Bage to make the survey.

To mark out such works was a traditional duty of military engineers; it would avoid unplanned digging, and Bridges did not ask of Bage more than he himself would have performed. Nevertheless the task could hardly have been more perilous. At 3 in the afternoon Bage and Drake Brockman went out, eight men under Lieutenant Selby of the 11th accompanying them. Crossing the head of the first valley—Allah Gully—they reached the crest of Silt Spur. Here Selby's men lay down in order to give covering fire, if necessary, while Bage, Drake Brockman, and two young sappers crawled down the fore-slope to mark the trench. The two officers, holding a stretched cord between them, had fixed the southern face of the proposed redoubt, and Bage was hammering in with a stone the eastern peg, when the Turks at the head of the same knuckle and also farther back on Lone Pine, 250 yards distant, opened fire. It has been estimated that at least five machine-guns were directed upon them. Bage was hit first in the arm, then in the leg, and finally through the head, and killed; Selby and two others were wounded. Bage's body was left until dark, when at great risk one of the covering party, Lance-Corporal Joyce,⁴ and some men of the 11th searched for and brought it in.




The position which Bage had pegged was not immediately occupied. Bridges visited the sector again with Colonel

³ Capt. E. F. R. Bage; 3rd Fld Coy Engrs. Officer of Aust Permanent Forces, of Melbourne; b. St Kilda, Vic., 17 Apr., 1888. Killed in action, 7 May, 1915.

⁴ L./Cpl. J. J. Joyce (No. 197, 11th Bn). Soft goods traveller; of Punjarra, W. Aust.; b. Geelong, Vic., 14 Aug., 1876. Killed in action, 9 July, 1915.

Elliott, his chief engineer. But the quicker methods which he had hoped to apply were proved impossible in an area so close to the formidable Turkish position on Lone Pine.⁵ The southern re-entrant of the Pimple was eventually straightened by the same method as the northern. Leane's company of the 11th began a sap which, by the day when Bridges received his mortal wound, was already approaching one of the abandoned trenches at the head of Allah Gully. It was from this sap that the 11th enfiladed the Turks who were waiting in that gully early on the morning of their great attack. Other forward saps had also been begun north of this, nearer to the Pimple. On May 27th the northernmost of them met another, which was being driven by the 1st Brigade from the southern face of the Pimple, the projection of that salient being thus greatly modified.




Bridges had not lived to see his plans completed, and less insistence was now shown concerning the pushing forward of the Pimple. But, as other tasks were finished, the working power of the 1st Division all along its line was being concentrated upon sapping. During the early days of May the troops on the rear slopes had been employed largely in digging roads by which the guns might reach the ridges. On the night of May 9th it had taken eighty men of the 2nd Battalion two

⁵ Twice during the ensuing month large parties of the 11th were sent out after dark to bayonet the enemy on Turkey Knoll, the enemy's outpost position on the knuckle from which Bage had been fired on. On each occasion the Turks were alarmed before the object of the sortie could be accomplished. In the first raid Lieut. S. H. Jackson, the subaltern in command of the covering party, led his men over the trench on the knoll. A few Turks in it were bayoneted, but it was found mainly crowded with unburied Turkish dead. A few of the enemy gave the alarm, and from the Pine there broke out the same intense fire which had been poured on Bage's party. Few were injured, but the raiders were foiled. On the second occasion the raiding party was withdrawn when within a few yards of the enemy's newly-dug trenches on Snipers' Ridge. These enterprises were of an almost impossible nature; or at least—since the lives of 150 men could easily have been placed in jeopardy—they demanded in the senior leaders an exceptional combination of daring and caution rare among those of a newly raised force. [The fusillade from Lone Pine or from the head of Snipers' Ridge was always particularly heavy. A few days after the first raid mentioned above Lieut. G. H. Henderson Smith (of Perth, W. Aust.), who was working on the 11th Bn. trenches, exposed himself in order to avoid exposing his men, and was killed by this fire.]

hours to drag one of Bessell-Browne's guns to the Pimple. A long sap as wide as a carriage road had to be cut for that battery alone. Half the energy of the field companies was at that time devoted to constructing gun-positions. But as these were finished, one section of engineers after another was detailed to superintend reserve companies of the infantry in sapping. A plan was drawn up by the chief engineer of the 1st Division, Colonel Elliott, for the system of saps on either side of the Pimple. Similar work was in progress all along the line, the brigadiers generally forming their plans on the advice of the engineers allotted to their sectors.

Towards the end of May, as the saps on either flank of the Pimple were completed, others were at once begun in order to advance the front of the salient itself. The intention was that, when these had been driven for 30 yards, their heads should be joined by a further sap running at right angles to them, which would form the new front line. The parapet of the Pimple being by this time a massive rampart of loose earth and sandbags, rising from 3 to 4 feet above the general surface, it was necessary to start each sap by tunnelling beneath it. This was begun on May 27th in three places, the intention being to tunnel 14 feet and then continue by open sapping. It was found that the tunnel roofs held without being supported by timbers, and the process was therefore comparatively easy. The three excavations had not been broken out to the surface when, on May 29th, the Turks exploded their mine beneath Quinn's.

That event brought home to all commanders the risk that their positions might be mined. Before that morning was out, the lists of all miners in the 2nd and 3rd Australian Brigades had been collected, and by evening 200 men, with mining engineers for officers, had been sent to tunnel for the other division at Quinn's, Pope's, and Courtney's. The 1st Division also began mining vigorously



in its own area⁶ along the whole front opposite German Officers', Johnston's Jolly, and Lone Pine.

The only sure method of protecting the line against being undermined was for the defenders themselves to tunnel forward and encircle their front with an "apron" of underground galleries, so that any approaching enemy tunnels would be detected by sound and blown in. It so happened that the three saps already being tunnelled under the parapet of the Pimple afforded a convenient beginning, as did a few others which had been started by the infantry and squadrons of light horse opposite Johnston's Jolly and German Officers' Trench. At the end of May they had progressed as follows:

Opposite Lone Pine.	Opposite north of Johnston's Jolly.	Opposite German Officers' Trench.
(2nd Bn. and 6th Light Horse) with 2nd Fld. Coy.	(4th Bn. and 6th Light Horse) with 2nd Fld. Coy.	(1st Bn. and 4th Light Horse) with 1st Fld. Coy.
Original number of tunnel.	Original number of tunnel.	Original number of tunnel.
B ₃ B ₅ B ₆ 41 ft. 51 ft. 26 ft.	1 2 2A 3 44 ft. 45 ft. 21 ft. 38 ft.	D ₁ D ₂ D ₃ D ₄ B ₁ B ₂ 31 ft. 27 ft. 13 ft. 7 ft. 28 ft. 3 ft.


The chaotic practice by which each brigadier or battalion commander numbered his local tunnels as he chose induced the chief engineer⁷ of the division to have the tunnels along the Australian divisional front numbered systematically, those at the extreme south being known as "A" tunnels; those opposite Lone Pine as "B"; opposite Johnston's Jolly, "C"; opposite German Officers' Trench, "D." The three original saps at the Pimple were thenceforward B₃, B₅, B₆.

It chanced that at this time another experiment was being made which greatly affected the development of the Anzac


⁶ As early as May 11, when German Officers' Trench began to appear on the slope close in front of Steele's, the 1st Bn. had begun to mine towards it with the object of blowing it up. Gen. Walker had appealed to Bridges for the guidance of the engineers, but they apparently advised that the tunnel was going in the wrong direction and was too deep, and it was therefore given up. The first shallow tunnel by which Steele's had been connected with Courtney's had not been altogether successful, breaking by mistake through the surface at several points. But Bridges had on May 12 warned the divisional engineers that it might become necessary to resort to mining in the near future. It was not, however, until there appeared a definite risk of the defenders being blown from their narrow posts that vigorous tunnelling was begun.

⁷ Maj. A. M. Martyn (afterwards Lieut.-Col., C.M.G., D.S.O.; commanded 1st Div. Engrs., 1915/18). On 15 May, 1915, he temporarily succeeded Col. Elliott as C.R.E. of the 1st Division, the latter being wounded.

line, and of which the result was that almost all the Australian digging opposite the Pine, the Jolly, and German Officers' took on from this time forth the form of tunnelling, and gave a peculiar character to the Anzac defences. The 12th Battalion, facing the minor ridges south of the Pine, was hampered by being unable to look into the head of Poppy Valley close in front. Captain Kayser, Lieutenant Rafferty, and others of the 12th, when reinforcing the marines on MacLaurin's Hill at the end of April, had discovered that trenches could be made in exposed positions by tunnelling from one rifle-pit to another and afterwards breaking down the roof. This method had now been applied on a much larger scale by Major Clogstoun of the 3rd Field Company, in order to secure a view into Poppy Valley. Tunnels were driven forward from the existing line. When these approached the head of the valley, their ends were




connected by a transverse tunnel a few feet below the surface. In this there were cut at intervals recesses similar to the fire-bays of a trench. Over these the roof was still left, so that no trace of the work appeared on the surface, until on a certain day the covering was carefully picked away from below, leaving each recess open to the sky. The "mullock" had been carried through the tunnels to the rear, and, since none was thrown up to form a parapet, these holes in the scrub were at first barely visible even at a few yards' distance. Such an occupied front trench could not long be kept secret from Turkish patrols, which probably first discovered it by sound; but,



although the enemy marked down the openings at night by throwing tins or waterbottles (duly pulled in by the occupants for "souvenirs") in the direction of the bomb or rifle flashes, such lines of defence remained to the end something of a mystery to the Turks.

These first underground trenches were completed early in June. By that time tunnelling was proceeding everywhere, the new plan at the Pimple being to connect the tunnels, when 90 feet out, by a transverse tunnel or apron. This transverse gallery was already branching from B5 and B6 when, on June 6th, General Walker held a conference to consider the whole system.⁸ It was then decided that the new forward line along the greater part of the Right Central Section should be made on the subterranean plan. Tunnelling was safer than sapping, the enemy being generally unaware that work was proceeding until it actually broke out on the surface.




Moreover the tunnels would serve both for a forward firing line and for a defence of the main position against Turkish mines; some of them could be driven forward to be used for offensive mines. About a week after the conference a similar plan of trench extension, but not so completely subterranean, was adopted for the Right Section also.

With this tunnelling phase began the heaviest work undertaken at Anzac. Most of the engineers were at this stage employed underground, the brigadiers furnishing them with infantry fatigue parties for the less skilled work. An engineer would be employed picking the "face" at the tunnel-head; another would shovel the loose earth into sandbags; and six men of the infantry would carry the sandbags to the rear and empty them either along the parapet of some rearward trench or in chutes and dumps at the back of the hills. The garrison

⁸ There were present the chief engineers of the corps and 1st Division, the brigadier of the Right Central Section (Gen Smyth), and the engineers working on his front opposite the Pine, the Jolly, and German Officers' Trench

50 0 100 200 YDS



WIGHTMAN

FOUR STAGES IN THE GROWTH OF THE TRENCHES AT THE PIMPLE SALIENT, ANZAC

became accustomed to the sight of a mining shaft leading down from the trenches to some candle-lit tunnel 15 or 20 feet below, along which a couple of big men occasionally came dragging a sack of earth as if they were ponies in a colliery, appearing from the bowels of the earth in front and disappearing to the rear, where, through some hole in the hillside, they shot the earth down the valley. At night these long drives and galleries, where the miners worked far out beneath No-Man's Land, were the only brightly illuminated avenues in the Anzac area. The men worked in shifts, and progress was usually at the rate of about 11 feet a day. To increase the number of working places, and so hasten completion of the schemes, many more tunnels were begun.

These extraordinarily heavy "fatigues" were increased when on June 23rd there arrived the first of a series of orders for extensive additional works, which were guessed by the troops to be connected with some forthcoming offensive. Terraces—to accommodate expected reinforcements—were to be made on the sheltered side of Braund's Hill, and a graded roadway was to be constructed over the Razor Edge between Rest and Reserve Gullies, so that troops could pass from North Beach over into Monash Valley without being seen by the enemy. Apart from these works a continuation of the original "Artillery Road" to the 400 Plateau was being dug along the sheltered side of the crest of Bolton's, immediately in rear of the line from Brown's Dip to Shell Green. No sooner was it finished than a further extension was put in hand, an existing communication trench from Brown's Dip northwards being widened to form a sunken lane for guns.⁹ Meanwhile orders came from the army corps to prepare an extensive system of water-supply and to excavate further terraces sufficient for nearly a division of infantry.

For such works as those last-mentioned the Turks would have used special labour corps, consisting of Greeks or of men of other nationalities whom they could not trust in the firing line.¹⁰ Even the British at Helles had advanced so far from their landing-places that they were able to employ Greek

⁹ This was intended to enable guns to be moved if the plans for the offensive in August succeeded. But it was still unfinished at the time of the Battle of Lone Pine and actually never quite reached White's Valley.

¹⁰ It was by this means that the Turks made their new military road to Anzac, leading by Anafarta and thence in shelter up Abdel Rahman Bair, over Hill 971, and down the summit of the range.

and Maltese labourers for unloading ships and constructing harbour works. But at Anzac, where the labour was undoubtedly heavier, the whole of it necessarily fell upon the garrison. Neither the staff nor the men themselves realised that the standard of effort was extraordinarily high. Military "fatigues" are usually attended by all the defects of forced labour; the men working on them are inclined to undertake as little exertion as possible unless they are sufficiently intelligent to perceive the urgent need for any particular work, or unless their officers, by fostering a high *esprit de corps*, can make them interested in their achievement. It is possible that even the Anzac fatigues did fall short of the full sum of work which the men would have accomplished had they been labouring in civil life for their own or their families' benefit. Nevertheless, seldom in this or perhaps in any army did fatigue work so nearly approach the extreme limit of which men are capable. In giving instructions that increased and sustained labour was to be undertaken in the improvement of Quinn's, Pope's, and Courtney's, Chauvel in May had ordered: "At no stage may it be said" (by the post commandants) "that all requisite work has been completed, because the extent to which the several posts can be improved and further secured is without limit." The pressure on the front of the 1st Australian Division was equally high. The work was being undertaken by men who obtained not more than half the sleep which is normal in civil life. Few, during the earlier months, were allowed to remove their boots night or day. They were almost without exception sickening with intermittent diarrhoea, and their physical strength was slowly but obviously decreasing.

At an early stage of the tunnelling it had appeared to the authorities of the division and of the engineers that the energy of the working parties was insufficient, and that the rate of progress had much diminished. As a remedy, General Walker ordered that the men provided from the infantry and light horse must be continuously supervised by their own officers, who knew them, and not merely by engineers. In order to maintain the speed, "task-work" was to be initiated—that is to say, a fixed amount of work had to be accomplished by each party before it could be relieved. Three eight-hour

"shifts" were instituted in the tunnels, so that progress should be continuous, night and day. And—what was probably the most important measure—the regimental commanders were to endeavour to allot the right men to this work. Lists were to be obtained of all men who were miners in civil life. Skilled miners were now to undertake the picking at the "face," previously performed by the engineers; a few were permanently attached to the field companies for the highly technical task of "listening" for enemy mining and judging its distance.


These measures, adopted on June 20th, quickly resulted in exploiting the full effort of the force. "Task-work" was greatly disliked, and was in the end applied but rarely, in some tunnel or sap in which the work appeared to be flagging. In the 3rd Brigade it was reported that the men did better without it. The handing over of the tunnelling to professional miners made a great difference. They were usually men of a certain rugged staunchness, and were often better content to labour almost permanently at this occupation, which in some degree approached that of their civil lives, than to work in the trenches.¹¹ There was a considerable proportion of miners in all the Australian brigades, although they were strongest in the 3rd. But the 2nd and 3rd had on May 29th each lent over 100 miners to the N.Z. & A. Division. The 2nd Brigade, having returned to the front line on June 11th and taken over that part of the 1st Brigade's front which faced German Officers' Trench, asked on June 24th for the return of these men. The mining at the head of Monash Valley having rendered the posts there completely safe, both parties were gradually withdrawn, the last men leaving on July 12th.

The scheme adopted at the conference of June 9th for the "new" firing line in the Right Central Section consisted simply of providing in front of the whole sector an underground firing line. Opposite German Officers' the new line was to be 20 yards in front of the old; opposite the Jolly

¹¹ For example, on May 28, when the usual party was being collected from the "resting" 13th Battalion for mining at Quinn's, a man of the 13th, by name MacDonald, applied to accompany several of his mates, coal-miners of Newcastle (N S W), to this work. As the party was already complete, Maj. Durrant refused his permission. Nevertheless on the following morning, when the debris of the Turkish mine, which exploded during the night, was cleared, the dead body of MacDonald was found beneath it with those of his mates.

and the Pine, 30 yards. The scheme for the Right Section was different, involving the seizure of a considerable area not by fighting, but by digging. In order to make clear the several enterprises which were involved, it is necessary to describe, more fully than has hitherto been done, the country which faced that portion of the line.

From the southern edge of the 400 Plateau, as has previously been explained, there ran southwards, roughly parallel to each other and to the sea, five minor ridges. Only one of these—that nearest to the coast—rose to the same height as the plateau; and along this one—Bolton's Ridge—lay that portion of the Australian line which was south of the plateau. In front of it came successively the four remaining ridges, each springing from the southern side of the 400 Plateau, but none rising level with it or with Bolton's. From west to east the successive ridges and gullies were:



Bolton's Ridge, on which then lay the front line of the 3rd Brigade. Allah Gully, commencing with a shallow dip south of the Pimple, and continuing as a short steep valley in front of Bolton's Ridge.

Silt Spur, a short wide spur 300 yards long, descending from south of the Pimple to a steep sharply-pointed end.

Cooee Gully, commencing as a depression east of Silt Spur and suddenly becoming steep and wooded as it neared the end of the spur.

Snipers' Ridge, narrower than Silt Spur. Opposite the end of Silt Spur this ridge bent slightly and was continued in the form of a lower and sharper spur known as the "Knife Edge." Snipers' Ridge and the Knife Edge together were nearly half-a-mile long, and, as Silt Spur was much shorter, it follows that the southern half of this spur (*i.e.*, the Knife Edge) faced Bolton's Ridge and Holly Ridge, itself a continuation of Bolton's. The valley between (the continuation of Allah and Cooee Gullies) was called the "Valley of Despair."

Surprise Gully.

Weir Ridge, a shorter but somewhat loftier spur.

Wanliss Gully.

Pine Ridge, longer than any of the preceding three, and curving slightly for nearly a mile until it almost met the southern extremity of Bolton's.

Beyond Pine Ridge lay Legge Valley, and, finally, Gun Ridge. But, whereas Gun Ridge ran down from the heights of the main range across the whole front of Anzac, the minor ridges in the above list were merely spurs of the 400 Plateau, and therefore affected only the right of the 1st Australian Division. It remains only to remind the reader that the first of them, Bolton's, 200 yards after passing the end of Silt Spur, became itself divided into two ridges, separated by a short valley. We thus have—

Bolton's proper (with its extension in the spur beside the sea, of which parts were afterwards known as "Chatham's Post" and "Harris Ridge").


Poppy Valley, commencing in the Wheatfield immediately outside the lines of the 12th Battalion and curving gently till it ended in the Valley of Despair.

Holly Ridge, commencing from the Wheatfield and ending a little before the end of Pine Ridge, which curved towards it. At this time Holly Ridge and Poppy Valley both lay altogether beyond the Australian front line.


Where Bolton's widened before thus splitting into two, there lay, immediately in front of the Australian line, the Wheatfield. This was about 200 yards long, and the crop was now ripening.

The 11th Battalion, immediately south of the Pimple, could not see into the head of Allah Gully, nor could the 12th at the south of the Wheatfield see into the head of Poppy Valley. In each case the valley formed "dead ground" close in front of the line. The new scheme was that the 3rd Brigade should by sheer digging incorporate in the line these two valleys and the greater part of the two ridges next beyond them, while the 2nd Light Horse Brigade (which on June 19th took over the extreme right of the line) should by the same means prolong the Anzac position southwards for nearly a quarter of a mile and afterwards connect the two extensions.

To describe the northernmost enterprise first. Silt Spur, lying beyond Allah Gully, was immediately south of the



Pimple, the high knuckle where it joined the plateau being known as "Turkey Knoll." At the beginning of June the 11th Battalion had already driven one sap to the head of Allah Gully, while two tunnels were approaching the valley itself.¹² About the middle of June, word was sent round Drake Brockman's company for three of its platoons—about 120 men—to assemble after dark. Of the nature of the enterprise nothing was known. When the troops had been assembled with their arms and full fighting equipment, picks and shovels were also handed to them, and they were marched in the dark through the sap in Leane's sector out into the head of Allah




Gully, where Silt Spur rose gently beyond them. A covering party had previously moved over the spur and was lying on the forward slope. The remainder were lined up on the rear slope and told to entrench, and to be sure that they were below the surface before daylight. The men had to wear their equipment in case of attack, and the ground was hard. But by dawn the line had been well dug-in. As the way to the Anzac trenches, over Bolton's, was exposed to heavy fire, they were compelled to remain during the day in the trench, which they spent the time in improving. The Turks on the spur beside the sea, far south of Anzac, could look up the gully; perceiving the new trench, they sniped at it intermittently, but without causing loss.

A foothold had thus been established in one night on the near slope of Silt Spur. At dark on the following night those of Drake Brockman's men who were occupying it were joined by the remaining platoon of their own company, which at once began to drive forward five tunnels from the trench. One of the platoons in the new trench was sent forward as a covering party for the night. The others were brought back to the old line on Bolton's for twenty-four hours' rest. On the following night the two rested platoons came out and took the place of

¹² The sap "B9" was being worked by Leane's company, and the tunnels, farther south, by Drake Brockman's.

the sapping and covering platoons, and thus the company worked in twenty-four-hour reliefs until five tunnels had been driven through Silt Spur to its forward slope.

This work was performed at the highest pressure which the men were capable of supporting. Almost every night several of the covering party were hit, and the duty of lying on the forward slope to be shot at was hated by all. Both platoons therefore worked to hasten the completion, and an average advance of 11 feet was made every twenty-four hours¹³ in each tunnel. When they were beneath the forward slope of Silt Spur, the final transverse gallery was driven at right angles connecting them, its roof being about 4 feet below ground. At this stage the 11th Battalion was withdrawn behind Bolton's for a fortnight, while the 10th went in to hold the sector. A few feet below the surface of Silt Spur lay a complete firing line, recessed, fire-stepped, ready to be opened in a single night by the picking down of the roof. No sign of it appeared in the virgin scrub. Only on the reverse slope of the spur were to be seen great chutes and hummocks of earth resembling the dumps round a mining city.¹⁴




¹³ Upon one occasion, in order to ease the work, a platoon of another company was temporarily allotted for sapping, but as the progress immediately dropped to an average of 4 feet, Drake Brockman's company asked to be allowed to finish the sapping itself. The ground was hard. The average progress in the 3rd Brigade tunnels is given by Maj. A. M. Ross, then brigade-major, as 15 feet per day in difficult ground and 23 to 25 feet in easy soil. The chief divisional engineer at the time, Lieut.-Col. E. N. Mozley, also gives the average at 15 feet a day for the Right Central Section. In the 3rd Brigade (Ross states) the men usually worked in four-hour shifts, one picking, one shovelling, and six carrying the earth in bags over an average distance of from 40 to 60 yards. In one case the progress was 32 feet in twenty-four hours. For open sapping the rate was from 2 ft. 6 in. to 3 feet an hour. On July 25 the 12th Bn. accomplished 39 feet in twelve hours. Tunnels were 6 feet deep and 3 feet wide; saps 5 feet deep and 2 feet wide, but enlarged by further digging parties to 7 feet by 3 feet.

¹⁴ See plate at p. 253. One of the largest heaps, the colour and shape of which reminded Western Australians of the dumps of the Great Boulder Mine, was called "Boulder Dump." In the soft soil of these heaps men of the working or covering parties used to bivouac. About July 10 a Turkish patrol, which had lain watching the 11th Battalion's covering party during the night, actually followed it so closely on its retirement that a bomb thrown by the Turks burst on one of these mounds and wounded a member of the party as he wrapped himself in his blankets to sleep.

The second enterprise—the advancing of the front on Holly Ridge—was begun two days earlier than that at Silt Spur. It was probably a necessary preliminary, since it prevented snipers from interfering at close range with the northern work. In consequence of the speed with which it was accomplished, this was more widely heard of throughout the force; but there was a difference in the nature of the undertakings. The southern work, "Tasmania Post," was comparatively distant from the most formidable enemy positions, and there was therefore no need to tunnel.

Holly Ridge extended southwards far beyond the existing right of the line, and there was no present intention of occupying the whole of it. The task set to the 12th Battalion¹⁵ was to cross the head of Poppy Valley and seize the northern end of the spur. As at Silt Spur, the plan was to send out a party to Holly Ridge to dig a support trench on its reverse slope. Instead of tunnels, saps were to be cut thence to the forward slope. But while the plan was maturing a difficult question arose. The forward slope of Holly Ridge fell away at a precipitous angle. It was argued by some that the edge of a cliff was a position to be avoided in digging entrenchments, since it is difficult for the garrison to fire at an enemy close beneath them. Others, who had crept nightly down the Valley of Despair, urged that the trench should be on the edge of the slope, since otherwise a company of Turks could move up the gully without the garrison being aware of it. It was, however, decided that the safer plan was to place the work about the middle of the ridge, with 40 yards' field of fire.

In order to avoid any mistake, two nights were spent by the engineers and scouts in creeping out to mark the position




¹⁵ The 12th Bn. at this time held three lines of trenches—the original front and support lines on Bolton's, and the first experimental underground line, fringing the head of Poppy Valley. See p. 261

of the post.¹⁸ Upon the third night, June 19th, the work was begun as a definite minor operation under the direction of Major Clogstoun of the 3rd Field Company, who had explained the plan to the digging parties during the afternoon. A covering party of 100 men lined the edge of the Valley of Despair. A further 100 in fighting equipment, with picks and shovels added, were lined on the near slope of Holly Ridge to dig the support trench. A third party of 130 began to form communication trenches from the existing line. As the support trench was not finished by dawn, all parties withdrew to Bolton's, returning to work again after dusk. On the third night the support trench was finished and garrisoned, and four saps were then directed towards the crest of Holly Ridge. When they reached it, cross saps were begun. Within a week of its commencement Tasmania Post was nearing completion, and the line lay 40 yards from the Valley of Despair.

The third and greatest extension was that on the extreme southern flank. This was begun on the same night as the digging of Tasmania Post, the work being carried out by the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, which had that day taken over this part of the line.

This brigade, which had reached Anzac on the day of the great Turkish attack, had been split up for experience between different brigades and battalions of the 1st Division. Its squadrons had relieved those companies of infantry which most required a rest. Its work had therefore included digging and tunnelling of the heaviest kind. But in the middle of June the brigade was reassembled. The Right Section, till then garrisoned by the 3rd Infantry Brigade, was divided into



¹⁸ On the night of June 17 the engineers went out and took the compass bearings. Capt. Rafferty then marked the chosen line on the crest by breaking or marking with tape a few small trees. Next day the engineers, taking sights of these trees, drew their plans, and during the following night Maj. Clogstoun, with Capt. Rafferty, Cpl. R. C. Storey, and three others (including a draughtsman named Cuthbertson), measured the ground with tapes. Storey and Cuthbertson belonged to Hobart.

Bird Trenches

Chatham's Post



Holly
Ridge

Harris
Ridge

POPPY VALLEY LOOKING SOUTH, SHOWING THE AUSTRALIAN LINE EXTENDED TO CHATHAM'S
Post


*Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1942
Taken in 1919.*

To face p 272



AIR-PHOTOGRAPH OF SOUTH FLANK OF ANZAC ON 20TH JUNE, 1915,
SHOWING COMMENCEMENT OF TASMANIA AND CHATHAM'S POSTS


*Lent by Lieut-Col C H Butler, R A F
Anzac War Memorial Collection No A2100*




THE SAME IN SEPTEMBER, 1915, SHOWING THE LINE AS COMPLETED
IN JULY

*British Air Force Photograph
Anzac War Memorial Collection No G153405*

To face p 273



100 0 100 200 300 400 YDS



KEYS TO PHOTOGRAPHS ON OPPOSITE PAGE



two—the Right Section North and Right Section South;¹⁷ and the latter was on June 19th allotted to the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, the 3rd Infantry Brigade thenceforward occupying only the Right Section North. In the light horse sector the 7th Regiment held the left, about Hughes's battery, while the 5th took over the right near the sea. The 6th Regiment was temporarily in reserve. Until that night the Anzac flank rested on the shoulder of Bolton's Hill leading down to the sea. From Bolton's there extended southwards, as has been explained, two ridges:

The spur beside the sea—a narrow, straight, steep ridge extending almost to Gaba Tepe.

Holly Ridge, already described, upon the upper end of which, near the Wheatfield, the 12th Battalion was this night commencing to dig Tasmania Post.

It had been decided that some 300 yards of the seaside spur should be seized, and this extension eventually connected with Holly Ridge by a trench across Poppy Valley.


Accordingly at nightfall on the day on which the brigade took over, Lieutenant W. Chatham¹⁸ of the 5th Regiment led a covering party of twenty men southward along the seaside spur, a working party of 200 of the 6th emerging immediately afterwards under Major J. F. White.¹⁹ The covering party went far down the ridge, where hitherto only the patrols of the two sides had wandered nightly. The working party was



¹⁷ These were actually named "Northern No. 1" and "Southern No. 1." The latter consisted of that portion of the old section which had been garrisoned by the 9th Bn.


¹⁸ Maj. W. Chatham; 5th L.H. Regt. Grazier; of Warwick, Q'land; b. Cradley Heath, Staffs., Eng., 4 Oct., 1882.

¹⁹ Maj (temp. Lieut.-Col.) J. F. White; 6th L.H. Regt. Grazier; of Glen Innes, N.S.W.; b. Denman, N.S.W., 19 July, 1876.




QUINN'S POST, ANZAC, SHOWING THE TRENCHES, SHELTERS, AND MINE-GALLERIES
EVENTUALLY CONSTRUCTED
(British trenches and works, red. Turkish
8th Fld Coy. Engrs
McInnis, Height contours, 10 metres)
Based on a plan by Sapper R. A. McInnis, blue

lined out well on the sheltered edge of the spur, as far as a knoll 250 yards down it. During the night a patrol of Turks ran against Chatham's covering party, which fired, killing three; but the working party dug without interruption. The new brigade was eager to show its mettle, and the big countrymen toiled as they had never done even among the infantry. The parties were withdrawn before daylight, but on the following night completed the trench. At its southern end, on the summit of the knoll, a redoubt was dug and named "Chatham's Post." From the third night onwards it was garrisoned. A second communication trench was then made along the summit of the spur, ascending by a tunnel²⁰ to the old line at Bolton's, and this became the main avenue of approach to Chatham's.



The space between Chatham's Post on Harris Ridge and Tasmania Post on Holly Ridge was next filled in by the 7th Light Horse, which dug five saps across Holly Ridge south of Tasmania Post. By mid-July the heads of these were being joined to form a new position known as "Ryrie's Post,"²¹ practically a southern extension of Tasmania Post. Birdwood had probably intended to occupy in the same manner the whole of Holly Ridge, but, since the Turks had now established a post at its extreme southern end, this became impossible. When, early in July, the




²⁰ The tunnel was necessary in order to avoid exposure in descending Bolton's. The trench (without the tunnel) was in use on July 2. The seaside ridge was named after the colonel of the 5th Regt, "Harris Ridge."

²¹ Called after the commander of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, Colonel Ryrie.

presence of Turks there was reported to him, Birdwood ordered that it should be prevented; but their removal could not be effected except by a local attack far too costly to be worth while. Consequently the 7th Light Horse, after connecting on the north with Tasmania Post on July 18th, began to dig across Poppy Valley to connect with Chatham's, leaving to the Turks the extreme end of Holly Ridge.

Thus within a month from June 19th the front of the Right Section had been considerably advanced, except at one point—the Wheatfield. South of the field Tasmania Post protruded, but Turkish snipers still crept up the valley into the crop. Towards the end of July, the 9th Battalion, which had re-

lieved the 10th in that sector, began to sap forward through the wheat. But before these saps were complete a new phase of the campaign had begun.




To return to the scheme in the Right Central Section. Between mid-June and mid-July the excavation of the secret firing line opposite German Officers', the Jolly, and the Pine had progressed to its final stage. At the Pimple this line, as has been said, was to be 30 yards in front of the old line; opposite German Officers', 20 yards. The longer tunnels which were here and there driven farther to undermine the enemy had rapidly approached his trenches, especially at German Officers', which was only 50 yards distant from part of Steele's. Here, as early as June 9th, when tunnel D9 and its forward branches had proceeded 25 yards, it was thought that the enemy could be heard countermining. To make sure that the sounds were not those of Australian picks, work was stopped in all neighbouring mines. The result left some doubt; but on the night of June 13th sounds were heard which made it certain that the Turks were mining from German Officers' Trench, and had reached a point near the left branch of D9. A charge was therefore laid by Lieutenant

Dyer,²² tamped with sandbags, and fired. The result was at the time uncertain. Later, the enemy was again heard picking, and there began a continuous series of measures and counter-measures, ending in hand-to-hand fighting, which will be described in a later chapter.

In the sector of the Pimple the two longest offensive tunnels, B5 and B6 (which in the middle of June were 190 and 178 feet "out" respectively—that is, about half-way to the Pine) were temporarily stopped, while a definite policy concerning the mining of the enemy's trenches was awaited. The head of each had been forked, and listeners in them could hear no sound of Turkish mining. A week later General Walker decided that they should again be driven ahead straight beneath the enemy's front line. His intention was that they should in due time be in position and ready for firing in any operation such as that already being foreshadowed against Lone Pine. Work was accordingly resumed and had proceeded for two days when, in the right branch of B6, there was faintly heard the sound of distant Turkish picking.

This was the first sign that the enemy was tunnelling from Lone Pine. General Walker, acting on Lieutenant-Colonel Mozley's²³ advice, decided that, as the undermining of the Pine was an advantage worth securing, risks must be taken, and that the tunnels should therefore be continued. Two days after the sounds were first heard, they were reported by Lieutenant Knight²⁴ to be very close to the left branch of B6. On the same day, June 27, picking was also heard near the head of B5. In each of these, therefore, work was temporarily stopped; a new gallery was started from B6 to head off the enemy; explosives were brought up in




²² Lieut.-Col. R. J. Dyer, D.S.O. Commanded 4th Div. Engrs., 1918/19. Engineer, of Sydney; b. Sydney, 8 Dec., 1803.

²³ Lieut.-Col. E. N. Mozley, D.S.O., R.E. Of Leeds, Eng.; b. Mirfield, Yorks., Eng., 21 May, 1875.

²⁴ Capt. R. G. Knight, M.C.; 2nd Fld. Coy. Engrs. Civil engineering student; of Mildura, Vic.; b. Echuca, Vic., 14 Jan., 1893.

readiness, and men were kept listening for the Turkish picks. But Walker and the engineers were averse to firing a charge in No-Man's Land if they could avoid it, since their plan of undermining Lone Pine would thereby be hampered.

At 6.30 p.m. on June 29th, when the parties from these two workings had retired for their tea, leaving only two engineers listening, the Turks exploded two mines, one near the head of each tunnel. A tapping had been continuously audible, and it was thence concluded that the enemy was still picking and was not yet charging his mines. It was afterwards realised that this "knocking" sound, which the Australian miners were at that stage only beginning to distinguish from true "picking," had been produced by an artifice, and that the tamping and charging of the Turkish mine had been carried out under cover of it. The two listeners, Sappers Weekes²⁵ and Rogasch,²⁶ were buried.



It had already been decided at a conference of engineers and infantry commanders held that day to drive a tunnel from the unengaged branch of B5 straight on to Lone Pine. Work was accordingly continued until this exceeded 207 feet, when one of the enemy's heavy shells, falling near his own lines, blew in the roof of a neighbouring branch. As it was feared that through this opening the enemy might hear the sounds of picking, progress was stopped until the hole could be filled. A few days later Turkish tunnelling was heard near the head of B5. This time charges were laid, and on July 11th were fired, destroying the enemy's workings. It was remarked that the crater caused by this explosion lay close to the barbed-wire entanglement of Lone Pine.

²⁵ Spr. W. Weekes (No. 129, 2nd Fld. Coy. Engrs.). Fitter and turner; b. Prahran, Vic., 1891. Killed in action, 29 June, 1915.

²⁶ Spr. E. A. G. Rogasch (No. 204, 2nd Fld. Coy. Engrs.). Carpenter; of Marnoo, Vic., b. Boort, Vic., 1895. Killed in action, 29 June, 1915.

Meanwhile the "C" tunnels also, opposite the Jolly, had encountered Turkish mining. At this position the enemy, with his flanks supported on either side by the formidable works at the Pine and German Officers', had been able to entrench without interruption, and during June had sapped swiftly and systematically towards the Australian lines. At some stage a secret excavation, deep, wide, and without parapet, appears to have been made in front of part of the sector, and a barbed-wire entanglement to have been erected on steel posts in the bottom of it.²⁷ On July 1st picking was heard from the Australian tunnels C5 and C6. Two days later other work was detected very close to C3. A charge was at once laid and was fired on July 8th, but sounds, apparently of the tamping of a mine, continued. A heavier charge was therefore exploded, enlarging the crater made by the first. The effect of this explosion could not be known; but it was inferred that the result made the enemy nervous, since next day the Turks themselves fired a mine in front of the Jolly at a considerable distance from any of the Australian workings.²⁸

By this time, as far as defensive and offensive mining was concerned, the supremacy of the Anzac miners was almost complete. Their galleries extended round practically the whole of the Right Central and Left Central Sections, and wherever the enemy was heard tunnelling, they simply waited till the sound came from within a few feet, and then blew in his workings. When the Australians eventually captured Lone Pine they discovered many proofs of the deadliness of their own countermines. At Quinn's no less than sixteen mines had been fired by the Australians or New Zealanders before July 19th, and underground fighting was practically continuous. The post was protected by a complete fringe of listening galleries with a long gallery connecting them, and a few deep level mines were now being driven beneath the

²⁷ This formidable obstacle existed in 1910 when the Australian Historical Mission visited Anzac, it appears to be shown in air-photographs taken late in the summer, but not in those of June 20.

²⁸ The Australian countermines were seldom exploded until the Turks were within a few feet. The danger to the enemy's miners may perhaps be judged from the effect of the Turkish mine here referred to. Although the nearest Anzac tunnel was 20 feet away, earth fell in it, burying a man of the 3rd Bn. who, though apparently uninjured, died shortly afterwards through those strange effects known as "shock."

earlier shallow system.²⁹ So close were the opposing tunnels that all conversation was whispered, and at certain points men went without their boots. In one gallery, as the result of an unsuccessful *camouflet*, a crack developed, leading into a hostile tunnel above. The New Zealand miners, when they reoccupied the working, could hear the enemy in his tunnel laughing and talking, but presently realised, from a sudden silence, that he had perceived the light of their candle through the crack. They therefore pretended to withdraw, but instead charged the gallery with explosive, working in darkness and with bare feet, and two hours later fired the mine. As soon as the after-gas had cleared they entered the crater, and found, where their gallery had been, only a heap of rubble. They could hear no sound of any human being; only, from beneath the *débris*, came the ticking of a watch.


At this stage the success of the Anzac miners began to have a marked effect upon the Turkish tunnellers, who were not themselves skilled miners. So often were the enemy parties buried that their nervousness became evident in their methods. Australian engineers reported that the Turks must be "in a state of semi-panic," being ready to fire their mines as soon as they heard the Anzac miners picking, no matter at what distance. Thus on July 22nd they blew up a mine only 15 yards from their own trench at Lone Pine, and flung into the air some of its barbed-wire entanglement. Two days later the Australian engineers in the same area let the Turks come to within 5 feet of them, and then fired their countermine, the Turkish picks being heard till the moment of the explosion.

While this fighting had been proceeding in the advanced tunnels, the excavation of the new firing line in rear of them had been completed. It remained only to fix a night upon which to remove the roofs of the recesses and begin opening up the whole system. The enemy was ignorant of the precise nature of the works, but he saw that much digging had been in progress. "Every day when I looked at the 'English' lines," said the commander of German Officers' some years later, "and saw always mound upon mound of new earth rising, I said to myself: 'What can these "English" be doing? I shall certainly wake some day and find that they

²⁹ See map at p. 274

have tunnelled to Constantinople!' ³⁰ The Turks had observed that shells had once or twice penetrated the surface of No-Man's Land and burst in some shallow working below. Their patrols, lying on the ground at night and listening, had probably heard the picking in the Anzac galleries. ³¹ Moreover one tunnel between Steele's and Courtney's, when employed as a secret position for a mountain-gun, ³² had been discovered and partly blown in by shell-fire. By these and other signs the enemy knew that extensive subterranean workings existed, but he probably associated them mainly with the mining warfare.

It was the middle of July when the last sections of the underground firing line were becoming ready for opening up, although other portions had been awaiting that process for three weeks. After dusk on July 14th, in the 3rd Battalion sector facing the southern part of the Jolly, the removal of the roof was begun. At each opening a parados of sandbags had to be erected in rear to protect it against stray bullets from the main Australian line, low sandbag traverses on either side to shield against enfilade, and a parapet in front. All night the infantry worked, but they were weak from illness and sustained labour, and by the morning only five recesses had been opened. On July 18th the 3rd Battalion sector was completed and garrisoned. But before the 4th Battalion, adjoining the north of the 3rd, had begun to open up, the enemy was heard mining, ³³ and a countermine had to be fired. The bodies of two Turks which were thrown up



³⁰ The Australians, who did not regard their own activity as abnormal, constantly watched with probably equal wonder the growth of the Turkish trenches.

³¹ Anzac engineers conjectured that this was the only method by which their two long tunnels B5 and B6 could have been so successfully located and countermined. At Pope's Hill a Turkish scout actually put his head into the forward opening of a gallery which had been tunnelled through the hill.

³² See p. 71. This operation, urged by the N.Z. & A. Division, had been opposed by Col. M'Cay of the 2nd Bde., who feared that (as eventually happened) it would disclose the left of his underground line, and probably result in damage to that portion of it.

³³ The Turkish mine was not far from the old crater of C3.

proved this mine to have been effective, but there was formed, only twelve yards from the underground firing line, a large crater, which became for some days a point of tension.⁸⁴ At this stage there also occurred events which for a time made the partly-opened underground line a source of embarrassment.

A secret report had reached G.H.Q. that the enemy intended almost immediately to make a final effort to drive the allies into the sea. For particular reasons especial credence was given to this information, and the warning from G.H.Q. was therefore urgent. At Anzac the foreshadowed attack was assumed to be almost certain, and it seemed probable that it would find the underground line in process of being opened. Movements of Turks were reported in Johnston's Jolly, and the situation of the 3rd Battalion, in the opened-up section of the new line, with its left almost touching the disputed crater, was so awkward that on July 18th Colonel E. S. Brown sent all his bombs and flares to that position for use in emergency.


The question of opening the rest of the line had to be at once considered. The sections dug by the 4th (north of the 3rd) and by the 11th (south of the Pimple on Silt Spur) were then practically ready, but in the sector between them, round the Pimple, the work was not yet so advanced. It was decided that the 4th and 10th (which had then relieved the 11th) should open up at once. The 10th accordingly completed the necessary work beneath Silt Spur during the night; and at dawn on the 19th the open bays, or "recesses," fringed the whole forward slope of that ridge.

But the decision to complete the work in the 4th Battalion's sector was again modified. On July 19th the commander of the 2nd Brigade, farther north opposite German Officers', put in a very strong plea against any opening up of his new line. He pointed out that in some parts it would be within 20 yards of the enemy's trench, and was therefore liable to be rushed before most of the rifles or any machine-guns could be got into action. It would take longer for the supports to reinforce

⁸⁴ It was decided to occupy it after dusk, but it was then perceived that the enemy had reached the crater first. Bombs were therefore thrown into it, and two of the enemy bolted, one escaping and the other missing his direction and running shouting between the lines until he was shot.

Map No. 10

10 0 50 100 150 YDS




WIGHTMAN

THE ANZAC LINE NEAR THE PIMPLE, SHOWING THE OLD TRENCHES AND UNDERGROUND FIRING LINE

Height contours, 2 metres.

the new line than the old,³⁵ and if men were wounded they would block the passage of others through the tunnels. He therefore recommended that the new line should not be opened, but should be used as an obstacle or trap, the recesses being filled with barbed-wire and the roof above them scraped so thin that the enemy, in attacking, would fall through it and be dealt with by the sentries in the tunnel below. Next day the 1st Brigade proposed that opposite the Jolly also the finished and unfinished sections of the new line should be turned into an obstacle, in this case by the raising of a barbed-wire entanglement above and between the recesses. These proposals were agreed to by the divisional commander.³⁶ On the night of July 21st the garrison of the new recesses was withdrawn, and the 2nd Field Company and 3rd and 4th Battalions worked all night erecting the barbed-wire on poles. The openings were then filled in by pulling into them the sandbags from parados and parapet. When daylight came, the enemy was faced with a high entanglement along his front on the Jolly. Though not complete, it would constitute a most formidable obstacle to the anticipated attack.

The story of that alarm belongs to the next chapter. What must be noted here is that at the end of July the 1st Australian Division possessed a new front line along practically its whole front. But while the new posts south of the 400 Plateau—on Silt Spur, Holly Ridge, and Harris Ridge—were all occupied, the new firing line north of them was not used as such: the Pimple tunnels were not yet quite ready for opening; those facing the Jolly had been opened, but closed again with an entanglement over them; those opposite German Officers' remained unopened but "thinned" as a trap for the enemy. On the front of the N.Z. & A. Division the equally heavy



³⁵ This recommendation was from Col Wanliss, then commanding the 2nd Bde. He pointed out that, even if supports were kept in the tunnels, they could reach the old line as quickly as the new.

³⁶ At this time Gen Legge,

labour in extending the defences had taken a different form—at Courtney's, Quinn's, and Pope's, mining or the general improvement of the post; at Russell's Top, the digging and tunnelling of front saps, which were now almost within bombing distance of the Turks. Behind the lines throughout the Anzac area roads had long since been cut and wells dug. Among other works Watson's Pier, in the Cove, had been finished, with a Turkish 8-inch shell for a pile-driver. The long communication trench to No. 2 Outpost now lay widened almost to the breadth of a carriage-way

CHAPTER X

OPERATIONS IN JUNE AND JULY

DURING the months of June and July the most important operations undertaken by the Anzac troops were probably those of tunnelling and sapping described in the last chapter. But the trench-warfare which was kept up at the same time was keener than that of later years. It becomes necessary, therefore, to describe its peculiar features, and also several difficult minor operations which occurred during this period.

The outstanding feature of the Anzac trench-warfare was the constant tension, which showed itself especially in the sniping. The manner in which the opposing marksmen watched one another—particularly in that most anxious corner where the Turkish snipers on Dead Man's Ridge and the Australians and New Zealanders at Quinn's and Pope's incessantly scanned each others' parapets for the least sign of change or movement—may best be judged from certain typical incidents which occurred during the summer. It will be remembered that in this angle there had been, early in June, an acute struggle for observation, the Australian and New Zealand snipers eventually forcing the enemy to keep not only his head but his periscopes well hidden. In their attempt to regain observation the Turks in this corner were forced to resort to all manner of contrivances. Since the ordinary periscope was now smashed the moment it appeared,¹ their next device was to put up mirrors fastened to a slender stick; but though these offered a smaller target, they also were shot away. They then tried smaller mirrors, an inch or two in diameter, and enclosed in strong metal cases. These they further endeavoured to screen with green or dead leaves, or by wrapping them in sacking to resemble the sandbag parapet. Finding that all such instruments were immediately detected and broken, they covered a mirror with half-a-dozen

¹ On July 25 it was reported that on the Australian side, in the sector of the 1st Division (where the tension was somewhat less), thirty periscopes were being broken daily.

shreds of sacking and raised it cautiously two inches above a torn sandbag of similar appearance, hoping that their opponents might mistake it for the ragged edge of the bag lifted by the breeze. This again was detected, and the mirror at once smashed. A device which for a time was more successful was the raising of a dummy periscope cut from tin, in the hope that, while the Anzac snipers were firing at it, a Turkish observer some distance away might be enabled to raise a real periscope, through which to detect, by means of the puffs of dust, the positions from which rifles were being fired.

The Australians had soon learned to leave sham periscopes alone. But one drowsy afternoon the Anzac snipers were relieving the tediousness, as they sometimes did, by testing their aim upon them, being careful, of course, not to fire from their sniping positions but only from obvious loop-holes well known to the enemy. A tin periscope was shot away. A Turk then raised a disc of cardboard on a stick. Several Australians fired. The cardboard was waved from side to side, the Turk signalling a "miss" in the fashion of a marker on a rifle-range, until, being waved too vigorously, the card flew from its stick and sailed boomerang-wise down the hundred yards of valley between Dead Man's Ridge and Quinn's. There followed a pause, during which the Turk fashioned something in a different form. Then above the parapet appeared a piece of tin cut in the shape of a cross.

The Australian soldier was not meticulously observant of his religion, but every man knew why this emblem was raised. The casual firing ceased. But two men who seldom missed their mark drew upon it, and in two shots cut the stick away from the tin.

Foiled by a watchfulness of which many other illustrations could be given, and finding it consequently impossible to keep a periscope above the parapet in this area, the enemy endeavoured to construct secret loop-holes, but in this he was similarly frustrated. At first he adopted no very deep artifice by way of concealment. The box-like framework of the loop-hole was inserted in the parapet during the night, but was invariably discovered in the morning, when the Anzac snipers, placing shot after shot along its edges, would

systematically cut out the frame. The enemy afterwards attempted by many devices to disguise his work. But if a new sandbag lay in the morning above his trench, it was forthwith thumped with bullets until pushed from the parapet.²

In order to tempt the Australian and New Zealand snipers to fire and disclose themselves, Turks more than once stood for a moment breast high above the parapet. But in spite of all devices, so keen was the vigilance now exercised that it was only by night that the enemy could regain observation in this area. During the dark his snipers frequently marked down the flashes of the rifles at Quinn's and Pope's, and instantly replied to them. This, however, was of little avail, since the Anzac snipers in those posts carefully abstained from using during the night the loop-holes from which they fired by day.

Another form of trench-warfare which was now fairly continuous was that of trench-mortars. For stationary fighting in the Anzac area these were an ideal weapon. The nature of the ground had forced each combatant to occupy in strength certain folds and contours of the hills, with a front-line garrison crowded on the summit and the supports equally crowded on the rearward slope. Across Baby 700, on the northern front of the Anzac position, the distribution of the enemy's troops may have been fairly even; but on the eastern front he held four strong points—at Quinn's, German Officers', Johnston's Jolly, and Lone Pine³—each of which, like the posts of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps facing them, formed perfect targets for trench-mortar bombs.

² One morning the Quinn's Post snipers saw suddenly raised over the enemy's trench on Dead Man's Ridge a long conical object of wickerwork, with a snout not unlike a pig's and two protruding openings in place of the eyes. Imagining that it was intended merely to draw fire, they ceased shooting. Then Tpr. A. M. Maxwell (of Hobart, Tas.), 3rd Light Horse Regt., fired from a sniping loop-hole known to the Turks (*see Vol XII, plate 93*), and began to reload his rifle. When he looked again the snout was pointing straight at him. He emptied his magazine into it. The thing ripped, collapsed, and did not reappear. This contest between snipers was all the keener by reason of the sportsmanship which was strong in the Anzac troops and which was often exhibited by the enemy. Opposite Johnston's Jolly, for example, an officer of the 3rd Bn., going his rounds by day, found all the men in one section of trenches on the fire step, watching over the parapet while one of their number stood alone with breast exposed and arms folded, gazing at the Turks. It appeared that he and a Turk in the opposite trench were engaged in a duel, each firing by turns while the other stood up to be shot at. The officer ordered both duellist and spectators to keep their heads below the parapet, but when he had gone the duel was resumed. The Turks in the opposing trench kept their implied promise not to shoot, but while the duel was in progress the Australian fell killed by some enemy marksman far on the flank who doubtless knew nothing of the contest.

³ The Turkish Bomba Sirt, Merkez Tepe, Kirmezi Sirt, and Kanlı Sirt

But the trench-mortar was then only gradually coming into use on the Western Front, and few were available for Gallipoli. Most of those employed at Anzac were of a crude type known as the "Garland." This consisted of little more than a short length of tube, through which, when propped at an angle, large jam-tin bombs were propelled by explosive tied in diminutive bags, the range depending upon the number of bags employed. The first trench-mortar used by the Anzac troops was that supplied on May 12th to the 2nd Battalion, which tested it at the Pimple and reported that, when the bomb exploded, the enemy in the opposing trenches fixed bayonets, as if fearing attack, and fired into the air. The 3rd Battalion, after shooting at the Jolly some days later with the same weapon, reported that the effect was slight.

On May 20th, however, there arrived four much more powerful mortars procured from Japan, where this type of weapon had been improved since the Russo-Japanese War. Their bombs, about four inches in diameter, weighed about thirty pounds, and contained a much heavier charge of high explosive than those of the Garland mortar. The bomb was not itself inserted into the gun, but possessed a metal shaft or handle which fitted into the barrel, the bomb itself resting outside upon the muzzle. When fired by day, the track of the bomb could be traced by this shaft revolving high in the air; at night it was marked by the sparks of the fuse.⁴

Two Japanese mortars were apportioned to each division. Those of the N.Z. & A. Division were placed at Pope's and Courtney's in order to cover Quinn's, while the 1st Australian Division allotted its pair to the 400 Plateau and MacLaurin's Hill. At the close of the informal armistice on May 20th several bombs were fired from one of these mortars towards the hidden slope of the Jolly, where the Turks were supposed to be treacherously gathering. The burst of these missiles was always accompanied by a terrifying crash. They "appeared to have great moral effect," reported the 1st Brigade after again testing them on May 22nd. "The enemy drop their tools and run." Since the targets were generally in trenches or on hidden slopes, the results could

⁴ The shaft was sometimes flung to a great distance by the explosion. A light horseman bivouacked in rear of Pope's was killed by the handle of a Japanese bomb which burst at Quinn's, and men in the Pimple were similarly injured by a bomb which burst in Lone Pine.

for the most part only be guessed, but the firing of the mortars at night was constantly followed by cries from the enemy. It is now known that the Turkish soldiers, who called these bombs "black cats," at that time dreaded them more than any other missile. They were effective whether they burst in the air or on the ground. One, exploding over the heads of Turkish reserves assembled on the sheltered end of German Officers' Ridge, either killed or wounded eighty men. Their range was usually short, but the enemy was surprised by one which burst at 600 yards over the reserves of the 57th Regiment encamped in apparent safety behind Mortar Ridge.

It appears that Johnston's Jolly—in other respects a safe and comfortable position for the Turks—at first suffered much damage from the Japanese bombs. Before long, however, the enemy discovered that he could obtain warning of them by listening for the slight report of the mortar and watching the trail of the bomb. He also found that a roof of timber, a few inches in thickness, afforded almost complete protection, and that, by roofing-over his trenches and rushing to cover when he heard the discharge of the mortars, he could escape the effect of the missiles. Consequently at the end of May he energetically commenced to cover the more exposed portions of his line. Within two months most of the front line at Quinn's, German Officers', the Jolly, and Lone Pine had been roofed with timber from Constantinople and pine-trunks cut locally on the hillsides. The roof-beams lay slightly above the level of the surrounding ground, and were covered with earth, loop-holes being made beneath their edge.

It was not, however, the enemy's counter-measures which eventually rendered these mortars almost useless. Their bombs were being fired at the rate of about twenty a day when it was discovered that any supply beyond the 2,000 originally landed would have to be specially manufactured in Japan. From that moment their influence on the course of the fighting dwindled. The Garland guns, which were better supplied with ammunition, continued to be employed from the Pimple and from Quinn's, but the difficulty of altering range and the smallness of the bombs prevented

them from being anything more than an annoyance to the enemy. Several 3.7-inch trench-mortars and two or three large catapults—in reality, cross-bows, which flung a bomb of the size and shape of a cricket-ball—were afterwards introduced. The latter possessed the advantage of being noiseless, but their bomb had only the effect of a hand grenade.⁵

The Turks were never during this campaign provided with effective trench-mortars. It is true that rocket-bombs, improvised from shell-cases filled with high-explosive and attached to rocket-sticks, began to be used by them in July. In the same month they emplaced behind the Jolly a mortar at least fifty years old, firing an ancient iron shell,⁶ spherical in form, eleven inches in diameter, and fitted with a wooden fuse. They further constructed a rude bomb-thrower consisting of a clumsy wooden gun-stock to which an empty shrapnel-case was strapped for a barrel. But although later in the campaign rocket-bombs were so employed as to place considerable strain upon the Anzac troops most exposed to them, the value of the Turkish trench-mortars was insignificant. With the weapons used later in France, either side could have blown the other from its strong-points, and would have more than made up for the ineffectiveness of the artillery; but these were never available. Thus the weapon which might possibly have been decisive at Anzac influenced the struggle only in one respect, namely, that it forced the Turkish garrisons to go under head-cover.

Except for the differences which have been described,⁷ the active trench-warfare at Anzac differed little from that upon other fronts. The system of periodical trench-raids had not been initiated,⁸ but stationary warfare was punctuated by

⁵ Other bomb-throwers were improvised. Cpl P. Daly of the 2nd Bn., a tradesman with a fondness for experimenting with explosives, used to fill empty Turkish shrapnel-cases with rag, pellets, and ammonal, covered with a wad of soap, in which he set a five-seconds fuse. This was too dangerous to fire from inside the trench, but he was allowed to take it to a sally-port, where he fired it from a gun consisting of a block of wood with a socket for the powder, over which the bomb was placed. Sometimes the missile shot into the enemy's lines and satisfactorily exploded. On other occasions it merely rolled over for a yard or two, and Daly had to rush forth and stamp out the fuse.

⁶ See Vol. XII, plate 138. The mortar is said to have been obtained from a museum.

⁷ As regards artillery, pp. 63-85; periscope rifles and sniping system, pp. 248-51, sapping and mining, pp. 260-84, sniping, pp. 285-7; trench-mortars, pp. 287-90. The peculiarities of passive trench-warfare at Anzac are dealt with on pp. 347-87.

⁸ The system is understood to have had its origin in raids delivered by the Canadians on the Western Front.

several minor operations of a different nature. It has been mentioned that Hamilton's orders to Birdwood allowed him to undertake minor operations "with a view to occupying such points as may facilitate your advance . . . hereafter and meanwhile compel the enemy to maintain a large force in your front," and thus relieve pressure upon the Allies at Helles, "which is your present rôle." It was in accordance with this strategy that the repeated attacks already described had been launched from Quinn's. After their failure the policy seems to have been abandoned by the Anzac leaders. So keen became the aversion of the troops to these isolated enterprises, that certain commanders gained a marked unpopularity through a belief that they favoured them. It may be doubted, for example, whether General Godley ever lived down the impression current among the New Zealanders that they suffered to no purpose in the attacks at Quinn's Post and later at Hill 60. For the same reason a report that Colonel M'Cay of the 2nd Brigade had offered to take German Officers'—a project which the troops believed to be futile—discounted with them the credit won by his outstanding bravery at Helles.

But although after June 7th the Anzac leaders abandoned the policy of making minor attacks, there occurred during the next five weeks three not unimportant fights, of which two were initiated by orders from G.H.Q., and one by the enemy. It has already been stated that, at the time of the battle of June 4th at Helles, Birdwood was asked to make a feint from Anzac. On June 28th he received a similar request:—


8th Corps is making attack at 11 a.m. to-day on its left. General commanding is sure that anything you can do to prevent reinforcements leaving you for south will be done.

As this message did not arrive until 8.30 on the morning of the projected operation, and as no previous notification had been received, it became necessary to use great haste in devising an effective feint. Colonel White was summoned to Colonel Skeen, and between them they evolved a plan for simulating a serious attempt to thrust forward from the right, or southern, flank of Anzac. Incidentally this would help to mislead the enemy concerning Birdwood's own project

of attacking from his northern flank.⁹ The feint was to be made by the two brigades on the right: the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, farthest south, would push out along the seaside spur (Harris Ridge) to engage the Turks in certain new earthworks known as the "Echelon Trenches," while the 3rd Infantry Brigade would attack the spur in front of its position—Snipers' Ridge with its continuation, the Knife Edge.¹⁰ The brigadiers were instructed that, if any position were captured which in their opinion should be retained, it was within their discretion to retain it.

This plan had one merit not possessed by that of June 4th. It did not initiate one of those constantly expected—almost weekly—operations against the probability of which the enemy must in any case retain troops in readiness. On the contrary, it proposed that a considerable part of the right flank should threaten to advance across country which had never been approached since the day of the Landing. The orders, hurriedly drawn by Skeen and White at 9.30, were despatched at 10.30 to the 3rd Infantry and 2nd Light Horse Brigades. The brigadiers were asked to arrange between themselves the earliest hour at which they could attack. Eventually they fixed 1 p.m. At that hour two companies of the 9th Battalion moved towards Snipers' Ridge, while, to cover them, two of the 11th advanced to Silt Spur and Turkey Knoll. At the same time two squadrons of the 5th Regiment of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade began to make their way southwards along the seaward slope of Harris Ridge.

This brigade, as has already been mentioned, had sailed from Australia as part of the second contingent, but both Bridges and Birdwood had been of opinion that its training in Egypt was less systematic than that of other brigades. Its



⁹ On June 28, in accordance with this policy, any forward step on the northern flank was avoided. The N.Z. & A. Div., which had taken the main part in the feint of June 4, was now ordered merely to harass the enemy with increased rifle-fire and bombing; similar action was to be taken by those parts of the 1st Aust. Div. which were not engaged in the advance.

¹⁰ Silt Spur, which formerly intervened, had been won by digging

brigade-major was somewhat elderly, and its brigadier, Colonel Ryrie, though a staunch bushman with a good knowledge of Australians, was no lover of the book-learning which Bridges considered a necessary basis for the training of efficient soldiers. Nevertheless it was realised that the men were magnificent material; and though Birdwood and Bridges had been strongly opposed to bringing the whole of the "mounted" troops to Gallipoli in brigades—believing that so many small separate staffs would be an embarrassment—yet they had strongly desired to strengthen their infantry with drafts from all the brigades. As has been already explained,¹¹ General Maxwell, appreciating the enthusiasm of both men and officers, had sent them to the front under their own brigadiers, leaving to Birdwood the onus of splitting them up if he thought it wise so to do. But though Birdwood had expected to be embarrassed by the four minor staffs, the first two—consisting of young and active regular officers under two regular¹² brigadiers, Chauvel and Russell—had been quickly utilised for the commands in Monash Valley and Walker's Ridge respectively. Those of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades, which arrived a week later, had been less easily absorbed. The regiments of the 3rd, whose brigadier was an elderly militia officer, Colonel Hughes, were first placed in the line under the control of his predecessors, Chauvel and Russell. When, however, a few days later, General Russell was forced to concentrate his attention upon the fighting at No. 3 Outpost, the command on Russell's Top was transferred to Hughes, whose brigade-major, Colonel Antill, was a senior regular officer with a record of good service in the South African War. On the other hand, Ryrie, whose brigade had been allotted to the 1st Australian Division, was as yet an unknown quantity, and possessed less adequate assistance. His regiments had therefore been temporarily attached to the 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades, the 6th Regiment sending its three squadrons into the trenches of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Battalions respectively, and the 5th and 7th Light Horse being for different periods split up between the 9th, 10th, and 11th Battalions. The squadrons

¹¹ Vol. I, p. 600.

¹² Gen. Russell was, properly speaking, an ex-regular, having resigned his commission in the British Army.

had been retained unbroken, being sent out as working parties or taking over various sub-sectors of the trenches.


While the 2nd Light Horse Brigade had thus been gaining experience, its staff also had been split up, Colonel Ryrie himself being attached to the headquarters of the Right Central Section. Day after day the brigadier—member of parliament, grazier, heavy-weight boxer, and typical Australian upcountryman—tramped round the front line with his enthusiastic and devoted orderly officer, Lieutenant Oliver Hogue,¹⁸ visiting every section, exchanging a joke with the men, and taking in the realities of the situation with a quickness perhaps hardly attributed to him by most observers. In the second week of June the brigade staff was reconstituted, Captain W. J. Foster, Bridges' former aide-de-camp, a trained and capable soldier, being sent to Ryrie as brigade-major. At this stage both sections of the 1st Australian Division's line—Right and Right Central—had been subdivided. The 2nd Infantry Brigade, having rested since the Battle of Krithia, had been sent into the northern half of the Right Central Section, and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade into the southern half of the Right, where (as has been told in the last chapter) it had by very heavy digging extended the flank to Chatham's Post, far down the seaward spur.

On the seaward ridge were several short lengths of old entrenchments, dating from before the Landing and not occupied by either side. Among these, 500 yards south of Chatham's, were the "Balkan Gun Pits," apparently part of the defences of Gaba Tepe in some previous campaign. They consisted of two embrasures—for either guns or machine-guns—on the seaward side of the ridge, looking out obliquely towards Anzac and each communicating by a small trench with the inland slope of the hill. They had been roofed over with brushwood, but were not usually occupied by the enemy, who till June had garrisoned only the extreme end of the seaward spur, a knoll upon which were the two small parallel excavations known as the "Twin Trenches." But as soon as the light horse had established Chatham's Post, the

¹⁸ Maj. O. Hogue; 14th L.H. Regt. Journalist, of Glebe, N.S.W.; b. Darlington, N.S.W., 29 Apr., 1880. Died of illness, 3 March, 1919. Son of the late Hon. J. A. Hogue, M.L.A.

enemy also—as invariably happened—had begun to extend his own positions. His working parties had been heard nightly near the Balkan Pits preparing a new position, which he was also connecting with those farther inland by means of two new works known as the “Echelon Trenches,” shutting in the Australian flank. These were the trenches against which on June 28th the 2nd Light Horse Brigade was suddenly called upon to launch a feint attack.

Ryrie's plan was to send a squadron of the 5th Regiment to occupy the Balkan Pits, as if with the purpose of attacking the Echelon Trenches from that point. It was to be covered by another squadron of the same regiment, which would occupy the seaward slope at a point about half-way to the pits, and also by two troops of the 7th Regiment, which would lie out on Holly Ridge, farther north, watching the Echelon Trenches and the inner slope of the seaward ridge. The field and mountain artillery of the 1st Division's sector were to support these operations as occasion arose, the 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery giving especial attention to the Twin and Echelon Trenches, while No. 1 gun of Hughes's (7th) battery attended to Gaba Tepe. A destroyer was to watch the Twin Trenches and Gun Ridge.



At 12.50 the two troops (half a squadron) of the 7th Regiment emerged on the sheltered western slope of Holly Ridge, and, extending across it, at 1.15 opened fire on the Echelon Trenches. Meanwhile at 1 o'clock the leading troop of the 5th Regiment, under Lieutenant Nimmo,¹⁴ began to move similarly down the sheltered slope of the seaward ridge. As it did so, the second troop, under Lieutenant Bolingbroke,¹⁵ doubled forward on to Nimmo's right. The two pushed southward through heavy scrub over the successive


¹⁴ Lieut.-Col. R. H. Nimmo; 5th L.H. Regt. Duntroon graduate; of Southport, Q'land, b. Oak Park, Ennasleigh, Q'land, 22 Nov., 1893.

¹⁵ Maj. A. G. Bolingbroke, D.S.O.; 5th L.H. Regt. Accountant; of Charleville, Q'land; b. Melchbourne, Bedfordshire, Eng., 26 Jan., 1880.

corrugations, advancing, despite the extreme heat of that day, with great rapidity. Bullets from some position farther south began to whistle about them, but the main difficulty was the scrub and the roughness of the folds. Within twenty minutes Nimmo's troop had reached a large indentation, at the farther side of which were the pits. He lined some of his men immediately behind the crest, facing inland. The remainder were placed at right angles down that edge of the fold which faced Gaba Tepe. Bolingbroke's troop came up and continued the line along the crest in the direction of Anzac. Major Midgley,¹⁶ with the remaining half of the squadron, was at this time still advancing towards an intermediate height of the seaward ridge known as "Green Knoll."

The leading troop had just taken up position when one of the sergeants, who had been peering over the crest, beckoned to Nimmo, and pointed out to him a line of Turks on the foot of Holly Ridge, a little northward across the valley and only 300 yards away. They were standing in some entrenchment at the southern end of the spur¹⁷ and firing continuously upon opponents farther north, probably the 7th Light Horse on Holly Ridge. This Turkish trench was entirely exposed to the two onlookers, who found themselves gazing directly along it, with a full view both of the Turks firing and of the officers or N.C.O's directing them. Nimmo quietly collected a dozen men, explained to them the position, and then gave the signal to rise and deliver five rounds of rapid fire. The enemy became confused and took cover. But the shots raised a storm of answering rifle-fire, which from that time continuously swept the summit of the seaward ridge.

The Balkan Pits, which adjoined Nimmo's position, were found empty, but the enemy had been thoroughly roused, and rushed men into the Twin Trenches. These troops were



¹⁶ Lieut.-Col. S. Midgley, C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded 54th Bn. 1916/17. Mine owner; of Brisbane; b. Macleay River, N.S.W., 29 May, 1871.

¹⁷ See p. 275

observed digging, and, upon Ryrie's order, were shelled by Ross's gun of the Bolton's Hill battery. This field-piece had only fired seven rounds, when, as usually happened, the Turkish battery directly opposite on Gun Ridge retaliated, bursting two shells on the embrasure and one in the gun-pit, and causing the gun to be withdrawn slightly damaged.¹⁸ The Turks in the Twin Trenches were thus free to pour heavy fire upon Bolingbroke's troop, whose position on a shoulder north of the pits was exposed to them, and men began to fall. As a counter-measure, Lieutenant-Colonel Harris¹⁹ of the 5th moved his two supporting squadrons farther forward, and sent to the advanced position a troop of men with picks and shovels to assist in providing shelter.

It was at this moment, when the enemy's fire was increasing and losses were beginning to occur, that there were hurled into the thick of the small force clinging to the hillside three high-explosive shells. These shots, cleanly planted at intervals along the seaward slope, burst in the centre of the troops, raising a dense cloud of brown earth and greenish smoke unlike that of any Turkish shell. On Bolton's Hill Ryrie, watching through his periscope from the observation-post of Hughes's battery, saw the first shell fall, and shouted: "What gun's that?" A second shot fell, whereupon one of the staff, rushing to the rear to see if the destroyer was firing, shouted that she had just done so. The next instant a spurt of brown earth and smoke leapt from the midst of the knot of men far down the ridge. Urgent messages were sent to stop this shooting, but the destroyer had already turned her guns farther south upon Twin Trenches, and presently ceased fire.

It was stated afterwards that the advance of the light horse had been so rapid that they were in the Balkan Pits before the warships expected them there. The occurrence was more probably due to the extreme haste with which the sortie had necessarily been planned. The number of men hit by the shells was fortunately small—at the most three or four were wounded. But, whatever the loss, it is certain that the advanced half-squadron of the 5th now found


¹⁸ See plates at p. 83

¹⁹ Lieut.-Col. H. J. I. Harris, V.D. Commanded 5th L.H. Regt. 1914/15. Accountant and secretary; of Brisbane; b. Dalby, Q'land, 19 Jan., 1871. Killed in action, 31 July, 1915.

itself in a situation by which the best troops are often shaken. The enemy was close to them on two sides—in the Echelon Trenches a bare hundred yards on the other side of the crest, and working up communication trenches from the south close to the Balkan Pits. A whirlwind of fire from Gun and Pine Ridges swept the crest. And now the handful of light horse lying beneath it found the guns of their own side throwing aimed shells into their defenceless backs. Evidently some terrible error had occurred. In such circumstances a withdrawal might have seemed justified.

But although these previously untried light horsemen well realised that they were engaged only in a demonstration—a form of operation in which the resolution of soldiers is generally weakest—not for an instant did any part of the two troops give ground. The shriek and explosion of the shells caused the men to scatter at the point of impact, and some of them seemed for a moment to waver, doubtful whether to retire or hold on. But they were at once steadied by the example of Nimmo and other leaders. After the second shell half-a-dozen men jumped up and ran forward to the inland side of the slope. This was a bare wheatfield, lying under the crowded rifles in the Echelon Trenches and Gun and Pine Ridges. One man was hit as he ran. A second managed to stagger and roll back amid the dust of following bullets. Three others could be seen lying there motionless until dusk.

It was immediately after this shelling that those on Bolton's observed a force of the enemy, apparently one battalion strong, moving up to reinforce the Echelon Trenches. These Turks were creeping over the open in the direction of the Balkan Pits, when Captain Trenchard's section of mountain-guns burst its shrapnel in their faces. They ran back; but after a dozen shots Trenchard was ordered to switch his guns on to the Twin Trenches, in order to subdue the heavy fire upon Major Midgley's squadron



During this respite the Turks near the Echelon Trenches again crept forward, until they reached those trenches and also the scrub very close to the Balkan Pits.


Shortly before this, Midgley, seeing that the enemy had—as was intended—been thoroughly stirred up, had ordered his advanced troops to withdraw to Green Knoll; but in consequence of the determination of the light horse to bring in all their wounded the retirement was exceedingly slow. Though the difficulties were great, they were overcome. Thus one big trooper transported a seriously wounded man down a precipitous washaway by pulling him on to his own chest and then sliding on his back head-foremost down the slope, turning himself into a sledge on which he carried his mate. So rough was the country and so great the heat that, though the force had advanced less than half-a-mile, both men and officers were already almost completely exhausted. Yet they were as deliberate in retirement as they had been swift in advance. To onlookers who anxiously waited for them to come in, they gave the impression of deliberately dawdling; ages appeared to pass before they moved from one depression to another. The men of the small rear-guard could still be seen conversing and firing occasional shots on one side of the Balkan Pits when the leading Turks had already crept to the other. When finally the rear-guard withdrew, the fire of the 6th Regiment (which had temporarily moved into the trenches of the 5th) and that of the machine-guns prevented the enemy from at once entering the pits. The last party of the 5th reached their own lines at dusk. The regiment had lost in all 24 killed; 79, including 5 officers, wounded; and 1 man made prisoner²⁰ by the Turks. In the 7th Light Horse 5 were killed and about 20 wounded, including Lieutenant Gilchrist, who died next day.²¹

²⁰ In the 5th Light Horse the officers wounded were—Capt. D. C. Cameron and G. P. Donovan; Lieuts. D. W. Rutherford, F. W. Banff, and J. G. D. McNeill. The prisoner, Sgt. M. G. Delpratt, was captured in the following way. He had been sent by Col. Harris with an urgent message bidding Midgley to retire, but missed the troops, whom Midgley had already withdrawn, and on reaching the Balkan Pits found them empty. He was there seen by the Australian machine-gunners, who mistook him for one of the enemy, and by their fire cut off his retreat. While he was in this position two Turks and a German sergeant crept to the pit from the other direction and captured him. (Cameron was of Brisbane, Q'land; Donovan, of Lismore, N.S.W.; Rutherford, Rockhampton, Q'land; Banff, Coominya, Q'land; McNeill, Moree, N.S.W.; Delpratt, of Tambourine, Jimboomba, Q'land.)

²¹ The two troops of the 7th under Capt. Richardson (of Raymond Terrace, N.S.W., afterwards Lieut.-Col. Richardson) comprised only some 70 men. Lieut. H. W. Gilchrist had been an officer of the mounted police. He was of Tamworth, N.S.W.; b. Willoughby, N.S.W., 22 Nov., 1878. Died of wounds, 29 June, 1915.

The sortie of the 9th Battalion farther north was an operation likely to be more strongly opposed. Two companies were set to advance across a valley commanded by the enemy and to assault his trench on the lower end of Snipers' Ridge and its continuation, the Knife Edge. This position was close to the strong defences of Lone Pine, of the upper end of Snipers' Ridge, and also of Pine Ridge. The enemy fire from these points was therefore to be subdued, if possible, by the other battalions of the 3rd Brigade, which would concentrate upon them all their rifles and machine-guns. In order to do this effectively, the 11th would have to send two companies forward to lie in the open on Silt Spur and Turkey Knoll, from which they could fire on Lone Pine and Snipers' Ridge.

The arrangements were very hurried. As soon as the brigadier was notified of the proposed attack he sent for the battalion commanders, to whom he explained his orders. The senior officer of the 9th—Major Campbell Robertson, who had been wounded at the Landing and who was on this day confirmed in the command of his regiment—took the commanders of two of his companies to a position whence they could see the ground over which they were to make the sortie, and there explained the plans. At this date, although the trenches of the 11th on Silt Spur were incomplete, the communication saps had been made into Allah Gully. Through these Major Walsh's²² company of the 9th was to file out across Allah Gully, turn southwards along the support trench on Silt Spur, and then, rounding the southern end of the spur, attack Snipers' Ridge.




The other company would emerge a quarter of a mile farther south through a similar sap across Poppy Valley, and would then line out on Holly Ridge, touching the south of the new Tasmania Post. Thence it would charge over Holly

²² Maj. R. H. Walsh, 9th Bn. Public servant; of East Brisbane, Q'land, b. Goondiwindi, Q'land, 5 Feb., 1874.

Gaba
Tepe

Holly
Ridge



Knife
Edge

THE TURKISH TRENCHES ON THE KNIFE EDGE NEAR THE POINT WHERE
THEY WERE ATTACKED BY THE 9TH BATTALION FROM HOLLY RIDGE
(OPPOSITE)

*Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. G2095
Taken in 1919*

Harris
Ridge.

Gaba
Tepe



VIEW SOUTHWARDS ALONG HARRIS RIDGE, SHOWING SLOPE ON WHICH
THE LIGHT HORSE ADVANCED ON 28TH JUNE, 1915

*Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. G2095
Taken in 1919*

To face p 300




MAJORS S. MIDGLEY (LEFT) AND L C WILSON (RIGHT), 5TH LIGHT
HORSE REGIMENT, ANZAC

*taken by L/Cpl K H McConnell, 5th LH Regt.
Aust War Memorial Collection No C428*

To face p. 301

Ridge, cross the steep Valley of Despair, and attack the Knife Edge. By directing itself obliquely northwards it should find the northern company upon its left.

The men of the 9th for the most part understood that they were to take the enemy's trenches if possible, but that, if it proved impossible, the matter was of no great moment, since the operation was a feint. The southern company was observed by the Turks while it was moving through the sap in Poppy Valley, which was visible from Gaba Tepe. It was thereupon shelled with shrapnel, and the crest of Holly Ridge began to be swept with heavy fire. The officer of the leading platoon ordered his men to charge "half-left," and with a certain number of them tumbled down the precipitous sides of the Valley of Despair, which they suddenly found at their feet. A few reached the foot of the valley. But the scrub was thick; the men were far apart; no others appeared. Several tried to regain their own trenches, but the hilltop behind them was now swept with fire. Some half-dozen, who gathered around their officer, stubbornly insisted, in spite of the desperate nature of their position, on firing at the enemy. Two, by name King²³ and Sullivan,²⁴ essayed to go back for reinforcements, but Sullivan was immediately killed and the other wounded. Two others fetched their comrade in and then themselves were wounded—one mortally—in vainly attempting the same errand. At the end of the afternoon five survivors and the officer were found by the Turks and made prisoners.²⁵



Only a part of the leading platoon of the southern company seems to have reached the Valley of Despair. The supporting


²³ Pte G B King (No. 1379, 9th Bn) Miner; of Charters Towers, Q'land; b. Charters Towers, 1894. Died while prisoner of war, 16 Aug., 1918.

²⁴ Pte W J. Sullivan (No. 1039, 9th Bn) Stockman; of Kalgoorlie, W. Aust.; b. Clifton Hill, Vic., 13 July, 1894. Killed in action, 28 June, 1915.

²⁵ Only three of the six men seem to have survived imprisonment in Turkey. Pte D B Creedon (of Maryborough, Q'land), whose vivid diary forms the main basis for the above narrative died at Angora in 1917.

platoons, coming into a storm of rifle- and shell-fire on Holly Ridge, did not push into the valley, but, after lying out for a time, losing heavily, were driven in before the arrival of the order to withdraw. The plan of the southern company's attack therefore failed; but the northern company of the 9th carried out its operation exactly as planned. As it moved out from the arbutus and low holly-oak at the mouth of Allah Gully, and turned eastwards to face the trenches on Snipers' Ridge, the enemy in

those trenches opened fire. The company dashed across the open bed of the valley to the foot of the ridge and laboured up the ascent towards the Turkish position. Once on the slope the men were in shelter, since the Turks above could not raise themselves over the parapet to fire down without being killed by the covering fire. When the climbing men reached a point near the enemy's parapet, they found that the trench was a



covered one; but some of the Queenslanders pushed their rifles in at the loop-holes and fired. They carried some jam-tin bombs, but so great had been the heat and strain that their clothing was soaked with sweat, and few of their matches would strike. Several bombs were finally lit and thrown on the head-cover or through the loop-holes. One man was seen to go up to the Turkish trenches and look over the parapet. and he presently brought an officer or sergeant to do the same. The Turks appear for the time being to have retreated. But since the head-cover made it difficult to occupy the trenches, the Australians remained lying outside below the parapet, where many of them could be seen eating their midday meal.

They were presently, however, observed by the enemy from a projecting position at the northern end of the ridge, and rifle-fire was turned upon them. The previously comfortable situation was rapidly converted into one of extreme danger, a deadly fire sweeping the hillside and


forcing the 9th to lie close to the slope, where many were hit. Nevertheless, since no order for withdrawal had yet arrived, the troops clung to their exposed position. The enemy's guns in the Olive Grove were now directed upon the valley immediately behind them and also upon Allah Gully, in the mouth of which Captain Graham Butler, the medical officer, had his dressing-station. All this was observed by the brigade commander, Colonel MacLagan, who, watching the fight from the old firing line directly opposite, perceived that the advanced troops were now being subjected to a deadly fusillade. There was not a tremor in the line, and at least one stretcher-bearer could be seen walking calmly about the fire-swept area attending to the wounded and carrying man after man into safety.²⁶ About this time MacLagan was warned by the 1st Brigade farther north that the Turks were moving troops behind the Pine, apparently for a counter-attack. This development—the engaging of the enemy's local reserve—was precisely what the Anzac commanders were hoping for,²⁷ and MacLagan, rightly judging that no more could be usefully accomplished, obtained leave from the divisional commander to withdraw the troops. By his orders Major Walsh's company retired from the position which it had maintained for two hours. As it passed through the valleys in front of the line, it was shelled from the Olive Grove, and followed by a heavy fire from the Pine. About one-half of its men had by that time been hit. Nevertheless, carrying its wounded through the thick undergrowth—Graham Butler himself shouldering one desperately wounded officer—it withdrew in good order up Allah Gully.

Simultaneously with the first advance of the 9th, Leane's and Drake Brockman's companies of the 11th had moved out to Turkey Knoll and Silt Spur, in order to be able thence to cover the advance of the 9th immediately south of them

²⁶ This man, Pte G E Latimer (of Collingwood, Vic), 2nd Field Ambulance, was killed during the afternoon. Bearers of the field ambulance were not supposed to work beyond the regimental aid-posts, but Latimer had determined, in consequence of some trouble with the authorities, to win the Victoria Cross or die in the attempt. At any later period of the war his reckless bravery would doubtless have gained him this coveted distinction, but until after the Battle of Lone Pine the Australian commanders, as far as is known, recommended only one man for the Victoria Cross.

²⁷ It is now known that three lines of reserve troops, hastily gathered, were at the end of the afternoon assembled on the hidden slope of Snipers' Ridge, where they waited for the attack to develop further.

The order to the men was simply "to get out in front, line the ridge, and lie down." The right company, Drake Brockman's, whose objective was Silt Spur, sent out first a small covering party to beat down the Turkish fire, the rest of the company following. But the whole side of the plateau, from which Silt Spur protruded like a buttress, lay bare to the guns in the Olive Grove, and these were shelling its summit before even the covering party reached it. Under this fire the company took up its intended position. Turkey Knoll, to which Leane's company had been hastily directed, was being swept even more heavily by shrapnel and high-explosive shells, while sniping and machine-gun fire from every trench from the Pine to Gun Ridge made it utterly untenable. As Lieutenant Macdonald led out the first wave, a Turkish shell carried away his shoulder and arm. Many of his men fell killed or wounded, and the first line was driven in. Lieutenant Parry²⁸ then took charge, and an attempt was made to reach the knoll by a *détour* under cover of Silt Spur. A few men reached a point near the enemy's trenches in the neighbourhood of the knoll, but all were killed, Parry himself being shot dead by a sniper. Captain La Nauze,²⁹ commanding the reserve platoon, was killed by a shell. Leane himself and Lieutenant Kelly³⁰ were wounded. A portion of the company lay out behind what cover it could find, and sniped at the enemy's trenches, but none of its foremost troops ever returned. Even from Drake Brockman's line lower down word was constantly passed back asking whether something could not be done to suppress the machine-guns on the Pine. The support trench on Silt Spur became filled with wounded men. Drake Brockman twice sent reinforcements to the firing line, himself taking some of them to his left near the knoll and



²⁸ Lieut H L Parry; 11th Bn Civil servant; of Guildford, W Aust.; b. Albany, W Aust., 1890. Killed in action, 28 June, 1915.

²⁹ Capt C A La Nauze; 11th Bn Bank accountant; of Boulder, W Aust; b. Mauritius, 16 Sept., 1882. Killed in action, 28 June, 1915.

³⁰ Capt. H C. Kelly, 51st Bn. Public servant; of Perth, W Aust; b Ipswich, Q'land, 24 Aug., 1895.

planting them, one here, one there, behind any cover he could find. The enemy, probably seeing the reinforcements, opened more heavily, bursting the shrapnel low down over the backs of the men. Lieutenant Farr³¹ passed the word to dig in—an order which some brave men questioned, probably imagining that their duty was to charge farther and support the 9th. About 4 p.m., after the 9th had been withdrawn, those of the 11th who still remained out were likewise recalled. It was at about this time that the brigadiers were informed from corps headquarters that the object of the demonstration had been attained, and were ordered to withdraw their troops, or, at their discretion, to retain the positions occupied. But, as constantly occurred in such cases, this discretion had already been exercised an hour previously by commanders nearer to the fighting, and the troops engaged in each sortie were already on their way back to their own trenches.

The two companies of the 9th had 37 men killed and 62 wounded; those of the 11th, 21 killed and 42 wounded. The chief result of the "demonstration" had been to puzzle and embitter the troops engaged in it. The operation had been the most trying yet experienced, and they reasonably doubted whether any useful purpose had been served. As Walsh's company of the 9th filed back into its trenches the men passed their brigadier, who, though a British officer, understood well the character of Australian troops. One growled: "What sort of —— business is this—sending us out there and bringing us back again?" MacLagan interrupted him. "I'll tell you why they sent you out, my lad. It was in order to help your mates down south." "Just as well there was some —— reason," said the Queenslander as he passed on. But the man who followed him took the trouble to explain to MacLagan that the growler had three bullets through him and had refused to go to the medical officer to have his wounds dressed. Another, by name Bailey,³² who had already carried in a wounded man from Snipers' Ridge, returned to fetch a second, whose position

³¹ Capt T A L Farr, 13th Fld Coy Engrs. Junior assistant engineer, of Cottosloe, W. Aust.; b. London, 13 June, 1894.

³² Lieut L H Bailey, M M; 9th Bn Steward; b. Hackney, London, 1895.

he knew. He found him dead, but, having heard it mentioned that, according to a standing order, the rifles of the dead should have been brought back, busied himself in searching for rifles near such bodies as he could see, and brought in four. Several others³³ went out on their own initiative, and could be seen—one of them in a blue Australian jersey—strolling about the far hillside on the same errand. On one of these men being hit, his mates sat down by him, bandaged him up, and brought him in, together with several rifles.³⁴

Thus ended the second "demonstration" made by the Anzac troops. As on June 4th, if the thrust which was being made at Helles could be imperilled by Turkish reserves arriving eight hours later from Anzac, some such feint had necessarily to be made; but it is probably no less true that nothing which was planned or achieved at Helles on this later occasion could have been appreciably affected by the Anzac demonstration. The feint—which was continued during the night by the preconcerted burning of flares, as if to signal the launching of an attack, and by the blowing of whistles and showing of bayonets above the parapet—unquestionably made the enemy apprehensive of a new local assault. The Turkish staff even believed that some of the trenches on Snipers' Ridge, which were deserted by their garrison, had been captured by the Australians. As a counter-measure, some of the battalions in rest behind the line appear to have been moved up. Had these been consumed, a call would doubtless then have been made on the reserves of the zone; but it is improbable that the demonstration affected the movement of any Turkish soldier outside the 16th Division and 77th Regiment, the normal garrison of the threatened sector. It is true that, if the enemy had contemplated despatching part of the normal garrison to Helles, the demonstration might have checked him. But since that garrison then numbered only some 16,000, such a proceeding was not likely, and it could certainly have been prevented by some pretence of activity far less costly and trying than this operation, which some both of the light

³³ Pte G R Gray (of Murgon, Q'land), returned to Snipers' Ridge and brought in some of the equipment of the dead

³⁴ On Turkey Knoll or Silt Spur, where the 11th Bn had been fighting, such action would have meant instant death. But the stretcher-bearers of the 11th spent the evening in crawling to the summit of those prominences, where some of the wounded had been left, rolling them on to stretchers, and dragging them in

horse and the infantry regarded as the most unpleasant undertaken by them during the war. Unfortunately the hour at which the order arrived from G.H.Q. had left no time for deliberation; and for that delay an exaggerated regard for secrecy was probably responsible.³⁵

It so chanced that the demonstration caused the enemy to postpone for twenty-four hours a serious attack which he had intended to make during the night of June 28th. This plan had been suggested, not by Essad Pasha, the commander of the zone, but by Mustafa Kemal Bey, whose division lay across the northern half of the Anzac front, on Baby 700 and the end of Monash Valley. Kemal appears to have realised what the Anzac staff recognised about the same time—that, although Quinn's was by far the weakest position in the line, it was not

the most important; since, even if the enemy were to seize it, the immediate evacuation of the Anzac line would not necessarily follow. On the other hand, if the enemy attacked at The Nek and advanced only 300 yards upon Russell's Top, he would on the one side have the North Beach and the Anzac anchorage under his rifles, and on the other would look straight into the back of all the posts along Monash Valley. If he could hold



— Australian Line T Top
 ⇔ Projected attack

that position, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps would be forced to withdraw, if it could, from the Peninsula, and would probably be crushed in making the attempt.

Mustafa Kemal's plan had been partly suggested by the arrival of an especially fine regiment, which he believed might be capable of carrying it out. This was the 18th, commanded by a particularly brave and distinguished officer from Constantinople, who was idolised by his troops. On reaching Anzac it had been attached to the 19th Division, and Kemal thought that the high spirit both of the men and of their

³⁵ Early in the war regular staffs were sometimes apprehensive lest the hurriedly enlisted "new armies" (such as the A.I.F.) might not merely prove over-talkative, but might contain paid agents of the enemy.

leader justified him in throwing it into a difficult but vitally important operation. He had accordingly placed it in the line on Baby 700 and the Chessboard, with the object of launching it a few days later from The Nek against Russell's Top. To enable his men to file safely and secretly to the starting-point, he devised a tunnelled approach to the Turkish position at The Nek, but through lack of mining skill this passage was not ready in time. Shortly after arrival the gallant commander of the 18th was killed while visiting his line,³⁰ but though his loss was seriously felt, the plans were unchanged.

Whether by chance or design Kemal decided to make this attack during a visit of Enver Pasha, the Minister for War, to Anzac, and had fixed upon the night of June 28th. But during the afternoon of that day there occurred the sortie of the 1st Australian Division,³¹ and, being apprehensive of further attack, the enemy postponed his assault for twenty-four hours.

The night of June 29th fell very dark, and at 9.30 there burst upon Anzac a wild gust of wind preceding a thunder-storm. From the tracks and shelves behind the lines, long since trampled to powder by the constant passage of men, the dust was swept in dense clouds towards the Turks, together with everything the gale could carry, including numbers of whirling newspapers. At that moment a heavy fire was opened by the Turks. "It's this wind," said Major Ross to his brigadier at 3rd Brigade Headquarters, as the spent bullets whipped here and there into Shell Green. "They can't see,

³⁰ Strangely enough, although little was then known by the Anzac staff of any changes in the Turkish regiments holding the line (no Turkish prisoners having been captured since the last fighting at Quinn's), the death of this officer had been noted by the 7th Bn. Towards the end of June the snipers of the 7th, lying out in the morning at Jackson's Post—a point on the southern shoulder of Steele's from which they could shoot up Monash Valley—remarked a Turkish officer who daily visited the enemy's position at the head of the valley. He wore the soft Turkish helmet and blue uniform with gold braid, and he came every morning to the trenches opposite Pope's, where he daily went through the following routine: nodded to the men (the Australian observers said that through the telescope "they could see his white teeth when he smiled"), borrowed a rifle from a Turkish sniper, rested it on the parapet, and fired a shot or two down the valley. Such a proceeding made him an obvious mark for snipers, and, after watching him for several days, those of the 7th made special preparations. One of them was a prizeman at rifle meetings at Ballarat. Two others had match rifles and pin-hole sights, and beside them were several observers with telescopes. As usual, the Turkish officer came along. He was leaning over the parapet for his first shot, when an Australian bullet struck the dust a little ahead of him. He must have seen it, but he nestled down to his aim. A second bullet hit the earth behind him, but he continued aiming. At the third shot the gallant officer threw up his hands, dropped his rifle, and fell forward.

³¹ The prisoners captured (see p. 301) were taken that night before Enver Pasha

and they think we're attacking." Making his way to the line, he told the men of the 12th to add to the enemy's confusion by cheering. In some other sectors the troops were doing the same on their own initiative, and the answer came in wild outbursts from the enemy's rifles and machine-guns.³⁸

The Anzac troops had rightly estimated the effect of the storm upon the Turkish garrison. When any strange phenomenon of nature occurs in war-time—as, for example, the oncoming of a tempest or the reddening of the sky above some great fire—the first instinct of any troops who are under strain is to suspect that the noise or glare may herald some new and unknown devilry of the enemy. On this occasion it chanced that the Anzac troops had been ordered to make, about the same hour, a demonstration with flares and shouting. The star-shells of the Indian mountain-battery set fire to the scrub near Lone Pine. The flares and coloured lights shone luridly through the fog of whirling dust. The result was that even level-headed and experienced officers among the Turks were tricked for a moment into imagining that a mine had been exploded, or that the dust was an artificial device. The Turkish mountain-batteries opened from Scrubby Knoll and Mortar Ridge,³⁹ and it is probable that Kemal, knowing what was planned for the morning—though the secret was still kept from most of his subordinates—was rendered anxious by the sudden uproar. In any case urgent inquiries as to its meaning were telephoned to the front-line battalions of the 57th Regiment at the Turkish Quinn's and at German Officers'. The commander of the latter post⁴⁰ was answering the call, when there came to him an orderly with a report from one of his front-line companies to the effect that "the Australians were advancing by leaps and bounds." The subaltern who sent this message was known to be excitable, and the post-commander, in forwarding it, added that he did not believe the report, since both sides were firing, and the "English" could not both fire and attack at the same time. Going forward himself in order to report, he found that there was no cause for alarm. Australian

³⁸ Australian patrols which were out that night, as on June 28, searching for the bodies or weapons of those killed or wounded in the demonstration, were prevented by the volume of this fire from approaching the hillcrests.

³⁹ They had standing orders, in the event of attack, to lay down a barrage in front of Lone Pine, the Jolly, or German Officers'.

⁴⁰ Zeki Bey, commanding 1-57th Regt.


newspapers were still careering wildly past, and his men collected a few and gave them to him. With these strange packets of news from the other end of the world under his arm, he returned to find that in the meantime an order had arrived which had been written down by his adjutant:—

If the Australians attack, you are to charge out and meet them in No-Man's Land with the bayonet.

He telephoned back that nothing of importance had occurred—merely a thunder-storm. A few minutes later came a telephone message from Hairi Bey, commander of the 3/57th at Turkish Quinn's. "We have been ordered to attack," he said. "Be prepared to help us in an hour or two with your enfilade fire in case we need it." The commandant of German Officers', referring at once to the regimental headquarters at Mortar Ridge, learned for the first time that the 18th Regiment was to deliver an attack that night at the head of Monash Valley, and that the 57th was at the same time to make a feint from the Turkish Quinn's.

In consequence of this secrecy the arrangements for the Turkish demonstration were at least as hurried as those of the Australians on the previous day. It was extremely difficult for the Turks to launch even a feint from their solidly-roofed trenches at Quinn's. Moreover the experienced soldiers in the Turkish post had the same dread of that fatal crest as did the Anzac troops. Hurried instructions, however, were issued to the garrison to lift the head-cover from below, and, when the time came, attempt an assault upon Quinn's.

For the main attack upon Russell's Top nothing approaching an effective bombardment could be planned, the Turkish artillery being insufficient and largely out of date. But about midnight the fire of two 75-mm. guns on the main ridge was for twenty minutes concentrated upon the Top, and was followed by a heavy fusillade of rifles and machine-guns from the Turks at Quinn's




and German Officers'. When this died away, the 18th Regiment advanced. As it charged from The Nek, the Turkish posts far down the line could hear the cries of "Allah! Allah!" and they were shortly afterwards informed that it had taken the first line of English trenches, capturing two machine-guns, and had reached the second line, into which some of the men had penetrated. From that time on no further news arrived. The distant shouts, which at first (says a Turkish commander) had seemed "joyous," changed to sounds of tragedy. What appeared to be balls of fire were being thrown out by the "English," and these, it seemed, lay burning in rear of the attackers, preventing both them from returning and others from reinforcing them.

On this night Enver Pasha was still at Essad's headquarters on Scrubby Knoll. He was inclined to be displeased with the whole project, not seeing what useful object was to be gained. But Mustafa Kemal was convinced that the results which must follow from the seizure of Russell's Top, and, if possible, of Plugge's Plateau, made the attempt worth while. When the first report came in, it was immediately forwarded by him to Enver. But as the night wore on, and no confirming news arrived, the Minister for War grew sceptical. He asked Kemal to let him see the captured machine-guns; but from the front came nothing but the rattle of musketry and the cries of the wounded on The Nek, amid whom each side was now rolling out flares of tow, which lay flickering between the lines. A battalion and a half of the 18th had simply advanced and disappeared, leaving their trenches empty behind them. The few who had returned brought some half-understood tale about having fallen into trap-doors, and finding themselves in an excavation among men of the enemy. Kemal now exhibited the usual anxiety lest his opponents might counter-attack while the Turkish trenches at The Nek were practically unoccupied. He appears to have gone forward in person from his headquarters near Battleship Hill, hurrying his reserves into the vacant trenches.

What had happened to the attack was this. The Anzac trenches on the Top were at this time held by two regiments of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade—the 9th on the seaward


portion, including Walker's Ridge and about half of the trenches facing The Nek; the 8th holding the inland half, including the edge of Monash Valley overlooking Pope's and the Chessboard. The forward saps, which had been incomplete on May 19th, now formed the firing line, and others had been extended from them. These were now very close to the enemy's line, and one of them, running through the scrub to the seaward cliff, had been dug as a "secret sap"—that is to say, the excavated earth had been carried away to the rear, no parapet being thrown up, and the sap being therefore merely a deep gutter winding through the scrub and invisible at a few yards' distance. Other saps, partly open, partly tunnelled, were being driven towards the enemy's line, which was now at one point only twenty yards distant.




It had been a disturbed night, the Australian demonstration, increased in its effect by the storm, having caused outbursts of heavy firing. The troops at Russell's Top, however, were unaware of any threat, since the enemy's midnight bombardment had not fallen heavily on the front line, the shells mostly passing overhead. The outburst of rifle-fire at 12.30 occurred lower down on the right, opposite Quinn's or Courtney's. But, as it died, the garrison of Russell's observed Turks approaching the advanced saps.

In the saps on the right half of the front there were only thirty-eight men of the 8th Light Horse under Captain Hore, with another thirty-eight in the support trenches; but their reliefs were on the way to the firing line when the clamour of "Allah!" arose and the enemy appeared beside Sap No. 2, the tunnelled head of which ran directly towards The Nek. The enemy threw bombs into the open portion, killing or wounding a number of the 8th Light Horse and causing others to recoil, some forward into the tunnel, where a few engineers were working, and others towards the main trenches. Turks leapt into the sap; Major McLaurin, counter-attacking at once with

a handful of the 8th, bombed some of them out,⁴¹ but the main defence lay in sheer good and rapid shooting. The Australians who had been cut off in the tunnel were released. One of the saps was held single-handed by a light horseman named Sanderson,⁴² who, after his three companions had been killed or wounded by the enemy's bombs, killed two Turks who leapt into it, and defended the sap until the enemy had been driven back.



Other Turks, from the northern end of The Nek, charging between No. 2 Sap and the cliff overlooking the sea, stumbled suddenly upon the secret sap. This was not yet used as a fire-trench and was therefore guarded only by some dozen men of the 9th, distributed at wide intervals in groups of three or four. The advancing Turks dropped into it, killing one of the men,⁴³ while the remainder recoiled to the flank. The enemy then occupied more than half the sap, and about fifty Turks crossed it and pushed on in the direction of Walker's Ridge and of the two machine-guns of the 9th, which were stationed on a prominence at the cliff's edge, known as "Turks' Point." Doubtless it was at this stage that they sent back the messages of success.



But the success was short-lived. Revolver in hand, Major Reynell,⁴⁴ the second-in-command of the 9th, conducted a

⁴¹ Capt. Hore had already entered one of the tunnels and shot a Turk in it. Lieut.-Col. A. McG. McLaurin commanded 8th L.H. Regt., 1917/18. He died on 23 Nov., 1918.

⁴² Pte. B. Sanderson (No. 329, 8th L.H. Regt.) Butcher; of Benalla, Vic; b Echuca, Vic, 1888.


⁴³ Pte. J. L. Hopping (of Caltowie, S. Aust.), 9th L.H. Regt.

⁴⁴ Lieut.-Col. C. Reynell. Commanded 9th L.H. Regt., 1915. Vigneron and wine-maker; of Reynella, S. Aust.; b Rostrevor, Magill, S. Aust., 16 Sept., 1883. Killed in action, 28 August., 1915.

party of his men up a communication sap leading into the secret sap, and, exchanging shots with the enemy at three yards' distance, drove them from the junction. Sergeant Sullivan,⁴⁵ carrying on the attack with bombs, cleared the remainder of the trench. A party of the 9th had by then reinforced No. 2 Sap, from which, firing at right angles to the secret sap, they swept its front at short range.

The garrison of the secret sap was now increased to forty-five men. The fifty Turks who had crossed it were thus completely cut off, though probably neither they nor the Australians in the secret sap were aware of the fact.

The Turks must then have been lying quietly in the scrub between the sap and Walker's Ridge, for it was not until 2 a.m., half-an-hour after the sap had been recaptured, that they were again heard of. At that hour a Turk suddenly rose from the bushes at Turks' Point and bayoneted one of the 9th in the detached



machine-gun post. He was actually reaching for one of the machine-guns when the sergeant in charge of it, having no time to turn it upon him, seized a rifle and shot him. Most of the enemy then fled, and were cut down by the machine-guns; but a few, who had passed Turks' Point, wandered into a gully which adjoined Walker's Ridge and was guarded only by a sentry group. Two of the light horsemen in the group were asleep, when the third, who was on guard, fell on top of them, in holts with a Turk whom he had endeavoured to bayonet. This Turk was captured, but his comrades escaped into the dark. The news that some of the enemy were at large within the lines caused the adjutant of the 9th, Captain Wieck,⁴⁶ hurriedly to gather parties from regimental headquarters and place them to guard the summit of Walker's


⁴⁵ Sgt H. Sullivan (No. 72, 9th L.H. Regt). Orchardist, of Blackwood, S Aust; b. Blackwood, 3 Sept, 1886. Died while prisoner of war, 11 Feb., 1917.

⁴⁶ Col G F G Wieck, D.S.O., O.B.E. G.S.O. (2), 3rd Aust Div., 1917/18, G.S.O. (1), 1st Aust. Div., 1918. Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces, of Brisbane, b. Brisbane, 18 Aug., 1881.

Ridge and the old 6-inch howitzer which was stationed there, while half a squadron was sent to Turks' Point.

Meanwhile, on the centre and right of this narrow front, the enemy, though coming on with great gallantry, had not driven home his charge by leaping into the trenches and using the bayonet—a feat which, in truth, though much written of, was hardly ever possible until the trenches had first been almost cleared by shooting or bombing from the parapet. On this occasion the Turks flung themselves down outside the trenches and lay firing over the parapet until one by one they were killed. Facing them the Australian supports, since there was no suitable second trench on Russell's Top, lay out in the open, firing from behind the main line. This could be done without undue risk, since, as soon as the enemy's advance had begun, practically all his small arms and artillery had become silent. The only fire which disturbed the light horse was that of a machine-gun far down in German Officers' Trench, which endeavoured to cover the advancing Turks by sprinkling its bullets in front of them. The moon was shining, and in the light of the flares⁴⁷ thrown from the front line the figures of the enemy were easily visible. Under these conditions the Australians fired practically as they pleased, and the attack, which appeared to come in three waves, withered before them.

Shortly after the first charge a part of the Turkish attack was observed from Pope's Hill retiring into the head of Monash Valley, and then advancing again in the shelter of that hollow. One party attempted to creep forward close beneath the edge of Russell's Top, as if intending to pass below the trenches of the 8th Light Horse and to climb on to the Top again in rear of them. It was detected by the 8th and driven back with bombs, while the larger party withdrew to its trenches, after being fired on by the machine-guns on Pope's and by part of the 2nd



⁴⁷ Tow dipped in kerosene.

Light Horse, which Lieutenant-Colonel Stodart⁴⁸ had moved into that branch of the valley.⁴⁹

The attack of the 18th Turkish Regiment, though most gallantly delivered, had by 2 a.m. been everywhere defeated. About the first break of dawn another wave emerged, but was met by fire from the saps and also from the machine-guns at Turks' Point, which caught some of the enemy on the horizon, and subsequently caused heavy loss among others who were streaming down Baby 700 to reinforce their front.⁵⁰

At the time of the original assault the demonstration from the Turkish Quinn's was not carried out strictly as ordered. Hairi Bey, commanding the 3/57th, was an officer well trusted by Mustafa Kemal, but on this occasion he took the view that his instructions were impossible of fulfilment. There was no time to remove the heavy planking of the head-cover, and at 12.30 the 3/57th appears to have merely opened a heavy fusillade. At the time of the second attack, however, the order was literally obeyed,⁵¹ the head-cover being prised up and Turkish soldiers emerging opposite the southern end of Quinn's. They were completely exposed at short range to the garrison of Pope's, and were at once shot down. Neither demonstration had the least influence on the course of the action upon Russell's Top.

For the enemy it was, as one of them afterwards said, "a black night." It is true that Enver Pasha, in addressing the 18th Regiment, assured the men that their gallant charge had been "most useful in engaging the attention of the English at a critical moment."⁵² Nevertheless daylight had found the men of that fine regiment scattered over those deadly

⁴⁸ Brigadier R. M. Stodart, V.D. Commanded 2nd L.H. Regt., 1914/15 Merchant; of Kangaroo Point, Q'land, b. Brisbane, 14 Sept., 1879.

⁴⁹ The machine-guns, at Pope's, an excellent unit under a Duntroon graduate, Lieut. J. R. Broadbent (of Corowa, N.S.W.), constantly performed high service. The 2nd L.H. Regt. was local reserve to Pope's, which was held by the 1st. Earlier in the night, while the 2nd, roused by an outburst of Turkish firing, was standing to arms in the valley behind Pope's, Maj. A. W. Nash (of Gympie, Q'land) was killed and Capt. Birkbeck wounded by a chance shot.

⁵⁰ Probably part of the reserves hurried forward by Mustafa Kemal. According to some accounts, there occurred in Monash Valley also, at dawn, an incursion of 250 of the enemy, while a further fifty crept forward beneath the edge of the Top. This looks like another version of the story already related, and is not mentioned in the official report of the fight.

⁵¹ Possibly in consequence of insistence on the part of Mustafa Kemal.

⁵² This statement the Turks—unlike the more cynical Australian troops, who about the same time were receiving a similar assurance concerning their demonstration of June 28—seem to have accepted at its face value.

heights. While the light horse had lost only 7 killed and 19 wounded, over 100 of the enemy lay dead in one half of the field; it is probable that 200 of the 18th Regiment were killed, and three times that number wounded. As often happened, there were also in No-Man's Land many uninjured Turks, who, when daylight came, tried to crawl back from positions in which they had lain firing. Numbers of these were shot, but efforts were subsequently made to assist some who lay wounded and dying between the lines.⁵³

The fighting at the end of June left the enemy "nervy." Upon the bursting of another thunderstorm over Anzac after dusk on June 30th, his bullets swept in sheets through the harmless rain-showers. Some of his infantry were under the additional strain of knowing that the Anzac tunnellers were in many places approaching his trenches, under or near which several mines had already been exploded. But the most depressing influence of all was probably the news from Helles, where the fighting at this stage was the heaviest in the campaign. Although the success of the British and French had been but partial, Liman von Sanders' policy forced the Turks to attempt again and again the recapture of all lost ground. It was these costly counter-attacks which they afterwards remembered with the greatest horror.

The nervousness of the enemy at this period was evidenced by his reply to the demonstrations which, since the end of May, had been made almost nightly with a view to causing him to waste rifle ammunition.⁵⁴ At pre-arranged hours the garrison of some part of the Anzac line would open rapid fire and cheer, or show its bayonets above the edge of the trenches, the infantry officers blowing whistles and shouting orders, while flares were lighted and the mountain-guns occasionally fired star-shell. At first these ruses had drawn

⁵³ From Pope's there could be seen high on the side of Russell's Top one wounded man who waved a crumpled newspaper. A few others, obviously wounded, endeavoured to struggle towards the nearest assistance. There was no special need for the securing of prisoners for information, since eight prisoners had been taken—among them Armenians, who gave all the information desired. But, learning of the plight of some of the wounded, Captain the Hon. Aubrey Herbert (*see p 165*), a gallant and chivalrous British officer, after getting an interpreter to shout an explanation to those of the enemy who were within earshot, walked out in front of The Nek at the imminent risk of his life to bring in one terribly wounded Turk. Having succeeded, he next went up to Monash Valley to search for the other who had waved the newspaper; but when he called, no answer came, the man being probably dead.


⁵⁴ The enemy's supply was suspected to be short; but, while there were good grounds for this suspicion, the shortage was never sufficiently acute to affect his operations.

heavy fire, lasting sometimes for a quarter of an hour, but the response had quickly decreased, the Turkish commanders issuing orders that their troops were not to reply. Nevertheless, upon Birdwood's insistence, the demonstrations had been continued. They came to be perfunctory affairs, the troops imagining, often with reason, that the Turks laughed at them. Yet when any state of tension existed, as at the end of June and the beginning of July, the enemy seldom failed to respond.

On July 12th there was launched at Helles the last of the series of major attacks made by the allies during that period of heavy fighting. As before, the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was required to detain the enemy at Anzac by making a demonstration. The hour of the attack at Helles was 7.30 a.m., and on this occasion the information reached Anzac at 7 on the previous evening. The plans of the Army Corps, drawn up during the night, were designed to make a striking show of attack but to avoid the needless loss incurred on June 28th. As before, the activity was to be on the southern half of the front. There the 1st Australian Division was to simulate attack from its centre against Johnston's Jolly and Lone Pine; but no men were to be actually moved beyond their front line except at the extreme southern flank, on Harris and Holly Ridges, and very few even there. The plan was simple. There now existed in that sector, as has been explained, three posts in advance of the old firing line—Tasmania Post, near the northern end of Holly Ridge; Rylie's Post, held by the 7th Light Horse, farther south on that ridge; and Chatham's Post on Harris Ridge. The ways of communication to these posts were largely underground, and therefore invisible to the enemy. It was now arranged to send lines of men out over the parapet of the old trenches opposite the two positions first named, as if attacking, but on reaching the gully they were to come back through the interior of the hill by way of the tunnels and covered approaches which opened in Poppy Valley. They would thus be exposed only during their movement down Bolton's Hill. Simultaneously, however, two small "covering" parties were to be sent out actually in advance of the foremost line, from Tasmania and Rylie's

Posts respectively, in order to drive back any outlying troops of the enemy.

These two small parties, as it turned out, suffered almost all the casualties of the operation. The whole movement began at 8.15 a.m., commencing with a short bombardment by the artillery, which had already shelled the Jolly and Lone Pine at dawn. Two waves of the 6th and 7th Light Horse issued over the parapet at the southern end of Bolton's, and several waves of the 12th Battalion farther north. At the same time two troops of the 6th and 7th Light Horse advanced as "covering" party from Ryrie's, and an officer and twenty men of the 12th from Tasmania Post. In the main trenches in rear bayonets began to be shown, and movements of troops were made evident.



The response of the enemy surprised everyone by its promptness. His machine-guns and rifles opened almost instantly both on the covering parties and on the old front line. So strong was the fire which began to skim the parapet on Bolton's after the two first lines of light horse had left that the third was wisely held back. Within three minutes after the advance of the covering parties Turkish shells began to fall on the southern one, and within five minutes they were raining upon Tasmania Post. The whole southern end of the position was sharply bombarded for nearly two hours. Meanwhile the enemy had rushed his supports into the Pine Ridge and neighbouring trenches. The clear inference was that the previous feint had caused him to increase his vigilance upon the southern flank.

The results of this preparedness fell mainly on the two small parties of Australians which were in advance of the line. Of the northern party, Lieutenant Weavers⁵⁵ and 13 of his 20 men were wounded. They were withdrawn by 9.15. The southern party of the

⁵⁵ Col T E Weavers, O B E; 12th Bn. Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces; of Hobart; b. Hobart, 31 Jan. 1892

6th Light Horse under Lieutenant Ferguson,⁶⁶ which lay out under particularly heavy shrapnel fire, lost 4 men killed and 11 wounded, and was withdrawn at 8.40, carrying its wounded. Sharp loss was also suffered by a small part of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, which was engaged in an active operation, to be described in the next chapter, at German Officers' Trench. But the remainder of the troops, although they made a great show of preparing to attack, were hardly exposed to danger. The chief artifice, by which line after line went over the parapet and then withdrew through tunnels, has been described, but many others were employed along all the southern half of the line. At several points the units made use of the device by which a few stage soldiers create in the theatre the appearance of a legion. The 5th Light Horse, by marching one party constantly round the trenches at one end of their communication sap on Bolton's and another party similarly at its mouth in the gully below, made it appear that men were being poured continuously on to Harris Ridge. Farther south on the same ridge bodies of light horsemen advanced in full view along the seaward slope as far as certain rifle-pits, withdrew quietly, and again went forward ostentatiously. On Bolton's, where a few yards of the 9th Battalion's parapet had been tumbled into the trench by shell-fire, some of the men of one company with bayonets fixed were set to run over the heap of earth, partially exposing themselves to view, then doubling back through a circle of communication trenches, and many times repeating the manoeuvre. This called down heavy fire, which did nothing worse than shattering three rifles. By these means preparations for an attack were counterfeited opposite all the Turkish front from German Officers' southwards; yet, exclusive of the covering parties, the whole loss of the two brigades which participated most actively was 2 killed and 7 wounded.

Far from embittering the troops, the ingenious plans of this demonstration amused and encouraged them. Whether its other results were valuable may be doubted. It certainly caused the enemy to move up his immediate reserves on the southern flank and to retain them in or near the trenches during the morning. But it also convinced the Turkish troops, and

⁶⁶ Maj G. A. Ferguson, 6th L H Regt Wool classer; of Mosman, N S W.; b Dubbo, N S W., 12 Feb., 1887

possibly some of their commanders, that they had succeeded in repelling a serious attack. Consequently, in the words of an enemy officer, the operations—especially those at German Officers' to be related in the next chapter—"did much to encourage the Turks." Indeed, so widely was this small success noised and celebrated in the Turkish Army that intelligent Turks inferred that it was being purposely exaggerated in order to offset the daily arrival in Constantinople of shiploads of wounded men full of distressing reports from Helles.

It chanced that the day of the allied attack was also the first day of the Mohammedan fast of Ramadan. It had been anticipated that the fervour of the Turkish soldiers might during this month be turned to account, and the British Intelligence Staff had warned the troops of the possibility of an attack by the enemy. But several days had passed without any sign of Turkish activity, when there arrived from G.H.Q. important news. A secret report, to which for certain reasons especial credence was attached, had been received to the effect that a Turkish force 100,000 strong was being collected for a final attack upon the allies in the Peninsula. During the following week further information was supplied: that, at a council of war, held on July 11th on the steamer *General*, final arrangements had been made for the attack; that 50,000 of the additional troops were reinforcing the divisions already in Gallipoli, and the remainder were concentrating at Uzun Keupru; that, when these were brought to the Peninsula, a "giant attack" would be made by land forces and submarines, the signal for which was to be "the crossing of a small boat over the straits." "Gas, inflammable liquids, and all possible means" of dislodging the allies were to be employed; and chemicals for these were arriving in Constantinople. It was added that big guns were being brought to the Dardanelles; that the railways were crowded with moving troops; finally, that a party of 145 distinguished visitors, including religious and political leaders and journalists, was being conducted to the Peninsula to witness the operations.⁵⁷ The reports were to some extent confirmed by Turkish prisoners captured at this time, who made vague reference to the arrival at the

⁵⁷ Generally, in all the armies, parties of journalists and other visitors were "shown round" the front only at times when operations had been temporarily ended or were proceeding with assured success; they were rigidly excluded when an offensive was imminent.


straits of a consignment of gas-bombs. Moreover, parties of men, some in white and others in diverse dress and head-gear—evidently the visitors—were seen at both Anzac and Helles.

Although poison gas had not been employed by either side in this campaign, and although Turkish officers, both among prisoners and among the delegates who arranged the armistice of May 24th, expressed either sincere or affected disgust at its employment by the Germans, yet such professions could not, of course, justify any relaxation of precautions on the part of the British. The early form of anti-gas respirators had been issued to the troops, and there had lately arrived a consignment of "helmets"—cloth hoods saturated with an anti-gas solution. Their number was at first insufficient for the whole force, but they were sent to the different sectors to be kept for distribution to front-line troops when an attack was probable. Instructions had also been circulated setting forth the somewhat desperate measures by which in the early days of gas warfare the allies endeavoured to meet this unexpected form of attack. For example, the troops were informed that a gas-cloud could be partly dispersed by firing heavily into it, or by locating the enemy's gas-cylinders and throwing bombs at them, or by burning flares of tow and brushwood upon the parapet to create an upward draught.

When the first message concerning an impending offensive was received at Anzac, a warning order was issued and the gas-helmets were distributed to the men. The secret underground line of the 1st Australian Division was converted, as already described, into an obstacle, and the heads of two tunnels, D9A and D25R, which were known to be near German Officers' Trench, were charged and tamped ready for firing. Plans were also made to meet the possibility of the enemy precluding his attack by a systematic bombardment such as he had lately laid upon Courtney's and Steele's, causing much loss and placing a strain upon the garrison. Although the bombardment preceding an attack would probably be still more severe, it was obvious that the enemy would not advance so long as his shells were actually falling on the trenches which he intended to capture. There would be an interval, if only of seconds, before his attack emerged. Instructions were therefore issued that, if any section of the line should be

heavily bombarded, the men holding it were to be temporarily withdrawn to the flanks and rear, where they were to remain prepared to reoccupy their trenches the moment the bombardment ceased. Lastly, as a precaution against surprise, each night, at intervals after the set of the moon, a mountain-gun was to burst a star-shell at the back of German Officers' and the Jolly, so that Legge Valley might be periodically illuminated.

The reported movements of certain Turkish regiments made it appear probable that, if directed to Anzac, they would reach it between July 21st and 23rd; a further report from the trusted source stated that the attack would be made on the 23rd or 24th—the latter being the anniversary of the proclaiming of the Turkish constitution in 1908. Another message ran: "General attack is imminent." On July 23rd, therefore, in order to rest part of the troops, the task of digging ledges for the expected reinforcements was for one day remitted. That night everything was in readiness to receive a powerful attack. The usual demonstration to draw Turkish fire was foregone, and the recently arrived 5th (City of Glasgow) Howitzer Battery shelled with its old 5-inch weapons the slopes of the main range. The post concerning which the Anzac commanders were now most anxious was Courtney's, which, however, was well covered by machine-guns. On its flank at Steele's, a most disconcerting secret obstacle awaited the enemy in the shape of the thinly-roofed tunnels, over the bays of which the earth lay only four inches thick, while sentries waited below to deal with any Turks who might tumble through into the wire coiled beneath. Where the underground firing line faced the Jolly there stood above it a high barrier of barbed-wire. The Anzac defences were thus far stronger than on May 19th; while the garrison, though sick with dysentery and overwork, had increased numerically to 20,410 rifles with 68 guns, the N.Z. & A. Division having been augmented by one infantry and one light horse



brigade, and the 1st Australian Division by a brigade of light horse. The expectation of the assault cheered the men, and the number going sick dropped from 190 on July 21st to 44 on the 22nd. Throughout the night of the 23rd, as on those preceding, supports and reserves slept in readiness close behind the lines, and the garrison waited in eager hope of the attack.

But that night and the next went as quietly as those which preceded them. The tension passed. Indeed, if an attack was ever seriously contemplated—which is doubtful—the Turkish army on the front had no suspicion of it. On the contrary, the enemy was himself apprehending attack. He had observed the concentration of Anzac machine-guns to cover Steele's and Courtney's, and interpreted it as threatening an assault upon German Officers'. Farther south, Rushdi Bey, commanding the 16th Turkish Division, on July 22nd warned Ahmed Tewfik Bey of the 47th Regiment, at Lone Pine, that "the continual gun-firing of the enemy upon our division, both from north and south . . . may be the commencement of an attack." On the 24th special orders were issued to the Turks to be alert from midnight to dawn.

It was afterwards inferred by some of the staff at Anzac that the report of the enemy's intention to assault had been inspired by the Turkish authorities themselves, possibly in order to test some suspected channel of leakage. Be that as it may, among the Turks at Anzac, Ramadan⁵⁸ and Constitution Day were marked by no signs of warlike enthusiasm, but rather by growing anxiety concerning the intentions of an opponent for whom they now knew that great reinforcements would shortly arrive.


⁵⁸ Ramadan appears to have been duly observed by the Turks at Anzac by fasting during daylight and eating at night. At any rate, an account exists showing that the feast of Bairam, in which Ramadan ended (about August 13 or 14), was duly celebrated. Some anxiety was caused to Turkish commanders by the fact that at this time—immediately after the August offensive—Turkish officers were visiting one another when they might well have been working. It is incidentally recorded that the commander of the 57th (whose name is given as "Ahuni Bey," and who is described as a good man and well loved) told his visitors that he had just received a letter from his children asking how long the war would last, and whether their father would be with them for the feast as he had been the year before, and adding how dreary it was without him. Two hours later he was killed near his headquarters on Mortar Ridge by a shell from one of the newly-arrived British howitzers.

CHAPTER XI

GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH

FROM the day when its parapet was first remarked showing above the scrub less than a hundred yards from Steele's, and when two Germans were observed apparently planning a machine-gun position at its north-western corner,¹ German Officers' Trench had a special importance. It was the southern flanking defence for the Turkish Quinn's. Immediately it was observed, the 1st Battalion had on its own initiative commenced tunnelling towards it from Steele's with the object of undermining and blowing up the machine-gun position.


General Walker, then brigadier, had approved of this project. But being without guidance from the engineers, who did not then favour this method, the infantry had driven its tunnel too deep and in a wrong direction, and it was consequently abandoned. It will be remembered that, during the New Zealand attack at Quinn's on the night of June 4th, two attempts were made to silence or destroy the gun, the first by a patrol guided by Sergeant Freame, and the second by a large raiding party under Lieutenant Longfield Lloyd.² The first attempt had failed, and the result of the second remained doubtful. Freame was therefore instructed to crawl out again on the night of June 6th in order to draw fire from the trench and thus ascertain whether the machine-gun was still in position, and whether the main trench was strongly occupied or merely held by sentries. He asked for a couple of men to accompany him, and found that the keenest to volunteer



¹ See pp. 123-4

² See pp. 241-4

were two lads, by name Morris^a and Elart, the former a recently-arrived reinforcement. After dark the three crept from the hole in the tunnel between Steele's and Courtney's, Freame, who was leading, being armed with two revolvers and five bombs, and each of the two lads with a rifle and two bombs. Freame had taught them to creep low—not on knees and elbows, but on their stomachs, snake-fashion—and in that manner they wriggled past the southern end of the snipers' trench and towards the north-western corner of German Officers'. The snipers' trench, as before, contained Turks, but these were busily firing at a patrol which was out farther north in front of Courtney's. Freame's party crawled some way down the gully and then up to the point where the front line of German Officers' bent back towards the Turkish rear. It was here that, watching on the night of June 4th, Freame had seen the flash of two machine-guns. He now threw a couple of bombs at the loop-holes, but in return only three rifles flashed. Next, crawling round to the front of the trench, he flung several bombs along it. Again only two or three rifles replied. It was inferred that the place was not strongly held,⁴ and the three, having finished their mission, crept back towards the snipers' trench. From its rear they threw at this their remaining bombs, causing the Turkish occupants to fire furiously in the other direction. Freame then directed the boys towards Steele's, and, as a last means of drawing fire, himself stood up in the open in front of German Officers' and emptied his twelve revolver-cartridges in its direction. There came the same reply as before. He therefore turned, caught up his companions, and, himself crawling last and steering them by tugging the right or left foot of the boy in front of him, guided the patrol back to the wire in front of the Australian line



^a Pte W. Morris (No 1807, 1st Bn). Commercial traveller; of Dulwich Hill, N S.W.; b Albury, N S.W., 1890

⁴ The truth was exactly the opposite; a crowded garrison was maintained.

At that point there occurred one of those pitiable mischances always most to be feared in night patrolling. It had been arranged that the three should come back over the parapet, and orders had been given that no shots must be fired till they had returned. After creeping through a few strands of loose wire the boys had reached a second line of anchored wire when some noise was made—possibly the jangling of some of the old jam-tins which were normally attached to the wire in order to give warning of anyone crossing it. The sentry opposite the spot, a newcomer to Anzac, forgot the warning and fired. The bullet entered the eyes of the leading boy, Elart,^a passed through neck and shoulder and through the face and neck of the second lad, Morris, behind him. Both were brought in, but Elart died.

Shortly before this enterprise the attempt to tunnel beneath the north-west corner of German Officers' had been resumed, and it was now an important part of the whole scheme of mining. The objective—the angle of trench holding the machine-guns which swept the front of Quinn's—was only fifty yards distant. Scarcely had the mining scheme been begun when the Turks obtained a hint of it from a spy in Egypt, who had learned, doubtless through stories brought back by wounded men, that tunnelling had been started at many points by the Anzac troops. Until the receipt of this news the Turks had for their part commenced but few tunnels, the enterprise being left to the discretion of the commanders in each sector. But an order was now issued that mining must be begun wherever the opposing trenches ran close.

One of the first points at which it was in consequence attempted was on the northern side of German Officers' Ridge. On this hillside there had stood, since before the Landing, several tents. Behind these the acting-commander of the

^a Elart left a letter to General Walker written before he went out with Freame. In this he stated that his true name was Hart. He had been a seaman in the flagship *Australia*, but had deserted before the war. When war broke out he was deeply sensitive of the fact that he had failed when his country needed him, and he would have returned to the Navy had it not been for fear of its discipline. He therefore enlisted in the infantry. His one desire was to be able to write to his sister telling her that he had wiped out the offence of the desertion, and he welcomed this opportunity of asking for a pardon. (No. 103, Pte. H O Hart, 1st Bn. Labourer; of Armadale, Vic; b North Melbourne, Vic, 1889. Died of wounds, 17 June, 1915).

1/57th,⁶ which held German Officers', had, about June 1st caused the beginning of a mine to be dug. Some days later the battalion commander, Zeki Bey, returning from hospital, found that this "mine" had taken the form of a wide, shallow excavation in the hillside. He asked what progress had been made, and was told "two or three metres." Neither he nor his men knew anything of mining, this being an industry in which their countrymen were rarely engaged, but he realised that an excavation of this sort, progressing at such a rate, was futile. Laughing at the miners, he asked them what they expected to achieve, and warned them that, if the rate were not increased, "something would certainly happen before long." He himself, however, was at a loss what course to urge, except greater speed. Observing the new earth which was daily heaped above the nearest "English" parapets, he realised that it would not be long before the "English" tunnels would be approaching his trench.

A few days later the Turkish sentry at the north-western corner of German Officers' came running down the communication trench to battalion headquarters on the rear slope. There had been an earthquake, he said. The ground had been so shaken that little drops of dust rose from it like the splashes of rain. Zeki Bey, realising that a hostile mine must have been fired, went at once to the Turkish tunnel but found that it had not been blown up. He concluded that an Australian gallery must have been approaching this point at a deeper level, and that, on the Turks being heard, it had been exploded in an unsuccessful attempt to blow in the Turkish work. A few days later the Turkish tunnel was destroyed by a more effective explosion.

The facts were exactly as he suspected. As has been already narrated,⁷ on June 13th the Australian engineers in tunnel D 9, in front of Steele's, had heard the Turks at work, and a charge had been immediately laid. It was believed that the Turks were within a few feet, and the mine had therefore been fired the next day: but the result was at the time difficult to estimate. The surface had not been broken, and the Australian gallery was filled with the foul gas of the explosion, which, it was clear, had partly blown back

⁶ 1st Bn., 57th Turkish Regt The 2nd and 3rd Bns., alternated at Quinn's.
⁷ See pp 276-7

through the tamping. When the tamping was finally removed it was found that each of the walls had been bulged, but not broken. It was therefore suspected that the distance of the enemy tunnel had been misjudged and that the mine had been fired at too great a distance.⁸ Skilled listeners were obtained from among the professional miners in the infantry, and although the Turks were again heard picking on June 16th, and 100 lb. of gun-cotton were laid ready for exploding, it was decided not to fire this charge until the enemy was certainly within four or five feet. The Turk dug slowly and only at intervals, but on June 24th there seemed no doubt that he was some eight feet distant, with the floor of his tunnel level with the roof of D9. Next day, when he appeared to have reached a point only three feet away and exactly over the left branch of the Australian tunnel, the mine was fired, the explosion being timed to coincide with a "demonstration" intended to cause the enemy to waste his ammunition. The engineers reported that the ground was "greatly shaken." The air in the Australian galleries remained fresh. The tamping was intact; and from the sounds it appeared certain that the Turkish miners had been entombed. Next morning it was seen that a crater twenty feet in diameter had been formed close beside the northern corner of German Officers' Trench, its brim touching the parapet.

The commander of German Officers' knew well that this explosion was not the end of the mining operations against his post. He was therefore not surprised when the men in his firing line a few days later reported that the sound of "English" picks could be heard at a point somewhat nearer the centre of their front. But though he realised the extreme danger, he could think of no counter-move beyond setting his men to dig a tunnel towards the sound, in the hope that, when the inevitable explosion occurred, its force might be directed along the line of least resistance, and might thus be partially expended upon the tunnel and mitigated in its effect upon the trench. To avoid loss of life, he also held his front line with as few men as he dared, reducing its garrison in the dangerous sector to fifteen. At this time the system by which the 1/57th held German Officers' (the Merkez Tepe or

⁸ The charge, 30 lb. of gun cotton, was also presumed to have been too small.

"Central Hill" of the Turks) was to occupy the front line with two companies, keeping the remaining two bivouacked towards the rear of the spur, where also were the battalion headquarters. The garrison was thus fairly strong; but whereas in the Turkish Quinn's the 2nd and 3rd Battalions relieved each other weekly or at shorter intervals, the 1st at German Officers' remained permanently at that post and had to find its own reliefs.⁹


The strain upon both the miners and the sentries of the Turks, occupying positions under which they suspected the enemy to be continuously tunnelling, was very severe. Late on the night of July 4th, near the point where picking had last been heard and towards which Zeki Bey's men had been set to dig their vent, an Australian mine was fired. Though its centre was not directly beneath the Turkish fire-trench, it blew a wide gap in its front wall, and five of the garrison were not seen again. The communications were filled with débris and dust, and the whole garrison was half-stunned and lay crouching in its shelters. To the Turkish commandant it seemed afterwards that, if his men had been rushed at that moment, they could scarcely have offered any opposition. As a matter of fact a proposal for following up the explosion with a raid had been mooted by the Australian staff. The mine was in tunnel D21, which it had been decided at the engineering conference on June 29th¹⁰ to drive forward as swiftly as possible beneath German Officers'. The tunnel had therefore been continued at a steep grade in order to gain depth; but late on July 4th, when it was known to be twelve feet from its goal and eighteen below the surface, the Turks had been heard starting their excavation close to its southern side. The section commander—at this date Colonel M'Kay of the 2nd Brigade—at once determined to push forward a northern branch of the tunnel and blow up that portion of German Officers' Trench by exploding what was at that time considered a heavy charge—150 lb. of ammonal. On his reporting this decision to divisional headquarters, it was

⁹ The same conditions had resulted in the NZ Inf Bde (and previously in the 4th Aust) holding Quinn's and Courtney's by an almost identical system of reliefs.

¹⁰ See p. 278. The tunnel-head, when the mine was eventually fired, was eight feet from German Officers'.


suggested that fifty men should raid the trench after the explosion and bayonet its garrison. The narrow isolated ridge could certainly not have been permanently held, and it was therefore proposed that the party should return immediately; but after conference with Colonel Skeen the whole proposal was dropped, probably with wisdom, since the danger to be encountered in attacking German Officers' lay, not in that trench itself, but in the flanking machine-guns of the posts to the right and left—Turkish Quinn's and the Jolly. As it turned out, heavy firing followed the explosion, making it certain that the withdrawal of the raiders would have been rendered costly.

But though no attack followed, this explosion left the Turkish commander somewhat anxious, since through the wide crater and the "English" tunnel, which presumably led to it, there might be opened an avenue leading directly from the "English" trenches into his own front line. Becoming anxious to discover the precise intentions of his enemy, he decided personally to reconnoitre the "English" tunnel-head. Accordingly on July 8th, with one of his soldiers assisting, he began pulling away the stones and rubble at the bottom of the crater, and presently came upon two wires buried in earth but leading straight in the direction of Steele's. Gradually unearthing them, he found them disappear beneath the foot of a barrier of sandbags, evidently blocking the mouth of the "English" tunnel. These bags Zeki Bey and the soldier began carefully to remove. As they did so, they heard a slight noise on the other side of the barricade, suggestive of a sentry standing there with rifle and bayonet. They silently continued their work until a crevice appeared through which they could peer into the interior. Gazing in, they perceived the tunnel continuing ahead of them, but no sign of any man.



Here the commandant hesitated. His first intention was to blow the barrier down, and he accordingly sent for half-a-dozen sticks of explosive. But finding them to be similar to those used for blowing up railways, and having tested such a charge elsewhere without success, he sent them back, and decided to explore the tunnel farther. With his assistant, therefore, he pulled down more bags, until there was room to go through. He then sent the soldier into the tunnel, which was found to lead on for about ten feet, when it turned at a sharp angle to the left. Zeki Bey went as far as the corner, and again sent forward the soldier and a sergeant to explore. Almost at once they came running back. The soldier, trembling, said that he had come upon steps leading down to a deeper tunnel, where a light was flickering.¹¹ Someone there had fired a revolver-shot after him, which hit the wall at the bend. There followed some firing with rifles from both sides, but, as each was protected by the bend, no one was hurt. Zeki Bey put an end to the exchange of shots by causing the old bags of the Australian tamping to be thrown round the corner, thus quickly rebuilding the barricade and securing a few yards of the Australian tunnel.¹²

What had happened on the Australian side was this. The 7th Battalion, then holding Steele's, had in the first place observed during the morning that shovelfuls of earth were being flung over the lip of the crater, which was known to be occupied by the Turks. It was con-



jectured that the enemy was fortifying it. At this time the engineers were working in the southern branch of the tunnel, assisted by the usual fatigue party of infantry. The workings were under their control, and, at the point where the main drive forked, not far from its head, was stationed a guard of the 7th, to prevent men of the infantry from intruding. Complete silence was enforced even round the mouths of the tunnels.


¹¹ This description was naturally inaccurate in details.

¹² The Australian revolver bullet, which he found lying at the angle Zeki picked up and sent to Kemal Bey and Essad Pasha as being the first shot fired in underground warfare at Anzac



THE BLOWN-OUT AUSTRALIAN TUNNEL AND 'GREIG'S' CRATER LEADING INTO GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH
The Turkish officer standing by the tunnel is Zeki Bey *Inset* Lieutenant N. J. Greig

*Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. G1024
Taken in 1919*



CAPTURED TURKISH SOLDIERS, ANZAC


*Admiralty Official Photograph
Aust War Memorial Collection No G456*



AN AUSTRALIAN SENTRY AT THE MOUTH OF ONE OF THE
TUNNELS NEAR GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH

*Taken by Sgt E Lloyd, 1st Field Coy, 4th
Aust War Memorial Collection No C3300*

since there existed vague suspicions that the enemy might possess some listening apparatus. Beyond the fork the infantry had no guard, but an engineer was kept listening behind the tamping of the old mine. The main drive and the right fork were lighted with candles at intervals, but the branch leading to the tamping was dark.




At 11.45 a.m. the engineer behind the barricade had reported that Turks were moving on its other side. A sentry was consequently posted. At 1.57 the sentry further reported that he could see daylight through a crevice between the bags, a fact which showed that the Turks were in the act of removing them. A message was at once sent to Sergeant Brown,¹⁸ in charge of the nearest Japanese trench-mortar, to fire a bomb into the crater, the sentry being ordered to withdraw from danger while this was being done. It was while he was away that Zeki Bey and his men had crept forward. Colonel Elliott of the 7th was at his headquarters behind Steele's when an engineer ran up with the hurried message: "The Turks are in our tunnel." Elliott at once ordered his adjutant, Captain Grills, and a company-commander, Captain Permezel, who chanced to be present, to organise a party and drive the enemy out. When they had left him, it occurred to Elliott that, since he himself had not actually seen the position, these orders might be wrongly conceived. He therefore characteristically decided to go in person to the tunnel. Taking with him two men whom he found at its mouth, and who chanced to be newly-arrived reinforcements, he strode along the gallery until stopped by the guard at the fork. He was told that, by regulation, his boots must be removed if he went farther, and, after complying with this request, he started with his companions, himself leading, along the dark gallery in which the enemy was reported to be present. The passage was narrow, but he had with some difficulty reached a point twenty feet from its end when there was a flash in his face, and a


¹⁸ Lieut. (temp. Capt.) H. E. D. Brown, M.C., Div. Trench-Mortar Officer, 1st Aust. Div., 1916/17. Of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Nelson, N.Z., Feb., 1879.

cry behind him. A bullet passing under his left arm had hit one of the soldiers. This man dropped his rifle and fell against his mate, and both ran back. Elliott, pistol in hand, pressed himself close to the right-hand wall and waited lest the enemy might come on. For two minutes nothing happened; then the Turk, who was evidently close round the corner, heard him move and fired again, hitting the left-hand wall. Shortly afterwards Elliott heard movement behind him, and, guessing that this was Permezel coming up with his party, crept back to the next curve and whispered that officer's name. It was indeed Permezel; but the two reinforcements had carried back the report—which they doubtless believed—that the colonel had been killed, and the supporting party therefore suspected Elliott to be one of the enemy. He was asked to state his

nickname;¹⁴ upon his doing so, the party went forward with him, still keeping close to the right-hand wall. At the point which he had previously reached Elliott stopped, and, instructing Permezel to organise a line of men to hand him ready-filled sandbags, began to build a barricade. The Turkish sentry, hearing their voices, fired again into the wall, and Permezel begged to be allowed to take his colonel's place; but the latter refused, and speedily built a barricade two sandbags in thickness. Into a space near the top was inserted a steel loop-hole. At this stage the Australians, being able to peer round the bags—their eyes having become accustomed to the darkness—for the first time observed the enemy's barrier, round which, like themselves, the Turkish sentry was occasionally peering.¹⁵ Elliott could easily have shot the sentry.



x Turkish sentry T barricade



T Turkish barricade

A Australian . .


¹⁴ At the time "Bob"; afterwards "Pompey"

¹⁵ At one time a Turkish officer, doubtless the commandant of German Officers', was seen looking over the sentry's shoulder, the two laughing at the trick which had been played on the "English."

but he decided that it was wiser to avoid all firing; and the acting-brigadier, Colonel Wanliss,¹⁶ coming up with Major Jess, the brigade-major, approved of this decision.

Later, at brigade headquarters, these three discussed the situation. The first instructions from the divisional commander were that new galleries must be driven on either side of the captured tunnel in order to intercept the Turks if they attempted to mine from it, and that the crater must also be cleared by bombing. The new galleries were accordingly begun, but on the advice of those on the spot it was decided to attempt a novel method of ejecting the enemy from the crater. A 25-lb. charge of gun-cotton, with electric wires attached, was put out by Lieutenant Dyer over the top of the Australian barrier and lowered to the ground. The barrier was then completed so as to block the tunnel, and was increased to a thickness of ten feet. The work had to be performed in strict silence, since there was always a fear that the Turkish sentry might discover the explosive and remove it; but it was remarked that, whenever he heard a noise, he fired round the corner. Early in the afternoon of July 9th the charge was ready to be fired.

In the meantime Zeki Bey on his side had taken precautions to guard the opening into German Officers' Trench by placing one sentry in the tunnel behind the sandbags (giving him his own revolver), another at the opening of the tunnel into the crater, and a third in support, with a corporal in charge. Some time later they reported that voices could be heard behind the Australian barricade. Zeki Bey, being certain that his enemy was not passive, suspected mining, and sent for an expert from the German pioneer company which was attached to Essad Pasha's force. He took the German into the crater, where, listening against its side, both of them could detect picking. "Digging is going on," said the expert, "two or three metres from here." Immediate measures were necessary, but the




x Turkish sentries ● Explosive

¹⁶ Col M'Cay had been sent for a few days to hospital.

post-commander was at a loss what to do. On previous occasions when his men had started to countermine, the Australians had heard them and had immediately blown-in the Turkish workings.

No digging, therefore, was attempted. Next afternoon, July 9th, when Zeki Bey was in the trenches, there was an explosion. He was blown down, but, picking himself up, ran along the front line to the dangerous area. He found that the Australians had fired a charge in their old tunnel, using the gallery as if it were the barrel of a gun, in which the Turkish barricade formed, as it were, the wad. That barricade had been blown down; the roof of the tunnel as far as the Australian barrier had fallen in, and where the charge had been a new crater—known thenceforth as "Dyer's"—had been formed. The foremost Turkish sentry was never afterwards found, having doubtless been buried under his own barricade; the man at the tunnel-mouth was blown over the parapets of German Officers' Trench and killed; the supporting sentry was killed also.

Meanwhile in the Australian trenches Colonel Elliott had placed a small party, under Lieutenant Kenneth Walker¹⁷ of his battalion, at the fork of D21 with orders to rush the new crater. This Walker did. The movement was not observed by the Turks, but the commander of German Officers' decided, as before, to explore the old tunnel in person. After clearing away the stony débris, he came to the edge of Dyer's crater and, through a crevice between the clods, saw close to him an Australian sentry. The man appeared to have heard something, for he was crouching on one knee against the forward edge of the cavity, his rifle resting on his knee, his free hand quietly brushing the dirt from its breech, while his gaze was directed intently towards his observer. The latter's first instinct was to shoot him, but he remembered that his revolver lay beneath the earth with the buried sentry, to whom he had lent it. He went to find




¹⁷ Lieut. K. L. Walker; 7th Bn. Jackeroo; of Essendon, Vic.; b. Ascot Vale, Vic., 18 June, 1893. Died of wounds, 12 July, 1915.

another, but reflected that no purpose would be served by shooting the Australian, whereas prisoners were rare and were greatly desired by the staff. He therefore decided to wait till night, when a small party was ordered to jump suddenly into Dyer's crater—a mere step from the old one—and capture the sentry. But the movement of Zeki Bey or of his men in the old tunnel had been heard. It was imagined that the Turks had sapped out to Dyer's crater, and the Australian post in it was consequently strengthened. The result was that when, in the small hours of July 11th, the Turkish raiders scrambled out to capture the sentry, their leader was immediately shot; the remainder gave up the attempt and crouched in the old crater. Later, upon reconnoitring the Australian crater, the Turks found it unoccupied but filled with barbed-wire. As a matter of fact, the engineers were trying to repeat their former experiment by placing a charge of gun-cotton in the new crater with the object of demolishing the barrier between it and the old tunnel or sap in which the Turks had been heard. But though Lieutenant Dyer, as before, placed the charge in position, it failed to detonate, and merely burned with a brilliant flame.

Such was the position at this point when, late on July 11th, there reached Anzac the orders for the "demonstration" upon the next day. Birdwood, among other measures, ordered the 1st Australian Division to simulate an attack upon Lone Pine and Johnston's Jolly; and General Legge, then commanding the division, directed that, as one means of doing so, a bomb attack should be made from Dyer's crater. By "bomb" attack was apparently meant the mere throwing of bombs, since the orders from Birdwood, with a view to avoiding loss, definitely forbade that men should leave their trenches except on Holly Ridge. This injunction, however, was not specifically repeated in the 1st Division's orders, and the bomb attack designed by the staff of the 2nd Brigade and Colonel Elliott involved a more important operation than that intended. This was no less than the seizure of the old crater of D21, then occupied by the enemy, and the demolition of any Turkish work between it and the new crater. Although it was recognised that this would be a most dangerous task, its extent was probably not realised.

since the position in the old crater was not really known to the Australians. The infantry in Steele's had been sceptical concerning the success of the original explosion of D21, believing that the engineers had fired the mine before their tunnel had penetrated near enough to its objective. They did not realise that the front wall of German Officers' Trench had been blown away, and that the crater opened wide into the trench itself. As a matter of fact the opening had merely been barred with a fence or "grille" of barbed wire, through which the Turks looked from their trench into the crater. This being so, an attack upon the crater was—though the Australians were unaware of it—practically an attack upon German Officers' Trench itself.

As usual, the time for preparation was short. Elliott called for volunteers, informing his men of the danger. Lieutenant Greig,¹⁸ newly arrived at Anzac, offered to lead the party, which included eleven other volunteers. At 8.15, in broad daylight, they rushed the Turkish position. None of the enemy was in the tunnel, but a number who had been occupying the crater instantly scrambled out of it, leaving three killed. A party of the 6th Battalion (which at this time was combined with the 7th at Steele's under Elliott's command) was about to begin demolishing the near end of the tunnel when bombing started in the crater, and Greig's voice was heard calling for reinforcements. Half-a-dozen gallant men of the 6th climbed out into the open, but, knowing nothing of the position, most of them, instead of making for the crater, made for the parapet of German Officers', a few yards distant on their right. In whatever direction they had charged, it could have made no difference to the issue. They found confusion in the Turkish trench, into which they fired several shots; but at this juncture a machine-gun was turned upon them from the rear. Many light horsemen of the N.Z. & A. Division on Pope's, not



¹⁸ Lieut N. J. Greig; 7th Bn. School teacher; of Penshurst, Vic; b. Daylesford, Vic, 10 Jan., 1891. Killed in action, 12 July, 1915

having received warning of any operation, were convinced that the men whom they saw issuing from what was apparently a part of the enemy trenches¹⁹ were Turks, and it is almost certain that fire was turned upon them from Russell's Top. Be this as it may, two were killed, and a third was seen running to and fro in ignorance which way to turn.

The attitude of the Turks had by this time changed, and they were beginning to shower bombs from German Officers' Trench into the crater. Two of Greig's own party were killed, and all the rest, including himself, wounded. He therefore sent back his men along the broken-down tunnel. The rearmost of them, on reaching safety, reported that he had last seen his officer standing at the tunnel-mouth, revolver in hand, his head bleeding, holding back the Turks while his men retired.

Among the enemy who were facing this gallant youngster, though he cannot have known it, was the commander of German Officers'. For him the day had been an anxious one. It was a peculiarity of German Officers' that the trenches of the battalion holding it were overlooked at short distance by the regimental headquarters, the divisional headquarters, and the zone headquarters, situated respectively on successive ridges.²⁰ The headquarters of the post itself, on the other hand, necessarily lay on a rear slope out of sight of the firing line. It followed that the higher staffs sometimes had notice of occurrences before the post-commander himself could learn of them. The headquarters of the zone-commander, Essad Pasha, were in a terrace of rude but comfortable huts around the head of a gully behind the northern shoulder of Scrubby Knoll. Within a few yards of this shelter there had been built a niche, whence a look-out was maintained upon the line from Courtney's to Lone Pine, German Officers' Trench being clearly visible and less than a mile away.

On this particular day the garrison of German Officers' had observed fixed bayonets in the "English" trenches. Especial watchfulness was therefore called for, but, several men having been wounded by shells, the rest were inclined to keep low in the trench. This the divisional commander had

¹⁹ The open end of the Australian tunnel appeared, of course, like a short sap leading out of German Officers'.

²⁰ The Turkish positions at the Pine and Jolly also were under the eyes of the zone headquarters, but not of the intermediate staffs.

observed, and he had complained to the post-commander that no look-out was being maintained. The latter had called for a report, but he somewhat mistrusted the subaltern in charge of the north-western corner of his front line—the same who in the storm of June 29th had reported that the Australians were advancing “by leaps and bounds.” The answer, however, was just to hand that all was normal, when there came on the telephone a call from the headquarters of the Ari Burnu zone and the chief of Essad Pasha’s staff spoke. “The enemy is getting into your trenches, Zeki Bey,” he said. “What are you going to do?”

On receiving this astonishing news the post-commander went straight to the front trench, and, having discovered on his way that the fighting was at the crater, proceeded towards that point. The subaltern above mentioned had lost his nerve, and his men had at first made little resistance. But in the southern company’s sector there was a junior officer of different mettle, who, as it turned out, had already saved the situation by ordering his men to aim along their own front line at the mouth of the crater. This officer with his men had now reached a point near the wire barrier, and, as his battalion commander came up, seized his arm, saying: “It is dangerous there; they’ve been shooting at each other.”

At the grid were several of the soldiers of both sides lying dead. Against the wire rested an Australian rifle with bayonet fixed. The Australian party was apparently getting away, but in the crater was a fine young officer—very handsome, so his enemy thought, and well-dressed. He had retreated to the tunnel-mouth and was standing there wounded, leaning against the earthen wall at the far end of the crater, revolver in hand, with his face to the enemy. “Don’t kill that man,” shouted the commandant to his troops; “we want to capture him.” “He will not allow himself to be taken,” they answered. The next moment the boy was killed by a bomb.²¹

The crater was at once reoccupied by the Turks, who shortly afterwards attacked with bombs Dyer’s crater also, but failed to drive out its garrison, although several officers

²¹ Lieut. Greig was buried by the Turks in Legge Valley with more reverence than was generally shown to the dead of their enemies.

and men of the 6th Australian Battalion were wounded in repelling the attack. Nevertheless, as has been stated, the day's operation put heart into the Turks holding German Officers'. Not only had they been subjected to the extreme strain of knowing that the trench was undermined, and consequently of dreading further and greater explosions, but they had lived in hourly expectation of heavy attack. Their leaders were now able to argue that the assault had been delivered and had proved not very serious.²²

But the relief did not last long. On the day following Greig's raid two mines, D9A and D25R, were fired beneath the north-western end of German Officers' Trench. The Turkish tunnellers could do nothing to cope with the mining of their opponents;²³ but on this occasion the enemy answered by bombarding the corresponding sector of the Anzac trenches with an old 6-inch howitzer and several field-guns. The latter were quick-firers of the famous French pattern of *soixante-quinze* (75-millimetre), part of a consignment which had been intercepted by the Turks on the way to the Serbians during the late Balkan War. The velocity of their shells, which were mainly high-explosive, was so great that at moderate ranges they burst before men could hear the warning whistle of their approach—a fact which much increased their moral effect. The battery firing them was judged to be high on the main range at a point known as "Su Yatagha" ("The Watercourse"), immediately east of the summit of Chunuk Bair. The 6-inch howitzer was thought to be behind a nearer crest known as "Turks' Hump," but could not be definitely located. Both batteries almost exactly enfiladed the 1st Australian Division's line; but whereas the 75's usually burst their shells on the parapet or paradoss,

²² A high decoration usually reserved for seniors was presented to the young Turkish officer who had saved the situation.

²³ The Turks spent much labour upon mining. A long Turkish gallery near the old snipers' trench below Courtney's was broken into by New Zealand tunnellers on the night of July 12, and Sgt. H. W. Newman (of Invercargill, N.Z.) of the New Zealand engineers, exploring for some minutes, discovered several fairly extensive galleries, evidently dug some weeks previously. But although his diggings were extensive, the enemy knew himself to be outmatched below ground, and his explanation was that his opponents "apparently were well provided with the necessary machinery and implements." This was far from being the case, but they at least possessed more suitable tools than the Turks. While the Anzac miner was deploring the absence of the ordinary machinery of his trade, his opponents were envying him the possession of his despised little British "entrenching-tool," which they themselves prized exceedingly whenever they could obtain one.

tearing up the sandbags and frequently half-demolishing a few bays, the shells of the howitzer plunged into trenches and dugouts, sometimes burying men beneath the fallen earth. Firing in enfilade, this ancient cannon rarely missed its mark, it being a simple matter for the Turkish gunners, when once they had found the correct line, to lengthen and shorten range, playing their fire up and down the crowded position, in which the shots constantly went home.

This fire, which had been directed intermittently upon the 8th Battalion at Steele's on various dates between June 11th and July 3rd, was now turned with some intensity upon the 6th and 7th in the same position. Although only 45 6-inch shells fell in or near the post on July 13th, and 12, 13, 15, none, and 40 on the five succeeding days, the strain upon the garrison was far heavier than these figures imply.

Among others, Major Flockart of the 5th and Lieutenant Biggsley of the 6th—who had fought with such distinction at the Landing and at Helles respectively—were killed in these recurring bombardments, while between July 13th and 18th the 2nd Brigade lost, mainly from this cause, over 130 men. Although the chief artillery officer of the corps, lately from France, assured the infantry commanders that their trenches had never yet been really shelled, since "in many places in France 900 heavy shells fell in one day in one lot of trenches," yet the strain showed upon the men. During the succeeding weeks the 6th and 7th Battalions, and the 8th which on July 18th relieved them, were subjected to a stress not unlike that which they subsequently suffered in bombarded sectors of the line in France. On July 17th the medical officers reported that, in consequence of these bombardments and of overwork, the men of the 6th and 7th were in a highly-strung and "jumpy" condition, and Colonel Elliott informed his brigadier that they were completely worn



out. For the first time individual cases of "shock" began daily to be specified in the casualty lists of the brigade.

Although this bombardment fell most effectively upon the crowded narrow foothold of the 2nd Brigade at Steele's, the 1st and 3rd Infantry Brigades farther south were now subjected almost daily to similar fire. In their case it came largely from an old-pattern 8-inch howitzer emplaced somewhere behind Scrubby Knoll. Since, however, this gun did not enfilade the line, its effect was far less than that of the 6-inch howitzer used against Steele's. On June 20th it dropped twenty shells into the Pimple, and on July 18th thirty-eight.²⁴ These projectiles could often be seen in the air before they arrived, but they were none the more easily evaded, and they occasionally killed or wounded men of Browne's battery and of the 2nd Battalion in the Pimple.²⁵ The swift shell of the 75's, enfilading the line, proved more effective, men being constantly hit by its steel fragments whirring down the length of the trenches.

From July 13th to 17th, when the bombardments of Steele's were most severe, Browne's battery in the Pimple fought a daily duel with the 75's. The position from which some of them were firing was already known to the Australian artillery as that of the enemy's "sandpit" battery.²⁶ Presently, however, it was discovered that at least one of the 75's was firing from some other direction. The infantry detected a flash, apparently of a gun, behind Battleship Hill. On to this Browne on July 17th endeavoured to register a section of his battery. Since only the two guns under Lieutenant Edwards²⁷ were available, and since the 75's at once returned their fire, rapid shooting became necessary in order to "smother" them. Other gun-detachments were ordered to stand by, in order to "carry on" if either of the

²⁴ On that day it also dropped one shell into a tunnel of the new firing line, and two into the Turkish position on Lone Pine.

²⁵ During the bombardment on June 20, for example, a shell of this battery struck a machine-gunner of the 4th Light Horse lying on the fire-step of the Pimple, and, after taking off his leg and part of his arm, ricocheted off the floor of the trench and away over the parapets without bursting. The man asked for a cigarette, and spoke cheerfully to those around him of earning his living by selling newspapers; but he died subsequently of the shock.

²⁶ It was probably these three "sandpits" (in reality large washaways or landslides) which gave to the hill behind them its Turkish name of Su Yatagha ("The Watercourse").

²⁷ Col P. M. Edwards, D.S.O., D.C.M., V.D. Commanded temporarily 11th A.F.A. Bde., 1917-18. Costume manufacturer, of Sydney, b. Port Melbourne, Vic., 5 Dec., 1875.

crews were disabled. The expected happened. After several high-explosive shells from the 75's had burst on the parapet, another struck the shield of No. 1 gun and blew away its crew. Sergeant Taylor,²⁸ covered with wounds, struggled to continue firing, but the relieving detachment, which had sprung at once to the gun, forced him, strongly protesting, away from it. "See after the others," he said, "I'm only scratched." Of "the others" one gunner, Barrett-Lennard,²⁹ a youngster of twenty-one, lay with an arm and a thigh shattered, but life lingered for a minute or two. "Look after the sergeant," he insisted. "I'm all right—I'm done, but, by God, you see, I'm dying hard." Another, Stanley Carter,³⁰ part of whose back had been torn away, also regained a brief consciousness before he died. "Is the gun all right, sergeant?" were his first words. Of such mettle were the men who, under the almost insuperable difficulties of Anzac, fought their guns throughout the campaign.

But both the Turkish 75 and the 6-inch howitzer continued unlocated. Sometimes, when the newly-arrived City of Glasgow Battery burst its 5-inch shells behind Battleship Hill, the howitzer ceased fire; but on other occasions when the same point was bombarded it persisted in action. Several attempts were made to direct the Glasgow howitzers by wireless telegraphy from an aeroplane, a method new to Anzac. These, however, failed. Although the airman discovered two emplacements, apparently for heavy guns, near the sandpit battery, it was uncertain what cannon, if any, fired from them.

Since these guns could not be located, General Birdwood ordered that, when Steele's and Courtney's were being shelled, their garrisons should, if possible, be withdrawn. This was a difficult task, but it was partly effected by moving the men, during periods of shelling, into the forward tunnels, until they were as close as possible to the Turkish line. Here, since the enemy would not intentionally drop shells near his own trenches, they were comparatively safe.


²⁸ Sgt. S. A. Taylor (No. 1891, 8th Bty., A.F.A.). Clerk; b. Sydney, 5 Feb., 1892.

²⁹ Dvr. D. Barrett-Lennard (No. 1879, 8th Bty., A.F.A.). Vigneron; of Guildford, W. Aust.; b. St. Leonard's, Swan district, W. Aust., 27 May, 1894. Killed in action, 17 July, 1915.

³⁰ Gnr. S. Carter (No. 1793, 8th Bty., A.F.A.). Draper; of Fremantle, W. Aust.; b. Invercargill, N.Z., 1938. Killed in action. 17 July, 1915.

From the events narrated it follows that the garrisons both of German Officers' and of the Australian line facing it were during the month of July subjected to heavy stress. That upon the enemy, however, was undoubtedly the greater, since the battalion in German Officers' was not relieved, as were the Australians, throughout July. So frequently was the north-western angle of its trench blown up that the earth became too friable to dig, and had to be built up with mud bricks. Moreover, so closely was it marked by Australian snipers and machine-guns that the two Turkish machine-guns covering Quinn's were first withdrawn some distance towards the rear and afterwards separated, one firing from a point slightly behind the northern flank of the trench, the other from near the farther side of the spur.

The two craters in front of German Officers' remained for some time a place of tension, an Australian post behind a barricade of sandbags facing at a few yards a similar Turkish post and barricade. In consequence of the strain and the exposure to bombs the men at this point were relieved every three hours. This tension was eventually eased by a guard of the 7th, composed of farmers from Swan Hill in the mallee country of Victoria. These men found that, if they threw three bombs to the Turkish one, the enemy would remain very quiet. They volunteered to hold Dyer's crater as long as their battalion was in the sector, and were permitted so to do.



CHAPTER XII

THE BEACH

ON May 21st, although the sky over Anzac was clear as on every day since the Landing and no breeze was stirring, the sea was for some reason heaving slowly with a slight swell from the north-west. The lighters and horseboats along the Beach butted each other as they rocked. No harm followed, but observers could not fail to speculate what would happen if the wind were to set from the sea and not, as almost always, from the shore. Every day since the Landing the sky had been blue, the water glassily smooth. The climate, which was that of an ideal health resort, always brilliant but at first fresh and even cold, became steadily warmer, until in July the midday temperature in the shade was regularly between 83 and 85 degrees Fahrenheit. Many of the Australians were accustomed to sun-bathing in their seaside resorts at home, and those whose business was in the Cove quickly discarded their shirts, amusing themselves with an informal competition to become "the brownest man on the Beach." The New Zealanders caught the humour of it, and by midsummer their skins were in many cases tanned darker than those of the occasional Turkish prisoners. When the struggle of the Landing had subsided, the Beach on summer days reminded many onlookers of an Australian coastal holiday-place. The shoreline itself resembled rather an old-time port, with its crowded barges (often beached to prevent their being sunk), a few short piers, piles of biscuit boxes and fodder stacked behind, the smell of rope, of tar, of wet wood, of cheese and other cargo; but in the water the hundreds of bathers, and on the hillside the little tracks winding through the low scrub, irresistibly recalled the Manly of New South Wales or the Victorian Sorrento, while the sleepy "tick-tock" of rifles from behind the hills suggested the assiduous practice of batsmen at their nets on some neighbouring cricket-field.

In this weather, which appeared to be normal at the Dardanelles, the landing of supplies could be carried on without a break, and although a week's rations and fodder had been at once accumulated,¹ the water-supply was replenished from day to day.

Through Birdwood's insistence, the 1st Australian Division had within a few hours of the Landing sunk the first well. By the second day there were on the Beach some twenty shallow wells, giving 20,000 gallons daily, and others were quickly dug in the valleys. The New Zealand area was drier, except at the extreme north near the outposts, and, exclusive of the well at No. 2 Outpost, only six were sunk before the middle of May. These gave 1,800 gallons. In the meantime some of the early wells in the Australian Division's area had run dry, but about twenty were normally giving water, and at the end of June digging was still continuing in several shafts at depths of over 50 feet in search of a further supply. The wells had been timbered and closed in, and small pumps installed, the whole being placed under close guard. A considerable part of the front-line garrison from Pope's Hill southwards obtained its water from these wells. The allowance for drinking and cooking (but not washing) which is laid down in British manuals as the minimum desirable for troops in the field is one gallon daily for each man. At Anzac this allowance could seldom be approached. Between the last weeks of June and July the troops in Monash Valley were receiving only about one-third of a gallon each, and this came entirely from the local wells.² At the end of July the wells in the valley began to dry up, and even to keep up this meagre ration 720 gallons had to be sent nightly from the Beach. Meanwhile on the extreme north of Anzac, where a well in the bed of the Chailak Dere gave about 2,500

¹ At the Landing 7 days' rations and forage were put ashore. This was at first maintained, *e.g.*, on May 9 there were ashore rations and forage for 6½ days; in addition to this, supply for 7 days was in the transports: the ship *Trewellard* contained a further 14 days' supply. For the amounts on the Beach in July, *see note on p. 359*.

² The garrison of Quinn's during this time was receiving only one-third of a gallon daily per head. At Pope's the allowance was a full waterbottle (one quart). The troops in Monash Valley were approximately 4,000 strong, and at the end of May they had been supplied with 1,800 to 2,000 gallons nightly from the Beach in addition to the well-water. By the end of June, when the supply from the Beach to Monash Valley was stopped, the engineers had 11 wells supplying that valley and the neighbouring sectors, their depth ranging to 28 feet, and one of them giving 750 gallons during the day while another filled several hundred kerosene tins in a morning.

gallons daily, the ration was more than a gallon to each man at the neighbouring posts, as well as three gallons to each of 350 mules. But the Anzac area as a whole, comprising as it did less than a square mile of arid hillside, did not afford a natural supply for 25,000 men, and the troops were therefore at all times partly dependent upon water-barges towed from Alexandria and Malta. From the lighters, made fast at a small pier on the Beach, the water at this date was pumped by hand into tanks on shore, a small fatigue party, sometimes consisting of military "offenders," doing the work. Thence it was carried at night, generally by mules, to storage tanks in the gullies. From these it was conveyed by men to the posts and bivouacs on the hills.

There was practically no reserve of the imported water; and it was only in consequence of the perfect calm which had continued since the Landing that it had always been available. But during June there came several days which gave a warning of what might happen not only to the water-supply, but to the whole traffic of the Cove, if the weather changed. On the 14th and 15th, when a slight breeze from the sea ruffled the surface, the tiny waves not only prevented any water from being pumped ashore, but disturbed the piles and trestles of Watson's Pier, which was at the time being constructed. On the 22nd a Turkish shell sank one of the three water-lighters then at Anzac, and on that night the 1st Australian Division found it necessary to borrow water from the N.Z. & A. On the 29th there descended the thunder-storm which so alarmed the Turks.* Jetties and boats were washed on to the shore. A lighter full of stores broke away, damaging its cargo. The carriage of supplies along the Beach was effected with difficulty, the waves casting up seaweed across the fairway and almost reaching the shelters of the Australian Casualty Clearing Station at its southern end. At the "hospital"⁴ the evacuation of sick and wounded at dusk happened to have been delayed by the departure of the 1st Battalion to inaugurate a new system

* See p. 308

⁴ The Casualty Clearing Station at Anzac in reality performed much of the work of "dressing-stations" in France. But its official title (like that of similar units in the British Army) was originally "Clearing Hospital." The title was changed shortly before the campaign, but the dressing station on the Beach was throughout known to most men as "the hospital."



ANZAC BEACH

The steam is that of the pumping engine

*Taken in October, 1915, by Sgt. H. L. Woods, 4th Fld. Amb.
Aust. War Memorial Collection No. C699*



DUGOUTS ABOVE ANZAC BEACH

In foreground—Lieutenant-Colonel W. W. Hearne, 2nd Field Ambulance.

*Taken by Capt. B. Quack, 2nd Fld. Amb.
Aust. War Memorial Collection No. C1731*

To face p. 348



Steps to (ien Birdwood's shelter.

THE SHELLING OF ANZAC BEACH BY THE OLIVE GROVE BATTERY (SUMMER, 1915)

Taken by P. F. E. Schuler, Esq.
Anzac War Memorial Collection No. A2007

of "short rests" in Imbros; and it was not till the height of the thunder-storm that the hospital convoy—one horseboat with nineteen "lying-down" cases, and a cutter crowded with others less serious—started out for the hospital ship in tow of a small steamboat. The tow could barely make headway against the wind, and almost at once those on the Beach heard shouts in the darkness. The two boats—lighter and cutter—were observed to have broken away and to be floating slowly southwards. Fortunately they bumped into some barges near one of the southern jetties, and engineers, stretcher-bearers, and a few bathers with some difficulty brought in the sick and wounded.

On the same night one of the remaining water-lighters, containing 150 tons of water, broke adrift. She grounded on Hell Spit and was salvaged, but very little of her water was saved. There seems to have been still moored in the Cove one lighter full of water, but apparently it could not immediately be brought to the shore, for the 1st Australian Division that night received no imported water, and on the following day had to rely solely upon the wells.

Since this vital supply could be so easily deranged by a bombardment or a turn of the weather, it was clearly a matter of the utmost urgency to increase the storage. For this reason, and also in order to avoid much heavy and unnecessary labour in distributing, Colonel de Lotbinière, Birdwood's chief engineer, suggested that a steam-engine and pumping plant should if possible be obtained and installed on the Beach, and the water be forced through pipes laid up the gullies to tanks in various parts of the Anzac area. A somewhat rickety second-hand engine was accordingly obtained from Egypt, and the laying of pipes and setting up of heavy iron storage-tanks were put in hand. By these measures a fairly assured water-supply appeared to be in prospect.

From the first the "advanced base" of the Anzac force was really Anzac Cove, and the system of work there was from an early stage conditioned by the shelling from the enemy, who had it within easy range. As has been mentioned,⁵ after a futile attempt to bombard the Beach from directly inland, he had shelled it heavily from the Olive Grove in the

⁵ See p. 76

south, slaughtering many mules and forcing the distribution of water and supplies to be performed thenceforth at night. Shortly afterwards a new battery opened from the north. Four miles distant on that flank, beyond the farthest spurs of Hill 971, rose several hills which from Anzac appeared to lie detached in the Suvla plain, although they were in reality the nearest outliers of the hill-mass beyond Northern Anafarta. The most westerly were called, from the colour of their dried scrub, the "Chocolate Hills"; the more easterly, which were separated by a valley from the Chocolate Hills, and were marked with belts of scrub serrated like a "W" along their corrugated slopes, were known as the "W" Hills. From the latter, about the middle of May, there opened a battery of field-guns, which at first fired mainly on the New Zealand positions on Walker's Ridge and the Top, but shortly afterwards commenced almost daily bombardments—always of shrapnel—upon the Beach and anchorage. This battery, which was under the command of a German, Major Lierau,⁶ and became known as "the Anafarta gun," fired with great accuracy;⁷ but, as its range was a long one, the "bump-bump-bump-bump" of the distant discharge and the whine of the small approaching shells were often heard in time to allow men to shelter between the stacks of stores, which the shrapnel would not penetrate; on the other hand, the shells from the Olive Grove, coming with less warning and being frequently high-explosive, were more dangerous.

The smaller craft in the Anzac roadstead were fired upon by both these batteries;⁸ but the landing of troops was still carried out by day until an occurrence on May 26th brought the practice to a sudden stop. On that day the cable-yacht *Imogen*, being only a small vessel, had endeavoured to slip inshore and moor at one of the buoys in the roadstead. As she did so, the Anafarta battery burst three shrapnel directly over her, causing her quickly to steam out again. At 4 o'clock on the same afternoon four destroyers, their decks crowded

⁶ Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 120.

⁷ A photograph of its shell bursting near the Beach is reproduced in *Vol. XII*, plate 84.

⁸ The larger ships which still on rare occasions ventured to Anzac by day usually lay farther out. If they came within several miles of the Beach, they were almost invariably fired on by a separate battery in the Olive Grove.

with troops,⁹ arrived off Anzac, where, through a breakdown of the cable to Lemnos, notice had not been received of their coming. One of them moved straight towards the buoy which the *Imogen* had visited in the morning, and anchored near it. The Anafarta battery forthwith opened, throwing two shells beyond the vessel, then one or two short, and then bursting eight or ten fairly over the men upon her crowded deck. Before the destroyer could draw clear, 4 soldiers and a seaman had been killed and 41 wounded, of whom 7 afterwards died.

This incident forced the Anzac staff to have the safeguard which since May 9th had been applied to the traffic of mules adopted for the landing of men also. Henceforth they were disembarked at night. It is true that the unloading of stores from lighters in the roadstead was still undertaken partly by day, and on certain occasions troops were sent away from Anzac in daylight. Thus on July 5th, when Birdwood desired to tempt the enemy to repeat his attack of June 29th, the 16th Battalion, leaving Anzac for a rest at Imbros, was purposely towed to its transport by daylight in order to give the Turks the impression that the garrison was being weakened. On that occasion, although the lighters were duly shelled, no loss was caused. But almost every important movement of shipping in Anzac Cove was now restricted to the night. The ships carrying supplies for Anzac would arrive from Lemnos¹⁰ after dark and steal over to a particular buoy off the Cove, one or more troopships also sometimes arriving and taking their positions at the other buoys. The staff at Anzac were previously notified of the date and hour of their arrival, and arrangements were made by the Naval Transport Officer on Anzac Beach to unload them. Captain Littler, in charge of the beach parties, provided the fatigue parties, and the Naval Transport Officer the lighters, horseboats, and—by arrangement with the fleet—the small naval steamboats which served as tugs in this roadstead. Work would continue sometimes at furious speed during dark, and in these hours the Cove took on some of the appearance of a busy commercial harbour. Small panting steamboats drifted up with great barges lashed

* These were men returning from hospital and reinforcements.

¹⁰ Sometimes ships with consignments which could not be unloaded in a single night used to lie by day in Imbros Harbour, and move over to Anzac nightly.

beside them; ammunition, biscuit-boxes, bales of fodder were man-handled from lighters to the shore, and loaded on the rickety carts; and, through it all, reinforcements kept arriving. Although the work, as has been stated, was really that of an advanced base of supplies, it was for a long time controlled, not by Hamilton's Lines-of-Communication staff, but by the Army Corps and the Navy, a few officers of the corps, the two divisions, and the Navy directing. Colonel Lesslie of Birdwood's staff was always in the thick of the movement, superintending the landing of supplies and the despatch of trains of mules and mule-carts to the various dépôts as the stores came ashore. Captain Griffiths of the Australian division was nightly busy on the Beach and the landing stages, checking and sorting the batches of reinforcements for his division, and forwarding them in charge of guides to their various units. Commander Cater, hoarse from shouting through his megaphone, directed the incoming barges to their proper piers and superintended the Anzac Beach parties in making them fast—no easy matter, where the only illumination for the whole bay and its foreshores was the light of the stars, or of a rare stable lantern swinging in the hand of one of these officers or tucked behind some stack of provisions where work was active.

It has been explained that, through lack of space on the Beach, additional dépôts of supplies for the two Anzac divisions had been established shortly after the Landing in other parts of the area.¹¹ Thus the 1st Australian Division, whose original dépôt (sometimes known as "A" Dépôt) was on the Beach, founded on May 3rd a "South" or "B" Dépôt on the lower slope of M'Cay's Hill near the mouth of Shrapnel Gully. At this point there quickly mounted great stacks of provisions, some of them sheeted over with bright green canvas almost more conspicuous than the naked biscuit boxes.¹²

Close below them, at Brighton Beach, a short jetty had been built. As the foreshore from which it projected jutted out in front of Gaba Tepe at only two miles' range, it was impossible to use the pier by day. But until July lighters were regularly taken there after dark and unloaded, thus

¹¹ *I'ol I*, p. 546

¹² This position is said to have been originally chosen in consequence of a barge drifting thither and being unloaded where stranded

avoiding much labour in carting goods along the Beach, although that method also had to be used. The "South" Dépôt itself was plainly visible from Gaba Tepe, and on May 6th and 12th, almost as soon as it was established, was bombarded from the Olive Grove. So severe was the shelling that the question of moving the dépôt was raised; but, since a supply store was much required in that position, it was decided that it must remain, and that the men responsible for its working must protect themselves as best they could. The stacks were accordingly rearranged, so that the piles of stores themselves screened from the enemy any activity in the dépôt, and also gave some protection. It was the movement of mules and carts by day from the main Beach round Hell Spit to this dépôt which had occasioned the original bombardments from the Olive Grove. But this movement had now been restricted to the night, and, when once the stores were in the branch dépôts, the units on the inland slopes, being mostly invisible to Gaba Tepe and Nibrunesi, could safely fetch them by day. The general practice was for the staff-captain of each brigade, with the quartermasters of its four battalions and other units, to go down at a fixed hour—usually about dusk—to the dépôt and receive the allotment of rations in accordance with their requisitions;¹³ the staff-captain would then get these carried, either on mules, if he could procure them, or by fatigue parties of men from the brigade, to a brigade dépôt close behind the front; thence parties from each battalion would fetch them to its lines, where the quartermaster-sergeant of each company received the rations for his men and distributed them.

Next to the South Dépôt, but nearer to the Beach, was the Engineer Store, to which timber, galvanised iron, barbed-wire, pipes, and other engineering material were similarly carted. The charge of this department was at first undertaken by a detachment of engineers of the 1st Division. At the beginning of June it became recognised as a department of the advanced base,¹⁴ and the 1st Division then established its own store

¹³ Forms were sent in daily showing the number of men then on the strength of the battalion

¹⁴ The staff was still provided by the 1st Division, the officer in charge being Lieut. E. D. Moore, R.E. (of Co. Leitrim, Ireland), and, after he was wounded, Lieut. J. E. B. Potter, R.E. (of Putney, London). These were British subalterns attached to the 1st Division

next to it, drawing materials from it and distributing them to its field companies much as the South Dépôt distributed them to the battalions. The ordnance office of both the divisions, to which units had recourse for clothing, equipment, arms, and ammunition, remained near the northern end of the Beach, where the stores of shells and other ammunition for the N.Z. & A. Division were stacked. The ammunition dumps of the 1st Division were at the southern end of the Beach, where a number of recesses had been dug into the foreshore to protect them from shell-fire. The carriage of all these goods from lighters to stacks on the Beach, and from the Beach to the dépôts south or north of it, was now performed entirely by night.

The chief facility at the base was a pier constructed in June by a party of the 2nd Australian Field Company under Lieutenant Watson.¹⁵ Its shoreward end was first built on trestles, but these were so easily displaced by the smallest waves that a change was at once made to piles, a Turkish 8-inch shell being used to drive them. The enemy's ammunition was insufficient to prevent this or the smaller piers and jetties from being built, but he would not allow craft of any importance to approach them by day. On May 21st, when a small steamer carrying water endeavoured to approach one of the old pontoon piers, the Turks placed seven shots within a few yards of her,¹⁶ and, when she had withdrawn, turned upon Trawler 329, which was anchored somewhat nearer than usual to the shore, and burst a shell inside her. On June 19th, when Watson's Pier was first completed, the torpedo-boat which acted as the daily despatch-boat from G.H.Q. attempted to approach it. As she came alongside, two shells from the Olive Grove fell short of her and one just beyond, others narrowly missing her as she hurriedly withdrew.¹⁷ Although the water beside the new pier was deep enough to take craft such as trawlers, the Olive Grove batteries would allow nothing larger than a lighter or a warship's steamboat to lie by it during the day, nor indeed were any but small craft brought to the piers at night.

¹⁵ Maj. S. H. Watson, D.S.O., M.C., then of 1st Div. Sig. Coy. Commanded 2nd Div. Sig. Coy., 1917/19. Draughtsman; of Plympton, S. Aust.; b. Adelaide 24 Oct., 1887.

¹⁶ Vol. XII, plate 80

¹⁷ Vol. XII, plate 85. The Turks this day hit the water steamer.

Although the facilities of the advanced base were so small, yet by pre-arranging definite berths for the ships, with a time-table for sailing and arriving and a system of discharging from the several berths to corresponding piers, the staff discovered that it was possible to bring ashore in an orderly manner during a single night 6,000 troops. A few came almost every night. In the first week of June, for example, there arrived—

- June 1—426 (reinforcements).
- 2—520 (mainly 4th monthly quota of reinforcements from Australia).
- 3—267 (mainly 2nd Field Company, N.Z. Engineers).
- 4—433 (no description given).
- 5—Nil.
- 6—103 (returning from hospital, &c.).
- 7—504 (New Zealand "4th" reinforcements).

At 3 o'clock every morning the fleet-sweeper (formerly a packet boat), which came nightly as a ferry from Lemnos, left the roadstead on her return journey. By daylight all large vessels had disappeared from the anchorage, and both harbour and offing were as empty as on the previous day.

Thus, since the sea was almost invariably calm, the working system of the Anzac base was determined by only one external factor of importance—the Turkish shell-fire. Whether the enemy ever realised what activity was proceeding each night upon the narrow foreshore within a few thousand yards of his guns, is doubtful. From an observation post at Suvla Bay, four miles to the north, and from Gaba Tepe, two miles to the south, his telescopes were incessantly turned upon the Cove, but his view was too limited to give him an accurate clue to the system. Although his infantry from their trenches, a thousand yards from the Cove, could hear nightly the puffing of steamboats, rattling of anchor-chains, and shouting of naval commands, his artillery observers were probably unaware of them. Hamilton protested that "extremely accurate outline panoramas of the Australian position from the back; trenches, communication tracks, &c., all to scale; a true military sketch" had been allowed to appear in a London newspaper on June 5th. "The wildest indiscretion in words could not equal this," he added. At a later date at least one photograph of Anzac Beach, stores, dugouts, piers, and paths, affording priceless intelligence to the enemy's artillery officers

if it had ever reached them, was published in the Australian press; a paragraph contributed by an Australian to a London paper said that one Turkish battery was the terror of Anzac Beach, having accounted for at least 1,000 casualties and made bathing next to impossible.¹⁸

If definite information of the routine or plan of the Beach had been secured by the enemy, he could have used his small stock of shells so effectively as almost to stop the operations of the base. But though his Anafarta and Olive Grove batteries enfiladed it, and one or the other opened practically every day,¹⁹ their fire was never regarded as more than a nuisance, and a personal danger rather than a peril to the force. The shelling usually lasted for about half-an-hour at a time, sometimes taking the form of five or six salvoes, but more often of single shells at intervals of a few minutes. It occurred almost invariably in the late afternoon, but sometimes in the morning also. It was seldom harmless, and may perhaps best be described by taking eight typical days:—

June 17—The Anafarta and Olive Grove batteries bombarded the Beach for ten minutes only, firing simultaneously from each flank. Casualties not recorded.

June 18—In the morning one battery opened fire against the south end of the Beach, killing one man. At night—for the first time since the early weeks of the campaign—the Olive Grove battery opened during dark, firing upon South Dépôt and the Beach Road to Anzac Cove. Doubtless the enemy rightly suspected that the dépôt would be busy at that hour.²⁰ As the dépôt had also been heavily shelled on the 15th, and a quantity of stores destroyed, and as the shelling by night seemed to indicate that he was aware of the routine, the shifting of "B" Dépôt was mooted, but was not carried out.

June 19—Both the Anafarta and Olive Grove batteries opened a few minutes' cross-fire on the Beach. The experiment appears to have

¹⁸ It is known that a similar hint, found by the Turks during June in the diary of a dead British officer, caused them to realise the damage effected by their bombardments of the British beaches at Helles, and possibly led them to increase their efforts. At any rate on June 19 the enemy's guns firing across the straits at the rear of the British and French positions placed 87 high-explosive shells around Hunter-Weston's headquarters, almost as many among the animals crowded above "W" Beach, and 150 in the French base at "V" Beach, which lay completely open to fire from the southern shore. A similar bombardment of the French rear, occurring before the heavy Turkish counter-attack of July 5, killed or wounded 3 officers, 60 men, and 400 animals. On the night of July 19, in a bombardment of "V" Beach, the French had 62 men killed or wounded.

¹⁹ On July 22 it was noted as worth recording that the Beach had not been shelled for two days. This was at the time considered by some to be a sign that the enemy was preparing for the general attack which was expected on July 23.

²⁰ His shells bursting along the road did not catch the mule-train, but they struck several of the shallow dugouts of the Army Service Corps bordering the road. One burst in a dugout containing three men, but only one was hurt (by fragments of stone and splinters).

been harmless. At night a shell killed a man in the engineer dépôt, south of the Cove, and drove the party in charge of the stores from their dangerous bivouac. It was decided to protect the store as far as possible by building traverses.

June 20—The Turkish batteries were almost silent.

June 21—The enemy's batteries sank one of the water-barges, drove away the larger water-carrier (which endeavoured to steam in and take the place of the barge), and then turned upon a trawler and hit her.

June 22—The Olive Grove guns again hit a trawler.

June 23—The Olive Grove opened upon the ammunition dépôt at the southern end of the Beach. One shell destroyed some fifty rifles and another set fire to several ammunition-boxes, the danger of conflagration and explosion being averted by several men who immediately seized the boxes and dumped them in the sea. On the same day eight of the bathers or other men on the Beach were hit.

June 24—The Anafarta battery and several field-pieces at the Olive Grove, as well as a 4.2 gun, again opened a cross-fire, clearing the Beach and forcing a fleet-sweeper in the offing to move her berth. Shortly after this bombardment the Anafarta battery opened, again causing sixteen casualties.

The fire of these batteries certainly cost more lives than that of any others in the Anzac zone, and caused the Beach to be recognised as the most dangerous part of the area. Those chiefly exposed were the staff concerned with the landing of stores and men,²¹ but battalions up in the trenches remarked that, when fatigue parties were detached to work for a time upon the Beach, they rarely returned without having had some of their number killed or wounded. Men of the medical establishments on the foreshore were constantly hit. Shells, undoubtedly intended for the bathers, fell into the New Zealand Field Ambulance, which, under Colonel Begg,²² served as a clearing hospital for the N.Z. & A. Division at the north end of the Beach. On one occasion, during a surgical operation, a shell came through the tent, scattering dust over the patient, but wounding no one. On June 11th shrapnel pellets, flying through the operating tent, killed two men who were sitting outside. By the middle of June five had been killed in the ambulance, and many

²¹ On August 5 the gallant Cater (Lieut.-Commr. E. H. Cater, R.N., Naval Transport Officer—see p. 352) was killed and Lieut. Cowan, R.N.R., wounded in rushing out along the pier to steady the crew of a small steamboat which had been holed during a bombardment.

²² Col C M. Begg, C.B., C.M.G. D.D.M.S., XXII Army Corps, 1917/18 Surgeon; of Wellington, N.Z.; b Dunedin, N.Z., 1879 Died of illness, 2 Feb. 1919.

wounded. This caused Colonel Manders, the chief medical officer of the division, to move the main part of the ambulance on June 27th to Walker's Ridge, still leaving, however, a dressing-station under one officer at the northern end of the Beach. The 4th Australian Field Ambulance in the comparative safety of Anzac Gully immediately above Birdwood's headquarters had, by June 11th, 6 of its staff killed and 36 wounded. In the Australian Casualty Clearing Station also, at the southern end of the Beach, men were constantly hit. A sailor who came in late with some minor complaint, and was tucked up in the hospital for the night while waiting for a boat, was killed in the morning. Captain Holmes, one of the most promising officers of the 10th Battalion and orderly officer to MacLagan, having looked in on the medical officers on the Beach while his chief had tea with General Walker, was mortally wounded. As a result of casualties the hospital was forced to dig more closely into the bank. It was fully realised by patients and medical staff alike that this shelling was not intended for them. The shells burst impartially along the whole length of the Beach, among the "hospitals" and ordnance and supply stores which were crowded there. In such a situation the medical establishments could not, and did not, expect immunity. On the other hand, throughout the campaign the British hospital ships lay unharmed, their white sides facing the entrance of the Cove, and their row of bright green lights and brilliant red cross dancing on its black water every night.

The Turkish shelling did not drive any of the necessary establishments off the Beach. The medical stations most needed there remained to the end of the campaign; the ordnance and supply stores, and the headquarters of the Army Corps, until after the offensive of August. The periscope factory, which before the end of May produced 3,000 periscopes, and thenceforward made periscope-rifles also, was on the Beach throughout. The "bomb factory,"²³ which was by June producing over 200 high-explosive bombs daily, was situated (of all places!) slightly above the Beach inside the triangle formed by the headquarters of the corps and the two divisions.

²³ Vol. XII, plate 101

The one establishment of which the moving had to be seriously considered was the South Dépôt. On June 15th and 18th, when a large increase in the reserve of stores was imminent, this dépôt was so heavily shelled that it seemed liable to destruction. Colonel Foott of the 1st Australian Division raised the question whether it was wise to increase the stock at that place, and inspections of several sites were made by him and by Generals Birdwood and Carruthers in order to determine the best course. But as days passed and the enemy's fire, though occasionally turned upon the dépôt, was never destructive, it was decided to retain the South Dépôt. Orders shortly came that ten instead of seven days' stock was to be maintained there; for the main reserve, which was then being increased to twenty-three days' supplies, Anzac Gully was chosen,²⁴ as being entirely hidden from the enemy.

Just as the system of work ashore adapted itself to the conditions imposed by the enemy's shell-fire—partly avoiding and partly ignoring it—so did the routine of the anchorage. Since the G.H.Q. torpedo-boat could not come to the pier, she anchored in the offing and was met by a small steamboat, to which she transferred her despatches and passengers. A similar routine was adopted by the ferry-steamers (in this case trawlers), one of which each day made the Imbros-Anzac-Helles-Imbros journey, while another made the reverse. They moved in accordance with published time-tables,²⁵ each arriving off Anzac in the day-time and anchoring in the offing. A small steamboat put out to them from Watson's Pier, carrying odd passengers, and transferred these and their luggage to the trawler, which in turn transferred to the steamboat any passengers for Anzac and sometimes a little urgent cargo. The trawler then sailed. Occasionally a few shells were fired from the Olive Grove at the boats engaged in these services, especially if some extra formality or bustle on board gave the impression that the passengers included officers of importance. On one occasion a steamboat carrying Sir Ian Hamilton to the pier was warmly shelled. But these small craft were generally left alone, and were often even

²⁴ By July 17 the stock at Anzac had been increased to 23 days' rations and 2 days' fuel for 25,000 men; also 5 days' grain and 1 day's hay for 1,000 animals. At Helles 24 days' rations for 45,000 men and 4 days' forage for 8,000 animals.

²⁵ Published in military orders and posted on the Beach

allowed to go out to a barge-load of stores moored in the roadstead, make it fast, and tow it to the Beach without interference.

It was obvious from the first that what hampered the enemy's action against the Beach was shortage of ammunition. With a supply approaching that which was afterwards available to the A.I.F. in France, or even equal to that of the Allies in Gallipoli, he might by day have burnt the stores, wrecked the small craft, and broken the tanks and pumping engine; by night he might have rendered the Beach and piers almost impassable for fatigue parties. But the shell factory newly established under German direction at Constantinople gave only a small output, and that of inferior quality; and it now appears, though at the time it was widely doubted, that Roumania and Bulgaria during this period prevented the passage of German ammunition through their territory to Turkey.²⁶ The result was that from the beginning of the campaign the Turks required almost the whole of their shell-supply for the most pressing needs of defence, for which it occasionally fell dangerously low. Consequently, though the Turkish artillery was improving and, in von Sanders' opinion, "shot quite well,"²⁷ it had to refrain from firing on any except the most important targets.²⁸ It is true that if the enemy had realised the nature and importance of the work on the Beach, and the impossibility of protecting it, he would probably have foregone his daily bombardments of the trenches and concentrated his shell-fire on the Beach, where almost every shell told, and where, even with his limited ammunition, the damage to material and hindrance to the operations might have been vital. But since he lacked the necessary insight, the work of the base continued under the muzzles of his batteries almost without impediment.

The experience of the "administrative" staff of the Australian and New Zealand forces grew very rapidly at Anzac. As the situation there began to approach that of a permanently entrenched camp, it was found necessary to revert to methods of routine not far different from those of peace.

²⁶ Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 125.

²⁷ This shortage is described in *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 90.

²⁸ The party building Watson's Pier, in full sight of the observers for both Turkish batteries, was hardly ever fired on during its three weeks' labour.

During the heavy fighting of the Landing, if a single private came to the ordnance officer on the Beach with a breathless verbal request for more ammunition, he would be sent back with any available stragglers carrying a load of ammunition-boxes. The ordnance or supply officers rightly considered that their duty at such a time was to give all possible help to the troops without observing the formalities of accounting and "requisitions," provided that they themselves could keep a general check of their stocks. But when the crisis of the Landing had passed, it became imperative to secure the prevention of waste—an urgent and immediate military object—by reimposing systematic checks. Not only had rations, ammunition, and stores to be properly indented for; even water from the Shrapnel Gully wells could in the end be obtained only by proper requisitions. During June an audit was taken of the stocks of rations and ammunition by comparing them with the proper records.

A great part of the formalities, which were often contemptuously summed up as "red tape," could have been avoided if all officers and men, in seeking supplies for their units—or even concessions such as rest or relief, or awards of honours or decorations—had been determined to assist their fellow-units and the general cause by resolutely refraining from seeking more than their due. But although many commanders, following the example conspicuously set by men like Gellibrand and Glasgow, did instil into their commands this spirit, there existed a tradition—largely inherited from the old professional army—that the best quartermaster was one who, by slyness in manœuvring within the regulations, could obtain for his unit more than its share. This attitude was common in old soldiers, but did not serve the general good. In July, for example, when it was found exceedingly difficult to provide even a somewhat diminished ration of water for all the front-line troops, Colonel Foott and his assistants, working night and day to maintain the supply, discovered that the cause of the deficiency was partly the failure of units to help one another in the obtaining of water at the wells. A system for requisitioning for water was then necessarily established, and there immediately resulted an orderly and more adequate supply to the front line.

Experience in difficult conditions was, in fact, beginning to teach both staff and troops that almost any trouble could be overcome by intelligent organisation, and that it was impossible to exaggerate the patient forethought and care which should be devoted to the task of organising. This point of view was a new one to many Australian soldiers, especially, at first, to those accustomed to the life of the bush, who tended to look upon elaborate organisation as "fussy" and unnecessary. Indeed the British armies as a whole were only beginning to perceive what could be done by careful planning beforehand. There were whole phases in the soldier's life—such, for instance, as the scanty but vital snatches of rest, and the equally necessary recreation—which as yet received little systematic forethought from the staff. The field for forethought was so wide, and some of the problems so pressing, that the limited numbers of the higher British staff had—partly through sheer lack of time—been unable as yet to consider many of these needs; while the scope of others—such as railway construction—was as yet unimagined. Moreover to the troops themselves the great branches and sub-branches of army administration—operations, intelligence, supply, transport, movement of troops, promotion, discipline, sanitation, and others, with their respective offices and staffs and methods—were as yet barely realised to be the services by whose help they lived. Three years later the functions of the various army departments were as familiar, both to the soldiers and staff, as were those of railways and tramways, light and water services, building, clothing, and grocery stores in their civic lives. Many preparations which needed elaborate forethought and instruction in 1915 could be taken for granted in 1918, the staff knowing that they would be automatically carried out.

The force at Anzac, however, was not served by the same transport units by which its supplies were brought to it in Egypt or in France. It was occupying an almost permanent position, only half-a-mile from its base, but quite inaccessible to wheeled traffic. The established transport of the divisions—"general service" waggons, ammunition waggons, water-carts, horsed-ambulances, Maltese carts, with their innumerable horses and drivers—though nearly all brought to the original

Landing, had not been disembarked.²⁹ When the force did not advance, and the anchorage had to be cleared, all the animals and gear and most of the men had been sent back to Alexandria, where they remained, the drivers occasionally "deserting" and arriving as stowaways off the Peninsula. The special needs of Anzac were mainly served by the Indian Mule-Cart Corps, together with a reduced proportion of the Anzac transport troops, tables of the exact numbers required being drawn up at an early date by the local staff. The mule-carts were confined to the flats, but it was at one time proposed that the hills should be served by a light railway. This was to be operated by No. 11 Company of the Australian Army Service Corps,³⁰ which had been raised from railwaymen. But though the company was brought to Anzac, the short length of tramway eventually constructed along the foreshore was quickly encumbered with seaweed, and was never mechanically operated.

The daily rations of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps during May were³¹ :—

Preserved meat	12 oz.	
Biscuits	1½ lbs.	
Bacon	4 oz.	
Cheese	3 oz.	
Onions	½ lb.	(or potatoes ½ lb., onions ½ lb.). This "issue" was irregular.
Tea	⅔ oz.	
Jam	½ lb.	
Sugar	3 oz.	
Salt	½ oz.	
Mustard	⅛ oz.	
Pepper	⅛ oz.	

In addition, the divisional commanders, if so advised by their chief medical officers, could order :—

Rum—Half gill. (Comparatively seldom "issued" in Gallipoli.)

Tobacco (cigarettes or tins)—2 oz. weekly.

Lime juice (1-10th gill) was also authorised, but was not to be issued so long as fresh onions or potatoes were available. The labour involved in supply may be estimated from the fact that a 2-oz. ration, say, of tobacco meant the landing of a ton and a quarter.

²⁹ With the exception of a few water-carts, drivers, and ammunition waggons for the artillery.

³⁰ Commanded by Capt. E. O. Milne of the N.S.W. Govt. Railways, afterwards Major, D.S.O.; D.A.Q.M.G., Aust. Corps H.Q., 1917/18.

³¹ The scale here given differs slightly from that authorised, which was never exactly followed.

The 1st Australian Field Bakery had, since March 6th, been at Lemnos. But though its commander, Captain Prior,³³ and his men were from the first eager to supply the troops with bread, as did the French bakeries, it was not until the end of May that they were moved to Imbros for the purpose. There, working under great stress, they contrived from June 9th till the end of the campaign to send, whenever weather permitted,³⁴ a daily supply for half the Anzac troops.³⁴ Fresh beef was also obtained³⁵ (at one time thrice weekly) from ships at Imbros with refrigerated cargoes. But although the troops at first welcomed it as a change from the invariable "bully beef," many of the men as well as of the medical officers quickly turned against it. Sides of beef arrived on shore either uncovered or with a torn shroud and sacking, already fly-blown. Without better covering they were carried up the hillsides, either on the sweating shoulders of men or roped on a pack-saddle, to the stores of the regimental quartermasters. There, in some cases, they were kept exposed for hours in the extreme heat, commencing to go bad before they were "issued." This was pointed out early in the summer by several medical officers, and the ration was for a time at midsummer wholly discontinued.³⁶

³³ Maj. J. G. Prior. Commanded 1st Fld. Bakery, 1914/19. Café manager; of Adelaide; b. Penfield, S. Aust., 24 Sept., 1876.

³⁴ The daily supply was at first towed from Imbros to Anzac in a barge; but since these consignments were always held up by any freshness in the wind, the bread was eventually carried in a trawler, which sailed almost daily from Imbros. Shortage of the Imbros water-supply constantly interrupted the baking, and fuel was difficult to obtain, grass being used on at least one occasion. Shipments of wood were eventually obtained from a Greek contractor named Goulondris, who brought them—partly from Mt. Athos—at £2 2s. a ton. Until the end of July the Australian bakery, working alone on Imbros, besides sending some 14,500 bread rations to Anzac, daily supplied G.H.Q. and any troops on the island. At this stage numerous bakeries arrived, all of which were placed under Capt. Prior's command, until by August 30 he had, besides his own (then known as the "13th Australian" Company), the 10th, 11th, 29th, 41st, 50th, and 51st Divisional Bakeries, though most of these were at first handicapped through being unaccustomed to brew their own yeast. After August the daily supply was normally—to Anzac, 20,000 rations; to Suvla, 40,000.

³⁵ From this the 1st Aust. Division was supplied on one day and the N.Z. & A. Division the next. Birdwood's A.Q.M.G., Lieut.-Col. H. O. Knox, informed the 1st Aust. Division on Sept. 1: "Bread is issued only every other day on account of it being impossible to provide transport for a daily issue—not for any other reason." It is difficult to believe that with energy this could not have been overcome.

³⁶ The 1st Aust. Field Butchery (known at that time as the "13th Australian"), under Lieut. O. F. Ford (of Hobart), remained, together with a few men of the bakery, at Lemnos, supplying meat to the troops ashore and on the harbour. Cattle were obtained for the butchery from a contractor named Reeves, of Cyprus, and were slaughtered by Greeks.

³⁷ The senior medical officer of the N.Z. & A. Division, however, Col. Manders, recommended that the ration be continued, but that greater care be taken in handling it.

The food of the army in Gallipoli during the summer of 1915 was, by many observers, considered to have affected its health and consequent fighting strength more than any other factor, except the actual bullets and shells of the enemy.⁸⁷ It is true that some stalwart campaigners—the gallant, high-minded Bauchop,⁸⁸ for example, commanding the Otago Mounted Rifles at No. 2 Outpost—proclaimed the daily ration to be the most generous ever supplied to an army in the field. “The rations issued in this campaign have been of the most luxurious sort,” he wrote. “I question if British troops have ever been so well fed. Delicacies unknown before in the history of an army in the field have been lavishly distributed.” After detailing the day’s ration, he added: “This to my mind is the most luxurious scale of food. The health of the troops cannot be prejudiced by such a dietary.”

To veterans of the South African War, who could recall marching for weeks together on a short allowance of dry biscuits, the British ration at the Dardanelles appeared bountiful. The fact remained that, while the soldier on the veldt fifteen years before had kept fit on his half-ration, the man on Gallipoli with his whole ration fell sick.

⁸⁷ It is doubtful if this opinion is sustained by the evidence; see pp. 378, 380

⁸⁸ Lieut.-Col. A. Bauchop, C.M.G. Commanded Otago Mtd. Rifles, 1914/15 Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Dunedin, N.Z.; b. Port Chalmers, N.Z., 27 Feb., 1871. Died of wounds, 10 Aug., 1915.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SICKNESS OF THE ARMY

THE sickness which during the summer of 1915 invaded the British army at the Dardanelles, its causes and effects, and the methods by which it was combated, are matters for the medical history of the Australian forces.¹ But its influence upon the campaign was so great that a brief account of it must be given here.

Until the end of May the health of the troops at Anzac was perfect. The days were fresh and bright. The life was novel. Above all, on the practically uninhabited hillsides amid which the corps landed there existed scarcely any flies, and very few were bred there during the first month of the occupation. But in the manure of the transport animals, crowded in valleys behind the opposing lines, in the waste food and other refuse which, at least during the early weeks, was somewhat carelessly disposed of, and in the bodies of the dead, decaying by thousands after the Turkish attack of May 19th, they were produced in swarms. About the beginning of June they became so numerous as to be universally regarded as a pest, although it was not adequately realised how imminent a danger they constituted to the health of the troops.

Some illness had begun to be noted in May. On the 4th the officer then responsible for sanitation in the Australian Division² noted: "Health good—few cases diarrhoea." On May 10th: "Another case of dysentery. Doubt if they are true dysentery." On the 25th a New Zealand sanitary officer recorded: "Men suffering from diarrhoea. This is largely due to abdominal chill," to prevent which he urged the wearing of cholera-belts. On June 1st the number of sick

¹ The Official History of the Medical Services of the A.I.F. and R.A.N. is being written by Col. A. G. Butler (formerly of the 9th Battalion, and D.A.D.M.S., I Anzac Corps) and by other medical officers under his editorship. The short account here given owes much to his generous assistance.

² This was part of the duty of the second medical staff officer (D.A.D.M.S.) of the division. Upon Col. Marshall being wounded, the position at Anzac was first filled by Maj. E. S. Stokes, and afterwards by Majors A. J. Aspinall and A. H. Tebbutt (all of Sydney).

reported for the day at Anzac was 64. On June 18th those sent to the hospital ship or carrier numbered 117; the daily figures continued about the same until the beginning of July. On July 3rd the 1st Australian Field Ambulance noted: "Dysentery is becoming very acute, and cases of extreme collapse are occurring," and on July 8th the number rose to 153. On one day, July 22nd, it dropped to 44, since the commanders were expecting an attack on that or the following night, and from mixed motives of self-respect and love of excitement the troops refused to go sick. The figures for that week, with a strength of about 25,600, were:—

July 21	190
" 22	44
" 23	150
" 24	186
" 25	200
" 26	226
" 27	231

Thus at the end of July the corps was losing fortnightly through sickness as many men as would be placed out of action in a general assault. Nor did this represent the total trouble, since many who stayed on duty were almost as ill as those that were sent away. There was sickness among the Allied troops at Helles, but, at any rate in later months, not to the same extent.

The sickness was due almost entirely to diarrhœa (or dysentery) and enteric fever. The Australian and New Zealand troops had, like all others in the British forces, been vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against typhoid fever, this process having in their case been generally carried out during the voyage from Australia to Egypt. There is no doubt that the typhoid inoculation saved the force from being ravaged by that disease at several stages of the war, but especially at Anzac. As it was, where every condition favoured a devastating epidemic, there occurred only isolated cases, and those comparatively few. Lieutenant-Colonel Rowell of the 3rd Light Horse, the commandant at Pope's, a gallant and popular officer, died of it in hospital, but such was the prophylactic effect of the inoculation that typhoid was never a serious danger. There existed, however, two other forms of enteric, known as "paratyphoid A and

B." These diseases had been discovered before the war, but little was known of them, and the vaccine employed failed to protect the troops against them.³ Though they did not possess the extreme deadliness of typhoid, they placed large numbers of troops temporarily out of action.

But the epidemic which made the greatest ravages in Gallipoli was of the nature of dysentery. At the time when this disease began to occur, medical officers at the front found it very difficult to determine whether it was dysentery caused by some violent organism, or merely diarrhoea arising from unsuitable diet. For some time they tended strongly to a belief that it was not true dysentery. But the medical organisation—in most respects highly efficient—at that time provided no adequate method of enabling medical officers of the regiments, ambulances, and casualty clearing stations near the front to learn anything of the subsequent history of the cases which passed through their hands. At a fairly early stage those concerned at Anzac suspected that the epidemic was partly "amœbic" dysentery (that is to say, caused by a certain type of organism); and since some of them possessed a small supply of "emetine" (a preparation by which this form of the disease can be fought), they began to employ it, with some good results. An opinion was, however, received from the Base that the disease was not amœbic dysentery, in which case emetine would be useless. In August or September this decision was reversed, it being then estimated, according to one authority, that 80 per cent. of the cases were of that nature. At a still later stage, when at last pathological laboratories were established under Majors Archibald⁴ and Martin⁵ at Lemnos, it was observed that the dysentery changed somewhat suddenly from the amœbic to the bacillary type. Had it been possible to diagnose the diseases as soon

³ Lieut.-Col (then Major) Sir C. J. Martin, C.M.G., F.R.S., A.A.M.C. (formerly Professor of Physiology in the University of Melbourne, but then Director of the Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine), by his researches as an officer of No. 3 A.G.H. at Lemnos, enabled a vaccine to be produced in Australia and afterwards employed, ensuring protection against three forms of enteric. This vaccine was independently produced elsewhere also, and known as "T.A.B." Col. Martin was born in London, 9 Jan., 1866.

⁴ Maj. R. G. Archibald, D.S.O., R.A.M.C. Subsequently Director, Wellcome Tropical Research Laboratories, Khartum; of Colchester, Eng.; b. Secunderabad India, 4 July, 1880.

⁵ These two officers worked separately, but on parallel lines.

as they appeared, much more might have been done to prevent them. In September orders were given to treat every case with emetine; but at that date No. 4 Advanced Dépôt of Medical Stores at Anzac possessed neither emetine nor needles for its injection. Although therefore many troops were afterwards treated with it, this method was not generally practised during the crucial months. Indeed, what proportion of the cases during those months was dysentery and what proportion diarrhoea remains still a matter of opinion. Many men never recovered sufficiently to be returned to the front, but served afterwards in other classes of military employment or were invalided from the army. A relatively small proportion died.

For some of these reasons, during the main stress of the campaign the fight against dysentery, like that against the less serious forms of enteric, could only be waged by the medical officers by two main methods—first, sanitation; second, the sending away of sick to prevent contagion.

It was some days after the Landing before any but the crudest sanitation could be enforced in the firing line. The supports and reserves crowded behind the front tended to resort, for the offices of nature, to areas of scrub on the sheltered hillsides; and this practice continued longest in those parts—such as the head of Monash Valley—where fighting remained most acute. Moreover sanitation always varied with the degree to which troops were trained, organised, and inspected. On the morning of the Landing latrines were dug in certain parts of the hillside above the Beach, generally in areas exposed to shell-fire and therefore unlikely to be employed for bivouacs. In the rare cases in which latrines had to be made in the actual trenches, the ordinary form came to be a slit leading off the trench, sometimes provided with a system of pans emptied by orderlies. But at Anzac it was almost everywhere possible to site the latrines on the rear slopes, where, as in all sheltered areas, they at first invariably took the form of a narrow ditch or trench. From an early stage it was found necessary through want of space to dig these receptacles very deep. In other respects they remained, until the end of the campaign, the general pattern for Anzac.

When once latrines had been provided, their use was enforced, and, where formed and disciplined units were bivouacked, the fouling of ground, though almost unavoidable during the first few days, practically ceased. The cleaning of the valleys and hillsides behind the lines—on which were lying numbers of dead mules, as well as rifles, tools, and equipment dropped at the Landing—was ordered upon May 2nd, troops of the Royal Marine Brigade being detailed for the purpose. On May 14th Birdwood pointed out to his D.A. & Q.M.G.^o that water from the inland wells was being used for washing and incidentally fouled in the process; that the matter in the pit-latrines was not being regularly covered with earth; and that numbers of open bully-beef and other tins, still containing food, were to be found in the occupied area. He indicated the danger of flies breeding in the tins, swarming to the latrines, and thence carrying infection to the food of the men. The area which Birdwood instanced as most insanitary in these respects was not in the neighbourhood of the front line, but close to headquarters above the Beach at the southern end of Anzac Cove. Each individual battalion depended for sanitation upon its own sanitary detachment, composed of eight men under a corporal and working under the supervision of the regimental medical officer and his small staff; other units had sanitary orderlies under the instructions of their respective doctors; but the division as a whole had no "sanitary section" (although both Surgeon-General Williams and Colonel Howse had asked for its establishment), since none was then provided in the British Army organisation. On May 4th, however, Howse had managed to improvise a "sanitation company" of about 30 men, obtained from various units throughout the division, to keep clean the large area behind its lines. This was organised in three sections of 8 or 9 men under N.C.O.'s, each operating part of the area, digging the necessary latrines, and cleaning the ground, especially near the wells. The strength of the company, however, was far too small for the crowded area of the base, near headquarters itself. On the hillside above the Cove, around the three headquarters, were camped the beach parties, men detached from their own regiments

^o An army corps had, at that time, no special director of its medical services, the D.A. & Q.M.G. being charged with that responsibility.

and under loose control when not actually working. To remedy the evil conditions around the Cove, the base was on May 26th organised as a sanitary area under Lieutenant-Colonel Bowler,⁷ the "camp commandant" of the corps headquarters, with Captain Littler as adjutant and Major Millard as medical officer. Incinerators were built in which to burn meat-tins and other rubbish, and the headquarters area became temporarily cleaner; but with changes in both staff and working parties the conditions at times relapsed.

Far different was it in the trenches. It is true that during the early weeks, before the danger of the practice was perceived, ends of bacon, dregs of tea, and remnants of meals were constantly thrown by troops over the front or rear of their trenches. During May it was recognised that this encouraged the breeding of flies, and, as that pest increased, the cleanliness of the trenches was safeguarded by a very strict régime. Trenches and saps near the line were carefully swept daily; all refuse was collected and burnt; great care was exercised not to spill tea or water, which in that dry climate was observed instantly to attract flies. Those who came to the Peninsula at a later stage barely realised what were the conditions which gave rise to these practices. "This daily cleaning up had become almost a fetish in the army," wrote afterwards the commander of a battalion of the 2nd Australian Division.⁸ "But it undoubtedly engendered habits of orderliness . . . and also had a material effect on the health . . . by keeping down the flies."

There were three chief points at which flies could be dealt with: at the manure heaps, dead bodies, and refuse, in which they bred;⁹ at the latrines and bodies of the dead, where they touched infection; and at the food and eating vessels, where they imparted it. At some of these points the fight against infection could be waged both by covering or removing the matter on which the flies settled and by treating it with chemical preventives, and some of these precautions were accordingly taken. Part of the manure was burnt in

⁷ Lieut.-Col E R Bowler. Solicitor; of Gore, N Z; b. Inchelutha, N Z, 21 July, 1866.

⁸ *The 28th*, by Col. H. B. Collett, *Vol. I*, p. 79.

⁹ The common house-fly, generally assumed to be the most dangerous carrier of infection, bred almost entirely in the fresh animal manure, of which there were great quantities both at Helles and Anzac. The blow-fly bred mostly in dead bodies

incinerators, although quantities remained. Fly-proof box-latrines of the simple type afterwards employed in France were established by a few units, mostly late in the campaign; but the higher staff, if it was aware of the merits of this device, did not impose the system,¹⁰ apparently trusting rather to disinfectants or similar means of keeping the flies from refuse. Of these chemicals, however, there was never a sufficient supply. When cresol was available, there was not enough fresh water for mixing it; the pouring of kerosene on the latrines was soon prohibited.¹¹ As the campaign progressed, the tins and other refuse behind the lines were burnt in incinerators; the dead in No-Man's Land, always covered with flies, were sometimes, when possible, buried.¹² Many such sources of infection were, of course, out of reach. Some disease, for example, was probably imported by flies from the Turkish lines, which ran very close, although no definite evidence of this existed at Anzac. In the attempt to keep the flies from dugouts and shelters much might have been effected with mosquito netting, and in the later part of the campaign many men obtained from mates in Egypt, or even from Australia, enough at least to cover their faces while asleep; others, mainly officers, managed to curtain their dugouts. A small supply was also bought for use in ambulances and aid-posts.

Besides the flies it is possible that the dust, which now lay inches deep on the trodden tracks, may have acted to a very small extent as a carrier of infection. In this case nothing was, or indeed could be, done for prevention. But the third possible agent—water—was the subject of strict regulation. Whether any precautions were enforced at Alexandria or Malta to purify the supply sent to Anzac, or the barges in which it was brought, was not known; but when once it arrived, this, like all other drinking water in the area, was strictly guarded against contamination. The wells were covered, fenced off, and carefully guarded. Furthermore,

¹⁰ The scarcity of even the small quantity of wood required for latrines, and the temptation of the men to take it for firewood, have been cited as reasons why closed box-latrines were impossible. It may be assumed, however, that, if the value of this method and the need for it had been realised, steps would have been taken to protect the boxes. Indeed, some box latrines, as above stated, were used, especially in the final months.

¹¹ Chloride of lime was almost unobtainable, and when the need for it was urged, the medical authority at G. H. Q. could only recommend the Anzac authorities to get rid of the manure in which flies bred, and to spread "tangle-foot" on the trees.

¹² The spraying with kerosene and burning of these bodies was prohibited by G. H. Q. out of regard for Mohammedan sentiment.

regulations were at various times made to the effect that all water, however pure, must be treated with chloride of lime at the actual wells or tanks, and must also be boiled by the troops themselves before drinking. But neither of these regulations was continuously enforced, for the reason that the apparatus for effective chlorination could not be obtained. The real safeguard, after the water had left the wells or tanks, was the universal practice of boiling almost all drinking-water for tea. It is true that in times of movement bottles were generally filled with unboiled water. But it had been carefully kept pure, and although at first it was suspected to be a cause of diarrhoea, this opinion was ultimately abandoned.

Despite these measures of sanitation, the outstanding facts were that from June to October flies swarmed at Anzac; that the sanitary organisation, though it fought them with some success in the trenches, at no time succeeded in keeping them from the open latrines; and that, although food was generally covered, it was almost impossible to prevent them from settling upon it, even on its way to a man's mouth, while they swarmed over mess-tins and utensils and drowned themselves in the tea. The infection thus carried undoubtedly caused an important proportion of the sickness on the Peninsula.

The second possible method of fighting disease—the sending away of all infected men—was hardly attempted at Anzac, the efforts both of the commanders and of the troops themselves tending constantly in the other direction. Indeed from July onwards such wholesale evacuation would have been out of the question. Although the hospital ships were taking daily from Anzac 200 sick, mainly suffering from dysentery or diarrhoea, almost every man who remained was afflicted in a greater or less degree with one or other of these complaints. The need for maintaining the numbers of the garrison caused the medical authorities to aim, not at sending away the sick, but at keeping them as long as possible at Anzac. The ideal encouraged in the men was that of holding out and performing their regimental duties as long as they had strength to “carry on”; a policy never difficult of application to these troops, since, even in later years, when war service had lost its glamour and its conditions were often detested,

their mettle and inborn aversion to "giving in" almost invariably inclined them to struggle to the end against sickness.¹³

In order to assist in keeping men at the front, most of the regimental doctors established on their own account shelters in rear of the lines, in which men who seemed to need only a few days' rest could lie down and receive more suitable food. Moreover since the early days something in the nature of a hospital had been established in the tents and dugouts of the 3rd Field Ambulance on M'Cay's Hill, where from 20 to 40 patients were accommodated for two or three days—most of them to be sent away afterwards to the hospital ship, but a small proportion returning direct to their units in the line. In consequence of a report at the end of June that cases of cholera had occurred among the French at Helles, and since it was probable that this disease might come through from the Turkish lines, or at any rate be met with in the impending advance, it was ordered on July 7th that all men who consented should be inoculated against cholera; and on July 17th two temporary hospitals for cholera were established, one below Walker's Ridge and one in Rest Gully. Although no case of that disease occurred, these hospitals were soon filled with patients suffering from diarrhœa.

Thus, although the policy of retaining sick men on the Peninsula was probably fully justified by its moral as well as material effect, and was entirely in accordance with the desire of the troops, it made impossible one method of coping with the

¹³ This attitude was most strongly marked in the men who formed the original contingent. In September, for example, there came to the medical officer of the 9th a youngster named Gray (of Murgon, Q'land), whom he remembered having seen before. This was one of two brothers, Queenslanders of the 9th Bn., who during the voyage from Australia nearly a year before had both become ill with influenza. They had then been so reduced by illness that they were suspected of being tubercular, and were consequently brought before a medical board at Mena Camp and ordered to be returned to Australia. Both were so heartbroken that they wept, and Col. B. J. Newmarch (of Sydney), who presided over the board, relented, and allowed each of them to be put temporarily off duty, in order to build themselves up by food and exercise. They were eventually declared fit, and afterwards sedulously avoided the doctor, and both landed with their battalion. At the Landing one brother (Pte. G. R. Gray) had been a member of one of the parties which penetrated farthest. It was the other who now came to the regimental doctor saying that he had received a wound at the Landing and, though he had been to hospital, it was again giving a little trouble. He had endeavoured to "carry on," but had at last been forced to see if the doctor "could advise a little treatment." The medical officer found that he had had a compound fracture of the arm, two bullets through his thigh, another through diaphragm, liver, and side; and that there were adhesions to the liver and pleura. He was returned at once to Australia, where he was eventually discharged from hospital and, re-enlisting, returned to the front in the artillery. His brother eventually became quartermaster-sergeant of the 9th, in which capacity he continued to serve until the last year of the war.

epidemics, and undoubtedly increased both dysentery and enteric by retaining among the troops innumerable sources of infection.

For that proportion of the illness which was definitely caused by organisms and contagion, measures designed to prevent infection could alone be adequate. But a further proportion—possibly half of the general ill-health—was due to other causes. One of these, at first negligible, but increasing in importance as the campaign went on, was defective teeth. In the original A.I.F. few men had been enlisted whose teeth were not either perfect or perfectly repaired. But in the wear and tear of the campaign dental trouble began to occur, caused in some cases by the difficulty of grinding army biscuits. About the same time the original strictness of the enlistment conditions in Australia was somewhat relaxed, and men with more or less defective teeth were arriving at the front. Yet the Australian army medical service, being modelled rigidly on the British, included no recognised dentists, the sole provision in the early contingents—in spite of efforts made by Surgeon-General Williams—being the inclusion of a few dental instruments in the equipment of every field ambulance and transport. By getting several dentists, who were found in the ranks, to employ this crude outfit, some of the unit commanders enabled a proportion of their men to be treated both in Egypt and at Anzac.¹⁴ But the head of the army medical service in

¹⁴ These dentists worked both in the lines and in the hospitals or other medical establishments, and an endeavour was made to have the system regularised. On March 16 Col. Howse cabled from Mena urging that one of them "who has treated over 900 cases in the division" should be attached to No. 2 A.G.H. and given officer's rank. The Director-General of the Medical Services in Australia, however, holding strictly to the British army medical practice, opposed the recommendation, which the Minister accordingly rejected. On April 4, however, Bridges, upon the advice of Howse, cabled requesting that, "in the interests of the troops," this decision should be reconsidered. As the dental profession in Australia was at the same time pressing that officers should be appointed and sent from Australia, the Minister for Defence sent to the War Office an inquiry as to whether dentists were employed in the field. The reply was that a certain number were engaged when required, and in certain cases were given rank as officers "unattached," but that they were not included in medical units unless they happened also to be fully qualified medical practitioners. On receiving this answer Senator Pearce, wisely discarding an example somewhat difficult to comprehend, approved on May 18 of the raising of a number of dental officers and mechanics to be included in the A.M.C., and to serve at the Base and in Egypt, where the authorities asked for eight dentists with staff and full equipment. In July, before these had sailed, there came through the War Office a request (really emanating from Col. Howse through Surgeon Gen. W. Babbie, V.C., the senior medical officer in the Mediterranean) for ten dentists with mechanics and equipment to serve "near the front." This was at first confused with the demand from Egypt, and approval was on July 5 given for the appointment of 13 dental officers—6 to be sent from Australia, 6 appointed in Egypt, and 1 in England. (The raising of a dental reserve of the military forces in Australia, had been authorised shortly before.) The provision also included 13 mechanics, 13 orderlies, and equipment for work in Nos. 1, 2, and 3 A.G.H.'s, and the Australian Convalescent Dépôt in England.

Australia, despite pressure from Bridges and Howse at the front and from the dental profession in Australia, held tenaciously to the principle—generally a sound one—that the practice of the British medical service must be adhered to. It was not until Senator Pearce himself modified this policy that a small quota of dental officers and mechanics was raised for service in Egypt and at the Base. These arrived at Cairo in August. In the meantime two dental officers of the New Zealand force, and several privates and others in the A.I.F., had been working in the Australian hospitals in Egypt; and several other Australians¹⁵ and Captain Finn¹⁶ of the New Zealand Field Ambulance, though lacking full equipment, were endeavouring to alleviate dental trouble as best they could among the 25,000 men at Anzac.

The result was that men with broken "plates" had often to be sent round the Mediterranean in search of a dentist; the majority of other sufferers had to endure their troubles, and grind their biscuits as best they could.

A second possible cause of disease was the plague of lice, which spread rapidly through the force when trench-life began. Body-lice were first remarked on a few individual soldiers on the voyage from Australia. In Egypt the cases increased, probably through contact with unclean houses or clothes. As the vermin spread by breeding in the seams of clothes, steps were taken at Mena to "delouse" affected garments in a hot-air sterilising plant. But comparatively few men were affected by lice until the trenches at Anzac were dug and inhabited. There not only did the troops occupy a number of trenches abandoned by the Turks; they necessarily lived for months with their clothes unchanged. In the course of successive reliefs they lay packed on the floor of communication saps, or in "puzzies" in the trench-wall inhabited by other men before them, or in dugouts previously occupied by generations of troops in reserve. The necessary result was that in a short time practically no officer or man was

¹⁵ Among those working at Anzac were a lance-corporal—A. M. McIntosh—of the 1st Bn (later captain, Aust. Dental Services; of Sydney), Sgt. H. D. Ferguson, 12th L.H. Regt. (later captain, Aust. Dental Services; of Gundagai, N.S.W.) and another sergeant, of the 1st A.C.C.S., on the Beach.

¹⁶ Lt.-Col. B. S. Finn, D.S.O., N.Z.M.C. Dentist, of Auckland, N.Z., b. Invercargill, N.Z., 18 Oct., 1880.

without lice and fleas.¹⁷ Only when men were moving were their skins free from the constant crawling of the pest. There existed no system such as that organised in France of passing the clothes at intervals through a steam cleaning-apparatus. All that the men could do was to employ intervals of leisure in taking off their shirts or breeches, and killing the vermin and eggs in the seams. Nevertheless the dreaded typhus, carried by body-lice, by which armies have frequently been devastated, did not occur at Anzac; and except possibly for certain vague trench fevers, of which little was then known, no definite disease appears to have been caused by them.

They were nevertheless probably contributory to the most general cause of sickness at Anzac. That cause was not always easy to diagnose or express, but, as on many other occasions, the clearest summary of the situation is found in a short note sent in on July 29th by the commander of the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General Monash. In this he stated that, as sickness was steadily increasing, he had called together his four regimental medical officers, who agreed that:

- (1) the men's health was below normal and was getting worse;
- (2) no further steps could be suggested towards improving sanitation or hygiene;
- (3) the principal symptoms were—
gastric derangements,
bronchial affections,
rapid pulses,
loss of weight,
heart dilatation:
- (4) the predisposing causes were—
irregularity of rest and meals,
restricted dietary (as regards variety),
hot weather,
flies,
dust.

Brigadier-General Monash added that he did not regard the position as very serious; under a powerful stimulus, such as the prospect of an offensive (which at this time he knew to be imminent) the condition of the men would markedly improve. But the work during the last three weeks had been very hard—fatigue parties turning out at all hours of the day and night, at short notice, and absorbing every fit man. He therefore asked for as much relief as was possible.

¹⁷ A similar condition existed in the South African War, 1899-1902. So important did the matter appear to the medical authorities that the first meeting of the "Anzac Medical Society" (Anzac Branch, British Medical Association) on 7 Nov., 1915, was devoted to a discussion of the best means of combating the pest.

The view concisely expressed by Monash was the one almost universally held—that one of the most prevalent causes of sickness lay in that very scale of food which drew such encomiums from the gallant Bauchop. The amount of the rations at Anzac was always sufficient or more than sufficient, and, in a war of movement, would have maintained the troops in excellent health. For a month it was possible to eat “bully beef,” onions, army biscuits, bacon, and jam, and drink tea with relish. But as month followed month; as heat and flies increased; as men became jaded with heavy monotonous work, insufficient sleep, and almost universal diarrhoea and dysentery; as vermin encroached and their constant crawling over chest and limbs precluded all rest and its refreshment; as these conditions grew, the troops sickened of their unchanging ration. They had little appetite for the over-salted “bully,” which, in the heat of midday or afternoon, slipped in its own fat across the platter or mess-tin, swamping stray flies as it went; or for the thin apricot jam on tasteless biscuit; or for the cheese, greasy from exposure to the sun and filling the dugout with an odour sickeningly reminiscent of that exhaling from the corpses in No-Man’s Land. Had the troops been freshened by some alteration in their conditions, their health might have suffered less. But there was no change of scene in the burnished sky, the hillsides worn into hundreds of little paths, the figures of men constantly tramping with water-tins or other burdens through the glaring white dust, the mule-lines, and the all too obviously frequented latrines. There was no change in the smell from the distant corpses of the dead, and from the burning metal and fat of “bully-beef” tins in the nearest incinerator. The units in “rest” lived under the same conditions as those in the line; they enjoyed no “spells” among civilians, women, or children, as in the rest areas in France; there were no daily papers, no *cafés* or *cabarets*. Gallipoli was never to be connected in any man’s mind with any popular tune or snatch of a song heard there;¹⁸ there were few pleasures, good or bad. Except for the rum-ration—sparingly issued, chiefly to miners—and for certain casks of wine which

¹⁸ Probably the only music heard at Anzac was that of a few church parades (the 3rd Bn. started a choir) and of a band of one N.Z. battalion, which at a later stage gave a performance in one of the gullies north of Anzac.

drifted ashore from the sunken *Triumph* and caused trouble among a few of the discoverers, there was no strong drink during these months.¹⁹ Incidentally it may be noted that there was consequently an almost complete absence of crime, the military police having practically nothing to do.

Efforts were made at a fairly early stage to obtain more variety in the rations. The first step—the provision of fresh bread on alternate days—was the result of a conference held at G.H.Q. in May. Eggs were actually twice distributed during June, but the consignment was sufficient only for a comparatively small portion of the garrison. At the beginning of that month, with the approval of almost all units, extra jam was provided instead of part of the “bully-beef” ration; in July, in consequence of frequent recommendations by the medical officers, rice and occasionally dried fruit were served out, taking the place of the extra jam. On rare occasions, instead of “bully beef,” tins were given out containing an excellent stew of meat, vegetables, and gravy—known as “Maconochie’s rations.” At Anzac this stew was always regarded as the most precious delicacy, although in later times, when more varied food was obtainable, it became unpopular. The rare “issues” of rum, and the occasional infinitesimal portion of lime-juice—to prevent scurvy—formed the nearest approach to a “relish.” On July 24th, almost immediately before the greatest effort of the campaign, tinned milk was provided, but it was at once²⁰ withdrawn by order of G.H.Q. until the men should consume the stacks of cheese to which they had a strong and reasonable aversion.

During June and July the strength of the troops visibly declined. The great frames which had impressed beholders in Egypt now stood out gauntly; faces became lined, cheeks sunken. Several warnings were sent in by medical officers pointing out the increasing weakness of the men.²¹ A

¹⁹ There was no rule against officers obtaining wine or spirits from Imbros, but they were practically never able to do so. Some unit commanders insisted upon their messing as their men did, and at Anzac this was the general practice.

²⁰ On July 26.

²¹ On July 29 Col. Howse wrote to Gen Walker, commanding 1st Aust. Div: “It is with regret that I am compelled to report that the officers and men of your division are suffering a great deal from a type of diarrhoea which is producing anæmia, and considering the food and environment under which they are living, I shall expect a general deterioration of their physique.” The offensive was then imminent. Howse recommended a daily “issue” of milk and rice, and “a medicinal ration of rum every night whilst great strain is being maintained.” The most serious deficiency was probably the general absence of fresh vegetables.

few simple measures would have provided, if not a remedy, at least an immense alleviation of much of this trouble. If those men who were supposed to be well had been able to vary their food by purchasing small luxuries at a canteen; or if those who were sick could have obtained during the early summer trifles such as cornflour, arrowroot, or tinned milk from the medical stores or Red Cross in quantities bearing any proportion to their immense numbers, some sickness would have been avoided, and much would have been more easily borne by those who had to face it out at their work. Instead—except for such medical comforts as the regimental doctor could obtain for a few special cases—"bully beef," mainly from South America, over-salted and suspected by all the men of having been already robbed of its juices for "extract," remained during most of these critical months the staple diet for sick and well alike at Anzac. The need for a canteen at which the men could buy pickles, sauces, dried or tinned fruits, tinned milk, sweet biscuits, chocolate, or margarine was pressed upon Birdwood's staff by both divisions. When on June 18th £146 worth of canteen stores²² was sent to Anzac, it could easily have been sold a hundred times over. On July 5th the divisions were informed that the War Office had been asked to send out a "Field Force Canteen,"²³ but on July 8th it was intimated that there was "no hope" of the request being granted. As nothing was effected by the staff of the army corps, Colonel Foott, of the 1st Australian Division, a fortnight later inaugurated a plan by which the division was to start its own canteen; but this had not reached finality before the end of the campaign.²⁴ As for supplementary comforts

²² Collected from the transport *Sceang Bee*, and made available for purchase by representatives of the troops.


²³ A canteen was for a short time provided by a Greek civilian on "W" Beach at Cape Helles, but his presence was afterwards considered undesirable.

²⁴ At an early stage there had been an active barter on the Beach between Australians in possession of expended Turkish shrapnel-cases and men of the Navy, who gave bread or tobacco in exchange, and who kept the shell-cases (or sold them to their officers) as *souvenirs*. At times during the shelling of the Beach all work stopped in the offices on the side of Plugge's Plateau, while the whole staff and other denizens of the hillside stood watching a few half-naked Australians amusing themselves by racing for the shrapnel-case after each burst. A private trade of a different kind was occasionally set up by some hard-headed individual, who contrived to import from Imbros a limited stock of chocolate or biscuits and began to sell it at enormous prices to men passing along the saps. This commerce was suppressed by the authorities as being inconsistent with the "mateship" between soldiers.



SICK AND WOUNDED BEING TOWED FROM ANZAC TO THE HOSPITAL SHIP
OR FERRY

*Taken by L/Cpl K. H. McConnell 5th L.H. Regt
Aust War Memorial Collection No C425*



BARGES CONTAINING SICK AND WOUNDED REACHING THE HOSPITAL SHIP,
SUMMER, 1915

*Taken by Chaplain the Rev. E. N. Merriman
Aust War Memorial Collection No C2670*

To face p. 380



A "HAIR-CUT" AT ANZAC

Lent by W. O. C. R. Eldon A.A.O.C.
Aust. War Memorial Collection No. C1139

To face p. 381.

for the sick, although very large sums had been raised by the Red Cross in Australia and were at this time being spent in Egypt, very little reached the sick at the front during the critical months of the campaign.²⁵ Indeed it is doubtful if the majority, either of the men or of medical officers who clung to duty at Anzac, realised at this time that such a fund existed.

A system of reliefs and rests, such as was afterwards possible in France, was out of the question at Anzac. A proportion of regiments or brigades were of course withdrawn into the area behind the lines; but in such a position as Anzac the necessary works were so urgent that this period was completely occupied with heavy and monotonous fatigues; and, though the rest area was generally safe, the fatigues often took men to the Beach, where casualties were almost certain to occur. There was no change of life or of scenes and sounds or diet. The nearest area for such a rest was in the islands; but troops, if withdrawn thither, could not be rushed to the line in an emergency. The withdrawal of a battalion at a time from Anzac to Imbros was decided on by G.H.Q. on May 21st,²⁶ and a short snatch of complete rest was thus afforded to the following battalions:—

1st Bn., left Anzac June 29. Returned to Anzac July 7.
16th Bn., left Anzac July 5. Returned to Anzac July 10.
10th Bn., left Anzac July 8. Returned to Anzac July 11.
14th Bn., left Anzac July 11. Returned to Anzac July 14.
8th Bn., left Anzac July 12. Returned to Anzac July 16.
Canterbury Bn., left Anzac July 15. Returned to Anzac July 19.
4th L.H. Regt., left Anzac July 17. Returned to Anzac July 21.
Otago Bn., left Anzac July 20. Returned to Anzac July 22.

(The troops usually left Anzac early in the morning and returned from Imbros late at night on the dates shown.)

“A perfect holiday picnic,” noted Captain Nott, medical officer of the 10th, after its visit to Imbros. But the rests were so short, and the troops to whom they could be allotted so few, that their effect on the health of the force was not appreciable.

²⁵ In July Lieut.-Col. Hon. J. L. Beeston (of Newcastle, N.S.W.), 4th Fld. Amb., sent for and received from the Red Cross a consignment of fifty cases of pyjamas, socks, shirts, soap, &c., for patients.

²⁶ Apparently at the same conference which determined upon the provision of bread to Anzac

There was possible at Anzac, however, one form of recreation which, in the words constantly used by medical officers, was "the salvation" of the troops—sea-bathing. As has been said, the allotment of water—sometimes half-a-gallon, often a third, sometimes only a quart to each man daily—was not sufficient to allow them to clean their clothes. With an egg-cupful of their allowance they contrived to wash their faces and hands and generally to shave; in Monash Valley the water of one well, having been banned for drinking, was allowed for washing. But for practically the whole force the only opportunity for washing either bodies or clothes was that afforded by a visit to the Beach.

From the day when first a section of the troops was withdrawn from the line to rest, bathing became the one officially approved recreation. The men at the Anzac base were able to get to the sea every day, and early in May all sections of the garrison were informed that troops not actually guarding the trenches could be sent to the Beach in small organised bathing parties. In practice, although for men in the trenches the chance might not occur once in a month, almost every man in the force contrived occasionally to get to the sea. The Beach shelved gradually, especially at Ari Burnu point, allowing the few who could not swim to bathe in comparative safety. The learners paddled about the bows of the small craft in the Cove, while the swimmers dived off piers and barges.

In June the bathing became so popular that the Beach took on some of the appearance of a health resort. On June 20th, for example—a drowsy midsummer Sunday—404 men were counted at one time either in the water or sun-bathing, and many more sitting half-dressed, browning their backs or dressing or undressing. The result was that about this date those of the enemy's guns which normally shelled the Beach began to be frequently turned upon the bathers, causing as has been explained, a number of casualties in the New Zealand hospital at the northern end of the Cove. But Birdwood, although this fact was represented to him, refused

to interfere with the bathing. Himself a good swimmer, and possessed of a keen admiration for the athletic spirit and ability of his men, he was convinced that the recreation was of great moral and physical value to the troops. The hospital was moved, but the bathing continued, in spite of frequent bombardments and the consequent casualties, from the Landing until the Evacuation.²⁷

An alleviation which perhaps came second to that of bathing was the receipt of a mail from Australia. The first such mail was received on the seventh day after the Landing, and later ones, ranging from 234 to 1,360 bags, arrived at intervals of about a fortnight, the letters reaching the troops in the front line on the same day or the next. The delivery of parcels was irregular; nevertheless they usually reached the soldier to whom they were addressed, unless, as often happened, he had left the front through wounds or sickness—a difficulty which in later years necessitated in the postal system a revolution which will be described in its place. The mails from England, including a proportion of London newspapers, reached the Dardanelles at shorter intervals. Later, in consequence of

²⁷ For instance it is recorded that on June 23, during bathing, some eight men were hit—one of them came out of the water holding his almost severed arm. Most of the men took cover for a few minutes, but some apparently did not think it worth while to leave the water. Next day, when men were bathing, the Olive Grove and Anafarta batteries laid down a cross-fire upon the Beach, drove the bathers temporarily off it, and made a fleet-sweeper in the anchorage shift her berth. All the while two beginners remained paddling and laughing in the water, practising the "dog-stroke" between the bows of the barges. As soon as the shelling eased the bathers returned. A number were lying sun-bathing on the edge of the strand when the Anafarta gun opened again, killing 2 of them and wounding 14 with one burst. But the same evening bathing began again. The Anafarta gun opened almost immediately, bursting a shell directly over a number of bathers, but hitting none. The men hurried from the water. Three or four more shells arrived—shrapnel, perfectly burst, low down over the water's surface, then a pause for ten minutes. The bathers began to return to the water, when a further shell burst over it. Some of those in the water waved their hands at it; but one, waving with less meaning than the rest, came out with blood streaming from his throat. Bathing again ceased for ten minutes and then continued, the Turkish battery, probably short of ammunition, abandoning its effort before the swimmers did. On that evening, as usual, Gen. Birdwood was through it all among the swimmers, ineffectually shadowed by his faithful Australian aide-de-camp, Lieut. R. G. Chrnside (of Carranballac, Skipton, Vic.), whom the anxious staff had urged to shepherd their general away from trouble. In the weeks which followed, Turkish sharpshooters at Snipers' Nest, nearly a mile distant—and on the scrubby side of Baby 700, which was slightly nearer—eventually drove most bathers away from the shallow spit of Ari Burnu point; and far south near Clarke Valley, where men of the 3rd Inf. and 2nd L.H. Bdes. used to bathe in full view of Gaba Tepe, the accurate sniping with rifles from along the shore and even occasionally with a machine-gun from Gaba Tepe itself, made bathing impossible by day, and even the act of walking along the Beach exceedingly dangerous. Parties accordingly bathed from this beach at night. But in Anzac Cove, although some bathing occurred at night, the practice of bathing by day, bombardment or no bombardment, continued.

the great size of the Australian mail, a practice grew up of retaining Australian papers at the Base for distribution to the hospitals. This added to the dearth of news among the troops at the front. Even the few English newspapers were several weeks old. The result was that, as commonly happens in war-time, the place of the accurate news-services of peace was usurped by a succession of rumours, known to the A.I.F. as "furfies,"²⁸ which were passed by word of mouth. These were usually alleged to be founded on reports from "a staff officer's batman" or "a signaller on the Beach." They varied little—the Italians were about to land with an army of 100,000; 50,000 Russians were being sent to join the expedition; Greece was "coming in" with her army. They were generally improbable, and were so regarded by the majority. But it was a marked quality in the Anzac troops that, however cynical, they never ceased to be convinced that the fortune of war would ultimately favour them, and they tended to believe any cheering rumour; at the worst it gave passing interest to the day and helped them to digest their meals. In order to furnish more authentic news, G.H.Q. most wisely published a small news-sheet, *The Peninsula Press*. This was posted at the headquarters of many units, as well as on the Beach, the troops crowding to read it.²⁹ The other principal reliefs to the monotony of garrison life included the sight of a warship bombarding, which, in spite of a standing order, caused every hill to be outlined with men; and, more rarely, the spectacle of a Turkish aeroplane dropping bombs, or of a British machine followed by the white puffs of enemy shrapnel.

When shipload after shipload of wounded men left Anzac after the Landing, both they and the troops still at the front imagined that these casualties would proceed to the hospitals in Egypt or Cairo, and that the majority would thence before long be returned to the front. Little was it realised that a proportion of these men, and still more of the sick and wounded

²⁸ See Vol. I, p. 92.

²⁹ See Vol. XII, plate 95. A journal of a different order, *Dinkum Oil* (Australian slang for "true news"), was produced in the 1st Aust. Div. This was a periodical skit, which was really originated by Maj. Blamey, the Intelligence Officer of the division, in order to ridicule a recurrence of spy-mania. It was edited by a young sergeant of the 6th Bn., by name Noonan (of Kew, Vic.), with a keen and facile humour, and gave some amusement to the troops.

of later months, would be scattered to hospitals in Malta and England, and even to Italy, before they again saw Anzac or the A.I.F. The flood of wounded from Anzac and Helles, swiftly overflowing the hospitals in Egypt, made this dispersion necessary;³⁰ and a certain want of control and system, both in the Egyptian Base and in the Lines of Communication between it and the Peninsula, caused great difficulty in getting men back to the front when once they had left it, even when, as often happened at this stage of the war, they vehemently desired to return. In the 1st Australian Division alone, even assuming that 30 per cent. of the sick and wounded could never serve again, there were on September 4th no less than 5,600 still at the base camps and elsewhere who had left Anzac before the end of July, in many cases with quite minor injuries or sicknesses, and expecting to be back within a few weeks. It was known that a proportion of them, considering themselves perfectly restored and fit to serve, and endeavouring to be reshipped to Anzac, had been baffled again and again by the refusal of the Base authorities to ship them.³¹ Some managed to obtain an unauthorised passage on ships leaving for the front. Trained and veteran soldiers of the first contingent, wounded at the Landing—whom their commanders urgently needed at Anzac and who were equally anxious to return thither—were forced to practise elementary drill with reinforcements on the old training grounds outside Cairo. These reports, brought back to the fighting line, were enhanced

³⁰ There was also during the hot weather a definite policy against keeping sick or wounded men in Egypt longer than was necessary. Partly as a result of this, there were 10,000 members of the A.I.F. in England by the beginning of 1916.

³¹ Pte. E. S. Pilcher (of Capeville, Pentland, Q'land), 3rd Fld. Amb., wounded on Apr. 25, and discharged from hospital as fit at the end of May, was sent to No. 1 A.G.H. near Cairo to be employed as an orderly. He and several others similarly detained protested, but were officially informed that they could only go to Anzac when drafts for their units were called for. Pilcher twice went back to the Base Details Camp in the hope of being shipped to Anzac, on the second occasion being fined 30s for doing so. He was eventually sent forward in July. (He was killed in France, 25 June, 1918)

Numbers of the 2nd Aust. Inf. Bde reported that the practice at the Base Details Camp was for men who desired to return to the front to hand in their names. Even of those who so volunteered some were detained for several weeks, although their units urgently needed them. Officers and N.C.O.'s were occasionally kept back by the Base authorities for duty. Strong appeals were received at the front from some of those detained against their will. In October, when some of these letters were forwarded by Gen. Birdwood to Sir Ian Hamilton, the latter replied that "he had just written twice as strongly to Sir John Maxwell on this very subject"

by the experience of men passing through Lemnos.³² At that congested centre soldiers as to whose destination the military staff was often very vague, after waiting several days for a decision, would suddenly be ordered to embark in a ship which did not arrive, and after waiting interminably at the wharf would be sent back to camp, only, in some cases, to find that the tents had been struck and the camp had disappeared. Such were the delays that it sometimes appeared to exasperated men and officers on their way to the front that the Lines-of-Communication staff³³ was endeavouring to prevent them from

³² The following are a few extracts from letters:—

"To Capt. Hogue (2nd A.L.H. Bde.).—Dear Sir: Would you kindly let our brigadier, Gen. Ryrie, know that myself and a number of the 5th, 6th, and 7th Light Horse are kept here at Mudros West Australian Base for no other reason than awaiting orders to rejoin our regiments. I and others have been fit for the last three weeks, and it is not pleasant to feel like shirkers through no fault of our own. . . .—JAMES HUME, 7th A.L.H." (Hume was of Clifton Hill, Vic.)

"Dear Mr. Hogue: There are about twenty or thirty men of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade here in a detail camp, and we feel just like a crowd of malingers. We have tried all ways of getting back, but get no satisfaction, but instead are waiting, waiting, and are heartily sick of it. —HERMAN CHEATER, 6th A.L.H." (Cheater was of Wilde's Meadow, N.S.W.)

"To the O.C., 3rd Field Artillery Bde.— . . . The M.L.O. (Mudros) . . . refused to allow me to proceed, and told me that before I could be sent on to Anzac my commanding officer would have to request the authorities on the *Aragon* to send me on. . . . The following morning . . . the D.A.A.G. . . confirmed the statement. . . .—A. P. CRISP, Capt., 7th Battery, A.F.A." (Crisp was of Bellerive, Tas.)

"To O.C., 17th Bn.— . . . I was reported as fit for active service on Sept. 9, and left Malta next day. I arrived at Lemnos on Sept. 12 . . . but was informed by the C.O. troopship that I could not go on to Anzac till I had reported at the Base Office, Alexandria. . . . I reported there . . . and was informed . . . that I would be returned to Lemnos as soon as possible. . . . On the 27th Sept. . . . I was dumped ashore without orders at West Mudros . . . I spent the night on the beach and next morning eventually found my way to the Aust. Base Details Camp. . . . It took me twenty-four days to come from Malta to Anzac.—BASIL HOLMES, Lieut., 17th Bn., A.I.F." (Holmes was of Sydney.)

"To the G.O.C., 3rd A.L.H. Bde., Anzac.— . . . I cannot get away until you either write or wire to Camp Commandant and request that I may be returned to . . . Anzac *at once* as my presence is urgently required. I do not know whether it is or not, but it will take something to that effect in order to wake them up. . . .—W. S. KENT-HUGHES, Lieut." (then at the A. & N.Z. Base Details Camp, Mudros West). (Kent-Hughes was of Toorak, Vic.)

³³ While this staff included many conscientious and earnest workers, the rebuffs frequently received by officers or men from Anzac and Helles, in visiting on business the somewhat glittering company on the L. of C. H.Q.-ship *Aragon*, created much bitterness both in the British and oversea fighting forces. For example, Col. P. C. Fenwick (of Christchurch, N.Z.), a medical staff officer of the N.Z. & A. Div., who visited the ship in the endeavour to obtain for his men a supply of disinfectants and other materials, has recorded that the medical authority whom he found on board first informed him that he did not, officially, know him, and secondly, that it was not his (the authority's) province to supply them. Fenwick wrote in his diary that, while waiting on the ship, he "heard one officer breathe a sigh of thankfulness. 'That's good news,' he said. I asked what. 'Twenty cases of soda-water have come safely for the top-dogs.'" Such incidents, of daily occurrence, contributed sensibly to the disillusionment of the troops.

reaching it instead of to assist them thither. The impression of muddle was increased by the experience of several men who were sent from Anzac for dental treatment. One, who had broken his "plate," was sent for treatment to Lemnos. After some days there, it was discovered that he could not be treated on the island, and he was consequently despatched to Egypt. There he had one interview with a dentist, who drew two teeth and told him to return in ten days. Upon his doing so, he was informed that the dentist had gone away. He was therefore sent back to Lemnos, and, as nothing could be done for him there, was returned to Anzac, with his "plate" still broken, four weeks after he had left. Two other men who, being known to be trustworthy, were similarly sent away for treatment, were passed round the Mediterranean as far as Malta, and eventually returned to Anzac without repairs having been effected.

The confidence which the army at the front should have possessed in the work of its Base was further shaken at this time by a few stories of petty corruption, probably inevitable in a great war, but fortunately less heard of in later years—reports, for example, of the existence of crime among certain of the military police. But most important in its results was the justifiable fear that if once an officer or man became parted from his unit at the front, however short the separation intended, none could foretell when he would return to it. This greatly increased the desire of all responsible commanders to keep their sick at Anzac, and that of many of the sick themselves to stay there.

CHAPTER XIV

THE "SELF-GOVERNMENT" OF THE A.I.F.

THE confusion which occurred on the line of communications from the Peninsula to the main base in Egypt and to Great Britain was not unnatural. It has already been stated¹ that in consequence of the absence of all facilities at Lemnos—except for one magnificent harbour—the main base, which was originally to be placed there, was hurriedly transferred to Alexandria 650 miles away. Nevertheless, as the expedition continued to develop, this splendid harbour sixty miles from the Peninsula, though nominally never more than an "intermediate" base,² inevitably became an immensely important centre. It was within distant sight of the Dardanelles, the trawler ferries making the journey in eight hours, and fast fleet-sweepers or destroyers in half that time. The result was that the large oversea vessels bringing men and supplies for the expedition, though in the early days they called at Alexandria to re-stow their cargo, tended increasingly to be sent to Lemnos direct. After the appearance of submarines, when almost the only traffic coming to Anzac and Helles was that of small craft, practically all the large ships for the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force visited Lemnos, in order to transfer the whole or part of their troops and cargoes to the smaller ones.

Even before men and material began to arrive for the second main offensive, Lemnos had thus begun to develop into an important transshipping centre; with the preparations for that offensive the traffic grew enormously. The vast semi-commercial business of a base, involving both cargo and passenger traffic at times almost overwhelming, had to be managed, as best was possible without any facilities such as existed in the harbours in France, by a staff of military officers, partly belonging to the Army Service Corps, and of naval officers who had not even the advantage of such "business" training as the staff college afforded for the army. The forward passenger traffic consisted of new units or of reinforcement drafts, which were sent on according to their

¹ *I'ol.* I, pp. 209-11

² This somewhat vague term was applied to the establishment at Lemnos after August.

numbers in the nightly fleet-sweepers or else in destroyers or transports. The forward traffic of goods comprised shipments of supplies, engineer stores, ammunition, and water; and though the military staff responsible had some control of their own supply-ships, they had first to obtain from the naval staff suitable small craft, and then, when berths and timing had been settled, to arrange for their loading from other ships or from the shore. For this undertaking there were no harbour works, wharves, or piers, except a few mere boat-jetties, the sole facilities being an always insufficient supply of small craft and some Greek—and later Egyptian—labour. Yet by September for Anzac alone there were being loaded and despatched every two or three days steamers of moderate tonnage, carrying sometimes a special cargo, but usually tinned meat, biscuits, or fodder, or a general cargo of all classes of goods and stores. The difficulties of the business were increased by the fact that when large steamers arrived at Lemnos the goods most urgently needed were often at the bottom of the holds. Add to this that at Malta or other intermediate ports goods were sometimes shipped of which no information was forwarded to Lemnos; that the military authorities responsible for knowing what troops or goods were on board were never able to obtain enough steam or motor boats to visit the ships in harbour and inquire; and that frequently, before vessels were unloaded, they were summoned to the Peninsula or even to Great Britain, carrying their undischarged cargo with them, and only returning to Lemnos many weeks later. These were but a few of the perplexities attending the forward movement of troops and goods along the lines of communication.

It was contemplated, comparatively late in the campaign, that considerable works should be undertaken at Lemnos, including the construction of deep-water piers at which small ships, and even large ones, could be worked. Possibly a commercial directing head, such as Hamilton desired for his Lines-of-Communication staff,³ might have designed large facilities

³ Hamilton wrote on July 3 to the Quartermaster-General at the War Office "I worry just as much over things behind me as I do over the enemy in front of me. What I want is a really big man there a man I mean who, if he saw the real necessity, would wire for a great English contractor and 300 navvies without bothering or referring the matter to anyone." In his diary he writes "During the past month the confusion at Mudros, our advanced base, becomes daily worse confounded" (*Gallipoli Diary, Vol. I, p. 305*).

and established them; but the possibility of such an arrangement is dubious, since, however great the need, Great Britain was by this time in some directions temporarily reaching the limits both of the men and of the materials available for her world-wide enterprises. Be that as it may, the business of forwarding supplies and men through Lemnos outranged, from the earliest stage of the campaign, both the capacity of the Lines-of-Communication staff at Mudros and the facilities of the port.

The backward movement along the lines of communication was, as is usual in war, almost entirely that of sick or wounded men. In consequence there was largely involved in its control an additional staff—that of the Director of Medical Services. Concerning this traffic the intentions formulated by Hamilton's medical staff at the conference on May 21st were clear, and the scheme simple. Until then the wounded from the Peninsula had been sent to the main bases and not treated at Lemnos, the only hospital on that island being the 1st Australian Stationary, which was intended to receive patients only from the ships and shore-establishments at Mudros. A number of slight cases from the Peninsula, likely to be cured in two or three days, had been treated on board a transport converted into a temporary hospital ship; but after the arrival of the submarines this proceeding became less practicable. It was consequently decided to place three small hospitals (including the two Australian stationaries) at Lemnos to receive anything up to 3,000 slightly-wounded men—those whose cure might be expected within three weeks; the rest were to be sent on to Alexandria or Malta. In accordance with this plan men with slight wounds or sickness—who by the normal regulation were labelled at the dressing-station with white tickets—were automatically sent off by the nightly fleet-sweepers to that island to be treated there. The seriously wounded or sick—who were labelled with a red-bordered ticket—were carried in larger ships to Egypt or Malta. At Anzac in normal times this plan was carried out by means of a hospital ship lying day and night off the Cove⁴ and gradually filling with serious cases, of which

⁴ The nurses, including some Australians, in the *Gascon*, *Sicilia*, and other hospital ships, were the only women on the Allied side within the theatre of operations at Gallipoli, except those on the Greek islands

she could usually take about 400. If the fleet-sweeper did not run, or if any light cases came late for it, the hospital ship received them for a day or two and transferred them when the smaller ship ran again. When the hospital ship was full, she sailed for Mudros, set ashore any light cases if there was room in the local hospitals (or picked some up if these were overcrowded), and then proceeded to Alexandria or Malta with her load. Meanwhile another hospital ship, if available, took up station off the Cove. To meet crises such as those caused by the rush of wounded after battles, the staff relied upon supplementing the hospital ships by converting numbers of transports into "hospital carriers," for which purpose medical staffs were kept always ready at Mudros.

But this apparently simple scheme was only in part carried out. Although by May 24th there were hospitals in Mudros sufficient for 3,000 men—increased after a further conference in July to 6,000—and although all hospital ships and carriers were ordered to call there, yet the numbers of sick and wounded were so heavy, and the difficulty of organising transfers in Lemnos so great, that adherence to a simple routine could hardly ever be achieved.⁶ Vast numbers of slight cases were therefore sent to Egypt, while many serious cases were treated at Lemnos.

Before the end of May more than 17,000 sick and wounded had been passed along the lines of communication; about two-thirds of these, including great numbers of slight cases, being sent to Egypt and over 3,000 to Malta. There the Lines of Communication of Hamilton's force handed them over to the charge of the respective commanders of those places. Of these bases Egypt was infinitely the more important to the army in Gallipoli, and by the course of events in Cairo during 1915 the subsequent development of the A.I.F. was largely shaped.

Hamilton's "base" was at Alexandria; that is to say, it was chiefly there that the great dépôts from which he obtained his men and material were at first maintained, and that a part of his staff—the "Third Echelon" of G.H.Q.—was left to control the forwarding of them to his force at the front, as

⁶ Much of the confusion at Lemnos, as elsewhere, was doubtless the unavoidable consequence of the immense and sudden expansion of the old British Regular Army. The corps of trained officers was not large enough to supply competent men wherever required, and the natural tendency was to employ on staffs in rear areas some who were unsuited for staff work at the front.

well as to administer certain of his troops—for example, the horse-transport—which were maintained at Alexandria in readiness at any time to start for the front. On the other hand all the troops around Cairo, and the majority of those elsewhere in Egypt (including many at Alexandria), were part of Sir John Maxwell's force for the defence of Egypt, controlled by him through the Egyptian Army Headquarters in Cairo. The great majority of the Australian and New Zealand troops in Egypt were part of this force under Maxwell's command; and, although they formed a reservoir upon which Hamilton had certain powers of drawing, they did not pass from Maxwell's "Force in Egypt" into Hamilton's "Mediterranean Expeditionary Force" until they reached the wharf at Alexandria on their passage towards the front. Thus all the hospitals and the main reservoir of troops in Egypt, though often loosely included under the term "base," were really part of Maxwell's defence force and not of Hamilton's base. It was therefore as a section of Maxwell's staff that the great headquarters' organisation of the A.I.F. first took shape.

When the original Australian formations—the 1st Division and the 1st Light Horse Brigade—sailed from Australia, there were few who thought of them as other than two distinct bodies which would be employed separately among the British forces at the front. But Bridges and White from the first dimly foresaw that these, probably with many other similar bodies, would eventually form an Australian army overseas, which, even if it did not fight as a single force, would in some respects have to be administered as such. They envisaged some small group of military offices oversea, and foresaw that it might be necessary to have a responsible Australian commander for the whole force, although they expected that it would be administered and commanded chiefly by the authorities of the British Army. Be that as it might, until the force came under a British authority, an Australian command was necessary. Consequently, at the beginning of September, 1914, on the advice of Bridges and White, the Minister for Defence took two steps—first, to arrange with the British War Office that an "intermediate base" of the A.I.F. should be established in Great Britain under the direction of the High Commissioner for Australia; second, to place upon

Bridges the responsibility—quite separate from the command of his own division—of administering the A.I.F. How the Australian regiments took shape has already been described; it remains to be shown how from the first tentative provision thus made by Bridges and White there developed the administrative organisation of a "dominion" army fighting as part of a "British" army.

During the first few days after the force landed in Egypt, Bridges hoped and expected that the Egyptian War Office would take over both the administrative control and most of the actual office work, no doubt asking him for advice in matters of policy. But finding that the Egyptian authorities had no desire to administer his force and had made no provision for doing so, he continued for a short time to undertake that task, making promotions and transfers, and arranging for pay, clothing, and other requirements of the 1st Light Horse Brigade as well as for his own division. An enormous increase in this work was, however, to be expected when the second contingent, including fighting troops, five hospitals, butchery, bakery, and transport units, arrived from Australia. In order to transfer the routine work to other shoulders, Bridges recommended that the "intermediate base,"⁶ which was to have been formed in England, should at once be established in Egypt instead. A week after arriving in Cairo he submitted to Maxwell a scheme by which the proposed establishment should serve as an "Australian section" of Maxwell's general base dépôt for troops in Egypt. Its staff would thus form part of Maxwell's own, although doubtless consisting of Australians and with an experienced Australian officer at its head. This being approved by Maxwell and the British War Office, Bridges recommended for the command the A.A. & Q.M.G. of his division, Colonel V. C. M. Sellheim, an officer of ability and much experience, but one with whom, for some reason, he himself was inclined to be impatient.⁷

From that moment not only did Bridges pass the routine administration of the A.I.F. entirely on to Sellheim's shoulders, but to some extent disentangled himself from its command. His whole desire was to see the 1st Division thoroughly

⁶ It was realised that this was not an "intermediate" base in the technical sense of the term.

⁷ Sellheim was bitterly disappointed at not accompanying the force to Gallipoli, but Bridges promised him the first vacant command of a fighting brigade.

trained, and then to lead it in the field. Even when he had rid himself of the routine work, he was possessed with the fear which until the end of the war was inseparable from the office of "G.O.C., A.I.F."—the fear that he might some day be required to remain where most of the administrative work was performed, at the base. Consequently, although his position was practically that of administrative commander-in-chief, with exceedingly wide and important powers over the development of the A.I.F.,⁸ he was reluctant to hold it. From the moment when Sellheim's base was established, Bridges insisted on dealing with it through Birdwood and Maxwell, and not direct. To them he resolutely referred all Sellheim's queries, and winced at Birdwood's desire that he should retain his control. He obtained from Birdwood an order that he should now "assume command of the 1st Australian Division."⁹ He ceased to issue A.I.F. orders, changing their title to "Notifications" or "Instructions," which were to be signed by Sellheim; and he even pointed out that Maxwell, if acting as a "commander-in-chief in the field," could make—subject to confirmation in England—all promotions in the A.I.F. It was obvious, he added, that he himself would "soon be unable to do so," except within his own division. Maxwell did not assume these powers, and, until sailing for Gallipoli, Bridges remained the sole commander with power to promote or transfer officers in the A.I.F. He retained those powers in Gallipoli; but from the moment of sailing he never exercised them outside his own division.

Bridges' reluctance to have anything to do with Sellheim's base was largely due to his feeling that its function was utterly unimportant compared with the training and fighting of the 1st Division. He rightly desired the Australian force to consist

⁸ The position of General Officer Commanding the A.I.F. was established by an Order in Council of 17 Sept., 1914. By this the G.O.C., A.I.F., was authorised to change, vary, or group units, provided that he did not exceed the authorised "establishment" of men and officers; to transfer, remove, or detail for any duty officers or men, and, subject to confirmation from Australia, promote or appoint officers; to allot reinforcements and, if required, employ civilians. These powers (which were originally drafted by Col. White and which sufficed for the G.O.C., A.I.F., without alteration, except in one minor respect, until the end of the war) were subject only to any arrangements which the British Secretary of State for War might make for the A.I.F. in England, or to the orders of the British Commander-in-Chief in the field. Most of the difficulties arose from the fact that Bridges and White had to think out in war-time, under pressure of other work, the problems of Australian army organisation.

⁹ By this order of 19 Jan., 1915, questions of principle affecting the whole A.I.F. were to be referred to Bridges for his opinion, but he was to be relieved of the routine administration of its units other than his own division.

as far as possible of fighting troops, with as little as possible of base. One of his most intimate advisers, Colonel Howse, frequently warned him that he underrated the influence of the base upon the fighting troops, and that the ablest and most forcible officers in the A.I.F. might with advantage be employed there. But Bridges laughed at his forebodings. He believed that the problems of the base would be met by the vast British organisation, and that the task of the Australian staff was of comparatively slight moment. He therefore did not hesitate, on occasion, to foist on to it officers of whom he desired to disencumber himself.

Such were the conditions—with the commander of the A.I.F. practically abdicating that position and leaving the base work as far as possible to the British—under which, on the 14th of January, 1915, the A.I.F. headquarters¹⁰ and base dépôt for troops took shape as the smallest possible organisation likely to enable the A.I.F. to be paid and administered. Bridges did not himself establish the "base," but, having obtained Maxwell's approval to the scheme, he merely transferred three persons from his own headquarters to Maxwell's. These were Sellheim, his batman, and one staff clerk; and with this personnel, without office, furniture, or equipment, Sellheim was left to build up, under Maxwell, the proposed departments. Bridges told Sellheim that, beyond "his blessing," he must expect little help from him. Nevertheless, as Sellheim persuaded Maxwell to establish one after another of the proposed departments, Bridges, on Maxwell's request, allotted the men or officers to staff them.

Of the six sections or departments which Bridges had suggested to constitute the Australian Intermediate Base, Maxwell established in 1915 only four—ordnance, records, pay and finance, and base details (reinforcements and convalescents).¹¹ Of these only one—ordnance—dealt with material. Although Australia had undertaken to maintain the A.I.F., she could not attempt to direct a separate stream of

¹⁰ Though not then the headquarters in name, this organisation was such in reality even at that time.

¹¹ Of the two others suggested, the Medical Section was not formed during this year; and although appointments were made to a "Remounts" Branch (intended to receive the shiploads of horses from Australia), it did not function, since there arrived early in 1915 from England the staff for an Egyptian remounts dépôt, which received the horses direct. The Australian Remount Units therefore worked under the remount department of the British base.

food and ammunition to its units scattered among those of the British Army. At this early stage it was thought that the best way of "maintaining" the force would be to send direct to it from Australia a certain amount of clothing, equipment, and rifle ammunition. All other necessities were to be procured from the British or Egyptian services or by outside purchase, with the understanding that by a system of cross-accounting these complicated items (including those in respect of Australians treated in British hospitals) could eventually be collected, and paid for by Australia.¹² It was to receive and distribute the clothing and ammunition from Australia, and to preserve some order in the extremely tangled transactions concerning them, that the ordnance sub-section of Sellheim's base was established. Throughout the campaign it equipped that portion of the A.I.F. which was in Egypt, including its horse- and motor-transport and the rapidly expanding hospitals. In addition, whenever the supply of Australian clothing exceeded what was required by Australians in Egypt, the residue was passed to Hamilton's base for despatch to the A.I.F. at the front.

Purchases for ordnance, as also of food, fodder, and other requisites for the Australian troops in Egypt, were made either through the High Commissioner in England, or, if in Egypt, at first through the finance department of Sellheim's base, and afterwards through a Standing Contracts Board established by him. The steps thus taken ensured that the honesty of the main dealings should be above suspicion; but both in the purchase of fodder and in the accounting of the ordnance branch there was a looseness of system which opened avenues for petty corruption, and these were closed only when a Sydney business man, R. M. McCheyne Anderson,¹³ sent from Australia as colonel and deputy-quartermaster-general, reorganised for Sellheim the business side of the base.¹⁴

This ordnance department, with limited functions, and the finance department—so far as it was charged with paying for

¹² This adjustment was eventually made, although it was several years after the war before the accounts could be finally rendered.

¹³ Brig.-Gen. Sir Robert M. McCheyne Anderson, K.C.M.G. Commandant, Admin. H.Q. A.I.F., London, 1916-17. Merchant and contractor, b. Sydney, 6 Aug., 1867.

¹⁴ Sellheim had at first no special quartermaster-general's branch of his staff, but used to discharge that function himself, or through such officers as he could detail. In April Maj. E. T. Leane (of Sydney) took charge of his ordnance. Certain contracts for the supply of food to the Australian troops in Egypt were let by the Standing Contracts Board. The sending of a Q.M.G. from Australia and later developments is dealt with in *Vol III (ch vi)*.

local purchases and hire of buildings—were the only sections of the Australian base dealing chiefly with material. In one half of the vast function of the British bases—that by which stores and supplies were accumulated for and despatched to the army—the commander and staff of the A.I.F. had throughout the war practically no share. In rear of the army corps the requisitioning, receipt, storage, and forwarding of arms, ammunition, equipment, food, fodder, stores, and animals, and the control of railways and sea-transport, were organised entirely by the British staff. It is true that the Commonwealth (as will be related in another volume)¹⁵ sent enormous and indispensable supplies to Great Britain and to her allies, exercising the necessary control over trade, industry, and shipping in Australia. Moreover, here and there individual lines-of-communication units of the A.I.F., such as railway-operating companies and dépôt-units of supply, took part in the work of distribution to the British armies. But the vast business was organised, controlled, and in the main carried through, by the British staff alone.

On the other hand, in the second half of the function of the base—that of receiving, training, administering, and transferring troops—the Australian staff manifestly had larger responsibilities. Men were in a different category from materials; and although in most respects Bridges did not see why the Australian soldier should be dealt with otherwise than the British, the force could not be cut off entirely from the Commonwealth Government, nor could an Australian service be handed over completely to the British staff. Bridges had considered that Maxwell might require four Australian departments dealing with troops—finance and pay, medical service, base-details (reinforcements and convalescents), and records. Of these, the finance staff, dealing with the pay of the whole A.I.F. and not merely of separate units, had so evidently been necessary that it had been formed before the force left Australia; the matter of soldiers' pay so obviously concerned the Commonwealth alone that this staff was at once incorporated without question in Sellheim's base. It was from the first overworked and insufficient in numbers, and some of the regular army pay officials were lacking in the grasp

¹⁵ Vol. XI—*Australia During the War*.

and breadth of view necessary for adapting their departments and system to the enormously expanding needs of the A.I.F. There ensued a tangle of affairs which resulted in two developments—the institution of a proper system of audit,¹⁶ and the gradual coming to the front of several young Australian accountants, who had originally enlisted in the ranks, but who quickly exercised an increasing influence in the Pay Branch.¹⁷

Although there was little question as to the necessity of the Ordnance and Pay Departments of Sellheim's base, in connection with each of its remaining proposed sections—medical, base-details, and records—there at once arose a problem. How far, if at all, did the A.I.F. abroad require its own staff at the base to transact that work, or how far could Australian soldiers in these matters be well administered by a British authority?

The overseas portion of the A.I.F. had by the end of May grown to include:

A small flying corps unit, forming half of the original flying squadron in Mesopotamia.

A motor ammunition-park and motor supply-column, which had been sent to England.

The 1st Australian Division and half of the N.Z. & A. Division in Gallipoli.

The Australian troops in Egypt, comprising—

First, those of the transport service at Alexandria.¹⁸

Second, the sick and wounded poured back from the fighting line to Alexandria and Cairo, most of whom after discharge from hospital and convalescent home were sent to a training camp, and there incorporated in provisional training battalions prior to return to the front.

Third, the fresh troops arriving from Australia.

Fourth, two large Australian hospitals.

Fifth, the personnel of the Intermediate Base itself.

¹⁶ Lieut.-Col. T. W. Jolliffe (of Melbourne) was sent from Australia as the first auditor.

¹⁷ Such were Staff-Sgts. H. S. Evans (afterwards Lieut.-Col.) and F. Grassick (afterwards Major), both of Melbourne.

¹⁸ Including grooms, these amounted to some 5,000 men, with 12,000 horses and 1,200 waggons. The Australian troops at Alexandria also included a small records staff at Third Echelon, the postal branch of Sellheim's base, and a small staff in charge of the "base dépôts," where the two divisions before leaving Egypt had deposited kits and gear not required or not permitted at the front.

It was with the forces in Egypt and Gallipoli that Sellheim's base was concerned;¹⁹ and for these the work of three departments dealing with men—the administering of the medical services, the keeping of personal records, and the training of reinforcements—was at this stage to a greater or less extent performed by the British staff. It remains to be narrated how far this was successful.

First, in the medical services and establishments. A definitely appointed head of the medical services of the A.I.F., with a very capable young staff-sergeant as his assistant,²⁰ had actually come from Australia with the first contingent. The head was Surgeon-General Williams, the founder of the Australian Army Medical Service,²¹ a man who in his prime had possessed eminent capacity and real vision. It might have been expected that, when Sellheim's base was established, Williams would automatically have become the head of its medical section, or that, if he had accompanied the commander of the A.I.F. to the front as his medical adviser, he would have administered the medical service through a representative at Sellheim's headquarters. But Bridges had barely left Australia before he began to recognise that this veteran organiser no longer possessed his former outstanding ability and energy. He therefore, on reaching Egypt, adopted the easy expedient—too often employed by commanders to avoid the difficulty of superseding a senior officer—of allowing him to remain, without any very definite duties, at the base. When Surgeon-General Ford,²² a senior British officer, was allocated by the War Office to direct (for Maxwell) the medical services in Egypt, Bridges allowed his veteran staff officer to be ignored. Ford's own standing was not in all respects very strong, but he decided to deal with all hospitals in Egypt, including the Australian, direct, without the intervention of any Australian staff. Brooking no apparent rival, he almost immediately questioned Williams' status, and Bridges gave the latter no support. Had he removed him and appointed an adequate

¹⁹ Those in Mesopotamia and Great Britain were then administered by the British.

²⁰ Staff-Sgt. J. R. Drummond (afterwards Capt; of Oakleigh, Vic.).

²¹ Williams had organised the N.S.W. Army Medical Corps which won much admiration from the British authorities in the South African War; later he organised the Commonwealth army medical service.

²² Maj.-Gen. Sir Richard W. Ford, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., R.A.M.C., of London, b. 26 Sept., 1857. Died 31 March, 1925.

successor, much subsequent trouble would have been avoided. Bridges was quite strong enough for such action, but he frankly regarded the work at the base as of little concern to the A.I.F. The medical sub-section of Sellheim's base was consequently not established, and Williams found himself without any department through which he could deal with the medical service or hospitals of the A.I.F.—and therefore practically without duties, except those of endeavouring to arrange for the future sea-transport of the wounded, and of representing the Australian Red Cross Society.

A British officer had thus been fully charged with the control of the Australian medical service in Egypt, consisting mainly of Nos. 1 and 2 Australian General Hospitals in Cairo;²³ and it might have been anticipated that, at any rate after Bridges left for the front, Surgeon-General Ford would have dealt with those hospitals as confidently as he did with the British and Indian. But he knew nothing of the Commonwealth service, of the capacity of its various officers, or of their relation to one another. When the time came for action, he was exceedingly diffident in giving to Australian hospitals orders which might involve the Commonwealth, or even the Australian Branch of the Red Cross Society, in considerable expenditure of money, or which might necessitate changes in the positions and appointments of medical officers. An occasion for such action soon arose, when, within a few weeks of the departure of the fighting troops, the medical authorities were suddenly confronted with the problem of how the hospitals in Cairo—mainly Australian—were to expand rapidly enough to receive the flood of wounded which was expected to pour in after the Landing. This involved the spending of money upon equipment and building and the allocation of medical officers to new duties and commands. Immediately, also, there followed the need for determining what were the special requirements of Australian convalescents. In addition, some principle of invaliding had to be arrived at, applicable to all sick and wounded of the Australian force. To what extent were they to be retained in Egypt? Must a proportion of the more lengthy cases be sent to England, like British troops, or could all such be shipped to Australia (as was strongly desired by the Commonwealth Government)?

²³ The three other hospitals had then gone forward to Lemnos and the front.

Lastly, what cases should be returned to Australia as unfit for further service, and how could ships be found and equipped for taking them?

In most of these questions the Australian Government would inevitably be interested. Although it appeared to hand over its expeditionary force unreservedly to British control, it could not in reality pass to another Government all responsibility for so important a section of its people. For the general welfare of its troops the Commonwealth Government would, in the last resort, have to answer to the Australian nation. Although it is probable that this matter was but vaguely thought out, British officers as wise as Sir John Maxwell knew that political considerations must be involved in the administration of the A.I.F. And with that sagacity which marks most administrators of the British race, both he and others, who were not responsible to the Australian Government, hesitated to deal with matters of intimate concern to the Commonwealth unless some Australian officer assumed the responsibility of advising them. Consequently, when the first of these questions presented itself, Ford could only look to some Australian adviser to explain to him the Commonwealth's probable attitude, and to shoulder the responsibility of making a recommendation.

Had the medical sub-section of the Intermediate Base been in existence, the tendering of such advice would have been its specific duty.²⁴ But the staff had not been created. In this difficulty Ford at first resorted to Williams, who, though shorn of his powers, was still the recognised head of the Australian medical service. He was not, it is true, an active assistant who would think out the director's problems in advance and then take steps to give effect to their solutions. Yet there was no great difficulty in deciding upon Australian matters, or in appointing and transferring medical officers of the A.I.F., if Williams gave his authority or even advice.

But on April 25th Williams, in pursuance of some of the few duties left to him, went to England, passing to Colonel

²⁴ Bridges' original suggestion to Maxwell was that 'in providing hospital accommodation in cases that cannot be treated by field ambulances, this section should aid the D.D.M.S.' (of the Egyptian command) 'in the administrative arrangements and in determining the incidence of the cost.' (The field ambulances were, at the date when the scheme was drafted, the only Australian medical units in Egypt.) The other proposed function was to obtain and distribute medical and red cross stores

Martin,²⁵ commander of No. 2 General Hospital, the vague duties of "senior medical officer." The Australian medical service in Egypt was thus left without any effective head, and each of its two big hospitals became practically an independent establishment, with which it was most difficult for the British director to deal. The difficulty was increased by the fact that the Australian Government, desirous of sending the cream of the medical profession to serve its troops, had appointed to these hospitals a number of leading physicians and surgeons who had had no previous experience in the Australian army medical service, but yet were promoted directly to high rank. While possessing no experience of military administration or organisation, they were recognised as men of high qualifications in modern medicine or surgery; and Ford and other senior British army-surgeons realised that their own duty of inspecting the work of these officers, and of controlling and instructing them, was a highly delicate one. The need of some Australian staff officer to deal with Australian medical problems was all the more urgent. But there was no such officer. Colonel Howse, the most active medical administrator in the force, was with the 1st Division at Anzac, and Colonel Martin, although acting in some respects as senior in the service,²⁶ did not attempt in all matters the rôle of Williams's representative.

While, however, Surgeon-General Williams was still in Egypt, he had come constantly into touch with the registrar of No. 1 Australian General Hospital, which had been established at the great Heliopolis Palace Hotel, and of which he was very proud. The registrar was a leading Melbourne eye-specialist, Dr. J. W. Barrett,²⁷ who had been given the rank of major and sent in charge of an eye and ear department of No. 1. This active, able, and thrusting personality had not long been in Egypt before he became of eminent assistance both to Williams, in such matters as the conduct of the Red Cross work, and to Ford, by providing an activity and forethought upon which the latter came to lean heavily. The work of the registrar of a large hospital was practically that of a

²⁵ Col. T. M. Martin, C M G, A A M C. Commanded No 2 A G. H., 1914/16; No 2 A A H., 1916/18. Medical practitioner, of Sydney; b Blackrock, Dublin, Ireland, 30 Nov., 1854. Died 23 May, 1928.

²⁶ For example, in deciding who was to be sent when further medical officers were required in Gallipoli.

²⁷ Lieut.-Col. Sir James W. Barrett, K B E, C B, C M G, R A M C. Medical practitioner (oculist and aurist); of Melbourne, b South Melbourne, 27 Feb., 1862.

staff officer, and Barrett differed markedly in one respect from most of the other surgical or medical specialists on the hospital staffs. While these were interested in their professional work, and were not eager to concern themselves with the forms of military administration, he keenly grasped the fact that administration and organisation were even more important to an army than surgery, and that without certain strict formalities and routine the huge organisations of war would be reduced to chaos.

It so happened that the chief crisis for the medical service in Egypt was impending at the very moment when Williams departed for London, leaving the Australian medical service in Egypt without an effective head, but handing over his Red Cross store and funds to be managed by Major Barrett. At this juncture, when the pressure of work upon Egyptian hospitals began to mount by leaps and bounds, Ford, in want of an Australian staff and director, turned to Barrett—who was in fact doing much of the work of a staff officer—and made him, except in a few specific matters, his sole adviser in Australian medical affairs. In the middle of June he definitely appointed him to his staff, Barrett occupying a room in the Australian Intermediate Base Headquarters, and to all intents undertaking the duties of the missing medical subsection. Ford also employed a very senior officer of the Indian Army, Colonel Manifold,²⁸ in going round constantly to the various Australian establishments as his own unofficial deputy, in order to give advice and assistance to their responsible officers, many of whom were admittedly new to methods of military administration. Manifold was warned²⁹ "that great tact was required with the Australians," and, being naturally of a considerate and courteous disposition, was very successful in his mission. Such was the informal medical staff which Ford and Maxwell, having rejected the proposal to create a recognised Australian department, were forced to improvise during the Gallipoli campaign. Upon the achievements of the improvised staff, which have now to be narrated, much depended.

²⁸ Maj.-Gen. Sir C. C. Manifold, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.D.M.S., Aust. Corps, 1916/18. Of Edinburgh, Scotland; b Sitapur, India, 3 Apr., 1864.

²⁹ By Surgeon-Gen. W. Babbie, V.C., Director of the Medical Services of the M.E.F., Egypt, and Malta, and therefore Ford's superior officer.

Information of the probable extent of the Landing operations had reached Cairo while Williams was still there. A conference was accordingly held between Ford, Williams, Sellheim, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay Smith³⁰ (of No. 1 General Hospital) and Barrett, to decide how accommodation could be most speedily extended to meet the probable inrush of Australian wounded. It seems to have been taken for granted that the Australian hospitals would be held responsible for receiving them; and, as a matter of fact, during this particular campaign it was found possible to divide the streams of wounded so as to treat Australian and British soldiers mainly, though by no means entirely, in their respective hospitals.³¹ At the conference it was decided to spend a considerable sum of money in preparations which thenceforth were carried out almost entirely by Barrett. The skating-rink in the Luna Park pleasure-garden was forthwith taken over as an auxiliary to No. 1 General Hospital, and became practically one vast ward of 750 beds. A few days later the rest of the park was rented and fitted so that the number of patients could be increased, in an emergency, to 1,650.

As a result, when on April 29th trainloads of men wounded at the Landing began suddenly to pour into Cairo, there were beds sufficient for them. Many of the most seriously wounded Australians were, it is true, not sent on the long journey to Cairo, but were kept in Alexandria in British and other hospitals.³² In No. 1 Hospital at Heliopolis³³ (to which trains were now for the first time run along the tram-line) there were on April 28th 479 patients, about 100 having been discharged that day. On April 29th the number rose to 631, on April 30th to 1,082, and in the next few days was increased by several hundreds. On April 30th Luna Park opened with 296 patients; by May 2nd it had 790; by May 18th 1,244; by June 11th 1,620. Further, within a few days of the Landing, in order to rid the other hospitals of slight cases, a very

³⁰ Lieut.-Col. W. Ramsay Smith, A.A.M.C. Commanded No. 1 A.G.H., 1914/15. Physician and surgeon; of Adelaide; b King Edward, Aberdeenshire, Scotland, 27 Nov., 1859.

³¹ The commander of No. 5 Ind. Hosp. at Alexandria risked the strong displeasure of the authorities by begging equipment from a hospital ship in order to provide for a number of Australians.

³² These hospitals were partly staffed by Australian nurses, both of the A.I.F. and of the British service. At this stage of the war 130 nursing sisters and 100 doctors were raised in Australia for the British Army.

³³ Vol. XII, plate 164.

large hotel in the suburb of Helouan was taken over as a convalescent home. By the second week in May it held 700 patients. A Cairo factory-building was next converted into a hospital for 400, and then the Sporting Club, with wooden shelters over its tennis-courts, was fitted for 1,250.

All these establishments and many others were originally auxiliaries or offshoots of No. 1. Barrett indeed claimed that his own hospital of 520 beds had eventually expanded into establishments containing 10,600. The swift equipment of these was largely assisted by a bold use of the Australian Red Cross funds controlled by him. Some of the establishments were taken over by the British, but most were staffed and controlled by No. 1. No. 2³⁴ eventually held some 900 patients, retaining Mena House for its overflow.

No sooner had those hospitals been thus expanded than there began to arise the problem of dealing with those men in hospital or convalescent homes who appeared unfit, either permanently or for several months, to return to the front. According to the British procedure, which was adopted, any medical officer in charge of a patient whom he believed to be in that condition could have the case examined by a "medical board." In the case of British soldiers the question for the board was whether the soldier was permanently unfit for service or should merely be sent for a change to England. The Australian boards, consisting of civilian doctors, were often at this stage of the war inclined "to give a change" (to Australia or England) to a man from the front, even if his condition did not, strictly speaking, require it. As a check, Barrett reviewed all the decisions, but found it difficult to persuade any board to modify them. Eventually a system was established by which every patient, before he was allowed to be "boarded," had to be examined by the senior Australian medical officer in Egypt or by Colonel Manifold. The boards then investigated the cases submitted to them. If a man required three months' change or more, the board sent him to Australia;³⁵ if he required from two to three months' change and had friends in England, it could send him to England; if he were fit for duty at the base, but not at the front, it might retain him for such duty in Egypt.

³⁴ Then occupying the Ghezira Palace Hotel

³⁵ In July certain important points concerning the system of invaliding Australians were referred by Gen. Legge, as G.O.C., A.I.F., to Gen. Birdwood for decision.

Large numbers of temporarily or permanently disabled men were now becoming convalescent in Egypt, and their transport to Australia was a matter of urgency. Since February Williams had on several occasions urged the Australian Government to provide two hospital ships, each for 500 patients, to receive those who were very seriously sick or injured; he had also pressed that the ordinary transports should be provided with some hospital accommodation and with a nursing staff. As the Government had not yet adopted these measures, the only feasible system was to obtain notice, when possible, of any available steamer passing through to Australia or returning thither, and to fit her with a makeshift staff and appliances from Egypt. This was done; the ships were hurriedly cleaned and refitted; surgical appliances and Red Cross stores were placed on board; and a small staff was allotted from one of the two hospitals. In order to avoid the Suez Canal charges these vessels took on the sick and wounded at Suez, after passing the Canal, a hospital train bringing the patients from Cairo to the ship's side. So it was that on June 7th the *Kyarra* left Suez, carrying back the first freight of wounded Australians to their native land.⁸⁶

For the medical and nursing staffs of these ships, and of each new auxiliary hospital or home, the personnel of one of the two Australian hospitals in Cairo had to be drawn upon. The result was that work had everywhere to be carried on by a staff too small for it. Thus in the first week of May Luna Park, containing then 790 patients, was served by four medical officers, four sisters, and four orderlies. On May 14th, with 1,171 patients, there were but four medical officers and thirteen sisters assisted by forty orderlies, most of whom were untrained. The work was increased by the fact that much of the equipment was improvised; kerosene tins were being used as dressing-trays, and water was sterilised in "dixies"

⁸⁶ On May 20 Surgeon-Gen. Williams advised the Australian Govt that two hospital ships, each fitted for 450 patients, would be required to work between Egypt and Australia. The War Office having no ships available, two large Australian steamers engaged in the coastwise traffic, the *Karoola* and *Kanowna*, were taken over in June and sent to England to be fitted. At the same time units, not unlike general hospitals, were raised and trained for them in Australia under two leading surgeons, Lieut.-Col. R. Gordon Craig (of Sydney) and Lieut.-Col. A. B. Brockway (of Brisbane) respectively. These units were sent to England to join the ships, which then became Nos 1 and 2 Australian Hospital Ships. Both began to carry patients from Suez to Australia in October. But before then 1,623 wounded, 4,216 others mostly permanently unfit, and 1,183 men sent for the benefit of a temporary change, had left Egypt for Australia.

Reinforcements gradually arrived, and the Australian Government also eventually created a special staff to undertake the service in the transports. But the call upon all the Australian medical service in Egypt had been heavy, and upon the nurses at times excessive.

Unfortunately during this time, however great the responsibilities thrown upon medical or other officers in the A.I.F., no one in Egypt was in a position to recommend to the Australian Government with confidence and authority such sweeping alterations as were required to meet certain needs. Once or twice, the recommendation being forwarded to Australia through Maxwell, promotions were made. But even so small a matter as the appointment of an officer to have charge of the motor-transport services caused trouble. At one time several dentists, though given honorary rank as officers, had to continue with privates' pay. No strong head existed to allot medical officers to the work for which they were suited. It was thus that a scientist like Mathison had been acting as regimental medical officer when he was mortally wounded at Krithia; and that a surgeon of international reputation, such as Sir Alexander MacCormick,⁸⁷ was attached to a hospital at Lemnos where only the slighter cases were officially supposed to be treated. Having now no recognised medical adviser or medical staff, the commander of the A.I.F. had practically ceased to exist so far as its medical service was concerned.

The position may be summarised thus. Though in the absence of an authorised staff the British authorities had managed to administer the Australian medical service with a makeshift, they were unable to provide any head for that service. By means of the informal staff, the expansion of the Australian hospital accommodation was successfully carried out; by dint of heavy work the doctors, nurses, and orderlies were enabled to carry through the treatment of Australian sick and wounded not merely without disaster but without special hardship, except to some of themselves; a system of invaliding was established, and the interpretation of its rules, at first loose, was tightened. But this informal

⁸⁷ Col Sir Alexander MacCormick, K C M G Surgeon, of Sydney, b Argyllshire, Scotland, 31 July, 1856.

organisation was lacking in one respect—the Australian medical service had been provided with a staff officer, but it lacked a head. Had Colonel Martin been ambitious to do so, he might possibly have established himself in that capacity.³⁸

As things were, no ordered system was established in the Australian medical service at the base. The result was that this important section of the A.I.F. became, for once, a field of conflicting rivalries and antipathies such as were never again known in the history of the force. The fine *esprit de corps* which was at this very time being created in the same corps at Anzac—the loyal subordination of each man's personal wishes to the good of the whole service—could not flourish under such conditions. The trouble, which threatened the efficiency of the Australian medical corps and the peace of mind of its members, lay not among the younger officers, nor among many eminent and modest men who were single-mindedly working in overcrowded hospitals, but between a few prominent seniors who had been appointed straight from civilian practice to high rank and administrative positions. The friction caused by Barrett's enormous expansion of his own hospital, the wide range of his activities, and the uncertainty in some minds concerning his title, was intense; and it is unquestionable that, as registrar of his hospital, ear and eye specialist, executive officer of the Australian Red Cross in Egypt, and staff officer to Ford, charged not only with the invaliding of Australians, but even with the control of all requisitions for medical stores and the motor-transport service in Egypt, he was filling far more positions than could be with advantage to the A.I.F. occupied by one man. The situation came to a head in July, when reports of friction reached the War Office, and caused it to suggest to the Australian Government that an inquiry should be held. After protracted investigation Barrett was fully exculpated from all the charges which formed the subject of inquiry. But the Government thought wise to recall him and certain others to Australia.³⁹

³⁸ At one period Ford himself had suggested that the "nearly independent" Australian hospitals should be supervised by the appointment of Martin to inspect them. Barrett on the other hand suggested a committee, and the matter appears to have been dropped.

³⁹ Lieut-Col Barrett did not return with the others, but was allowed to resign from the A.I.F. in Egypt. He was immediately reappointed with equal rank in the British service, and worked as a specialist and in other capacities until the end of the war.

But the work which Barrett had inaugurated as a staff officer was continued. The registrar of No. 2 Hospital, Captain Mackenzie,⁴⁰ was immediately appointed to carry it on, occupying an office at the Australian Intermediate Base from which Barrett had withdrawn. The need for a responsible head of the Australian medical corps was meanwhile being strongly urged by Colonel Howse, who about this time accepted control of all medical arrangements at Anzac. His tenure,⁴¹ however, was only temporary, since from the moment when Williams failed to sustain the position of D.M.S., A.I.F., Howse had been determined to re-establish and occupy it. His great ability, combined with the glamour of his Victoria Cross, which he wore modestly, had made him from the first the outstanding candidate for any high promotion, and his ambition made use of every fair opportunity. Personally fearless, he won all possible promotion at the front before seeking it at the base. Outwardly cynical, brilliant but scathing in conversation, he was nevertheless kind and intensely loyal to his subordinates, and as he rose the service benefited. He was a past-master in diplomacy, and, possessing an assured civil position in Australia, could talk to his most eminent superiors with an independence which members of a regular service could hardly affect; he knew well, too, how to employ in argument his semi-independent responsibility to the Australian Government. In the autumn Surgeon-General Fetherston,⁴² the D.G.M.S. in Australia, visited London, Egypt, and Gallipoli in an endeavour to disentangle the confusion in the service. But it was really Howse who, after convincing Birdwood, Fetherston, and Babbie, induced the British authorities to recognise, half unwillingly at first, the independence of the Australian service. He was appointed its director overseas, and thenceforth administered it through a small but highly efficient staff at the base.

The whole episode was of particular significance. The commander of the A.I.F. himself had endeavoured to cast the control of this service upon the British. But the mere course of events had forced the Australian Government

⁴⁰ Lt-Col. D. S. Mackenzie, D.S.O.; A.A.M.C. Medical practitioner, of Rockhampton, Q'land; b Goulburn, N.S.W., 30 March, 1884.

⁴¹ As D.D.M.S., Anzac Corps. The permanent appointment was given to Col Manifold, but he had not reached the front when the Evacuation took place.

⁴² Surgeon-Gen. R. H. J. Fetherston, A.A.M.C. Director-General of Medical Services in Australia, 1914/18. Of Prahran, Vic; b Carlton, Vic., 2 May, 1864.

to provide a definite head and ordered system in this service, which for the want of them had become, far beyond Egypt, the field of a struggle between ambitious personalities; and a British authority, when charged with administering a branch of the Australian service, had itself been driven to seek for a staff and a responsible head among the Australians.

The most important department of Sellheim's base, if it had from the first undertaken all dealings with Australians—as distinct from material—would have been that charged with receiving and training reinforcements and convalescents. But to assist Maxwell in training the Australian and New Zealand troops Kitchener sent out a British officer, Major-General Spens.⁴³ Until his arrival both reinforcements and convalescents had passed into the camps of Sellheim's "base-details" sub-section, and Sellheim urged that the convalescents should continue to do so. But his request was not supported. Spens took control of the convalescents and, incidentally, of what remained of the staff of Sellheim's base-details sub-section.

His task was less difficult than that of Surgeon-General Ford, in that its results would not so directly interest the Australian Government and people as did the care of the sick and wounded. Moreover his duties were definite. It is probable that Lord Kitchener adhered to a sound British principle that, however pressing the call from the front, it was useless to send thither either drafts or new divisions until they were thoroughly trained. It is possible also that both he and Maxwell were anxious lest colonial instructors might adopt a less severe standard of training than that of the British Regular Army. Spens, therefore, had a settled task, and the authority of Kitchener to support him. As far as he dealt with formed bodies of troops, in newly-arrived battalions or brigades, under their own officers, the training was fairly satisfactory. When troops arrived in formed units, it was chiefly their own regimental officers who trained them. And wherever the regimental commander was a man of suitable character and capacity, with his interest concentrated on the efficiency and happiness of his unit, the regimental officers

⁴³ Maj.-Gen. James Spens, C.B., C.M.G., G.O.C., Cairo District, 1915-16. Officer of British Regular Army; b 30 March, 1853. Died 19 June, 1934.

invariably followed his lead; the men always caught the spirit, and the never-failing result was an efficient and high-spirited unit. There grew up keen competition between units in training, and in leisure hours the officers, knowing their men, had them in some control.

But the reinforcement drafts for the older regiments were less easily handled. Being as yet incorporated in no unit, but arriving in charge of a few junior officers, they had to be trained by Spens's staff. Under those instructors, who were non-commissioned officers of the old regular army, the training was often valuable. The Australian soldier worked keenly so long as he felt that he was learning, and these old soldiers were in most cases so competent and experienced in teaching the recruit, and, though strict, so capable of handling men, that the majority of the troops learned eagerly from them. Under their sharp orders draft after draft of Australian infantry stumbled through the grimy sand around Cairo, and then "stood easy" to be lectured with time-honoured illustrations, tags, and sarcasms, which had served for generations of recruits in England. But under some of the British officers the training tended to be perfunctory and therefore slack; and this, together with the lack of control over unattached drafts, contributed to a looseness of discipline which continued in these camps throughout the year. The power which really impelled reinforcements in their training was the individual anxiety of each man to get to the front. The general result was that the drafts sent to Anzac from the Cairo dépôt were inadequately trained, the men being often found to know little of either drill or musketry.

Nevertheless the peculiar conditions of Anzac—where troops were seldom seen in any formed or drilled body—caused these defects to be lightly considered. Birdwood and his divisional commanders had never once seen their original troops employ the method of attack so thoroughly learned in Egypt.⁴⁴ In Birdwood's opinion Egypt could hardly supply useful training for the trench-warfare of Anzac; but, provided a man could shoot, it could quickly be acquired at the front. He was therefore eager to fill his shrunk battalions with the rank and file of reinforcements, even if

⁴⁴ This had been employed only by the two detached brigades in the Second Battle of Krithia.

imperfectly trained. But neither he nor his troops welcomed so eagerly the arrival of newly-enlisted reinforcement officers and N.C.O's. The original men of the force, thoroughly experienced in heavy fighting, did not find it easy to be commanded by men who came to them after a short training in Australia or Egypt. If officers or N.C.O's were required, there had by this time been discovered in the ranks of every regiment numbers of natural and acknowledged leaders, tested in action, and justly marked for promotion in their own or sister battalions as soon as vacancies occurred. For this reason regimental commanders at the front objected to have forced upon them more than a small percentage of "ready-made" officers. As a matter of fact the proportion sent from Australia was always small—usually an officer to seventy-five men; and after July, 1915, when the Defence Department was asked to send only officers of junior rank, no seniors were included. From that time, if sent at all, they commanded only for the voyage and then returned to Australia on similar duty. In the case of reinforcement N.C.O's, from March, 1915, onwards, the rule was even more strict. Thenceforth they received in Australia only provisional rank, reverting to privates when they reached Egypt or England.

Even under these arrangements regimental commanders often kept their reinforcement officers for a long period at the base, and watched them narrowly when they reached the front. But these considerations applied only to the officers and N.C.O's. The rank and file of the drafts were eagerly received. Birdwood urged that they should be sent with little delay to Anzac, even if not trained to the normal standards.⁴⁵ It is probable that in deference to this attitude troops were sent to Anzac earlier than would otherwise have been the case. There it was found that some of them were at first inclined to question orders,⁴⁶ but their discipline quickly improved under the stern conditions of the front. Practice in musketry was afforded on a miniature rifle-range on Reinforcement

⁴⁵ Gen Godley similarly pressed for the half-battalion of Maoris, when first they arrived at Malta and were reported to be as yet unfit for the front.

⁴⁶ For example, there were refusals to carry water on the order of an N.C.O. Such objectors, however, received no sympathy from the older soldiers, who realised the need for command. A few sharp sentences of imprisonment were inflicted, but the death penalty was never applied in the A.I.F.

Green, off Shrapnel Gully, 550 yards behind the front line. Each unit drilled its own reinforcements in such spare moments as were available. This training sufficed for the defence of the trenches; but it was with justifiable hesitation that reinforcements which arrived on the eve of Lone Pine were allowed by the staff of the 1st Division to accompany their regiments into that formidable action.

Such being the requirements, General Spens's régime, though not entirely successful, nevertheless continued without serious breakdown during the campaign. At the end of the year, however, the Australian Government upon its own initiative took steps to have the Australian reinforcements and headquarters in Egypt brought under a single Australian authority.⁴⁷

The other chief department of Sellheim's base dealing with men was that designed to maintain the records of each man's rank, unit, and condition. Here also the question constantly arose how far this work should be undertaken by the existing British machinery and how far by the A.I.F. Under the system then existing in the British service, when a soldier went to the front, the record of his rank and other particulars was retained at a "Home Records Office," but at the same time a form⁴⁸ containing an extract from that record was sent abroad with him—not carried upon his person, but forwarded to the General Headquarters of the army in which he was to serve, where it was kept along with those for the rest of that army so long as he remained there. The branch of the adjutant-general's department of G.H.Q. which preserved these records did not move with the commander-in-chief or the adjutant-general himself in the forward "echelons" of G.H.Q., but was retained with the "Third Echelon" at the base. Here the soldier's record-form remained until, by reason of death, disablement, or transfer, he passed out of that command. During this time, if his rank was altered, or if he became a casualty or was moved from his unit, the alteration was, as a matter of routine, recorded by his unit,⁴⁹ and the notification was passed to the office at

⁴⁷ A description of the great difficulties encountered by Gen. Spens, and of the reforms, which were again modified upon the transfer of the A.I.F. Headquarters to London, are further explained in *Vol III (ch vi)*.

⁴⁸ Known as "Army Form B103."

⁴⁹ On the "Field Return," Army Form B213, which was submitted weekly to Third Echelon.

Third Echelon; Third Echelon duly entered the alteration upon his record-form, and also published it, together with similar notifications concerning other individuals in the force, in a daily "order" or list.⁶⁰ By means of these "orders" the notification reached all other authorities who might be concerned with the history of each individual soldier, and they were thus informed of his death, wounds, or sickness, or of the alteration of his status. His record in the Home Record Office was thus kept up-to-date; paymasters were informed of increase or decrease in the amounts due to him; his wife or other next-of-kin, whose addresses were registered in the home office, was informed of his death or wounds, or of his progress in hospital. From the same sources the casualty lists were compiled at the War Office and published in the newspapers.

In Australia, since the "pre-war" army had been designed only for operations within the Commonwealth, no such system had existed, and very little was known concerning its requirements, except that the record of every soldier who left the country must be preserved in some office in Australia. The particulars of each man joining the A.I.F. were therefore taken in duplicate on his "attestation paper," and, when the several units sailed, each left one set of its attestation papers in a specially established "Base Records Office" in Melbourne. The other set it carried oversea, and in Egypt these were at first preserved in the regimental orderly rooms. It had been foreseen that the units could not conveniently carry such papers to the front, and the original intention was that they should be deposited in a records office to be organised under the High Commissioner in England. When the force was stopped in Egypt, Bridges decided that one of the functions of Sellheim's base should be to receive these records when the troops left for the front. The "Records Department" was accordingly formed. One N.C.O., whose duty was to obtain these attestation papers from the units, and one native who acted as his fatigue man, were its original staff.

There soon arose the question whether this oversea records office was equivalent to that which the British maintained at Third Echelon, or whether it was necessary to have the records

⁶⁰ Part II Orders of G H Q.

of the Australians dealt with at Hamilton's Third Echelon as well. The War Office had from the first assumed that the proper records must be sent to Third Echelon, and had ordered that the requisite forms⁵¹ should be made out by each unit on the voyage from Port Said to England. As the transports were stopped before that stage, the work of making out these forms was undertaken by Sellheim's base, which, though it had not yet collected the attestation papers, happened to have in its pay office a personal record of all the troops. From this the copies were made, and after the commencement of the campaign the record-forms for 20,000 Australian soldiers were sent to Hamilton's Third Echelon at Alexandria. A small staff of Australian officers and clerks—a certain number from each division—was detached to carry out the Australian section of the work at Third Echelon, and remained until the end of the war, a part of the British war machinery.⁵² To it came all reports of casualties and alterations of rank or status, and in it the work of entering up these events in the individual records, and of issuing the daily orders, was centralised. It was upon the "orders," or lists, issuing from this section that the casualty lists were based.

In the meantime, however, Sellheim's base, by collecting from units leaving for the Dardanelles the attestation papers⁵³ containing the original and much fuller particulars, had established a records office which was practically a duplicate of that in Melbourne. A staff was employed in keeping them up-to-date by entering up the alterations notified from Third Echelon, precisely the same process being carried out in Melbourne upon the parallel set of records. Hamilton's staff at once questioned the necessity of this duplication, and assumed that it would absorb this section of Sellheim's base. Sellheim, on the contrary, maintained that his records office was necessary to meet the special needs of the Australian Government and people. He went so far as to maintain that it was the Australian section at Third Echelon which was unnecessary, since the Records Section of his base could efficiently undertake the whole work. The eventual result was that, in spite of

⁵¹ Army Form B103, *see p. 413*

⁵² The system was about to be altered when the war ended. *See p. 417.*

⁵³ It was at first by no means easy to obtain them, since some units carried them to Lemnos, and others stored them with their spare kit at Alexandria. Eventually the complete number was secured.

deep misgivings on the part of some of the higher officers responsible, the Australian records were maintained at Base Records in Melbourne, at A.I.F. Headquarters overseas, and at Third Echelon in Egypt and afterwards in France, until the end of the war. In each case a card index-system was added to the original records. The staff grew at Base Records, Melbourne, from 55 to 378; at A.I.F. overseas headquarters from 28 to about 1,000;⁵⁴ and at Third Echelon from 143 in 1915 to 353⁵⁵ in 1918. There could be no question of the necessity of the records in Melbourne. Only through them could the country keep its contract with each soldier, preserve touch with him wherever he moved, provide a check upon his pay or his pension, and attempt to meet the multitude of inquiries which swarmed in from relatives and friends. Inevitable also was the maintenance overseas of one complete record of the A.I.F. The fact that the Australian people were at the other end of the world from their army gave rise to special requirements. When, for example, the flood of inquiries about the wounded began to pour in, the Minister for Defence ordered that, in addition to other telegraphed information, a cable should be sent every week reporting the progress in hospital of every dangerously sick or wounded man. The sending of such telegrams by individual chaplains or friends led to distressing mistakes, and the only adequate method was to form a special section of Sellheim's records department to undertake the work. The innumerable inquiries not only from relatives but from commanders at the front; the great distance of the Melbourne base, and the consequent difficulty of referring to it in the event of doubt or mistake; the necessity for facilitating the settlement of the affairs of soldiers who died, and whose next-of-kin were often in Great Britain; the needs of the postal service—these and many other considerations constantly made it necessary to possess overseas as well as in Melbourne, a full record of every individual in the force. Canada maintained one; New Zealand, which originally trusted to Third Echelon overseas, instituted its own department in 1917. Australia maintained it throughout at its overseas headquarters. In 1918 it was decided that the

⁵⁴ Of these over 700 were civilians; a certain number of Australian soldiers were also employed upon the same duty in Egypt.

⁵⁵ Including 50 in Egypt

Australian section at Third Echelon in France was superfluous, and it was withdrawn to A.I.F. headquarters in London, which thenceforward, as Sellheim had desired in 1915, was to carry out Third Echelon's work. By a strange chance this change occurred on the day after the war had ended.⁵⁶

To return to the year 1915. Although numerous British commanders, when first sent out to the East, endeavoured to absorb the Australian base,⁵⁷ Sellheim, with the wise support of Sir John Maxwell, managed to maintain its independence. At the end of the year it consisted in reality of three departments—ordnance, records, and finance—with a staff of about 300 men in all. Two additional departments—one concerned with the convalescent and training dépôts and the other with the medical services—were being transferred after a year's experience to Australian control. The postal work, which was performed by the Records Department, was also becoming heavy enough to require a department for itself.

While the oversea headquarters of the A.I.F. was thus slowly developing, its control was also gradually crystallising. Birdwood was always anxious that there should be an established commander of the A.I.F. Bridges during his lifetime had frequently referred A.I.F. matters to Birdwood, and after Bridges' death the Australian Government agreed to Birdwood's assuming control of the force "in the absence of a general officer commanding it." The Government had as a matter of fact appointed as successor to Bridges Colonel Legge, the Chief of the General Staff in Melbourne, and was sending him to command both the 1st Division and the A.I.F. But Legge's arrival at Anzac in June gave rise to what might have proved an awkward situation. While it might have been feasible for Bridges to exercise certain powers over the Australian half of Godley's N.Z. & A. Division, it was uncertain how far a comparatively junior commander

⁵⁶ Most of the Australian section from Third Echelon arrived in London on 12 Nov., 1918. The change was only possible because of the nearness of A.I.F. H.Q. to its troops. The army forms rendered by units to Third Echelon could be delivered quite as easily to A.I.F. H.Q. in London.

⁵⁷ Among those who sent Sellheim orders preliminary to the absorption of the whole or part of his base were the Commandant of Hamilton's base at Alexandria, the respective commanders of the Cairo training dépôt, the Lavant base, and the Delta defences, and one of Hamilton's successors in the M.E.F. The N.Z. force having then no separate organisation at the base, Sellheim had, during this year, a N.Z. intermediate base included in his command. Reciprocally, a N.Z. officer was appointed to the "base details" section of Sellheim's staff.

could safely do so. Birdwood, indeed, until Legge actually reached him, was uncertain of the Australian Government's intention. Legge very wisely avoided any present difficulty by referring every promotion and other decision of importance to Birdwood for approval. Birdwood thus in effect continued to administer the A.I.F. with Legge as his adviser, so long as the latter commanded the 1st Division. But when in July Legge was about to leave Anzac in order to take up the command of the 2nd Division, he appears to have agreed that the transference of the A.I.F. command to Birdwood was desirable. Birdwood next day wrote to the Governor-General of Australia stating that "for co-ordination and fairness in promotion" throughout the A.I.F. it would be "more equitable" if the commander of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps were also considered the commander of the A.I.F. This was undoubtedly the opinion of most seniors in the A.I.F., and the Australian Government concurred in it to the extent of agreeing that all the powers previously given to Bridges should be delegated to Birdwood, though it did not as yet appoint him to the definite position of commander of the A.I.F.⁵⁸ Major Griffiths of the 1st Division, in consequence of his intimate knowledge of the Australian personnel, was transferred to his staff, and was charged with all details concerning promotion. His position, nominally that of military secretary, was really the adjutant-generalship of the A.I.F.

⁵⁸ The appointment of G.O.C., A.I.F., was deliberately withheld, as it was considered that it might cause inconvenience if Australian troops serving outside Birdwood's corps were administered by him. He nevertheless, in practice, administered for the Australian Govt. the whole of the A.I.F. oversea, except small units detached in distant theatres of war. On 14 Sept., 1916, the appointment of G.O.C., A.I.F., was conferred upon him, being dated back to 18 Sept., 1915.

CHAPTER XV

NEW TROOPS—AND A MENTAL CHANGE

IN June and July, 1915, there arrived in Egypt from Australia reinforcements of special importance. For some time after the departure of the Gallipoli expedition the only Australian troops regularly arriving had been the monthly drafts to maintain the strength of units already at the front. These came forward with absolute regularity, the quotas being whatever was laid down for the British Army. For example, when in December, 1914, the British War Office, after experience of the heavy losses in France, decided to send forward monthly 15 per cent. of the full strength of each infantry unit and 10 per cent. for each unit of cavalry, Australia adopted the same scale. At that time the force consisted of—

One (1st) infantry division,

One additional (4th) infantry brigade,

Three (1st, 2nd, and 3rd) light horse brigades, and

Certain base or L.-of-C. units.

For these the increased monthly reinforcement would be 3,227 officers and men. This number was therefore regularly despatched from Australia. But the recruits who continued to offer were more numerous than could be absorbed in these drafts. The great tide of enlistment which set in after the Landing had not, indeed, yet commenced, but since the sailing of the early contingents there had been steadily enrolled a somewhat different class of men from that which had first rushed to the recruiting offices. They were men who perceived that the war was likely to be longer and more difficult than had at first appeared; men who waited to settle their family or business affairs before considering themselves free to enlist; men who had begun to realise that, if the war was to be won, each individual citizen must put his shoulder to the wheel. A high proportion volunteered not so much from impetuosity of spirit as because of a reasoned patriotism. The newspapers, in the effort to encourage enlistment, pointed out that these men were perhaps more truly representative of Australia

than the adventurous 1st Division, and that they were impressing all beholders as the finest troops yet raised in the Commonwealth. Men of the 1st Division, reduced, war-worn, sickening in their trenches at Anzac, read such eulogies with sardonic comments, and at once christened these future arrivals the "Dinkum" (that is, "the genuine") Australians.

When this class began to maintain the flood of enrolment and the camps in Australia were found to be receiving far larger numbers than would be required for mere reinforcements, the Commonwealth Government cabled to Great Britain offering to organise, despatch, and maintain fresh units of a strength of 10,000. This proposal was accepted, the British Government asking that as large a percentage as possible should be infantry. On February 2nd, therefore, the Commonwealth notified London that the new force would comprise—

Two (5th and 6th) infantry brigades.

One (4th) light horse brigade.

On April 1st this was increased by the additional offer of—

One (7th) infantry brigade.

The three infantry brigades were raised as follows:—

In New South Wales—

5th (17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th Battalions).

In Victoria—

6th (21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Battalions).

In other States—

7th Brigade¹—

25th Battalion (Queensland).

26th Battalion (half Queensland, half Tasmania).

27th Battalion (South Australia).

28th Battalion (Western Australia).

It happened that at the time when these troops were being raised the military portion of the force which in the early days of the war had captured German New Guinea² was released from service in that territory. Of these troops, who had been raised in New South Wales, a very large number re-enlisted in the 5th Brigade, of which their commander,

¹ Certain portions of N S W. were included in the Q'land and S. Aust. military districts (see foot-notes in Vol I pp 22 and 40).

² The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (see Vol X and Vol I p 36).

Colonel Holmes,³ was appointed brigadier. Most of them were young and of particularly fine physical standard. They included many from the University of Sydney, and all belonged to that eager class which had rushed to arms within the first fortnight of the war.

Following the arrangements suggested before the war,⁴ each brigade was accompanied by its proportion of signallers, a field ambulance, a company of transport, and—according to sound British rule—the first monthly quota of reinforcements. The new contingent therefore amounted to 17,183 officers and men, for whose raising, organising, and equipment the staffs of the Commonwealth headquarters in Melbourne and those of the six military districts were responsible, the Chief of the General Staff being Colonel Legge, and the Adjutant-General Colonel Dodds.⁵ Some of the Australian training-camps had by this time been removed to more suitable areas, farther from the great cities, and several were now developing into the large permanent camps—military cities of wood and galvanised iron—which continued to be the Australian training-dépôts during the war.⁶ In these the new brigades received a preliminary instruction, which, however, differed in one important respect from that given to the first force. A reaction had set in against the plan of allowing brigade and battalion commanders to choose the officers for their infantry regiments.⁷ This duty was now entrusted to selection boards, appointed by the Minister for Defence, which sat in the various capitals and tended to make choice of a rather senior and academic type of officer from the citizen forces. Battalion commanders were consequently forced to contrive as best they could by “compromise and adjustment”⁸ to secure the best “team” of officers possible in the circumstances. Even Colonel Holmes, returning with his force from New Guinea, failed to obtain in the 5th Brigade a selection which entirely satisfied him. Many of his former officers,

³ Maj.-Gen. W. Holmes, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded A.N. & M.E.F. 1914/15; 5th Inf. Bde., 1915/16; 4th Div., 1916/17. Secretary, Water and Sewerage Board, Sydney; b. Sydney, 12 Sept., 1862. Killed in action, 2 July, 1917.

⁴ See Vol. I pp. 28-9.

⁵ Maj.-Gen. T. H. Dodds, C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., D.A.G., A.I.F., 1917/18. Officer of Aust Permanent Forces; of Brisbane and Melbourne, b. Newcastle-on-Tyne, Eng., 11 Nov., 1873.

⁶ See Vol. XI—*Australia During the War*; and Vol. XII, plate 704

⁷ Vol. I, pp. 51-4

⁸ The 28th (history of 28th Bn., A.I.F.), Vol. I.

however, secured commands. Lieutenant-Colonel Russell Watson,⁹ a citizen officer with a good South African record, who had led the infantry in New Guinea, became colonel of the 24th Battalion in the 6th Brigade, with Captain Manning¹⁰ (previously Judge-Advocate General in New Guinea) as his adjutant; Colonel Paton,¹¹ second-in-command of the New Guinea infantry, was appointed to the 25th Battalion of the 7th Brigade; other members of Holmes' former staff were scattered through the 5th Brigade. The command of the 6th Brigade was given to Colonel Linton,¹² then a brigadier in the Citizen Forces, and that of the 7th to Colonel Burston,¹³ formerly Lord Mayor of Melbourne, a keen citizen officer but one whose age seemed likely to tell against him on service. At the time of these appointments Australian brigadiers still held only the rank of colonel, it being the policy in Australia, as in America, to have few officers of high title in time of peace. In July, 1915, however, this policy was changed, since by reason of it the Australian brigadiers in the field were finding themselves always junior to their British, Canadian, and other colleagues. In July, therefore, all commanders of infantry and light horse brigades at the front were raised to "temporary brigadier-generals."

The new brigades began to sail from Australia in May, their last units leaving in June. The Indian Ocean now being entirely safe, the transports made their journey singly, sailing at various dates, without escort. As the units arrived in Egypt, they were moved to the camping-grounds of their respective brigades outside Cairo,¹⁴ where they continued their training under their own officers and the staff of Major-General Spens.

⁹ Col. W. W. R. Watson, C.B., C.M.G., V.D. Commanded 24th Bn., 1915/17; Overseas Training Bde., 1917/19. Company director, of Balmain, N.S.W.; b Sydney, 19 May, 1875. Died 30 June, 1924.

¹⁰ Maj. C. E. Manning; 24th Bn. Barrister-at-law; of Hunter's Hill, N.S.W.; b Hunter's Hill, 24 Oct., 1879. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1916.

¹¹ Maj.-Gen. J. Paton, C.B., C.M.G., V.D. Commanded 7th Inf. Bde., 1915/17; 6th Inf. Bde., 1917/18. Merchant; of Waratah, N.S.W.; b. Newcastle, N.S.W., 18 Nov., 1867.

¹² Col. R. Linton. Commanded 6th Inf. Bde., 1915. Hardware merchant; of Melbourne; b. Dalton, Lockerbie, Scotland, 3 Nov., 1861. Died at sea, 2 Sept., 1915 (*See p. 809*).

¹³ Maj.-Gen. J. Burston, V.D. Commanded 7th Inf. Bde., 1915. Malster; of Hawthorn, Vic.; b. Kilmore, Vic., 1 May, 1856. Died 4 March, 1920.

¹⁴ The 5th and 6th Bdes went into the Aerodrome Camp on the N.E. outskirts of Heliopolis with the 4th L.H. Bde. The 7th was quartered at Abbassia, S.W. of Heliopolis. These were each about five miles from the centre of Cairo.

In the middle of June General Legge, on his way to assume command of the 1st Division, reached Egypt, and at Birdwood's request stayed there a few days in order to inform himself of the state of affairs at the base.¹⁵ At that time the new brigades which he had raised in Australia were beginning their Egyptian training, and he carried to Anzac the latest news of this important reinforcement.

Legge's impending arrival to take over the 1st Division from Walker had raised much feeling among a few senior Australian officers. It was not the troops who objected, though they had become attached to Walker as a brave and considerate commander. Nor did Walker himself harbour the least resentment; it was typical of his loyal nature that, dearly though he loved his division, he affirmed that it was natural and proper for the Commonwealth to desire its command to be in the hands of an Australian. But several seniors, including M'Cay¹⁶ and Monash, objected to being passed over in favour of a commander who, though a professional soldier, was their junior in the service and without experience of the front. Some even spoke of resigning, until Birdwood urged that resignation was not to be thought of in war, and that, if they suspected their new commander of being unequal to the task, their part was as far as possible to stand by him and help him through. This point of view was accepted loyally enough. Upon Legge reaching Anzac with the news of the three new infantry brigades in Egypt, the suggestion was made that these should be combined to form, with certain additional units, a 2nd Australian Division. M'Cay, the senior Australian brigadier, having shown himself brave in battle and of marked capacity in training, was chosen by Legge and Birdwood for the command. The consent of Lord Kitchener was received on July 10th, and, the Australian Government concurring, the formation of the division was authorised.

On July 11th, the day before he was to leave Anzac, M'Cay was descending a steep and dangerous corner of the

¹⁵ Upon making this inspection Legge reported direct to the Australian Government that Cairo was a totally unsuitable centre for the training of Australian troops. Presumably Legge made this report as commander of the A.I.F., but the ignoring of Sir John Maxwell, who considered that it should have been sent through him, gave rise temporarily to a difficult situation.

¹⁶ Recently returned to the front, and apparently recovered from his leg-wound received at Helles.

communication trench in rear of Scott's Point when his leg, previously wounded at Helles, snapped at the point where the bullet had injured the bone. He was invalided to Australia. The officer most suitable for the task of organising the new division appeared to be Legge, whose capacity as an administrator was well known, and under whom its three infantry brigades had been raised in Australia. His short tenure of his actual appointment had not been unaccompanied by difficulties. He had expressed strong tactical objections to the plan of the Lone Pine assault which the 1st Division was about to undertake. Moreover, his temporary withdrawal from Anzac rendered easier the retransfer to Birdwood of the supreme administrative command of the A.I.F. Legge's appointment to the 2nd Division was approved by Kitchener, and on July 26th he handed over the 1st to Walker and left Anzac for Egypt, taking with him some of the elements of a strong and experienced staff. To the remaining steps in the formation of the 2nd Division reference will be made in their place.

In addition to this reinforcement, the Australian Government had at the end of May despatched to Egypt a "bridging train," composed mainly of ratings drawn from the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, together with pontoons, trestles, and technical equipment.¹⁷ Further, partly in order to afford war experience to the regular troops of the Royal Australian Artillery, a brigade of siege artillery, including the personnel—but not guns—for two heavy batteries, was sent from Australia in mid-July. These batteries proceeded direct to England. Beyond those enumerated no additional Australian units reached Egypt until after August. Moreover, in consequence of the great numbers of horses which were being maintained, apparently to no good purpose, in Egypt, Sir Ian Hamilton, at Birdwood's request, had asked of the War Office that no more mounted troops should be sent from Australia. The 4th Light Horse Brigade was already on its way; but after this no other light horse brigades were formed in Australia, and the sending of horses for remounts was temporarily stopped.

Before leaving the story of the base it is necessary to mention one further development which occurred during the

¹⁷ A detailed account of the R.A.N.B.T. is given in Vol IX of this history

critical months of the Gallipoli campaign. During the first half of that campaign the keen desire not merely of the reinforcements but of the majority of wounded Australians from Anzac was to get clear of hospital and Egypt, and hasten back to the front. Colonel Maudsley,¹⁸ a leading physician of No. 1 General Hospital in Cairo, has recorded that at this early stage it was noticeable that "there were none of the effects of war weariness. . . . The wounded had done their work well and would soon be back. They were well satisfied." Some of the first wounded, even while suffering the extreme discomfort of the hospital carriers, were consumed by anger against the enemy who had injured them, and were eager to get back for another blow at the "bastards."¹⁹ Many more chafed to be at Anzac beside their mates.

As the summer drew on, this high, keen spirit became less noticeable in the hospital wards. Many were more listless; in a few cases there was discovered the trouble common in every war—malingering, that is to say, feigning illness in order to avoid fighting, work, or discipline.²⁰ Other patients, who would not have dreamed of shirking duty, nevertheless appeared to be no longer inspired with the same high enthusiasm. "Many cases," noted Colonel Manifold in his diary for July 20th, ". . . though not malingering, . . . required some moral stimulus probably, and pulling themselves together to overcome simply morbid symptoms or disinclination to make an effort." A medical officer at Luna Park also remarked "the difference in tone between those who had been admitted at first and those admitted now," and thought the cause might be the herding of men "in large wards with enormous masses of beds."

It is possible that this overcrowding, and also the disillusionment caused by defective organisation at Lemnos and the base, were in part responsible. But the main cause lay far away in the dusty fly-infested bivouacs and trenches

¹⁸ Col. Sir H. C. Maudsley, K.C.M.G., C.B.E. Consulting Physician, A.I.F., 1916/19 Of Melbourne; b. Stainforth Hall, near Settle, Yorks, Eng., 25 Apr., 1859.

¹⁹ Vol. I, pp. 570-1.

²⁰ Almost simultaneously there began to happen at Anzac a very few cases of an occurrence inseparable from war—the infliction of wounds by men upon themselves in order to escape from service. The instances seem to have occurred (as afterwards in France) mainly among comparatively new arrivals who felt unable to face the overwhelming strain of fighting. Such action, of course, constituted a serious military crime. It was noted about this time that Turkish soldiers also occasionally held their hands above the parapet to be shot at.

at Anzac. About that time there began to occur in the veteran portion of the force—the “originals,” as they were called, who had fought at the Landing—the first signs of a psychological change. This may, in the narration, appear vague and shadowy, but it was nevertheless quite clear to any close observer; and so concrete was it in its results that, in the end, it completely determined the response of the troops to various methods of leadership.

Disillusionment, more or less acute, had undoubtedly followed the heavy and futile fighting at Quinn’s early in June and the expensive demonstration on June 28th. But the mental change which began to affect the veterans of the force during the summer of 1915 was not mere disillusionment. About the middle of July some of those most intimately in touch with the troops began first to observe a subtle, yet fully palpable, alteration in the mental attitude of the original officers and men. At that time there had begun to spread through the force the first whispers of an impending attack by the troops at Anzac. As it became certain that this second tremendous fight, probably no less bloody than the Landing, was ahead of them, there was brought home for the first time to a great part of the infantry a realisation of the part which in the fine enthusiasm or excitement of enlistment they had undertaken to play.

The first Australians who enlisted in this war had undoubtedly in their minds the story of previous Australian contingents, or at any rate of British expeditions oversea. They had pictured themselves fighting for perhaps a year or more, and had imagined the majority then returning, as they had done from South Africa, marching through the well-known streets and cheering crowds of their home city, and arriving back among their families with strange tales, interesting “souvenirs,” and thrilling experience. Now for the first time the perception came to many—not in any startling form but in their few moments of quiet reflection, as they lay endeavouring to cheat the flies in their “pozzies,” or watched the bacon frizzling in their mess-tins—that the prospect of marching home did not belong to the infantry who enlisted earliest in this war; that they had engaged themselves in a service which was not to end when they had borne their share of hardship,

experience, and excitement. A man could lightly accept the chances if the fighting were to be over in a twelvemonth, or if there lay against him only the risks of one great engagement such as the Landing. But they now knew that for them the prospect was one of battle after battle, in which, in the long run, there must almost certainly be one of two endings. They felt themselves penned between two long blank walls reaching perpetually ahead of them, from which there was no turning and no escape, save that of death or of such wounds as would render them useless for further service.

This realisation—which must have been brought home at an early stage to the men of the British Regular Army, and indeed to the officers and men of any infantry on those fronts where the war was fiercest—came almost visibly to a large proportion of the “original” officers and men of the Australian Imperial Force before the second offensive in Gallipoli. The first adventurous eagerness for battle, and the itching desire to get at the enemy, had in their case disappeared. Many observers failed to perceive this truth. Some writers on the press, either misled by the false literature of other wars or bent on sustaining the national determination in this one, invariably assumed that the men in hospital were thirsting to engage in further battles. The truth was that, while a few hot spirits undoubtedly remained restless and impatient unless they were in holts with the enemy, the great majority of those who had once been subjected to the stress of a heavy fight had no wish to hurry into another. Rather they faced each fresh battle grimly, sometimes bitterly, with a full knowledge of the ugly chances lying before them—chances which in a greater or less degree every man dreaded, and which only their ideal of duty or of manhood forced the majority of them to accept. The self-respect of most officers and men led them, as far as the matter rested with them, to return to duty among their mates in the firing line as soon as they were fit for it. No man who had enjoyed the frank fellowship and true good-comradeship of the regimental messes or bivouacs at the front could hear with an easy conscience of his fellow-officers or his old platoon in the thick of some heavy fight, if he was aware within himself that he could be there. None who knew the manner in which men and officers at the front regarded a

certain few, who were suspected of shirking service by clinging to duties at the base, could have any doubt as to the course of conduct to which they themselves would adhere. There could be no question which were the comrades with whom they desired to be reckoned. Except in a few great crises, it was these reasons, and not any especial eagerness to deal with the enemy, which in later years caused men to press for return to the front, or at least cheerfully to accept that contingency when it became due.

From July, 1915, onwards, as far as the A.I.F. was concerned, there lay more and more upon the base authorities the onus of providing the machinery for returning convalescents to the front. The rending strain of battle might, twenty times in one day, lay bare feelings which these men would not normally exhibit in a lifetime, and it left no man quite as elastic as it found him. They became content to give up their individual wills to the military machine, waiting for its movements, and, when these came, accepting them without question. In 1915 the well-meant sympathy of medical officers at the base often, in effect, imposed upon convalescents the necessity for volunteering a second time, and even of finding their own means to reach the front. Later in the war the machinery for such return became automatic.

Of this mental change there were at the front few spoken signs, except some very rare and chance remark of an arresting bitterness. For example, after the brilliant assault by the 11th (Western Australian) Battalion on Leane's Trench, a stranger remarked to a man of that unit: "They will be pleased in Western Australia when they hear of it." "This!" was the instant reply; "the 28th Battalion will get the cheering for this!" The 28th was the latest-raised battalion of that State, and the most recent mail had brought news of its arrival in Egypt.²¹ With each individual officer and man the tussle was an internal one; it is probable that even Birdwood, though he visited his trenches daily and personally knew many of his men, did not realise that there was any change in the outlook of his troops. When he assumed, as he invariably did in addressing them, that their keenest ambition was to have another opportunity of chasing the enemy with

²¹ Long before the 28th returned to receive any ovation, that veteran battalion had suffered in battle after battle as heavily as the 11th itself.

the bayonet, he always elicited a smile from the majority of the grim faces surrounding him. Nevertheless they were no longer in tune, as of old, with that time-honoured joke.

So the internal revolution came and passed, with a mere quietness among some of the older men. The new prospect was faced. The fond dream of the return home had been silently surrendered by many without a word or a sign in their letters, such as might afford a hint of it to their families. The passionate love of home, marked in Australians, became stronger; but thenceforth it began to be taken for granted, in the infantry, that life was uncertain and probably short, and this assumption made the bonds of their comradeship very firm. Instant though most of them had been to use their fists in civil life, at the front these virile infantrymen seldom quarrelled, and a fight between them was rarely known. At least in the generous life of their messes and platoons selfish aims and personal strivings had no place. They lived from day to day. Their ambitions were for their regiment, their squadron, their company—for the brigade and the division and the A.I.F. Many outsiders went among them with deep, if unspoken, reverence, as among men devoted to die. The pure quality of their fellowship was perhaps seldom equalled in time of peace.

It was a sign of the native mettle of this infantry that, when the time for the impending movement approached, the men, sick and weak though they were, became animated by the excitement and by the prospect of a change from the dull monotony of trench life. Colonel Hankey, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, visiting Anzac on July 27th, telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: "Australians are superbly dug in and spoiling for a fight."²² While this reference to the men's eagerness probably applied most accurately to the light horse or mounted rifles, which had not yet been engaged in any general offensive, yet, as the day fixed for the attack approached, it became almost equally true of the most battle-worn amongst the troops at Anzac. Within measurable distance of the conflict they began to chafe for it, like racehorses approaching the starting-gate.

²² Sir Ian Hamilton, in *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol II, p. 37, gives the wording of this telegram as: "Australians are superbly confident and spoiling for a fight."

CHAPTER XVI

THE PLAN OF THE SECOND OFFENSIVE

THE story now turns from the local struggle of the Anzac troops, burrowed into a few acres of Gallipoli hillside, to the main policy and direction of the campaign and of the war during the same months. On the Western Front there had been deadlock—the impossibility of effective movement being proved every time it was attempted. The one important development was the retirement of the Russians in Galicia under pressure which no possible action on the Western Front could relieve. There was, however, a possibility that the Allies might decisively turn the tables by driving through their effort, already inaugurated, to link with Russia by way of the Dardanelles.

The efforts at the Dardanelles had twice met with complete failure. Hamilton's frank report after the Second Battle of Krithia had left the British War Council in no doubt of the double defeat—of the Navy on March 18th; of his whole expeditionary force, supported by the Navy, on May 6th to 8th. The War Council which met on May 14th squarely faced the question whether it was worth while to persist with the enterprise.

If the expedition continued its attempts, two methods were possible: one naval and one military. Out at the front, immediately after the Second Battle of Krithia, Commodore Roger Keyes and some of the younger spirits in the fleet pressed to be allowed to make a further attempt, employing destroyers as mine-sweepers. The Admiralty, however, even before the War Council met, had decided that the probable results of a naval attack were not worth the cost, and that all idea of it

must be abandoned.¹ The War Council of May 14th, therefore, had now to determine whether it was worth while to prolong the effort to force the Dardanelles by military means alone.

At that day's meeting the question could not be decided. The position was as follows. Strong reasons existed against abandoning the campaign. Apart from considerations—especially deep with Lord Kitchener—of loyalty to the distant army, the effect on small neutrals might be calamitous. Several Balkan states were hesitating whether to enter the war, and each side was at the moment endeavouring to attract them by demonstrating its chances of victory—the Allies at Gallipoli, the Germans in Galicia. If, with the Germans powerfully advancing, the Allies were to relinquish their expedition, not only would Greece, Bulgaria, and Roumania hold aloof from them, but the strongest of the three, Bulgaria, would almost certainly join the enemy. Moreover the step seemed likely to prove fatal to British prestige among Eastern races. On the other hand, the enterprise had given rise to situations undreamed of at its beginning. Far from being a mere "diversion" for the benefit of the Russians, it now stood in need of Russian assistance. But the army corps which the Russians had promised to throw in when the expedition reached the Sea of Marmora, and which had so far been retained at Odessa, was now required to meet the Germans in Galicia. Although Italy was entering the war, no Italian force could be sent to the Dardanelles, since Russia objected,² as she had previously done in the case of Greece.

¹ In addition, despite Kitchener's strong protest, the *Queen Elizabeth* was withdrawn, being required by Lord Fisher for the North Sea, while Admiral Thursby's squadron was also removed in order to fulfil an engagement with Italy—then entering the war—that four battleships should be sent to the Adriatic. When the question of these withdrawals came before the War Council, Kitchener protested that it was the sending of the *Queen Elizabeth* and Churchill's forecast of the power of her guns which had most weighed with him in assenting to the expedition. The Admiralty, however, persisted; and its persistence was undoubtedly right, since the naval fire had proved comparatively ineffective. In order to meet Kitchener's objection, Churchill now ordered the new monitors which had been constructed for Lord Fisher's cherished project of a landing in the Baltic to be diverted to Gallipoli. This step, and the diversion of additional ships to assist Italy, led to Lord Fisher's resignation. The steps taken by Lord French to disclose the ammunition shortage, occurring at the same moment, caused a political crisis in which Asquith invited the Unionist leaders to join the Government. Winston Churchill left the Admiralty, accepting a comparatively minor appointment in the Cabinet, with a seat on the Dardanelles Committee. He supported the expedition as keenly as ever, but with less influence. (See *Dardanelles Commission Report II*, and *Naval Operations*, by Sir Julian Corbett, Vol II, pp. 405-11.)

² Italy entered the war on May 23. The troops at the Dardanelles constantly expected both Greek and Italian help. But Russia, to which the Allies had in their extremity promised Constantinople, was jealous of the intervention of either of these nations in Turkey.

The French Government and military authorities were known to be opposed to an increasing entanglement of their forces on any front except the Western. To all appearance, therefore, if the expedition was to be carried swiftly through, Great Britain alone must provide the necessary reinforcements.

Could Great Britain do so? At that time it was intended that the divisions of the "New Army,"³ then finishing their training, should proceed to France.⁴ Could Great Britain divert some of these to Hamilton? If she did, was the port of Mudros adequate for the necessary transshipment? Could the growing demands for ammunition be met for both fronts? Above all, even if several divisions were sent to Hamilton, would they make his success a certainty? The War Council of May 14th came to no decision, except, apparently, a resolution to ascertain from Hamilton what force he considered necessary to ensure success.

Hamilton had already outlined to Kitchener his intentions concerning his next move. Using, apparently, the troops that he had, he would endeavour to reach Achi Baba by stages, the means employed being night advances and heavier bombardments. In the original plan of the Landing, this hill was to be reached by the covering force as a preliminary to an attack on the key position, the Kilid Bahr Plateau, which lay beyond, hiding the Narrows. Achi Baba itself commanded no vital position; but by those who since April 25th had bravely spent themselves in the desperate effort to reach it, this peak came naturally to be regarded as the crucial objective of the expedition. Even Hamilton seems at this time to have persuaded himself that, when once its summit was reached, his army would break through into open country, and his Chief of Staff, Braithwaite, was a powerful advocate of that plan. Consequently the scheme, indicated in Hamilton's telegram of May 10th, had been to "hammer away" at Achi Baba with his present force.⁵ But he had added: "If you

³ See Vol. I, p. 168. One "New Army" division was already in France.

⁴ According to Sir George Arthur (*Life of Lord Kitchener, Vol III, p 141*) it had already been decided to send to Hamilton—though he was not then aware of the fact—three Territorial divisions, the 52nd, 53rd, and 54th, some of which seem to have been rated lower in fighting value than the New Army.

⁵ Hamilton wrote on May 9 "The main object remains unachieved . . . More and more munitions will be needed to do so" Next day he added "The admiral agrees with me in thinking that the only sound procedure is to hammer away until the enemy gets demoralised . . . We must make short advances during the night and dig in for the day until we get Achi Baba." He was in hopes that the offer cabled by de Robeck to the Admiralty to "go through" with the fleet would be endorsed, but he did not refer to it.

could only spare me two fresh divisions organised as a corps, I could push on with great hopes of success both from Helles and Gaba Tepe; otherwise I am afraid we shall degenerate into trench warfare with its resultant slowness." Next day Kitchener had telegraphed that he was sending a Lowland Scottish Territorial division, the 52nd, with some artillery. Although this news was welcome, the reinforcement did not amount to the two divisions for which Hamilton had asked.⁶ Such was the position when he received the telegram containing the War Council's question—what force did he consider necessary for success? Kitchener had added that, for the purpose of the answer, Hamilton should suppose that sufficient troops were available to meet his demands. Hamilton appreciated the generosity of this attitude, and resolved to ask for not a man less than he believed necessary, but for not a man more.

Yet the answer to this apparently simple question was not so simple. If the Bulgarians or Greeks joined the Allies, or if the Russians assisted with their army corps from Odessa, the moderate reinforcement of two British divisions, for which Hamilton had already asked, might suffice to ensure victory. If, on the other hand, he had to rely on the British and French alone, he decided after careful consideration that he would need two army corps (four divisions). In either case he asked that his present force should be kept up to strength by the necessary drafts. This estimate was telegraphed to Kitchener on May 17th.

For three weeks no word of any decision reached him. He was greatly puzzled by the delay, and, as the situation was changing with the further defeat of the Russians, he telegraphed on June 2nd that the larger number of troops requested—four divisions and reinforcements for the existing divisions—would now certainly be required, unless a fresh ally could be obtained in the East.

The real cause of the delay was that a change of government was in process. The position of the Asquith Ministry having been much weakened by the increasing popular mistrust of its war measures,⁷ the Prime Minister

⁶ Hamilton's request was based on the assumption (mentioned in a cable of May 13) that the losses of the 20th Div. would be made good by the sending to it of 211 officers and 11,672 men

⁷ See note on p. 431.

thought it wise to strengthen the Government by offering a share in it to the Conservative leaders. The coalition was formed, and, consequent upon it, the "Dardanelles Committee." This was a body almost identical with the defunct "War Council,"⁸ but included a number of the new Conservative ministers, chief among them being Balfour, who had replaced Churchill at the Admiralty. The new ministers naturally desired time and further information before deciding the most important question which confronted them—namely, whether the Dardanelles Campaign should be abandoned or continued. On May 28th Kitchener, who had now received Hamilton's estimate, prepared a memorandum pointing out that three courses were open:

1. Withdrawal.
2. The provision of sufficient troops and munitions to enable the campaign to be driven through to immediate success.
3. Holding on and pushing forward when possible.

At the time of writing the memorandum it was the third course to which Kitchener himself inclined. To withdrawal, unless it became necessary in order to avoid disaster, he was utterly opposed. On the other hand he did not think that either the troops or the ammunition required for immediate success could be spared. Personally he doubted whether the "two army corps" asked for by Hamilton would suffice to "carry the position."⁹ But he seems to have hesitated in this judgment. If only he could feel confident of Hamilton's ability to force the straits, then every sentiment would drive him towards providing the men. After writing his memorandum he again telegraphed: "Are you convinced that with immediate reinforcements to the extent you mention you could force the Kilid Bahr position and thus finish the Dardanelles operations?" Hamilton's reply, which he delayed until after the attack made at Helles on June 4th, was: "I believe the reinforcements asked for . . . will eventually enable me to take Kilid Bahr and will assuredly expedite the decision."

This seems to have determined Kitchener's attitude. When, on June 7th, the Dardanelles Committee at last met, he

⁸ See Vol. I, p 175

⁹ Kitchener was apparently thinking of Hamilton's plan of breaking through the entrenchments in front of Achi Baba. The failure at Festubert in France had just proved that, without an immensely increased shell-supply, such attempts were futile.

informed it that he would not remain in office if the campaign were abandoned, and he urged its most vigorous prosecution. The Committee, accepting this advice, decided to give Hamilton the fullest possible support. One Territorial division, the 52nd (Lowland Scottish), had already been promised. Kitchener now telegraphed:

"Your difficulties are fully recognised by the Cabinet, who are determined to support you. We are sending you three divisions of the New Army. . . . The last . . . ought to reach you not later than the first fortnight in July. . . . While steadily pressing the enemy, there seems no reason for running any premature risks in the meantime."

From the caution with which the message ended it may be inferred that Kitchener was anxious lest Hamilton might fritter away his present army, and possibly some of the reinforcements, by the delivery of attacks which would not lead to a final decision. His urgent desire was that the whole of this precious reinforcement should be reserved intact for the delivery of a final blow. "Do not let Sir Ian Hamilton throw away his strength in the interval," he had urged at the meeting, "but let us send out ample reinforcements to carry the thing through." In a verbal message which he sent to Hamilton some weeks later by Lieutenant-General Stopford,¹⁰ he laid stress on the same point: "It is not the wish of the Cabinet that Sir Ian Hamilton should make partial attacks. They consider it preferable that he should await the arrival of his reinforcements to make one great effort."

The wisdom of the Committee's decision seems obvious. If four additional divisions could, as Hamilton estimated, carry the Dardanelles Campaign to victory, there was no other theatre of war in which a similar force could gain comparable results. The winning of new allies in the Balkans, the cutting-off of Turkey from Germany, the opening of the Dardanelles route to Russia, even the temporary relief of pressure on the hard-driven Russians, would be infinitely more important than any advantage which could possibly be obtained from the use of four divisions on the Western

¹⁰ Lieut.-Gen the Hon. Sir Frederick W. Stopford, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., p.s.c. Commanded IX Corps, 1915. Officer of British Regular Army, b. 22 Feb., 1854. Died 4 May, 1929.

Front, unless—which was not the case—those divisions were likely to make the difference between holding or losing the Western line. Neither in 1915 nor in 1916 was there ever the faintest prospect that such a reinforcement would bring the British Army within measurable distance of a final breach of the German line in France. Although, therefore, the balance of opinion of the British military staff was probably then, as later, against the diversion of troops from the main theatre, there is little doubt that the decision of the Government was, at least on this occasion, sound.¹¹

Upon what calculations Hamilton based his original estimate that four additional divisions would carry him to victory is not recorded. So far as can be inferred, his intention was still to continue the attack from Helles and Anzac. But by June 6th, although he worded his telegram to Kitchener as if he adhered to his original plan, it is plain from his diary that he had under consideration one entirely different, but so dependent upon secrecy that he preferred not to impart it even to his chief.¹² For since May 30th he had been possessed of the first draft of Birdwood's and Skeen's suggestion for a surprise movement from the north of Anzac against the heights of Sari Bair.¹³




¹¹ Sir Julian Corbett (*Naval Operations*, Vol. III, p. 42) states: "though it (the opinion that all available force should be concentrated in the main theatre) was widely held in military circles, civilian opinion, in this country (Great Britain) at least, was not convinced—it was indeed thoroughly sceptical."

¹² Kitchener would be obliged to inform the Cabinet, and Hamilton suspected that the secrets of Cabinet Ministers became known in certain circles of English society, whose gossip possibly reached the enemy. Sir Ian believed that the date of the original Landing had in this manner been communicated beforehand, *vid* Vienna, to the Turks. Secrets of high importance certainly reached British officers in Gallipoli in letters from members of high social circles. There was, however, no evidence of any action on the part of the Turks such as would indicate that they had received information as to the Landing. The Turkish staff, in its answers to questions put to it by the Australian Historical Mission, stated that the date was not known, and there is every reason to believe that this is correct.

¹³ It has been explained (*Vol. I*, p. 268) that this name was not applied by the Turks to the whole mountain, but apparently only to the feature in the Anzac foot-hills, known as the "Sphinx." It has, however, been officially employed in despatches, and has given its name to the offensive of Aug., 1915. It is therefore used in this volume as designating the whole hill-mass which was known to the Turks by the name of its highest summit—Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971)

The freshness of the conception—the surprise, the night attack, the reliance on the extreme difficulty of the country as the essential advantage; above all, the chance of striking at the enemy in an area not yet barred by continuous trenches—all these elements caused the plan to appeal to the Commander-in-Chief. The most general fault of the British staff, a drab lack of imagination, was not among his defects. It often seemed as if leaders had but one resource for overcoming tactical difficulties—bombardment by artillery; if that failed, a further, but often still insufficient, bombardment. But where others advocated a dismal repetition of frontal assaults by daylight against machine-guns arrayed in line after line of entrenchments, his more nimble brain tended to fly to every expedient which could avoid the slaughter, the miserably insignificant results, and the despondency, which invariably followed. His imagination—that of an artist—led him to advocate changes of method to procure changed results—night attacks, surprises, sometimes even apparently fantastic devices. Later in the campaign, for example, he was greatly attracted by a suggestion from some Australians experienced in gold-mining¹⁴ that they should attempt to wash away the enemy's front trenches by employing a common method of their profession, to wit, sluicing the soil with a jet of water under extreme pressure.

Moreover, Skeen's and Birdwood's plan reached him at a moment when that advocated by Braithwaite and Hunter-Weston, the champions of "hammering away" towards Achi Baba, was under trial. Hunter-Weston believed that an opportunity had presented itself of gaining important local advantages by a further frontal attack. There were still some troops who might be used for such an offensive,¹⁵ and,



¹⁴ See p. 820.

¹⁵ Most of the E. Lanes Div had not previously engaged in any important assault, and the R N. Div. had not yet been exhausted.

its probable advantages being strongly urged, Hamilton ordered the attack for June 4th.

With this battle the British contest at Helles entered the stage of trench-fighting. The British trench-line at this date faced the enemy's at an average distance of some 200 yards along most of its front. At 8 a.m. there began the artillery preparation, the French lending two groups of their field-guns to increase the fire on the British front. At midday the whole line of French and British infantry advanced, and in the first shock succeeded beyond expectation. Along a large proportion of the front three successive lines of trenches were taken, and it was believed by spectators, although probably without good reason, that the Turkish defence system had in some sectors been broken through, and that the country beyond lay open.¹⁶ But within a few hours the French, who had advanced along the same summit as on May 8th,¹⁷ were repelled by a counter-attack. Reoccupying their trenches on this height, the Turks were able to fire directly along those taken by the Naval Division in the hollow of the Kanli Dere. The right of that division was thereupon rapidly driven back, suffering heavily as it recrossed the open. In the centre the Lancashire Territorials, who had passed the Vineyard, still held out with their flank in the air, but were eventually ordered by Hamilton to withdraw to the nearer edge of the Vineyard. The 29th Division, which fought in practically every attack that was planned at Helles, for some days clung to a salient south-west of Krithia, but was finally driven back from its most advanced position. The British casualties had been over 4,000. The enemy's front line had been taken and held, but he began forthwith to extend his trench-system until it was soon more formidable than before.

The experience of this battle was probably the cause of Hamilton's final revolt against the policy advocated by his subordinates of "hammering away" at entrenchments. He refused to enmesh his new divisions, if he received them, in an area gridironed with trench-lines. Landings at Enos, Bulair, and south of the straits were considered, but some of the reasons which weighed against those proposals in

¹⁶ Even had this been so, the individual Turk was still staunch, and not half-demoralised, as in 1918, and it needed only a few determined machine-gunners, when once the surprise had faded, to bring such a penetration to a standstill.

¹⁷ Capturing a redoubt known to the French as the "Haricot."

April had been strengthened by the arrival of German submarines. Meanwhile at Anzac part of the chance which had existed before the original Landing still lay open; the enemy had left the heights on the northern flank leading to 971 practically unfortified, in the belief that they were impassable. That summit overlooked at a few miles distance both the Turkish land-communications down the Peninsula and their sea-communications at the Narrows. Its capture would possibly at one blow cut off the Turkish army, and would in any case render its position so precarious as almost to compel its withdrawal. Here at least was a plan for delivering his main blow "unexpectedly against some key position which was *not* prepared for defence."¹⁸ Birdwood asked for an additional division and brigade to carry it through, and suggested a date early in July, when the moon had passed the full. Braithwaite appears to have opposed the plan as over-adventurous, but Hamilton adopted it.

He had already decided on this plan when the information arrived that three New Army divisions were to come to him. With that news the whole outlook was changed. He was assured of the Cabinet's support. The troops promised were sufficient for a powerful offensive, although its date would necessarily be deferred from the moon of June-July to that of July-August. Hamilton at once conferred with his generals and with the admiral; on June 11th, at a second meeting with Birdwood, Hunter-Weston, and General Gouraud, the commander of the French army corps at Helles, he gave an outline of his scheme. It was accepted warmly.¹⁹ "Everyone keen and sanguine," Hamilton noted in his diary.²⁰

¹⁸ Hamilton's *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol I, p. 267

¹⁹ Gouraud, like the great soldier that he was, ignored the local difficulties of his own corps and flung himself heartily into support of whatever plan was likely to bring victory to the whole force. The French were at this time greatly harried by the Turkish guns on the Asiatic coast, south of the straits, which shelled them from flank and rear. These guns might have been silenced by a landing south of the straits, and French officers therefore frequently advocated this course. But Gouraud, who himself was shortly afterwards maimed by one of the Asiatic shells, swept aside that consideration in one penetrating sentence as "a defensive measure which will not help forward the campaign by a single step." As for the capture of Achi Baba, though a great military achievement, it would only, he wrote, "bring us on the next day face to face with the escarpments of Kilid Bahr." The occupation of the Gaba Tepe-Maidos area, on the other hand, "would outflank, if it did not destroy, the enemy's closure of the Dardanelles." Still better he considered a landing at Bulair, which would directly threaten Constantinople itself. This course, therefore, he favoured, if the naval difficulties were not too great; but if the admiral considered them insuperable, then let the blow be delivered at Anzac. After Gouraud was wounded, his successor, General Bailloud, induced the French Government to suggest the operation which Gouraud had discarded—a landing on the southern side of the straits—but the plan was rejected by Hamilton

²⁰ *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. I, p. 288.

In order to impress his corps commanders with the need for secrecy he showed them a copy of the cable in which he had intentionally misled Kitchener concerning his plans. But Kitchener's inquiries soon made it necessary to disclose to him some of the details, and his full sympathy seems to have been enlisted. He too was convinced of the futility of wasting men in assaulting prepared positions. "The only way to make a real success of an attack," he said in a message to Hamilton, "is by surprise. . . . When the surprise ceases to be operative, in so far that the advance is checked and the enemy begin to collect from all sides to oppose the attackers, then perseverance becomes merely a useless waste of life."²¹ Everything depended upon securing a decisive position while the surprise lasted, and, since this was the aim of the new plan, Kitchener appears to have thrown himself with the more enthusiasm into its support. In order, apparently, to afford a reserve, which had been lacking at the Landing, he offered Hamilton two additional Territorial divisions, the 53rd and 54th;²² and later, a few days before the actual fighting, informed him that the 2nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Division, a number of Indian troops, and certain artillery, all at that date in Egypt, were at his disposal. These were not intended to be used in the first stage of the offensive; it was then, indeed, too late for them to be so employed. But Hamilton at once called for the Yeomanry to come as infantry; and Maxwell, who protested that this diminution of his forces seriously weakened the defence of Egypt, was informed by Kitchener that the risk must be undertaken.

Thus eventually, where Hamilton had asked for four divisions, seven were offered to him and accepted:

Before War Council's meeting, May 14:

52nd (Lowland Territorial) Division.

After Dardanelles Committee's decision, June 7:

10th (New Army) Division.

11th (New Army) Division.

13th (New Army) Division.

End of June:

53rd (Territorial) Division.

54th (Territorial) Division.

End of July:

2nd Mounted (Yeomanry) Division.


²¹ A verbal message sent to Hamilton through Gen. Stopford. See *Gallipoli Diary*, by Sir Ian Hamilton, Vol. II p. 1.

²² See note 4 on p. 432. The 52nd had already been sent.

Half of these forces were without artillery, and their value might of course vary enormously with the efficiency of the staffs and the fighting capacity of the troops, a fact which neither War Office nor commanders, British or colonial, yet fully realised. Nevertheless the assistance may be fairly said to have exceeded what Hamilton had either asked or expected. So far as the adequacy of his ammunition supply was concerned, the projected night-attack against a scattered enemy in mountainous country would not in its early stages be dependent upon artillery fire, although the summits, once gained, might have to be so defended. Whether his ammunition would be sufficient depended partly upon what Kitchener could send him, but also partly upon what he himself expended in the meantime. If minor attacks continued to be delivered against the entrenchments in front of Achi Baba, the stocks of shell would naturally be depleted, since for these attacks heavy preliminary bombardments were the most vital need. This consideration applied with equal truth to the expenditure of men. Kitchener's anxiety that all the reinforcements should be kept intact for the main offensive has already been mentioned. When Hamilton informed him that through lack of room he intended to keep them, until the time came, upon the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Mitylene, Kitchener asked whether this applied to the Lowland Division. He would not order Hamilton to refrain entirely from all operations before the main offensive.²³ But he had made

clear his desire that partial attacks should not be undertaken unless a special advantage could be obtained by so doing.


Yet in the interval between June 4th and the main offensive two more strong attempts were made to "hammer away" up the long glacis of Achi Baba. The suggestion in



²³ "It is not intended . . ." he told Stopford, "that Sir Ian should do nothing in the meantime, and if he gets a really good opportunity he is to seize it."

each case came from the local commander, and was supported by a strong opinion of some of Hamilton's staff that a substantial success would be achieved. Yet his acceptance is harder to understand than any other act of his leadership. In the first battle, on June 28th, Hunter-Weston advanced the 29th Division for 1,000 yards along the sea-coast, while a brigade of the newly-arrived 52nd Division conformed with it, pivoting on the centre of the British front. Since the shell-supply, so vital at Helles, was deficient, the artillery commander deliberately concentrated his bombardment in front of the more important operation—that of the 29th Division—giving but weak assistance to the 52nd.²⁴ Although

the latter failed, suffering heavily, the general result was a brilliant success of trench-warfare. The casualties were 1,500, not counting 300 in the simultaneous "demonstration" at Anzac. The second battle, on July 12th, was an attempt to swing up the centre and right, which had not advanced on June 28th. The remainder of the 52nd and the French were engaged. As the French field-guns could normally expend 40,000 shells before



a fight, whereas the British, though covering a longer front, never had available more than 12,000, the French on this occasion undertook the preliminary bombardment for the British front also, leaving the British artillery to support its troops when once the attack had begun. The assault at first succeeded and then failed. The much-worn and depleted Royal Naval Division had to be thrown in to meet the counter-attacks. The shell-supply for the British field artillery ran so low that only 5,000 rounds remained at Helles. Fighting lasted until July 15th, the British casualties amounting to 3,500.

In addition the French carried out an assault, with partial success, on June 21st. As a result of all these battles, which were not minor operations, but as heavy as any fighting in Gallipoli, the 52nd Division was weakened, and the 29th,

²⁴ *Gallipoli Diary*, by Sir Ian Hamilton, Vol II., pp. 282-3.

Royal Naval, and East Lancashire Divisions and the Indian brigade were left so exhausted that Hunter-Weston began to urge the hurrying to Helles of further brigades of the New Army, of which some part was already being brought thither to obtain experience. But at this point Hamilton met him with a refusal, and although the 13th Division and part of the 11th, together with General Stopford and some of the staff of the IX Corps, were brought for experience to Helles,²⁵ the Commander-in-Chief took steps to prevent them from being embroiled even in a counter-attack on any large scale.

Such, in brief, was the direction of the campaign during the two months preceding the offensive of August. For Hamilton it may be claimed that these battles, although they were not fought chiefly for that reason, did much to wear down the Turks. The desperate and continued counter-attacks which von Sanders' policy forced them to deliver were even more costly than the assaults of the Allies. According to Amin Bey,²⁶ the Turks, after losing 9,000 men at the beginning of June, suffered 16,000 further casualties between June 21st and 28th. "This battle," he says, "which has passed into our history as the Battle of Zighin Dere (Gully Ravine), was the most costly engagement in the whole Dardanelles Campaign." Undoubtedly the cost to the enemy in men was most serious, and his shell-supply was at times, like that of the British, almost exhausted. Hamilton and Hunter-Weston fully believed that the morale of the Turkish infantry at Helles was strained to breaking-point.

It is true that, while the Anzac plan was maturing, it was most desirable to keep the enemy's attention riveted upon Helles, and that some form of aggressive action was considered necessary from time to time in order to keep "an offensive spirit" in the troops. A report was current that after months of passive duty troops tended to become shy of leaving the trenches to attack. The system of maintaining activity by constant raiding had not yet been invented.

But all these objects, except the wearing down of the enemy, could assuredly have been achieved by far less desperate enterprises than such battles as that of July 12th,

²⁵ Enabling the 20th Div. and Indian brigade to take a short rest at Imbros.

²⁶ Preface to *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, Turkish edition.

by which the spirit of the attacking troops was in fact shaken. As for the exhaustion of the Turkish divisions, those that suffered most were from time to time relieved by an exchange with the Second Army, which the Turks were forced to maintain idle in Thrace in order to guard against possible attack from Greece or Bulgaria. Whatever effect these assaults may have had upon the enemy, it is at least arguable that it would have been infinitely more valuable had they been delayed until the main offensive.

Be that as it may, the result of Hamilton's policy was that the Helles troops, including the 52nd Division, were unavailable for the delivery of his main blow, for which he had to look entirely to the following divisions:—


1st Australian Division.
N.Z. & A. Division.
10th Division.
11th Division.
13th Division.

The 53rd and 54th would arrive just too late for the first stroke, the Commander-in-Chief having wisely decided not to defer it but to use them in following it up.

Such being the provision of the troops for the new offensive, it remains to relate the evolution of its detailed plan. It was about the end of June when Hamilton set to work upon this. The first step was to determine how to employ the promised divisions with most effect. Birdwood had originally estimated that for his scheme he would require an additional division and a brigade. Hamilton now asked him to show how he would use one, two, and three reinforcing divisions if available.

The size of any force which could gather at Anzac was limited, since not only was the area so small and overlooked that there were few valleys where reinforcements could bivouac in concealment. but the water-supply was barely sufficient for the present garrison. Birdwood, therefore, replied on July 1st that, with the single division and 29th Indian Brigade originally asked for, he could carry through the capture of Sari Bair and the two subsidiary operations which he now considered necessary—a feint by the 1st Australian Division at Lone Pine on his right, and the seizure of the Chocolate and "W" Hills on his left. With one division, however, the offensive

1 0 1 2 3 4 5 MILES




THE ANZAC-SUVLA AREA, SHOWING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECTED OFFENSIVE

The front proposed to be occupied at the end of the main operations is shown by a red dotted line


would end there. With two, the second stage could be undertaken, part of the force on the summit immediately turning southwards down the main ridge and meeting another, which would break out farther south and capture Gun Ridge.

But even this step would not actually place him astride of the Turkish communications. For this the third division might suffice. "I doubt," wrote Birdwood, "if we could land a third division at Anzac Cove with any comfort." Nor would its cramped beach form a suitable base for the larger forces required for such a thrust. Five miles to the north, however, was Suvla Bay, of which the deep bight and sandy beaches afforded a landing-place for very large numbers, as well as a convenient base and safe harbour during the worst weather of the year. Here—or, alternatively, south of it, near Fisherman's Hut—Birdwood proposed that the third division, if sent to him, should be landed.

But it was not only in the event of the third division being sent that Birdwood proposed a landing at Suvla. On that flank were the detached "W" Hills, which held the batteries so harassing to the northern flank. These batteries would take in rear any force assaulting Hill 971, and so important did Birdwood and Skeen consider the capture of the "W" Hills that they proposed, even if the reinforcement were only one division and a brigade, to capture them by a raid from Suvla. They pointed out that the force making this raid would not be able to approach Suvla Bay until after the night attack from Anzac itself began. Otherwise the Turks might be alarmed and draw their reserves northwards—the result which it was most desired to avoid. The force should therefore begin disembarking at about 10 p.m. Two battalions would be sufficient to reach and seize the hills during the night, one attacking them from the enemy's rear (that is, from the north) and the other from the flank; but to make sure it was proposed to allot a brigade.



As the raid would be through comparatively easy country, Birdwood held that it should be carried out by the new troops, leaving the Anzac and Gurkha units to face the more difficult country on Sari Bair. If a third division were provided, he and Skeen pointed out that, by crossing the Suvla lowlands and seizing the long and lofty ridge of Kavak and Tekke Tepe, which fenced them on the east, it could establish a line along that hill in extension of the intended line along Sari Bair. The front would then extend in a semi-circle from Ejelmer Bay in the north to near Gaba Tepe in the south, enclosing a secure base at Suvla Bay. From that position further operations could be launched against the Turkish communications.²⁷



The document, dated July 1st, which contained these replies to Hamilton's inquiry, contained also Birdwood's third elaboration of the plan as worked out by the two branches of the Anzac staff.²⁸ This foreshadowed that 65,000 gallons

²⁷ Happening about July 10 to learn that more than the three New Army divisions were being sent to Hamilton, Birdwood and Skeen suggested that an additional division should be thrust forward between Kavak Tepe and Sari Bair. By seizing Hill 820 (the main north-eastern spur of Hill 971, immediately beyond Southern Anafarta) it would command the main road up the Peninsula. The Turkish land communications would thus be cut in the first advance, while the surprise of the assault on Sari Bair still lasted. While the plans were being considered, the success of Venizelos on June 13 in the Greek elections had suggested to the troops at the front the possibility that a Greek army might join them. Birdwood suggested that in such a case the heights east of the Suvla plain would be its most suitable objective.

²⁸ The plan had been previously outlined in "appreciations" dated May 30 and June 9. The document of July 1 also suggests the steps to be taken in connection with the provision of water and food beforehand at the projected bivouacs of the reinforcements, in order to avoid any marked increase in activity after their arrival; the provision of extra water ready to be carried forward in the advance, and of the means of carrying it; the additional transport mules required at each stage; the landing of ammunition for the new troops and its storage in special dumps; the careful separating and distinguishing of the improved "Mark VII" rifle ammunition used by English troops from the older "Mark VI" used by Australian units; the need of extra guns—probably only "the howitzers and 60-pounders of one division"—for the initial attack. The guns should land, it was explained, without horses, but with the waggons and ammunition required for their immediate supply. Further, the horse-boats and lighters at Anzac, which were kept beached to prevent their being sunk, must be floated, and a few additional tugs, steamboats, lighters, and horse-boats obtained; guns, and reserve ammunition for infantry, should be landed before the infantry itself; commanders and some staff officers should come two days before their troops; certain portions of field ambulances should arrive with the infantry, but ambulance tents and transport later.

of water would have to be provided and bivouacs dug on hidden slopes to receive the reinforcements, and that the landing of the new troops, which would have to be accomplished during darkness, could by adopting certain measures²⁹ be carried out at the rate of 6,000 nightly. During the days when this landing was proceeding the normal beach work of maintaining supplies and sending away the sick must be effected by day.

On the day after these plans had been submitted, Birdwood was summoned to G.H.Q., where Sir Ian Hamilton appears to have made his decision known to him. This was, first, that an operation under a separate commander would be undertaken from Suvla at the same time as Birdwood's attack upon Sari Bair; second, that the reinforcement to be sent to Anzac for the assault on Sari Bair would be:

13th Division.

A brigade of 10th Division.


29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

Certain additional artillery (mainly 5-inch howitzers).

Additional mule-transport.

It was made clear to Birdwood that he need not concern himself with the proposed raid upon the "W" Hills, since that would be undertaken by the Suvla force. After spending the day in working out some of the details with Sir Ian, Birdwood returned to Anzac. Shortly afterwards it was decided that, since the full moon must be avoided during the Suvla landing, the attack should be begun when the moon was in its last quarter, on August 6th.

Upon Birdwood's return to Anzac orders for the earliest preparations were at once issued. Even before this the 1st Division had been instructed to terrace the sheltered portions




²⁹ Ensuring that the ships bringing them were so loaded and despatched that the respective brigades, battalions, and smaller units arrived together, and that the ships themselves took up fixed stations in the anchorage and anchored and sailed according to time-table.

of Braund's Hill so as to receive two battalions. Orders were now given to prepare terraces for six more in hidden parts³⁰ of Victoria Gully, White's Valley, Rest Gully, and the western end of M'Cay's Hill. The N.Z. & A. Division also had been already at work upon the road between Rest and Reserve Gullies³¹ and in widening the long northern sap, the sole means of communication by day with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Outposts, from which the main assault on Sari Bair would start. In order to hasten this work the newly arrived half-battalion of Maoris was now thrown into the task. At the same time an open road parallel to the sap, but only used at night by mules and carts carrying supplies to the outposts, was to be prepared for artillery. As soon as these works were nearing completion, a further order was given on July 15th that the sheltered sides of Rest and Reserve Gullies were to be terraced for 9,000 additional men. All signs of these activities were to be carefully hidden from the Turks. The work was carried out by those of the Anzac troops who were "resting" during the month of July.³² When the terraces were ready the



New bivouacs

1 Reserve Gy 2 Rest Gy
3 Braund's Hill 4 White's Vy
5 M'Cay's Hill 6 Victoria Gy



S S Sap to N°2 Post

³⁰ Positions screened from shell-fire as well as from sight could not everywhere be obtained. The New Army troops in their terraces in Victoria Gully suffered heavily when the enemy's artillery became active during the fighting at Lone Pine.

³¹ See p 264.

³² The 14th Bn, 4th Aust. Bde., for example, resting in Reserve Gully, had 400 of its men terracing that valley from July 15 to 19 and 21. Work was then stopped for two days to rest the troops in anticipation of the (wrongly) expected Turkish attack. On July 25 the task was resumed and continued until the 31st, when the fatigues of the battalion were somewhat lightened, and rifle exercises, sharpening bayonets, and other preparations for the offensive began. Similarly in the 3rd Aust Inf Bde. the reserve battalion was engaged during practically all July in preparing terraces for coming troops.

engineers constructed shelters for incoming ambulances, brigadiers, and brigade staffs, while the signallers ran telephone lines to these positions.

Bivouacs were thus provided for about twenty battalions of the new brigades. As for water, the second-hand engine obtained in Egypt was now installed, and pipes were laid from it to storage tanks below the edge of Plugge's Plateau, and far up the gullies near the front line. These tanks were to be filled with water pumped from the Beach; from some of them it would be further distributed by gravitation to more distant areas on the flank. Platforms for the main storages were hewn on the steep sides of Plugge's Plateau and Walker's Ridge, and large tanks were then hauled up to them by parties of as many as 110 men with drag-ropes.³³ By July 24th these, as well as tanks far up Shrapnel Gully, Bridges' Road, and other valleys, were connected by pipes, and on the 29th pumping began. During the subsequent three critical weeks the engine never succeeded in completely performing its task. But though the breakdowns threatened at times to imperil the whole venture,³⁴ and the water ration was sometimes reduced to a minimum, yet by obtaining extra water-tins from Tenedos and sending up water on mules the staff managed to keep a supply in those tanks where it was most needed. In consequence of the employment of the mules for this service, shells and other ammunition and stores had to be carried by men. But the storage of water for the offensive was achieved

³³ See plate at p. 463.

³⁴ On the first day, before the tanks had been half-filled, the engine broke down. At this time the wells were rapidly failing; those in Shrapnel Gully, which had been supplying the 1st Bde., ran dry on July 31. It was necessary for the 1st Bde., in addition to its daily supply, to store at Brown's Dip 4,500 tins of water as well as 6,900 gallons in tanks for use in the projected attack at Lone Pine; the new brigades also were about to arrive at their bivouacs, where water should be awaiting them. Consequently during the whole night of July 29 water was conveyed in mule-carts to the Bridges' Road tanks. A diminished ration from wells and tanks was apportioned to battalions on July 30. Next day the engine began to work again, and filled all tanks; but it once more broke down on Aug. 1, and, when its repair was approaching completion, a lighter containing water, which had left Alexandria for Anzac on July 23, failed to arrive. The situation was such that Birdwood telegraphed to G.H.Q.: "Unless water-boats turn up immediately, shall have to abandon major part of programme for landing; have had to refuse to receive hay and forage to-night—all available men required for water fatigues; our wells have dried up and pump is not working; 9,000 men already on fatigues irrespective of sappers." By next day the pump was repaired, but the only water-lighters then at Anzac were pumped dry. Birdwood telegraphed that unless this situation could be remedied he could receive no more troops, and must consider sending away some of those already at Anzac. Just then the Navy reported that the water-lighter for Anzac, with her tug, had been sighted early that morning near Mudros. She did not arrive at Anzac until Aug. 5; but in the meantime it had been found possible to obtain a supply from water-boats and lighters at Imbros, although on two days pumping was interrupted by the shelling of the Beach.

as planned; and, though the water-supply continued to be the main anxiety of the "Q" branch of the staff, and the ration for the Anzac troops was on a few days cut very low, nevertheless only once did the shortage seriously affect the course of the operations at Anzac.

Meanwhile Birdwood and Skeen had elaborated the final plans for the assault. The operations outlined in Birdwood's statement of July 1st were:

First, a demonstration at Lone Pine and elsewhere on the right, to deceive the Turks as to the direction of the attack.


Second, the main turning movement through the hills.

Third, a frontal attack on Baby 700, to be launched as soon as Chunuk Bair was captured, so as to meet a simultaneous movement by the troops from Chunuk Bair.

Fourth, the subsidiary seizure of the Chocolate and "W" Hills, which (it had since been decided) would be undertaken by the Suvla force.

Taking these operations in the above order, we are first concerned with the formidable "demonstration" on the right. This was to be made by the 1st Australian Division, reinforced only by two battalions—to be employed mainly for fatigues—and by some artillery. Practically the whole of the reinforcements was thus allotted to the main operations on the left.

It will be remembered that in the original plan³⁵ a southerly thrust by the 1st Division against Gaba Tepe had been projected, not as a mere feint, but as part of the principal operation. But the commander of the Right Section (at that time Brigadier-General Carruthers), when consulted on May 30th, reported forcibly against any attempt to take Gaba Tepe. It could not, he pointed out, be safely attacked or held unless the southern lobe of the 400 Plateau, Lone Pine, were



³⁵ See marginal sketch on page 187.

first occupied. As the capture of the 400 Plateau would be a necessary preliminary to any general advance eastwards, Carruthers recommended that the 1st Division should attack, not Gaba Tepe, but Lone Pine. This view was supported by General Walker and by Colonel White, the chief-of-staff of the division. In view of their opinions Birdwood turned his attention to Lone Pine.

But the attack upon the northern summits of Sari Bair was manifestly the crucial operation, since they commanded all the surrounding country, including that of the southern attack. At an early stage, therefore, Birdwood came to regard the southern attack as a feint, the intention being not so much to capture the positions as to mislead the Turks into believing that the blow would be south-eastwards, towards the Kilid Bahr Plateau. If they could only be persuaded of this, they would be likely to hurry their reserves to the south of Anzac, thus leaving the northern flank and the summits of the range almost free. Such was the service which Birdwood desired of the 1st Australian Division.

His own opinion was that the seizure of Gaba Tepe would create the desired impression more certainly than an attack upon Lone Pine. Nevertheless, if the Gaba Tepe attack were tactically impossible, the capture of Lone Pine might suffice. The enemy clearly and justly recognised that Lone Pine was one of the capital points in his line.³⁶ Essad Pasha realised, as did the Australian commanders, that the real defence of the low ridges south of the Pine lay in the bastion of the Pine itself, overlooking them from the north. The loss of that position, now most formidably strengthened, would assuredly alarm the Turkish commander and cause him to launch heavy and immediate counter-attacks to retake the position. Birdwood therefore reluctantly abandoned³⁷ the



³⁶ See Turkish orders of May 28 concerning its fortification, p 108

³⁷ In the second draft of his plan, June 9

proposal to attack Gaba Tepe, since its object might "be attained, though not so fully, by an attack on 'the Lonesome Pine'." Incidentally the capture of the Pine would be of much value later, when the time came to advance to Gun Ridge.

Since Birdwood regarded the attack as a feint, he resolved that it should be launched some hours before the main operation. But in enforcing this decision he had to overrule stiff opposition from successive commanders of the 1st Division and from its chief-of-staff. To those responsible for this splendid force—the pride of Australia, and at that time comprising almost the whole of her field army—so detached a view as Birdwood's was scarcely possible. They saw clearly that, just as Lone Pine commanded Gaba Tepe, so Baby 700 commanded Lone Pine; and therefore that, as a matter of sound tactics, Lone Pine should not be assaulted until Baby 700 was either captured or being attacked. Ever since the Landing Colonel White had strongly urged this view, differing therein from Birdwood. Now, merely in order to effect a "demonstration," as to the probable value of which he was more than doubtful, he was to be involved in what he believed to be the blunder of throwing the 1st Division into the fight half-a-day before action was taken elsewhere. If this "demonstration" were effective, the result, he imagined, would be the crushing of the division under concentrated attack by the whole of the enemy's available artillery and infantry. On precisely the same grounds General Walker, who during June temporarily commanded the division, strongly opposed the plan, and joined with White in submitting an alternative, by which Baby 700 and Lone Pine should be attacked simultaneously.

But from Birdwood's point of view the greater the weight of local reserves thrown by the enemy against the 1st Division, the more effectively was that division assisting. In overruling the objections he wrote that he hoped the 1st Division's attack would draw towards itself all reserves located within easy distance of 971, including those at Anafarta. Even at the worst, "in case of complete failure, all that could happen would be that the attacking force would fall back on its original trenches. . . . The continuous fighting which


would in any case take place round Lone Pine must help the attack elsewhere."³⁸ He therefore held firmly to his intention to assault Lone Pine some hours at least before launching the northern movement. As to the exact hour, "what we had to learn by actual experience," he said some years later, "was the actual interval required between a feint and the real attack." He at first decided to launch this assault at 3 in the afternoon and the main attack immediately after dark.³⁹

General Legge, who on June 24th took command of the 1st Division, was even more strongly opposed to this arrangement than Walker had been. On July 9th he submitted to Birdwood a further "appreciation," drawn by himself and White, favouring a simultaneous early morning attack upon Lone Pine and Chunuk Bair. By this time, however, the plan was fixed, although the prospect that it would have to be carried out by a commander strongly opposed to it was unwelcome both to Birdwood and to Legge himself. It was avoided by the opportunity which happened to offer itself for the appointment of Legge on July 26th to command the 2nd Australian Division, then being formed in Egypt. Upon Walker, who was reappointed to command the 1st, fell the conduct of its forthcoming operations. Even at that late hour Walker put in a written suggestion that the 1st Division should be allowed, instead, to seize the Chocolate and "W" Hills and thus form outposts for the troops landing at Suvla. But Birdwood was quite determined upon Lone Pine. Under much pressure from Walker and White he deferred the hour of the infantry attack to 5 o'clock. At the last moment, when it appeared that the bombardment allowed for was insufficient, the hour was further deferred to 5.30. The objective was to be, not the first or second trench, but the heart of Lone Pine; the troops, however, were not to seize the southern edge of the hill, where they would be unduly exposed.

³⁸ In the same document, however, he stated that he felt sure an Australian brigade once established in the excellent trenches of the Pine would not allow itself to be driven out again; bomb and bayonet fighting were "to be expected in plenty"; but "at these," he said, "we must make up our minds to entirely defeat the Turks." Finally he noted that he did not fear, as White did, that the attack would warn the Turks of a coming offensive against 971; he believed rather that it would cause them to anticipate a "break-out" eastwards to join hands with the British at Ach Baba.

³⁹ "The Turkish efforts to retain or recapture the Lone Pine works," he wrote on July 1, "would probably continue all night."

Besides this feint the 1st Division was to undertake a smaller but difficult operation with the separate object of assisting the attack upon Baby 700. This was the capture of German Officers'. Walker and White considered that this attack should be simultaneous with that on Baby 700, but they were again over-ruled, the hour favoured by Birdwood being midnight on August 6th, after the attack on Lone Pine but before that on Baby 700. The 1st Division was to be further responsible for holding Courtney's, so as to set free the New Zealand infantry, who were required for the attacks on Sari Bair. Birdwood also intended that the 1st Division should seize Johnston's Jolly at the same time as Lone Pine. Walker and White objected that this was beyond the division's strength. The Jolly was a stronger position than Lone Pine, with a wider No-Man's Land to be crossed. When once the Pine and German Officers' were taken, the Jolly, lying between them, might possibly be captured by a comparatively small effort. But to attack it at the same time as the Pine would require another brigade. Birdwood, though not definitely insisting, urged even in his final orders a simultaneous attack. In addition, he pressed the division to strengthen its feint by other extensive assaults upon the extreme southern flank.



Having thus laid down the main lines of action for the 1st Division, Birdwood left the details entirely to its staff. He and Skeen devoted a larger share of their attention to the capital operation upon Sari Bair. This he entrusted to the N.Z. & A. Division under General Godley. That division then comprised :

- New Zealand Infantry Brigade.
- 4th Australian Infantry Brigade.
- 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade.
- 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
- New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.

The reinforcements were allotted as follows:

To N.Z. & A. Division.

13th Division (less three battalions and certain other troops).
29th Indian Infantry Brigade.

Corps Reserve.

Three battalions of the 13th Division.

One brigade of the 10th Division.

These troops amounted to two divisions and two infantry brigades. All of them, with the exception of those enumerated below, would be available for the main night advance on Sari Bair. The exceptions were the troops required to garrison the northern part of the old line and to carry out from it certain operations, viz.:

Left Central Section.


1st Light Horse Brigade and half-a-battalion (New Army).

Left Section.

3rd Light Horse Brigade and one and a half battalions (New Army).

As for artillery, the main columns would be supported by most of the Anzac batteries reinforced by the field-howitzers of the 13th Division, which could best cover their movement by firing from positions inside the old Anzac lines. The two Indian mountain-batteries, except four guns, would actually accompany the attacking columns.

In these operations the vital movement, to which all the rest were only subsidiary, was that against the crest-line of the range. As has been already explained, its highest summit, Hill 971, was at the northern end, separated almost completely from the rest by precipices. For this reason Birdwood in his original plan had reluctantly rejected the notion of attacking it,⁴⁰ and had confined his projected thrust to the equally valuable summit rising nearer the centre of the




⁴⁰ "No assault on it," he wrote on May 30, "could . . . form part of an attack on the main position without being itself completely isolated."

range and known to the Turks as "Dchonk Bair"⁴¹ (mis-written in the English maps "Chunuk Bair"). This was three-quarters of a mile along the ridge-top from Hill 971, the two summits of Hill Q intervening. In the other direction a little over a mile of crest-line—including Battleship Hill and Baby 700—separated it from Anzac. It afforded a view of the Narrows almost as extensive as that from Hill 971. Gun Ridge, the enemy's main position east of Anzac, sprang from it. Chunuk Bair had been the most important objective at the Landing, and though the direct line of approach up the summit of the range was now barred by the Turkish position on Baby 700, it was intended to reach Chunuk Bair by the route reconnoitred by Major Overton—that is to say, by Rhododendron Ridge.⁴²

In June, when elaborating their plans, Birdwood and Skeen made an addition to their original objective. When they incorporated in their scheme the raid on the Chocolate and "W" Hills, and when they also learned that large reinforcements were coming, they determined to include the capture of Hill 971 itself. But perusal of their several "appreciations" leaves no doubt that the crucial objective was still Chunuk Bair.

The crest from Chunuk Bair to Hill 971 was to be reached in two steps. The first was to clear the enemy from the foot-hills north of Anzac. On these ridges, leading from the shore up to the range, lay many




Anzac Posts shown thus ●
 Turkish Posts { 1 Old N°3 2 Table Top
 3 Bauchop's 4 Walden Pt

⁴¹ Pronounced "Jonk Byre." "Dchonk" appears to be a man's name.

⁴² See pp 180-2. Only two spurs at all, passable for troops led direct to the crest-line of the range, Abdel Rahman Bair rising from the Suvla Plain to Hill 971, and Rhododendron leading to Chunuk Bair.

strong Turkish outposts, perched high on the several knuckles, mainly at the entrance to the valleys leading from the coast up to the range. In particular, strong defences crowned the three fingers by which Rhododendron Ridge led down to the sea. Here the enemy had fortified Old No. 3 Post, facing new No. 3; Table Top, a far more inaccessible knob immediately above Old No. 3; and Destroyer and Bauchop's Hills to the south and north of it respectively. It was up the valleys between these fingers that the columns attacking Chunuk Bair must move. Major Overton, reconnoitring farther north, had found the same conditions existing in the Aghyl Dere, along which lay the projected route to Hill 971. On the hills on either side of its mouth were trenches, which were well garrisoned at night.⁴³ Overton reported that it might be possible "on a dark rainy or windy night" for a squadron, or "with luck" perhaps a regiment, of Anzac troops to slip through without disturbing the Turkish posts. On the other hand, he added, "if the trenches guarding the mouth of the valley were taken, a direct advance could be made right up the valley to Q Hill."

The latter was the plan adopted by Birdwood and Skeen. As a first step, during the early hours of the night on which the grand attack was to be made, outposts must be cleared from all the foot-hills. This task was allotted to the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, who garrisoned the three Anzac outposts and had scouted for two months through these ridges.⁴⁴ To protect the flank of the column making for Hill 971, it was further necessary to clear the low, slightly-defended spur beyond the Aghyl Dere, Damakjelik Bair. This task was allotted to one of the New Army brigades,



⁴³ At dusk, as Overton lay hidden on the north side of Bauchop's Hill, 150 Turks had marched past him down the valley to garrison these trenches.

⁴⁴ Birdwood at first estimated that two regiments would be sufficient; but after the extension of the enemy's defences Gen. Godley, to whom the decision was left, designated the complete brigade (four regiments and the Maori contingent) for the task.

which would march along the beach while the mounted rifles cleared the flanking foot-hills. The two brigades were to be known as the "left and right covering forces" respectively. As soon as they had finished their task, they were to picquet the captured foot-hills, so that the columns attacking the crest might pass up the valleys undisturbed.

These covering attacks were to be launched immediately after dark, and it was necessary that they should be completed with great speed, in order that the way might at an early hour be clear for the columns moving to attack the summit. But several of the Turkish outposts were formidable positions, especially Old No. 3, which had been converted into a redoubt and protected with barbed-wire. One of the very earliest of Birdwood's preparations, therefore, was to elaborate a ruse by which this strong-post might be speedily captured. If the Turks could be led to suppose that a nightly bombardment was merely a matter of routine, they would probably be taken by surprise when, on the night of the offensive, the bombardment was followed by a sudden attack. The destroyer which watched the northern flank was accordingly asked to open bursts of fire nightly upon the enemy's trenches on The Nek, Old No. 3 Post, Table Top, and Rhododendron Ridge, also keeping its searchlights steadily fixed for certain periods upon those targets, and in particular shelling Old No. 3 and Table Top for a short interval early every night.⁴⁵ This programme was at once put into effect, and at first caused alarm in the Turkish posts⁴⁶ and evoked sharp retaliation

⁴⁵ These destroyers were usually the *Chelmer* (Commr. H. T. England) or *Colne* (Commr. C. Seymour) but sometimes the *Rattlesnake* (Commr. P. G. Wodehouse) or others. On July 27 at Birdwood's request this programme was crystallised, the southern destroyer regularly shelling Lone Pine, Gaba Tepe, and the southern end of Gun Ridge in order to arouse suspicions of a coming attack in that direction, the northern destroyer at intervals between 9.30 and 11 shelling Old No. 3 Post; then ceasing fire, but keeping her searchlight steadily directed upon the post for thirty minutes; then, after a further short bombardment, suddenly switching her light on to Table Top and commencing a somewhat similar programme there. The fire was afterwards to be directed farther north, returning to The Nek later in the night and also invariably at dawn. Birdwood explained to the commanders of the destroyers the reason for this proceeding. He judged that the Turkish garrisons would become accustomed to the routine and therefore grow careless. On the night of the attack the mounted rifles would creep up to Old No. 3 during the din of the bombardment and, when it ceased, would immediately rush the post. Birdwood also looked to this ruse to render easier the capture of Table Top and Bauchop's Hill.

⁴⁶ On The Nek the enemy's front and second line running up the seaward slope were entirely enfiladed from the sea. The fire sweeping along these trenches, necessarily crowded with troops, evidently caused destruction, for in the first week of July the enemy completely reconstructed them. During that week, when the Turkish posts were shelled, the enemy, probably in fear of attack, used to turn a battery of two quick-firing 75-mm. guns upon the Anzac trenches facing The Nek. On July 5, either in retaliation or as a demonstration intended to divert attention from a heavy counter-attack at Helles, he opened a particularly sharp bombardment.

by his artillery. But as the destroyers continued week after week their nightly routine, the enemy ceased to reply. His garrisons, lying low in their trenches during the bombardments, were perfectly safe, and the regularity of the programme was no doubt attributed to the stupidity of their opponents.

It was estimated that, partly by means of this ruse, the enemy would be sufficiently cleared from the foot-hills by 11 p.m. The way would then be open for the second step Infantry columns, which would have started northwards along the shore from Anzac shortly after the covering brigades, would head inland between the safely-picqueted foot-hills and assault the crest Chunuk Bair—Hill 971.

The second step was to be made by two separate columns under different commanders, heading, the one for Chunuk Bair, and the other for Hill 971.⁴⁷ Chunuk Bair was to be seized by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which on the day before the attack would be withdrawn from the posts at the head of Monash Valley.

The brigade itself would make the attack in two columns, one battalion issuing south of No. 2 Outpost and heading up a branch of the Sazli Dere into the heart of Rhododendron Ridge, the rest of the brigade issuing north of No. 3 Outpost and following the Chailak Dere to a northern fold of



*** Line to be reached by Mtd Rifles
 → → → Route of main attack
 1-N°1 Post 2-N°2 Post 3-N°3 Post

Rhododendron. Both sections of the brigade, leaving the foreshore about 11 p.m., and advancing a mile and three-quarters through steep and difficult country, should, Birdwood estimated, reach a point on Rhododendron Ridge "within


⁴⁷ The orders issued by Godley are here summarised. In those issued by Birdwood to Godley the operations were grouped differently. He was to execute the following moves following upon each other without delay—

- (1) clear the foot-hills Destroyer Hill, Table Top, Bauchop's Hill;
- (2) (a) clear the foot-hill Damakjehik Bair;
 (b) move a force to attack the crest round 971;
- (3) move a force to attack the crest round Chunuk Bair.

In the morning green flares were to be burnt to show the Navy the position reached by the advanced troops.

assaulting distance" of Chunuk Bair by 2.30 a.m. Whether either section of the brigade upon reaching Rhododendron was to wait for the other before attacking the summit, or was to press on without waiting, is not indicated in the orders of brigade or division; but Birdwood's general intention as imparted to Godley was: "You should impress on the commanders entrusted with each (objective) that the objective to be reached is to be aimed at whatever the progress of columns in other parts." He also personally addressed the officers of Godley's force, urging upon them the advice which he had also given before the Landing, that each part of the force should press forward, whether others were held up or not.⁴⁸

The force which was to capture Koja Chemen Tepe would have to operate in a different valley, the Aghyl Dere. This lay immediately north of the Chailak Dere, but so steep and well-defined were the ridges separating their upper reaches that there was little fear of the two columns clashing. Since the first conception of his plan Birdwood had endeavoured to obtain the Gurkha hill-men of the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade⁴⁹ for the attack upon these wild slopes. These were eventually sent to him and, with Monash's 4th Australian Infantry Brigade and some mountain-guns, formed the column for seizing Hill 971 and the crest-line between that height and Chunuk Bair, including both summits of "Q."



⁴⁸ In a special order issued immediately before the attack, he said: "I want you all to remember that the fighting we shall probably have in this advance will be very much of the same nature as it was on the day we landed . . . We shall have to face and tackle a very difficult bit of country, which the enemy will have to some extent entrenched, as they did for our arrival. Then, however, we ignored all trenches—rushing at all we saw, chasing the Turks out of them, and keeping them well on the run. This we have got to do again . . . We will advance on a broad front as we did on landing. Some will find they have trenches in front of them; others will not. But all must keep on and on continuously until we have occupied the enemy's position."

⁴⁹ This now comprised the 1/5th, 1/6th, and 2/10th Gurkhas, and 14th Sikhs. On July 22 Birdwood noted that the brigade was not being sent until Aug 7. As this would be too late for the main night attack, "Is this final?" he telegraphed "I would much rather have it than two battalions of the 10th Division" (which were being sent earlier). Eventually the brigade was sent on the night of Aug 5.

The planning in detail of this most difficult operation was left largely to Major-General Cox of the Indian brigade, who would command the whole column. This experienced soldier arrived at Anzac with his staff five days before the fighting, and after having surveyed what was possible of the northern ridges,⁵⁰ and having conferred with Brigadier-General Monash, who was to act under him, drew the orders for the attack on 971 and "Q."

It may be doubted if Birdwood and Skeen realised the immense difficulty of this operation as compared with that against Chunuk Bair. The proposed route to Chunuk Bair lay up two valleys, of which the Sazli Dere possessed only two important branches, while the Chailak Dere, though in its upper course wild, narrow, and precipitous in the extreme, was nevertheless a single, deep, and narrow ravine running almost straight from the shore to the range. But the route to be taken by the column attacking 971 and "Q" lay up the Aghyl Dere, which, when followed inland, spreads fanwise into five branches, which again issue from a wild tangle of at least thirty steep scrub-covered gullies and ravines. Except for an expedition by Major Overton along its southern slopes on May 28th, it had not been explored.⁵¹ He had observed gullies branching north-eastward, but no scouting party reached them. General Cox's plans, therefore, had to be based on the map, and although this was copied from one recently captured from the Turks, and was in general accurate, it gave little evidence of the enormous difficulties of the undertaking.

Cox's plan was that the whole column, headed by the Australian brigade, should move along the foreshore to the



COX'S PROPOSED COURSE
Aust Bns detached 2 Gurkhas detached
3 British Bde at Damakjelic

⁵⁰ First from aboard the *Colne*, and later from Anzac with Birdwood and Godley

⁵¹ Overton worked his way along the northern side of Bauchop's until he met with a considerable Turkish bivouac near some cultivation and huts in the valley. It appeared to him that if he could have penetrated a little farther he would have reached slopes leading directly to the cultivated ledge known as "The Farm," and to Chunuk Bair above it.

mouth of the Aghyl Dere and, after working up that valley for three-quarters of a mile,⁵² should throw out two of its Australian battalions to its left flank to form outposts guarding its former course. It would then move farther up the valley to its main fork, where it would turn north-east past the foot of Hill Q. Here two Gurkha battalions would be detached to seize that height, but the rest of the column would continue north-east, climb the Aghyl into the Asma Dere⁵³ and, crossing the latter, seize a spur of Abdel Rahman Bair.⁵⁴ While that ridge was being reconnoitred by scouts, orders for the final attack would be issued to the waiting column. Finally the force would advance for three-quarters of a mile up this wild outstanding ridge, and seize the summit of Hill 971. During this last stage they might be exposed to shell-fire from their direct rear, if the Turkish guns on the "W" Hills were still undisturbed. But if, as was hoped, the "W" Hills had by then been seized by the Suvla force, this crowning difficulty would be absent. Finally, when 971 had been reached, trenches would be dug, running round the summit and thence connecting with the Gurkhas at "Q" and the New Zealanders at Chunuk Bair.



Asma Dere 2 Abdel Rahman Bair
3 W Hills

Thus—to summarise—the column for 971 was to penetrate three miles of unreconnoitred hill-country, by a route about

⁵² That is, where the third main gully on its northern side branched from the Aghyl Dere. Up to this point the column's flank would be adequately protected by the British covering brigade, which would have proceeded farther north to Damakjelik. The two leading Australian battalions would continue the picquet-line from the flank of the British brigade to the point where the final assault was to begin.

⁵³ At the end of the branch of the Aghyl which they would be following lies a razor-edged and contorted continuation of the Damakjelik Bair, separating the watershed of the Aghyl Dere from that of the equally steep Asma Dere.

⁵⁴ This important ridge, a spur of Hill 971 itself, projects north-westward into the Suvla Plain. It is much higher than any intervening spur north of Rhododendron, and forms the northern horizon of any view from the foot-hills in which the columns would be operating. From its crest fire could be brought to bear upon the seaward side of all summits as far as Chunuk Bair. Not far beyond it lay Southern Anafarta, while up its inland side wound one of the main tracks to Hill 971—a path which had lately been much improved by the enemy's labour companies.

971 Q Churuk Laid



SARI BAIR SHOWING THE RIDGES UP WHICH CENTRAL BIRMINGHAM PROPOSED TO BUILD ITS
MAIN ATTACK

The routes of columns are shown thus — Australian and Indian column for Hills 971 and
"Q" (1) — — —, New Zealand infantry for Churuk Bar (2) (2) — — — The
old Anzac line is shown thus — — —.

Reproduced by permission from a model made by Mr. Instone, Fremantle
Photographed by A. N. B. Co. (Australia) Ltd.



AUSTRALIANS MAKING TERRACES FOR THE EXPECTED REINFORCEMENTS

*Taken by P. F. E. Schuler, Esq.
Aust War Memorial Collection No. A2011*




MAKES HAULING A TANK TO A TERRACE CONSTRUCTED NEAR THE SUMMIT
OF PLUGGE'S FOR WATER-STORAGE

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No. G1119

To face p. 463.


twice as long as that to be covered by the Chunuk Bair column and infinitely more difficult to follow. The strongest factor for its success was that Major Overton himself was allotted to it as guide. Birdwood hoped that this summit would be reached at the same hour as Chunuk Bair, at any rate that it would be attacked about dawn.

Such were the plans for the principal assault.⁸⁵ As soon as it should be completed, and Chunuk Bair—and possibly the summits north-east of it—occupied, a very heavy counter-attack was expected. Reserve columns of New Army troops were provided, which would follow closely behind the attacking columns and be available, if necessary, to assist in defeating the counter-attack and in immediately launching the second phase of the offensive. In this phase part of the force on Chunuk Bair would move down the summit and southerly spurs of the range to meet a force breaking out from the old Anzac position. Between them would lie certain lightly-held trenches on Battleship Hill and the formidable position on Baby 700. The taking of Baby 700 was to be the rôle of part of the force from "old" Anzac.



⁸⁵ A daring movement was suggested which, if it had been approved, would have occurred at this stage. This was a raid by a regiment of light horse, mounted, round the extreme northern flank and into the enemy's rear areas. This might either be designed to circle east and then south past Boghali, Kojadere, and Gaba Tepe, and so back to Anzac; or it might be planned to wheel northwards to the Turshen Keui Plain (see map at p. 445), whence it would co-operate with the Suvla landing force. In putting this forward Birdwood apprehended that it might "perhaps be considered in the nature of a 'wild-cat' scheme." The plan was not approved, probably in consequence of the difficulty of landing the horses.

Baby 700 was the strongest position at Anzac. Across its summit the enemy's trenches lay one above the other, affording tier after tier of fire. The only direct approach to it from Anzac lay along the narrow Nek, not thirty yards wide, which led to Russell's Top. To attempt a frontal assault upon this position was like endeavouring to attack an inverted frying-pan from the direction of its handle. The actual Nek was in possession of the Turks, who held it with two lines of trenches, while on either flank, slightly



towards the Turkish rear, were inaccessible spurs from which Turkish machine-guns, themselves free from interference, could sweep the narrow No-Man's Land. Birdwood and Skeen, writing on July 1st, said: "These trenches and convergences of communication trenches . . . require considerable strength to force. The narrow Nek to be crossed . . . makes an unaided attack in this direction almost hopeless."⁵⁶

Under the original scheme (of May 30th) this otherwise "almost hopeless" assault would be aided by the fact that "at least one brigade" of the troops who had reached Chunuk Bair would be advancing down the crest of the main range against the enemy's rear. "As this brigade approached the north-east corner of my present position," Birdwood wrote, "the brigade at present occupying that position would move forward to meet it." Writing on June 9th, however, he and Skeen mention a quite different motive for the attack on Baby 700. It would be "essential to draw off attention from, and co-operate with, the main enveloping movement." In the "appreciation" of July 1st they suggested that, as an alternative, it might be launched simultaneously with the actual capture of Chunuk. The intention here indicated—to use the attack on Baby 700 as a feint—involved really an utterly different operation, since in this case the assault

⁵⁶ Gen Walker and Col. White, in an "appreciation" submitted at Birdwood's request, had estimated that, while two brigades would be sufficient for seizing Lone Pine and Johnston's Jolly, the capture of Baby 700 would require three

previously described as "almost hopeless" would have to be attempted without the aid of any attack on the enemy's rear. It is true that Birdwood's final instructions to Godley make no reference to this possibility. The operation is there described as "a converging attack from that ridge (Chunuk Bair) and from No. IV Section (Russell's Top) against Baby 700." This was to take place after Chunuk Bair had been captured, the hour chosen being consequently 4.30.⁸⁷ Nevertheless the notion that the Baby 700 attack was partly a feint appears to have existed throughout in Birdwood's mind. His intention probably was to deliver converging attacks if Chunuk Bair were captured in time, but, if the capture of Chunuk were delayed, to assist it by ordering the minor assault to go forward alone. The consequences were probably not further considered. But to the small force making the frontal attack they might be very different in the two cases. Though the numbers of those who were to make the actual assault were eventually reduced to 600,⁸⁸ its allotted objective involved the capture of nine lines of trenches in front and several to the flank, comprising in all at least forty separate trenches and saps. Birdwood and Skeen can hardly have expected that, in the event of the assault being delivered as a feint, it could effect much more than the capture of the foremost works at The Nek. It may have been these doubts which caused the order for the attack to be qualified—"at 4.30 a.m. . . . unless orders are given to the contrary." The assault was to be made by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, which was well acquainted with the position. Two British battalions would form its reserve, holding the old trenches, and, if the attack succeeded, offering further assistance.

The attack upon Baby 700 was to be assisted by a simultaneous rush from Quinn's against the Turkish Quinn's,


⁸⁷ The columns engaged in the main operation were expected to be within assaulting distance of the summits of Sari Bair at 2.30 a.m. The assaults upon Chunuk Bair and 971 were to be made (according to Gen. Godley) "well before daylight." The reserves, which would assist in the subsequent movement towards Baby 700, were to be near the summit of Chunuk by 3.30.

⁸⁸ The 600 light horse were, however, to be assisted by two companies of New Army infantry on the flank and by a battalion which would hold the trenches once they had been captured. The numbers employed in the actual attack were conditioned by the difficulty of deployment on the narrow Nek. In the "appreciation" of June 9 the forces suggested for this phase had been: (1) advancing from Chunuk Bair against the rear of Baby 700—2,500 men; (2) making frontal attack across The Nek against Baby 700—1,000; (3) holding Anzac trenches in that sector—1,500. By a later estimate (July 1) 3,000 rifles were to be devoted to (2), and 1,000 to (3).

and also, if Colonel Chauvel thought necessary, from Pope's against the Chessboard. All these operations would be much simplified if, as was planned, German Officers' Trench were successfully stormed during the previous night.

It remains to outline the plan of the attack from Suvla, one of the main objects of which was to assist the struggle on Sari Bair by the capture of the Chocolate and "W" Hills. From the day on which Birdwood learned of the decision to land a force at Suvla, until July 25th, when General Stopford, who would be in charge of the operation, visited Anzac, practically no information concerning it was received by any member of the Anzac staff. Except for hints dropped by members of Hamilton's staff, and an isolated reference in preliminary orders, Birdwood and Skeen were not informed; nor was their advice sought. On the one occasion upon which it was offered, the reply made it clear that it was against the policy of G.H.Q. to admit Anzac to its confidence.⁵⁹ It thus happened that the Suvla plans, although in most basic points coinciding with those suggested by Birdwood and Skeen on July 1st, were elaborated practically without consultation with the Anzac staff, and were first imparted to it a few days before the offensive.

In one point the plan seems to have differed from that originally conceived. The "primary mission" of the Suvla force was now "to secure Suvla Bay as a base of operations for all the forces in the northern zone." The capture of the



⁵⁹ In the tables of the sea-movement of the reinforcements, most carefully and efficiently drawn up by G.H.Q., it was incidentally mentioned that the destination of the 11th Div. was "the beach south of Suvla Bay," and that of half the 10th Div. was "either Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove." Birdwood and Skeen seized the opportunity afforded by this official intimation to offer assistance from Anzac in verifying the supposed existence of guns and trenches on Lala Baba and the Chocolate Hills. The immediate reply from G.H.Q. was: "Your G A 393 The actual landing-place of the 11th Division, the locality of which will be kept secret till the last minute, has been selected after careful consideration of all the known factors of the case—W. P. BRAITHEWAITE, Major-General, C.G.S., Medtn Exped Force."

Chocolate and "W" Hills, with a view to assisting the attack on Sari Bair, was only secondary, though "of very special importance."⁶⁰ A further step to be undertaken later, if practicable, was the moving of any available troops past Southern Anafarta up the eastern slopes of Hill 971. Commencing to land as soon as possible after 10 p.m., General Stopford was expected to have ashore at Suvla before dawn the following troops of the IX Army Corps:

11th Division (complete with the exception of its artillery).

One battery of field artillery.

Two batteries of mountain artillery.

At dawn, or immediately after, the following should be off Suvla ready to land:


Six battalions of the 10th Division. (It was intended to keep these for some days previously at Mitylene, in order to make the enemy anticipate that the objective was Smyrna. At dusk on Aug. 6 the battalions would sail from Mitylene for a destination unknown to the islanders.)

Horse- and mule-transport.

Certain additional artillery of the Suvla corps would also have been landed at Anzac and would join its corps by land as soon as possible. Three more battalions of the 10th Division would be brought later from Imbros.⁶¹

General Stopford chose, as the main objective for the 10th and 11th Divisions, the line of hills beyond the Suvla Plain, from Tekke Tepe to Ejelmer Bay. The preliminary objectives for the 11th Division were:

The Turkish posts on Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba (near the two points of Suvla Bay respectively) overlooking the landing-places.



⁶⁰ In previous instructions to Stopford, dated July 22, the urgency of capturing these hills was more strongly stated. "It is of first importance that Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hill) and Ismail Oglu Tepe ('W' Hills) should be captured by a *coup de main* before daylight."

⁶¹ The remaining infantry of this division and the 13th Div (all normally belonging to the IX Corps) had been temporarily allotted to Birdwood (see p. 455).

The coastal ridge of Kiretch Tepe, as far as Kartal Tepe, overlooking Ejelmer Bay.

The Chocolate and "W" Hills.

The lower slope of the hills east of Suvla at Baka Baba, near Anafarta. Connection was to be established between this point and the troops on Kartal Tepe.

Objectives were to be given to the 10th Division when it arrived on the morning after the landing. They would depend on the situation of the troops already landed, and upon the enemy's position, which would be ascertained by "bold reconnaissance." The whole district was believed to contain only two or three thousand enemy troops.⁶²

The rate of advance of the Suvla troops was a matter closely affecting the Anzac plans. When, therefore, Stopford visited Anzac, Birdwood pressed upon him to make sure that every man knew his exact orders, so that upon landing all units would be able to start racing for their objectives at the top of the hills.⁶³ Stopford was manifestly nervous as to the employment of his troops in a night advance, to which they were unaccustomed. Birdwood urged that the 11th Division had still eight or nine nights on Imbros, during which this defect might be largely overcome by practice. Stopford's nervousness, however, cannot have been dispelled, since his orders, shortly afterwards issued, contained no insistence whatever upon speed nor any incitement to reach the objectives before dawn. Far from instruction being given to the men concerning their objectives, special measures were taken to ensure that most of the officers and men on Imbros and all those at

⁶² The commanders of the landing force were informed that of 30,000 Turkish troops north of Kild Bahr, 12,000 were in trenches at Anzac and 18,000 in reserve east or south-east of it; and that the only troops in the Suvla area were a battalion on the Chocolate Hills, another on the "W" Hills, about three battalions in or near Northern and Southern Anafarta, and a few mounted troops and *gendarmes* scattered through the country. A 9.2-inch gun, one 4.2-inch, and three field guns were known to be in the "W" Hills, but these and the trenches and entanglements protecting them all faced south towards Anzac.

⁶³ Finding that Stopford was inclined to consider a preliminary bombardment necessary, Birdwood strongly advised him to trust to surprise, and urged that, although the attack was to be made at night, there was little danger of the troops losing their way if they knew their objectives, since they would be able to see the outline of the hills and need only keep pressing forward to reach them. Advancing on a broad front, they should have little difficulty in pushing past the few scattered enemy trenches which would confront them.

Mitylene should be completely ignorant until the last moment of what they were to do and where they were to be employed.⁶⁴

The wisdom of this policy was to be tested a few days later; but it was entirely consistent with Hamilton's own policy of rigid secrecy. The fact that Skeen, who for months had given his whole heart to the study of the area between Anzac and Suvla, was not consulted in drawing the Suvla plans caused deep disappointment to the few at Anzac who were aware of it. The omission was afterwards, in bitterness, attributed by some to that tendency towards self-sufficiency to which reference has already been made.⁶⁵ But a more probable or more powerful motive was the determination of the Commander-in-Chief himself to preserve absolute secrecy. Determined to achieve surprise, he endeavoured to conceal his plans, almost till the eve of the attack, from all but a few members of his staff and the corps commanders. The chance of a leakage of news through Stopford's troops, who were encamped on the Greek islands, seems to have caused the secret to be kept from Stopford himself until July 22nd; and when Birdwood early in July, as a first step towards making vigorous preparations, gave Godley and Walker a draft of his plan, and mentioned the fact in a private letter to Hamilton, the latter was greatly disturbed. He telegraphed:

I am sorry you have told your divisional generals. I have not even informed Stopford or Bailloud. Please find out at once how many staff officers each of them has told, and let me know. Now take early opportunity of telling your divisional generals that whole plan is abandoned. I leave it to you to invent the reason for this abandonment. The operation is secret and must remain secret.

Birdwood recalled the draft and informed his generals that it had not been adopted. Undoubtedly its communication involved one danger. It was not that the enemy might have spies in the Anzac forces;⁶⁶ nor that a soldier might be

⁶⁴ This was probably from fear lest some leakage of information might occur at Imbros, Lemnos, or Mitylene, the Greek islands in which the troops were quartered. With Stopford's orders to his divisional commanders there was issued, on Aug. 3, a special injunction that no officer or man was to be informed of their contents "until the latest moment at which it is necessary for the performance of his duty . . ." Even then, only those portions of the plan which concerned any particular officer or man were to be divulged to him.

⁶⁵ *Vol. I, p. 231.*

⁶⁶ In one case during the war an Australian soldier—a foreigner by birth—came under official suspicion of being an agent of the enemy, but the evidence was quite inconclusive. In another case a foreigner, though not really suspected, was "for greater caution" removed from the front.

captured and let slip some hint to his interrogators. In spite of rewards offered for their capture, the enemy made hardly any prisoners at Anzac, and most of those stubbornly refused to speak. Nor was there any civilian population to repeat the chatter of the troops. But there was a distinct possibility that some sick or wounded officer or man sent to Egypt might there talk carelessly of what he had heard at the front;⁸⁷ and the rumours of Egypt might quickly reach the enemy.

Birdwood's policy of taking subordinates into his confidence therefore involved a definite risk. Nevertheless, if certain important preparations were to be made, that risk had to be accepted. During the fortnight following his return on July 2nd from G.H.Q. with the approved plan, certain officers of the mounted rifles by his orders explored the Sazli, Chailak, and Aghyl Deres, reporting on their penetrability, the probable speed of troops marching through them, the landmarks at night, and similar matters. This scouting was carried out nightly by Lieutenants Taylor⁸⁸ and Wilson,⁸⁹ each with four men who could later serve as guides to the attacking columns. Their reports were closely followed by Skeen, who on July 16th advised that they had learned so much that they should not be allowed to incur further risks. They were accordingly sent to Imbros, Birdwood giving orders that, together with any Anzac battalion which was resting there, they should practise night-leading and attacking in the hills. He further asked that any of his New Army reinforcements quartered on the islands should do the same. At Anzac another relay of scouts was being sent up the valleys, but with a special caution to avoid capture. In addition, three or four officers of the N.Z. & A. Division were daily sent out to one of the flanking destroyers, so that, while she kept her normal watch over these ridges, the staff and regimental officers

⁸⁷ Though it was the obvious duty of those who incidentally learned of the plans to keep them to themselves, in the reckless, breezy life of the soldier this duty was not always observed. It is on record that on July 8 a young officer temporarily in command of an Australian battalion, having attended in the afternoon a conference upon the proposed attack on Lone Pine, freely discussed the project at the evening meal within hearing of several officers and of the headquarters' cook.

⁸⁸ Capt. G. N. Taylor; Canterbury Mtd Rifles. School teacher; of Okaramio, N.Z.; b. Denniston, N.Z.; 4 May, 1892.

⁸⁹ It was apparently after these officers that "Taylor's Hollow" or "Gap" and "Wilson's Knob" were named.

should have an opportunity of studying them from the sea. Such reconnaissances necessarily gave those officers some hint of the plans.⁷⁰ But if that partial disclosure involved some danger, Birdwood by this means provided guides for all his columns and ensured that most of the commanders, staffs, and regimental officers should acquire at least some general knowledge of such features as Chunuk Bair, Rhododendron Ridge, Table Top, The Farm, and Abdel Rahman Bair.

Whether the value of such preparation counterbalanced the risk must be a matter of opinion. Concerning the necessity of hiding the plans from the enemy there was of course no question. For months before the offensive Birdwood, while encouraging activity on the south, limited the movements of his northern flank to the regular routine of the destroyers and careful patrolling by the New Zealanders.⁷¹ How long subordinate commanders on the British side, and their staffs (or even their troops), could safely be kept in ignorance of what they were to do was a problem for which the events of the war had up to this time provided no exact solution. Whatever course was pursued, some risk was incurred. But in subsequent campaigns of the A.I.F. the plans were never screened from the higher staffs and commanders to the extent to which this was attempted by Hamilton in the case of the landing at Suvla.

One part of the general plan remains to be mentioned—a projected feint by the VIII Corps at Helles. This would commence before the feint at Lone Pine, the hour eventually fixed being 3.50 p.m. on August 6th. The shell-supply was estimated to permit of an assault on a front of about 1,200 yards on either side of the Vineyard. The Helles troops⁷²

⁷⁰ The commander of the N.Z. Fld. Troop records that on July 13 he heard in confidence of the "new move."

⁷¹ When shortly before the offensive a destroyer commander, upon a chance suggestion from Skeen, fired a shell into the Salt Lake at Suvla in order to discover whether it were yet dry, this proceeding was considered by both Hamilton and Birdwood to have been over-dangerous. About July 23, when a Turkish attack was expected, Birdwood determined that he would not even counter-attack on his northern front, unless a good opportunity offered to seize the whole of Sari Bair. Of this attitude Hamilton cordially approved.

⁷² 29th Division.

Royal Naval Division (reduced).

42nd (E. Lancs Territorial) Division.

52nd (Lowland Territorial) Division.


(Comprising about 24,780 effectives.)

would not be reinforced, but the French would take over part of the British line, thus releasing a brigade of the 29th Division, which again was to be used for the main demonstration, the 42nd assisting it on the flank.

Thus the offensive would begin in the southern zone at 3.50 p.m. Lone Pine would next be attacked at 5.30. Farther north still the main blow would be launched at 10. At the extreme north the Suvla force would then begin landing. If all went well, daybreak would find Sari Bari and Tekke Tepe in Hamilton's hands, with Suvla behind as a base and the old Turkish position in front of Anzac outflanked and crumbling before a further advance. A final thrust would block the enemy's communications on land, and guns and searchlights would prevent his sea-transport across the straits.

With the commencement of preparations for this offensive the second phase of the campaign—comprising Hamilton's thrust for Achi Baba—may be said to have closed, and the third—in which the main effort was directed north of Anzac—to have begun.

100 50 0 100 200 300 YDS



THROBINSON

PORTION OF THE LINE ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF ANZAC, SHOWING
THE POSITION (LEANE'S TRENCH) ESTABLISHED BY THE ENEMY ON HOLLY
RIDGE PRIOR TO 31ST JULY, 1915

British trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres

CHAPTER XVII

THE PREPARATORY DEMONSTRATIONS— LEANE'S TRENCH

THE staffs of the New Army brigades were about to reach Anzac; the accompanying portion of their artillery had already landed; the torpedo-boat destroyers had just entered upon the final week's programme in their nightly bombardments, when General Birdwood was asked by Sir Ian Hamilton to make some further pretence of an intention to break out southwards from Anzac. It chanced that, a week previously, Brigadier-General MacLagan, commanding in the sector southernmost but one, had asked leave to drive the Turks out of an inconvenient position in which they had newly established themselves in front of Tasmania Post. This suggestion was now seized upon by Birdwood as offering an opportunity for a suitable demonstration.

It will be remembered that, before Tasmania Post was dug, there had been some controversy¹ as to whether it should be sited on the edge of the almost precipitous Valley of Despair, or some forty yards farther back on the summit of the ridge. The post had eventually been dug on the summit, with the result that its garrison commanded a short field of fire extending to the edge of the slope, but could not see into the steep gully beyond. To the north of the post lay the Wheatfield, covered with a deep ripe crop and still open to the enemy, although saps were now being pushed forward in order to form a firing line level with that of the post. Two hundred yards to the south of Tasmania Post the 7th Light Horse had established Rylie's, and the two were now being joined by a sap.

From the moment when Tasmania Post was completed, the fact that the enemy could move troops unseen up the valley to within forty yards of it became a constant source of anxiety. Turks could be heard nightly on the edge, but the low bushes and the crop hid them from view. Colonel Hilmer Smith of the 12th had caused a number of short

¹ See p. 271

tunnels to be driven forward from Tasmania Post, ending in "bombing-holes"—small openings to the surface—in which sentries could be stationed, and from which a weak barbed-wire entanglement was put out. From these openings bombs were occasionally thrown if the enemy were heard dangerously close to the post; groups of men were also sent nightly into the scrub to act as listening-posts.

On a night in June, in order to test these and other measures for the safety of the post, Colonel Smith himself, guided by Captain Rafferty,² crept out over the crest to a shelf dug by the enemy on its edge, from which a Turkish sniper occasionally shot up the valley towards Silt Spur. As they reached the spot it was seen that a few feet of new trench had been cut into the edge of the hill.³

As hand-grenades and trench-mortar bombs flung in that direction did not prevent the enemy from extending this trench, it was raided by the 12th Battalion on the night of July 18th, one Turk being bayoneted and others escaping. This method also being ineffectual, Colonel Smith on July 21st applied for leave to capture the Turkish work before it became inconveniently strong. He pointed out that two of the bomb-hole tunnels had been prolonged beneath the enemy's trench,⁴ so that mines could be exploded, if it were so desired, and the tunnels afterwards used for communication trenches. MacLagan supported Smith's suggestion, urging that, if the attack were deferred until the Turks had completed their work, it might involve severe loss. But leave was refused in consequence of the supposed imminence of a general attack by the enemy.⁵ As a temporary precaution, however, Colonel Smith ordered the scrub in front of Tasmania Post and part of the wheat crop to be cleared by

² With them were Maj. Whitlam and Cpl. G. H. C. Hart (afterwards Lieutenant; of Broome, W. Aust.), who died of wounds received at Meteren, Apr., 1918.

³ The patrols of the 12th used to go out before dark in order to reach their positions before a Turkish patrol which moved nightly up the valley. On this occasion a Turk was already sitting in the scooped-out recess. Col. Smith, not perceiving him, spoke aloud. The Turk at once plunged down the hillside and rejoined his patrol, which opened fire and chanced to catch the men of the listening-posts going out later than usual. Cpl. W. A. Gillam (of Launceston, Tas.) was killed.

⁴ The mining was easy, inasmuch as the enemy had not yet attempted to counter-mine.


⁵ See p. 323.

burning, and this operation was carried out on July 23rd by Rafferty and Private H. V. Weighill.⁶

After this fire had cleared some of the ground, it was observed that—as had been anticipated—the enemy was rapidly joining up several short trenches, so as to construct along the edge of the valley an earth-work over a hundred yards in length, of which the sandbagged parapet was now clearly visible. He was also obviously endeavouring to extend this trench northwards into the Wheatfield, in order to overlap the northern end of Tasmania Post. To meet this, the post was extended northwards, and the saps in the Wheatfield were pushed ahead. At the same time two more bomb-hole tunnels were prolonged to undermine the enemy's trench, which was also occasionally bombarded.

As a matter of fact the completion of this trench was one of the measures taken by the 16th Turkish Division, when warned on July 27th to prepare for the coming British offensive, of which news had arrived from Germany.⁷ Such was the position when, on July 29th, Hamilton's desire for a further demonstration on the southern flank was made known to the commander of the 1st Division, to whom Birdwood suggested that the new Turkish works opposite Tasmania Post might be attacked that night.

As, however, the capture of the post and not a mere raid was intended, MacLagan asked for two further days in which to have the tunnelling completed.⁸ The attack was accordingly




⁶ These two crawled to the eastern edge of the Wheatfield, and, after setting light to it, came back, closely followed by the flames, to one of the forward bombing-holes. A characteristic incident is recorded. As Rafferty slid safely into this bomb-hole, a big man scrambled out past him and went out thirty or forty yards through the lively rifle-fire evoked by the conflagration. It was Pte Weighill; he had observed some Turkish cricket-ball bombs lying out near the edge of the blaze—some of them were exploding in it. He accordingly went out and brought in a bomb, explaining that he "wanted to have a look at it."

⁷ See pp 435-6. Rushdi Bey, commanding the 16th Div., ordered the 48th Regt. to "use every means to complete and fortify the trenches begun . . . on Holly Ridge" (the Turkish is "Yeshil" or "Green" Ridge)

⁸ The tunnels were to be used for communication with the trench when captured

fixed for moonrise⁹ on the night of July 31st, and was to be delivered by the 11th Battalion, which had then relieved the 12th in Tasmania Post. The operation was carefully planned. A portion of Snipers' Ridge, where there were known to be at least two machine-guns and a trench-mortar bearing on the position, was to be bombarded during the afternoon by the newly-landed howitzers of the 13th (British) Division,¹⁰ with forty rounds of high-explosive shell. During the actual fight other enemy machine-guns in the northern bastion of Snipers' Ridge were to be smothered with shrapnel, while the whole semicircle of surrounding positions would be kept as far as possible under shrapnel from the artillery¹¹ and intense rifle-fire from the Australian trenches on that flank. At the hour of the assault mines were to be fired by the 3rd Field Company in each of the four tunnels, one under either end of the enemy's trench and the others at even distances between. The assault was then immediately to be made by four parties of the 11th¹² under the command of Captain Leane—the same who on May 4th had led the raid upon Gaba Tepe. The signal for the attack was to be the lighting of a red flare on the parapet of the old firing line.

Early in the night of July 31st there was a violent outbreak of firing on the left of Anzac. It died down and left an almost unbroken quiet. As the moon began to rise, a single red light appeared on the black hillside behind Tasmania Post. Twenty seconds later, close in front of the post, a shower of red sparks, caused by the explosion of one of the mines, was projected twenty feet into the air, followed almost immediately by a second flash near by.



⁹ At 10.16

¹⁰ 69th Bde., R.F.A.

¹¹ The right-flank ship (on this night a monitor) would also shell the Twin Trenches.

¹² Each consisting of fifty men under an officer. In each party there were to be four bomb-throwers (each carrying eight percussion stick-bombs), twenty-six riflemen; and twenty men with sandbags and entrenching tools—but also carrying arms—who were to follow immediately behind the others and act as a working party.

Several rifles were fired from the position attacked, and the sparkle of distant rifle-fire quickly ran along the surrounding ridges from Echelon Trenches to the Pine.


When the red light appeared, Captain Leane, whose four parties were lining the parapet of Tasmania Post, each opposite its allotted mine, had given the signal for the firing of the mines and for the attack. But there followed only two explosions, one at either end of the enemy's trench. It was impossible to judge whether the other mines had altogether failed or whether their explosion was merely delayed, in which case there would be extreme danger for the centre parties. But there was only one wise course to pursue: Leane instantly led out the attack. As it reached the trench, the southern of the two central mines, which—like the northern—was a few yards short of the trench, exploded, burying one or more Turks and at least one Australian, who was already in the trench.¹² The fourth did not explode.

With the *débris* still raining from the air upon some of them, the parties reached the Turkish trench. The bombers, as they approached it, flung percussion bombs both into it and down the steep slope beyond. The trench proved to have a parapet of sandbags with large sand-bricks on its nearer side, behind which, jabbering and scrambling, and staring up in an amazed manner, was a line of Turks. The Australians stood firing down at it until spaces were cleared and they were able to jump in, the Turks rushing to the rear through the communication trenches. The central portion of the fire-trench was easily captured, and Leane thereupon turned his attention first to his left flank and then to his right.

The left party, under Captain Jackson, which had to traverse about sixty yards of No-Man's Land, had found that the northern part of the trench "petered out" into the head of a washaway, which served the enemy as a communication trench. Beyond was the Wheatfield, in which were only some unfinished excavations. Some of the Western Australians dropped into the end of the trench; but Jackson and ten men found themselves in the cornfield north of the washaway. His men chased a few Turks down this gutter.

¹² According to one account, however, these men were buried subsequently by a shell

and, after killing several, returned. As one of the enemy's machine-guns was playing in this direction, the open end of the trench was forthwith blocked with sandbags, while Jackson and his ten followers dug rifle-pits in the Wheatfield north of the washaway. His working party had not reached him,¹⁴ but Lance-Corporal L. B. Taylor, twice going to the captured trench, brought thence a dozen men.¹⁵ Tools and sandbags were also thrown from the trench into the washaway, whence Jackson's men fetched them. The head of the washaway was then filled and protected with a breastwork, this labour continuing during the night.



The mine in front of Lieutenant Franklyn's¹⁶ party, which started south of Jackson's, failed to explode, but the enemy, on being attacked, ran off through a short communication trench into the Valley of Despair. Leane at once ordered Sergeant Louch to block this exit with sandbags. Then, seeing that the left was safe, he turned to ascertain the situation on his right.

As he proceeded southward, he observed that several men who were endeavouring to cut fire-steps in the wall of the trench fell shot from the rear. In order to solve this puzzle he sent his "observer," Lance-Corporal F. Smith,¹⁷ to get touch with the party on that flank. Smith presently reported that a strong party of the enemy intervened.¹⁸

The right central party, under Lieutenant Puckle,¹⁹ had been unable to clear its sector of the trench. The mine on its front was that which exploded late, burying one or more

¹⁴ According to some accounts they were caught in one of the mine explosions.

¹⁵ Taylor was of Gympie, Ql'and. Sgt. M. C. Bullen (of Perth, W. Aust.), who was with these, was shot dead as they left the trench.

¹⁶ Lieut. J. W. Franklyn; 11th Bn. Draper; of Subiaco, W. Aust.; b. 1897. Died of wounds, 6 Aug., 1915.

¹⁷ Capt. F. Smith, M.C.; 51st Bn. Barman; of Mullewa, W. Aust.; b. Mullewa, 1891. Killed in action, 25th Apr., 1918.



¹⁸ This was confirmed by a report from Lieut. Croker, an engineer of the 3rd Fld Coy., who, when inspecting the mine-craters in the old No-Man's Land, observed some of the enemy's supports advancing up a washaway and communication trench towards the bay held by their comrades. Croker shot three of them.

¹⁹ Lieut. C. E. M. Puckle; 11th Bn. Farmer; of Mullewa, W. Aust.; b. Toorak, Vic. 19 Feb., 1887. Killed in action, 31 July, 1915.

of its men. Most of them, however, leapt into the trench some distance north of it, the Turks at the same time recoiling southward. Some of these withdrew into a Y-shaped washaway on the valley-side, and others into a trench-bay which projected sharply towards the Australian line. Puckle endeavoured to seize the opening to the washaway and thus cut off the enemy in the bay, but he and several of his men were killed. A barricade was therefore hurriedly raised across the trench, the enemy remaining in the bay south of it, from which he fired continually towards Tasmania Post.

The southernmost party of the 11th was under Captain Rockliff. Of its fortune Leane knew nothing, except that, by the sound, it was still fighting. As a matter of fact it had been engaged from the first in a severe struggle. As it reached the trench, the enemy at that end had been hurrying away down three short saps into the Valley of Despair. Rockliff's men, who had reached the trench without a casualty, instantly began to tear down the sandbags of the Turkish parapet, and to throw them, together with the sand-bricks and any other available material, across the mouth of the communication saps, in order to block the exits. In the southernmost sap a number of the enemy appeared to wait in anticipation of further explosions, and the barricades were only a foot or two in height when these Turks began to creep forward again and throw bombs.

Rockliff's four bombers had carried between them thirty-two percussion bombs, but many of these had been used, and the remainder were now soon thrown. A box of jam-tin



grenades was to have been brought across, but its bearer could not be found.²⁰ The supply was thus exhausted. A machine-gun under Sergeant Hallahan, which had accompanied the party, was set up on the edge of the trench, but was at once put out of action. When calls for ammunition were sent along the trench, no reply came back. On the contrary, amid the din of bombs, rifles, and shells were heard shouts: "There are Turks on the left!" But so critical was the position that Rockliff could pay little attention to this cry. From the open communication trench the enemy was bombing with impunity, and, though the Australians were throwing back some of the Turkish grenades,²¹ this situation could not have lasted long. Just then Rockliff, looking out from the back of the trench, saw lying in the open what appeared to be a box of ammunition. It was fetched in by one of the men, and was found to contain the missing jam-tin bombs. Clumsy though they were, their effect was decisive. The Australians threw one after another, the dust and smoke




Sketch (made in 1919) of Leane's position, viewed from the Turkish rear, showing washaways held by the Turks. (*From the diary of the Official War Correspondent.*)

²⁰ Both the lad who carried the bombs and an ammunition carrier for the machine-gun had been wounded in the rush across. The machine-gunner was seen wandering dazed and aimlessly past the right flank of the Turkish trench to the communication trench, where he now lay dead. The wounded bomb-carrier got back to Tasmania Post.

²¹ Pte W J Luckie (of Wellington, N.Z.) threw back six of the enemy's grenades.

becoming so thick that there was some anxiety lest the enemy might creep round under cover of it and attack the trench from the rear. But the Turks had been driven far along their trench. The work of barricading the exits was resumed, Rockliff preventing his men from firing, as there were no visible targets.

It soon became clear that the party was not connected with the one on its left. Corporal McNamara,²² in charge of the working party for Rockliff's sector, had entered the trench alone farther north and found Turks in it immediately north of him. He had then turned southwards to join his own party,²³ but found his way blocked by what he at first believed to be a fall of earth from the nearest mine. Clambering out of the trench and round this obstacle, he came on his men in a continuation of the trench five yards away. He set them to clear the trench and then discovered that it had never been fully dug through, but merely spitlocked. He reported this to Rockliff, who, looking northwards, could see the



flashes of the enemy's rifles, firing over the rear of the trench, and occasionally the Turkish uniforms lit up by the flashes; farther north the Australian rifles fired in the opposite direction. Corporal McOmish, creeping out to within three yards of the portion held by the Turks, confirmed their presence there.²⁴

Messengers from both Rockliff and Leane independently brought news of this discovery to the 11th Battalion headquarters. But in the meantime Leane made an immediate effort to oust the Turks. Their position was clearly marked by the flashes of their rifles and the burst of an occasional bomb. Upon Leane's instruction, therefore, Lieutenant Franklyn and a dozen men attempted to charge over the open in rear of the trench towards these flashes.

²² Cpl. T. W. McNamara (No. 1593, 11th Bn.). Hairdresser, of Collic, W. Aust.; b Chesterfield, Derby, Eng., 23 Sept., 1890.


²³ He here came upon a man named Prentice, badly wounded, dressed his wounds, and directed him to the rear. (Prentice, who was totally blinded, belonged to Perth, W. Aust., and Melbourne.)

²⁴ Sgt. W. McOmish, M.M. (No. 962, 51st Bn.). Miner; of Leederville, W. Aust., b Glasgow, Scotland, 1883. (Apparently both McOmish and McNamara, and also a man named Miller, were sent by Rockliff to battalion headquarters with this news. Miller was shot.)

The position, however, was confused, since some of Rockliff's men, apprehensive of attack from the rear, were intermittently firing in that direction. As the Turks were also opening with rifles and bombs, Franklyn's party was driven back.

Shortly afterwards, however, the commander of the 11th, acting on Rockliff's report, ordered Lieutenant Potter²⁵ with a reserve platoon from Tasmania Post to charge the section held by the enemy.

The trenches of the post were at this moment blocked with the passage of wounded men to the rear, which caused a difficulty in launching all the men simultaneously, and Potter himself was wounded as the attack started. But both he and Sergeant M. Ringwood, an old South African soldier, led small parties straight for the enemy, a stunted pine-tree, which was burning immediately behind the



Turks, serving as a guiding mark. They were met by heavy fire, eight of the fifteen with Ringwood being hit before the trench was reached. It was not captured, although several Australians were killed in it.²⁶ A further batch of Potter's men dashed forward soon after, losing heavily, but some reaching Leane's position. Eventually a supply of grenades reached Leane and, as the Turks refused to surrender, they were attacked with these and shot down in the trench or when attempting to leave it. The outlet to the Y-shaped washaway was then hurriedly barricaded with their corpses and with sandbags pulled from the parapet, and the trench thus finally secured.

Meanwhile the four mine-tunnels were being opened for communication, Lieutenant Croker of the engineers having reconnoitred the craters²⁷ and repeatedly crossed the open

²⁵ Lieut G Potter; 11th Bn Farmer; of Claremont, W. Aust; b Linlithgowshire, Scotland, 17 Sept., 1884.

²⁶ Ringwood himself fought a bayonet duel with one of the enemy, who unsuccessfully endeavoured to parry Ringwood's thrusts by moving his own point in a circle. Ringwood (afterwards Lieut.) belonged to Perth.

²⁷ The southern craters were also reconnoitred by Spr H. E Townsend (afterwards Capt.; of Broken Hill, N.S.W.), 3rd Fld. Coy.

with his men, who with parties of infantry were opening the passages from both ends. The air in the tunnels being pure,²⁸ three of them had within an hour been sufficiently cleared to allow sandbags and other material to be handed through the holes in the craters. But the regular passage of men was not possible till early morning, and during the night they traversed the open.

By 1.30 the gap between Rockliff and the main trench had been cut through²⁹ by a shallow trench, which by 3.20 was "passable and defensible." Along the rest of the position, by dint of heavy labour, the Turkish parapet was before daylight transferred to the eastern side, overlooking the valley, and in some places had been doubled in thickness; traverses had been made against enfilade, with well-recessed fire-bays between; in each bay fire-steps had been cut, loop-holes made, and the trench deepened. By the small hours three of the tunnels were open for communication. The northern flank was now protected by several low sandbag breastworks or sangars, standing isolated above the trampled yellow corn.

Both during the attack and afterwards the covering fire of the Anzac artillery hampered the Turkish machine-guns,³⁰ and the counter-attacks of the Turkish infantry, when once Rockliff had driven them back on the right, were feeble.³¹ One or two weak efforts were made to bomb up the southern communication trench, but were easily defeated by the throwing of a few jam-tin bombs. On the northern flank, shortly after midnight, signs of enemy movement in the Wheatfield were quickly suppressed by the fire of the 9th and 11th and of a machine-gun emplaced at one of the sap-heads. Later, near the centre of the position, the observers perceived about twenty of the enemy clinging to the hillside close below them, but these were quickly dispersed with a few jam-tin and Lotbinière grenades.

²⁸ Since the gases of the explosion had escaped through the craters.

²⁹ Capt. E. T. Brennan, medical officer of the 11th, at great risk to his life, crawled through this shallow trench to attend the wounded who were crowding the bottom of the fire trench.

³⁰ A machine-gun of the 33rd Turkish M.G. Coy. had been turned upon Holly Ridge, but was hampered by shell-fire, which damaged the trench on the southern slope of Lone Pine, whence the gun was shooting. "The enemy's fire was accurate and well aimed at our machine-guns," wrote the company commander. Nevertheless his guns fired throughout the night.

³¹ It was subsequently stated by prisoners that both the commander of the 48th (holding the post) and the commander of the supports failed in their duty.

Had this sharp action occurred three years later in an Australian sector in France, the regimental quartermaster would have had his settled part in it, and, whatever the conditions of weather or fighting, the troops would have been served with a hot drink, if not a hot meal, before daylight. But the importance of the commissariat in a fight was not yet realised. Water for the attacking troops had, it is true, been specially stored in Tasmania Post; but it does not appear to have been conveyed to them, probably in consequence of the difficulty of passing through the congested communication tunnels. For the same reason the dead of both sides had been left in the bottom of the trench, where they lay trampled on by the workers. The men were worn out with strain, absence of sleep, and heavy labour; when at dawn the Olive Grove batteries opened strongly upon the post with high-explosive, they were subjected to a severe trial of their nerve. Again and again the parapet was blown down. Part of the garrison was accordingly withdrawn into the tunnels, and most of the Wheatfield party was brought into the trench.³² Leane and many others were wounded.³³ But at 5.30, when the bombardment ceased, no attack followed.

In the evening a company of the 12th relieved the 11th in the captured position (henceforth known as "Leane's Trench"), and garrisoned it during that and the succeeding night. The fight, which had been a trying one, cost the 11th Battalion 36 killed and 73 wounded.³⁴ On the Turkish side the loss was greater.³⁵ The attack had cleared the enemy from a position from which he might subsequently have harassed the flank of the troops attacking Lone Pine. Its value as a demonstration must be judged in the light of later events.

During the week following this action four brigades of the New Army and the 29th Indian Brigade reached Anzac.

³² A small post under Sgt. R. L. Richardson (of Onslow, W. Aust.) was left in the breastworks.

³³ During this bombardment the men occupied themselves in repairing the parapet wherever it was destroyed. Leane was speaking to an observer when the latter's head was blown away by a shell, Leane himself being wounded in the head, but remaining at his post. Among those wounded at this time were Capt. Jackson and Sgt. Hallahan.

³⁴ A few casualties occurred in other units. Lieut.-Col. Harris of the 5th L.H. Regt. being killed during the general fusillade.

³⁵ Of the company of the 48th which had garrisoned the trench, only 90 men are said to have answered to their names next day. Some 30 of the enemy were lying dead in or around the trench; others were killed in the Wheatfield.

On the night of August 2nd there arrived Major-General Shaw,³⁶ commanding the 13th Division, together with some of his staff and the brigadiers and staffs of the 39th and 40th Infantry Brigades. On the following night there were disembarked 6,000 men of the 13th Division—comprising the whole of the 39th Brigade and two battalions of the 40th. At 5.45 a German aeroplane came over Anzac; but by that time the 39th was in Rest Gully and the 40th in White's Valley, having been guided thither quietly and quickly during the night. The whole process had been completed before daylight, and the enemy airmen flew away without perceiving any important change. On the night of August 4th the two remaining battalions of the 40th Brigade were landed and guided to Russell's Top and Monash Valley; the 38th Brigade was taken to Victoria Gully and Bridges' Road; the pioneer battalion of the 13th Division and divisional headquarters were also brought ashore. On the night of August 5th the 29th (New Army) and 29th Indian Brigades were to be disembarked. The British troops were duly put ashore and guided to Bridges' Road, but the Indians were still landing when day broke. A fairly heavy shell-fire was opened upon the Beach, and, although disembarkation was continued after daylight, it had eventually to be abandoned, some 200 of the 14th Sikhs being taken back to Imbros, to be returned to Anzac after dark that night. The rest of the brigade, however, was duly ashore, and bivouacked in Reserve Gully. Between August 2nd and 6th there had also been landed drafts of Australian and New Zealand troops amounting to over 3,900, including about 2,250 reinforcements.³⁷ Within the limits of Anzac there were now 37,000 troops and 72 guns.³⁸

By this time Liman von Sanders, as has been stated, had become aware that a new offensive was imminent. But he had not as yet detected any sure signs to indicate where the stroke would fall. On July 16th a report had reached him from Salonica that 50,000 to 60,000 men and 140 ships were

³⁶ Lieut.-Gen Rt Hon. Sir F. C. Shaw, K.C.B. Chief of Gen Staff, Home Force, 1916/18. Officer of British Regular Army; b. 31 July, 1861.

³⁷ Early on August 6 there arrived among the reinforcements 2 officers and 131 men for the 18th and 19th Battalions, belonging properly to the newly-formed 2nd Australian Division, then in Egypt. They were allotted to the 2nd Infantry Brigade, and were at Anzac throughout the offensive. On August 9 there arrived also 139 for the 20th Battalion.

³⁸ See foot-note 63 on p. 523.

at Lemnos,³⁹ and other rumours placed the numbers even higher. A letter of July 22nd from General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff of the German G.H.Q. in France, also warned him of the apparent probability that at the beginning of August an attempt, heavier than ever before, would be made against the Dardanelles, possibly accompanied by a landing in the Gulf of Saros, or south of the straits. Von Sanders himself suspected that the British reinforcements would be employed in making a new landing rather than in launching further futile efforts from Anzac or Helles. His observing aeroplanes were consequently sent out almost daily in spite of retaliatory raids by numbers of French aeroplanes upon the Turkish aerodrome at Chanak. On July 29th, 30th, and 31st, and August 2nd and 4th, German aeroplanes flew over Anzac, for the most part shortly before dawn; but they appear to have observed no important changes. At times during the nights of August 3rd, 4th, and 5th it seemed to listeners at Anzac that the rattle of anchor chains, and the shouts of naval officers directing incoming tows to the landing stages, must afford dangerously obvious signs of the move that was in process. It is true also that at day-break on August 4th an observer of the 47th Turkish Regiment on Lone Pine reported that a "loud noise" had been heard during the night on the enemy's pier. But the Turk was accustomed to these nightly sounds;⁴⁰ and, though he was evidently nervous, though he fired at night upon little provocation, though his artillery was active and rear areas were more frequently shelled, and though there existed that general tension which constantly precedes a great battle, nevertheless during the first few days and nights of August, crowded as they were with preparation on the Anzac side, no suspicion of that preparation reached the enemy.

During these days General Birdwood, realising that the Turkish leaders would gather some general information concerning the coming offensive, but trusting that his various demonstrations had drawn their attention to his southern flank, was anxious to keep it riveted there by a further feint. A suitable objective for this purpose seemed to be a post


³⁹ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, by Gen. Liman von Sanders, p. 104 *et seq*

⁴⁰ In the quiet of No. 2 Outpost the N.Z. sentries could sometimes hear the Turks, far up on the ranges, mimicking the sounds of the Beach officers.

recently established by the enemy in front of Ryrie's, much as Leane's Trench had been dug by them in front of Tasmania Post. He had from the first been anxious to oust the Turks from this position, which had been occupied by them as part of their new policy of shutting in his southern flank.⁴¹ He now ordered the 1st Division to attack the place.

Both General Walker and Colonel White had shown themselves strongly opposed to the undertaking, realising it to be more difficult than the capture of Leane's Trench; but, definite orders being eventually given, they passed them to the commander of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, Brigadier-General Ryrie. Ryrie at once referred them to Major Clogstoun, commanding the 3rd Field Company, who had taken a great part in planning the defences on the southern flank, and who would be charged with tunnelling to the new post in accordance with the same plan as that previously employed at Leane's. Clogstoun, however, pointed out that the task was very different, since the enemy appeared to have protected this post by mining.⁴² Moreover, even if the enemy had no mine galleries, and the Australian tunnels were immediately driven forward, it was improbable that they could reach the Turkish trench by the night proposed for the attack. If the position were captured, it was improbable that full communication with it could be opened in less than eighteen hours; and, as the place was difficult to cover with Australian fire and would be swept by Turkish enfilade, it was doubtful if the attacking party could hold out so long.

Ryrie's 2nd Light Horse Brigade had not yet been engaged in any important assault, a circumstance which often laid upon



⁴¹ The trench was reconnoitred by a patrol under Sgt. Walker of the 7th Light Horse. At dawn one morning this party jumped out of the Australian trench and ran across the thirty yards to the Turkish position. After shooting down among the scared enemy in the trench, the light horsemen returned without a casualty. Undoubtedly the enemy's new policy of shutting in the southern flank of Anzac was a result of Birdwood's activity in that direction.

⁴² A Turkish mine had already been harmlessly fired there, apparently in panic, during the fighting at Leane's.

a new commander a strong temptation to grasp any opportunity of showing the mettle of his troops without paying sufficient attention to the difficulties. It might have been suspected that Ryrie, in particular, would have been anxious to impress his superiors by carrying out their plans. If, however, he did not pretend to be a highly skilled or learned soldier, he was a man of sure sense and long accustomed to take responsibilities and make decisions. The divisional staff had already more than once been impressed by his prudent advice. Feeling himself charged with the lives of his men, he carefully weighed the chances of the attack, and then supported Clogstoun's objections, forwarding them under cover of a wise letter from himself. The result was that, on August 5th, the very day on which it was to have taken place, the operation was indefinitely postponed. Instead, Birdwood ordered that the 2nd Light Horse Brigade should on the same night attack a far easier objective, the Balkan Gun Pits south of Anzac. A raid was accordingly prepared, again postponed, and eventually fixed for the night of August 6th. Before then, however, events had occurred which caused the project to be abandoned.

The night of August 5th was a somewhat disturbed one. Preceding as it did the opening day of the offensive, it was, on the Anzac side, a time of anxious preparation. While part of the infantry was obtaining its last sleep before the battle, the 29th Indian and 29th British Brigades were being landed on the Beach. The last loads of stores were being hurried to advanced dumps close behind the points of attack. In the secret underground galleries in front of the Pimple, from which the first line of the attack on Lone Pine was to be launched, engineers and infantry were toiling by candle-light, taking out the packing of sandbags which had been temporarily left in the recesses, and preparing to break down the roof and make the openings from which that line would emerge. The minds of officers and men were full of excited anticipation of open warfare, a move to Maidos and the Narrows, and possibly to Constantinople. The previous week's attack upon Leane's Trench had been almost forgotten.

But, though the Australians did not realise it, the enemy had regarded the loss of Leane's as a serious reverse. Not only was it against his settled principle to yield any ground, but Birdwood's policy had succeeded in drawing his attention to the south of Anzac, and special orders had been given to the Turks to fortify that flank against the possibility of an outbreak of the Anzac force. The loss of Leane's at this juncture was taken deeply to heart. The two company commanders of the 48th Regiment who were held responsible are said to have been court-martialled, and one of them sentenced to death, while a third appears to have volunteered to retake the trench and to have expressed his willingness, in the event of failure, to allow the Turkish machine-guns to be turned upon himself and his men. Whether or not these statements, subsequently made by prisoners, are true, orders were given for the counter-attack. It was to be covered by artillery and by the machine-guns of the 47th Regiment on Lone Pine and Snipers' Ridge; "if the Turkish troops . . . failed to stand firm . . . or ran away," these machine-guns were to fire upon them.⁴⁸ The trench was to be destroyed by artillery overnight and attacked at dawn on August 6th.

At 6 p.m. on August 5th the Turkish artillery on Gun Ridge opened upon Leane's Trench, then occupied by part of a company of the 11th under Captain Rockliff. The bombardment was one of the fiercest experienced at Anzac, but the trajectory of most of the shells was too flat for them to be dangerous, their high-explosive merely blowing down the sandbag parapet. The Olive Grove battery, far more effective because it was firing in enfilade, opened also, but not so heavily. At 7 o'clock the bombardment ceased, only two men having been wounded.

Half the garrison of the trench consisted of reinforcements who had been poured in from Egypt in anticipation of the coming offensive. Rockliff went along the trench distributing the men alternately—old soldier—reinforcement—old soldier—

⁴⁸ A copy of the order by Rushdi Bey (commander of the 16th Div.) to this effect was captured. The 77th and part of the 48th Regts., in the sector from Pine Ridge to Gaba Tepe, were also to cover the attack by firing upon the trenches opposite them. The 3/13th, part of the 5th Turkish Div., then acting as reserve for the Anzac zone, was to move to Pine Ridge to the position vacated by the attacking companies of the 48th

reinforcement. No assault followed, but the bombardment had been so sharp that it seemed probable that one was impending. Yet five yards from the edge of the trench the valley fell so abruptly that it was impossible to see into it; the only means of detecting an enemy moving in the gully was therefore by sound. But the picks which were then busily at work, preparing the trench for the delivery of a fusillade the next day, prevented hearing. Rockliff explained this at battalion headquarters, but was told that the work, being connected with the next day's offensive, must proceed. Nevertheless, on returning to the trench, he stopped it. At midnight, when his company commander, Captain Boyd Aarons,⁴⁴ relieved him on duty, it was recommenced.

About dawn someone in the trench heard an order given by a Turkish officer close beneath in the valley. Some of the 11th fired and threw bombs in the direction of the sound. A few minutes later a hail of machine-gun fire burst upon the parapet; shells began to explode around it; heavy rifle-fire was poured upon the whole front; and a volley of Turkish bombs burst in the southern end of the trench. The enemy had crept unperceived up his old communication trenches and the Y-shaped washaway and was fiercely attacking.

One of the Turkish machine-gunners has recorded that they could see their men on the slope below Leane's harassed by a fierce bomb-fire, which at first appeared to prevent them from climbing over the parapet. Possibly also the Turkish artillery, which seems to have been shelling the southern end of the trench, at first kept the Turks back. But presently this fire lifted. A shell, or a volley of bombs, had killed or wounded almost every Australian at that end of the trench, and about thirty of the enemy scrambled over the parapet. One of the surviving Australians, by name Smith,⁴⁵ ran back through the southernmost communication tunnel to Tasmania Post to bring supports; but, when returning through the tunnel, he heard in front of him the click of a rifle-bolt. Realising that the enemy was in the passage, he stationed himself with several comrades at a bend of the tunnel, preventing further

⁴⁴ Maj Julian Boyd; Permanent President of Courts Martial, A.I.F. Dépôts in the United Kingdom, 1917/19. Mine manager; of Boulder, W. Aust.; b. Melbourne, 26 Apr., 1876.


⁴⁵ Pte. W. R. Smith (No. 232, 11th Bn.). Stockman; of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Bendigo, 1881.

penetration. Meanwhile all the men who could be spared from Tasmania Post were rushed forward into Leane's through a tunnel farther north, led by Lieutenant Robertson,⁴⁶ one of the newly-arrived reinforcements.

These supports found Leane's Trench a shambles. The southern end of it was paved with killed and wounded. The bags on the parapet had been cut to ribbons by machine-gun fire, and the sand and gravel poured into the trench. To show a head above the parapet was almost certain death. Meanwhile, though the Turks had only entered its southern end, another force of them was so close to its central sector that their bayonets could be seen above the parapet, and also their hands as they flung bombs. The Australians in the trench had at this juncture only eight jam-tin grenades and no matches with which to light the fuses. An automatic cigarette-lighter was, however, obtained from Captain Boyd Aarons, and, as the last of the bombs was flung, a further supply came to hand.

The Australians, who by shooting into the trench-wall at a bend had been preventing the enemy from working northwards, now began throwing bombs over the angle, while Sergeant Wallish⁴⁷ hastily piled across the trench a barricade over which the bomb-fighting continued.⁴⁸ Robertson was killed. Wallish, though wounded, continued to fight on until his leg was shattered. Boyd Aarons, endeavouring to smother a Turkish bomb by covering it with a blanket and sandbag, was wounded in the knee.

About 6 o'clock, the Turks still being in the southern end of the trench, the officer




⁴⁶ Lieut. A. J. Robertson; 11th Bn. Mining engineer and geologist; of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Bundalaguah, Vic., 4 Jan., 1887. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁷ Sgt. A. J. E. Wallish, D.C.M. (No. 1186, 11th Bn.). Miner; of Sandstone, W. Aust.; b. Apsley, Vic., 3 Apr., 1890.

⁴⁸ Pte. H. Whitbread (of Port Pirie, S. Aust.) and others threw back numbers of the enemy's bombs.

commanding the 11th informed his brigadier, MacLagan, that the enemy could not be driven out. MacLagan ordered him to prepare a counter-attack, and, the matter seeming urgent, himself proceeded to Tasmania Post, where he took charge of the arrangements. Two parties, each of about twenty-five men, had been already organised under Lieutenants Prockter⁴⁹ and Franklyn. MacLagan directed that Prockter's party should dash across the open from the southern end of Tasmania Post, while Franklyn's stood ready instantly to support it. The charge was at once made. Prockter's men, who were largely reinforcements, had no more than forty yards to traverse, but were met by heavy fire. Part of them, missing the trench, ran south of it into the gully, and were killed by the enemy's machine-guns. About half the party—mostly wounded and too few to assault the trench successfully—reached the parados and flung themselves down behind it. Two newly-arrived reinforcements, named Johns⁵⁰ and Morrison,⁵¹ could be seen coolly rising and firing rapidly into the trench or the gully and then sheltering again. A third, named Roper,⁵² was near them, firing from a kneeling position and then turning to those in Tasmania Post and giving the signal to reinforce.⁵³



As the first rush had failed, MacLagan ordered Franklyn to charge. This party was met with even heavier fire than the first, but most of it reached the parados and stood for a

⁴⁹ Lieut. C. H. Prockter; 11th Bn. Station manager; of Kalamunda, W. Aust., b. Hawthorn, Vic., 24 Dec., 1891. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

⁵⁰ Pte. B. D. Johns (No. 2153, 11th Bn.). Farmer; of Kojonup, W. Aust.; b. Pembrokehire, Wales, 1888. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

⁵¹ Pte. J. M. Morrison (No. 2172, 11th Bn.). Telegraphist; of Midland Junction, W. Aust.; b. Flemington, Vic., 1890. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

⁵² Pte. D. Roper (No. 2437, 11th Bn.). Labourer; of Subiaco, W. Aust.; b. Ballarat, Vic., 1893.

⁵³ He shortly afterwards ran back to the post to report the situation, being severely wounded on the way.

moment firing down. Then, as the enemy fell or spread, the survivors of both parties jumped into the trench. All the enemy in it were killed, but six were captured in the tunnel. Of the parties which made this gallant counter-attack, both had suffered heavily. Both officers were mortally wounded.⁵⁴ In Prockter's party of 26, 8 were killed and 18 wounded, the gallant Johns and Morrison both losing their lives.

Thus by about 7 o'clock the trench had been cleared of the enemy, but Turks were still clinging to the slope below its centre and northern end, although they had not yet made any rush over the crest. Their position was, in fact, one of extreme difficulty, since shortly after daylight the 10th Battalion on Silt Spur, which enfiladed the valley, had been ordered to maintain rifle-fire down the gully in rear of them, and at 5.30 some of the Anzac batteries also had been turned upon it. The Turks sheltered from this fire in the washaways close beneath the parapet of Leane's, but were not in a favourable position to continue the assault. Meanwhile two men of the 11th, Privates Cocking⁵⁵ and Moran,⁵⁶ who had found loop-holes from which they could see into parts of the washaways through certain breaks in their banks, were steadily shooting every man who passed. It was also observed that, when the Turks attempted to break back in twos and threes to the valley, their own machine-guns from the rear were cutting them down.⁵⁷

Nevertheless the existence of the enemy in force so close beneath the trench caused some anxiety. If reinforced, it seemed likely that he would attempt to rush the trench, in which case the field of fire, only five yards in width, gave little room for repelling him. Moreover the sound of picking, heard at about 8 o'clock from one of the tunnels, suggested

⁵⁴ By shell-fire on the edge of the trench. Prockter died in the aid-post; Franklyn on the hospital ship.


⁵⁵ Pte. D. Cocking (No. 980, 11th Bn.). Prospector, of Ballarat East, Vic; b Ballarat, 1885. Killed in action, 30 May, 1916.

⁵⁶ Pte. P. F. Moran (No. 810, 11th Bn.). Labourer; of Seven Hills, S Aust; b Wilmington, S. Aust., 1893. Killed in action, 30 May, 1916.

⁵⁷ MacLagan, who with Peck, his staff-captain, went forward into Leane's, himself remarked that the machine-guns shooting these men appeared to be those of their own side, stationed one on Knife Edge, one on Snipers' Ridge, and two on the southern bastion of Lone Pine—duly posted that is to say, where Rushdi Bey had ordered.

that the Turks were driving a mine into the hillside. Major Clogstoun of the engineers was sent for, and endeavoured to discover what the Turks were about. In doing so he daringly leant over the parapet⁵⁸ and was at once shot through the windpipe. MacLagan, who on hearing the same report had again gone forward to Leane's, could find no evidence of mining; but he saw that it was difficult to dislodge the enemy, since the jam-tin bombs thrown by the 11th rolled down the hill and burst out of range. "Throw some gun-cotton at them," he said to Boyd Aarons, who, though wounded, was still in charge. A small box of this explosive, prepared for use as a bomb, was accordingly rolled over the parapet. It exploded, killing some half-dozen of the enemy, and the threat of attack ended.⁵⁹

Meanwhile, however, the commander of the 11th had ordered another step to be taken to oust the digging Turks. This was a charge over the open north of Tasmania Post by twenty-five men under a reinforcement officer, Lieutenant Hall.⁶⁰ This party accordingly dashed forward⁶¹ through the Wheatfield. The morning was advanced. The whole area was on the alert. As they reached the edge of the slope the machine-guns on Snipers' Ridge and the Knife Edge, and shrapnel-fire from a Turkish battery, were turned upon them. Hall was struck, and pitched headlong down the slope. A number of his men charged or stumbled down it, ten of their bodies being afterwards found near its foot. A body of the enemy, which they surprised, fled on their appearance, and, as it recoiled, the



⁵⁸ If a periscope was put up, it was instantly broken.

⁵⁹ According to one account an ineffective mine-explosion subsequently occurred where the Turks had been digging. But it seems possible that the explosion of the gun-cotton was mistaken for that of an enemy mine.

⁶⁰ Lieut S G L Hall; 11th Bn. Bank clerk; of Kadina, S. Aust; b. Lucindale, S. Aust., 22 July, 1891. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

⁶¹ From the "Oratunga" fire-trench, a northerly continuation of Tasmania Post.

crackle of the Turkish machine-guns swelled into a deafening uproar. But of Hall's party only three wounded men managed to return to the northern end of Leane's.⁶²

In case the enemy might rally, the fire of howitzers was now directed upon the lower part of the Valley of Despair. A few bombs continued to be thrown by some of the enemy lingering beneath the trench.⁶³ The action died out about 10.30. It had cost the Australians 55 killed and 100 wounded. The enemy's losses were probably equal.⁶⁴

Urgent steps were at once taken to put Leane's Trench into such a condition that its garrison could that afternoon take their allotted part in helping to cover with rifle-fire the attack upon Lone Pine. The artillery was already carrying out the third and last day's programme of slow bombardment of the Pine and other positions. Since the previous night the 1st Infantry Brigade had been resting in its support line, the 2nd Brigade having been extended so as to take over its entire front. The 2nd Field Company, which for the past week had been cutting a new sap to the Pimple, widening the old ones, and deepening and preparing the tunnels,⁶⁵ was now in full force breaking open the roof of the underground firing line opposite the Pine. Water and supplies had been stored in Brown's Dip, immediately in rear of the Pimple. The men of the 1st Brigade had crammed their belongings into their packs and stacked these in convenient dépôts behind the lines. Bayonets had been sharpened; broad white patches of calico had been sewn by all troops round the sleeves and on the backs of tunics to serve as distinguishing marks by night. The plans had been explained by the officers to the men. At 2 p.m. the 2nd Field Company finished the opening of the underground line. At 2.30 p.m. the portion of the 2nd Brigade which had been garrisoning the Pimple was withdrawn to the flanks, and the 1st moved in to take up its allotted position for the attack

⁶² Men in Leane's observed through a periscope that one of Hall's party, lying on the edge of the valley, was moving his limbs. A medical orderly of the 11th named Winzar (of Boulder City, W. Aust.) thereupon crawled out at 11 a.m. and, after dressing his wound, attached to him a rope by which he was dragged into the trench. The man, who was a reinforcement and had been wounded in the leg, subsequently recovered.

⁶³ By one of the last bombs Capt. Rockliff was wounded.

⁶⁴ Forty Turkish dead lay within view.

⁶⁵ Working with infantry fatigue parties.

upon Lone Pine. Meanwhile the 7th Battalion was held ready to launch, at short notice, an attack upon Johnston's Jolly, this provision being insisted on by General Birdwood, although General Walker was adverse. The powerful influence of Colonel White had been exercised, as on numerous occasions later in the war, for cutting-down any part of the plan which he considered tactically impracticable or beyond the power of the available troops. The opposition of himself, Walker, and Ryrie, maintained till the commencement of the offensive, undoubtedly caused a curtailment of the projected feint, which would otherwise have included both a prior assault on Holly Ridge and an attack on the Jolly simultaneous with that upon the Pine.⁶⁶


⁶⁶ Whether this opposition was justified by the reasons given for it at the time (*see pp 454 and 487-8*), and by the actual consequences, can only be judged in the light of the events themselves.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE ATTACK UPON LONE PINE

THE front line of the Turkish trenches at Lone Pine could be seen from the Australian front on the same plateau, its high-heaped parapet showing clearly over the sparse low scrub¹ at a distance of from 60 to 100 yards. The surface of the plateau was almost level, and its northern half, where the grassy square of the Daisy Patch still lay between the lines, was completely bare of scrub. But the Turks, by extremely laborious digging, had established their line round the head of Owen's Gully, whence it wound 400 yards southwards through the scrub, skirting the Daisy Patch and crossing the plateau. From the southern edge of the Pine the same trench, dipping lower, continued along Snipers' Ridge.

The centre of the enemy's front on the Pine was far less advanced than its two flanks, receding towards the Turkish rear and merely serving to connect the advanced flanks. Although the growth of these trenches had been anxiously watched since the early days, only a rough notion of their plan could be obtained by observers from the ground. In June, however, photographs were taken from the air.² From these, although the staff was at that time inexperienced in interpreting them, a rude plan of the Turkish trenches had been compiled; it was rough both in scale and detail, did not show the heights, gullies, or other natural features, and did not, therefore, make clear which trenches were on higher or lower ground. Nor did it show—what was clearly to be seen in the air-photograph—that the southern





¹ See Volume XII, plate 103


² See plate at p. 563

half of the trenches had been generally roofed over. It exhibited fairly well, however, the general run of the enemy's lines, showing that a support line ran close behind the front on left and right, but that in the centre there were only a number of communication trenches leading back over the plateau and most of them ending at a transverse trench about a third of the way towards its eastern edge. This last was selected by General Walker as a suitable limit for the centre of his advance. It would, however, only afford a front

of 160 yards. It was estimated, indeed, that this and the two flanks taken together would not, when first captured, conveniently hold more than three infantry battalions. It was therefore arranged that three battalions—the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th—should make the assault, and one—the 1st—act as reserve. The 3rd was to seize most of the deep central objective; the 4th and 2nd the northern and southern flanks respectively. Each was to reach specified points shown in the map, and many officers spent part of the time before the attack in carefully noting through periscopes the line which they and their respective troops must follow.

The general staff concentrated its efforts upon ensuring that the attacking brigade should be given a good start. This work mainly fell upon Colonel White of the divisional staff and Major King of the brigade. In order that the first blow should be an exceedingly heavy one, three lines—each a company strong—were to be launched by each battalion simultaneously,






LONE PINE AND THE AUSTRALIAN LINES AT THE PIMPLE, FROM WHICH THE ATTACK STARTED
 The posts established by the Australian infantry in the Turkish trenches before midnight on 6th August, 1915, are shown by red dots. (British trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.)

L: Leane's Trench; W: Wheatfield

Bolton's Hill.




Silt Spur

THE VALLEY OF DESPAIR, FROM SILT SPUR, SHOWING THE POSITION OF LEANE'S TRENCH

And Had Mount Ophthal Photo No. 61954
Taken in 1919

To face p. 408



SKETCH OF THE JOLLY, OWEN'S GULLY, AND LONE PINE, DRAWN BY SERGEANT-MAJOR GOLDENSTEDT, 3RD BATTALION, ON 30TH JULY, 1915, FROM THE AUSTRALIAN LINE OPPOSITE THE JOLLY

one behind the other; the foremost starting from the secret underground firing line in front of the Pimple, only forty to sixty yards from the Turks; the second from the old or main fire-trench of the Pimple thirty yards in rear; the third (carrying picks and shovels as well as rifles) was to follow from the main fire-trench immediately after the second. White and King had worked out on the spot, recess by recess, the space to be occupied by each battalion at its starting-point. The tunnels of the new underground line, as well as all important passages leading to the Pimple, had been widened, and each unit had been allotted a separate and clearly marked line of approach through these avenues.

In front of parts of their trenches the Turks³ had constructed a fairly strong wire entanglement. In order to destroy this, to break down head-cover—which was known to exist—and to damage the flanking positions or those against which later attacks were designed, there had been arranged a bombardment extending over three days. This was not a destructive bombardment, as known later in France, since comparatively few shells were allotted for each day. But various "shoots" at a slow rate of fire were to occur on August 4th, 5th, and 6th, and were to be followed on the third and final day by an hour's⁴ "intensive" bombardment by all guns. The nature of the slow bombardment may be illustrated by the shooting of the 1st New Zealand Field Battery on Russell's Top, which was the only field-battery commanding the Turkish wire entanglements at the Pine, and was therefore charged with destroying them. For this purpose it was to fire at fixed hours on August 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th, a total of 125 shells. The first day's "shoot," in which were used 24 high-explosive and 11 shrapnel shells, was intently watched from the infantry trenches. "Medium result," notes the 3rd Battalion diary. "Not much damage done," says that of the 2nd. Next day it became clear that, with so meagre an allowance, the entanglements would not be broken down. Accordingly on the morning of August 5th the battery was ordered to use shrapnel, set to burst on percussion against the ground, and to continue firing until the entanglements were

³ Working by night in the early months, when Australians used scarcely to fire a shot during dark.

⁴ This was originally planned to last only half-an-hour, but the order was altered two days before the attack.

destroyed. An observing-officer was stationed in the Pimple, with a direct telephone line to his guns. Most of the shooting was performed by one gun of the battery, but by 3 p.m. on August 6th, after 383 rounds in all had been fired, the entanglement (except a few "knife rests") had been destroyed to the satisfaction of the infantry commanders. During the night of August 5th star-shells were fired in order to prevent the enemy from repairing the damage.

The actual trenches of the Pine, which were in a large measure covered, were bombarded by two New Zealand howitzers of the new 4.5-inch pattern, and by two old 5-inch weapons of the 69th (British) Brigade. The same New Zealand howitzers, with another battery of the 69th, were responsible for Johnston's Jolly. The 4th (City of Glasgow) Battery of the Lowland Howitzer Brigade fired upon German Officers'; two Australian field batteries—the 4th and 5th—and a further howitzer battery of the 69th Brigade were directed upon The Nek and Chessboard. Thus the Pine itself—trenches and entanglement—was in reality being bombarded by at most eight guns, while for the whole of the slow bombardment preparatory to this attack there were allotted only twenty-eight.

At 2 p.m. on August 6th, as the last engineers⁵ were withdrawn from the Pimple tunnels, three mines were exploded in No-Man's Land between the Pine and the Pimple, in order that the earth thrown up might increase the slender cover available. At 2.30 the battalions of the 1st Brigade began to file towards the Pimple. An hour later several warships were seen taking position off the coast, far to the south at Helles, while others were approaching Anzac. About 4 p.m. the offensive began at Helles;⁶ the plumes of earth thrown up by the big shells could be seen leaping out against the distant sky-line. Near Anzac a few minutes later the cruiser *Bacchante*,⁷ from her old station off Gaba Tepe, opened in answer to Turkish batteries which were firing at her. At 4.30 the intensive bombardment at Anzac began; the guns

⁵ Having duly finished breaking open the underground line.

⁶ A feint was also made by several hundred Greek irregulars who landed at Karachali on the coast of the Gulf of Saros.

⁷ The squadron supporting at Anzac was the 2nd, under Capt the Hon. A. D. E. H. Boyle of the *Bacchante*, the other ships being: on the right—one large and three small monitors; on the left—the *Endymion* (Capt A. V. Vyvyan), a small monitor, and two destroyers.

which had been engaged in the slow shooting commenced to fire at a regular, though not rapid, rate.⁸ Those land batteries which had not previously taken part in the bombardment now opened upon the Turkish batteries and other usual targets. Two field-pieces of the 5th Battery were run up on to the open crest behind the old trench-line, 200 yards from the Turkish position. One of these, under Lieutenant Gatliff,⁹ succeeded in firing sixty rounds directly at the parapets of the Pine; the other, endeavouring to fire similarly at the Jolly, was hit by a Turkish projectile. The ships' artillery was shelling more distant targets, chiefly on Gun Ridge and the main summits of Sari Bair.

At the time when this bombardment began, the three battalions destined for the assault were still moving by their respective routes into the Pimple. Immediately behind that salient was the wide shallow depression—really the head of Victoria Gully—known as “Brown’s Dip,” which ever since the days of the Landing had formed the approach and centre of communication for this part of the line. On its broad paths and ledges, long since worn white by traffic, the supplies required for the fight had been stored. Here Brigadier-General Smyth of the 1st Brigade had installed his headquarters, the old brigade-headquarters at the head of White’s Valley, a few hundred yards to the north, being now occupied by General Walker and part of the staff of the division.¹⁰ In the centre of the Dip, in a series of long wide pits, were the companies of the 1st Battalion, the reserve unit, which had been moved thither before the other battalions began their march to the starting-point. Past it through the Dip were now filing in three separate routes its three sister battalions—the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th—which were to make the attack.¹¹ The bright sun of a warm summer afternoon shone upon their backs, white calico squares, and broad white armlets. Behind them, far down on the twinkling sea, lay the warships, firing occasional salvoes. The three columns steadily disappearing into the dusty rabbit-warren of trenches reminded onlookers of the regulated traffic of a metropolis. At one moment,

⁸ The howitzer shells could be heard at intervals climbing high overhead, squeaking like a badly-oiled axle, and presently crunching into the enemy’s area, and occasionally into his trenches.

⁹ Brig. V. H. Gatliff, D.S.O., V.D.; 13th A.F.A. Bde. Stationer, of Northcote, Vic.; b. Heathcote, Vic., 11 Jan., 1889.

¹⁰ Vol. XII, plate 62.

¹¹ Vol. XII, plate 104.


fearing that the 2nd Battalion, by blocking certain trenches, might cause the deployment to be late, Major King came, flushed with haste, to a point of congestion. To save time, part of the 3rd was eventually moved through the old firing line instead of by its allotted route. When the bombardment was half-through, the three assaulting battalions were in position both in the tunnelled firing line and in the main line behind it, ready to launch the formidable demonstration upon which so much depended.

Until the last only one doubt obsessed the regimental officers—whether the men, sick with diarrhoea and strained with lack of sleep and heavy work, could sustain prolonged fighting or marching. But, as the battalions marched to the starting-point and settled themselves to wait for the signal, their officers—as often afterwards in France—watched with intense interest the evidence of qualities which, till the end of the war, never ceased to surprise even those who knew the Australian soldier best. Whatever their previous feelings, the actual filling and dumping of their packs, the march through the trenches, and the imminence of the advance after months of trench life, provided an excitement which put new vitality into the troops.¹² As they waited in the crowded bays, there was not the least sign of nervousness in face, speech, or action. The prevailing thought was: "It's the turn of the 1st Brigade to show what it can do."¹³ The men chaffed each other drily, after the manner of spectators waiting to see a football match. Some belated messenger hurried along the trench to find his platoon, and, in passing, recognised a friend. "*Au revoir, Bill,*" he nodded, "meet you over there." - "So long, Tom," was the answer; "see you again in half-an-hour." In the opening of the main tunnel—B5, leading forward from the old firing line to the new underground line—stood Major King, whistle in one hand, watch in the other. At the corresponding

¹² In order to enable the men to eat their meals with relish, a small "issue" of rum had been made daily for a few days before the fight. On Aug. 6 two "issues" were due, and the question arose when they should be given. In the 3rd Battalion the matter was discussed at a conference of officers held on a ledge behind the trenches on the evening of Aug. 5. The colonel's view was: "I believe the 'issue' will be a good tonic to the men in their present condition, but I do not like the idea of giving it to them just before they go into action. We will have one 'issue' in the morning, and the other after the fight is over." This view was supported by the medical officer, Capt J. W. B. Bean, and was adopted for the 3rd Battalion.

¹³ The 3rd Brigade had made itself especially famous at the Landing, and the 2nd Brigade at Helles.

opening in the underground line was Major McConaghy of the 3rd, ready to repeat the signal for the attack—three blasts of the whistle. Watches had been twice compared and corrected, and while the officers gave a few last hints to their men they kept an eye on the minute-hand as though they were starting a boat-race. "Five twenty-seven—get ready to go over the parapet," said a young officer¹⁴ crouched in the corner of one fire-step, glancing at his wrist-watch. Almost immediately the order came: "Pull down the top bags in that recess." The men on the step dragged down the uppermost row of sandbags, thus rendering the exit easier. "Prepare to jump out," said the officer, putting his whistle between his teeth. The men of the second line¹⁵ on the fire-step crouched higher against the wall. Those of the third, on the floor of the trench, took a firmer foothold for their spring. A whistle sounded and was repeated shrilly along the front. In a scatter of falling bags and earth the young officer and his men scrambled from the bay. Rifle-shots rang out from the enemy's trenches, gradually growing into a heavy fusillade. One of the men leaving that particular bay fell back, shot through the mouth. From every section of the Pimple, and from the holes of the forward line, troops were similarly scrambling; the sunny square of the Daisy Patch and the scrub south of it were full of figures running forward. At the same time a tremendous rifle-fire from the Anzac line immediately north of the Pimple began to raise the dust in spurts from the parapets of the Jolly.¹⁶ This was the fire of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, endeavouring to suppress the Turks in the Jolly while the 1st was making its attack. The 3rd Infantry and 2nd Light Horse Brigades south of the Pine were meanwhile attempting by the same means to silence the enemy in that quarter also.



¹⁴ Capt. D. T. Moore, 3rd Bn., who in later years commanded the battalion.

¹⁵ The first line was forward in the underground trenches.

¹⁶ Vol. XII, plate 105.

It appeared to onlookers that as soon as the attacking troops began to reach the enemy's trenches there occurred an unforeseen check. Instead of disappearing into the trench, they could be seen standing by its nearer edge, until there was strung along it a crowd not unlike that lining the rope round a cricket field. Fresh men were still running across, often tripping in the scrub or the barbed-wire in front of the Pimple, a few lying still, the majority picking themselves up to run on again. As each joined the crowd at the enemy's trench, he would move to left or right in search of a place. On the right a number lay down along the enemy's parapet. Here and there stood one firing at some target beyond as coolly as if he were shooting in the paddocks at home. The crowd,



The Lone Pine attack. (Sketch, from diary of Official War Correspondent, drawn from memory in February, 1916.)

which remained for fifteen minutes kneeling or lying along the enemy's parapet, made it difficult to observe what was happening on the farther side; but bayonets could occasionally be seen moving deep into the Turkish position. In the meantime it was evident that the Turks in the Jolly had begun to recover; for, although that grim warren of trenches was absolutely devoid of visible signs of life or movement except for the dust of Australian bullets spurting in clouds along its bare parapets, from some point in it two machine-guns were now sweeping No-Man's Land. Several Turkish batteries also had opened, and the shrapnel burst constantly—first over the front line at the Pimple, and presently over No-Man's Land—the view being sometimes entirely obscured by the clouds of yellow smoke and dust floating by under the rays of the setting sun. The position of any man outside the trenches was evidently becoming precarious, and the remnant of the crowd by the parapet began to jump into the Pine. Only on the right

did a line of men still lie in the open. Not until an hour later did onlookers realise that they were dead.

What had happened was this. The men's previous knowledge of the trenches to be attacked can be gathered from the sketch, reproduced opposite, which was drawn by Sergeant-Major Goldenstedt¹⁷ from the 3rd Battalion's lines opposite the Jolly. Upon crossing No-Man's Land they had found the enemy's barbed-wire entanglements thoroughly beaten down, but, instead of a trench, they were confronted by a continuous sandy mound forming the roof of a covered gallery. All knew that some head-cover would be met with, but none were prepared for this; and the attack at once split into two separate fights—one portion of the troops staying at the front line and gradually entering it, another part racing farther ahead to where the saps were open and establishing themselves there.

Those who stayed at the front trench found that the head-cover rested upon massive timbers, and below the eaves of these were numerous loop-holes, from some of which the puffs of rifle-blasts were spasmodically spurting. On the right was one particularly high mound of head-cover, which had been assumed to be a field-gun emplacement. Captain Pain¹⁸ and some of his men of the 2nd made straight towards it, when, half-way across, they perceived that it was a machine-gun emplacement with a clumsily-built log roof. They could see the tongue of flame from the gun and the crew fumbling about the weapon, which in the excitement was firing unduly depressed, the bullets tearing up the dust close in front and passing harmlessly. Elsewhere also many Australians, perceiving the puffs of rifles firing through loop-holes, picked their way so as to avoid them; others, not heeding the holes, were killed as they passed.

The line of heaped-up roof, resting on timbers of six by four inches and even of nine by four,¹⁹ was far too heavy to remove, and the bombardment had left it practically unbroken. There were a few holes, some made by shells, some sally-ports through which Turkish patrols had been wont to creep out


¹⁷ Lieut.-Col. P. Goldenstedt, 15th L.H. Regt. Journalist; of Darlinghurst and Bathurst, N.S.W. b. Glebe, N.S.W., 31 Dec., 1887.

¹⁸ Col. J. H. F. Pain, D.S.O., M.C., p.s.c. Bde-Maj., 9th Inf. Bde, 1917/18. Duntroon graduate; of Sydney; b. Homebush, N.S.W., 15 Aug., 1893.

¹⁹ See plate at p. 515.

at night; here and there a few feet of trench had been left open between long covered shelters.²⁰ Some of the Australians stood over these, shooting into the dark passages beyond, from which shots were returned. It was presently found that, in order to avoid the bombardment, nearly half of the enemy's garrison had been moved into the Turkish mine-tunnels which ran from this front trench in the direction of the Australian line. On the alarm, a few men had issued from this shelter, but the attack had come upon them too swiftly to allow of their manning the line, and the majority remained penned in the tunnels, fearing to move. Among the attacking Australians there were not wanting men of reckless gallantry who leapt almost immediately into the open spaces, or even let themselves down, feet foremost, through the holes in the head-cover. A number were killed both on the edge of the trench and inside it, but parts of the front line were thus occupied and the enemy in the tunnels completely cut off. Lieutenant McLeod of the 3rd then ordered into the front line such men as were still lining its parapet. Part of the central sector of the trench, which was but half-covered, became thus unduly crowded; but to move forward through the maze of communication trenches was at that stage most dangerous and difficult. The men were therefore led out again over the top by Lieutenant Woods²¹ and others towards those farther positions to which, as has been explained, other parties of the attacking force had from the first directed themselves. To these parties the narrative must now turn.

It was only the advanced portion of the Turkish positions that had been generally roofed over. As has been already explained, the central loop of the front trench and the maze of communications




²⁰ Such an opening (near Capt. Pain's position) is shown in *Vol XII, plate 107*.

²¹ Lieut.-Col. P. W. Woods, D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 55th Bn, 1917/18. Business manager; of Croydon, N.S.W.; b. Sydney, 8 Nov., 1885. Died 5 Jan., 1937.

running back over the plateau were almost devoid of head-cover. From the very first a number of officers and men, perceiving this, made no pause at the front line, but ran on beside the open saps in search of a suitable point of entrance. In some of the battalions the order had been given, in accordance with a theory then accepted in France, that the first line of troops should ignore the enemy's front trench, leaving it to be dealt with by those who followed after, and should pass on to the farthest objective. Consequently some of the leading officers, followed by a number of the men, raced straight on over the enemy's head-cover in the direction in which they judged their final objective to be. Others, though no such instruction had been given in their case, barely paused at the covered line, but hurried on beside the maze of open communications. As they ran they caught sight of Turks bolting back through these avenues in twos and threes, and stood shooting down at them. It was far easier to fire at the enemy from above than from the trench itself, and some of the Australians continued to do so, until they became aware that few of their own side were now moving outside the trenches, and that the slopes were ominously bare; for numbers of daring men, including many officers, had leapt into the trenches as soon as they reached an empty space, and had begun to feel their way through them. Many were killed within a few minutes of entering, since it was easy for a single Turk, at bay beyond a bend and warned by a bayonet coming round it, to shoot one man after another. In several places Australians lay dead four or five deep, having been shot in this manner, sometimes with a heap of Turks similarly killed a few yards distant from them. The Australians quickly learned to hold their rifles vertically so as to give no warning of their approach, while the slower-minded Turk pointed his bayonet along the trench. Bombs would have subdued most of this opposition; but, though arrangements had been made to provide bombing squads, these were immediately disorganised, the supply of bombs was intermittent, and few men knew how to throw them. Moreover, it was often impossible to be certain whether those round the next corner in this labyrinth were friends or enemies. Thus a few men

with Major Morshead were held up at a corner by some unseen party beyond it. One of them, believing that the opposing party was Australian, went forward to see. A moment later he returned. "They are Turks all right," he said quietly, "and they got me in the stomach." After talking quietly for a few minutes he sat down and shortly after died in great pain. Similarly, when three men, who leapt in beside Captain Pain of the 2nd, pushed eagerly round a support trench on the right, three shots rang out, and they all fell dead. In the exact centre of the position Captain Lloyd²² of the 4th, whose men made farther to the left, rushed ahead by himself, and reached a point where a howitzer-shell had broken down the side of the open trench, rendering access to it easy. He looked down on a number of Turks, who scattered round the bend on either side as he jumped in. As they attempted to return, he watched first one side and then the other and shot several. Presently, realising that he had fired the last cartridge in his magazine, he dropped and feigned death. Turks brushed against him, passed over him, handled his rifle, but did not tread upon him. It was twenty minutes before he was turned over by a man of the 3rd Battalion and knew that the trench was in Australian hands.


Working thus through the trenches, or running over the top, certain leading officers and men had begun, within a few minutes of the start, to reach the neighbourhood of their objectives. Those in the centre quite unexpectedly found themselves approaching a steep gully, which bit deeply into the Lone Pine plateau across almost the whole front of the attack. This was the depression—a deep inlet branching at right angles off Owen's Gully—which, in the narrative of the Landing, has been named "The Cup," and the existence of which was barely suggested



²² Maj. E. A. Lloyd; 4th Bn. Clerk; of Parramatta, N.S.W.; b. Parramatta, 9 Feb., 1891.

in any maps possessed by the attacking force. It completely limited the advance to the east, part of the chosen objective lying, as a matter of fact, in an unattainable position down its slope.²³ But above its edge, round the area bordered by Owen's Gully on the north, The Cup on the east, and the slope to Snipers' Ridge on the south—that is to say, round nearly the whole of the Lone Pine works—the Australians had before dark hurriedly established a line of defensive posts which must now be described in some detail.

On the extreme left of the attack, where the Turkish front line, covered with heavy timber, rounded the head of Owen's Gully,²⁴ part of the 4th Battalion under Lieutenant Giles,²⁵ having crossed the front trench, jumped into the support trench eight or ten yards beyond, at a point where shells had partly wrecked it.



It being part of the duty of the 4th to barricade the northern end of these trenches, Giles made to the left, but at a bend of the trench every man who attempted to advance was instantly shot. After three or four, including Giles, had been killed, two trained bomb-throwers arrived, and endeavoured to suppress the opposition by flinging grenades round the corner. At this juncture Captain Milson, one of the most gallant and admired leaders in the battalion, came up. Believing that the unseen enemy at this point might be overborne, he called on the men to follow him and led the way round the corner. He was immediately shot dead, falling across the body of Giles, but his men continued to roll bombs round the bend, and presently the enemy surrendered. It was then discovered that beyond the turn there was a covered trench or tunnel leading towards the



²³ The tracks up the bed of this and Owen's Gullies, and some of the ledges on the side of The Cup, had been shown in the trench map as trenches.

²⁴ Point "A" in marginal sketch and plate at page 522.

²⁵ Lieut. A. M. Giles; 4th Bn. Analytical chemist; of Sydney; b. Waverley, N.S.W., 31 Oct., 1892. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

front line. In this had been penned a Turkish officer and thirty men, who had been shooting everyone who passed its mouth.²⁶

As the Turks in the tunnel surrendered, there came along the trench Lieutenant Seldon of the 4th. One of his eyes had been shot away, the wreck of it hanging shattered on his cheek-bone. He would not hear of having his hurt tended, but, seeing the urgency of blocking the northern end of the trench, he ordered Lance-Corporal Aylward²⁷ and others, including a bomb-thrower, Private Hayward,²⁸ to move round the front line while he led a party along the support trench. Going first himself, he reached a point where the support and front line, becoming again connected, descended sharply to the bed of Owen's Gully. Here a Turk from the Jolly shot him dead; but Corporals Aylward and Stone,²⁹ by means of bombing, kept the enemy at a distance below while their united parties constructed a barricade near the point where Seldon had been killed. Behind this block Aylward, with several bomb-throwers, took up his position. The extreme left flank was thus secured in exact accordance with the plan. The support line south of this post was turned into a fire-trench, facing down Owen's Gully.



Fifty yards south of Aylward's block a communication sap ran eastward along the side of Owen's Gully, with a second


²⁶ Immediately beyond this point in the support trench lay fifteen of the enemy, apparently killed by the preparatory bombardment.

²⁷ L/Cpl. J. W. Aylward (No. 507, 4th Bn.). Locomotive cleaner; of Hurstville, N.S.W.; b. Lambeth, London, 7th Sept., 1892.

²⁸ Pte. G. R. Hayward (No. 489, 4th Bn.). Storeman; of Redfern, N.S.W.; b. Manchester, Eng., 1891.

²⁹ Sgt. E. H. Stone (No. 989, 4th Bn.). Seaman; of Northfleet, Kent, Eng; b. London, 1882. Killed in action, 11 Sept., 1918.

trench winding parallel to it, but higher, along the edge of the slope. The moment the attack started, Major Iven Mackay of the 4th at the head of a number of men dashed across No-Man's Land, and, without halting at the front Turkish trench, raced over the surface beside the upper of these two saps—a comparatively narrow avenue—toward what they knew to be their objective. As they ran, firing from the hip, they killed several Turks who were fleeing along the trenches below, but one of the enemy turned and shot Sergeant Griffiths,³⁰ another mortally wounded Lieutenant Merivale.³¹ Perceiving another communication trench with broad buttress-like traverses, a wide open sap which came obliquely from the right and crossed the first at right angles, Mackay veered towards it and, jumping in, pushed on till he approached the point where the two crossed. Here he stood, shooting a number of Turks as they dashed down the narrow trench and past the cross-ways. Presently, when no more came, he judged that the trenches



farther back were now in Australian hands, and, running on to the junction, leapt across it. But a young corporal—a Duntroon boy named Mills³²—who attempted to follow, was killed as he crossed the junction by some Turk shooting from farther along the narrower trench. The next man following Mills, and attempting to cross as he had done, was shot dead by the same Turk. A third suffered the same fate. The remainder of the party paused on their side of the junction.

Mackay was thus alone beyond the junction in a section of the broad communication sap, which for clearness will be


³⁰ Sgt. H. Griffiths (No. 405, 4th Bn.). Grazier; of Sydney; b. Sydney, 18 Nov., 1885. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

³¹ Lieut. J. L. Merivale; 4th Bn. Of Sydney; b. Sydney, 1887. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

³² Cpl. H. S. Mills (No. 1995, 4th Bn.). Of Sydney; b. Petersham, N.S.W., 14 Nov., 1895. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915. He had left the Military College before completing his course and had enlisted in the ranks.

called the "Traversed Trench." It here formed a spacious well-constructed bay, as wide as a small room and about ten yards long, running down the slope of Owen's Gully. The sides had been neatly revetted, evidently by engineers, and on that nearest to the Australian line was a fire-step. On this Mackay took up his position. He had scarcely done so when into the lower end of the bay came three of the enemy. Mackay attempted to fire his rifle, but the trigger merely clicked, the magazine being empty. Lunging with his bayonet, he grazed the leader of the Turks, who all three turned and ran.


Mackay now instructed the survivors of his party, who were behind him on the other side of the cross-ways, to fill the empty sandbags, of which each carried two in his belt, and throw them across the mouth of the narrower sap, up which the Turk who had shot Mills was still firing. He himself kept guard in front of the men as they built. As he did so another Turk appeared round the same corner as before. Mackay, warned by the man's bayonet coming round the corner, easily shot him. The barricade was soon raised sufficiently high to enable one of the men to lie behind it, push his rifle between the bags, and fire at intervals down the narrower sap. It then became possible for the rest of the party to cross the opening and join Mackay. Still keeping guard, he set them to block the Traversed Trench also at the lower end of his bay. Before dark both trenches had been barred. The barricades were built higher, so that two rifles could be fired through each. Fire-steps were cut on the side of the bay nearest to the enemy, and both its sides and its dead-end were then manned. The post thus established overlooking Owen's Gully was strongly held; facing west, north, and east, it formed the north-eastern angle of the new Australian position in Lone Pine. Of the parallel sap lower down the gully only a third



was occupied by the Australians, the barricade in it being held by a party under Lieutenant McDonald,³³ the quartermaster of the 4th.

While the northern flank of the 1st Brigade's foothold was thus secured by Mackay's Post at the northern end of the Traversed Trench, the southern end of that trench had also been entered by Australians near the centre of the old Turkish front. Captain Lloyd, who had been forced to feign death until rescued by men of the 3rd Battalion,³⁴ had pushed eastward along a communication trench which may be called "Lloyd's Trench."

At twenty yards from the old Turkish front line there branched from it diagonally to the left (or north-east) the Traversed Trench. Passing this by, Lloyd found that his trench soon veered north-eastward also, leading in front of and almost parallel to the Traversed Trench, straight down the slope towards the Jolly. As the Turks on the Jolly could



here see him from head to feet, Lloyd withdrew round the corner and blocked his trench at a point slightly in advance of its junction with the Traversed Trench. The latter was occupied by a garrison under Lieutenant Osborne³⁵ of the 4th, and, extending from Mackay to Lloyd, formed a sort of front line covering the northern half of the captured position.


South of this there ran across the new Australian position another diagonal sap—really a south-westerly continuation of that from which Lloyd had had to withdraw. This long north-easterly avenue, afterwards known as "Sasse's Sap,"

³³ Capt. W. T. McDonald; 4th Bn. Electrical employee; of Sydney; b Stawell, Vic., 16 June, 1880. Killed in action, 16 Aug., 1916. (McDonald, who bayoneted a Turk and was himself wounded by a bayonet, held this trench while his men blocked it. It is said that he went forward to an angle of the sap, and, pressing close into the corner, fired at the enemy. He then asked his men to throw him bombs with the fuses already lighted, which he caught and flung farther, first blowing on the fuse. During this time the barricade was being built in rear of him. When it was several feet high, he came back over it.)

³⁴ See p 508.

³⁵ Capt. J. B. Osborne, 4th Bn. Farmer and grazier; of Sydney, b 14 March, 1892. Killed in action, 15 Oct., 1918.

formed eventually the centre line of the Australian position in the Pine. In the first rush a number of the 3rd Battalion, led over the Turkish front by Captain Moore and Lieutenant Garnham,³⁶ found themselves looking down into it while a number of the enemy scurried past to the rear. After many of these had been shot,³⁷ Moore ordered his men into the trench. In leaping in himself, he fell on the bayonet of a dying Turk, and was wounded. Captain Dawson,³⁸ an officer newly arrived from Egypt, who came up a few minutes later, was shot dead. About that time, however, there arrived Lieutenant D. R. Brown³⁹ with one of the machine-gun crews of the 4th Battalion. Although the other battalions had left their respective machine-gun sections to follow as a last reserve, the commander of the 4th had allotted a special duty to each of his guns and had ordered them to go forward with the first assault. At this stage of the war the machine-guns of the infantry were being increased from two to four for each battalion. Four guns therefore accompanied the third line of the 4th Battalion. Of these three were lost in No-Man's Land, but Brown, crossing the enemy's front line with the fourth, set up his weapon on the surface immediately behind Sasse's Sap. This trench, as has been explained, led directly towards the Jolly, and the machine-gun crew, looking in that direction for its pre-arranged target, found it at once in plain view—a communication trench packed with Turks and only 160 yards distant. Brown ordered a few of the 3rd to climb out of the trench and lie in the open as a guard for




³⁶ Lieut. S. M. Garnham; 3rd Bn. School teacher; of Morpeth, N.S.W.; b Morpeth, 1884. Killed in action, 8 Aug., 1915.

³⁷ The Australians would bend over the sap when they heard a Turk fire at him, and then stand back again till they heard another. Both Moore and Garnham were wounded during this procedure.

³⁸ Capt. E. Dawson; 3rd Bn. Civil servant; b. Ilford, N.S.W., 17 July, 1880. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

³⁹ Maj D. R. Brown, M.C.; 4th Bn. Duntroon graduate; of Katoomba, N.S.W.; b North Sydney, 17 Aug., 1894.



THE TURKISH TRENCHES AT LONE PINE (PHOTOGRAPHED AFTER
THE ATTACK)

*Taken by Pte H T Lowe, 1st Aust Rly Supply Detachment
Aust War Memorial Collection No 41039*



MAJOR-GENERAL H B. WALKER (WITH STICK), WHO COMMANDED THE
1ST AUSTRALIAN DIVISION, WITH GENERAL BIRDWOOD (SITTING) AND
MAJOR C M WAGSTAFF (ON RIGHT)

*Taken by Col C S Ryan, Anzac Corps H Q
Aust War Memorial Collection No 65395*

To face p 514



THE FRONT TURKISH TRENCH AT LONE PINE AFTER CAPTURE
The officer holding his knee is Major D. McF. McConaghy, then
commanding the 3rd Battalion.


Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. 61126

To face p. 515

the gun. The machine-gunner, Private Edwards,⁴⁰ then poured his fire into the thick of the crowded enemy.

The sound of one of their own machine-guns opening so early from the new front line greatly encouraged those of the 1st Brigade who were near it, while it produced a strong effect upon the enemy. It became at once the centre of a storm of Turkish fire, and a machine-gun from the Jolly killed the men of the 3rd who were guarding the Australian gun. Sergeant McMahon⁴¹ and all the crew were hit. In spite of this opposition the machine-gun had expended 700 rounds before an enemy field-piece on the Ridge burst its shrapnel over the spot, tearing the ammunition belts and rendering further action impossible. Brown took down the gun and began to repair it. Private Railton Macdonald,⁴² who then took charge of the post, was shortly afterwards wounded—for the third time in twenty minutes—by Turks who were now established in some cross-trench a few yards distant. Major Austin, who came round the position, was presently killed. Nevertheless Sasse's Sap was gradually fire-stepped, barricaded, and firmly occupied.

Forty yards farther along the south-easterly trench from which Sasse's sprang there opened a shorter avenue, parallel with Sasse's—not so much a trench as a track running on to the surface of the Pine. It was at first overlooked in the consolidation, and Major McConaghy and Sergeant-Major Goldenstedt, going round the position before dark, unwittingly walked out through it on to the open plateau, where they found themselves standing not far from a broken tree-stump, which both instantly recognised as that of the famous



⁴⁰ Sgt N Edwards (No. 241, 1st M.G. Coy.). Clerk; of Redfern, N.S.W.; b West Maitland, N.S.W., 28 Nov., 1896.

⁴¹ Lieut R G F. McMahon, M.C.; 4th Bn. Agricultural contractor; of North Sydney; b Newtown, N.S.W., 24 May, 1886. Died of illness, 23 Feb., 1919.

⁴² Sgt. R. Y. V. Macdonald (No. 560, 3rd Bn.). Farmer; of Quandary, Temora, N.S.W.; b. Hamilton, Vic., 30 Nov., 1893.

pine. Shots from the Jolly and a shell from Gun Ridge whizzed past them as they turned and dived back into the trenches. This trench, or track, and a parallel trench between it and Sasse's Sap were presently barred by Lieutenant Woods and by some of the men whom he and others had led forward to relieve the congestion in the old Turkish front line.⁴⁵ Woods barricaded the trench next to Sasse's, and by transferring its parapet to the eastern side formed an isolated post like that in Sasse's, fronting towards The Cup.

The communication sap from which these two trenches and the track opened ran south-eastwards until it approached the head of The Cup. Here, just beyond the track, a short branch-sap led to that depression; and immediately afterwards the sap itself, turning sharply to the left, formed a second connection with The Cup. At this bend, which will be called in this narrative "Tubb's Corner,"⁴⁶ Lieutenant S. A. Pinkstone,⁴⁵ Corporal Haua,⁴⁶ and some men of the 3rd endeavoured to establish a post. The sap had been either broken down by shell-fire or blocked by the enemy; and in the corner so formed Pinkstone and Haua made recesses as best they could with entrenching tools. The importance of Tubb's Corner was so obvious that fragments of all battalions were hurried along to it. Pinkstone and Haua were soon wounded, the latter mortally, but the post was maintained. The avenue north of it was also occupied. This short sap, in which several Turks, including a white-bearded officer, had been killed, was probably an outlet for mine-spoil, since it ended in a "chute" of earth. It was occupied by Sergeant-Major Goldenstedt, with Corporal McGrath⁴⁷ and about twenty-five men. This post and that at Tubb's Corner formed the right flank of the 3rd Battalion.

On the south the 2nd Battalion had attacked with its right on the southern edge of the plateau overlooking the gullies and spurs leading towards Gaba Tepe. Here the Turkish front trench was more completely covered than elsewhere, with the result that the check at the front line lasted longer.

⁴⁵ See p 506


⁴⁶ This position was generally identified with Lieut. Tubb, who was there subsequently, although it was not the post in which he eventually won distinction.

⁴⁷ Capt. S. A. Pinkstone, M.C.; 55th Bn. Printer; of Wagga Wagga, N.S.W.; b. Cootamundra, N.S.W., 28 Jan., 1892.

⁴⁸ Cpl. A. C. Haua (No. 1336, 3rd Bn.). Bookkeeper; b. Tauranga, Auckland, N.Z., 30 June, 1894. Died of wounds, 11 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁹ Sgt. M. M. McGrath (No. 1364, Anzac Provost Corps). Clerk, P.M.G.'s Dept.; of Shoalhaven district, N.S.W.; b. Nowra, N.S.W., 23 Aug., 1892.

Nevertheless some of the battalion, at once crossing the head-cover, found to their right, along the edge of the plateau, a wide and deep communication trench. Parallel with it, and at one point only five yards north, was a shallow sap, either unfinished or abandoned. The front line, from which both of these sprang, continued southwards down the abrupt slope to Snipers' Ridge, while the deep sap, with its shallow companion, trended north-eastwards and then branched, to end through several avenues at the head of The Cup.



The deep sap, though inaccurately shown on the map, was recognised by almost all parties of the 2nd as their objective—the right flank of the intended Australian position in the Pine. Among the first eager leaders to reach it was a reinforcement officer who had arrived only the night before from Egypt but had begged leave to join the attack—Lieutenant Everard Digges La Touche,⁴⁸ a missionary of the Church of England in Sydney. At its first bend he and two of his men fell mortally wounded, and a few Turks remained at bay in this corner for half-an-hour after Australians had passed it, until they were driven out by some of the 1st Battalion. Meanwhile Major Morshead, Lieutenant Youden,⁴⁹ and others pushed down its south-easterly branches, shooting at some of the enemy, who fled to their brushwood-covered bivouacs in The Cup or into the old gun-pits into which the Australians had penetrated at the Landing. Near the head of The Cup Youden found his party held up by enemy farther along the trench. This position, which was nearest to the gully-head, was forthwith

⁴⁸ Lieut. E. Digges La Touche; and Bn. Clergyman; of Sydney; b. Newcastle, Co. Down, Ireland, 14 March, 1883. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915. (Prior to coming to Sydney in 1912, he had occupied the post of Donnellan lecturer in the University of Dublin. When war broke out, being unable to obtain an appointment as chaplain, he enlisted as a private in the Australian infantry. "If I obtain any promotion," he said, "I want it to be that which I win by my own efforts." He was at first rejected in consequence of varicose veins, but underwent an operation and succeeded in reaching Anzac on the eve of this battle.)

⁴⁹ Lieut.-Col. H. A. Youden, D.S.O. Commanded 2nd Bn., 1918/19. Farmer; of Condobolin, N.S.W.; b. Uddingston, Lanark, Scotland, 9 Dec., 1884.

barricaded with sandbags, the neighbouring branches of the trench being similarly stopped by men of the 2nd under Captain Cook and Lieutenant Harkness.⁵⁰ The less advanced outlets from the sap were similarly stopped, and a definite right flank was thus early established by the 2nd in the Pine. Its most advanced posts, under Cook, Youden, and Harkness, were not directly connected with the 3rd Battalion farther north. But Tubb's Corner was only twenty yards away, at the end of the unfinished or abandoned trench before mentioned,⁵¹ and all three battalions at an early stage found touch with each other through the rear trenches.

Thus by 6 o'clock the three attacking battalions of the 1st Brigade had established themselves in the Pine, holding a long communication trench on either flank, and in the centre seven or eight isolated posts in as many communication trenches. These posts, surrounding the captured position as the finger-knuckles surround an outspread hand, constituted a formidable defence. In the meantime the enemy's organisation, which for a few minutes had almost disappeared, began again to make itself felt. Parties of Turks were now firing from behind the farther traverses or bends—taking their stand, to use the previous simile, at the finger-nails of the position—while an increasing fusillade was poured in from the Jolly. Signs of a coming counter-attack were already evident. Those Australians who could see down Owen's Gully or Legge Valley had early caught sight of Turkish reinforcements coming in continuous single file along the gully-beds, while on the side of the Jolly appeared an excited senior officer, who, with several others, surveyed the Pine through field-glasses and despatched messengers one after another down the gully.

Reinforcements were therefore called for by Major McConaghy, then in charge of the 3rd Battalion in the Pine. An attempt was first made to signal this request by "Morse-periscope," an apparatus with which the attacking battalions had been provided, and which was not unlike a miniature window-blind at the end of a stick. The word "reinforcements" was deciphered, but the dust and smoke of the enemy's shells smothered the rest. A quarter of an hour later the

⁵⁰ Lieut E. G. J. Harkness; 2nd Bn. Builder and contractor, of Sydney; b Sydney, 7 Sept., 1887. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915

⁵¹ See p. 516.

signaller himself dashed over No-Man's Land with the message. In the meantime two others had run across the open with a telephone line, over which further messages began immediately to be received. Colonel Macnaghten of the 4th, who was himself in the Pine, reported that his men had penetrated 200 to 300 yards from the front trench,⁵² but that his left was weak, the Turks were massing to attack it, and reinforcements were required. This was followed by a further message from McConaghy: "Left safe. Centre wants a few men." At 6.19 it was reported that numbers of the enemy with fixed bayonets could be seen in the communication trench which crossed Owen's Gully from the Jolly. From the Pimple itself the bayonets were visible, and General Smyth of the 1st Brigade, standing by the entrance of B5 tunnel in the old salient, and quietly sifting these and other messages, now sent forward part of his reserve battalion—the 1st. The tunnels which were to be used as communication trenches were as yet hardly passable; at various times excited soldiers—whom no one heeded—would rush up to Smyth ejaculating: "Men smothering in that tunnel!" This was an exaggeration, since presently a slow stream of wounded began to debouch from B5, crawling, limping, but for the most part confident and well satisfied.⁵³ But to move forward the reserves through the tunnel was impracticable, and therefore Captain Jacobs with part of the leading company of the 1st went over the open into the right of the Pine. Here Colonel Scobie of the 2nd at once placed most of this reinforcement in the right-flank sap. Overhearing him express disappointment that no bombs or machine-guns had been brought, a private named Judd⁵⁴ asked for written authority to get the gun, and then ran back alone over No-Man's Land, returning presently over the top with that weapon. Meanwhile Captain Sasse,⁵⁵ with another portion of the 1st, had gone forward to help the 3rd to connect its front with the 2nd. The two remaining companies of the

⁵² This was a natural misconception. The extreme penetration, except in the case of a few men who actually reached The Cup and were killed there, did not really exceed 100 yards.

⁵³ One of them, at least, cheerfully continued his journey through the Pimple on hands and knees.

⁵⁴ Lieut. C. C. Judd, M.M.; 1st Bn. Operating porter; b. Cheltenham, Vic., 1892.

⁵⁵ Lieut.-Col. C. D. Sasse, D.S.O. Commanded 4th Bn., 1918/19. Wool broker b. Kensington, London, 5 Sept., 1886. Died 4 May, 1934.

1st were trickled slowly through B5 sap⁵⁶ to reinforce the already somewhat congested trenches in the northern half of the Pine. By 8.30 the whole reserve battalion, including its newly-arrived reinforcements organised in a special party, had been sent into the Pine. The 12th, the next reserve, had been summoned to stand ready in the Pimple.

Thus before sundown, by dint of heavy fighting, the position had been taken and had been reinforced against the imminent counter-attack which the Lone Pine assault had been designed to evoke. Within two hours of nightfall the N.Z. & A. Division must launch the main offensive north of Anzac. If by then the enemy had committed his chief local reserves to a counter-attack at the Pine, the N.Z. & A. Division, advancing through the night towards Chunuk Bair, might find its crest weakly defended or even vacant. The whole effectiveness of the Lone Pine feint therefore hung on whatever counter-measures Essad Pasha might take.

It has been explained⁵⁷ that the Turkish commanders had several weeks' warning of an impending offensive. Some reports had even purported to indicate the probable point of attack, but none were regarded by Liman von Sanders as trustworthy, and he was thus forced, as before the Landing, to judge this matter for himself. "Hardly any indication," he writes, "could be gathered."⁵⁸ It was, however, a consideration that, while at Helles no open flank existed, at Anzac both the British flanks were open. "On their southern flank at Anzac," he says, "the enemy had on several occasions endeavoured to gain ground. The result had been merely a trifling bending back of the left flank of the Turks. On the northern flank of the English a smaller detachment—little more than a battalion—had been thrust out to the north, somewhat isolated from that flank. This fact appeared to me to be not without significance, but Essad Pasha did not think that any menace was to be inferred from it. Several attempts to dislodge this English detachment—for which purpose there were actually detailed some of the headquarters-troops of the 5th Army—came up against a tough resistance and were unable to fulfil their object.


⁵⁶ The head of B5 tunnel was near the Pine; but the sap was not yet complete, and troops had to run across the few intervening yards of No-Man's Land

⁵⁷ See pp. 485-6

⁵⁸ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 104

"These were the *sole indications* which perhaps might have pointed to an intention to extend the front in that locality. But the evidence was very insignificant. There still existed the possibility that, by an operation directed against the narrow neck at the upper end of the Gulf of Saros, the Peninsula might be completely cut off from communication with Constantinople. A renewed landing on the Asiatic side was, after the previous miscarriage, improbable.

"The main anxiety of the 5th Army lay in the open area between the Anzac and Helles fronts, since by a strong landing in this area the rear of the Turkish army at Helles would also have been threatened. The relief of a portion of the troops previously engaged on the Helles front, and the accession of other reinforcements, had made certain units available. Consequently the 9th Division under Colonel Kannengiesser was moved into the open area referred to on the western slopes of Kayali Tepe (a western prominence of the Kilid Bahr Plateau)."




The apprehension of the enemy had, therefore, before the battle been turned in precisely the direction towards which Birdwood and Skeen had endeavoured to attract it. The demonstrations of June and July had apparently been interpreted as "endeavours to gain ground" to the south of Anzac; the quiet tactics pursued on the northern flank had diverted Essad's fears from that quarter.⁵⁹ The activities of Turkish spies, whether in Egypt or in the islands, had not given them the faintest indication as to the direction in which the blows would fall.

On July 26th, when von Sanders was in the midst of his preparations against the then imminent offensive, he was astonished by receiving a sudden summons to visit the German

⁵⁹ The replies kindly furnished to the Aust. Historical Mission by Kiazim Pasha state that a landing north of Anzac was regarded as possible, "because the activity of the Anzac left wing was noticeable." He may be referring to the mere existence of the N.Z. outposts. It seems certain that Essad Pasha had no such suspicions. In the *Short History* published by the Turkish General Staff it is, however, claimed that Essad expected a landing in the Anafarta sector, and that Liman von Sanders disregarded his opinion.

G.H.Q. on the Western Front. This order, the result of an intrigue initiated in Turkey, he successfully combated; but not till July 30th was he assured that he might remain in Gallipoli and carry out his preparations for the impending offensive. To meet this his forces—which had been accurately estimated by Hamilton's staff—were at the beginning of August disposed in the following manner.⁶⁰

The Helles "group," commanded by Vehib Pasha, a brother of Essad, consisted of the 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th, 11th, 13th, and 14th Turkish Divisions, opposing which were four British and two French divisions.⁶¹ Covering the coast between Helles and Anzac was the 9th Turkish Division, commanded by a German, Colonel Kannengiesser. North of this, under the command of Essad Pasha, the Anzac "group"—opposed to the 1st Australian and N.Z. & A. Divisions—comprised the 19th and 16th Divisions holding the trenches opposite the main Anzac line, and one regiment of the 5th Division—the 14th—stationed in the hills north and east of the New Zealand outposts. The 5th Division had suffered heavily on May 19th at Anzac and in mid-July at Helles, and had returned to rest at Anzac. It was thus that its 14th Regiment had been bivouacked in the quiet hill-sector, while the 13th and 15th



⁶⁰ Lieut.-Col. C. C. R. Murphy, in his book on the Turkish Army (*Soldiers of the Prophet*, pp. 141-2), speaking of the divisions which were in Gallipoli at the end of August, says "The forces then in Gallipoli . . . amounted to about one-half of the Turkish Army, and included the whole of the famous old Constantinople, Adrianople, and Gallipoli Army Corps, as well as those of Smyrna, Angora, and Aleppo. In addition to all these crack divisions there were four battalions of the 'Fire-extinguishing Regiment,' which is probably the best fighting regiment in the Ottoman Army. There was also a large number of German officers and men, and some of the coast batteries were manned by picked German bluejackets from the *Göeben* and *Breslau*. Taken as a whole therefore, the army in Gallipoli may be justly considered to have been the finest that has ever taken the field in the history of the Turkish Empire. There could be no comparison between it and the Yildirim army which was opposed to Lord Allenby in Palestine in 1918." The troops in Gallipoli included a great part of the Second Turkish Army as well as the whole of the Fifth, the staff of the latter, however, administering all the troops. Of the twenty-two divisions enumerated by Col. Murphy, little more than half were in the Peninsula at the beginning of the August offensive.

⁶¹ According to figures supplied by the Turkish Staff the Turkish Helles group comprised 72 battalions with 163 guns and 45 machine-guns. The Allied divisions (29th, Royal Naval, 42nd, 52nd British, and 1st and 2nd French) were, as regards the numbers of their infantry, roughly speaking, of about the same strength.

he Jolly

Owen's
Gully

Gun
Ridge

Legge
Valley

The Cup



MONUMENT RAISED BY THE TURKS AT LONE PINE AFTER THE EVACUATION
OF THE PENINSULA BY THE ALLIES

The monument is on the edge of The Cup, where the Australian
advance was stopped, overlooking Legge Valley.

*Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1752
Taken in 1919*



THE CUP (LEFT) AND OWEN'S GULLY (RIGHT), LOOKING TOWARDS THE
AUSTRALIAN LINE

The Turks clung to the edge of the gully on the left, the Australians
holding the summit just beyond. Site of Turkish battalion head-
quarters where several Australians were killed is marked with a cross

*Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1795
Taken in 1919*

To face p 522




TROOPS WAITING IN LONE PINE NEAR JACOBS'S TRENCH DURING THE FIGHTING ON AUGUST 8TH

Taken by Capt. H. Jacobs, 1st Bn.
Aust. War Memorial Collection No. A1005.

were retained by Essad as his reserve—the 13th in the valley south of Kojadere, about a mile south-east from Scrubby Knoll, and the 15th in Kurt Dere, among the steep gullies three-quarters of a mile inland from Chunuk Bair.⁶² In closer reserve was a resting battalion of the 72nd (Arab) Regiment, of the 19th Division, in bivouac behind Mortar Ridge. The "Northern Group" was at this time probably 21,000 strong.⁶³

Beyond the Northern Group there was stationed, observing the coast at Suvla and Ejelmer Bays, and patrolling the neighbouring district, a small scattered force under Major Willmer, a Bavarian. This included in all only four battalions (mainly of *gendarmes*), a squadron of cavalry, and eleven guns.⁶⁴ Much farther north, distant two days by road, there were maintained near Gallipoli the 7th and 12th Turkish Divisions, assuring the defence of the Bulair Lines. South of the straits were forces amounting perhaps to a division.⁶⁵ As the nearest available railway station to the Peninsula was Uzun Kepru, on the Adrianople line, ninety miles from Anzac, and as the British submarines were making precarious the sea-transport of Turkish troops, the forces thus enumerated were the only ones likely to affect the fate of Hamilton's offensive.



⁶² The 15th Regt. was not employed next day to reinforce at Chunuk Bair. It is probable that it had already been summoned to Lone Pine (where it eventually fought), but this is not definitely known. Another possible explanation is that the "Kurt Dere" shown in the maps is not the same as that in which the regiment was stationed.

⁶³ This is based on the figures supplied by the Turkish Staff, viz., 38 battalions of 500 to 600 men. The A & N.Z. Army Corps was on Aug. 1 20,200 strong with 72 guns; by Aug. 6 the strength of the troops had been (unknown to the Turks) increased to 37,000 men. The artillery reinforcing Anzac had arrived before Aug. 1. Four heavy and sixteen field-guns were landed after Aug. 6, for transfer by land to Suvla.

⁶⁴ These figures are based on those given by the Turkish General Staff to the Australian Historical Mission. According to Liman von Sanders (*Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 105) this force consisted of the Gallipoli and Broussa *gendarmes* battalions, parts of the 33rd Inf. Regt., a cavalry detachment, and four batteries. The strength was about 3,000. The troops of the two British divisions to be landed by Aug. 7 at Suvla would number roughly 20,000. The eleven enemy guns included those at the "W" Hills which infiltrated Anzac.

⁶⁵ According to the intelligence received by the British staff at the time the force south of the straits comprised the 2nd Div. and part of the 8th, totalling about 12,000 men. The *Short History* published by the Turkish General Staff, however, speaks of "three divisions."

It will be evident to the reader that the attack of the 1st Australian Division at Lone Pine would not be successful unless it induced Essad Pasha to throw in against it the 13th and, if possible, the 15th Regiments, both of which were lying in reserve only a few miles from the summits which the N.Z. & A. Division hoped to attain at dawn.⁶⁶

Although Essad Pasha had received no information of the landing of the New Army troops at Anzac, certain movements of the ships had rendered him suspicious. He had warned his force that either a relief or a reinforcement was in progress at Anzac, and, in the hope of obtaining definite evidence, he offered £5 for the capture of a prisoner. In spite of this foreknowledge, and of the warning received from Europe that the offensive would probably commence early in August, the slow bombardment upon August 4th, 5th, and 6th, with which it actually began, was so moderated that it was not recognised by the Turks as the prelude to the outbreak. It chanced that on the 5th the commanders of the Turkish garrisons at Johnston's Jolly and German Officers'—Abd el Rizak Bey and Zeki Bey—were ordered to exhibit from their front trenches placards displaying the news that Warsaw had been captured. These notices ("*Warcheuve est tombe*" (*sic*), "*La chute de Varchord*," and "*Varsaw ash fallin*") had no more important influence upon the Anzac morale than to cause one sentry to remark grimly: "Well, let's see if we can't make his ——— notice fall too," upon which he set himself to shoot down the poles supporting it. But some of the Turks obtained the impression that the bombardment by howitzers which presently fell upon their trenches came in retaliation for the setting up of the placards.

Yet, slow though it was, this shelling caused heavy loss, especially in the crowded trenches of Lone Pine. The adoption everywhere of thick head-cover, which had given almost complete protection against Japanese bombs, proved disastrous under howitzer bombardment. The roof detonated the shells, which pierced it, burst in the covered trenches, and caused terrible losses.⁶⁷ On the morning of August 6th, of some


⁶⁶ According to some Turkish accounts the 12th Regt (of the 4th Div.) was also at Boghali.

⁶⁷ In consequence of such an experience the head-cover had on July 29 been removed from the front trenches on the Jolly. This had been interpreted by some Australians as a sign of an impending attack by the Turks, though others guessed the real motive. On both the Pine and German Officers' the front was still almost entirely covered.

twenty odd shells which fell on German Officers' Ridge, five burst in the trenches, killing or wounding twenty-two men. In Lone Pine the losses were heavier. On its southern slope, where it dipped to Snipers' Ridge, the front trench was almost completely destroyed. It was the slaughter caused by a few shells bursting in the trenches on August 5th which caused the front-line garrison to be sent forward into the mine-tunnels when the howitzers opened on the 6th.


Even when that final bombardment was laid upon them, the troops in the Pine expected no attack. Similar shelling seemed to have occurred before. Suddenly one of the officers or N.C.O.'s who were keeping watch in the front line shouted: "Look out. The English are coming!" A sergeant rushed to the tunnels to get his men out, but it was too late. Before the garrison emerged the Australians had reached the trench.

The Turkish garrison of Lone Pine consisted of two battalions of the 47th Regiment, of which a third battalion occupied Snipers' Ridge. The 47th was the central regiment of the 16th Division, of which the 125th held Johnston's Jolly, and the 48th Pine Ridge and the posts on Holly Ridge. The headquarters of the 47th and of the two Lone Pine battalions were in The Cup,⁶⁸ where, unknown to the Anzac staff, the whole administration of the position centred. At least 500 men appear to have held the front trenches, with another 500 in close support. By 5.30, when the attack commenced, about half of the front-line garrison had been killed or wounded; most of the remainder was in the tunnels. When the attack cut off the majority, a few remnants of the supports came running out of the communication trenches into The Cup and thence down Owen's Gully. Some escaped across the gully



⁶⁸ The position of The Cup and of these headquarters is marked by the well-worn tracks shown in the plate at p. 522.

to Johnston's Jolly, to a point near the slope of which the commander of the 47th, Tewfik Bey, himself withdrew. One of the two battalion commanders, a namesake of Mustafa Kemal, believing—as was indeed true—that he had lost practically all his troops, retired to the lower end of Owen's Gully, and there awaited the arrival of any survivors. His colleague, a cool-headed leader, took up his position in some horse-stalls in Owen's Gully opposite the mouth of The Cup. Part of one company of the 47th had scrambled out of the north-flank trench and, after retiring some way down Owen's Gully (which was now almost everywhere under fire), lay in the valley-bed waiting for orders. In the trenches at the extreme head of The Cup appeared Australian soldiers. An officer and two or three men actually reached the headquarters of one of the battalions, which, as at Quinn's or Courtney's, lay at the head of the numerous tracks and shelves on the valley-side immediately behind the edge of the depression. These men were killed by shots either from the Jolly or from a few small parties of the enemy which still lurked among the shelters in The Cup or round the mouths of the communication trenches. As the attack reached its limits, these enemy parties, mostly under junior officers, stood fast, although every moment expecting to be swept away by another onrush of attacking infantry.




ⓈPosition of some of the Australian dead

As has been already stated, Essad Pasha's "zone headquarters" on Scrubby Knoll overlooked at a mile's distance both Johnston's Jolly and Lone Pine, and an observer was kept stationed a few yards from the general's office, to give notice of any unusual occurrence. When, therefore, the attack opened it did not require a message from Lone Pine to inform Essad of its outbreak. In accordance with standing orders the batteries at Scrubby Knoll immediately opened upon the No-Man's Land in front of the Pine, and word was instantly

despatched to the 19th Division to throw in its nearest reserve—the battalion in rest behind Mortar Ridge.

It happened that during the day the resting battalion had been changed. The 1st Battalion of the 57th Turkish Regiment, which had held German Officers' for forty-five consecutive days, was so completely worn out that, upon the urgent representations of its commander, it had been relieved by a reserve battalion of the 72nd and brought out to rest.⁶⁹ While it was settling into its rest-bivouacs, the battalion commander with his chief, the colonel of the regiment, climbed to a ledge above regimental headquarters in order to ascertain




the meaning of the increased outburst of artillery fire. Looking southwards they saw Lone Pine covered with the smoke and dust of shells, and at that moment the heavy reports of the guns gave place to a patter of rifles ("as, after thunder, you hear the rain begin," said one of them later). The regimental observer remarked that he could see men running across No-Man's Land. The commander of the 1/57th realised instantly that his men's hard-earned rest had vanished, since they formed the sole immediate reserve. He forthwith ordered them to put on again the equipment they had just dropped. A few minutes later there arrived the order, telephoned from Mustafa Kemal, for the 1/57th to move to the Pine. The battalion was then ready, and Zeki Bey ordered it to move at the double down Legge Valley, fixing bayonets as it went, while

⁶⁹ This battalion is designated in the remainder of this chapter by the ordinary military abbreviation, "1/57th". It had suffered, according to its own officers, from twenty-one mine explosions near the north-western corner of German Officers' Trench. The Australian diaries do not record so many, but the battalion was indubitably worn out. Its commander, who himself slept little during the past month, had of late begged for its relief, but, though promised, this had been postponed. At last on Aug. 6, after the first two days of the preliminary Lone Pine bombardment, the order was given, but the commander of the incoming unit urged that a relief could not be carried out during such shell-fire. The commander of the 1/57th, however, growing desperate, assured his colleague that it was the normal condition at German Officers' Trench, and thus avoided further postponement.

he himself, having told the leading company commander to meet him in Owen's Gully, ran ahead and turned into that valley.

He found the commander of the 47th, Tewfik Bey, on the side of Johnston's Jolly, but in a condition so disturbed that no useful information could be obtained from him. As, however, the position where he stood offered an excellent view over the rear of Lone Pine, Zeki Bey saw for himself that the centre of action was The Cup, and he accordingly hurried thither across Owen's Gully. His battalion had now got ahead of him, and, toiling after it to the topmost ledge of The Cup, where the communication saps from Lone Pine debouched, he found that most of his men had already been moved into those trenches. What had happened was that, as the battalion reached the top of the depression, young officers of the 47th, who were endeavouring to hold the ends of the saps, seized on various portions of the arriving 1/57th to reinforce their respective positions. None had been taken into the extreme northern sap, which was held by some of the 47th, but elements had entered each of the other communication trenches and were also congregated at the head of the valley.

The position in detail was as follows. The extreme northern sap—that blocked on the Australian side by Lieutenant McDonald—was still, along a good part of its length, in the hands of a remnant of the original garrison. The next sap to it, one of the two blocked by Mackay, was held at about thirty-five yards from The Cup by a party of the 1/57th under its Hoja Mufti, or chaplain. This priest, a brave cool-headed man, was occupying an old somewhat broken-down bay in which lay several dead. The Australians were round the next traverse, and bombing was going on. "Don't be anxious about this flank—I will remain here," cried the Hoja to his battalion commander as the latter hurriedly reconnoitred the front.



South of this point, where the Australians approached more nearly to the edge of The Cup, the situation appeared to Zeki Bey more dangerous. The next sap but one was almost entirely held by the Anzac troops, whose bayonets could be seen beyond a traverse not far from the edge of the gully. Both sides were throwing bombs, and Zeki Bey could see that the spirit of his supporting troops was shaken by their having to pass over wounded and dying men in order to reach the scene of the fighting. Still farther south the head of The Cup, where there appeared to be a number of disconnected rifle-pits and much thrown-up earth but no definite trenches, was crowded with Turkish infantry. An officer of the 47th reported that the trenches in that quarter were in the hands of the enemy, and the men would not re-enter them. "The English reached even here," he said, pointing to an Australian lying dead beside his feet.

The Turks were thus holding the rearmost fragment of their old position at Lone Pine, but their situation was obviously critical. Only a few trenches, and those on the very edge of The Cup, were in their hands, and if the Australians again attacked these would certainly be lost. Accordingly, neglecting for the moment the position at the head of the valley, Zeki Bey went back along its western side, and, making his way through the saps, ascertained that one cross-trench, a few yards in from the edge, still remained in the possession of the Turks. This was a deep alley joining the ends of the communication saps, and without fire-step. He at once ordered the men in this area to leave all other work and, by digging fire-steps with bayonets, entrenching tools, or any available implement, to convert the sap into a fire-trench facing the Australian front. A non-commissioned officer was then directed to keep his men firing—"even if they could not see 'the English'"—so as to make a barrage. An irregular front was thus formed by the 1/57th and remnants of the 47th in the communication trenches and across the head of The Cup. Mustafa Kemal of the 47th, and his fellow battalion commander, came back to their respective headquarters on the edge of The Cup.⁷⁰ The

⁷⁰ Though few of their men were left, they were available to give advice

Australian advance had apparently ceased, and, since the whole immediate Turkish reserve had been absorbed, nothing more was to be done on the spot. Zeki Bey therefore went across Owen's Gully to the headquarters of the 125th on the Jolly to request Abd el Rizak Bey to turn the fire of his regiment upon the Pine.

It appeared somewhat strange that no attempt had been made by the 125th to counter-attack the Pine from the Jolly. It had, however, been reported to Abd el Rizak that the Australians in the line facing the Jolly appeared to be active, and that sandbags had been removed from the opposing trenches, as if to enable infantry to charge from them. As a matter of fact the 7th Australian Battalion had made such preparations, having been warned by Birdwood himself that, if the assaulting battalions were successful at Lone Pine, it might be required at dawn to attack Johnston's Jolly. Moreover a torrent of Australian rifle-fire was being poured upon the Jolly. Zeki Bey, however, implored Abd el Rizak to realise that matters were more critical at the Pine and to turn his fire upon it in order to demoralise the assailants. The commander of the 1/57th then returned to the Pine. Night was falling, and with it there arrived in Owen's Gully Ali Riza Bey, the commander of the 13th Regiment.

It will be remembered that the 13th was one of the two Turkish regiments which the whole Battle of Lone Pine was designed to attract. Completely deceived, Essad had at the very outset ordered it at all costs to retake the position. The feint had indeed so far succeeded almost beyond anticipation. Expecting, as he had done, that the British reinforcements would be thrown in towards Kilid Bahr, Essad at once assumed that the Lone Pine attack was the main intended offensive, and so deeply was he disturbed that he not only ordered the 13th Regiment to move immediately to the Pine, but instructed the 9th Turkish Division, stationed between Helles and Anzac, to move in that direction also.⁷¹

It is not known whether any orders were sent to the 15th Regiment at this stage. What is certain is that the Turkish

⁷¹ Liman von Sanders states that Kiazim Bey was sent that evening to Essad's HQ, and could not return for several hours in consequence of the heavy artillery fire on all the rear areas. It may be conjectured that he was instructed to discuss the necessity, which was urged by Essad, of summoning the 9th Div. to Lone Pine.


commander in the Anzac zone now bent his whole effort towards recapturing the Lone Pine position. It appears that before dusk Tewfik Bey of the 47th took the questionable step of reporting that his men had regained their front trenches but could not hold them, and that they required heavy reinforcements. Tewfik must have known that this message was untrue, since from the ledge on the Jolly where he wrote it he could actually see, across the gully, the Australian troops deep in his old position at the Pine. His statement was based on a report of one Turkish non-commissioned officer who had led a few men up Owen's Gully (which was never attacked) to the old front line at its head, where they were facing Corporal Aylward's party at the extreme flank of the new Australian position.⁷² Tewfik's motive in distorting the report was possibly that which sometimes influenced weak officers; he knew that he was blamed by officers and men for the loss of the Pine, and may have wished to hide his failure rather than inform his seniors frankly of the position.

The conduct of the fighting during the night fell, however, not upon Tewfik but on Ali Riza, commander of the 13th, who about midnight took his station at one of the old battalion headquarters in The Cup. He divided the western edge of The Cup into three sectors, placing Zeki Bey, Mustafa Kemal, and a third battalion commander in charge of them respectively. Orders were then issued for a counter-attack to be delivered during the night. A few troops of the 13th Regiment appear to have arrived, adding to the congestion, and the confusion at the head of The Cup and in the saps was extreme. Flares of all colours and brilliant white star-shells thrown from the Anzac position were falling close, an Australian machine-gun was firing from some point almost on the edge of The Cup, and bombs were constantly bursting. In this confusion the Turkish officers endeavoured to find their way through the position and to organise some concerted movement, but they could effect nothing.

On the Australian side the 2nd Field Company and infantry working parties had since 5 30 been digging to join the heads

⁷² About dusk one Turk, actually looking over the barricade, had been shot by Aylward with his revolver

of tunnels B5, B6, and B8 with Lone Pine. By 9 p.m. there had been made from B5 into No-Man's Land a good opening from which men could run over the surface to the Pine. This exposure became unnecessary at 1 a.m., when a sap from this tunnel was through to the Pine. B8 was finished by 4 o'clock, and a shallow connection from B6 by the same hour. But in the last case the sap had to be driven through crumbled earth shattered by mine explosions, and, as it was also exposed to



snipers from the Jolly, this avenue was abandoned after several men had been hit. When B5 was completed, it became possible to bring out the Turkish prisoners, 70 in number, who till then had been guarded in the tunnels. The main part of No-Man's Land was seldom traversed after the actual attack except by two medical officers, Majors Dunlop⁷³ and Fullerton,⁷⁴ and some of their men, who searched it and brought in the wounded. In the trenches the dead lay so thick that the only respect which could be paid them was to avoid treading on their faces. The troops were too busy and too weary to carry them to the rear, nor would there have been room in the congested trenches to perform the work. In several sectors, in order to gain space, the bodies were piled in unused communication trenches or dugouts until some of these were completely filled. Where possible, the wounded were cleared, although to any man wounded through the intestines such movement was probably fatal.⁷⁵

While communications were thus being opened to the rear, the men in the front line had begun to sustain the first phase of the long and dreadful counter-attack for which the Battle of


⁷³ Capt. (temp. Maj.) L. W. Dunlop; 1st Fld Amb. Medical practitioner; of Sydney; b. 24 June, 1887

⁷⁴ Maj. A. Y. Fullerton; A A M C. Medical practitioner; of Windsor, N S W; b. Sydney, 8 May, 1865

⁷⁵ Capt. Jacobs had determined that his friend Digges La Touche, who lay in his trench grievously wounded in this manner, should not be moved. But the wounded man insisted that he must be cleared out of the way. "It's not me you must consider," he urged, "but the position." He was moved, and shortly afterwards died

Lone Pine is chiefly famous. This did not as yet fall upon the southern flank of the new Australian line, where—except for a weak effort about 8 p.m., and for a strong attack upon Captain Nash⁷⁶ of the 2nd, whose exact position has never been ascertained—the enemy, during this night, left the Australian troops almost undisturbed. From some position unknown, messages came from Nash praying for grenades. "For God's sake send bombs," ran one of these. Presently the messages ceased, and nothing more was ever heard of him.

At first, therefore, the Turkish activity was entirely confined to The Cup. Near the head of that depression Cook's and Youden's posts carried on a desultory bombing duel with parties of the enemy on three sides of them. The Turks were in the hollow, and the Australians, firing down it from both sides of the trenches, kept them fairly subdued. It was thus possible for a number of men under



Captain Sasse of the 1st to commence a new trench leading from Tubb's Corner to the detached position of Youden. Near the north of The Cup, however, where the Hoja Mufti and his men were crowded on the Turkish side of the barricades, and Major Mackay and his men on the other, the bombing was heavy throughout the night. Mackay remained on the fire-step of his wide trench-bay, both front and rear of which were kept lined with men, while Lance-Corporal Besanko,⁷⁷ shoulder-high above its northern end, kept watch over the slope to Owen's Gully. The enemy, throwing bombs from both communication saps and from Owen's Gully, could not miss the wide receptacle afforded by that bay. The men in it endeavoured with fair success to smother these grenades by the Anzac method, falling on them with half-filled sandbags; but they were constantly wounded

⁷⁶ Capt H. L. Nash; 2nd Bn. Civil servant; of West Maitland, N.S.W.; b. West Maitland, 24 Dec., 1889. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915

⁷⁷ Sgt. C. V. M. Besanko, D.C.M., M.M. (No. 6, 4th Bn.). Electrician; of Yorketown, S. Aust.; b. Willowie, S. Aust., 1886.

and were carried out to be laid at the rear of the bay, the supports who crowded the north-flank communication trench being brought in singly to take their place. The rear trenches were too crowded to allow of the removal of the wounded, who lay there to be stumbled over by every passer-by. Many died, and, as the night wore on, Mackay began to realise that the particular bay which he was holding possessed no importance commensurate to the losses among the men who had to be crowded into it. He therefore sent a message to Colonel Macnaghten advising that it should be given up. About this time he was himself wounded when falling upon a bomb, the explosion actually throwing him into the air. Hearing of this occurrence, Colonel Macnaghten sent his adjutant, Lieutenant Massie, to relieve him and to ascertain the position, but Mackay refused to leave his post. Massie, who had stationed himself beside Mackay, was stooping down to remove a body from the floor of the trench when one of the enemy looked over the parapet and fired down, wounding Massie severely. He was carried out, but Mackay, though half-dazed, remained on his fire-step. Dawn found him there, with his trench-junction, though continuously attacked, still in Australian hands.

During this night two companies of the 12th under Major Lane⁷⁸ and Captain Mullen⁷⁹ were sent into the Pine.⁸⁰ Meanwhile the 7th Battalion remained ready to attack Johnston's Jolly; but as one part of the reserve after another was absorbed, it gradually became certain that no such attack would be made. The projected demonstration by the 2nd Light Horse Brigade⁸¹ was also abandoned. Indeed no further feint was needed; for, unknown to the Australians, the summoned Turkish reserves—both the 13th Regiment and the 9th Division—began to arrive in Legge Valley during the dark.

⁷⁸ Lieut.-Col D. A. Lane Commanded 52nd Bn., 1916/17. Area officer; of Lindisfarne, Tas; b. Christchurch, N.Z., 3 Nov., 1886.

⁷⁹ Lieut.-Col L. M. Mullen, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 9th Bn., 1916/18. Area officer and accountant, of Burnie, Tas.; b. Williamstown, Vic., 15 Aug., 1882.

⁸⁰ Maj. Lane's company moved into the south of the position at 10.40, and Capt Mullen's at midnight. During the movement of the latter Lieut. T. A. Ogilvie (of Toorak, Vic., and Corowa, N.S.W.) was mortally wounded.


⁸¹ See pp. 487-8.

CHAPTER XIX

THE COUNTER-ATTACK AT LONE PINE

As dawn approached the Australian posts established radially around Lone Pine observed many signs which convinced them that a counter-attack was imminent. Almost everywhere the bombing increased; but in reality so confused was the situation in The Cup that the efforts of the Turkish commanders there to organise an assault were as yet disjointed. The Australians had seized all the completed trenches connecting the enemy's local headquarters in The Cup with his garrison on Snipers' Ridge south of the Pine, though part of the gap so created was bridged by an unfinished sap. By the Turkish standing orders¹ it was incumbent on the commander of the defeated 47th Regiment to regain, if possible, the ground lost; but he and the other commanders and the troops in The Cup were cut off from his third and comparatively intact battalion on Snipers' Ridge. A conjoint attack was therefore difficult to arrange.

The result was that the first Turkish assaults, other than the persistent bombing attack, were spasmodic and disconnected. For example, at an early stage one of the battalion commanders in The Cup, acting under Ali Riza Bey of the 13th Regiment, organised a party which was to dash forward from that depression, crossing the roofed-in portion of the fire-trench held by the Turks along its edge. But, when this was attempted, they were caught by a machine-gun only thirty yards distant across the level, and twenty-five or thirty were killed and wounded.




Posts are shown thus ●
1 Aylwards 2 Mc Donalds 3 Mackays
4 Lloyd's 5 Sesse's Sap 6 Woods's
7 Goldenstedt's 8 Tubbs's Corner 9 Youden's
10 Cook's 11 Cox's 12 Jacobs's 13 Pain's

¹ These orders accorded with Liman von Sanders' decision referred to on p. 7.

With the advance of daylight the Turkish leaders in The Cup—few of whom were acquainted with the Lone Pine trenches—obtained a clearer notion of the situation. Looking towards the head of The Cup they could see there the periscopes of the Australians peering down the gully at them. It at once became manifest that almost any massing of Turks in that gully for counter-attack must be plainly visible to an opponent so situated, and that he could deal murderously with their crowded numbers. If therefore The Cup was to be tenable, the Australians must be driven from these vantage points overlooking it.

The advanced posts which appeared to the enemy to possess such a command were those around Goldenstedt's, Tubb's Corner, Youden's, and Cook's, all near the centre of the plateau. They could therefore best be attacked in conjunction with a simultaneous assault from the southern side. Apparently for this reason, and also because the general advantage of concerted action on both flanks was obvious, orders were given to connect the north and south of the Pine by a trench. Certain unfinished works already existed, and the Turkish higher command now ordered that from both sides of the plateau working parties should be sent into these to connect them up.

A party of the 57th Regiment was accordingly sent with tools into a short unfinished sap which ran out of the south-eastern end of The Cup. But no sooner had the men entered it than a shell, coming at point-blank range, burst in their midst. They had been observed by the 1st New Zealand Field Battery on Russell's Top, to which that side of the gully was visible, and had been instantly fired on.* The




* The Turkish staff observed that two red and yellow flags were flying on the new Australian front line. They rightly assumed that these had been placed there to indicate to the artillery the position of the line and had thus enabled it to fire with safety at anything beyond.

working party came tumbling back, leaving two or three of its members dead or seriously wounded, and the plan of connecting the flanks was necessarily abandoned. Both upon that and later days the enemy's counter-attacks on the two sides of the Pine therefore remained disjointed. They may best be described from the point of view of the Australian defence upon which they fell.

Except for the attempted charge over the roofed-in trench, which has already been related, the counter-attack on the northern half of the Australian position during the morning of August 7th appears to have been confined to heavy bombing. At the extreme northern barricade, held by the small party under Lance-Corporal Aylward, the Turks had once or twice during the night been driven back when attempting to steal up the steep track from Owen's Gully. At 10 a.m. some of them, occupying the old bivouacs on the gully-side, began to bomb the barricade. By the first bomb which fell in the trench Aylward was wounded. A second burst in the hand of Private W. P. Kelly³ of the 4th Battalion, who had picked it up to return it. Almost all the men at the barrier, except Privates Hayward and Back⁴ were killed or wounded; and for the moment it was expected that the enemy would rush it. But Australians from farther up the trench reinforced; a machine-gun was eventually placed to fire through the barricade; and it was not again attacked.

Farther south Major Iven Mackay of the 4th, holding the post at the north-eastern corner of the Australian position, had, as has been already mentioned, formed the opinion that the trench-junction which he was occupying was a mere death-trap, and had urged



Posts are shown thus ●
1 Aylward's 2 McDonald's 3 Mackay's
4 Lloyd's 5 Sasse's A A Traversed Trench

³ Pte W. P. Kelly, DCM (No. 1577, 4th Bn.). Dental mechanic; of Goulburn, N.S.W.; b. Goulburn, 1893. Died of wounds, 11 Aug., 1915.

⁴ Lieut W. E. Back; 4th Bn. Chauffeur mechanic; of Jugiong, N.S.W.; b. Bombowlee, Tumut, N.S.W., 10 June, 1892.

upon his colonel, Macnaghten, that it should be given up. Macnaghten, who had been wounded in the knee, was by this time himself exhausted, and eventually replied that Mackay must act on his own judgment.

Mackay decided to withdraw only from the bay in which the losses were so heavy. To effect this he first caused each of the two intersecting trenches held by his men—the long north-flank trench and the Traversed Trench—to be blocked. He himself remained in front in the dangerous bay, waiting, rifle in hand, for the appearance of any of the enemy, while Captain Scott^a of the 4th and Lieutenant Howell-Price, adjutant of the 3rd, organised the work on the new barricades. When they had blocked the Traversed Trench and partly blocked the other, all three withdrew to the latter and completed the barricade. Mackay next arranged that a short tunnel should be driven to connect the two trenches, which the new barricades had separated. Then, having fought for a night and a day in front of his men though twice wounded, he reported to Macnaghten, who sent him to have his wounds dressed.


When Mackay was arranging with Scott and Howell-Price to block the northern end of the Traversed Trench, some of the men in it complained that the barricade would cut off their only exit. He had thereupon walked along the trench and assured himself that it connected at the southern end also with the Australian line. It had in fact throughout the night connected Mackay's post with Lloyd's near the centre of the Pine, and at that stage it had appeared to form an important part of the Australian front. Shortly before dawn Colonel Brown of the 3rd Battalion, apprehending a counter-attack, had come along it from one end to the other, ordering the garrison to line the parapet, and in some places the parados. At Lloyd's Post the Traversed Trench ended, but Brown^b had directed some of his men to climb out into the open beyond that post so as to continue the line across the depression between the high parapets of Lloyd's and Sasse's. While clambering out in the dark they disturbed a few Turks, who, probably in consequence of some similar order from their own

^a Lieut.-Col. A. H. Scott, D.S.O. Commanded 56th Bn., 1916/17. Clerk; of Wahroonga, N.S.W.; b. Tumut, N.S.W., 3 Apr., 1891. Killed in action, 1 Oct., 1917.

^b Some hours afterwards Col. Brown, while standing in an exposed position at Woods's Post, was mortally wounded.

commander, had been lying low, and who now scuttled back towards The Cup. At dawn the men whom Brown had sent into the open, glancing to their left rear, saw that they were completely open to the enemy's trenches on the Jolly. Their annihilation being otherwise certain, they wisely climbed back into Lloyd's Post.

During the night no attack whatever had been made on Lloyd's or on the neighbouring part of the Traversed Trench, but about 9 o'clock on the 7th a party of Turks, creeping up the open depression between Lloyd's and Sasse's,⁷ began to throw bombs behind Lloyd's barricade. As he had no bombs with which to reply, he sent back out of range all his men except one non-commissioned officer. The two then took up their position at a prominent traverse. When a bomb fell on one side of it they ran round to the other, remaining until it had burst. In this manner they dodged the fusillade for two hours, until a supply of bombs at last arrived. The throwing of three or four into the depression completely silenced the enemy.




The Australians at this post, as everywhere else in the Pine, were learning that bombs were the most powerful weapon for hand-to-hand trench fighting, and that—though they knew little of bomb-throwing and mistrusted the crude “jam-tins”—if they could obtain a constant supply, they could keep back the Turks. The chief danger at this stage of the fight appeared to be the obstruction of all supplies, not only by the dead and wounded clogging the trenches, but by the last companies of the 1st Battalion, under Colonel A. J. Bennett, and a third company of the 12th, which, in answer to appeals from over-anxious commanders, had been brought into the Pine and were hampering movement through the rear trenches. It was this overcrowding which prevented the urgently

⁷ The position from which the men posted by Brown had retired.

needed bombs from reaching the front line. Accordingly, Lloyd, having made his way back to Colonel Macnaghten, obtained leave to clear the trenches of wounded. The waiting companies of the 1st Battalion and two of the 12th were also shortly afterwards withdrawn, leaving, however, those elements of three companies⁸ which since an early stage of the attack had been engaged in the thick of the fighting.

When Lloyd, after clearing the wounded from his communications,⁹ returned to his post, he found that the enemy had attacked it heavily with bombs, seriously wounding Lieutenant Osborne, the officer in charge in the Traversed Trench, and driving back the troops from the junction of the two trenches. Lloyd led them back, but shortly afterwards, during his temporary absence, they were again heavily attacked. They thereupon retired, and constructed a low barricade farther back in Lloyd's Trench, thus completely cutting off part of the garrison of the Traversed Trench, who knew nothing of the retirement.

At this juncture Captain Scott of the 4th was sent to the position by Macnaghten. Scott, who in private life was a clerk in Dalgety and Company's Sydney office, was a cheerful and dashing soldier. He at once called to the men: "Who'll come with me?", and, leaping over the new barrier without the least knowledge of what was in front of him, ran straight past the junction of the Traversed Trench to Lloyd's old barricade. There he came upon a party of Turks busily throwing bombs over the barrier, which was about four feet high. He shot three or four, causing the rest to draw back round the bend of the trench. He then sent forward



⁸ Two of the 1st Bn. and Maj. Lane's company of the 12th.


⁹ Capt. C. S. Coltman (of Ballarat, Vic., and Sydney) was engaged in the same work.

two of the men who had followed him, telling them to prevent these Turks from returning, while he himself and a third man threw bombs. The two guards performed this duty by standing at the bend, firing into the smoke of the bursting bombs. One was killed by a shot in reply, but another took his place.

Meanwhile Scott continued to bomb, using miscellaneous ammunition, including improvised grenades made of eighteen-pounder shell-cases filled with high explosive. The supply had to be thrown to him across the opening of the Traversed Trench, since its junction with Lloyd's was now being rendered impassable by a machine-gun which was firing straight into it from the Jolly. The Turks continued to reply to Scott with bombs, until one of the improvised grenades burst among them, when their bombing ceased. While the struggle was at its height, Scott was surprised by an Australian creeping up to him out of the Traversed Trench. Learning for the first time that there were Australians in that trench, he ordered them to withdraw from it; but the first who attempted to creep past the junction was shot.

It had become clear to Scott that, since the Traversed Trench could not be held, neither could Lloyd's advanced barricade. He therefore ordered the new barricade in Lloyd's Trench to be built up. When it was ready, he and the men with him threw their rifles over it, those in the Traversed Trench doing the same. Then, leaping past the junction, they withdrew behind the barricade. The enemy's machine-gun was not at the moment firing, and the withdrawal was effected without loss.

Thus, by midday on August 7th the Traversed Trench had been given up, and the Australian front in the northern half of the Pine consisted of three sap-heads, which had been blocked by McDonald, Mackay, and Lloyd respectively. At




Posts are shown thus ●
 1 Aylwards 2 McDonalds 3 Mackay's
 4 Lloyd's 5 Sasse's Sap 6 Woodss
 7 Goldenstedt's 8 Tubbs Corner

each of these bombing continued intermittently until August 10th, but they were not again heavily attacked. On the Turkish side the Hoja Mufti of the 57th held his ground, as he had undertaken to do, until his battalion was relieved on August 9th, but the main counter-attack, during this and the following days, was entirely against the centre and southern half of the position.

On August 7th the men in Woods's Post, at about the centre of the new front, had early in the morning faced a sudden rush of Turks from the edge of The Cup, twenty-five yards distant. This rush, which was preceded by very heavy bombing, swept past the north of Goldenstedt's Post without attacking it.¹⁰ But during the previous evening the machine-guns of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions had been brought into the Pine. On the exposed summit it was extremely difficult to find possible positions for them, but a reserve gun had been mounted for use in emergency, on the edge of Woods's Trench. This now opened, and swept away the attack so effectively that no further assault was attempted by the enemy against the centre on that day. An intermittent bombing, however, continued.

On the right the advanced posts under Youden, Harkness, and Cook south of The Cup had early on August 7th observed enemy activity in two directions. At the head of The Cup the enemy had all through the night been making small rushes with a few men, who were on each occasion repulsed. But it was now observed that the Turks had established themselves in a trench or depression between Youden's Post and Tubb's Corner, the nearest point of the 3rd Battalion line, some twenty yards distant. From this and



¹⁰ Goldenstedt's position was, however, heavily bombed

other directions they began, in the morning, to throw bombs. All the Australians in the post were eager to do what they could by bombing in return, but being entirely untrained in this process, they left the fuses too long, with the result that some of their own missiles were thrown back at them. Moreover, when once the front-line troops had expended their few grenades,¹¹ it was found almost impossible to obtain more, since practically no supply filtered through the congested rear trenches to the advanced positions. An urgent message from Youden to 2nd Battalion Headquarters for "one bomb" failed to procure any. Consequently for a considerable time the men could only line both sides and the end of their position, and beat down the enemy as far as possible with rifle-fire. During the night, however, the posts had been improved for rifle-fire by the digging between them of a cross-trench (like the bar of a capital "A"), from which the garrison could fire north-eastwards down The Cup or south-eastwards across the plateau. By this means the position was, for the time being, firmly held.

About the same hour there was observed a movement of Turks across parts of the southern portion of the plateau, as though they were endeavouring to get into position to assault the southern flank. Files of the enemy were moving along a partly-finished trench and endeavouring to run across the open gaps. Heavy fire was turned upon them, and this movement ceased. Some, who had gathered behind a hummock near the southern edge of the plateau, raised a white flag, but, since there was no opportunity of capturing them, Major Morshead of the 2nd ordered the firing to continue, evoking a strong protest from one of his juniors, Lieutenant Harkness, who had newly arrived at the front.¹² The enemy's attempted movement was for the time being without result. Only on the extreme right, where the flank bent back to the old Turkish line, did he actually attack. Here it chanced that Captains Jacobs of the 1st and Pain of the 2nd had arranged, in order to keep the weary garrison awake, to order a short "stand-to" No sooner had their troops manned the fire-step

¹¹ By 8 10 a.m. on Aug. 7 the bomb factory near the Bench had sent forward all the grenades in its stock. By working with 54 men it seems to have succeeded by 7 10 p.m. in meeting the most urgent demands.


¹² When the danger of attack had passed a Greek (apparently of the 13th Turkish Regt.), having stuck a white flower in the muzzle of his rifle, crawled in and gave himself up.

than one of the sentries pointed to the enemy's trench, which ran parallel at a distance of fifty yards and was bristling with bayonets. Almost at once two lines of Turks scrambled out in an attempt to charge, but were met by overwhelming rifle-fire. A few reached a short section of empty trench twenty yards from the Australians; the rest either ran back or were killed.

It was clear that the enemy had attempted to make a concerted attack upon the right flank but had for the moment failed. In the lull which followed Scobie of the 2nd, with the brigade-major, King, went round that part of the line. The detached position of the 2nd Battalion—Cook's and Youden's Posts—had not yet been connected with the flank of the 3rd at Tubb's Corner. Although during the night some sort of communication had been obtained, Turks had since penetrated between the two. King instructed Cook to continue his new cross-trench¹⁸ so as to incorporate the 2nd Battalion posts solidly in the main position at the Pine. He promised that a party of the 3rd Battalion should sap out from Tubb's Corner to meet them.

Cook had just detailed a party for the 2nd Battalion's portion of the work when some of his "observers," keeping watch over the southern side of the trench, shouted "Stand to!" Up a trench on the right were coming large numbers of the enemy. The counter-attack on the right flank was evidently about to be resumed in force.

The enemy seems to have precluded and supported this attack with artillery fire, especially that of a battery in position to the south-east of Gun Ridge, known as "The Wineglass." This now opened on the southern flank of the Australian position, firing, at only a mile's range, directly along some of the old Turkish communication-saps which led from the




¹⁸ See p. 543

southern edge of the plateau. One of these, a straight shallow trench, was not occupied by Australians, and, since the Turks were also unlikely to use it, only a low barricade had been built where it ran into the new Australian position. Colonel Scobie, in passing, had observed this, and had spoken sharply to the young officer of the 1st Battalion in charge of it. This youngster—Lieutenant Cox¹⁴—was in some distress, since, despite his efforts, he had been unable to obtain sandbags for the work. At 11 o'clock, shortly after Scobie had passed, a shell from The Wineglass struck this barrier, killing Cox and the men beside him.

The Wineglass battery also completely enfiladed the communication trench leading to Cook's and Youden's Posts, although not the posts themselves; about noon the attack upon these detached positions of the 2nd Battalion became exceedingly severe. Few bombs could be obtained. Lieutenant Harkness, looking over the top of the trench to ascertain the position, was killed. A few minutes later Cook, doing the same thing, was seriously wounded in the head. Youden and Lieutenant Cotton,¹⁵ who were together, were hit at the same moment. The garrison was being bombed from several directions, and had little opportunity for defence.

At this stage, Colonel Scobie, a typical Australian countryman, sparing of words but decided in action, went forward himself and decided that the detached posts could not be usefully maintained. He accordingly ordered a retirement from the communication trench to the main position, himself remaining in the sap while his men were



¹⁴ Lieut. F. J. Cox; 1st Bn. Electrical mechanic; of Sydney, b. St. Peters, N.S.W., 18 Oct., 1887. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

¹⁵ Capt. M. J. B. Cotton; 2nd Bn. Clerk; of East Maitland, N.S.W.; b. Cobar, N.S.W., 10 Nov., 1894. Killed in action, 24 July, 1916.

withdrawing from it. He had sent for one of the large improvised bombs, which he intended to throw with his own hands in order to cover the retirement, and was above the parapet, heaving it, when he fell back dead.¹⁶

About the time of Scobie's death the main right-flank trench, held by Captains Jacobs and Pain, began to be severely bombed by Turks who had dashed across the open into the isolated trench twenty yards in front of it. Of thirty of the enemy who started a dozen were hit, but the remainder began throwing small grenades with deadly effect into the Australian line. Pain's company possessed only one bomb, which its commander now threw; but a few specially posted men, manfully shooting over the parapet, were forcing the enemy in all the surrounding trenches to keep their heads down and thus holding up the attack.


Shortly after 1 o'clock, however, the assault grew suddenly more threatening. After Scobie's death the enemy who had been pressing him gained access to the main position,¹⁷ which was held, slightly farther to the west, by Jacobs. This officer had not been informed of the withdrawal, and his first intimation of it was the actual sight of the enemy moving along the communication trench from which the 2nd Battalion had been withdrawn.¹⁸ Seeing that a continuous stream of Turks was advancing slowly along this sap towards the heart of the position, he hurried with the news to 2nd Battalion Headquarters, which was near at hand. Major Stevens, who was temporarily in command of the battalion, observing that the short isolated trench parallel to his front was also bristling with bayonets, took steps to meet this danger, while

¹⁶ Lieut. E. W. G. Wren (3rd Bn), who with Pte Wilson was bombing at the same post, could see no mark of bullet or bomb on Scobie, but assumed that he had been shot. Pte L. Keysor (b. Maida Vale, London), one of the men engaged in holding off the Turks during this episode, was for gallantry during the whole of the Lone Pine fighting awarded the Victoria Cross.

¹⁷ According to one account, when Scobie withdrew his men from the detached posts, a shallow barricade had been made to prevent Turks from following them through the communication trench into the main position. But the men guarding this barricade were soon all killed and wounded.

¹⁸ The first sign was a red and yellow flag moving along the communication trench. This was probably a ruse of the enemy. Red and yellow flags were carried during this offensive by the Anzac troops, who had orders to display them at the farthest points reached, so as to indicate the front-line position to their artillery. The Turks had certainly observed this. For example, on the previous evening a Turkish NCO in The Cup had pointed out to Zeki Bey a man in the act of placing such a flag near the edge of that depression. The NCO. asked if it was a Turkish flag. Zeki Bey answered that it was not, and ordered him to shoot. Similar flags were almost certainly captured by the Turks, and used with the intention of misleading the British artillery.

Jacobs returned to his own position. The enemy had now entered the front line where the 2nd Battalion had withdrawn from it, and Jacobs's men were beginning to be killed and wounded by bombs coming from their left rear, as well as from flank and front. His trench was filled two and three deep with dead and dying men, and the men on the exposed flank were being driven in. There was no barrier across the trench except the bodies of the dead. Consequently, having obtained a number of captured Turkish grenades, Jacobs went with Sergeant Wicks¹⁹ to the flank and threw them, while his men began to build a barricade.



The bombs, however, quickly ran out, and, in spite of the urgency, no more could be obtained until Wicks, recollecting that he had seen a supply in the trench evacuated by the 2nd, volunteered to search for it. This errand would take him, if not among the Turks, at any rate into a curve of the trench in which their bombs were constantly bursting. He nevertheless went forward, and, though wounded, found the grenades, and in three journeys recovered them. This additional supply enabled Jacobs to continue throwing while his men barricaded the trench.

Meanwhile Major Stevens had sent for Captain Pain and instructed him to bring a machine-gun into action back at the angle of Jacobs's trench with the old Turkish front line. Lieutenant Wells,²⁰ the machine-gun officer of the 2nd, had been wounded, and there was then remaining only one man of the gun's crew. Pain, however, decided to set up the gun in the open, in the angle between the two trenches, where there existed a mound which commanded an excellent view of all the Turkish positions in the neighbourhood, and from which

¹⁹ C.S.M. A. E. Wicks, D.C.M. (No. 555, 1st Bn). Grocer; of Sydney; b. Adelaide, 29 Nov., 1894.

²⁰ Maj. J. M. Wells; Div. M.G. Officer, 3rd Aust. Div., 1917/18. Member of Aust. Permanent Forces; of Sydney; b. Woolwich, Kent, Eng., 27 June, 1884.

the enemy could be seen standing breast high above the trenches evacuated by Scobie and shooting at Jacobs's trench. On this mound Pain set up the gun, and, sweeping the enemy's parapet with it, forced the Turks under cover. Upon Major Stevens asking him whether the field of fire was sufficiently wide, Pain had the gun's position slightly shifted, placing the legs of the tripod on the shoulders of three men below—Privates Nichol,²¹ Montgomery,²² and Goudemey.²³ He himself stood shoulder high above the parapet, sweeping the tops of the surrounding trenches. A number of rifles were now fired at him, and several bombs burst near the gun. Its water-jacket was pierced, and he himself was hit; he nevertheless continued to fire, though scalding water, pouring upon the men below, was causing them to laugh and swear. A few moments later a bullet from the flank wounded Montgomery. The gun was too much damaged to continue shooting, and Pain was sent to the hospital ship. But he had succeeded in firing 750 rounds, which at a critical moment had so hampered the attacking Turks that they were now holding their rifles above the parapet and firing blindly into the air.

Meanwhile Jacobs's men had barricaded their trench at a point about twenty-five yards in advance of Pain's position. Moreover the two and a half companies of the 1st Battalion, which had been sent back from the Pine in the morning, had again been summoned forward. Part of these, under Major Davidson,²⁴ as well as 120 of the next reserve—the 12th—under Major Lane and Captain Rafferty, were hurried to the southern sector immediately behind Jacobs, some of them reinforcing his position. His sector (which may be called "Jacobs's Trench") was only the butt, as it were, of the original south-flank trench, the rest of which had now been regained by the Turks, and most of the original line on the south flank having thus been lost, men of the 2nd and other battalions were set to deepen the shallow disused trench which,

²¹ Pte W. Nichol, D.C.M. (No. 972, 1st Pioneer Bn). Labourer; of Coonamble, N.S.W.; b Bradford, Yorks, Eng., 31 July, 1892.

²² Pte. J. A. Montgomery (No. 1787, 2nd Bn). Bank clerk; of Tahara, Vic; b Droun, Vic, 29 Sept., 1895. Died of wounds, 11 Aug., 1915.


²³ L/Cpl W. Goudemey, D.C.M. (No. 1745, 1st Pioneer Bn). Metal moulder; of St. Peters, N.S.W.; b St. Peters, 23 Apr., 1894. Killed in action, 23 July, 1916.

²⁴ Maj. W. Davidson: 1st Bn. Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces; of Oatley, N.S.W., b. Nairn, Scotland, 24 Apr., 1866. Died of wounds, 19 Aug., 1915.

as has been already described,²⁵ ran parallel with it, and in parts almost touched it. By this means a continuous fire-trench was re-established along the whole southern flank, now reaching from the old Turkish front line to Tubb's Corner. Although the trench recaptured by the Turks came at one point within five yards of the new flank-trench, the enemy usually maintained at that point only a small post of three or four men.

Late in the afternoon of August 7th the enemy's bombing again increased, not only at Jacobs's Trench but at most of the other posts round the Lone Pine position. The enemy attacked Goldenstedt's Post, but during the day a number of bombs had at last been brought to that position by Sergeant Clark²⁶ of the 3rd Battalion, and although none of the survivors in the post had ever before thrown one, the assault was nevertheless checked by their use. But it was again on the southern flank that the fighting was most severe. Fortunately the Turkish reinforcements, continually arriving under the apparent shelter of the southern edge of the plateau, were visible from Lieutenant Ross's gun of the 7th Battery on Bolton's Ridge, which constantly fired at them, despite the efforts of a Turkish battery on Gun Ridge to silence it. But the bombing on that flank was continuous. Lane's and Rafferty's companies of the 12th had been brought thither, enabling Jacobs, who had been wounded in the head, to be temporarily relieved, and at 6 o'clock, in response to an urgent message, all the trained bomb-throwers of the 7th Battalion, thirty-two in number, were sent forward into the Pine.


The second night thus closed in upon the conflict still raging in Lone Pine. On the enemy's side Essad Pasha was still feverishly anxious to regain the lost ground. The result



²⁵ See p. 517.

²⁶ Lieut C. O. Clark, M.C., M.M.; 3rd Bn. School teacher; of Sydney; b. Wattle Flat Bathurst, N.S.W., 1890.

was that the detachment of the 13th Regiment which continued to arrive all day at the rear of the position were thrown in piece-meal, one or two companies at a time, as they came up. The losses among the waiting troops, packed into the head of The Cup, were excessive, the Australian bombs rolling down the depression and exploding murderously among them. The dead were dragged away, and, by some unwise arrangement, were laid beside the track up which each newly arriving Turkish company had to make its way from Legge Valley. These companies of the already depleted 5th Division²⁷ were in some cases commanded by sergeants. As they were hurried into Owen's Gully they first came under fire from its upper end. Then, climbing the track, they found themselves passing rows of Turkish dead, laid out four deep, on their left-hand side—a "column of dead men," as



a Turkish officer described it. At its head were lying a few Australians, including an officer or N.C.O. of splendid physique. Next, turning into The Cup, the reinforcements came within sound and sight of the heavy fighting at its upper end, where the bombing and shooting never ceased; and, as they neared the top, "there were the Australian periscopes looking over at them." "These troops," said the same officer, "were in bad condition and came to a bad situation." It is confirmation of this that, after the counter-attack on the detached posts, observers of the 1st New Zealand Battery could see a Turkish officer whipping on his men after the manner of the East. Nor were the relations between the Turkish officers altogether happy. Tewfik Bey, for instance, the commander of the 47th Regiment, was being so sharply blamed for the loss of Lone Pine that in resentment he decided to head a counter-attack on the southern flank, and was killed, either on this day or the next, in an unsuccessful charge against Jacobs's Trench.

²⁷ The 13th Regt. was still reinforcing, followed apparently at some stage by the 15th.

Nevertheless as the result of the fighting on the 7th, the Turks had driven the 2nd Battalion from the head of The Cup and had recaptured most of the south-flank trench, which had previously given the Australians a commanding view over the southern slope of the plateau. But the portion of that trench which had been retained by Pain and Jacobs still afforded such a view, and at least one post, Goldenstedt's, still overlooked The Cup. In the northern half, however, the Australians had been forced to abandon the Traversed Trench, and the defence now consisted only of a number of disconnected posts at the sap-heads.


At about this stage the enemy, whose operations in The Cup were still directed by Ali Riza Bey of the 13th Regiment, with Zeki Bey of the 1/57th as his chief assistant, adopted a new method of attack. Realising that the Turkish artillery was not strong enough to prepare the way sufficiently for their counter-attacks, they decided to cover their assault with sniping fire. Marksmen were posted at various points on the far side of The Cup or on the Jolly with orders to force the Australians to keep their heads down until the moment for a Turkish assault. What success attended this method will be told later.

During the night of August 7th the bombing of the southern half of the Australian position, and especially of Jacobs's Trench, was continuous. The officer of the 12th and Sergeant Wicks of the 1st, who succeeded him, were in turn seriously wounded, and Jacobs had to be summoned again from the 2nd Battalion Headquarters, where Colonel Cass (returned from his wound at Helles and now appointed to succeed Scobie) had insisted on his resting. The trench was by this time so crowded with men of the 1st, 2nd, and 12th, and with the bombers of the 7th, that the troops could not dodge the enemy's bombs; the trench was literally floored with dead, in places several deep, and the fight, which was incessant, had to be carried on over their bodies.

In order to remedy these conditions the garrison was now thinned out. The actual points of fighting in the southern half of the Pine were only about ten—mostly barricaded at old trench intersections along the line. The men at each of these posts were now reduced to two or three; the rest, who were not immediately required, were sent farther back, to be sheltered

if possible in the nearest covered section of trench or in one of the old Turkish dugouts, beyond the range of bombs. As a further measure, the engineers of the 2nd Field Company brought in, and set up along part of the parapet of Jacobs's, screens of wire-netting, which materially assisted in warding off the enemy's bombs. At daybreak on August 8th half-a-company of the enemy, which was observed to be approaching along the southern edge of the Pine, was driven off. In the lull which followed, Captain Sasse of the 1st, who now commanded in Jacobs's Trench, organised an effort to clear it of the dead by heaping them in certain of the saps, shelters, and tunnels which were not in use.

While this work was in progress the enemy again attacked both the south and centre of the Pine. At Jacobs's Post he blew down the barricade and, opening a heavy fire down the trench, threatened to advance along it. Learning this, Captain Sasse hurried to the point of danger and, grabbing sandbags from the top of either trench-wall, pulled them down so as to form a shallow barricade. Dropping upon this with his rifle, and coolly aiming every shot, he rapidly drove the enemy back and re-established the barricade.²⁸



But in the centre, which at dawn on the 8th was still held largely by the survivors of the original assaulting battalions, the strain on the posts was in parts almost beyond their strength. During that morning Goldenstedt's Post was again heavily bombed; it possessed no grenades, and a supply was very difficult to obtain. Lieutenant Burrett²⁹ had been wounded there, and of the twenty-nine men originally in the post only Sergeant-Major Goldenstedt and four others remained. The adjutant of the 3rd, Lieutenant Howell-Price, visiting the

²⁸ For a photograph of this trench on this day, see *Vol. XII, plate 108*.


²⁹ Lieut.-Col. A. F. Burrett, D.S.O., 3rd Bn. Bank clerk, of Sydney; b. Grenfell, N.S.W., 21 Aug., 1894.

position, had recommended that it should be barricaded and then evacuated, but this had not been done. Goldenstedt now endeavoured to obtain reinforcements from Major Morshead, whose headquarters were next to him at Tubb's Corner, but Morshead had no men to spare. Goldenstedt consequently withdrew from the post. The enemy appears to have entered it shortly afterwards. He found only the dead lying beside their broken rifles. But from that time the Australian periscopes were no longer seen by the Turks in The Cup.

The men of the 1st Brigade were now not only almost completely exhausted but also sick with the stench of the dead and the dreadful conditions of the position. Yet they never wavered in their determination to hold on, though many fell asleep as they stood. Under these circumstances General Smyth decided to relieve those in the southern half of the position, in which the fighting had been and still was the heaviest. As the projected assault on Johnston's Jolly had not been undertaken, the 7th Battalion, which had been allotted for it, was in close reserve, and was ordered by Smyth to relieve the 1st and 2nd on the right. Titanic though the two days' struggle had been, the 3rd and 4th were still left in the central and northern sectors respectively, supported only by an admixture of men of the 1st and 12th, who had been fighting almost as continuously. The 7th began to march in at 1.30, and by 3 p.m. on August 8th occupied the southern half of the position.

Meanwhile, after the morning's attack had eased, an endeavour had been made to clear the trenches of dead, not merely in order to improve communication but for the health of the men.


During the remainder of the fighting this task was performed during almost every lull of the battle, the 5th Connaught Rangers, who were now brought into reserve at the Pimple,



Posts are shown thus •

- | | | |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------|
| 1 Ayfwards | 2 McDonalds | 3 Mackay's |
| 4 Lloyds | 5 Sasse's Sap | 6 Woodss |
| 7 Goldenstedt's | 8 Tubb's Corner | 9 Jacobss |
| 10 Pains | | |

being employed almost continuously in dragging the bodies to Brown's Dip for burial. During the midday hours of the 8th Major McConaghy, now commanding the 3rd in the centre of the position, determined to commence the important work of digging a new front line to connect the isolated saphead-posts in that sector. Between two of these, Woods's Post and Sasse's Sap, there lay a length of some old Turkish trench, half-hidden under the mullock-heaps thrown up by the digging of other trenches. It was decided to connect this with the posts on either side of it. Lieutenant McLeod was sent up Sasse's to determine the point where digging should be commenced on that side, while Woods did the same in his trench. The two were in the act of fixing the line, signalling to each other from their respective trenches, when McLeod fell, shot through the brain. Nevertheless by dint of constant labour by Captain Scott at the 4th Battalion end and Lieutenant Howell-Price from the side




of the 3rd Battalion a line was fixed and the old Turkish trench occupied. At about 3 p.m., when the connecting trench at Woods's end was almost complete, a sentry observed through his periscope a party of the enemy creeping forward from the brim of The Cup with the evident intention of making a rush, as on the previous day, straight for the centre of the Australian line. Woods had now with him only three survivors of his own party and Corporal McGrath, who had previously fought at Goldenstedt's. McGrath instantly got the reserve machine-gun into action, and, joking and laughing as he worked, swept away the attack.

It seems possible that this assault was identical with one prepared by Ali Riza and Zeki Bey under cover of sniping fire. According to the Turkish account, after a heavy sniping fire a number of bombs were thrown, and then a rush was made by a small party—only nine in all—over the edge of The

Cup towards Goldenstedt's and Tubb's Corner. A gallant young officer led it forward. But the instant it left the brim of The Cup it was met with machine-gun and rifle fire. The gun of the 1st New Zealand Battery, which was kept laid upon this position from Russell's Top, also opened at once. The Turkish officer was severely wounded by the shell-case, and all but one of his followers were hit. The assault failed, and it was realised that no similar attack from The Cup was likely to succeed.

About the time of this fighting the 7th Battalion came into the Pine. Part of it had been detached on other duties and, of its bombers who had been sent to the Pine on the night of August 7th, almost all had been killed or wounded. The 7th therefore had a fighting strength of only 13 officers and 511 of other ranks, and of these Lieutenant Tubb's³⁰ company was for the present kept in reserve at Brown's Dip. At the time when the battalion came in, the fighting had temporarily died down, and Colonel Elliott was able to go round his line ascertaining the situation. He found that the trenches were defended, as has been already said, by ten or twelve posts; but the men in these³¹ were so utterly exhausted that little information could be obtained from them. Those on the extreme right flank were still supported by two machine-guns of the 2nd Battalion, the crews of which, however, were so worn out that it seemed impossible for them to be of further value for the defence. Elliott divided his front between two companies, the left, under Lieutenant Symons,³² taking over the posts from Goldenstedt's to Woods's. On the extreme right, as Jacobs's Trench appeared to be dangerously isolated, he slightly increased the number of posts. One of these was



³⁰ Maj F. H. Tubb, V.C.; 7th Bn. Grazier; of Longwood, Vic; b. "St. Helena," Longwood, 28 Nov., 1881. Died of wounds, 20 Sept., 1917.

³¹ Belonging to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 12th Bns.

³² Capt. W. J. Symons, V.C.; 37th Bn. Traveller; of Brunswick, Vic; b. Brunswick, 10 July, 1888.

placed at the head of Jacobs's Trench behind the barricade and partly protected by the wire-netting screens along the parapet; a second was fifteen yards farther back, where head-cover had been placed over the trench; a third was in close support at the nearest bend of the old Turkish front line. At the first and third were stationed the machine-guns of the 2nd Battalion, and all three gave a magnificent command over the lower ridges and gullies towards Gaba Tepe.

While Elliott was still inspecting his trenches it was observed that the enemy was bringing further troops on to the entrenched ridges south of the position. The commanders of two posts in Jacobs's, Lieutenant Fisher⁸³ and Private Erikson,⁸⁴ both expert marksmen, were themselves shooting at these Turks, but they had not long been doing so when the enemy directed a sharp bombardment upon their posts. The shell-fire caused heavy loss. The right-flank company of the 7th consisted mainly of recruits, who had recently arrived and had been incorporated in that company under Lieutenant Dyett,⁸⁵ the officer who had come with them. They were inexperienced, but Elliott himself, going among them, steadied them, explaining that the bombardment would probably soon end, and that they would then deal with the enemy's infantry. The bombardment was followed by a heavy bomb-attack upon the post at Jacobs's barricade, which again caused much loss. Fisher, Erikson, and many others⁸⁶ had by this time been killed or wounded. The trenches were overcrowded with men, among whom the grenades exploded murderously. Though this congestion was partly due to inexperience it was also largely due to a shortage in the supply of bombs from the Beach, which caused the officers at the front to fear that the enemy might at any moment rush the trenches. In consequence the 7th at first kept its men crowded near the posts, in order to be ready to repel any attack. But the losses caused by that policy were so heavy that Colonel Elliott presently issued orders to have the garrison thinned out and most of the men kept back under shelter.

⁸³ Lieut. W. Fisher; 7th Bn. Plumber; of Frankston, Vic.; b. Kangaroo Flat, Vic., 7 May, 1877. Died, 29 Oct., 1938. He was one of nine brothers, all of whom enlisted.

⁸⁴ Pte J. Erikson (No. 1749, 7th Bn.). Boat builder; of Geelong, Vic.; b. Farlof, Sweden, 1872. Died of wounds, 12 Aug., 1915.


⁸⁵ Capt. Sir Gilbert Dyett, C.M.G.; 7th Bn. Auctioneer and salesman; subsequently Federal President, Returned Sailors' and Soldiers' Imperial League of Australia; of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Bendigo, 23 June, 1891.

⁸⁶ Including Fisher's brother (J. M. Fisher), a corporal of the 7th.

At 7 o'clock in the evening the attack, which had been intermittent throughout the afternoon, was renewed against the whole of the southern sector. It was especially violent at Jacobs's Trench and the neighbouring part of the new right-flank line, and also at what had been Goldenstedt's Post, now held by a portion of Lieutenant Symons's company. Here the enemy's bomb-throwers were sheltered by a few beams of head-cover which had given partial protection to Goldenstedt's men and from beneath which there was now the greatest difficulty in ejecting the enemy. The Australian losses were heavy, and the Turks again and again succeeded in forcing their way over the low barricade into the main position. Symons, however, kept his reserve bombers and other supports in a small dugout near by, the entrance of which had been protected against bombs by a wire-netting door. The sole duty of these reserves was to clear the position when the enemy entered it. After a struggle lasting most of the night the Turkish bombers were at about 2 a.m. finally driven from their head-cover, and the situation eased.

Meanwhile in Jacobs's Trench, Lieutenant Dyett having been severely wounded, Lieutenant West⁸⁷ was placed in command; and since the fighting at Tubb's Corner also urgently required superintendence, Lieutenant Tubb, commanding the reserve company of the 7th, was brought in from the Pimple to take charge, half his company at the same time coming into the Pine to support. As casualties occurred at Tubb's Corner and in the new flank-trench, his men were drafted into the posts, until they gradually formed the garrison of that sector.

About 10.30 on the night of August 8th the fighting at Jacobs's had died down, and towards morning the struggle




⁸⁷ Lieut. J. M. West; 7th Bn School teacher; of St. Kilda, Vic.; b. Mooroopna, Vic., 17 Feb., 1889.

farther north also subsided. But as the sky began to pale, the enemy's troops could at several points be seen moving, evidently in preparation for an important assault. What appeared to be skirmishing lines came out of The Cup and crept forward to positions behind the parapets of the Turkish trench, while there was a stealthy advance of other parties along those saps which ran into the Australian front line.


On this fourth and last day of acute struggle in the Pine the Australian position was held in the north by the 4th Battalion; in the centre by the 3rd; and in the southern and largest sector by the 7th, whose front had now been, in effect, sub-divided by Colonel Elliott into three commands—Symons's, Tubb's, and West's. In order to give further support to West's almost isolated posts in Jacobs's Trench, Elliott had caused a position for a supporting post to be specially constructed in the new flank-trench where it ran behind and parallel to Jacobs's. For this purpose a bay was dug with a shelving wall, against which the garrison could lie looking out to the southward.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of August 9th there burst from the enemy's positions around the Pine and also from Johnston's Jolly intense machine-gun and rifle fire.

All the periscopes of the watching sentries were quickly shattered. Bayonets were broken. Sandbags, torn and ripped, emptied themselves and then slipped into the trenches, and every spare man had to be engaged in replacing them. Under cover of this there fell upon Lone Pine a most violent general attack, extending, upon this occasion, as far north as Sasse's Sap. The northern wing of this assault was directed against the junction of the 3rd and 4th Battalions, which had held their respective sectors continuously since the original attack. The enemy first bombed back the men on the post in Sasse's, but was counter-attacked with grenades and driven out. A little later, however,



he again forced his way over the barricade, which was only 4 feet 6 inches in height, and came up the sap which led somewhat up the hill directly to the heart of the Pine, where were advanced-headquarters of the 1st Brigade and those of the 3rd Battalion. Lieutenant Howell-Price, adjutant of the 3rd, looking over the top of the headquarters' trench, saw the enemy streaming up the sap and hurriedly instructed a few men³⁸ to scramble on to the parapet, while he himself went to the end of Sasse's, where, fifteen yards away, was the head of a column of Turks advancing three deep. Price, who was supported by General Smyth, Major McConaghy, and one of the brigade staff, fired several shots into the enemy. The Turks were headed by no leader—though an officer's voice could be heard apparently urging them from the rear—and they were too astonished to act quickly. One whipped up his rifle but missed Price; another, shot by Private Ward,³⁹ dropped a bomb which exploded and killed two more. Others again, leaning high over the parapet and bombing into the 4th Battalion sector, were shot down by the handful of Australian soldiers who, by Price's orders, were actually lying out on the surface overlooking Sasse's. One of them, protecting himself with a few sandbags, lay in the open informing his officer where to throw bombs. A dangerous assault upon the centre was thus driven back.⁴⁰



Southward, along the whole front of the Pine, the attack was furious. In Woods's Trench, Lieutenant Edwards, of Symons's company, after himself shooting at least eight Turks, was firing over the trench into the thick of the enemy, when


³⁸ These appear to have comprised Lieut. E. W. G. Wren, Sgt. W. Adams, Ptes. P. H. Ward, V B Perkins, T. Jenkins, and J. Hamilton.

³⁹ Sgt. P. H. Ward, D.C.M., M.M. (No. 1843, 3rd Bn.). Labourer; of Sydney; b. Ipswich, Eng., 13 Aug. 1895.

⁴⁰ For his exceptional coolness in getting up on the parapets and shooting down the enemy's bombers, Pte. J. Hamilton (of Penshurst, N.S.W.) was awarded the Victoria Cross.

he was killed.⁴¹ Lieutenant Hamilton⁴² of the same company was wounded near by. Symons himself took charge in the even heavier fighting which had again broken out at Goldenstedt's, farther south. Here, by throwing the big Lotbinière bombs (slabs of gun-cotton tied to a small board shaped like a hairbrush), he temporarily subdued the enemy; but he was soon summoned by Colonel Elliott for even more pressing work, and Lieutenant Tubb, who till then had been at the next post, Tubb's Corner, became responsible for Symons's Post at the barricaded entrance of Goldenstedt's Trench.

Tubb had at that position ten men, eight of whom were on the parapet, while two corporals, Webb⁴³ and Wright,⁴⁴ were told to remain on the floor of the trench in order to catch and throw back the enemy's bombs, or else to smother their explosion by throwing over them Turkish overcoats which were lying about the trenches. A few of the enemy, shouting "Allah!", had in the first rush scrambled into the Australian trench, but had been shot or bayoneted. Tubb and his men now fired at them over the parapet, shooting all who came up Goldenstedt's Trench or who attempted to creep over the open. Tubb, using his revolver, exposed himself recklessly over the parapet, and his example caused his men to do the same. "Good boy!" he shouted, slapping the back of one of them who by kneeling on the parapet had shot a sheltering Turk. As the same man said



⁴¹ Lieut. B. N. W. Edwards; 7th Bn. Civil engineer, of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Bendigo, 27 March, 1894. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915. (Edwards felt certain that he would meet his death in this action. He had therefore importuned Symons to be allowed to write a letter to his people, and was at last given permission. Having finished the letter, he returned to his post. The attack came almost immediately, and Edwards fought gaily, without a thought of himself, until he was killed.)

⁴² Capt. A. N. Hamilton; 7th Bn. Bank clerk; of Korong Vale, Vic.; b. Korong Vale, 16 March, 1885.


⁴³ Cpl. H. Webb, D.C.M. (No. 509, 7th Bn.). Groom; of Essendon, Vic.; b. Newmarket, Vic., 1891. Died of wounds, 9 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁴ Cpl. F. Wright (No. 1062, 7th Bn.). Labourer; of Melbourne; b. Clifton Hill, Vic., 1889. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

later: "With him up there you couldn't think of getting your head down."

But one by one the men who were catching bombs were mutilated. Wright clutched at one which burst in his face and killed him. Webb, an orphan from Essendon, continued to catch them, but presently both his hands were blown away and, after walking out of the Pine, he died at Brown's Dip. At one moment several bombs burst simultaneously in Tubb's recess. Four men in it were killed or wounded; a fifth was blown down and his rifle shattered. Tubb, bleeding from bomb-wounds in arm and scalp, continued to fight, supported in the end only by a Ballarat recruit, Corporal Dunstan,⁴⁵ and a personal friend of his own, Corporal Burton⁴⁶ of Euroa. At this stage there occurred at the barricade a violent explosion, which threw back the defenders and tumbled down the sandbags. It was conjectured that the Turks had fired an explosive charge with the object of destroying the barrier. Tubb, however, drove them off, and Dunstan and Burton were helping to rebuild the barrier when a bomb fell between them, killing Burton and temporarily blinding his comrade. Tubb obtained further men from the next post, Tubb's Corner; but the enemy's attack weakened, the Turks continuing to bomb and fire rifles into the air, but never again attempting to rush the barricade.⁴⁷

Meanwhile the struggle in Jacobs's Trench had been at least as fierce. The support which was looked for from the specially constructed post in the new flank-trench⁴⁸ had failed. The supporting post had indeed been duly manned. But at day-break its garrison, looking out to the south, was visible to the enemy in its rear on Johnston's Jolly.



⁴⁵ Lieut. W. Dunstan, V.C.; 7th Bn. Clerk, of Ballarat, Vic.; b. Ballarat, 8 March, 1895.

⁴⁶ Cpl. A. S. Burton, V.C. (No. 384, 7th Bn.). Ironmonger; of Euroa, Vic., b. Kyneton, Vic., 1893. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁷ As a result of this fight Tubb, Burton, and Dunstan were awarded the Victoria Cross.

⁴⁸ See p. 558.

who turned upon it a machine-gun. As its fire traversed the post, the men appeared to lean forward, their heads upon the parapet, and for the rest of the day the garrison lay there dead. Jacobs's Trench was thus as isolated as on the previous day. Soon after the attack began, Lieutenant West, who was in charge of it, was wounded, but a private named Shadbolt⁴⁹ continued to hold it single-handed until Lieutenant Young⁵⁰ and a few men were sent by Elliott to the place. These for a time kept back the enemy; but before long every man in the party was killed or wounded, Shadbolt losing an eye by a Turkish bomb. A platoon of the 12th under Lieutenant Woodhouse⁵¹ was hurried from the other end of the Pine,⁵² but its commander was soon killed. Elliott finally sent to Jacobs's trench his adjutant, Lieutenant Bastin,⁵³ and the regimental sergeant-major, W. S. Smith.⁵⁴ The enemy had by then entered the trench, but Bastin, leading a rush, drove them out. His arm, however, was shattered by a bullet, and soon after he had been sent to the rear news reached Colonel Elliott that the post had been lost.

Elliott had remarked that throughout the heavy fighting on the left the reports coming from Lieutenant Symons, who was in charge there, had been invariably cheerful. In this emergency, therefore, he sent for Symons, handed him his own revolver, and ordered him to retake Jacobs's Trench. "I don't expect to see you again," he said, "but we must not lose that post."

Symons, who had left his own posts in charge of 'Tubb and Corporals Wadeson⁵⁵ and Ball,⁵⁶ now went to Jacobs's

⁴⁹ Pte L. J. Shadbolt (No. 649, 7th Bn.) Labourer; of Castlemaine, Vic.; b. Castlemaine, 1894.

⁵⁰ Capt. H. H. Young; 7th Bn. Farmer, of Stuartmill, Vic.; b. Stuartmill, 17 Apr., 1887.

⁵¹ Lieut. T. J. Woodhouse; 12th Bn. Farmer; of Turner's Marsh, Tas.; b. Shrewsbury, Shropshire, Eng., 29 Oct., 1889. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915. [Woodhouse appears to have been killed in the portion of this trench afterwards lost by the Australians. Pte. J. C. Vaughan (belonging to Queenstown, Tas.) of the 12th was prominent in the fighting.]

⁵² Capt. McPherson's company of the 12th had been sent to support the 4th Bn., and this platoon of it was diverted.

⁵³ Lieut.-Col. H. E. Bastin, M.C.; 7th Bn. Commands 8th Div. Cav. Regt., A.I.F., 1940. Plumber, of Melbourne, b. Richmond, Vic., 17 June, 1895.

⁵⁴ Sgt. W. S. Smith (No. 766, 7th Bn.). Engine-driver; of Bendigo, Vic.; b. Richmond, Vic., 1891.

⁵⁵ Lieut. J. H. Wadeson, M.C.; 59th Bn. Grocer; of Tatura, Vic.; b. Tatura, 23 Oct., 1889. Died 6 Feb., 1940.

⁵⁶ Sgt. G. Ball, D.C.M. (No. 881, 7th Bn.). Clerk; of Rutherglen, Vic.; b. St. Petersburg, Russia, 1892. Killed in action, 5 Nov., 1916.



AUSTRALIAN SENTRY ON GUARD IN ONE
 OF THE BARRICADED SAPS IN LONE PINE
 AFTER THE FIGHT

Aust War Memorial Official Photo
 No G 1127




CAPTAIN ALFRED SHOUT, 1ST
 BATTALION, AIF

Aust War Memorial Official Photo
 No G 1128



AIR-PHOTOGRAPH OF LONE PINE BEFORE THE FIGHT

*Lent by Lieut-Col C H Butler, R A F
Aust War Memorial Collection No A2102
Taken 20th June, 1915*





AIR-PHOTOGRAPH OF LONE PINE AFTER THE FIGHT

(The blank space at the south-eastern corner is not covered by any photograph of this date. The circular spots are flaws in the negative.)

*British Air Force Photograph, taken about September, 1915
Aust War Memorial Collection No G1534an*

To face p 563



KEYS TO PHOTOGRAPHS ON OPPOSITE PAGE

Trench, drove out the enemy—shooting two with his revolver—and rebuilt the barricade. Then, as the Turks were attacking the post from three sides, he asked Elliott's leave to abandon it. This being given, he withdrew his men under the overhead cover at its western end, leaving fifteen yards of open trench to the enemy. The Turks, continuing the attack, twice set fire to this head-cover, but on each occasion Symons, leading a rush, drove them back and extinguished the flames.⁵¹ An attempt by the enemy to encircle him by rushing up the old No-Man's Land in his rear was driven off by fire both from the Pimple and the Pine.

At an early stage in that morning's attack the reserve companies of the 12th Battalion had been sent into the Pine, a part of them reinforcing the 7th; and at 6 o'clock General Walker himself went forward to see the position. At 6.30 the 4th Battalion reported that the Turkish attack had failed in the northern half of the Pine, and ten minutes later it became clear that it had also failed in the southern half. As the enemy was showing signs of demoralisation, Walker forthwith ordered up the 1st Battalion with a view to delivering, if possible, an immediate counter-stroke. But, as was usual in the experience of the A.I.F., no such opportunity arrived, or, if it did, it had vanished before the reinforcements came, and the order was therefore countermanded. The 1st Battalion was, however, brought in again two hours later to relieve the 3rd, and the 5th at midday relieved the 7th.

Immediately after the 3rd had been withdrawn the attack was renewed. The enemy was shortly afterwards found to be in occupation of a great part of Sasse's Sap, and Captain Sasse determined to clear it. He took a rifle, arranged that three men carrying sandbags should accompany him and others follow closely, and led them down the trench. Coming on a number of the enemy who were engaged in firing in another direction, he shot down more than a dozen, and by firing over the sandbags thrown down by his men enabled a barricade to be built. He was elated by this achievement, and in the afternoon he and Captain Shout decided that they could carry it farther.

⁵¹ He also recovered a machine-gun which had been abandoned, being buried in the debris of the evacuated trench. For his leadership on this day Symons was awarded the Victoria Cross.

Having got together eight men to carry sandbags and bombs, after sufficient reconnaissance they thrust down the slight barricade and advanced along the trench, the two abreast, Shout bombing and Sasse shooting. Yells and the scuffle of arms and accoutrements round the next bend informed them of the effect upon the enemy. They advanced in this manner for several short stages, rebuilding a barricade at the end of each, and had just sighted a suitable point for the final barrier when Shout, who was fighting with a splendid gaiety, lit three bombs at once as a prelude to making the final dash. The third burst in his hand, destroying it and shattering one side of his face and body. Carried to the rear, still cheerful, he sat up and drank a pannikin of tea, vowing that he would soon recover; but his brave life ended on the hospital ship.⁵⁸ The original position in Sasse's was never wholly regained, although fighting continued till dusk, when it eased; the 4th Battalion, which had been in the northern sector since the commencement of the offensive, was then relieved by the 2nd Battalion and part of the 7th Light Horse. Bombing continued throughout the night in all sectors, but especially in the southern, where Captain Hooper of the 5th was killed in leading the fight much as Shout had done.

That night the Turkish counter-attack upon Lone Pine ended. Orders were, as a matter of fact, issued on the Turkish side that no further assault was to be delivered there. It had become evident to Turkish officers even in the thick of the struggle that the real danger was elsewhere. "All these days," said Zeki Bey afterwards, "I was looking over my shoulder at the Anzac shells bursting on the reverse slope of Chunuk Bair, and, although the situation in Lone Pine was critical, I could scarcely keep my eyes on it. I knew that things must be happening on Chunuk Bair which were more important by far." His battalion, the 1/57th, was relieved, utterly exhausted, on August 9th; and during the following days all available portions of the 5th Turkish Division (which had been the main reserve used in the Pine) were despatched to support the hard-pressed Gallipoli *gendarmes* north of

⁵⁸ Shout was awarded the Victoria Cross. (Capt. A. J. Shout, V.C., M.C., 1st Bn Carpenter and joiner; of Darlington, N.S.W.; b. New Zealand, 8 Aug, 1882. Died of wounds, 11 Aug, 1915). A few minutes after Shout's counter-attack the gallant Maj. Kindon was terribly wounded by one of the enemy's shells.

Suvla.⁵⁹ The demonstration at Lone Pine⁶⁰ had cost the 1st Australian Division over 2,000 men.⁶¹ Some of these losses were consequent upon overcrowding, but the greater number were incurred in sheer hand-to-hand fighting (which throughout this war was almost synonymous with "bombing"), certainly the heaviest of its kind in which Australian troops ever took part. The enemy's loss was heavier. If the Australians at times kept their trenches overcrowded, the Turks consistently did so. The 16th Division is said⁶² to have lost 6,930 men in five days, "the majority resulting from the Lone Pine fighting"; and of these casualties, 5,000, according to Zeki Bey, occurred in or round The Cup.

The blow which had been dealt by the 1st Australian Division was thus a terrible one. And precisely because it was so heavy, and delivered at so vital a point, this "demonstration" was certainly the most effective within the experience of infantry commanders of the A.I.F. It drew upon itself the whole of the immediate Turkish reserves, and for three days monopolised Essad Pasha's attention. How far it assisted towards the attainment of the aims of the offensive must be gathered from the narrative which follows.

⁵⁹ Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 113. It is not, however, definitely stated whether the 13th or 15th Regts. of that division from Lone Pine were included in the "available" units.


⁶⁰ Turkish officers afterwards referred to Lone Pine simply as "The Demonstration."

⁶¹ The chief losses were

	Officers.	Others.
1st Bn. (went in with 21 officers, 799 others)	.. 7	.. 333
2nd Bn. (went in with 22 officers, 560 others)	.. 21	.. 409
3rd Bn. (went in with 23 officers, 736 others)	.. 21	.. 490
4th Bn. (went in with 20 officers, 722 others)	.. 15	.. 459
7th Bn. (went in with 14 officers, 680 others)	.. 12	.. 342
12th Bn. (went in with 24 officers, 998 others)	.. 4	.. 164

The commanders of the 2nd (Col. Scobie) and 3rd (Col. Brown) were killed, and Col. Macnaghten of the 4th severely wounded. Some wounds were not reported. The 3rd Bn., for example, had every officer hit—including the medical officer and the chaplain (the Dean of Sydney)—except the quartermaster.

⁶² In the *Short History of Turkish Operations* issued by the Historical Section of the Turkish General Staff, which also states: "The enemy completely achieved the object he had in view in making this offensive. Not only did he capture the Kanlı Sirt (Lone Pine) line, but he drew into the fighting at Kanlı Sirt, at this very critical moment, three regiments from the reserves of the Northern Group."



LONE PINE AFTER THE BATTLE OF 6TH-10TH AUGUST, 1915

British trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.




CHAPTER XX

THE NIGHT ADVANCE ON SARI BAIR

At 8.30, immediately after the fall of darkness, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade began to move to its task of sweeping the foot-hills north of Anzac.¹ This was the preliminary to the whole northern advance, which was the crucial movement of the offensive and, indeed, the most important in the whole campaign.

The country on the northern flank of Anzac may be compared to a left hand laid on a table palm downwards; the fingers would represent the spurs, the finger-tips their seaward edges, and the metacarpal prominences the heights of the main range. Only the two southernmost finger-nails, Outposts Nos. 1 and 2, would be occupied by the Anzac troops, the enemy holding defences on the knuckles and upon the other nails. It may be said roughly that the task of the mounted rifles was to sweep the enemy's posts from the three southernmost fingers,² and thus allow the right assaulting column³ to move up the intervening gullies to Chunuk Bair, and the left covering and assaulting columns to issue into the hills farther north preparatory to the attack upon Hill 971. In particular the duty of the mounted rifles was to seize Old No. 3 (the lower knuckle) and Table Top (the middle knuckle) on the same spur as No. 2 Outpost, together with Destroyer Hill, a southern outlier of that spur, and also Bauchop's Hill (the finger third from the south), including Walden Point, a strongly held foot-hill (its finger-nail). The whole brigade




¹ See p. 457

² This figure only serves as a rough illustration. Sniper's Nest on the southernmost finger was to be ignored, while the ridge north of it contained three posts on different heights (Old No. 3, Table Top, and Destroyer Hill, all of which were to be captured).

³ For the plan of attack see pp. 457-63

had on August 4th been concentrated on Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts,⁴ where 126 of its sick, detailed by medical officers for "light duty," next day took over the front trenches while the remainder of the brigade rested. The Auckland, Otago, and Canterbury Regiments, which were to move out first—against Old No. 3, Bauchop's, and Walden Point respectively—rested behind No. 2; Wellington and the Maoris, most of whom were to pass through later and seize the precipitous Table Top, were behind Fisherman's Hut or No. 1.

The ruse by which the formidable defences of Old No. 3 Post, 450 yards inland from No. 2, were to be taken, had already for six weeks been prepared by the nightly programme of the destroyers.⁵ At 8.30 p.m. the Auckland Mounted Rifles began to file up the valley south of No. 2 Outpost, heading inland. Rifles were not loaded; the bayonet alone was to be used. At 9 p.m. the destroyer opened her usual bombardment on Old No. 3, drowning the noise of the leading squadrons then arriving at the foot of the hill. They deployed facing up the slope, the 11th (North Auckland) on the left, the 3rd (Auckland) on the right, the 4th (Waikato) in rear. There was an interval of ten minutes while the men closed up, and then, still under cover of the bombardment, they went up the slope. A picquet of four Turks was presently bayoneted and passed over, some New Zealanders being wounded in the scuffle, but no alarm being given. The Aucklanders reached the trenches on the crest and lay down, almost touching the sandbags, the enemy being still unaware of their presence. The destroyer was now by arrangement firing her shells so as to burst over the slope in rear of the post, but kept her searchlight turned full on the place. At 9.30 the brilliant beam



⁴ In the text of this chapter, to avoid confusion with Old No. 3, No. 3 Outpost proper is included under the designation of No. 2, of which it practically formed a part. In the maps, where no such danger exists, the proper designation is retained.

⁵ See pp. 458-9

was switched off, and in the darkness the New Zealanders, with a tremendous cheer,⁶ clambered into the trenches.

Their success was complete. The defences had been solidly constructed opposite No. 2 Outpost, the trenches roofed with heavy timber; and the front, which was separated from No. 2 by a narrowing of the crest, defended with thick wire-entanglements, in the gaps of which twenty-eight iron box-mines had been sown. But the New Zealanders had approached the position from the flank; and, when they jumped into it, although they found a Turk at a switchboard in a front-line dugout to which were laid the wires from the mines, they bayoneted him before he could complete the circuit.

Only some forty of the enemy were in the trenches, and most of the North Auckland squadron, leaving the front line to Waikato, who followed, ran jumping over the saps till they reached the rear slope. Here they came upon most of the garrison, who, apparently according to custom, had been resting there during the nightly bombardment. These Turks, and several hundred others who had been encamped behind the hill on the slopes of Chailak Dere, fled wildly, the Aucklanders bayoneting and bombing them.⁷ After the single cheer there was little noise except the rifle-fire of the Turks.⁸ About 100 of the enemy were killed, while the Aucklanders lost only Lieutenant H. F. E. Mackesy⁹ and 6 men killed and 15 wounded. Within a quarter of an hour they had worked through all the trenches, and by 10 p.m. not a Turk, except a few prisoners, remained alive within the position. The Auckland Regiment spent the rest of the night transforming Old No. 3 into a New Zealand post, facing upwards towards Chunuk Bair.

At 8.45, while the Aucklanders were approaching Old No. 3, the Wellington Mounted Rifles were following them into the Sazli Dere. After waiting near its mouth until 9.30, the moment of Auckland's assault, the Wellingtons moved along

⁶This cheer, which was against orders, was (according to one report) raised by some Maoris who were on the right of the attack. It was certainly taken up by all present, the impulse to shout, upon such an occasion, being very strong.

⁷Sgt.-Maj. J. G. Milne (of Waiuku, Auckland, N.Z.) killed or wounded five with one grenade as they ran.


⁸The New Zealanders also at Old No. 3 were allowed to fire when once the position had been taken.

⁹Lieut. H. F. E. Mackesy; Auckland Mtd. Rifles. Commercial traveller; of Whangarei, N.Z.; b Clifton, Kansas, U.S.A., 8 Dec., 1882. Killed in action, 6 Aug., 1915.

the valley. Their task was to storm up the almost sheer sides of Table Top; but before doing so they were to secure a long communication trench running obliquely across the *dere* from the rear of Old No. 3 to Destroyer Hill. The destroyer had shut off her light at 9.30, and was to turn it next, at 9.40, upon Table Top, which both she and the howitzers were to bombard until 10 o'clock. The hill was to be seized and picqueted by eleven.

At 10 o'clock, somewhat behind time, the leading squadron of Wellington, under Major Dick, came upon the communication trench. There were

Turks in it, who opened fire. The New Zealanders had been forbidden to shoot, and could only charge straight at the flashes. Four of them were killed, and Major Dick and seven others wounded, but the trench was seized. Two troops then turned along it to the



right and climbed the northern side of Destroyer Hill. This slope was in rear of the weak defences upon that height, since these faced southwards towards Anzac; but there were numerous dugouts and shelters in which Turks were resting. After 20 of the enemy had been bayoneted and 8 made prisoners, the Wellingtons reached and picqueted a trench on the summit. Meanwhile the other troops of Dick's squadron, turning left, had seized the communication trench leading to Old No. 3. The two remaining squadrons crossed it, and, marching farther up the gully, found themselves at the foot of Table Top.

This height stood boldly out into the valley, from which three of its sides rose. At the foot of its southern and south-eastern slopes the northern branch of the Sazli Dere descended sharply from its starting-point on Rhododendron Ridge. The southern slope, although very steep, was scrubby and not sheer. The eastern and north-eastern sides, however, had been worn into clay and gravel precipices almost as abrupt as those

100 0

500

1000 Yds

Map No. 15





THE FOOT-HILLS NORTH OF ANZAC, SHOWING THE POINTS OCCUPIED BY
THE MOUNTED RIFLES ABOUT MIDNIGHT ON AUGUST 6TH

British troops and trenches, red; Turkish, blue Height contours, 10 metres

of the Sphinx. From the northern edge of the hill a razor-edged ridge, precipitous on its southern side, connected Table Top with Old No. 3.

It had been intended to attack Table Top by working up its southern or scrub-covered slope. But the Wellingtons, turning into a side-branch of the gully, came up against the foot of the north-western side, which they began forthwith to climb. So sheer was the ascent¹⁰ that it soon became necessary for the men to cut themselves steps with their entrenching tools, zig-zagging upwards, after the manner of mountaineers. While they were thus engaged, a flare thrown by the Turks alighted on the razor-edge and set fire to a tuft of scrub, which blazed fiercely. For a moment every man paused, deeming it inevitable that the line of dark figures must be seen against the pale cliff. But no alarm followed. Cutting their way up the precipice, they came out upon the razor-edge at its junction with Table Top, twenty feet below the summit of the latter. The Turkish garrison, disturbed by the firing at Old No. 3 and Bauchop's, had gone down the Chailak Dere towards the fighting, and the mounted rifles found the summit of Table Top practically unoccupied. It proved to be a small scrub-covered plateau about an acre in extent, with a trench on its south-western edge. A few Turks (possibly a picquet) were bayoneted, and the trench was seized from the rear without opposition.




Patrols of the Wellingtons immediately found on the northern side of Table Top and of the razor-edge a broad track, well-graded and evidently much used, running above the

¹⁰ See Vol XII, plate 115

Chailak Dere from Rhododendron almost to the sea, and keeping, of course, always on that side of the ridge which was concealed from Anzac. A picquet was forthwith placed upon it, and several scouts were sent down the hillside with orders not to fire. Within half-an-hour twenty of the enemy had walked into the picquet and been made prisoners.¹¹

Thus Table Top, the steepest of all the enemy's outposts, had by midnight¹² been captured without any loss except that incurred at Destroyer Hill. Shortly after Auckland and Wellington had begun to move out south of No. 2 up the Sazli Dere, Otago and Canterbury, with some of the Maoris, were preparing to debouch on to the level foreshore north of that position. Otago was to advance northward until opposite the nearest spurs of Bauchop's (the next ridge north of No. 2), and then turn inland to attack it. Canterbury was to continue along the shore until opposite Walden Point, a half-detached

triangular hill forming the north-western extremity of Bauchop's, and then, similarly turning, seize the point, advance inland, and rejoin Otago farther east. The two regiments waited for the destroyer's light to be switched on to Table Top, and then moved out across the flat. It was known that there were Turkish posts on the foot-hills, several of them containing machine-guns, the first being on a low promontory called



"Wilson's Knob" immediately beyond the mouth of the Chailak Dere, north of No. 2 Outpost. Two small Nordenfeldt guns had during the last few days opened from behind Bauchop's Hill, as had also a pair of "75's." It was further known that bivouacs of the troops in the Turkish outposts and of their reserves, lay at the back of some of these ridges.

¹¹ A Turkish officer, plunging down the hill, avoided the bayonet of one of the sentries, who was not permitted to fire. The officer escaped.

¹² Lieut.-Col. Meldrum, in command, afterwards stated that the Wellington Mtd. Rifles reached Table Top at 10 55, and were in the trenches there by 11 p.m. Its capture was reported by telephone to Gen. Russell's H.Q. at Old No. 3 at 12 30 a.m. The time of the capture is given in the records of the brigade as 12.30.

The enemy had of late been heard constructing wire entanglements in the Chailak Dere, and it had been consequently arranged that, while Otago and Canterbury attacked the posts on Bauchop's beyond the valley, a few New Zealand engineers should remove the enemy's barbed-wire from its bed.


As soon as the Otagos, moving in column of troops, had crossed the Chailak, they wheeled so as to front inland, and closed upon the enemy's posts on the foot-hills facing the sea. The New Zealanders were seen and immediately fired on, but all knew the direction and the tactics to be followed. The 12th Squadron, which went farther than any other of its regiment along the foreshore before turning inland, rushed at the hill from its seaward flank and took the trenches for about 200 yards from its foot. The enemy had been startled by the cheer and the fighting at Old No. 3, and mostly fled before Otago reached them. Thirty or forty, however, were bayoneted. After the capture of each trench the troops re-formed as well as they were able, and advanced upon the next one. By the time the 12th Squadron had seized the foot-hill, the 5th and 7th, farther inland, had reached the top of Bauchop's, where the 12th joined them. Here the enemy's resistance greatly stiffened. In front of the 5th Squadron, but on the reverse slope, lay a considerable Turkish bivouac and headquarters, above which the enemy fought stubbornly. From the valley north of it there opened a 75-millimetre gun,¹³ not more than 600 yards distant, firing direct, though probably without much effect. Nevertheless heavy casualties began to occur, and the attack was for a time held up.

Meanwhile the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, issuing slightly behind the left flank of Otago, had moved northwards along the flat by the beach. The regiment advanced with two squadrons abreast and one, together with a platoon of Maoris, in support. Slightly ahead of the leading troops went a few scouts. As the regiment moved off, a picquet of four Turks was met. These, probably imagining that the oncoming party was a patrol, fought a bayonet duel with the Canterbury scouts, four men to four, neither side firing a shot. One New Zealander was wounded in the jaw and another in the chest; but all the Turks were killed.

¹³ One of the two recently emplaced in that valley. See p. 572.

Canterbury was then moving along the foreshore at a distance of only a few hundred yards from the foot-hills attacked by the Otagos; and, in passing below the beam of the destroyer's searchlight, it was apparently seen and fired on. At the same time there could be seen half-a-mile ahead, on Walden Point, the flash of a machine-gun and of rifles in trenches around the summit. Lieutenant-Colonel Findlay¹⁴ was wounded; but the regiment held straight on for the machine-gun. The 10th Squadron climbed directly towards it, thus for the moment avoiding its fire, since the barrel could not be sufficiently depressed. Simultaneously the 1st had

moved round to the right through the narrow pass separating Walden's from the north-western end of Bauchop's Hill, and thence charged at the gun from its rear. The magazines of their rifles were empty, and it was easy for the Turks to shoot them as they climbed the hill; near the gun there afterwards lay dead many sons of the oldest New Zealand settlers. Nevertheless the New Zealanders held to their orders,



firing no shot, and raising no cheer. The enemy could not tell from what quarter any part of this silent attack was coming, and the machine-gun was eventually rushed from the rear by the 1st Squadron, the Turks near it being bayoneted. The 10th Squadron swept northwards along the trench leading towards the Aghyl Dere. Having seized this position and four other small trenches on Walden Point, the Canterburys turned inland as ordered, crossed the pass between the two hills, and directed themselves in silence up the northern edge of Bauchop's. Trench after trench was rushed, almost without sound, the enemy's garrisons being utterly confused by these tactics. Those in the trenches were bayoneted, but some, found in rear of the positions, were captured. There was much close

¹⁴ Lieut.-Col. J. Findlay, C.B., D.S.O. Commanded Canterbury Mtd. Rifles, 1914/19. Farmer, of Ashburton, N.Z.; b. North Taieri, N.Z., 11 March, 1869.



THE NORTH FLANK OF ANZAC FROM WHICH THE NIGHT ATTACK ISSUED
The sap and the road leading to the left flank can easily be distinguished

*Admiralty Official Photograph
Aust War Memorial Collection No G410*





TABLE TOP (LEFT) AND PART OF RHODODENDRON, SHOWING THE ROAD
SUBSEQUENTLY MADE BY THE NEW ZEALANDERS

*Taken by Printing Section, G.H.Q., M.F.F.
Aust War Memorial Collection No G1534n*



OLD NO 3 POST SEEN FROM TABLE TOP, SHOWING THE RAZOR-EDGE
CONNECTING THE TWO

*Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1829
Taken in 1919*

To face p 575.

fighting, even wrestling. Major Hutton, who commanded the regiment after Findlay was hit, himself fought a bayonet duel in which, after lunging at his opponent four times, he fell, and was only saved by a companion who bayoneted the Turk. It was inevitable that in the numerous gullies the various squadrons should be much intermingled, but the men put themselves under any officer who was present. Individual Turks and even small armed parties were, of course, frequently left untouched in rear of the attack,¹⁵ since the advancing squadrons could not afford the time for a thorough search of the position. The complete silence preserved was very trying to the New Zealanders, inasmuch as, except for the bursts of Turkish rifle-fire, they had no knowledge of the progress of any other part of the attack. When the Canterburys, having seized four trenches upon Bauchop's, heard far across the ridges a loud cheer from their own side, their confidence was greatly increased.

This cheer, raised at 12.45, was heard by all the columns at that time making their way through the dark. It was at practically the same moment¹⁶ that the right flank of the Otago Mounted Rifles, which had met with such stubborn opposition in front of the Turkish headquarters on Bauchop's, delivered its final assault. Immediately after Canterbury had come up on the left the gallant Bauchop called: "Come along, boys, we'll charge!" He was at once mortally wounded through the spine; but the enemy's position was taken. On the down-slope in rear of it were found the bivouacs of two battalions. A Nordenfeldt gun was captured, together with the regimental stores. The field-gun in the valley beyond continued to fire,

¹⁵ Capt. Blair, adjutant of the Canterbury Mtd. Rifles, when on his way to the rear to find two troops which had gone astray, saw a party filing zigzag up the gully behind him. He was under the impression that these might be the missing men, when his orderly said: "Listen, they're Turks." Blair and his party (two Canterbury men and a Maori) slipped back into the bushes, and when the strangers approached it was seen that they were not wearing white armlets and patches. Fire was opened, four Turks falling dead and the remainder disappearing in the scrub. (Lieut.-Col. D. B. Blair, D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 3rd Auckland Bn., 1917; N.Z. M.G. Bn., 1918. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Christchurch, N.Z.; b. Wanganui, N.Z., 29 June, 1873.)

¹⁶ Whether the cheering came from the fight in Chailak Dere or from Bauchop's is uncertain. At 12.45 also a young New Zealander of the Canterburys, full of excitement, his bare forearms shining with perspiration and the point of his bayonet dark with blood, brought to Gen. Godley's H.Q. at No. 2 Outpost a message from Maj. Hutton. "We got into the trench on Bauchop's with the bayonet," he told those around him, "but the trench was mined, and the working party was blown up." The story of the mine may have been a common rumour of the battlefield. But the event is evidence of the hour at which Canterbury reached Bauchop's.

and Canterbury and Otago were about to send a party into the Aghyl Dere to capture it, when the infantry of the 4th Australian Brigade began to move through in that direction, commencing the second phase of the night's operations. The task was therefore handed over to the newcomers, but shortly afterwards a rattle of chains was heard in the dark as the Turks limbered up. The gun escaped.

It was 1.10 when Bauchop's Hill was taken. Otago had suffered sharp losses. Besides Colonel Bauchop, Captain Hay,¹⁷ Lieutenant MacKay,¹⁸ and 31 men had been killed, and Captain Paddon,¹⁹ Lieutenant Hargest,²⁰ and 63 others wounded.²¹ The loss incurred by Canterbury seems to have been smaller. The two regiments forthwith dug in along the north-eastern slopes of the hill to cover the advance of the infantry. At 1 a.m. progress had been sufficiently advanced for General Russell to report his line as Old No. 3 Post-Table Top-Bauchop's Hill.

By this magnificent feat of arms, the brilliance of which was never surpassed, if indeed equalled, during the campaign, almost the entire Turkish defence north of Anzac was for the moment swept aside and the way cleared for the infantry to advance up the valleys to Chunuk Bair. The opening move by the mounted rifles was undoubtedly that upon which the success of the offensive mainly depended. The operation was one which in its conception went flatly in the face of the principles laid down by British military authorities. "A thorough reconnaissance," said the *Field Service Regulations*, "is an essential prelude to a night advance or to a night assault. . . . Every commander who orders a night operation which is not preceded by a complete reconnaissance increases the risk of failure and incurs a heavy responsibility. . . . Reconnaissance from a distance is insufficient." It had been proved that in such operations there was extreme danger that various

¹⁷ Capt. B. S. Hay; Otago Mtd. Rifles. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Dunedin, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, 1879. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

¹⁸ Lieut. P. MacKay; Otago Mtd. Rifles. Farmer; of Otama, Southland, N.Z.; b. Otama, 24 July, 1890. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

¹⁹ Maj. C. J. S. W. Paddon; Otago Mtd. Rifles; b. Arkesden Hall, near Saffron Walden, Essex, Eng., 21 Apr., 1875.

²⁰ Lieut.-Col. J. Hargest, D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 2nd Otago Bn., 1918. Farmer; of Mandeville, Southland, N.Z.; b. Gore, N.Z., 4 Sept., 1891.

²¹ The mounted rifles regiments averaged only 360 strong before the offensive.

portions of the attacking force would lose touch, take a wrong direction, and even meet and fire upon other sections of their own side.


Yet the country through which Birdwood launched these troops had been explored only by picked scouts in a few daring expeditions. Its hills and valleys were so rugged and contorted that even after their capture men at first sometimes lost their way in them by day. Moreover the enemy's posts had to be attacked, not by a single advance on a straight front, but by several detachments moving by various intricate routes, in some cases to concentrate on the enemy's positions from widely different directions. For the maintenance of direction in the dark Birdwood depended almost solely upon the intelligence and experience of the New Zealand soldiers, while, to avoid the danger of friend firing upon friend, and also to conceal their attack from the enemy, they were to fight through to their respective objectives with rifles unloaded. It thus fell to them for several hours to bear down in complete silence, and with their bayonets alone, the opposition of an enemy who faced them with rifles and machine-guns.

What was demanded for such an operation was not a rigid military discipline but the highest degree of intelligent self-control, imposed on themselves by men understanding their task and determined to complete it. Thanks to those qualities an enterprise of extraordinary difficulty was carried through in almost exact accordance with the plan, except in one respect. From the commencement of the assault upon Bauchop's the whole subsequent operation fell little by little in arrear. That hill, which was to have been captured by 11 o'clock, was not cleared of the enemy until two hours later. Nevertheless the mounted rifles had broken the enemy's defence in time to allow the infantry every chance to reach the summit while the Turkish reserves were still held back by the 1st Australian Division's attack at Lone Pine.

The head of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which was to assault Chunuk Bair, arrived at No. 2 Outpost while the mounted rifles were clearing the ridges. The Otago Battalion, followed by the Wellington and Auckland, the 1st New Zealand Field Company, and the 26th Mountain Battery, was to move up the Chailak Dere; the Canterbury

Battalion was to follow the Sazli Dere. At the end of their climb the two columns were to converge on Rhododendron Ridge, and thence both assault Chunuk Bair, half-a-mile beyond.

It was estimated that the mounted rifles would have sufficiently cleared the hills on either side of the Chailak Dere by 10.30 p.m., at which hour the infantry was to start its advance. Arriving at 10.20 p.m., the Otagos duly emerged ten minutes later from the north of



No. 2 Outpost. The moment they left its shelter men began to fall, and, turning into Chailak Dere, the battalion ran straight into a barbed-wire entanglement and was fired on from a trench beyond. It appeared that the mounted rifles could not yet have accomplished their task, and, since the intention was that the valley should be cleared before the column entered it, the infantry was again halted under the shelter of No. 2 while waiting for the opposition to be overcome. After an hour's delay, it being still uncertain whether the way was clear, the order was given that the infantry itself should advance and seize the trenches obstructing its passage. It was then found that these trenches, which lay mainly on the southern slope of Bauchop's, were not strongly held, being manned by a mere handful of Turks who had dribbled into them after the mounted rifles had passed.²² These Otagos had to rush, after which they proceeded up the valley. Parties of the enemy still remained in several positions, and many bullets were flying. While leading his men beneath the side of Bauchop's Hill for better shelter, Lieutenant Nisbet²³ was shot dead, and,


²² It is stated that the wire impeding the passage of the infantry was not the lowest entanglement, which had been duly cut through by the N Z Fld. Troop and Maoris under Lieut. A. N. Oakey (of Christchurch, N.Z.), but another entanglement somewhat higher up, behind which about twenty of the enemy had collected.

²³ Lieut. T. H. Nisbet; Otago Bn. Law student; of Dunedin, N Z, b Hawthorn, Vic., 1 Aug, 1892. Killed in action, 7 Aug, 1915.

as the battalion approached Table Top it came under a considerable amount of unaimed fire, by which Captain Wilkinson²⁴ was wounded.

It will be remembered that the Wellington Mounted Rifles, after occupying the summit of Table Top, had placed a picquet on a road winding along the southern side of the Chailak Dere. This position the head of the infantry column was now approaching, and the policy of permitting no shooting during the attack was completely vindicated. No enemy had come down the road from Chunuk Bair; but, as the night progressed, several small parties from farther down the valley walked into the hands of the Wellington picquet and were captured. About 1.30 a.m. sixty Turks, retiring before the Otago infantry, came up the track two abreast, marching at their ease, in complete ignorance of the existence of any opponents in their rear, and were also made prisoners. Shortly afterwards the Otago infantry, working up the bed of the valley, neared the foot of Table Top immediately below the mounted rifles.

On the slope of the Chailak Dere, not far from Table Top but unknown to the mounted rifles, there existed a bivouac of the enemy. As the infantry approached this slope, expecting to find it already cleared by the mounted rifles, they were met, as has been already related, by a fairly heavy, though not very effective fusillade. The leading companies were therefore deployed along the foot of the hill, and headed up the slope. They were approaching the bivouac and were about to rush it, when a number of the enemy in the position, about 200 in all, suddenly raised a cheer, piled arms, and commenced clapping their hands. Individual Turks rushed to the New Zealand officers, kissing them and grasping their hands.



²⁴ Capt R. W. Wilkinson; Otago Bn. Company manager; of Wellington, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, N.Z., 3 Sept., 1879. Seriously wounded, 7 Aug., 1915; died, 22 Sept., 1915.

This extraordinary demonstration, which for a moment puzzled the arriving infantry, was intended to ensure kindly treatment on the part of their captors. Immediately after taking these prisoners the three leading companies of the Otago Battalion met the Wellington Mounted Rifles. The gallant officer who led the former, Major Statham,²⁵ explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Meldrum of the Wellingtons that, being uncertain what point the battalion had reached, and whether Table Top was or was not occupied, he had thought best to seize it first and ask for orders afterwards. As he spoke with Meldrum, the dawn was beginning to break. Meldrum pointed out Rhododendron Ridge, separated only by a short and easily passable neck from the point where they stood, and Statham led his company straight on to it. On Rhododendron Otago was to meet the Canterbury infantry, which should have come up the Sazli Dere, and both were to move thence against Chunuk Bair. But there was as yet no sign of Canterbury on the ridge.

The Canterbury Battalion had a shorter distance to cover than the rest, and had therefore been ordered to move from bivouac at the tail of the brigade. It had been directed to debouch in the Sazli Dere at 10.45, a quarter of an hour after the start of the Chailak Dere column. But, as has been seen, the head of the latter had been checked immediately upon emerging from No. 2 Outpost, and the whole brigade in rear had consequently been halted in the communication sap. At midnight the New Zealand infantry had still been filing endlessly through it; and the Canterbury Battalion, which should have moved out south of that post at 10.45, had not actually done so until two hours later. At 2 o'clock its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Hughes,²⁶ reported to General Godley that he had sent on his guides²⁷ and was waiting for them to return. Godley replied that he should not wait but move on at once to his objective. On the previous afternoon Hughes and his company commanders had obtained from

²⁵ Maj. F. H. Statham; Otago Bn Accountant, of St. Leonard's, Otago, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, N.Z., 31 Dec., 1879. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

²⁶ Lieut.-Col. J. G. Hughes, C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded Canterbury Bn., 1915. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Wellington, N.Z.; b. Bluff, N.Z., 12 March, 1866.

²⁷ Apparently to reconnoitre

No. 2 Outpost a partial view of the line of their projected advance, but they now almost immediately lost their way. Very near its mouth the Sazli Dere branches into two, the northern gully—which had been followed by the mounted rifles to Old No. 3 and Table Top—leading to the heart of Rhododendron Ridge, the other branch continuing along the southern side of Rhododendron to its head near Chunuk Bair. Between these branches lay Destroyer Hill, the steep southernmost prong of Rhododendron. Canterbury, which should have moved up the main course of the northern gully, lost its way in one of the folds. Upon realising that a mistake had been made, Hughes passed back an order for the battalion to retrace its steps. As the column returned, the companies farthest up the ravine discovered the proper direction and again moved forward along it. But the two companies nearest to Anzac, receiving a mutilated version of Hughes's message, went back to bivouac.



On Destroyer Hill, past which the leading companies now moved, Turks were everywhere found, but a party of men was presently heard talking loudly in English. It proved to be a number of the Wellington Mounted Rifles, who had been picqueting the hill and were now joining their regiment. About eighty of the enemy had remained in rear of these New Zealanders, neither side knowing of the other's presence, the Turks indeed being still in shelters on the hillside apparently unaware of anything that had happened during the night.²⁸ They were rushed with practically no opposition, a few bayoneted, and fifty captured. Moving on, part of the head of the column found itself about dawn on what was described by one present as "a frightfully precipitous ridge, where to our great delight we found Otago and Colonel Moore." This was the upper part of the gully between Rhododendron and Table Top. The half of Canterbury which was still with Hughes moved, in accordance with the plan, on to Rhododendron. The

²⁸ Maj. Critchley-Salmonson came upon a Turkish officer whose batman was in the act of laying out breakfast


other half, which had returned to bivouac, became aware of its mistake and, about this hour, set out again from Anzac. Thus about dawn the heads of both sections of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade were coming out upon Rhododendron Ridge, with Chunuk Bair, the main goal of the offensive, only a thousand yards distant. At last one of the vital objectives of the Dardanelles Campaign was not merely within view but within reach. The orders of the New Zealand column were to attack it.

At this stage of the narrative it is necessary to turn back and follow the progress of General Cox's column, which had been simultaneously making its way farther north into the Aghyl Dere, with a view to seizing Hill 971 by way of Abdel Rahman Bair. Just as the way up the Sazli and Chailak valleys had been opened for the New Zealand Infantry Brigade by a covering force of the mounted rifles, so the movement into the Aghyl Dere was to be protected by half of the 40th Brigade of the New Army which was to seize and hold the spur on the farther side of that valley. This ridge, Damakjelic Bair, was comparatively low and lightly occupied, and could be reached by marching along the foreshore under cover of the mounted rifles' attack. A few minutes before 9.30 the two battalions allotted for this task, the 4th South Wales Borderers and the 5th Wiltshire, under Brigadier-General Travers,²⁹ marching according to arrangement on the open road near the beach so as to keep clear of the New Zealand infantry in the sap, began to reach No. 2 Outpost. As soon as the mounted rifles had well launched their attack upon the hills facing the shore, the British troops moved northwards along the intervening flats. Here, at the cutting by which the road crossed the Chailak creek, they ran into men of the mounted rifles who were using the same passage, but after some mingling of units the column moved clear.³⁰ A certain amount of fire was coming from the hills on its right, where parties of the enemy were still opposing the mounted rifles; ignoring this, and passing


²⁹ Brig.-Gen. J. H. du B. Travers, C.B., C.M.G. Commanded 40th Inf. Bde., 1914/15; 159th Inf. Bde., 1915/18. Officer of British Regular Army, of Criccieth, N. Wales; b 8 Nov., 1861. Died 19 March, 1933.

³⁰ Marching according to the divisional diary, "in lines of companies moving to a flank in fours, with an advance-guard"

between Walden Point and the sea, the British battalions found near the mouth of the Aghyl creek a trench occupied by Turks. This was rushed by the advance-guard of the South Wales Borderers, who then climbed the slopes of Damak-jelik Bair immediately beyond, charging a second trench, and by 1.30 had the hill in their hands.⁸¹ The way was thus opened for General Cox's column, which was to turn into the Aghyl Dere and endeavour to reach Hill 971 before day-break.



It has been mentioned that in the second half of their march Cox's troops, comprising the 4th Australian and 29th Indian Infantry Brigades and a mountain-battery, were to probe their way through a tangle of country into which Overton and his scouts had scarcely penetrated. They were, however, to be guided by Overton himself. The plan may here be recapitulated.⁸² On reaching a certain point in the Aghyl Dere the two leading Australian battalions were to be detached to the left to cover the further movement; shortly afterwards, on passing the last fork of the Aghyl, two Gurkha battalions were to be sent eastwards up the steep side of the main range against Hill Q; the remainder, marching almost east-north-east, were to climb over into the Asma Dere, move across its gully up a spur of Abdel Rahman Bair, and finally, on that high ridge, re-form to attack Hill 971. General Godley had intended that the assaults



⁸¹ The available records unfortunately contain nothing but the bare outlines of this admirable achievement.

⁸² See pp 460-3.

upon the summit should occur "well before dawn," and it was typical of General Monash, whose brigade was to head the column, that he had drawn up a provisional time-table of the march, showing the hour at which various points should be reached. His staff-captain, Eastwood,³³ was to move at the head of the column and, as far as possible, regulate its pace. "Assuming no halts or checks," its probable progress was estimated as follows:—³⁴

Points.	Yards.	Total Yards.	From Aghyl Dere Track Crossing.	Time.
4th Brigade Headquarters				
Reserve Gully	—	—	—	—
No. 5 Supply Dépôt (official "starting point") ..	—	—	—	9.35 p.m.
Junction Reserve Gully and Beach Road	475	475	—	9.45 p.m.
Sazli Beit Dere	1,260	1,735	—	—
No. 3 Outpost	450	2,185	—	10.30 p.m.
Aghyl Dere Track Crossing (i.e., where column would turn east into Aghyl Dere)	1,300	3,485	0	(say) 11.15 p.m. ?
Where track crosses g.s.s. (a point on map where 13 and 14 Bns would leave to take up outpost position on N flank)	1,460	4,945	1,460	12.30 a.m. ?
Confluence of Aghyl Deres (where column would turn up northern branch) ..	270	5,215	1,730	12.35 a.m. ?
Foot of spur at Creek Junction (map reference given—where two Gurkha battalions would be de- tached to right to attack Hill "Q")	780	5,995	2,510	—
Objective on Abdel Rahman (map reference given) ..	1,000	6,995	3,510	1.40 a.m. ?

It will be seen that it was about three miles to the point where the 13th and 14th were to be detached to protect the flank, and more than a mile from that point to the forming-up position on Abdel Rahman. For the first three the country would probably have been cleared by the covering forces. For the last mile the column would have to fight its way.

In order to keep clear of the New Zealanders in the long sap, this column was to commence its march, like the 40th British Brigade, along the open road nearer to the beach. Its leading battalion, the 13th, left the camping site—Reserve

³³ Maj.-Gen. T R Eastwood, D S O., M.C., p.s.c. G S O.(2), N Z. Div., 1917/18; Commandant, Royal Military College, Sandhurst, 1938; b. Canterbury, Kent, Eng., 10 May, 1890

³⁴ For conciseness the time-table and table of distances have been combined. The words in italics are inserted to assist the reader, to whom the map references would not be intelligible


Gully—precisely at the time ordered. But the rest of the brigade had, till then, been forced to wait in its bivouacs on the hillsides in order to keep the road clear for the 40th British Brigade, which had to pass first. Each battalion after the 13th had thus to be fetched in the dark from its bivouac, and consequently the column made a disjointed start. Detachment after detachment, finding that its predecessors had gone ahead, jogged in its heavy equipment down the valley-bed and then for a quarter of a mile along the foreshore to come up with the rest. As the Indian brigade, which had to follow the 4th Australian, was bivouacked lower down the same gully, its start was hampered in the same manner. Moreover the tail of the 40th Brigade was a little behind time, and consequently at this stage three columns were moving parallel along the narrow level between the hills and the beach—the New Zealand infantry in the long sap; the 4th Brigade fifty yards west, along the newly-made road; the 40th Brigade through the tussocks and sand-hills a few yards nearer the sea.

The march along the road was a strangely exciting experience for men who for four months had been confined in trenches and hidden valleys. To the right front the hilltops were brilliantly illuminated by the destroyer's searchlight, which once or twice touched the moving column with the lowest rim of its beam. When the head of the 4th Brigade reached No. 2 Outpost, it had to halt while the 40th Brigade moved from seaward across its path at the crossing of the Chailak Dere. The Australians lay down, but stray bullets fell somewhat thickly, and men in each column were hit. The delay allowed some of the belated detachments in rear to close up and gain their breath. After half-an-hour the front cleared, and about 11 o'clock Cox's column moved forward.

After a short, brisk advance the troops at the rear of that column again found the pace checked, some obstacle evidently hampering the advance-guard. The march became a shuffle, slower than a funeral, with innumerable halts. More than once movements, doubtless originating at the head of the column when it struck opposition, passed far down its length, officers and men suddenly leaving the track in silent imitation of those ahead of them, and kneeling for a few minutes in the scrub or the tussocks. Shells from the warships' broadsides

went rumbling overhead, their subsequent explosions lighting the side of the distant range. A white flare shot up occasionally from some Turkish post inland. The crackle of musketry was incessant on the hills to the right, but the column, though at a snail's pace, gradually drew away from the sound. Parallel with the tail of the 4th Brigade, and a little inland of it, shuffled the column of Indians. At 1 a.m. they were still slowly filing along the flats below Godley's headquarters at No. 2 Outpost. About 2.30 the general asked one of his staff if he could now report that both brigades had passed. "No, sir," was the answer, "the Indian brigade is only arriving." It was 3 o'clock, and the moon was already rising, when the last of the Indian brigade began slowly to draw clear of divisional headquarters. Some unknown cause of delay was clearly jeopardising the chances of success for that column. Godley despatched Monash a message to push on at once to his objective.

What had happened was that, on approaching Walden Point, the native guide, who with an interpreter and ten scouts walked beside Major Overton at the head of the column, instead of directing the march straight to the mouth of the Aghyl Dere, directed it half-right, up the gully behind Walden Point and Bauchop's Hill. This was not the route intended, nor was it that previously reconnoitred by Overton. A consultation took place, the column halting. The villager asserted positively that his was the route which the people of the district always adopted, since it was a much shorter track to the Aghyl Dere. Realising that the local knowledge of the inhabitants was far surer than that of any scouts, Overton allowed himself to be persuaded, and led the column into the valley.



There can be little doubt that the villager was right in declaring that the ordinary track lay up this valley. In the matter of distance it saved nearly half-a-mile. But as the low, dark, scrub-covered hills closed in, and the gully narrowed,

the column was fired on from the right. These heights were to have been cleared by the mounted rifles, and the attack was therefore puzzling. Overton directed the first platoon of the leading company to deploy and move up the hill on the right, while the second platoon climbed that on the left. The right platoon was almost at once fired on, but charged cheering up the height and cleared it of Turks who, it was found, had trickled back into some of their trenches after the mounted rifles had passed. The left platoon, advancing up Walden Point itself, presently came upon some of the mounted rifles who had already seized that hill. Meanwhile the column, Overton still leading, moved farther up the gully.


As the troops climbed, the pass narrowed. The gully-bed, choked with prickly undergrowth, would permit only of movement in single file. Soon even that became almost impossible, and the pioneers of the 13th were accordingly sent forward to hack a passage. A way being opened, the head of the column moved through the narrow gap at the summit, and was looking down into the darkness of the Aghyl Dere, when a call for reinforcements came from the platoon which had been detached to the right. The two remaining platoons of the leading company were accordingly sent forward, diverging as before to right and left. That on the right, under Captain Lee,³⁵ a Duntroon graduate, moved along the slope on a front of about fifty yards, gathering as it went stray men of the previous platoon, and was almost immediately fired on from a fold of the Aghyl Dere. Part of the 4th Brigade had been ordered to charge the magazines of their rifles, but to keep the barrel empty and the cut-offs closed, and not to fire unless so ordered by their officers.³⁶ This was the case with Lee's platoon, which advanced in silence, the enemy retreating. A hundred yards farther on, however, some thirty Turks, in a position only sixty yards distant, opened a steady rifle-fire.

³⁵ Col. J. E. Lee, DSO, MC, Bde-Maj., 7th Inf. Bde., 1917/18. Duntroon graduate, of Narraport, Vic., b. Narraport, 10 Dec., 1893.

³⁶ There was a conflict of orders on this point. Birdwood's general instruction, which was circulated through the 4th Bde., was that rifles were not to be loaded (that is, there was to be no cartridge in the barrel), and men were not even to charge their magazines unless ordered by an officer to do so. Gen. Godley subsequently gave a definite order that magazines were not to be charged, but this modification appears not to have reached, or not to have been understood by, all troops in the assaulting columns. The precaution recommended in *Field Service Regulations, 1914*, is that magazines should be charged, but that rifles should not be fired except on the order of an officer.

Lee decided to make use of covering fire in order to rush them. Having approached by sectional rushes, the whole party fired five rounds at thirty yards and then charged. Lee was wounded through the thigh, and had his arm broken by a bullet; several others also were hit; but the enemy made off before the Australians reached them.

As it was clear that fairly strong resistance was now being encountered, part of the second company of the 13th was sent in the direction of the fighting. The rest of the company was also sent to the left front with one of the guides, to endeavour to capture the Turkish field-piece which had been firing at the mounted rifles. When this detachment



moved off, the head of the pass was left practically without troops, since the column in rear had not yet come up. In the gap there was only the staff of the 13th Battalion—Colonel Tilney, Major Herring, Captain Marks the adjutant, Chaplain Wray,³⁷ Lieutenant Thompson³⁸ the signalling officer, and a few signallers—gazing into the dark ravine in front. Presently some of the covering platoons returned from the left and reported the enemy gone. The scouts and guides came in; and from the rear there toiled up portion of the column. At this moment also the brigadier, General Monash, came to the front and took charge.

Monash was a leader of whom it was already said that he would command a division better than a brigade and a corps better than a division. His powerful intellect was obvious to all who knew him. His knowledge ranged over an extraordinarily wide field of subjects, and his width of outlook was combined with a grasp of detail which in social intercourse immediately raised him head and shoulders above most of his

³⁷ Chaplain the Rev. F. W. Wray, C.M.G., C.B.E., V.D. Senior C. of E. Chaplain, A.I.F., 1917/19. Of Castlemaine district, Vic.; b. Taradale, Vic., 29 Sept., 1864.

³⁸ Lieut. F. V. Thompson; 13th Bn. Builder and contractor; of Wallsend, N.S.W., b. 24 Apr., 1893.

colleagues. The care with which he prepared an operation, and the lucidity with which he could explain it, were the marks of an organising brain capable of undertakings of the first rank whether in the army or in civil life. But he was not a fighting commander of the type of Walker, M'Cay, or Chauvel, and the enterprise in which he was now engaged was one calling for still more—the touch of a Stonewall Jackson, and the recklessness of a J. E. B. Stuart. Monash's qualities were of a different order; but, in this crisis, he ultimately decided to take personal control, and, since one staff officer after another sent to the head of the column had failed to return, went forward himself to ascertain the reason of the delay. Making his way with difficulty up the gully choked with troops, past the medical staff attending to the wounded, he reached the gap, and there found the head of the column halted, and the gallant Overton and his guides discussing the question what route was now the safest for the column. Monash told Overton that he must adhere to the track laid down in the plans, and that, since no one then knew the position of the two detached companies, the main body must push on without them. The column, therefore, at last moved down the northern side of the shallow pass into the bed of the Aghyl Dere. The defile through which it had come was afterwards known as "Taylor's Gap." Though it was only 600 yards in length, its passage by the two leading battalions had cost nearly three hours—roughly from 11 o'clock until 2.


On reaching the bed of the Aghyl the troops crossed it, and emerged on to a stubble-field on a flat between two spurs of the low ridge beyond. Here the guides again discussed the route. The crescent moon was rising, and the troops standing on the pale surface were fired at from the hill on their right. Another company of the 13th and part of the 14th had by then been detached in that direction. It was afterwards estimated that most of the constant opposition on this flank had come from a company of the enemy whose bivouac was discovered in the neighbourhood.

The position at this stage was that the column had reached the Aghyl Dere by Taylor's Gap, but that Overton, not knowing this route, found it difficult to judge what point in the *dere* had been reached. The wide valley of the

stubble-field was believed to be that up which the 13th and 14th Battalions were to be detached to their outpost position. More than half of those two battalions had already been sent off to clear the hillsides, but some had returned, and in half-an-hour there were collected on the stubble one company of the 13th and nearly the whole of the 14th. General Monash, who had established the brigade headquarters temporarily at Taylor's Gap, ordered Tilney to lead these two battalions to their allotted outpost position on the ridge to the north. In the meantime Colonel Cannan, at the head of the 15th, had come up to the Gap, his battalion being followed by the 16th, Indian brigade, and mountain battery, trailing in that order behind him. Going forward after some delay to the brigade headquarters, he found the guides there. It was then 2.30. Monash, who had just sent the outpost battalions northwards, directed him eastwards along the flat beside the Aghyl Dere. In order to carry out the plan, the 15th, with the main part of the column behind it, would have to advance a certain distance along that gully, turn up a branch to the left, and head straight for Abdel Rahman Bair. At about the same point two Gurkha battalions would be detached to the right to storm Hill Q.

The leading company of the 15th was approaching the first northward-leading spur, when fire was opened from the front.

The position was at once rushed with the bayonet.³⁹ A second smaller flat, between hills running down to the creek, was then crossed. Here fire from the front and both flanks forced the whole of the leading company under Captain Moran⁴⁰ to deploy. The second company of the 15th was sent forward to support Moran's, and the third detached to the right to protect the southern flank.



³⁹ Men of the 15th were found next day in front of these positions lying dead with magazines loaded but cut-offs closed, precisely in accordance with their orders.

⁴⁰ Capt F. Moran; 15th Bn. Area officer, of Brisbane, b. Springsure, Q'land, 27 June, 1877. Died of wounds, 20 Aug., 1915



EQUIPMENT OF MEN KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE PINE, DUMPED AT
BROWN'S DIP


*Taken by Capt H Jacobs 1st Bn
Aust War Memorial Collection No C1943*



WOUNDED MAKING THEIR WAY ALONG THE BEACH

*Taken by Pte H J Lowe, 1st Aust Rly Supply Detachment
Aust War Memorial Collection No A1937*


To face p 590



SARI BAIR, SHOWING THE RIDGES WHICH WERE TO BE SEIZED BY THE NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED

RIFLES, AND THE ROUTES OF THE MAIN COLUMNS
The intended advance of the main columns is shown thus
is shown as follows—Indians ●●●●●; 4th Australian Brigade ———— Their actual advance
infantry ———— Posts established by 40th British Brigade x x x ; New Zealand

New Zealand Mounted Rifles ○○○○. The old Anzac line ————
Reproduced, by permission from a model made by Mr Justice Thomson
Photographed by N S W Government Printer




WIGHTMAN

THE OPPOSING LINES ON MACLAURIN'S HILL AT THE TIME OF THE ATTACK BY THE 6TH

BATTALION ON GERMAN OFFICERS' TRENCH, 7TH AUGUST, 1915. (See p. 600.)

The craters shown are those of the mines exploded at intervals prior to the attack (British trenches, red; Turkish, blue Height contours, 10 metres.)


It was now 3 o'clock, and the dawn was approaching. Cannan believed that the head of the column must be nearing the last fork of the Aghyl Dere, where it was to head east-north-eastwards. He therefore sought Major Overton and asked him to point out roughly the direction of the 200-metre contour on Abdel Rahman—the forming-up place for the attack upon 971. Overton gave the direction, and then minutely questioned the native guide, who said that it was only a quarter of an hour distant. Accordingly Cannan, after re-forming the battalion by collecting the three companies which had been in action, sent back to ask that the 16th should follow him closely, and then turned half-left up the next spur. Major Overton went back to find the two Indian battalions which were to be diverted against Hill Q.



Cannan and the 15th, heading up the spur in the direction of Abdel Rahman, found themselves working over "rough broken stony ridges, densely covered with low prickly undergrowth, in which the Turks had taken cover and were obstinately disputing every yard of our advance."⁴¹ The enemy—evidently the remnant of the two battalions from Bauchop's Hill—was shooting from behind bushes, making no prolonged stand but showing himself very stubborn in retirement. As dawn advanced and each side could see its targets, progress became more rapid, although the Australians, sick men and very weary, were inclined to drop down and fire, like the enemy, from the scrub. It was remarked that the old soldiers were now fighting more keenly than the recently-joined reinforcements. It was difficult work—entailing much exposure—for the officers and N.C.O's to prevent their men from becoming scattered, and to lift the attack continuously forward with speed and vigour. The spur

⁴¹ 15th Bn. War Diary.

up which the 15th was advancing culminated in a knoll about 300 feet high, on which, at day-break, the enemy made a stand. All this time the 16th, in accordance with orders from General Monash, had kept close upon the 15th's inland flank, routing the enemy from position after position. It now became clear to Colonel Pope, who was leading it, that the knoll ahead, which overlooked the valley on his left, was a highly important position if that valley was to be secured. It was accordingly rushed by a part of the 15th and 16th, Captain Chabrel,⁴² a Duntroon graduate, being killed in the final charge.



From the top of this knoll there was seen, half-a-mile distant, the whole length of Abdel Rahman Bair, rising from the Anafarta plain straight to the crest of Hill 971, which lay about a mile inland. Pope at first believed himself to be on a spur of Abdel Rahman. Some miles to the left front, off Suvla Bay, were numbers of British transports and warships; and along the ridge connecting Pope's position with the sea was moving a column of troops. These had already at the first dawn been seen by the 15th, to whom they appeared like blades of grass moving against the paling sky. Uncertain what force they might be, Cannan had twice sent messengers to ascertain; but scattered Turks intervened, and each time the messengers ran into the enemy and returned with a prisoner. Finally, by signalling, Cannan ascertained that the force which he could see was the 13th and 14th Battalions, which had advanced up a spur parallel to that followed by the 15th and 16th, and, finding the flank of the British 40th Brigade on Damakjelik Bair, had proceeded eastward along that ridge, extending the outpost line in the

⁴² Capt. F. G. Chabrel; 16th Bn. Duntroon graduate; of Glenelg, S Aust; b The Don, Tas, 20 Oct., 1894. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915

required direction. Upon learning this, Cannan advanced with part of the 15th across the head of the intervening gully, driving before him some 60 or 70 of the enemy, who, on finding themselves caught between the two lines, soon surrendered. The 15th moved to the head of the valley, where it found only some 100 yards intervening between the right of the 13th and the left of the 16th. The fairly spacious but much corrugated gully shut in by the spurs up which Monash's 4th Australian Brigade had advanced, and on which it now lay, was afterwards known as "Australia Valley."




Thus the left assaulting column also was at last within sight of its goal—Hill 971; and, according to the belief of Colonel Pope, the senior officer at its advanced position, the 4th Australian Brigade was actually on a spur of Abdel Rahman Bair. But all the four battalions had been forced to fight their way, and were consequently in line instead of column. The Indian battalions, which Overton had gone back to direct, were no longer in touch, and Pope was ignorant of their whereabouts. Though the Australians, weak with continued sickness, had been sustained through the night by the excitement, they were now showing signs of excessive weariness. At each halt the men tended to throw themselves down and sleep. They had reached a ridge forming a natural front to the north—it was in fact part of the Damakjelik Bair, along which the left flank extended through the 40th British Brigade to the sea. In front, at several hundred yards' distance, ran other ridges, believed at the time to be offshoots of Abdel Rahman. The 13th and 14th, being now apparently in their allotted covering position, began to dig in; and Cannan and Pope, convinced that the advance of the 15th and 16th could for the present be carried no farther, ordered them to dig in also. At 5 a.m. General Monash sent out telephone lines

in order to ascertain what his four battalions were doing. Reports were presently received that the 13th and 14th were on their intended positions. Pope informed Monash that, as far as he could judge, his right flank was on a spur of Abdel Rahman Bair, and in the report sent back to the higher commanders this was the line stated to have been reached by Monash's brigade.⁴³

Meanwhile the Indian battalions, keeping to the main Aghyl Dere after the 16th had branched from it,⁴⁴ had begun to approach the actual head of the valley. In that dark maze of gullies Overton directed one Indian battalion after another up the spurs which he deemed to correspond with those specified in his orders. There is little doubt that in some, if not in all, cases he was mistaken. At dawn, on one such ridge near the last fork of the Aghyl Dere, this very gallant officer was killed. In the end the 5th Gurkhas (who had marched next to Monash's brigade) and the 14th Sikhs seem to have occupied the spur next to that taken by the 15th and 16th Australians. Of the two battalions which were to be detached to attack Hill Q, the 6th began to climb the wild slopes of the main range leading, as they thought, to that height, but really culminating in Chunuk Bair. The 10th, heading still farther south, eventually came out upon Rhododendron near the New Zealand infantry.

Thus at day-break the progress of the three brigades, which according to the plans should have assaulted their respective summits "well before dawn," was as follows: Monash's 4th Australian Brigade was still half-a-mile from the point of assembly on Abdel Rahman, which itself was three-quarters of a mile from Hill 971. The 29th Indian Brigade, now diverging from the 4th, was only reaching the



⁴³ As is explained later (p. 654) the reported position was considerably in advance of that actually reached.

⁴⁴ Ninety men of the 16th under Lieut. Curlew became mingled with the 6th Gurkhas, and served with that battalion for several days.

foot of the main range below the twin summits of "Q." But the leading battalion of New Zealand infantry, emerging upon Rhododendron Ridge, was within striking distance of the main objective; for half-a-mile ahead and only two hundred feet above, central among the swelling summits of the range which reached for a mile on either hand, lay Chunuk Bair. The narrowing crest of Rhododendron led, over a few slight dips and saddles, straight to its southern shoulder.

Whether a Turkish garrison would be found on Chunuk Bair, "Q," or Abdel Rahman there was at the time no means of ascertaining. It was believed that no garrison was maintained there, and it is now known that—except possibly for a small detachment of the 33rd Regiment near Hill Q—the summits were practically unguarded during that night. When the offensive commenced it had not been immediately realised by the enemy that Sari Bair was threatened. The first news that a decisive attack was being made from Anzac northwards along the coast reached Liman von Sanders early in the night.⁴⁵ Shortly afterwards he was informed that strong forces were landing at different points still farther north. Kiazim Pasha, his chief of staff, was then with Essad,⁴⁶ but von Sanders himself appears to have almost immediately summoned southwards the 7th and 12th Turkish Divisions, which were in the neighbourhood of the Bulair Lines. These, however, would presumably not begin to arrive for two days, and the urgency of reinforcing the northern flank was extreme. But the whole local reserve—13th and 15th Regiments—was under the orders of Essad, who was at first convinced that the main attack was at the Pine, and who had apparently summoned thither not only both of those regiments⁴⁷ but also the 9th Division from the south. By dawn, however, when the 9th was just reaching the neighbourhood of the Pine, the urgency of reinforcing at Chunuk Bair became so obvious that it was ordered to pass northwards and climb the heights. Weary Australians fighting in the Pine

⁴⁵ Von Sanders says the news arrived "about 9 o'clock" (*Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 109).


⁴⁶ See note on p. 530

⁴⁷ It is, however, uncertain when the order to move to the Pine was given to the 15th Regt (see foot-note 62 on p. 523). Essad appears not to have heard of the northern attack until a late hour. The whole neighbourhood of his headquarters was under artillery fire, which possibly interfered with his telegraphic and other communications.

observed the continuous stream of Turkish reinforcements passing along Legge Valley. Shortly after day-break similar movement was seen higher up, in the trenches on Baby 700 and Battleship Hill.

While the New Zealand infantry was coming in sight of Chunuk Bair on the one hand, and the 9th Turkish Division was being despatched towards it on the other, there arrived the moment when, unless countermanded, there would be launched against Baby 700 the desperate assault

by which the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was to pin down the Turkish forces on the nearer heights and assist towards the capture of the main objective.




CHAPTER XXI

THE FEINTS OF AUGUST 7TH

UNTIL the approach of the actual hour—4.30 a.m. on August 7th—for which the frontal attack on Baby 700 was provisionally ordered, it was not clear whether the operation was to form part of a main attack delivered in conjunction with a force descending from Chunuk Bair upon the enemy's rear, or was to be merely a feint to aid the New Zealanders in attaining Chunuk Bair. If it was to be a feint, unassisted by any movement against the enemy's rear, the task would be one of portentous difficulty.

As Birdwood and Skeen had themselves written,¹ "an unaided attack" across The Nek against Baby 700 was "almost hopeless."

Besides the co-operation which had been expected from the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair there was another movement by which the




assault on Baby 700 was to be assisted; a simultaneous attack was to be delivered from Quinn's. Moreover Chauvel, who had been given discretion to decide whether further help should be rendered by a simultaneous assault from Pope's against the Chessboard, had determined that this also should be undertaken. These attacks in their turn were to be strengthened by the capture of German Officers' Trench, farther south, by the 6th Battalion of the 1st Australian Division. This last operation, by suppressing the enflading machine-guns, should facilitate both the assault at Quinn's and also that projected, but subsequently abandoned, against Johnston's Jolly. Walker and White had desired the attack on German Officers' to be made simultaneously with the operations which it was intended to assist; but Birdwood had

¹ See p. 464.

decided that it should be delivered earlier, preferably at midnight.

German Officers' Ridge contained two distinct works. The main one was German Officers' Trench proper, shaped like a horseshoe running round the northern and central part of the knuckle; the other was a single length of trench dug along a fold on the southern side of the spur and connected with German Officers' Trench by a single communication trench resembling the shaft of the letter "T." This subsidiary work, like the abandoned trench on the northern side of the knuckle² and many others round Anzac, was known as "Snipers' Trench." As it was overlooked by the enemy on the Jolly, Walker ordered that it should not be permanently held, but should merely be raided and cleared.




On the other hand, German Officers' Trench itself was to be taken and garrisoned. The assault was to be made by 400 men, assisted by the previous explosion of several mines beneath, or almost beneath, the northern end of the trench. Walker and White, who themselves were engaged in elaborating the scheme of attack on Lone Pine, left much of the planning of the operation to Brigadier-General Forsyth—an Australian regular soldier now in command of the 2nd Brigade—closely supervising his detailed arrangements. Forsyth chose for the attack the 6th Battalion, now under the youthful commander who had led it at Helles, Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Bennett, and with him and the brigade-major, Jess, worked out the scheme.

The problem was highly difficult. It has been mentioned that the Australian front facing German Officers' was protected by an underground firing line of which the roof had not yet been opened, but had instead been thinned so that anyone passing over would fall through. This line, though forming an excellent protection against assault by the Turks, would

² See p. 241.

also throw into confusion any Australian attack which attempted to cross it, at any rate by night. It would, of course, have been possible to turn the whole forward line into an open trench. But this would almost certainly have made the enemy anticipate that an attack was imminent. Moreover, since the forward line was in parts only twenty yards from that of the enemy, it would have created another position, in which bombing, such as was normal at Quinn's, would have been constant. It was therefore decided that the attack should be delivered from



the underground line, the bays of which were to be opened up after dark by the first line of the troops which were to make the attack. It was considered that this course, besides being the least objectionable, would possess two positive advantages. Not only would the assault have in parts only twenty yards to go, but the underground line in which the troops would assemble would be free from enemy shell-fire,³ whereas the old firing line at Steele's and MacLaurin's Hill was not only much exposed to the view of the enemy, but was also the most heavily shelled sector of the Anzac front.

Orders were therefore drafted that the attacking troops should be formed up in the underground line in two bodies—one of 300 (subdivided into covering party, main party, and parties to block communication trenches) opposite German Officers' itself, and another of 100 opposite Snipers' Trench. The crust of earth over the recesses was to be broken down by the fifty men who would afterwards form the covering party, this work beginning at 7.30 p.m. simultaneously with a demonstration by the 8th Battalion, the noise of which would presumably cover any tell-tale sound or movement.

³ It was not claimed that the shallow tunnels would be impenetrable to high-explosive shells; but they were hidden, and therefore did not afford targets; they were also too close to the enemy's line to be safely bombarded by his guns.

The brigade orders for the operation had already been issued, when the commander of the 1st Field Company warned General Forsyth that he feared lest part of the roof of the underground line might be shaken down by the explosions of the mines, the first of which was to contain 200 lb. of explosive—a charge which at Anzac was considered a heavy one. Forsyth still adhered to the plan by which the covering party of infantry was to enter the tunnels early in the evening, break the crust, and garrison the openings; but he now arranged that it should be withdrawn for a few minutes at the time of each explosion, and that the rest of the attacking troops should not begin to assemble in the tunnels until after the last mine had been fired. The last mine would therefore have to be exploded sufficiently early to allow the infantry to move through the galleries and take up its proper stations in the underground line before midnight.

In order to ascertain the time likely to be occupied in assembling, a complete rehearsal was carried out by the attacking parties during the afternoon of August 6th. It was found that all were in their positions in less than ten minutes. The brigadier consequently assumed that, if he doubled the time and allowed twenty minutes, this should be ample for the operation. It was therefore ordered that the first mine should be fired at 11 p.m., the second at 11.30, and the third at 11.40.⁴ The motive for this arrangement was the hope that the first mine would cause the enemy to fill his trenches, but that the second, or at any rate the third, would make him wary of repeating that process.

At the hour of the Lone Pine attack, Steele's Post was sharply bombarded by the enemy's 6-inch howitzer and 75's which were normally laid upon that post,⁵ and the old firing line was severely damaged; at 7.30 p.m. Forsyth informed Walker that, unless this howitzer could be silenced, the attack on German Officers' would be delayed. The rear trenches were also being bombarded with a comparatively new missile, the Turkish rocket-bomb.⁶ The sharp fire of


⁴ These mines were in tunnels D21A, D9B, and D21E. The third mine appears to have been a double one. The tunnels are shown in map facing p. 590.

⁵ See pp. 341-4.

⁶ More commonly known at Anzac as "broomstick-bombs."

guns and bombs did not cease, but continued into the night, breaking out with renewed intensity after each of the three mine-explosions. It was observed that the explosions were followed by rifle and machine-gun fire from the Turkish Quinn's and the Jolly—the enemy's flanking posts protecting German Officers'—and also from Mortar Ridge beyond it; but the enemy in German Officers' itself, probably frightened by the explosions, did not fire. This gave rise to the hope that the garrison had been shaken and perhaps withdrawn, if not destroyed by the mines. After the firing of each mine the underground trenches at Steele's were examined to ascertain if they had been blocked by falling earth. Slight repairs were effected by a working party.

The mines, however, seem to have caused them no damage. On the other hand, the enemy's bombardment had half-filled part of the trenches at Steele's with débris; and when, after the third explosion, the assault-parties of the 6th began to file through them into the pitch-dark tunnels on their way to the underground firing line, they found the galleries in front of one of the companies almost completely blocked with earth shaken down by the heavy shell-fire which had followed the last mine.⁷ The troops were further delayed by the bombardment which was still falling on the old line,⁸ as well as by the complete darkness of the tunnels. At the afternoon rehearsal a faint daylight had filtered into the tunnel-mouths, and its absence affected the plans more seriously than had been anticipated. The 6th consisted largely of young reinforcements, who were not sufficiently experienced to cope intelligently with every obstacle or to pass back information as to its nature. Consequently, when a line of men moving through the subterranean ways was held up, it was often impossible for an officer to discover the



⁷ Tunnel D7 was blocked and D9, apparently, partly so

⁸ At this stage Maj. F. W. Peters (of East Malvern, Vic.) was wounded

cause, except by squeezing himself along the narrow tunnel⁹ past one invisible figure after another, until he actually reached the impediment and ascertained its nature by feeling with his hands or body. In that black place the movement of a whole line could be held up by any youngster whose resolution failed him and who waited for orders; until an officer reached the spot it was uncertain whether the obstacle was real or imaginary; sometimes even then he could make sure of nothing but that he had squeezed past the leader of a line of men and that there appeared to be no others ahead of him. There was no alternative but to keep the troops on the move through the unblocked tunnels, while the company whose galleries had been barred was gradually drafted in through other passages. But long before all parties had reached their stations, the hour for the attack had come and gone.

As no report of the assault reached the 2nd Brigade Headquarters, where the brigadier and his staff were waiting for news, an order was sent at 12.30 to Colonel Bennett either to attack at once or to explain the reason for the delay. As a matter of fact Bennett had determined not to send forward the attack until his whole force was in position. In the recesses or bays of the underground firing line opposite German Officers' there should be Major Daly and the fifty men who were to rush past German Officers' and take up a covering position fifty yards farther down the slope. With them should be parties under Lieutenants Jackson¹⁰ and Hall¹¹ to block the communication trenches on either flank. In the galleries immediately in rear of these troops was to be the main party—250 men under Captain Prisk, the most trusted of Bennett's subordinates, and an excellent leader of men both in and out of a fight. Finally, in a separate length of the underground line farther south were to be Captain Yeoman¹² and 100 men to attack Snipers' Trench. At about 12.30 Bennett had satisfied himself that at any rate the parties destined for German Officers' were in position; and at 12.35.

⁹ Only three feet wide.

¹⁰ Lieut. A. C. H. Jackson; 6th Bn. Bank clerk; of Melbourne; b. Hawthorn, Vic., 1888. Died of wounds, 9 Aug., 1915.

¹¹ Lieut. R. A. Hall; 6th Bn. Commercial traveller; of Kew, Vic.; b. Battersea, London, 8 Oct., 1891.

¹² Capt. J. S. Yeoman; 6th Bn. Photographer; of East Malvern, Vic.; b. 14 March, 1885.

before the order from brigade headquarters reached him, he gave the signal for the attack.

Officers and men began immediately to climb out of the newly-opened recesses. There were only twenty-one of these bays, and though the actual openings to the surface were wide enough for four men or even more to emerge at once, the steps up to each bay from the tunnel would permit only one to pass at a time. As the leading troops began to clamber into the open, fire was opened on them from German Officers', twenty yards distant, and also from either flank. Men began to be hit at once, some of them before they had left the recesses. Captain Prisk, squeezing past one or two men who were blocking a recess, pushed his way on to the surface, where, about the width of a tennis-court away, a line of rifles was blazing like a fire along the whole front of German Officers' Trench. He was at once hit through both arms.¹³ Lieutenant Hall was wounded. Lieutenant Spargo¹⁴ is said to have reached or approached the enemy's trench; he was never seen again. The surface of No-Man's Land was also being swept by rifle-fire from Mortar Ridge and by machine-guns in the Turkish Quinn's and the Jolly. Of the troops who were following to support, at best only a succession of scattered men could scramble from the narrow openings; and when those who were hit fell back into the holes, blocking the passage of others trying to emerge, the fate of the attack was sealed. Those who had advanced unsupported either fell back or were killed. The wounded were dragged through the openings into the tunnels. Over their bodies some of the men, who had been waiting below crushed against the wall, scrambled to the surface, urged by their leaders to make further attempts. But only a dozen could start at a time, and these were mostly wounded—often in several places—by machine-gun fire almost before they left the trench. For the rest, in the confusion and pitch dark of the tunnels some of the young troops were difficult to stimulate to further onrushes.

The attack thus came quickly to a standstill. The enemy

¹³ Though very severely wounded, Prisk made his way to Bennett and reported the failure.

¹⁴ Lieut E B Spargo; 6th Bn. Clerk; of Malvern, Vic.; b. Brunswick, Vic., 16 Aug., 1888. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

in German Officers' happened to be comparatively well-rested troops of the 72nd Arab Regiment, which had relieved the 1/57th that afternoon; and if at the northern end they were temporarily shaken by the mine-explosions—which were nevertheless not so severe as had been expected—they had had ample time to recover, and had evidently been manning the trench in great strength, waiting for an assault. At about 1 o'clock General Forsyth, being informed by Bennett of the failure and its cause, passed on the report to divisional headquarters. The news came as an unwelcome surprise to Walker and White, who at first suspected that the failure was due to bad management by the local staff. As the capture of German Officers' was urgently required in view of the other impending operations, Walker at 1.10 ordered that the 6th Battalion should be at once reorganised and the attempt repeated.

Accordingly Bennett, assisted by the brigade-major, Jess, re-formed the parties as best he could in the dark tunnels, now more than half-blocked with wounded. The process took some time, and to those at divisional headquarters the delay appeared almost endless. At 2.20 instructions were sent that the new assault should be made by a party of 100 men, to be followed by a second, and, if necessary, a third line of the same strength. But such a suggestion could only have been made by those who failed to visualise the difficulty of controlling a body of men at night in the interior of the tunnels. Such a task, awkward under any circumstances, was doubly so after the heavy shock just received by the attacking troops. The utmost that could be done was to get the men marshalled in the underground firing line, ready for a single rush against German Officers', no attempt being made on this occasion against Snipers' Trench.

After more than two hours' heavy labour the troops were again in position, and the signal was given. But nothing had been, or could have been, done to change the conditions which led to the failure of the first assault. The moon had now risen, and the instant the line began to scramble from the recesses an intense rifle and machine-gun fire was opened upon it. Men were killed or wounded immediately outside the

holes, or actually in the openings. A few here or there succeeded in running forward, but these were never seen again. Among them was Lieutenant Fairclough.¹⁵ Although his nerve had been severely shaken in the first attack, he had bravely assisted Bennett in reorganising the troops, and had then charged forward with them. Another leader, Lieutenant Jackson, stood outside the trench and, walking up and down, beckoned to the men to come forward with him. He was hit first by a bullet and then by a bomb, and was carried back into the trenches, but died a few days later. Meanwhile numbers of wounded were blocking the passage of their comrades; and, though a few of the latter were again induced to clamber over their bodies and start forward in isolated twos and threes, the second assault quickly ended as the first had done.


Jess, who had taken part in marshalling the troops for this attack, now explained fully to the brigadier the impracticability of the plan. Forsyth passed on this view to General Walker, who, however, ordered him to go in person to the trenches and promptly organise a third attempt. Thereupon Bennett, realising the effort to be hopeless, contemplated leading out the assault himself. But in the meantime Major Glasfurd, who had been sent from divisional headquarters to investigate, appears to have confirmed Jess's report. Walker therefore consulted the corps commander, and, it being then past the hour for the assault on Baby 700 and Quinn's, to which that on German Officers' was subsidiary, Birdwood decided that it was inadvisable to repeat the attempt.

The assault upon German Officers' had cost the 6th Battalion 80 killed and 66 wounded. It had failed chiefly because the assault at Lone Pine, the mine-explosions, and the necessarily slow exit of the assaulting party from the tunnels had given ample warning to the Turks. Moreover the enemy, both opposite Steele's and at other parts of the line, had been kept watchful by "demonstrations" arranged so as to give him the false impression that the chief attack was at Anzac and thereby to cover the columns advancing to the north. In addition, the practicability of an attack from the


¹⁵ Lieut. R. T. Fairclough, 6th Bn. Farmer, of Melbourne, b. Stawell, Vic., 1884. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

underground line by night, and the necessity of widening tunnels and passages, had not received from the staff quite the same consideration which was devoted to plans for the more important operation at Lone Pine.

The most serious result of the failure was that at 4.30—when, “unless orders are given to the contrary,” the assaults from Russell’s Top, Pope’s, and Quinn’s were to be delivered—the machine-guns at German Officers’ which enfiladed all those positions, but especially Quinn’s, were still unsubdued. When the hour for these difficult enterprises was approaching, Birdwood and Skeen, who had been in anxious communication with Godley throughout the night, knew that both Monash’s brigade on the extreme left and the Indians in rear of it were still far from their respective objectives. But it was known that the New Zealand mounted rifles and infantry had by a heroic effort seized the lower part of Rhododendron, well on the way to the most important goal, Chunuk Bair; and Birdwood and Skeen pictured the New Zealand infantry struggling upwards near that height in performance of the last stage of this difficult task. Success in that operation was vital, and they had therefore no hesitation in ordering any action which could assist it. “It is not the light horse I am anxious about,” said Skeen half-an-hour later, when the fighting was at its height. “I think they will be all right. What I hope is that they will help the New Zealanders.” Consequently the operations against Baby 700, Pope’s, and Quinn’s were allowed to be launched at the hour provisionally fixed.



But it will be seen that neither the taking of Chunuk Bair nor that of German Officers’—the two conditions which were to precede the attacks on Baby 700 and the neighbouring posts—had come to pass when the decision was made. At the crucial moment all notion of “converging




WIGHTMAN


THE ATTACK BY THE 3RD LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE ON THE NEK, 7TH AUGUST, 1915

- (1) Direction of light horse attack (2) Attempt by Royal Welch Fusiliers (3) Point where flag was raised (British troops and trenches red, Turkish trenches, blue Height contours, 10 metres)

attacks," to be delivered simultaneously from Russell's upon the enemy's front and from Chunuk Bair upon his rear, had vanished. The operation was now a simple frontal assault, designed to draw the Turkish forces to the head of Monash Valley and so to assist the New Zealand infantry during the critical hour when it was approaching the summit of the ridge.



The actual storming of the Turkish trenches on The Nek and on Baby 700 beyond it was to be made by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade. Simultaneously the 1st Light Horse Brigade, then holding Pope's and Quinn's, was to seize with its 1st Regiment a part of the Chessboard and with its 2nd a sector of the Turkish Quinn's. Of these attacks, all difficult operations, that upon Baby 700 was by far the most important. The troops from Russell's Top were to be launched over the narrowing Nek to capture, first the several enemy trenches defending it, and immediately afterwards the maze of saps, about sixty in all, which seamed the front and both sides of the hill. If all the Turkish trenches were manned, the task would be absurdly beyond the power of the troops. But the light horse staff did not expect that any but the foremost Turkish lines would be occupied heavily, if at all, and the gigantic task was therefore confidently dealt with in the orders issued by the brigadier. Since the hillcrest along which the lines must first charge was a narrowing one between steep gullies, the number of men in each line was limited to 150. Two regiments of the 3rd Brigade, the 8th (Victoria) and 10th (Western Australia) were to undertake the main task, four lines, two from each regiment,



following one another in quick succession. The first line was to seize the Turkish trenches on The Nek;¹⁶ the second was to pass over them and take the nearer saps on Baby 700; the third would capture the farther trenches; the fourth, coming up with picks and shovels, would either fight or dig as required. The 8th Cheshire would then come over The Nek and help to consolidate; and, when once the trenches on The Nek had been secured, two companies of the 8th Royal Welch Fusiliers would climb up the western branch of Monash Valley, and from its head attack the nearer Turkish positions of the Chessboard, thus guarding the flank of the troops charging over The Nek, and eventually connecting with the assault of the 1st Regiment from Pope's. The troops were warned in orders that the garrison maintained by the enemy in his trenches appeared of late to

¹⁶ The actual orders were:—

"8th L.H. 1st Line.—First line will consist of troops already in fire-trenches and saps. On a given signal, silently and without rifle-fire, it will rush The Nek (A1) and with bayonet and bomb engage the enemy, taking possession of the flank, communicating and advanced trenches (A9, A5, A8, A11), paying special attention to the machine-guns, which must be sought for and rushed, and to the trenches overlooking the cliff north of The Nek and to those on the southern flank of same, so as to prevent flank interposition by the enemy—mine fuses and 'phone wires to be sought for and cut.

"8th L.H. 2nd Line.—Second line (already on banquette) will immediately follow. Jumping advanced trenches (already engaged by first line) it will sweep on and attack supporting and subsidiary trenches (A12, C1, C4). Its action will be forward, ignoring trenches behind, but accounting for those to right and left (C6A, B1, B2, B3). Bayonet and bomb without fire.


Note.—As soon as first line has moved from our trenches, second line will take the position vacated in order to make room for third line. In passing over intervening space officers will take post in the ranks so as not to make themselves a conspicuous target.

"10th L.H. 3rd Line.—Having moved up communicating trenches, third line will in like manner be prepared and follow on at once. Its objective will be the next line of trenches (C2, C3, C5, C7, C8) and, if possible, Z, Y, C10, C11, to C12-13. With bomb and bayonet only, the enemy will be driven back and out without turning back, and avenues blocked. Once in the trenches, the enemy will not be able to make effective use of his machine-guns. When the extreme limit of advance has been reached the gain must be made good and safe against machine-gun fire and against counter-attack. Here fourth line plays its part.

"10th L.H. 4th Line.—Fourth line will in like manner follow and act in concert with 2 and 3. It must endeavour to join up with the latter. Every second man will carry digging tools in the proportion of one pick to two shovels. It is impossible to define precisely what this line may be called upon to do. This must of necessity depend upon the progress of its predecessors. It may have to down tools and assist, but it must make every effort to join up with third line and block the approaches. This is its rôle."

(The capital letters and figures refer to Turkish trenches which were thus marked on the British maps. "Y" and "Z" were centres or junctions of several trenches.)

be "not light," that machine-guns were believed to exist in five positions,¹⁷ all commanding the approach to The Nek, and that the fighting might disclose others. The five suspected gun-positions were widely scattered, and, with the exception of one,¹⁸ were all 200 yards or more beyond the Turkish front. They could not therefore be seized and silenced at the first rush; but it was stated in the light horse orders that the attacking troops would have "the full assistance of naval guns and high-explosive fire from the full strength of our howitzer and other guns." When once the main attack was completed, it should not be necessary for troops to expose themselves by passing over The Nek, since there had been already driven under No-Man's Land two shallow tunnels,¹⁹ which, as soon as the assault started, were to be converted into avenues of communication.



The two light horse regiments were in no way dismayed at their task. Had they possessed previous experience of pitched battle, it is improbable that they would have faced so light-heartedly the prospect of attacking, along a high and exposed causeway, this hill, protected as it was by trenches eight deep and by well-posted flanking machine-guns. But the 3rd Light Horse Brigade had never yet seen any important offensive,²⁰ and its troops accepted as almost certain the success of the big scheme, in which their attack was only a small part. They had so far experienced only the Anzac trench-warfare—eleven weeks of trench-digging and water-carrying; and when the orders for the attack arrived, all ranks became eager with the anticipation that within a few days they would have burst

¹⁷ The orders issued by the staff of the 3rd L.H. Bde. stated: "There are supposed to be machine-guns in E8, E6, C6A, and most probably at Y and Z."

¹⁸ This was 120 yards from the enemy trench at The Nek. The gun fired across the head of Monash Valley.

¹⁹ During the night preceding the attack one of the deep-level tunnels came within a few feet of one of the enemy's workings. A small charge was therefore exploded, which appears to have destroyed the Turkish tunnel. The shallow tunnels abovementioned belonged to a different system, running in places within less than a foot of the surface.

²⁰ It had some experience of minor operations, the 8th and 9th Regts having defeated the 18th Turkish Regt.'s attack at The Nek on June 30, and the 10th having seen fighting at Quinn's

through the hitherto impassable trenches and would be moving through the green and open country. The prospect filled them with a longing akin to home-sickness. Four days before the attack, possibly in mistaken pursuance of an order which was cancelled in the case of other troops, their tunics were taken from them and they were left practically without clothes except their shirts, short pants, and puttees in which to fight.²¹ The order of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was:

Shirt sleeves, web equipment, helmets, 200 rounds, field dressing pinned right side inside shirt, gas helmet, full waterbottle, 6 biscuits, 2 sandbags (4 periscopes per each line and gas sprayers to be carried by fourth line), wire cutters, rifle (unloaded and uncharged), bayonet fixed.²²

Men and officers were ordered to stow what they could of their spare kit into their packs for storage. Most of the men crammed into some corner among their clothes certain specially-treasured mementoes—a fragment of Turkish shell, some coins bought of a prisoner, a home letter, a photograph or two. There was no chance of taking such treasures with them; they expected to bivouac on the open hills. The nights being cold, many obtained little sleep after their tunics had been taken away. But such was the excitement of anticipation that nothing could depress them. A number who were really too ill for fighting²³ hid their sickness from the medical officer in order to avoid being sent away. Others—like Sergeant Gollan²⁴ of the 10th Regiment—though too ill to escape observation, successfully begged the doctor to let them stay. Others again—like Captain Vernon Piesse²⁵ of the 10th, who had been sent away to the hospital ship on August 2nd—contrived to get back from hospital on the eve of the fight. Piesse succeeded in rejoining during the night of August 6th. "I'd never have been able to stand up again if I hadn't," he said.

In both light horse brigades, on the afternoon of August 6th, anticipation was raised to a high pitch by the sight of

²¹ See Vol. XII, plate 114.

²² The "helmets" were of British pattern, which was generally worn at that time in the 3rd L.H. Bde. The web equipment was the ordinary belts and pouches of the infantry, which had been served out to the light horse in place of their own bandoliers.

²³ Tpr. G. E. Womack of the 1st Regt., for example, who, though wretchedly ill, managed to hide his sickness, and was subsequently killed in the fight. He belonged to Broughton Village, N.S.W.

²⁴ Sgt. J. A. Gollan (No 409, 10th L.H. Regt.). Farmer, of Beverley, W. Aust.; b. Norwood, S. Aust., 1886. Died of wounds, 30 Aug., 1915.

²⁵ Capt. V. F. Piesse; 10th L.H. Regt. Farmer and grazier, of Wagin, W. Aust.; b. 23 Aug., 1889. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

the 1st Infantry Brigade attacking at Lone Pine. For two hours the troops on Pope's and Russell's Top watched crowd after crowd of distant khaki-clothed figures running forward into the heart of the Pine and carrying onward that magnificent assault; and most of the onlookers had not the least doubt that at dawn next morning their own attack upon Baby 700 would be equally successful. Throughout the night wild bursts of rifle-fire were heard, first comparatively close at hand, then more distant, as the other assaulting columns worked into the hills. Lastly, a little before day-break, there came, far off and faint, a sound as of the bubbling of water in a cauldron. It was the rifle-fire at Suvla. About that time the attacking parties of the 8th Light Horse in the trenches on Russell's Top took up the positions from which they were to make the rush. Each squadron carried forty-eight bombs, and a reserve of 400 was to accompany each line. The first line had two scaling-ladders for crossing or clambering out of the deep Turkish trenches; and with each line were to go four small red and yellow flags, to be erected in captured trenches as a sign to the artillery and the staff. Behind the 8th the 10th, in similar kit, assembled in the rearward saps, ready to file into the front trenches as soon as the two lines of the 8th had gone forward.

At 4 o'clock there commenced the "intensive" bombardment which was to precede the attack. All night long Phillips's, Caddy's, and Bessell-Browne's field-guns, the New Zealand howitzer battery on Anzac Beach, and "C" Battery of the 69th (British) Howitzer Brigade had each been firing single rounds at two-and-a-half minutes' intervals upon the enemy's trenches at The Nek and the Chessboard. The foremost trench at The Nek, and such trenches in rear of it as were on the seaward slope, could only be reached by the New Zealand howitzers. The shrapnel of the field-batteries was entirely harmless, but the howitzer shells inflicted serious loss. Occasionally one would explode actually inside some bay crowded with men of the 18th Turkish Regiment—the same which had made the desperate attempt of June 30th, and which was still garrisoning The Nek. At frequent intervals throughout the night the Turkish infantry, crouching in their line, would find maimed and shattered comrades being bundled past them along the trenches. The garrison of The Nek was thus placed under a heavy nerve-strain. At 4 a.m. the artillery

which had been engaged in this bombardment, with the addition of Trenchard's two mountain-guns, increased its rate of fire to four shells a minute. At the same time the guns of the supporting warships²⁶ opened, concentrating upon Baby 700 and the trenches immediately below it at The Nek. At 4.27 (according to the watches of the artillery) for three minutes the batteries increased their fire to an "intensive" rate. Since the night of May 2nd²¹ no such bombardment had been seen at Anzac. The front Turkish trench, being very close to the Australian, largely escaped the shells, but the position behind it became an inferno, the dark-brown dust of the shell-bursts, dimly visible in the grey light, rolling in clouds across the face of the hill and shutting out all view from any distance. During this bombardment the two lines of the 8th Light Horse were waiting in their front trench. The trench being a deep one, pegs had been driven into the wall for the men to hold, and niches cut for their feet, so that when the signal came they would be able to spring out in a flash. Beside the first line on the fire-step stood the second, ready to give the men of the first a "leg-up." Three officers, with previously-checked watches, waited at intervals along the front, preparing to give the word for the charge. One of these was Lieutenant-Colonel A. H. White,²⁸ the commander of the 8th, formerly a well-known Melbourne business man, who had insisted upon leading the first line of his regiment. The chance that such a leader would survive on such a day was obviously remote, and White, evidently realising this, had gone to the brigade office ten minutes before the start and held out his hand to the brigade-major, Antill. "Good-bye," he said simply. Two minutes later he was in position with his troops, with his eye on the second-hand of his timepiece. The men beside him showed no trace of excitement, hitching up their kit, and getting a firm foothold below the parapet.

For some reason, which will probably never be explained the bombardment which was then thundering upon the enemy ended—according to one account, "cut short as if by a knife"—seven minutes before the watches on Russell's Top pointed

²⁶ The fire on The Nek was chiefly that of the allotted destroyer, which fired well—but apparently not, until after the attack, at the actual front trench, which was dangerously close to the Anzac line

²⁷ See Vol. I, p. 585.

²⁸ Lieut.-Col A. H. White. Commanded 8th L.H. Regt., 1914/15. Malster; of Ballarat and Elsternwick, Vic.; b. Ballarat, 9 May, 1882. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.


to 4.30. The orders to the artillery were clear—that the guns were to continue until 4.30, when the land artillery would “stop” and the naval guns continue to fire upon targets farther back. There seems little question that there had been a mistake in the timing of the watches. Whatever the cause, the shelling of the enemy’s forward lines ceased; the destroyers began to direct a less intense fire on to some of the more distant trenches. The rest of the artillery, according to order, became silent. On either flank of Russell’s Top two Anzac machine-guns made ready to give covering fire to the attack. For three minutes hardly a shot was fired. But during that time the Turks, though severely tried by the night’s experience, gradually raised their heads and, realising • that there was now no fire at all upon them, manned their trenches two-deep in anticipation of the assault which they knew must be imminent. One line seated on the parapet and the other standing behind it, they nestled their rifles to their shoulders, took aim, and waited.²⁹ Their machine-guns here and there rattled off a dozen shots as they made ready for action. A spasmodic rifle-fire began, aimed at the Australian parapet, which was visible twenty to sixty yards away over the bullet-riddled stumps of dry bushes. Behind that parapet a few of the officers, looking at their watches, were perplexed at the sudden cessation of shell-fire. “What do you make of it?” asked Lieutenant Robinson of Major Redford. “There’s seven minutes to go.” “They may give them a heavy burst to finish,” was the reply. But none came. “Three minutes to go,” said Colonel White. Then simply, “Go!”

In an instant the first line, all eagerness, leapt over the parapet. Facing them, not a stone’s throw away, were hundreds of the enemy, lining two-deep their front trench and others behind it. The garrison had been reinforced the previous afternoon, when the Lone Pine bombardment started, the resting battalion of the 18th Regiment having been rushed from Mortar Ridge into the trenches. From that moment the crowded troops had waited for the attack. Consequently, the instant the light horse appeared, there burst upon them a fusillade that rose within a few seconds from a fierce crackle

²⁹ This was afterwards minutely described by a Turkish prisoner, who made a rough sketch showing how the tiers of fire were obtained. The space across which the left of the Australian line had to charge is shown in *Vol XII, plate 113*. The photograph was taken much later from the Australian trench.

into a continuous roar, in which it was impossible to distinguish the report of rifle or machine-gun. Watchers on Pope's Hill saw the Australian line start forward across the sky-line and then on a sudden grow limp and sink to the earth "as though," said one eye-witness, "the men's limbs had become string." As a matter of fact many had fallen back into the trench, wounded before clearing the parapet. Others, being hit when just beyond it, managed at once to crawl back and tumble over the parapet, thus avoiding the certainty of being hit a second and a third time and killed. Practically all the rest lay dead five or six

yards from the parapet. Colonel White had gone ten paces, and the two scaling-ladders lay at about the same distance. Every officer was killed, but on the right, near the edge of the valley, Private McGarvie and two others survived between the bullets as if by a miracle, reached the enemy's parapet, and, since they could effect nothing single-handed against two or three tiers of crowded trench-lines, flung themselves down outside the Turkish parapet and waited, throwing bombs, of which they had a bag full, into the enemy's trench.⁸⁰ They eventually crawled on to the slope of Monash Valley, where they were in partial shelter. On the other flank, near the seaward cliff, Lieutenant Wilson⁸¹ of the 8th also reached the enemy's trench and was seen sitting with his back to the parapet, beckoning to others to come on to him. Shortly afterwards he was killed by a bomb from the Turkish line. Here and there other individual soldiers had come near enough to the enemy's trench to throw a grenade, for the sound of the explosions could be distinguished for half-a-minute amid the uproar. But most of those who heard that fire




⁸⁰ Pte. McGarvie survived the fight. After throwing their bombs the three had shouted for more, but the answer came that there were none to give them. Over the parapet above them they could see rows of enemy bayonets. As no support reached them, after firing a few shots at the enemy's second trench, which they could see, they crept gradually down towards the head of Monash Valley, from which two nights later McGarvie succeeded in returning. He had been shot through the ankle, and so the other two, who were unwounded, arranged that he should start off first. As he came in there was a furious outburst of fire from the enemy, and the other two, who never returned, were probably caught by it. (706, Pte. D McGarvie, 8th L.H. Regt. Dairy farmer; of Pomborneit, Vic., b. Pomborneit, 19 June, 1892.)

⁸¹ Lieut. E. G. Wilson; 8th L.H. Regt. Grazier; of Warrnambool, Vic.; b. Minehead, Somerset, Eng., 7 Aug., 1892. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

realised that no attack could survive in it. The sound of bombing almost at once ceased. The first line, which had started so confidently, had been annihilated in half-a-minute; and the others having seen it mown down, realised fully that when they attempted to follow they would be instantly destroyed. Yet as soon as the first line had cleared the parapet, the second took its place, each man with his hand on the starting-peg and his foot on the step. The fire which roared undiminished overhead made it impossible to hear spoken orders. But exactly two minutes after the first had gone, the sight of leaders scrambling from the trench showed that the sign had been given for the further attack. Without hesitation every man in the second line leapt forward into the tempest.

A few survivors of that line afterwards remembered passing most of the first, all apparently dead, lying six yards in front of its own parapet. The second got a little farther, since, after the fight, its dead lay a few yards beyond those of the first line. Captain Hore,²² who was leading on the right, where No-Man's Land was widest, by running as fast as he could reached a point fifteen yards from the Turkish trenches. There, glancing over his shoulder, he perceived that he was the only man moving across the bare surface, the rest appearing all to have been killed. He flung himself down at the point which he had reached. None in that part of the line passed him.²³

Yet about this time observing-officers stationed in the trenches on Russell's Top undoubtedly saw, through the haze of dust raised by machine-gun bullets, a small red and yellow flag put up in the enemy's front line. It was on the south-eastern corner of the trench. Who placed it there will never be known, but there were almost certainly a few men of the first line who had managed to get into the extreme right of



²² Maj (temp. Lieut.-Col.) L. F. S. Hore, M.C.; Aust. Corps M.G. Officer, 1917/18. Barrister and solicitor; of London and Hobart; b. Murree, India, 5 Aug., 1870. Died 1 Sept., 1935.

²³ On the extreme left, where No-Man's Land was least dangerous, only the heads and shoulders of the attacking line being exposed to fire during the first half of the journey, some of the leaders of the second line, seeing the men on their right fall, flung themselves down, and thus a small proportion of their troops escaped death.

the Turkish trench. For ten minutes the flag fluttered behind the parapet, and then some unseen agency tore it down.⁸⁴ The fight in that corner was over; it could only have one ending. The Australian staff was subsequently told by a Turkish soldier, who had been in the front Turkish trench at the time and who was afterwards captured, that he knew nothing of any Australians having entered it alive. "They came on very well," he said, "and three men succeeded in reaching the Turkish trenches, falling dead over the parapet into the bottom of the trench."

These faint evidences are probably all that will ever be obtained concerning the incident. But its effects were important. After the second line had started, the men of the 10th Light Horse (Western Australia), forming the two lines which were next to attack, filed into the trenches which their predecessors had just left. In addition to the fire which had previously swept the parapet, two Turkish 75-mm. field-guns were now bursting their shrapnel low over No-Man's Land as fast as they could be loaded and fired. The saps were crowded with dead and wounded Victorians who had been shot back straight from the parapet and were being carried or helped to the rear. Among the Western Australians, who occasionally halted to let them pass, every man assumed that death was certain, and each in the secret places of his mind debated how he should go to it. Many seem to have silently determined that they would run forward as swiftly as possible, since that course was the simplest and most honourable, besides offering a far-off chance that, if everyone did the same, some might at least reach and create some effect upon the enemy. Mate having said good-bye to mate, the third line took up its position on the fire-step.

The apparent uselessness of continuing the effort did not engender a second's hesitation in the light horsemen. They knew that their operation was a small part of the crucial struggle in the campaign, and, whatever their doubts, they could not feel sure that the whole structure of the plan might not depend upon their rôle in it. That they should falter, and so possibly "let down" their mates in the other columns at

⁸⁴The evidence of the Brigade Signalling Officer, Lieut W. D. Oliver (of Melbourne), whose duty was to watch for the flags, is definite. He saw a man of fine physique whom he believed to be Sgt. Roger Palmer (of Winchelsea, Vic.) drop into the enemy's trench, and immediately afterwards the flag was waved.

a critical moment, was unthinkable. Certain efforts, however, were made by the regimental leaders to discover whether the sacrifice was necessary. Major Todd,³⁵ who commanded the third line, reported to the regimental commander, Colonel Brazier, that success would be impossible. Brazier, who during a slight relaxation in the Turkish fire had been able to raise a periscope, had himself seen the 8th Regiment lying prone in front of the trenches, either waiting for a lull in the fire or killed. About this time a staff officer from brigade headquarters came to him and asked why the third line had not gone forward. But Brazier, doubting whether the annihilation of additional troops could serve any interest except that of the enemy, determined to raise the question, as he had full right to do, before allowing that line to start. He accordingly at 4.40 went to brigade headquarters, which was slightly in rear, and finding there only the brigade-major, Colonel Antill, told him what he had seen, and informed him that, in view of the strength of the enemy's fire, the task laid upon his regiment was beyond achievement. But Antill, who was the main influence in the command of the brigade,³⁶ had already received the news that one of the red and yellow flags had been seen in the enemy's trench. It seemed an urgent matter to support any troops who might have seized part of the Turkish line. He replied, therefore, that the 10th Regiment must push on at once.

It was then about 4.45. The roar of small-arms which had been called forth by the lines of the 8th had subsided to almost complete silence before the third line, formed by the 10th, went out. But as the men rose above the parapet it instantly swelled until its volume was tremendous. The 10th went forward to meet death instantly, as the 8th had done, the men running as swiftly and as straight as they could at the Turkish rifles. With that regiment went the flower of the youth of Western Australia, sons of the old pioneering families, youngsters—in some cases two and three from the same home—who had flocked to Perth at the outbreak of war with their own horses and saddlery in order to secure

³⁵ Lieut.-Col. T. J. Todd, C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded 10th L.H. Regt., 1915/19; 3rd L.H. Bde, temp., 1918. Accountant; of Subiaco, W. Aust., and Auckland, N.Z., b. Christchurch, N.Z., 2 March, 1873. Died of illness, 23 Jan., 1919.

³⁶ Birdwood had little confidence in the brigade commander, but, like many generals, was averse to removing his subordinate outright, although he endeavoured to do so afterwards by invaliding. For any weakness in the brigade command this too soft, but very common, course of action must be held responsible.

enlistment in a mounted regiment of the A.I.F. Men known and popular, the best loved leaders in sport and work in the West, then rushed straight to their death. Gresley Harper³⁷ and Wilfred,³⁸ his younger brother, the latter of whom was last seen running forward like a schoolboy in a foot-race, with all the speed he could compass; the gallant Piesse, who had struggled ashore from the hospital ship; two others, who had just received their commissions, Roskams³⁹ and Turnbull⁴⁰—the latter a Rhodes scholar. Sergeant Gollan, who had begged the doctor's leave to take part, was mortally wounded. Captain Hore⁴¹ of the 8th, still crouched far out on the summit, waiting to go on with any supporting line, did not realise that any such lines started. But as he lay he saw two brave men, first one and later another, run swiftly past him each quite alone, making straight for the Turkish rifles. Each, after continuing past him for a dozen yards, seemed to trip and fall headlong. They were undoubtedly the remnant of the two lines of the 10th Light Horse.

After the third line had gone, Colonel Brazier had again determined to prevent, if possible, further sacrifice of men. Major Scott,⁴² commanding the fourth line, had reported as Todd had done—that the task could not be achieved—and Brazier had therefore again referred to Colonel Antill, but was ordered to advance. "As the fire was murderous," wrote Brazier afterwards, "I again referred the matter personally to the brigadier (General Hughes), who said to get what men I could and go round by Bully Beef Sap and Monash Gully." While the question of stopping further charges over The Nek

³⁷ Pte. G. Harper (No. 113, 10th L.H. Regt.). Barrister; of Guildford, W. Aust.; b. Guildford, 16 Feb., 1884. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

³⁸ Pte. W. L. Harper (No. 114, 10th L.H. Regt.). Farmer; of Guildford, W. Aust.; b. Guildford, 1890. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

³⁹ Lieut. L. J. C. Roskams; 10th L.H. Regt. Farmer; of Kellerberrin, W. Aust.; b. Bristol, Eng., 16 June, 1884. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁰ Lieut. A. P. Turnbull; 10th L.H. Regt. Solicitor; of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Dardanup, W. Aust., 18 July, 1888. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁴¹ In front of him, as he lay, was the swollen body of a Turk, killed apparently on June 30. Hore, who had so far only been tapped on the shoulder by a bullet, crept close into the shelter afforded by this corpse and lay waiting. He could see no other living man. It was useless to go forward; yet he could not stay on indefinitely where he was. Probing his conscience to discover his duty as an officer, he determined to wait until one of the other lines came up, so that he could go on with them. But, though he seemed to wait interminably, no other line came to him. A bullet struck him in the foot, rendering him useless for any further advance. He therefore began to edge back, inch by inch, to the Australian line. Before he withdrew, one Australian had crept up to him in No-Man's Land and asked his officer's advice as to what he should do. Hore told him to make his way back, if possible. Hore himself regained the trench, but the other man appears to have been killed.

⁴² Maj. J. B. Scott; 10th L.H. Regt. Accountant; of Launceston, Tas., and Katanning, W. Aust.; b. Hagley, Tas., 4 May, 1873. Killed in action, 8 Oct., 1915.

and attacking instead from a new direction was thus being debated, the fourth line had assembled on the fire-step. The roar of musketry had again died down; but, as commands could not safely be given by word of mouth, the leaders had arranged that the sign to advance should be a wave of the hand. Major Scott was to give the signal to his troop leaders, and they would pass it to their subordinates. It was known to the troop leaders, but not to the men, that the stoppage of the assault was under discussion, when about 5.15 a.m. there appears to have come to the right of the line some officer who had possibly heard of the first decision of brigade headquarters, and who asked the men why they had not gone forward. The incident is obscure, but the impression was somehow created that the charge had been ordered. The troops on the right at once leapt out. Instantly there burst forth the same tempest of machine-gun fire. As this uproar started, Major Scott, waiting near the centre, exclaimed: "By God, I believe the right has gone!" The nearest N.C.O.'s looked at Captain Rowan,⁴³ their troop leader, who signed to them to go, at the same time rising himself and waving his hand, only to fall back dead from the parapet. His troop sergeant, Sanderson,⁴⁴ repeated the signal, and the men in the centre sprang out. Sanderson's experience in this fourth rush has been recorded.⁴⁵

The rhododendron bushes had been cut off with machine-gun fire and were all spikey. The Turks were two-deep in the trench ahead. There was at least one machine-gun on the left and any number in the various trenches on the Chessboard. The men who were going out were absolutely certain that they were going to be killed, and they expected to be killed right away. The thing that struck a man most was if he wasn't knocked in the first three yards. Tpr. Weston,⁴⁶ on Sanderson's right, fell beside him as they got out of the trench, knocked back into the trench. Tpr. Biggs⁴⁷ also fell next to him. Sanderson went all he could for the Turkish trench. Tpr. H. G. Hill,⁴⁸ running beside him, was shot through the stomach, spun round, and fell. Sanderson saw the Turks (close) in front and looked over his shoulder. Four men were running about ten yards

⁴³ Capt. A. P. Rowan; 10th L.H. Regt. Gazier; of Melbourne; b. St. Kilda, Vic., 31 March, 1876. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁴ Maj. W. L. Sanderson, O.B.E., M.C.; 11th A.F.A. Bde. Irrigation and drainage engineer; of Claremont, W. Aust.; b. Omaru, N.Z., 23 Oct., 1889.

⁴⁵ In the diary of the Official War Correspondent. A few of the sentences at the commencement of this extract have been transposed for the sake of clearness.

⁴⁶ Pte. F. H. Weston (No. 357, 10th L.H. Regt.). Orchardist; of Mundaring, W. Aust.; b. Laura, S. Aust. 1885. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁷ Sgt. A. J. T. Biggs (No. 240, 10th L.H. Regt.). Miner; of Kalgoorlie, W. Aust.; b. Forest Range, S. Aust., 1883. Died of wounds, 10 Jan., 1917.

⁴⁸ Pte. H. G. Hill (No. 283, 10th L.H. Regt.). Farmer; b. Manor House Farm, Colton, Stafford, Eng., 9 Dec., 1887. Died of wounds, 11 Aug., 1915.

behind, and they all dropped at the same moment. He tripped over a rhododendron bush and fell over a dead Turk right on the Turkish parapet. The Turks were then throwing round cricket-ball bombs—you could see the brown arms coming up over the trenches. The bombs were going well over—only one blew back and hit him slightly in the leg. There were two dead men to the right towards the top of the hill, lying on the Turkish parapet—they looked like the Harper brothers. Sanderson knew how badly the show had gone. . . . He managed to get his rifle beside him and clean it, and got the first cartridge from the full magazine into the barrel. He expected the Turks to counter-attack, and decided to get in a few shots if they did.

After about half-an-hour, looking back, he saw Capt. Fry⁴⁹ (of his regiment) kneeling up outside the "secret sap." Sanderson waved to him, and Fry saw him. . . . The Turks were not up (*i.e.*, lining their parapet) at this moment, because the navy had begun to bombard, and lyddite shells were whizzing low over the parapet and exploding on the back of the trench, so close that they seemed to lift Sanderson off the ground every time—he was sure the first "short" would finish him. Major Todd (who had survived from the third line) came along beside Fry and presently shouted something which seemed to be: "Retire the fourth line first." Sanderson looked round. There was none beside him except the dead. He crawled towards the secret sap . . . about half-way there was an 8th L.H. man lying on his back smoking. . . . He said: "Have a cigarette; it's too — hot." Sanderson told him to get back and keep low, as machine-guns were firing from across the Chessboard and cutting the bushes pretty low. There was a lieutenant of the 8th L.H. there who had had some bombs in his haversack. These had been set off and the whole of his hip blown away. He was alive, and they tried to take him in. He begged them to let him stay. "I can't bloody well stand it," he said. They got him into the secret sap, and he died there as they got him in. In front of the secret sap were any number of the 8th L.H. The sap itself was full of dead. There were very few wounded—the ground in front of the trenches was simply covered. Sanderson went along the secret sap into the front line and there saw (dead) Capt. Rowan, Weston, and another Hill;⁵⁰ and Lieut. Turnbull just dying then. . . . About fifty yards of the line had not a man in it except the dead and wounded—no one was manning it.

It was at this stage that there were recovered a certain number of those who had gone out on the left and fallen wounded into ground which was partly sheltered. Lance-Corporal Hampshire,⁵¹ making five journeys, brought in Lieutenant Craig⁵² and others, the neighbouring Turks (according to one account) apparently refraining from firing at him. Most of the stricken, however, were on the exposed summit, where no man could venture and live.

⁴⁹ Capt. H. P. Fry; 10th L.H. Regt. Grazier; of Donnybrook, W. Aust.; b. Brentwood, Essex, Eng., 28 May, 1882. Killed in action, 29 Aug., 1915.

⁵⁰ Pte. A. H. Hill (No. 292, 10th L.H. Regt.). Farmer; of Bungulla, W. Aust; b. Clutton, Somerset, Eng., 9 Jan., 1892. Killed in action, 7 Aug. 1915.


⁵¹ Sgt. W. J. Hampshire (No. 293, 10th L.H. Regt.). Clerk; of Nedlands, W. Aust.; b. Melbourne, 15 Sept., 1877.

⁵² Capt. L. Craig; 10th L.H. Regt. Farmer; of Perth, W. Aust; b. York, W. Aust., 23 Nov., 1892.

It appears that the left of the fourth line, although the brigadier's final decision did not reach it in time to prevent its movement, went forward more cautiously than the rest, the men keeping low and not running. They were partly in shelter, and, after advancing a short distance, flung themselves down among officers and men of other lines who were lying there. Among these was Major Todd, who, on discussing the position with other senior officers, decided, as has been related, to withdraw the survivors. Upon this being done, Todd received the brigadier's new order to proceed down Bully Beef Sap⁵⁸ and Monash Valley, in order to support the detachment of British troops who were to assault from that direction. This step, however, was eventually abandoned, the impossibility of the plan being sufficiently demonstrated in the attempt made by the British to carry it out.

The plan of the attack had provided that, when once the enemy's trenches on the actual Nek had been captured by the first line of light horse, two companies of the Royal Welch Fusiliers should move up Monash Valley between Pope's and Russell's, and, when nearing its head, should climb the slope on the right and commence a flank assault upon the Chessboard, while a hundred yards farther east the 1st Light Horse from Pope's would also be frontally attacking. This assault would be impossible unless the trenches at The Nek were first taken, since their garrison would shoot into the back of the attacking British at seventy yards range. When, however, the red and yellow flag was sighted in the front trench on The Nek, the staff of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade considered the conditions sufficiently fulfilled to allow the British attack to proceed.

The two companies, together with some engineers of the New Army, had before dawn filed down Bully Beef Sap into the valley, up which they turned. Passing through the barbed-wire at the farthest Anzac post, they moved, one company up a



⁵⁸ The partly-tunnelled communication trench leading from Russell's Top down into Monash Valley.

steep washaway or indentation to the right, the other straight ahead along the main gully. At the limit of safety they waited for word of the capture of The Nek trenches. "At 5.10 a.m.," records their colonel, "a message was received that the Australian Light Horse were holding the 'A' line of trenches,"⁵⁴ and I was instructed to move forward at once."


In consequence of the dense undergrowth, Lieutenant-Colonel Hay⁵⁵ had directed that the troops should be sent forward in parties of only ten at a time. Such a party accordingly began at once to climb the washaway; but no sooner had it moved than bombs were thrown at it from the enemy's trench, the parapet of which could be seen fringing the summit. The 1st Light Horse, watching from Pope's, observed the Turks running forward from their trench, rolling bombs down the cliff-face. The leading men of the Fusiliers were blown back and, in falling, swept away those on the uncertain foothold below. The enemy, who seemed inclined to follow, were instantly stopped by the light horse snipers, who quickly picked off a score of them. But the task of climbing the washaway seemed hopeless, especially as the muzzles of two machine-guns could be seen protruding over the parapet. Colonel Hay therefore decided to abandon the attempt. Meanwhile the other company had come, almost at its starting-point, into heavy machine-gun fire, its leader, Captain Walter Lloyd,⁵⁶ had been killed, the subaltern next to him wounded, and every man in the first party hit. The company had thus been checked, and, as Colonel Hay found that the advance could only be made in single file and that any attempt to renew it was at once met by the fire of a machine-gun and by bomb-throwing, he reported to brigade headquarters that he was held up. The brigadier had diverted two companies of the Cheshire Regiment into Monash Valley, but, as the Fusiliers had failed, the attack there also was abandoned.

Thus by six o'clock the attack both on The Nek and by way of Monash Valley had been brought to a standstill. On no other occasion during the war did Australians have to face fire approaching in volume that which concentrated on The

⁵⁴ The Turkish position at The Nek was shown in the map as the "A" trenches.

⁵⁵ Lieut.-Col A. Hay. Commanded 8th Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1914/17. Officer of British Regular Army; of Edinburgh, Scotland; b. Shoeburyness, Eng., 9 Aug., 1872. Killed in action, 3 Feb., 1917.

⁵⁶ Capt W. Lloyd; 8th Royal Welch Fusiliers. Officer of British Regular Army; of Much Wenlock, Salop, Eng., b. 17 July, 1874. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.



WIGHTMAN

THE ASSAULTS MADE BY THE 1ST AND 2ND LIGHT HORSE REGIMENTS AND
ROYAL WELCH FUSILIERS, 7TH AUGUST, 1915

(1) 1st Light Horse Regiment. (2) 2nd Light Horse Regiment. (3) Royal Welch Fusiliers. (British troops and trenches, red; Turkish trenches, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.)



THE NEK FROM BABY 700

The trenches round the monument are those of the Turks. Beyond can be seen the Anzac trenches. The space across which the 3rd Light Horse Brigade attempted to charge lies between the two. The monument is a Turkish one raised after the Evacuation.

*ANZAC B or Memorial Official Photo No G1824
Taken in 1919*

To face p 622.

Baby 706.



Russell's Top



Gully climbed by
part of R W Fus

Top of

SOME OF THE TURKISH TRENCHES WHICH FACED THE 3RD LIGHT HORSE BRIGADE AND ROYAL WEICH FUSILIERS

Aust War Memorial Official Photos Nos G1133 and 1134



TURKISH TRENCHES ON CHIFFBOARD FACING THE 1ST LIGHT HORSE REGIMENT AND ROYAL WEICH FUSILIERS

*Annually Official Photograph
Aust War Memorial Collection No 6597*



TURKISH TRENCH FACING THE 2ND LIGHT HORSE REGIMENT AT QUINN'S *Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1019.*

To face p 623

Nek. From the whole face of Baby 700 and from secure positions far on both its flanks machine-guns swept that narrow space with a devastating cross-fire. In the 8th Light Horse half of those who started had been actually killed and nearly half the remainder wounded; that is to say, out of a total of 300, 12 officers and 142 men had been killed and 4 officers and 76 men wounded. The 10th Regiment had lost 9 officers and 129 men (of whom 7 officers and 73 men had been killed).⁵¹

⁵¹ The disposition of the four lines, as far as it has been possible to ascertain it, was as given below. The names are those of the officers and others commanding lines, squadrons, and troops. It will be perceived that the survivors were almost entirely on the left of the line.

8th Light Horse—

1st Line.

Lieut.-Col. A. H. White (killed).

Lieut. Dale (killed).

Maj. Redford (killed).

Lieut. Anderson (killed).

Lieut. Wilson (killed).

Lieut. Marsh (killed).

Lieut. Talbot Woods (killed).

Sgt. Grenfell (killed).

Lieut. Borthwick (killed).

Lieut. Henty (killed).

2nd Line.

Maj. Deeble.

Maj. McLaurin (wounded).

Lieut. W. Robinson (wounded).

Lieut. Higgins.

Lieut. Crawford (wounded).

Capt. Hore (wounded).

Lieut. Grant (killed).

Lieut. Carthew (killed).

Lieut. Howard (killed).

10th Light Horse—

3rd Line.

Maj. Todd.

The exact disposition is unknown, but the line was apparently led by the following officers—Captains V. F. Piesse (killed) and W. C. Robinson (wounded), Lieuts. McMaster (killed), Roskams (killed), Turnbull (killed), Heller (killed), and D. A. Jackson (killed).

4th Line.

Maj. Scott.

Sgt. H. W. Harper.

Lieut. Kidd.

Capt. Rowan (killed).

Lieut. Craig (wounded).

Lieut. Throssell.


Lieuts. C. C. Dale and L. W. H. Anderson, who were both killed, were ex-cadets of Duntroon. Maj. T. H. Redford (merchant) was of Warrnambool, Vic.; Lieut. C. Talbot Woods (accountant) of Sydney; Lieut. E. G. Wilson (grazier) of Warrnambool; Lieut. C. G. Marsh (clerk) of Beaconsfield Upper, Vic.; Sgt. C. Grenfell (grocer) of Belmont, Vic.; Lieut. K. Borthwick (grazier) of Sale, Vic.; Lieut. E. E. Henty (farmer) of Hamilton, Vic.; Maj. A. V. Deeble (schoolmaster) of Geelong, Vic.; Maj. A. McG. McLaurin (vigneron) of Rutherglen, Vic.; Capt. L. F. S. Hore (barrister and solicitor) of London and Hobart; Lieut. W. Robinson (farmer) of Murra Warra, Vic.; Lieut. M. B. Higgins (barrister) of Malvern and Dromana, Vic.; Lieut. A. Crawford (farmer) of Tatura, Vic.; Lieut. G. M. Grant (surveyor) of Sydney; Lieut. C. Carthew (farmer) of Myrtleford, Vic.; Lieut. T. S. Howard (clerk) of Melbourne; Maj. T. J. Todd (accountant) of Subiaco, W. Aust., and Auckland, N.Z.; Capt. V. F. Piesse (grazier) of Wagin, W. Aust.; Capt. W. C. Robinson (pastoralist) of Perth, W. Aust.; Lieut. L. J. C. Roskams (farmer) of Kellerberrin, W. Aust.; Lieut. A. P. Turnbull (solicitor) of Perth, W. Aust.; Lieut. T. J. Heller (ironmonger) of Northam, W. Aust.; Lieut. D. A. Jackson (architect) of Perth, W. Aust.; Maj. J. B. Scott (accountant) of Launceston, Tas., and Katanning, W. Aust.; Sgt. H. W. Harper (farmer) of Perth, W. Aust.; Lieut. T. A. Kidd (accountant) of Geraldton, W. Aust.; Capt. A. P. Rowan (grazier) of Melbourne; Lieut. L. Craig (farmer) of Perth, W. Aust.; Lieut. H. V. H. Throssell (farmer) of Cowcowing, W. Aust.

In the 9th L.H., in the trenches on Russell's Top, Lieut.-Col. A. Miell (pastoralist; of Crystal Brook, S. Aust.) was killed.

The Fusiliers had lost 4 officers and 61 men (1 officer and 15 men killed). The Turkish soldier beforementioned, who was in the enemy's trenches during this attack, stated that on The Nek during the actual assault the Turks suffered no loss.⁸⁸ The 18th Regiment, which itself had been cut to pieces in endeavouring to cross the same narrow space on June 30th, felt that it had "got its own back." Complimentary orders were issued by the Turkish commanders contrasting that regiment with the 14th and others, which had lost their posts in the hills; some medals were granted and promotions were made for bravery.

Before attempting to estimate the effect of the sacrifice of the 8th and 10th Light Horse Regiments, it is necessary to describe the operations at Pope's and Quinn's, which, though subsidiary to that upon Baby 700, were intended to augment the result. The troops at Pope's were to assault the trenches facing them.

These comprised the trenches upon Dead Man's Ridge and the portion of the Chessboard lying behind them. The intention was that the attacking force should drive through these so as to overlook the valley in rear of the Chessboard up which lay the route of enemy reinforcements for Baby 700. To carry




out this attack the light horse must first traverse a gully whose left or upper end was a mere depression, shallow, open, and spoon-shaped. Half-way down its course, however, it dropped suddenly to a deep, scrub-covered, precipitous ravine. The water tumbling after rainstorms down this steep break won it the name of "Waterfall Gully." On the far side of this gully lay Dead Man's Ridge, upon the slope of which the enemy had four tiers of trenches. The nearer of these had originally been dug by the 13th Battalion during the

⁸⁸ This may be correct, although a large number of the enemy who continued to expose themselves after the attack had been defeated were certainly shot by the machine-guns under Sgt. C. W. E. Ashburner (of Adelaide) at Turks' Point, and by the 1st L.H. Regt. on Pope's.

unsuccessful attack of May 2nd.⁵⁹ The enemy had since strongly entrenched the whole top of the hill. Beyond, but connected with Dead Man's by several communication trenches, were the lines of the Chessboard.

The attack was to be made by two squadrons—about 200 men—of the 1st Light Horse Regiment (New South Wales), the third squadron being left to garrison Pope's. The regimental commander was sick, but Major Glasgow of the 2nd Light Horse, who was acting as commandant of Pope's, would himself take charge of the operation. The right half of the attacking force, which he was to accompany, would move out some time before the actual assault and, making its way round the foot of Pope's into the mouth of Waterfall Gully, which was there sheltered from the enemy, would climb that valley, and form up ready to assault at 4.30 the right of Dead Man's Ridge. The other half of the force was to be under Major Reid,⁶⁰ an officer whose high and chivalrous bearing had made him in a sense the real leader of his regiment. Reid's party, on seeing the

other in position, was to climb out over the parapet of Pope's, and, charging straight across the shallow end of the gully, attack the left of the Turkish position. The two squadrons were thus to assault simultaneously. Reid's would have a much shorter distance to cover, but would throughout be exposed to a raking fire from a part of the Chessboard close upon his left, and possibly from German Officers' on his right. The right party, on the other hand, would probably be sheltered until it had climbed almost to its objective. The actual side of Dead Man's Ridge was sheltered from most of the enemy's surrounding positions, and could not therefore be swept by quite such a concentration of fire as that which could bear on The Nek or Quinn's. Moreover the attacks in




⁵⁹ See Vol I, p 597

⁶⁰ Maj. J. Moffat Reid; 1st L.H. Regt. Grazier; of Tenterfield, N.S.W.; b. Tent Hill, N.S.W., 9 Sept., 1881. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

progress at those flanking posts should divert much of the enemy's fire. The conditions at Pope's were therefore more favourable than at Russell's Top or Quinn's; but success would be futile unless the 3rd Light Horse Brigade on the flank succeeded in getting a foothold on Baby 700.

By an exceedingly brave dash the left of the 1st Regiment crossed the open depression at the head of Waterfall Gully. Charging through a heavy fire of rifles and machine-guns, which met them as soon as they appeared, they reached the old trenches of the 13th on Dead Man's Ridge. It is said that the gallant Reid, being hit through the right hand, changed his revolver to his left, and, though entreated to go to the rear, continued to lead his men. He was last seen amid the bomb-smoke in the enemy trench. The right party, having clambered up the valley, also reached the enemy's position, which, as has been said, comprised four tiers on Dead Man's Ridge⁶¹ and other trenches beyond. The first line of light horsemen carried a number of stick-bombs, designed to burst upon percussion. Sheltering in the old dugouts of the 13th Battalion near the bottom of the dip, they threw these into the trench close above them, killing or driving out the garrison, and then rushing the trench. From this position they proceeded to fling bombs into the next, which they also charged and captured. Shortly afterwards Major Glasgow, who was with his men in the thick of the fight, saw a white hand and arm waving above the third trench, into which his men were then throwing bombs. Realising that a party of Australians must have reached it, he clambered over the parapet, and leading his men to the third trench, found that Lieutenant Harris⁶² and his troop had entered it in a previous rush.

In this position the 1st Regiment held on; but its losses had been exceedingly



⁶¹ The lowest trench, being exposed to fire from Pope's, was usually occupied by the enemy only at night

⁶² Col G. H. L. Harris, M.C., V.D.; 1st L.H. Regt. Grazier; of Tumut, N S.W.; b. Werमतong Station, Tumut, 28 Oct., 1881.

severe. Few officers remained unwounded. The bomb-fight with the Turks in the trench on the summit was continuous and unequal. The light horse had spent most of their bombs in taking the first trench, and could do little except watch the sky above the parapet in order to watch and dodge the enemy's missiles. While so doing they found occasional grenades bursting about their feet. It was presently discovered that these were being rolled by the enemy down one of several tunnels which connected the position with the trench above it. This stratagem was checked by a light horseman firing his rifle up the tunnel. But, while the troops were transferring the parapet of the captured trench to the side facing the enemy, the bombs which were urgently needed to protect them ran out. The danger of carrying a further supply from Pope's across the open head of the gully was extreme. Several men nevertheless made the attempt, and at least three—Troopers Keys,⁶³ Tancred,⁶⁴ and Barrow⁶⁵—succeeded.

The Nek was within view of the left party assaulting from Pope's, and, when daylight increased, they saw the third line of the 3rd Brigade run forward and sink to the earth. They afterwards saw the Welch Fusiliers advance through the dust-haze caused by bombs and bullets until their first two lines fell almost in a heap, apparently killed or wounded, at the foot of a cliff. Meanwhile Glasgow on the southern shoulder of Dead Man's had the operations at Quinn's full in view. It became obvious to him that no support would come from either flank. On the contrary, as the fighting in those places subsided, more and more of the enemy's machine-guns were turned upon Dead Man's Ridge and the open space between it and Pope's. He and his few remaining men occupied only thirty yards of the third trench. A mere bend of it, held by Lieutenant Weir,⁶⁶ separated them from the enemy, who was in the same trench on their right. Harris, whose back had been torn by a bomb, held a similar bend on the left. Close above

⁶³ Lieut. B I Keys; 12th A.F.A. Bde. Grazier; of Walgett, N.S.W.; b Muswellbrook, N.S.W., 21 Dec., 1892.

⁶⁴ R Q M.S. R C. Tancred (No. 437, 1st L.H. Regt.). Butcher; of Narrromine, N.S.W.; b. Trangie, Narrromine, 1895.


⁶⁵ Pte. F. Barrow (No. 397, 1st L.H. Regt.). Tramway employee; of Manly, N.S.W.; b. Loxhore, Devon, Eng., 13 July, 1890.

⁶⁶ Maj. F. V. Weir, D.S.O.; 1st L.H. Regt. Station manager; of Deniliquin and Hay, N.S.W.; b. Widgiewa Station, Urana, N.S.W., 14 Feb., 1878.

was the much more formidable position on the summit of Dead Man's, crowded with Turks. Permanent occupation being under those conditions impossible, Glasgow, after holding on for two hours, decided to clear the wounded and withdraw; and he sent his orderly officer, Lieutenant Nettleton, to warn those in Pope's that he was retiring.

Nettleton was killed soon after, but Lieutenant Harris, together with four men and Glasgow himself, held on, covering the retirement, which was effected over the open to Pope's. Most of the wounded were carried in, but the losses of the assaulting party had been almost annihilating. Of the original 200, 154 were casualties, every officer except Glasgow—who retired with the last party—being hit.⁶⁷ By an order issued next day this fine officer was confirmed in the command of the regiment.

While the 1st Regiment was attacking from Pope's, the 2nd (Queensland) had made its assault from Quinn's, of which it formed the garrison. The main object of this assault was to assist that upon Baby 700 by seizing trenches overlooking the valley beyond Quinn's, up which the enemy's reinforcements to the Chessboard and Baby 700 would probably endeavour to move. By Birdwood's orders the effort was to be directed only against the trenches facing the left half of the post. These were to be rushed by 200 men issuing in four successive lines. On the left of Quinn's, in order to accommodate the troops before the assault, the roof of a shallow tunnel which ran out from the extreme flank had been broken in during the night. There was thus added to the post a shallow and narrow trench running for a short distance



⁶⁷ Maj. Reid and Lieut. Nettleton (merchant; of Sydney) and 56 of other ranks were killed. Capt. W. Cox (fruitgrower; of Carlingford, N.S.W.), with leg and arm broken, and Lieut. G. E. I. Tinson (mechanic; of Cessnock, N.S.W.), whose legs had been partly blown away by a bomb, crawled into Pope's twenty-four hours after the attack. Both died. Capt. R. D. Holman (of Sydney), Lieuts. A. D. Reid (of Murrumburrah, N.S.W.), A. A. White (of Scone, N.S.W.), N. S. MacMillan (of Moree, N.S.W.), J. Stewart (of Yass and Boorowa, N.S.W.), Weir, and Harris, and 87 other ranks were wounded.

along the edge of the Bloody Angle. From this the left of the attacking force was to issue. Arrangements for the emergence of the right were rendered difficult by the heavy roof of earth and timber which covered much of the centre of Quinn's, and by the wire-netting bomb-screens that protected the trench wherever it was open. Part of the roof was, however, removed during the night, and a length of bomb-screen taken down. The signal for the first line to attack was to be the explosion of a mine under the northern end of the objective.

This would be the first attempt made by any Anzac troops since the early days of June to cross the narrow No-Man's Land at Quinn's. The 2nd Regiment, which had made the sortie on May 15th when Major Graham was killed, well realised the difficulty of its task. But at the preliminary conference of regimental leaders called by General Birdwood it had been explained that, before the assault was undertaken, three conditions would have been fulfilled. German Officers' Trench would have been captured; the New Zealanders and British from Chunuk Bair would be descending upon the rear of the Chessboard and Turkish Quinn's; and the positions opposite Quinn's would have been thoroughly bombarded. This "pledge," for as such it was regarded by officers of the light horse, had been passed on to the troops, who were consequently in the highest spirits, never doubting that the general offensive would succeed. Unfortunately too much had been promised. The 2nd Regiment knew before dawn that no force had descended upon the rear of the Turks, and that German Officers' Trench was still in the hands of the enemy. As for the bombardment, it is true that the 2nd New Zealand Field Battery on Plugge's had been ordered to carry it out; but the fire of field-guns against such a position was useless except to repel attack. It followed that, except for any effect which might be produced by the mine, the assault would be dependent for success solely upon surprise, and since all night long the enemy had been roused not only by the fighting at the Pine and German Officers', but also by demonstrations—intended to cover the advance of the main columns—loyally and thoroughly carried out by the very troops who were to attack at Quinn's, Pope's, and Russell's Top, there was small chance that surprise would be achieved. At 3.55 the Turks opposite Quinn's, stirred by the renewed

attack upon German Officers', broke into a violent fusillade. This caused Colonel Stodart of the 2nd to report to Chauvel that it would not be possible to attack if such fire were maintained.

Nevertheless the troops who were to make the assault, though their intelligence showed them that every condition was now against them, faced their task with a grim determination. At 4.30, when the general bombardment ceased, no mine explosion could be heard. The first line was still waiting for the signal, when the engineer officer came up with the news that the mine had been fired, but apparently without causing any recognisable sound or eruption. Major Bourne,⁶⁸ who was conducting the operation, thereupon gave the order for the first line to charge. But here, as at The Nek, the enemy was perfectly prepared. As the troops scrambled from the trenches, intense fire was opened upon them. One Turkish machine-gun was shooting from the direct front, two from Dead Man's Ridge, and a fourth from German Officers.' Major Logan,⁶⁹ who led the line, was killed before he had gone five yards. Lieutenant Burge,⁷⁰ leading the left, fell dead when ten yards out. Trooper Marson,⁷¹ who followed him, had his leg practically severed with machine-gun bullets. With one exception every man of the first line was killed or wounded, the majority before they had gone six yards. Many owed their lives to the fact that they were struck when on the parapet and fell back wounded into the trench. The four machine-guns at Quinn's, although all firing at Turkish positions on the flank in order to cover the attack, could effect no apparent diminution of the enemy's fire.

Seeing the first line literally annihilated, and realising that the same fate must meet any similar attempt, Bourne ordered the second line to stand fast in Quinn's. Sufficient had been done to ensure that the enemy would keep his trenches filled. Moreover, if the three other lines of the 2nd Regiment were annihilated, Quinn's would be left with a garrison of only

⁶⁸ Lieut.-Col. G. H. Bourne, D.S.O. Commanded 2nd L.H. Regt., 1916/18, and 1st L.H. Bde., temp., in 1918. Bank manager; of Brisbane and Toowoomba, Q'land; b. Brisbane, 21 Nov., 1881.

⁶⁹ Maj. T. J. Logan; 2nd L.H. Regt. Farmer; of Forest Hill, Q'land; b. Brookfield, Q'land, 30 March, 1877. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁷⁰ Lieut. J. Burge; 2nd L.H. Regt. Auctioneer's clerk; of Allora, Q'land; b. 1 July, 1870. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁷¹ Pte. C. I. Marson (No. 347, 2nd L.H. Regt.). Butcher; of Mount Morgan, Q'land; b. Ellel, near Lancaster, Eng., 25 July, 1895. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

twenty-eight men; and the sole reserve for that post and Pope's was the 3rd Light Horse and two companies of the Royal Welch Fusiliers. Bourne's judgment in stopping the action was confirmed by Colonel Stodart and subsequently by the higher commanders.

In this action Major Logan, Lieutenants Burge and Hinton,⁷² and 14 others had been killed and Lieutenant Norris⁷³ and 36 others wounded. It was all over in less than a minute. In their excitement the Turks continued to expose themselves, standing shoulder-high above their parapets both opposite Quinn's and on the Chessboard, and so sustained losses which they would otherwise have escaped.

So ended the feints of August 7th. For sheer bravery, devoted loyalty, and that self-discipline which seldom failed in Australian soldiers, they stand alone in the annals of their country. Not once during all this deadly fighting did the troops display the least sign of hesitation in performing what they believed to be their duty. But the difficulties of the secondary attack upon a position of extraordinary strength had been insufficiently considered by Birdwood and Skeen. For the annihilation of line after line at The Nek the local command was, however, chiefly responsible. Although at such crises in a great battle firm action must be taken, sometimes regardless of cost, there could be no valid reason for flinging away the later lines after the first had utterly failed. It is doubtful if there exists in the records of the A.I.F. one instance in which, after one attacking party had been signally defeated, a second, sent after it, succeeded without some radical change having been effected in the plan or the conditions. Even had the enemy's trenches been reached and entered by later lines, it is unlikely that the movement of Turkish troops towards Chunuk Bair would have been affected by it to a greater extent than by the onslaught of the first line. But it seems certain that Antill at headquarters did not make himself aware of the true position, and, apart from the blunder in timing, it is to this that the heavy loss was mainly due. It may also be argued that the gallant White, acting as

⁷² Lieut. Hinton belonged to the second line, but was killed when covering by fire the withdrawal of the wounded. Tpr. Womack, who had induced the doctor to let him stay for the fight, was among the killed.

⁷³ Maj. A. R. Norris, M.B.E. M.C.; Imperial Camel Corps. D.A.A.G., Aust. Mtd. Div., 1919. Member of Aust. Permanent Forces: of Wallanbilla and Roma, Q'land; b. Williwa, N.S.W., 21 Dec., 1884.

a sportsman rather than a soldier, by leading forward the first line deprived his regiment of the control which should have been exercised over its operations. Its morale did not require the stimulus of personal leadership; and had his protest been added to Brazier's, Antill might have discontinued the attack. The most grievous result was the needless loss of lives precious to their nation. But the operation had also a serious military effect. Men cannot be subjected to such overstrain without reaction. For months afterwards in hospitals and convalescent camps those who had seen or taken part in the fighting on The Nek told of the murderous fire into which orders, which they attributed to a blunder, had repeatedly sent them. Their own morale and that of their regiments remained to an astonishing degree unaffected. The incident nevertheless had its result throughout the whole A.I.F. With the exception of the attempt of the 4th Infantry Brigade near Abdel Rahman the following day, no other experience in 1915 was so powerful to create that disillusionment which superseded the first fine fervour of Australian soldiers.⁷⁴

Yet, though the cost was needlessly high, the sacrifice so lavishly offered may have assisted the great object in view. There were, it is true, other ways of holding the Turks on Baby 700 besides throwing lines of men into impassable machine-gun fire. But if for a precious hour or two the summit of the range could by that means be kept open for the New Zealanders, so that the heights might be occupied, the way to Constantinople opened, and earlier victory in the war made possible, the sacrifice would certainly not be grudged by those who made it. The effect upon the Turks was marked. Their local reserve, it is true, had been hurried into the line the night before. But the crowded garrison was raised by the light horse attack to a high pitch of excitement. Trench above trench bristled with their bayonets. "You know the way a stubble paddock looks when you have put sheep across it, and they have turned the earth up a bit, and you see the stubble standing in rows behind their tracks," said an officer a few days later. "Well, that was what the Turkish bayonets looked like across the slope." Moreover while the trenches were still crowded after the fight there appears to have been some

⁷⁴ See pp. 425-9, 663-4.

movement of troops through them.⁷⁵ From 7 till 9.30 the cruisers *Bacchante* and *Endymion* poured their fire upon the seaward slope of Baby 700 and Battleship Hill in an endeavour to stop any transfer of the enemy's reserves to Chunuk Bair. The Turkish prisoner beforementioned stated: "Two hours after this attack the warships' guns opened and did much damage to the communication trenches going over Battleship Hill. The whole of the troops in the trenches had to take cover and all movement stopped. Evidently large reinforcements were being moved up. . . . Shells were bursting everywhere and men could be seen thrown into the air." The "large reinforcements" would be the column of the 9th Turkish Division which had been hurriedly sent forward from Legge Valley towards Chunuk Bair.


There exists therefore, some evidence, though not conclusive, that until about 9 a.m. on August 7th the movement of Turkish reinforcements to the threatened heights was impeded, if not prevented, by the feint made by the light horse and by the naval bombardment which succeeded it. Such was the result for which the light horse gave themselves. During the long hours of that day the summit of The Nek could be seen crowded with their bodies. At first here and there a man raised his arm to the sky, or tried to drink from his waterbottle. But as the sun of that burning day climbed higher, such movement ceased. Over the whole summit the figures lay still in the quivering heat.

⁷⁵ Probably that of the 2/72nd. Possibly also that of the 1/14th and of the 9th Div. See p. 642.

CHAPTER XXII

THE CHECKING OF THE ADVANCE ON AUGUST 7TH

WHILE the light horse was making its desperate assaults at the head of Monash Valley, the columns entrusted with the main operation were, as has been seen,¹ emerging from the foot-hills at varying distances from their objectives on Sari Bair. The leading battalion of New Zealanders, Otago, was coming out upon Rhododendron Ridge, 1,000 yards from Chunuk Bair; farther north the head of the Indian brigade had lost its way in the deep gullies at the foot of Chunuk and Hill Q; still farther north Monash's 4th Australian Brigade had occupied an east-and-west ridge upon which it was now stationary and was digging in, with the 40th British Brigade on its left nearer to the sea. What at this stage had checked Monash's troops was their fatigue. The Turkish force opposite Anzac had been completely surprised, and its weak northern wing broken and routed; and though small parties constantly hampered the advance, their resistance had not yet anywhere been strong enough to stop it. A vital point in the plan was that the summits of the main ridge should be reached while this disorganisation continued, and while the enemy's reserves were still being prevented from coming up. It was with a view to such prevention that the demonstrations at Lone Pine and Baby 700 had been carried out. The all-important objectives on Sari Bair were possibly still open, but they would certainly be entrenched and defended by the enemy before many hours had passed. The moment was therefore the most crucial yet reached in the Gallipoli campaign. It is necessary to follow the actions of the three attacking brigades at this critical juncture.



¹ See pp. 594-5.

As has been explained,² the 4th Brigade had reported that it had attained a spur of Abdel Rahman Bair. Upon hearing this General Cox ordered General Monash to collect the brigade and push on at once with the attack³ which was to be made from Abdel Rahman against Hill 971. But Monash, upon going forward, became convinced that Colonel Pope, the officer in charge of his advanced line, had been mistaken. A considerable valley, which Monash assumed to be the Asma Dere, still lay between the 4th Brigade and Abdel Rahman, the nearest point of which was at least 500 yards distant. The troops were therefore not yet near the position from which the final attack was to be launched. Moreover the difficulties of undertaking it were increased by the excessive fatigue of the men, whom Pope and other battalion commanders reported to be too exhausted to entrench. So long as it lay in its present position, with its flanks firmly in touch, the brigade was perfectly safe, but to press the advance for another mile over the lofty Abdel Rahman would involve much risk and colossal effort. Monash, who inclined to caution, represented the situation strongly to Cox, and after considerable demur was permitted for the present to fortify the line he had won. The 4th Australian Brigade thus became stationary.

The middle brigade—the 29th Indian—continued its advance towards Hill Q. But it had been very late in approaching the head of the Aghyl Dere, and, when once there,⁴ its three Gurkha battalions had been directed by Major Overton up spurs which were not those laid down in the plans. The 10th Gurkhas, wandering to the south, joined the New Zealand infantry; part of the 5th Gurkhas, turning northwards with the 14th Sikhs, moved up a subsidiary spur on the right flank of the 4th Australian Brigade, and by 7.30 were definitely stopped by the enemy. Between them the 6th Gurkhas (with a portion of the 5th), heading eastwards, began to climb Chamchak Punar, a very steep spur leading to Hill Q. “Finding it impossible to get on,” wrote their leader, Major Allanson,⁵ afterwards, “we swung to the right and attacked Chunuk Bair ridge up the nullah just south of

² See p. 594.

³ Orders preparatory to this attack were sent by Cox to the 21st Mtn. Bty. at about 8 a.m. The attack was to be about 11 a.m. Monash was to be reinforced by the 14th Sikhs, and Cox by two British battalions.

⁴ See p. 594.

⁵ Colonel C. J. L. Allanson. C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., p.s.c. Commanded 6th Gurkha Rifles, 1915. Officer of Indian Regular Army; of London; b. Carnarvon, North Wales, 2 April 1877.

Chamchak Punar." Here they were in reality not far from the New Zealand column, which lay high above them immediately south on Rhododendron Ridge. By 7.30 they had "got successfully to within about 500 yards of the top of the ridge with few casualties." To the brigade staff they "appeared hung up by the enemy now in position on top of the main ridge." For some reason they "were then recalled to prepare an outpost position for the night" athwart the last fork of the Aghyl Dere, at the foot of the range.


Farthest south, on Rhododendron, the head of the New Zealand column had at dawn worked forward on Rhododendron Spur, 1,000 yards from Chunuk Bair. A few small Turkish trenches existed on this ridge, but the enemy holding them made little show of fighting, some being ousted by the battalion bomb-throwers and others surrendering upon sight.⁶ The leading battalion of New Zealanders, Otago, continued to advance, and by 4.30 was nearing a saddle of the ridge only 600 yards from Chunuk Bair. At this point its right was skirting the steep southern slope of Rhododendron and looking down into Sazli Dere, in which were numbers of "scared Turks streaming back towards Battleship Hill."

This was the moment when the light horse were thrown in at Quinn's, Pope's, and The Nek, and when Chunuk Bair was likely, if ever, to be undefended. But now began a series of unnecessary delays the consequences of which were more fatal even than those of the British hesitation at "Y" Beach on April 25th. It may be doubted whether the vital nature of the operation had been sufficiently impressed upon the regimental officers and men. Only three companies of infantry, with Major Frank Statham at their head, were as yet at the forming-up position for the attack. They had so far suffered practically no loss, and Statham was a leader of precisely the right type for the enterprise. But it seems to have been considered essential to wait for the main body of the brigade. At about 5 a.m. Moore, with the fourth company of Otago, reached Rhododendron. At the same time the head of Canterbury began to toil up in his right rear, and Wellington, followed by Auckland, on his

⁶ At this stage a section of the men, refusing to accept the surrender of a considerable body of the enemy, fired into them, causing them to scatter, whereby a number escaped. This was strongly disapproved of by many New Zealanders present, including the gallant Maj. Elmslie.

⁷ *The New Zealanders at Gallipoli* (Vol. I of the New Zealand Official History), by Maj. Fred Waite.

left. The brigade was thus reaching its assembly position, and its battalions, as ordered, were leaving picquets on the ridges—Canterbury on the southern edge of Rhododendron to guard the right flank; Wellington on the yet steeper Cheshire Ridge, on the left. Up the steep channel between that ridge^a and Rhododendron the rest of the Wellingtons were mounting to the head of the



Chailak Dere, only 600 yards from Chunuk Bair. Close behind was the reserve battalion, Auckland, and the next step must obviously be the assault upon the summit. While the battalion commanders conferred, the troops sat on the slope of Rhododendron above the Chailak Dere taking their breakfast. Three-quarters of a mile southward the shells of the fleet and land-batteries were at that moment thundering against Baby 700, temporarily impeding the enemy's reserves.

The Wellington Battalion was comparatively fresh and had suffered no loss, and Auckland behind it was in similar condition. If Otago and Canterbury had encountered greater difficulties than was expected, the obvious course was for the two others to push through immediately; and this appears to have been advocated by Major Temperley, the brigade-major, who was now at the forming-up position. But Malone of the Wellingtons, the most forcible of the New Zealand commanders, was against the attempt. At about 8 o'clock General F. E. Johnston, the brigadier, conferred with him and Colonel Young of the Auckland Battalion on Rhododendron Ridge. From that height they could see to the north-west Monash's column stationary on the foot-hills near Damakjelik Bair. The slopes of the main ridge near Hill Q were bare of any sign of the Indian brigade; indeed, of the 10th Gurkhas, who were to have attacked that height, six

^a It sprang from Rhododendron, and was really the head of Bauchop's.

companies⁹ had just reached the New Zealanders. The shelf of The Farm, high on the side of Chunuk Bair, appeared to be empty, although earlier in the morning a Turkish machine-gun had been firing from that direction. The result of the conference was a message to General Godley stating that in view of the failure of the attack on Baby 700 and the fact that the left assaulting column was still on lower land, Johnston and his battalion commanders did not consider it prudent to push the assault upon Chunuk Bair. Godley's reply was an order to attack at once. But a deplorable delay had already occurred.


It was then 9 o'clock. The Otago Battalion was occupying a slight prominence, not unlike a cheek-bone, which ran across Rhododendron above the head of the Chailak Dere, giving shelter from an enemy in front although not from one farther north. From this rise (ever afterwards known as "The Apex") the summit of Rhododendron dipped in a shallow saddle, 200 yards in length, to a similar rise (called the "Pinnacle"). Thence it again dipped slightly,¹⁰ to rise to the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair 300 yards away. The main objective was thus only 500 yards from The Apex. But the whole approach stood out like a raised causeway, an ordered advance being practicable only on a strip thirty yards wide along the northern side of the summit of Rhododendron. At the northern edge of this strip the hillside fell steeply to the Aghyl Dere at the foot of The Farm. On its southern side, out of view, was the still sharper slope of the Sazli Dere. Troops advancing along it would therefore be for the most part hidden from Battleship Hill to the south, but entirely open to an enemy on Chunuk Bair or the more northerly heights. A section of the enemy's force was already on Chunuk Bair, since sniping and machine-gun fire had been opened thence upon some of the New Zealanders at breakfast on Rhododendron.

To make the short advance to the summit, General Johnston chose his reserve battalion, Auckland, and the 10th Gurkhas; covering fire was to be given by six machine-guns which were to be posted at The Apex, looking out upon The Farm and

⁹ The Indian battalions were still organised in eight companies.

¹⁰ See plate at p. 655.

Map No. 19




WIGHTMAN

POSITIONS OF GENERAL GODLEY'S COLUMNS NORTH OF ANZAC, AT DAY-BREAK, 7TH AUGUST, 1915
British troops, red; Turkish troops and trenches, blue. Height contours, 25 metres.

the side and crest of Chunuk Bair.¹¹ At 11 o'clock Auckland debouched from the narrow head of the Chailak Dere, and platoon after platoon went over the rise at The Apex.

No sooner had the leading line moved over it than there opened from Chunuk Bair a withering fire of rifles and machine-guns. Upon first coming into this storm the line for a moment hesitated. Perceiving this, Major Grant,¹² a newly-arrived officer, ran forward waving his revolver and calling "Come along, lads!" and the leading Aucklanders went on. Soon they were lost to sight in the dust which was torn up by the machine-gun bullets. Every platoon which followed met the same fusillade, and went down like a swathe before the reaper; and to this fire there was presently added that of a mountain-gun which the enemy had brought to Abdel Rahman, little over a mile distant, directly to the left of the advance.

Three companies of the Auckland Battalion were thus sent forward, and continued to make headway towards the front by rushes. It meant much to the New Zealanders that for the first time they were being launched in an advance along with the Gurkhas, of whose prowess both they and the Australians had heard stories from their childhood.¹³ During the terrible advance the New Zealanders cheered themselves by looking for the arrival of these troops. "Aren't the Gurkhas coming?" they asked their officers, but the Indians did not arrive. Nevertheless within an hour the Aucklanders reached the Pinnacle. Here they found a Turkish trench, which led up from the valley near The Farm on the one



¹¹ According to the account given in *The Auckland Regiment* (p. 50), by 2nd/Lieut. O. E. Burton, the machine-guns were not in position when the attack started.



¹² Maj S. A. Grant, Auckland Bn. Officer of NZ Staff Corps, of Auckland, N.Z., b Thames, N.Z., 17 July, 1879. Died of wounds, 11 Aug., 1915.

¹³ The Anzac troops were immensely proud of the title of "The White Gurkhas," which had been applied to themselves by some Indian on the Beach or in the mule camp, and of which they had told the story from bivouac to bivouac with the pleasure of children.

side, and so over the spur and steeply down into the Sazli Dere on the other. This trench they occupied, the enemy having apparently fled from it earlier in the day. By noon 100 Aucklanders, the remnants of three companies, had reached the position.

Meanwhile the six companies of the 10th Gurkhas had debouched on the left slightly later than the leading platoons of Auckland. But they had swerved on meeting the fire. Part turned half-left into the deep gully below The Farm, and then tried to creep forward along the lower slopes of Rhododendron. Others veered to the right, and, passing over the edge into the Sazli Dere, came under fire from Battleship Hill and were never seen again.

It was clear that Auckland, if unsupported, would have no chance of reaching Chunuk Bair that morning. The enemy's fire had been almost annihilating. It is said that on the narrow saddle leading to the Pinnacle the battalion lost 200 men in twenty minutes. The gallant Grant himself was mortally wounded. Two companies of Canterbury,¹⁴ which had been brought up with a view to supporting Auckland, had lost almost as heavily. The commander of Canterbury had also summoned forward one of his two companies which since early morning had been digging a line of trenches along the southern edge of Rhododendron, overhanging the Sazli Dere. Those companies had not been subjected to heavy fire in the early morning, although they



¹⁴ See pp 580-2. These two companies were those which had during the night gone back in error to Anzac. They had returned by 8 o'clock.

were digging almost on the sky-line and only 450 yards distant from Battleship Hill. But the enemy appeared to have occupied that hill later in strength; for, when the order came for one company to move, Major Cribb reported that the fire was so heavy that it was impossible to bring the troops out. The two supporting companies, however, lay down in the scrub on Rhododendron behind The Apex, the troops who till then had been holding The Apex line¹⁵ being withdrawn through them. This movement was probably observed by the enemy, for almost immediately a Turkish battery in the north—according to enemy accounts, coming out into the open upon Hill Q—brought fire to bear upon Canterbury, who were in full view from that direction. For a quarter of an hour the shells flew high, but the guns then lowered their range and burst their shrapnel again and again over the backs of the troops. There was no move or sound in the battalion, but within a few hours 7 officers and about 100 men had been hit.¹⁶

When General Johnston, watching from below, had seen platoon after platoon of Auckland fall as it passed The Apex, he realised that it had become impossible to reach Chunuk Bair during daylight; and now that Canterbury had been so reduced while merely lying ready to support, the impossibility was even more manifest.

Although, therefore, the feint at Lone Pine had concealed the real offensive until the early morning, and although the desperate assaults and consequent bombardments about the head of Monash Valley had almost certainly delayed the movement of part of the Turkish reserves, yet the last stage of the New Zealand advance to the summit was too late. By the time it was made, an enemy force had succeeded in reaching Chunuk Bair. It is now known that the first troops to bar the way both of the New Zealanders and also of the Indians climbing towards Hill Q were some hurriedly despatched by the commander of the 19th Turkish Division, Mustafa Kemal Bey, whose headquarters happened to be behind Battleship Hill, only 500 yards distant across

¹⁵ Otago and a company of Wellington.

¹⁶ According to another account, the casualties were 11 officers and 200 men.


the Sazli Dere from the New Zealanders on Rhododendron. During the morning he learned that Anzac troops were on Rhododendron climbing towards Chunuk Bair, which was in his rear and undefended. Accordingly, despite the attacks by the light horse upon his front, he despatched to his rear his only reserve battalion, the 1/14th, which occupied "with a thin skirmishing line"¹⁷ the crest between Hill Q and Chunuk Bair, together with two companies of the 2/72nd which came into line farther south. This weak line, though "shaken by the advance of the enemy in superior numbers," held on in face of the advance against Chunuk and Hill Q until reinforced "by the timely arrival of troops of the 9th (Turkish) Division." This was the division which had originally been summoned to Lone Pine and then diverted at day-break by Liman von Sanders to Chunuk Bair.¹⁸ It seems to have reached the crest at about 9 o'clock, while the New Zealanders were still on Rhododendron, only 500 yards distant. On its heels there had come from Helles the 4th, likewise hurrying northwards all night. One of its regiments was now directed to Chunuk Bair, and seems to have been put in during the morning on the northern flank of the 9th, near Hill Q. A second regiment was held for the moment in reserve at Essad's headquarters, and a third, arriving later, was despatched to Hill 971. Twelve machine-guns coming to hand during the day were posted at Chunuk Bair. A battery of artillery had come into action in the early morning on Hill Q, firing at the New Zealanders, and a second was sent during the following night to Hill 971.

¹⁷ From *A Short History of Turkish Operations in the Great War*, published by the Historical Section of the General Staff, Constantinople.

¹⁸ One of its two regiments, the 64th, had fought at Anzac before, and doubtless found its way quickly to the heights. It is arguable that if the attack on Lone Pine had been made later (say, at the same time as the main assault), the 9th Div. would not have reached Anzac in time to meet the attack on Chunuk Bair. On the other hand it may be said that, if Lone Pine had been attacked earlier, the 9th might have been committed to counter-attack it before the assault on Chunuk Bair became known to the enemy. It seems clear that the Lone Pine attack, while it diverted the enemy's local reserves from Sari Bair, drew his distant reserves closer to it. If, therefore, Essad Pasha could have been deceived by a later delivery of the feint attack, Chunuk Bair might have remained open for a few hours longer. The real problem of the feint seems to have been: what was the latest hour at which it could be made so as thoroughly to deceive the enemy? The steps actually taken deceived Essad, and gave Birdwood's columns from nine to ten hours from their starting-time in which to reach the crest of Sari Bair before the enemy occupied it. It is doubtful if any other plan could have given more

The Turkish reinforcements were not reaching these heights unscathed. Part of the inland slopes, both of the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair and of the crests of Turks' Hump and Battleship Hill immediately south of it, could be seen from the old lines at Anzac. These summits as well as Baby

700 were being watched by Browne's, Caddy's, and Phillips's Australian field-batteries, Trenchard's two mountain-guns, and some of the howitzers of the 4th (Lowland) and 69th British Artillery Brigades. All these had been directed to support Godley's columns in the Battle of Sari Bair, and most of them had already



been engaged in the preliminary bombardment of the main ridge at dawn. Between 10.30 and 11.30 the observers of the field- and mountain-artillery perceived enemy troops on Battleship Hill and Turks' Hump engaged in firing at some target upon the seaward slope. The field-guns were turned upon these from their rear, Browne's guns driving some of them back to their communication trenches. Movement upon the inland side of the summit consequently became difficult for the enemy.

Nevertheless the Turks had succeeded in anticipating Birdwood's columns on Sari Bair and barring their way to the summit. When, shortly before 6 a.m., General Godley had realised that Cox's columns were held up, he had taken the necessary step of reinforcing them by units from his reserve, in the hope that these would carry the attack forward. Each of the two original assaulting columns had behind it a reserve, which had been intended for its support when the objective was reached and a Turkish counter-attack had to be met. These reserves were entirely New Army battalions, of which Godley had six for the support of his main attacking columns, while seven more remained in the corps

reserve.¹⁹ Of Godley's six, four belonging to the 39th Brigade had moved under Brigadier-General Cayley²⁰ on the heels of the Indians to the Aghyl Dere; and a composite force of two battalions (the 8th Welch Pioneer Battalion of the 13th Division and the 6th South Lancashire of the 38th Brigade) under Lieutenant-Colonel Bald²¹ had similarly followed the New Zealanders to the mouth of the Chailak. About 6 o'clock Godley had ordered the 39th Brigade to move forward to the easternmost fork of the Aghyl Dere. During the hours which followed he definitely allotted the whole brigade to Cox for the purpose of continuing the attack.

Cayley had at 7 o'clock sought out Cox in order to learn his orders. That sardonic old soldier had been wounded in the ankle, and was unable himself to move; but, having by then abandoned for the time the advance by Monash's brigade, he instructed Cayley to attack Chunuk Bair forthwith, in co-operation with the Indians, and thence move against Hill Q.

Cayley returned to his brigade and set it in motion; and with its march there began those difficult and laborious movements of the reserves with which the remaining days of the Battle of Sari Bair were so largely occupied. The routes of these marches lay almost entirely through the two main ravines leading to the captured positions, the Chailak and Aghyl. Roads had not yet been carefully laid out—as they were later, clinging to the sheltered slopes—and the troops had to use the dry stream-beds, which were narrow, steep, and at certain points made dangerous by Turkish snipers and even machine-guns firing down them from the distant crest of the range. In addition, the enemy, knowing that there must be


¹⁹ The New Army infantry at Anzac comprised 17 battalions—13 (including one of pioneers) of the 13th Div., and 4 of the 10th. Of these at the outset Godley was given 10 (of the 13th Div.), while Birdwood retained 7. Of Godley's 10, 2 were by Birdwood's orders allotted as reserve in The Nek and Monash Valley sectors, while Godley detailed 2 for the "right covering force" attacking Damakjelik Bair. This left Godley 6 battalions available for attack. Birdwood had intended to use the Anzac and Indian troops for breaking down the enemy and seizing the heights, and subsequently to throw the 13th Div. intact through them. But Godley had been unable to devise his plans exactly in accordance with this general idea.

²⁰ Maj.-Gen. Sir W. de S. Cayley, K.C.M.G., C.B. Commanded 39th Inf. Bde., 1914/16; 13th Div., 1916/19. Officer of British Regular Army, of Stamford, Lincs, Eng.; b. Jorakhpur, India, 8 Aug., 1863.

²¹ Lieut.-Col. J. A. Bald, C.M.G., C.B.E. Commanded 8th Bn., Welch Regt. 1915/16. Officer of Indian Regular Army; of Kerkhampstead, Herts, Eng., b. Liverpool, Eng., 20 July, 1876.

constant traffic along those valleys, frequently burst shrapnel over certain parts of the tracks. Such corners were usually marked by the body of some man recently killed, or by the carcasses of mules putrefying in the heat, which throughout the whole of the August fighting was extreme. It was upon mules that the supplies were mainly carried, and the valleys were frequently congested with their movement and that of the wounded, so that the march of the reserves, always in single file, was generally very slow

On the occasion in question Cayley, returning to his troops, was misdirected by some instruction to advance "south of Little Table Top."²² He therefore turned back the brigade in order to follow this direction, which as a matter of fact would have brought it into the Chailak Dere behind the New Zealanders. The battalion which was now in the lead, the 7th Gloucester, was already in that valley before Cayley discovered the mistake. He again ordered the brigade to reverse its steps and, himself doing so, placed his headquarters at the last fork of the Aghyl Dere. But by 4 p.m. only half of one battalion had as yet returned to him. The plan of continuing to press the Indian attack by means of the reserves had, therefore, completely miscarried.



Meanwhile, on receiving the New Zealand brigadier's report, Godley had realised that there was no hope of that column being able to reach the crest of the range in full daylight. He consequently decided that until after nightfall no further attempt to advance should be made by any of the columns, but that in the interval steps should be taken to ascertain the best routes for further assault. Johnston thereupon temporarily withdrew the Canterbury half-battalion,²³ which had been lying in support at The Apex ready to make a further attempt. The same troops were ordered forward

²² Little Table Top was at the eastern end of Bauchop's, near Cheshire Ridge.

²³ Then reduced to Col. Hughes, 3 other officers, and 50 men.

again at 4 p.m. in view of the possibility of an attack at dusk, but about that time Godley postponed the assault until dawn next day. Canterbury was therefore withdrawn to its trenches on the southern edge of Rhododendron. Auckland remained in its advanced position at the Pinnacle, improving the captured enemy position, adding a support trench, and endeavouring to connect it with The Apex by a communication sap.

Thus in the first twenty-four hours of the great offensive from Anzac the all-important objectives on the crest of Sari Bair had nowhere been reached. The best chance in the whole campaign had been lost by the hesitation of the New Zealand leaders on Rhododendron Ridge at dawn, when the summit, so close, lay undefended and open to them. That evening the line lay almost exactly where it had been at the end of the night advance; that is to say, starting at the north it ran inland (eastwards) for a mile along the crest of Damakjelik Bair, where were the 40th British and 4th Australian Brigades; thence southwards across the wild foot-hills of "Q" to the lofty tongue between the two main branches of the Aghyl Dere, which was held by the Indian brigade with the 39th Brigade in support. South and in advance of these, high upon Rhododendron, within 300 yards of the summit of Chunuk Bair, was the advanced battalion of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, with the rest of that brigade and certain reserves behind it. South of the New Zealanders the line ran straight back to Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts near the coast. The Anzac area, previously less than a square mile, had therefore been trebled. The increase of "elbow-room," and the pleasure of camping in green and comparatively untouched country instead of amid dusty thoroughfares, greatly cheered and excited Godley's Anzac troops. But strategically the gain of country, although much was made of it in some quarters, was almost valueless, except in so far as it afforded a better opportunity of reaching the vital positions which still remained in the enemy's hands.

Of the progress of the force disembarked at Suvla Birdwood had no information except that which his eyes afforded him. Judging by the points where shells were bursting throughout August 7th, the advance from the landing



POSITION ON THE EVENING OF 7TH AUGUST, 1915, AFTER THE ATTEMPT BY THE AUCKLAND

BATTALION TO REACH CHUNUK BAIR


British troops, red; Turkish troops and trenches, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

WIGHTMAN

places had not been so great as was expected. What had actually happened was briefly as follows: The landing had begun at 10.30 on the night of August 6th, the troops being carried partly in destroyers and partly in the new specially-designed motor-barges. Some of the beaches where it was intended to disembark were found unsuitable, but before day-break the 32nd and 34th Brigades of the 11th Division²⁴ had landed and overcome the Turkish outposts near the coast, and the 33rd had been set ashore without opposition. It was not until after daylight that a farther enemy outpost on the hummock known as "Hill 10," 700 yards from the shore, was seized. By that time the work had also commenced of providing Suvla Bay with the bare facilities of a port, this being largely the task of the Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train.²⁵

During the morning of August 7th eight more battalions landed at Suvla, including five from Mitylene under Brigadier-General Hill;²⁶ and it became the duty of Hill's units, supported by some of those north of them, to seize the Chocolate and "W" Hills. The area of operations in front of the Suvla force was during this day defended by an enemy force, comprising two battalions of *gendarmarie* and part of the 33rd Regiment, totalling some 3,000 infantry, with four batteries, under the Bavarian Willmer. About half of this infantry and most of the guns may have been within the area of the Chocolate and "W" Hills, which were two and three miles distant respectively from the landing-place.

There was, however, a long delay in commencing the attack upon them. One reason contributing to this was that, until Hill's Mitylene troops were actually ashore, no indication had



²⁴ The 11th Div. was commanded by Maj.-Gen F Hammersley, C.B., p.s.c. an officer of the British Regular Army

²⁵ A full account of the work of the RANBT will be found in Vol IX of this history

²⁶ Brig.-Gen F. F. Hill, C.B., CMG D.S.O. Commanded 31st Inf Bde 1914/16; 186th Inf Bde 1916/17 Officer of British Regular Army, of Belfast, Ireland; b 8 July, 1860

reached them of where they were being landed or what they were to do. Through Hamilton's policy of secrecy Lieutenant-General Mahon,²⁷ commanding the 10th (Irish) Division, had been informed of the plans only on July 28th or 29th; and after learning them he, then at Mudros, had been unable to obtain a ship to convey him half-a-day's sail to Mitylene, and had not succeeded in an endeavour to send instructions by cipher. The result was that, when some of the first of Hill's battalions landed, it was only upon seeing the Salt Lake and locating it upon their maps that they discovered they were at Suvla.

Such causes were, however, at most only contributory to the paralysis which from the first affected the Suvla force. The opposition in that quarter was—for one of the great battles of the war—trifling, and such as would have been overwhelmed immediately by any determined advance. At least one of the vital portions of the objective could have been obtained with little loss by merely walking there. The only important steps taken on the first day were that, while the left of the force advanced against the Gallipoli *gendarmérie* battalion on Kiretch Tepe, the right, after protracted delays in arranging mutual support, moved late in the afternoon against the Chocolate Hills. These were defended by a battalion of the 33rd Turkish Regiment and a company of the Broussa *gendarmérie*. The hills were captured in soldierly style; but, although the Turks were strongest at this point, General Hill stated afterwards²⁸ that the opposition was not very formidable, and that there was no reason why Ismail Oglu Tepe (the "W" Hills) should not have been taken also, if the supporting troops had advanced more promptly on his left.

It is not certain, however, that an attack on the "W" Hills was even definitely ordered by the commanders immediately concerned. At all events these heights, the occupation of which was of supreme importance to the force engaged in the crucial struggle on Sari Bair, remained still uncaptured. That evening the position at Suvla was that the five battalions on the left were stationary in front of the handful of Turkish

²⁷ Gen. Rt. Hon. Sir Bryan T. Mahon, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O. Commanded 10th (Irish) Div. 1914/15; Salonica Army, 1915/16; the Forces in Ireland, 1916/18. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Belleville, Co. Galway, Ireland, 2 Apr., 1862. Died 24 Sept., 1930.

²⁸ *Dardanelles Commission Report (Part II)*, p. 30.

gendarmes. Opposite the centre of Stopford's front the lofty and commanding ridge of Kavak and Tekke Tepe, dominating Northern Anafarta and the "W" Hills, lay actually open and completely unoccupied, except perhaps by a few Turkish patrols. On the right, where the enemy had the bulk of his tiny force, the Chocolate Hills had been captured, but the advance had stopped short of the "W" Hills. At that point, the enemy, though still weak, was slowly being strengthened. Late in the afternoon some of the 4th Australian Brigade on the extreme left of the Anzac force observed Turkish infantry, with three or four batteries, passing through the cypresses surrounding Southern Anafarta, the guns coming into position a thousand yards south of the village. These troops were either a part of Willmer's small force or else of the 4th Turkish Division, which, as has been already stated, had hurried from Krithia to Hill 971.²⁹

Thus, on the northern flank of Anzac, the Suvla landing force was not yet in touch with Anzac troops, and only promoted Birdwood's scheme to the extent of engaging Willmer's force.³⁰ On the southern flank the struggle at Lone Pine was raging more furiously than ever. In the centre the greatest effort of the campaign, intended to open the Dardanelles and secure the almost unlimited results of that achievement, had been launched, but had not succeeded in the first rush as planned. The feints at Helles, Lone Pine, and The Nek had held open the crest-line of Sari Bair until the morning of August 7th, but the assaulting columns had failed to reach the summits during that precious interval.

Nevertheless the attacking columns had altered the position so materially that success in the great attempt was still within view. Though they had nowhere reached the objective, they had in certain sectors brought their line so near to it that there was fair prospect of their now being able, in spite of opposition, to force their way to the crest-line. Upon Chunuk Bair, in particular, the Anzac troops were in an incomparably more favourable position for reaching the summit than on the day

²⁹ This was, of course, then unknown at Anzac. It is possible that elements of the 7th and 12th Divs. from Bulair reached Anafarta late on the afternoon of the 7th, but they would hardly amount to the numbers seen by the 4th Bde. See Liman von Sanders' *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, pp. 110, 111.


³⁰ The "Anafarta gun" never after Aug. 6 fired upon Anzac Beach.

before. On the other hand, the task had changed. It was certain that the central and southern heights of Sari Bair were now garrisoned—in what strength could not be known—and to eject the enemy strong action would be necessary. In the northern foot-hills and Abdel Rahman Bair, on the other hand, though a few Turks were resisting stubbornly, strong opposition was not expected. Obviously the enemy's resistance on that flank must now depend largely upon the farther advance of the Suvla landing force.

It was with these prospects in view that Godley, during the afternoon of August 7th, drew his plans for the second attempt to reach the crest-line of Sari Bair. He designed to attack at dawn next morning the whole of his original objective on the crest-line,³¹ preceding the assault by a bombardment lasting for three-quarters of an hour—from 3.30 till 4.15. During this shelling three attacking forces (corresponding to the New Zealand, Indian, and 4th Australian Brigades on the day before) were to approach as closely as possible to the summits, and the moment the bombardment ceased they were to assault them.

Certain of Godley's units had already suffered losses which made it impracticable to employ them for a heavy attack. Of the New Zealand infantry, Auckland and Canterbury had been spent in the attempt to reach Chunuk Bair by daylight.³² But the Wellington Battalion was intact, and Otago had suffered but slightly. In the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade the Otago and Canterbury Regiments had been heavily tried, but Wellington, Auckland, and the Maori half-battalion had not suffered greatly.

To strengthen his several columns Godley allotted his reserves as follows. The Indian column had already been



³¹ That is, all the objectives of Aug. 7, except at Baby 700, Pope's, and Quinn's.

³² See pp. 640-1. Although the two companies of Canterbury which had suffered least heavily were on one other occasion brought up to support, neither the Canterbury nor the Auckland infantry was again used for any important assaults during the offensive.

reinforced by Cayley's 39th (New Army) Brigade. The New Zealanders would have been similarly reinforced by Bald's two battalions in the Chailak Dere.³³ But when Cayley's brigade had marched by mistake to the Chailak Dere,³⁴ its leading battalion, the 7th Gloucester, had never received the order to return, but had continued up the Chailak to the New Zealanders. It was consequently allowed to stay with that brigade, one of Bald's regiments, the 6th South Lancashire, being sent to Cayley instead. Bald's remaining battalion, the 8th Welch, was moved up the Chailak towards the New Zealanders before dark. The New Zealand infantry were also strengthened by the Auckland Mounted Rifles and Maori half-battalion, which were moved up to them late in the night.

Godley's columns for the coming attack were thus composed as follows:—

Left and Centre Columns under Major-General H. V. Cox.		Right Column under Brigadier-General F. E. Johnston.
Left.	Centre	Right.
4th Australian Infantry Brigade (Monash).	29th Indian Infantry Brigade (Cox). 39th New Army Brigade (Cayley). 6th South Lancashire.	New Zealand Infantry Brigade (Johnston). 7th Gloucester. 8th Welch Pioneers. Auckland Mounted Rifles Maori Contingent.

The 26th and 21st Indian Mountain Batteries, each with four guns, were given to Cox and Johnston respectively, as were also Nos. 2 and 1 Field Companies, New Zealand Engineers.³⁵ As Godley's original reserve was now being allotted to the attacking columns, Birdwood at 5 p.m. transferred to him Baldwin's 38th Brigade³⁶ from the corps reserve. Godley for the present retained this brigade at No. 2 Outpost.

It will be well to deal first with the most difficult of the three operations, the northernmost, allotted to the 4th Australian Brigade, the objective of which was the still distant Hill 971.

³³ The 6th S. Lances. (of the 38th Bde) and 8th Welch (pioneers). See p. 644.

³⁴ See p. 645


³⁵ The batteries, which had followed the infantry closely, had not been able to effect much on the first day, but No. 1 N.Z. Fld. Coy. was clearing a road down the Chailak Dere for the passage of mules and troops.

³⁶ Brig.-Gen. A. H. Baldwin. Commanded 38th Inf. Bde, 1914/15. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Stratford-on-Avon, Eng., 30 Sept., 1863. Killed in action, 10 Aug., 1915. [Baldwin's brigade then consisted of three battalions, the fourth (6th S. Lances.) having been detached for Bald's force. When Baldwin was sent to Godley, there remained in Birdwood's corps reserve the 29th (British) Bde. Of this the 5th Connaught Rangers were temporarily working with the 1st Aust. Inf. Bde. at Lone Pine.]

CHAPTER XXIII

THE ATTEMPT UPON HILL 971

GENERAL Monash had obtained permission to dig in for the day along a line which he believed to be bordering the Asma Dere,¹ and to be facing the lofty spur of Abdel Rahman which led direct to Hill 971. When that permission was received, the troops had already been for some time entrenching on the position, around the head of Australia Valley. For an hour or two the task had been comparatively easy. Then the enemy's snipers, having gained a breathing space, established themselves on the next spur to the north, and along the eastern half of Monash's line digging became a matter of instant danger. The enemy's field-guns also found the position and opened upon it with shrapnel. Lieutenant Pulling of the 13th, Captain Groom² of the 14th, and Captain Brashaw³ of the 16th were killed. Upon the least movement of an entrenching tool bullets whipped in from close range, and men could only lie all day in the shallow rifle-pits they had made.



Where this fire was hottest many of the troops had stopped digging and had withdrawn temporarily to the edge of the reverse slope—a wise proceeding which avoided heavy and needless loss. But on the left, nearer to the sea and to the 40th Brigade, where the position was much quieter, a number of officers and men, realising that where there were farms there must be water, loaded themselves with waterbottles and strolled out Suvla-wards over the low foot-hill⁴ of the next

¹ That is, Monash believed himself to be on the saddle connecting Damakjelik Bair with the main range.


² Capt. W. E. Groom; 14th Bn. Private secretary; of Brighton, Vic., b. Brighton, 19 Aug., 1888. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

³ Capt. J. A. Brashaw; 16th Bn. Chemist, of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Bellambi, N. S. W., 10 Jan., 1891. Killed in action, 7 Aug., 1915.

⁴ Hill 60, afterwards the scene of costly fighting.

spur and across an entirely empty plain to a farm hut, Susak Kuyu. After filling bottles and robbing bee-hives they returned without interference, except from a few sniping bullets. At dusk picks and shovels were brought to the line, and the work of entrenching was being actively renewed when the order arrived that the advance was to be resumed before dawn and Hill 971 attacked at day-break.

Late in the afternoon, when Cox sent for him to discuss the plan of advance, Monash expressed the opinion that, in view of the weariness of his troops, his force was insufficient. Accordingly Cox obtained from Godley one battalion of Baldwin's 38th Brigade, then formerly Godley's reserve.⁵ By holding his present trench-line with this unit (the 6th King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment) and with the 13th Australian Battalion, Monash was able to release the 14th, 15th, and 16th Australians for the operation. Receiving Cox's final orders at 7 p.m., he at once summoned the battalion commanders to his headquarters and explained his plan. The 15th, followed by the 14th and 16th, was to move out at 3 a.m., guided by Monash's staff-captain, Locke,⁶ a Duntroon graduate, who had hastily reconnoitred the front during that afternoon. The battalions would be led across the valley—then presumed to be the Asma Dere—which ran in front of the line, and thence up a prominent knuckle of Abdel Rahman, of which the low spur immediately fronting the Australian line was believed to be a foot-hill. From that point, after taking precautions to guard their flanks, they would move up the spur in column of platoons. It had been observed during the afternoon that there were Turks upon Abdel Rahman, but it was considered impossible that they should be in great force. During the latter part of the advance the enemy, ii




⁵ See p. 651.

⁶ Brig W. J. M. Locke, M.C., p.s.c. Bde-Maj, 3rd Inf Bde, 1917. Duntroon graduate, of St Kilda, Vic, b East St Kilda, 14 Aug, 1894


any, on the "W" Hills and on the Anafarta Plain would be directly in rear of the brigade; but it was regarded as possible that support might be afforded in that direction by the Suvla landing force.

This plan, it is now known, was based on a most serious error in the location of the 4th Brigade, but one in which the brigade staff and all the battalion commanders appear to have shared. Although Overton had intended to place the 13th and 15th upon spurs leading to the ridge overlooking the Asma Dere, he had actually directed them up ridges nearer to the sea, and the valley into which the brigade was looking was a comparatively short gully of the Damakjelik Bair, known as the "Kaiajik Dere" ("Little Rock Valley"), which was here interposed between those ridges and the Asma Dere. The low spur beyond this valley, supposed by the brigade staff to be an outlier of Abdel Rahman, was actually that offshoot of Damakjelik which ended in the bare foot-hill known to the Turks as the "Kaiajik Aghyl" ("Sheepfold of the Little Rock") and to the British as "Hill 60." It was on the far side of this, hidden from Monash's position, that the Asma Dere really lay, with the wild spurs and outstanding heights of Abdel Rahman rising beyond.



About dusk on August 7th Godley sent Monash two messages expressing his own attitude towards the 4th Brigade's enterprise, which was to be part of his second effort to gain the summits of Sari Bair. "The G.O.C. wishes you to close the troops . . . well up the slopes towards the enemy during the preliminary bombardment of the position, so as to be ready to reach the crest as soon as the gun-fire stops to-morrow morning. The assault should be carried out with loud cheering." And: "I feel confident that, after to-day's rest, and starting comparatively fresh, your brigade

* It was marked on the map by the 60-metre contour.



THE ATTEMPT BY THE 4TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE TO REACH HILL 971 BY WAY OF ABDEL RAHMAN BAIR, 8TH AUGUST, 1915

British troops and trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

W. Hills
(Turkish)

Abdel Rahman
Barr

Chocolate Hills
(Turkish)

Abdel Rahman
Barr

Abdel Rahman
Barr



VIEW FROM HILL 971 OVER THE COUNTRY THROUGH WHICH THE 4TH AUSTRALIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE ATTEMPTED TO REACH THAT HEIGHT ON 8TH AUGUST, 1915

The long ridge in the foreground is Abdel Rahman Barr. The thin white line indicates the route actually followed by the attack and the thick white line the route intended to be pursued. Behind the crest of Abdel Rahman runs a Turkish military road the line of which coincides with the intended direction of the assault in its final phase

Aust. War Memorial Official Photos Nos G1845a-b
Taken in 1919

Battleship
Hill

Sazh
Dere




No. 3
Outpost

THE APEX (ON RHODODENDRON RIDGE) FROM CHUNUK BAIR

The advance made by the Auckland Battalion on August 7th was from the farther knuckle (The Apex) to the nearer (the Pinnacle). The photograph was taken from Chunuk Bair after the war

will make a determined effort to capture the key of the position. . . . Selecting it for this task, I had the original brigade in mind. . . . We all expect the reconstituted⁸ brigade to live up to the traditions of the original." The assumption that Monash's troops were fresh was, of course, erroneous, since most of them, weary though they were already at dawn, had spent the day in digging for cover, bringing up ammunition, finding water, and burying the dead; and with nightfall the work of entrenching had increased in vigour. It was not until after the order for the new operation was issued that the three battalions destined for the assault appear to have had some rest.

They were aroused shortly after 2 on the morning of the 8th, and, after making a slight détour behind the lines, the leading troops of the 15th Battalion were guided by Captain Locke over the front line and down a steep valley-side to the bed of the Kaiajik Dere. The opposite slope at this point was found to be too sheer to be climbed, but after a short halt the column was led a little way down the gully and then up a gutter in the gravel cliff and so on to the surface of the next ridge, which was believed to be an offshoot of Abdel Rahman. Its wide low crest proved to be very level, though covered with scrub. Detaching a platoon to the right as protection against the enemy believed to be stationed there, the column pushed northwards across the crest. On nearing its farther side a second platoon was sent into the valley beyond, supposed to be a fold of Abdel Rahman but in reality the Asma Dere. The column then turned sharply to the right and, with one platoon ahead as advance-guard, pushed due eastward up the spur. Both flanking platoons were called in. The naval bombardment which had begun while the column was entering





⁸ The 4th Bde, like most of the Anzac formations, had suffered heavily, and was largely composed of comparatively raw troops.

the Kaiajik Dere was still thundering against Hill 971 and the other summits of the range. A few Turkish howitzers, dragged during the night with great labour up the hills north and south of Anafarta, were now spitting forth an occasional reply.


Near the seaward end of the gently-rising spur up which the 15th went were several open fields; and, as the head of the battalion turned eastwards along a line of high scrub resembling a hedge, its leading platoon came out upon a large patch from which a crop of oats had been gathered. The dawn, now breaking, threw a pale light on the stubble. It was just 4.15 a.m., the hour when the bombardment was to cease, and when, according to Godley's order, the column should have been "ready to reach" Hill 971. But the distance had been underestimated, the locality mistaken, and the start made hours too late. In addition, the column, having to pass through several narrow places, had strung out into single line, and the pace was that of a funeral. Consequently, when the head of the 15th came out upon the cornfield, the 14th was only beginning to enter the Kaiajik Dere, while part of the 16th was still behind the previous day's trench-line.

As the bombardment ceased, the advance-guard, having crossed the field and entered the scrub beyond, ran into scouts or sentries of the enemy. These fired a few shots and scurried off through the undergrowth. Two minutes later, when the leading company under Captain Moran was still crossing the stubble, there was opened upon it a fire of machine-guns, which rapidly increased to tornado-like intensity. The enemy's weapons



were in groups of four, of which two at least were visible. These were upon a high bluff on the left front beyond the Asma Dere—strangely enough, the precise offshoot of Abdel Rahman upon which Colonel Cannan, leading the 15th, still imagined that he was advancing. Other machine-guns opened from the main ridge directly in front of the column. In addition, there presently came into action on or near Hill 971 itself an enemy field-gun firing direct. The flash of this weapon was plainly visible, and one of the warships, perceiving it, quickly silenced the gun. But the fire of machine-guns directed upon the cornfield continued with such intensity that the 15th could hardly make way against it. Nevertheless platoon after platoon struggled across the field in rushes, widely extended.

About this time Turkish infantry appeared in force on the left of the column, both on the low knuckles immediately beyond the Asma Dere, and also in the scrub on the edge of the spur up which the 15th was advancing. Their presence so close on the flank and rear of the column was a most dangerous menace, and Cannan consequently detached half-a-company towards the Asma Dere to drive them back. The part of the 15th which had crossed the oatfield—or, later, had edged round its northern side—was hopelessly split up and out of touch; the 14th had followed by rushes across the southern half of the field, and, moving out on the right of the 15th near the southern and more sheltered edge of the spur, its leading platoons had managed to reach a height⁹ overlooking both the Asma Dere and part of the Kaiajik Dere. Across these a number of the enemy were fleeing. For a few moments the Australians fired at them, and then the




⁹ Known later as "Hill 100."

volume of enemy fire swept the head of the 14th also into confusion.

Following the 14th a portion of the 16th had wisely turned eastward up the Kaiajik Dere, not emerging on to the crest until the oatfield was passed. Thus the greater part of these two battalions had advanced farther up the spur than Cannan, whose headquarters was temporarily in the hedge-like scrub beside the oatfield.

He managed, however, by means of messengers to divert northward a few platoons of the 14th to stem the enemy's counter-attack on that flank; a considerable part of the 16th, not yet having turned eastwards, was also directed northwards across the spur. This was the last controlled movement in that part of the field. The left of the 15th, almost leaderless, without direction or instruction, and exposed to murderous fire sweeping the scrub above the Asma Dere, broke southwards. Cannan, telling those who were within touch to get back to the sheltered edge of the hill, withdrew his headquarters thither.

For several years the true course of this attack remained a mystery even to most of the actual survivors. The scene of the fight, the position of the enemy, and that reached by the column were equally obscure. Cannan, McSharry, and many other brave and competent soldiers fully believed, both at the time and afterwards, that they had been climbing a foot-hill of Abdel Rahman Bair. On the other hand, Major Dare of the 14th and some others maintained that the column was on the nearer spur leading down to Hill 60. But it was not until the Australian Historical Mission visited the spot in 1919 that evidence was obtained which placed the truth of Dare's contention beyond doubt.¹⁰ The facts, as gathered mainly



*Fragments of 15 & 14 Bns
Position of Turk MGs*

¹⁰ Very close searches since made by Lieut.-Col C E Hughes of the Imperial War Graves Commission have shown the point reached by Monash's brigade on Aug. 8 to be that marked with the letter A in the marginal map on p 663.

from the Turks and from numerous evidences of the fighting on the ground itself, are as follows.

Abdel Rahman Bair, communicating as it did directly with the summit of Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 971), had from an early stage of the campaign been protected by troops camped on or near its reverse or eastern slope. A road had also been made¹¹ from Southern Anafarta to the foot of this spur, thence up its sheltered side to Hill 971, and finally winding close behind the crest of the range to Chunuk Bair. On May 28th one of the battalions of the 33rd Regiment had been stationed near the junction of Abdel Rahman, "Q," and Hill 971 as a precaution against any advance northward by Birdwood's force. Possibly this guard was still there on August 7th. At all events on that date fragments of the 14th Regiment, retiring before the night advance, had collected in the Asma Dere immediately in front of Abdel Rahman, and, when the 4th Division from Helles arrived in haste during the morning, troops of the 11th Regiment forthwith took up a position on that spur itself. Half-way down it the 11th Turkish Machine Gun Company placed its four guns on a prominent height known as "Alai Tepe" ("Regiment Hill"). The site was well chosen, since it gave a perfect command of the low spur ending in Hill 60, over which an attack might be expected to come. The surface of that spur, which the Turks called "Yauan Tepe" or "Flat Hill," lay in a single plane, so tilted that the guns on Alai Tepe could graze almost the whole of it. On that surface, at day-break on the 8th, the 4th Australian Brigade appeared. The naval bombardment, terrific though it was, had done no harm to the 4th Turkish Division, since most of the troops were in the gullies behind the crest of Abdel Rahman and "Q." Consequently, although the battle-worn troops of the 14th Regiment in the Asma Dere fled at once before the advance, the 11th and other machine-gun companies, being in no present danger, worked their guns with coolness and decisive effect, the 11th Company receiving much credit among the Turks for its steadiness.

Liman von Sanders was at this time expecting a strong reinforcement at this very point. The two divisions, 7th and

¹¹ Possibly following an old track. The work appears to have been done by the Turks with Greek labour. This road eventually communicated with Anzac by means of two sunken mule-tracks east of Battleship Hill and Mortar Ridge respectively.

12th, which were coming from the north, had been due to arrive at Anafarta during the night of the 7th. Their commander, Feizi Bey, had indeed informed him, though wrongly, that they had begun to arrive there on the 7th at noon. Von Sanders had accordingly issued an order that they should attack at day-break on the 8th astride of the Asmak Dere,¹² that is to say, between the British forces at Suvla and at Anzac. In the early hours of the 8th he and his adjutant, Major Prigge, rode to the hills north of Anafarta to watch this assault. While they stood there, the bombardment of Hill 971 by the British fleet was in progress, but no troops of the 7th or 12th Divisions were at hand. Von Sanders eventually found a staff officer who informed him that those divisions were still far in rear. Their assault was consequently postponed until nightfall of the 8th.

What troops they were which now attacked the dangerously exposed left of Monash's brigade is therefore not known with certainty.¹³ The enemy was active, and only severe fighting by the 16th Australian Battalion kept him from enveloping the rear of the column. The situation of the brigade was utterly confused. The 14th, like the 15th, had been ordered back to the more sheltered side of the spur, but it was uncertain whether those men of either battalion who were lying in front on the exposed hilltop received the order. Most were driven off the crest; a few stayed. In a fold of the reverse slope near the dressing-stations of two of the medical officers¹⁴ Cannan found the headquarters of Pope, and joined him; but the organisation of the battalions had been utterly broken, and they were in touch with only the few officers and men nearest to them. Of the 15th, already reduced in numbers by the fighting of August 7th, 7 officers, including Cannan's brother, Major D. H. Cannan,¹⁵ had been killed; all


¹² The Asmak (a proper name) was the stream running from Southern Anafarta to the sea, and should not be confused with the Asma ("Vine") Dere which runs into it.

¹³ The Aust. Historical Mission received widely varying particulars of the troops in action against the 4th Bde. during this advance. They were given as (1) 11th M.G. Coy., 14th Regt., and possibly other machine-gun units; (2) 11th Regt., 33rd Regt., and one battalion each of 31st and 32nd Regts. The latter was the answer furnished by the Turkish General Staff, but there are difficulties in the way of its complete acceptance. The truth probably lies between the two.

¹⁴ Capts. H. G. Loughren (14th) and J. F. G. Luther (15th). Luther (of Maryborough, Q'land; b. 26 March, 1870) was killed in action on 25 Aug., 1915.

¹⁵ Maj. D. H. Cannan; 15th Bn. Accountant and secretary; of Brisbane; b. Townsville, Q'land, 14 Apr., 1880. Killed in action, 8 Aug., 1915.

the rest, excepting the colonel, adjutant, chaplain, medical officer, and one other, had been wounded; 400 of its men had been hit. The 14th had suffered almost as severely, 8 of its officers and 250 men being killed or wounded. But its position was now sheltered by Hill 100. Major Dare,¹⁶ the first of the boyish commanders who eventually became common in the A.I.F.,¹⁷ had control of a considerable number of the 14th and 15th Australians now entrenching around the head of the Kaiajik Dere, and was in touch with the 14th Sikhs on his right. Provided that Pope and Cannan could hold the edge of the same spur lower down, Dare was confident that he could maintain his position at the head of the valley. On the other hand, opposite Pope the enemy was already establishing himself upon the northern edge of the spur and even appearing on the farther borders of the oatfield.



Position of 4AIBde MGs shown thus →

It was urgent to determine what should be done. General Monash was at this time out of touch with the assaulting column, his headquarters not having accompanied it, and the telephone wire having been cut by shell-fire. Moreover an unfortunate lack of cordiality between the staffs of some of the battalions¹⁸ hampered intimate co-operation. But shortly after 7 o'clock the wire was mended by Sapper Murfitt,¹⁹ and Pope informed the brigadier that the battalions could certainly not accomplish their task; he represented that the enemy was strong in machine-guns and was now shelling the troops, whose casualties seemed to be heavy, and that under these circumstances there appeared to be no advantage in staying where they were. Monash repeated this report to Cox, who ordered the column to withdraw to its lines.

¹⁶ Lieut.-Col C. M. M. Dare, D.S.O. Commanded 14th Bn, 1915/16. Architect; of Moreland and Brighton, Vic.; b. Moreland, 27 May, 1888.

¹⁷ The actual battalion commander, Col Rankine, very ill, had attempted to accompany the battalion, but collapsed, and Dare took his place.

¹⁸ See p. 90.

¹⁹ Lieut. C. R. Murfitt, D.C.M.; Aust. Corps Sig. Coy. Electrician; b. Middlesex, Eng., 16 Feb., 1888.

Shrapnel from the direction of Hill 971 was now constantly bursting over the spur. A man of the 16th ran to Pope's headquarters calling that the Turks were upon them. The enemy was in fact moving past the far edge of the stubble-field. Sergeant-Major Warburton²⁰ steadied the troops near headquarters by giving the order, "Signallers, fix bayonets," and lining his men along the crest. At this moment there came up to the same point the magnificent machine-gun sections of the 4th Brigade under Captain Rose,²¹ Lieutenants Black and Blainey,²² and Sergeant Murray, possibly the finest unit that ever existed in the A.I.F. They set up their guns on either side of the indentation in which was Pope's headquarters, and from that moment all anxiety as to the safety of the brigade's retreat really ceased. Every attempt of the enemy to move upon the level spur brought instant losses, and he was thus pinned to the ground. A rear-guard of fifty men of the 16th under Captain Harwood and Lieutenant Day²³ was ordered by Pope to cover the machine-guns. From farther north the 14th retired in some order, covered by Captains Henry²⁴ and Giles.²⁵ During most of the morning remnants of the brigade strolled back from the spur and down the Kaiajik Dere to the lines held by the 13th and the King's Own. The men of the latter battalion, comparatively small, young, and very raw, were nevertheless keen in their sympathy for the Australians in this reverse, and asked to be allowed to go out in support and to bring in the wounded. But such of these as were within reach had been carried back by the Australians themselves, while those on the far side of the spur were in ground already occupied by the enemy. As on other occasions, very few of the wounded left in Turkish hands survived. Some were shot or bayoneted. A German officer, seeing the Turkish soldiers kicking a number of wounded men and preparing to roll them over a cliff on the

²⁰ Warrant-Officer F. Warburton; 14th Bn. Cook; b. Smethwick, Birmingham, Eng., 1883.

²¹ Capt. Rose was an expert from the School of Gunnery, Hythe. Lieut. Black, afterwards Maj. P. C. H. Black, D.S.O., D.C.M., killed at Bullecourt, 11 Apr., 1917; Sgt. Murray, later Lieut.-Col. H. W. Murray, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.M.

²² Capt. A. R. Blainey, M.C.; 14th Bn. Member of Aust. Permanent Forces; b. Easington, Durham, Eng., 25 Sept., 1883.

²³ Lieut. E. Day; 16th Bn. Surveyor; b. Prospect, S. Aust., 26 Feb., 1891.

²⁴ Capt. (temp. Maj.) A. Henry; 14th Bn. Merchant; b. 30 Apr., 1889.

²⁵ Capt. C. L. Giles; 39th Bn.; b. Glenferrie, Vic., 11 July, 1891.

hillside, stepped in and saved their lives.²⁶ Two small parties, each of about a dozen men, under Lieutenants Luscombe²⁷ of the 14th and Youden of the 15th—both of whom were wounded, the latter mortally—held on in the gullies on the far side of the spur, ignorant of any order to withdraw, and were captured. The crest of the "level spur" from which the Australians had withdrawn was not definitely occupied by the enemy for some days.

For the A.I.F. this fight of the 8th of August, 1915, like the Battle of Fromelles a year later, became one of those "black days" which most deeply affect the spirits of soldiers. Like the invincible optimists they were, some of the men afterwards comforted themselves with the notion that the assault had been intended only for a feint, to distract attention from the main assault on Chunuk Bair. All the evidence, however, goes to prove that the intention of the commanders was to seize Hill 971, but that the difficulties had been enormously underestimated by all the leaders concerned. When viewed after the war, the country in front of the 4th Brigade appeared to be more difficult than any against which Australian infantry was elsewhere sent. So rugged was it that from the supposed starting-point (which the column had barely reached at the end of its calamitous advance) the climbing of Abdel Rahman Bair, even in daylight and in peaceful manœuvres, would have taken troops, though at the acme of fitness and health, longer than the time allowed for the whole operation.

Leaving out of account the fact that the brigade was intended to proceed up an exposed spur with the enemy



A Point reached
B Supposed starting point
Intended route— Actual route—

²⁶ Some of the men thus rescued died a year or two later while working on the tunnels of the Taurus and Amanus Mountains or in other Turkish prison camps. The grave of Pte. B. Calcutt (of Williamstown, Vic.) of the 14th Bn., who was wounded in this battle, together with those of several other Australians, New Zealanders, and British soldiers, lies at Hadschkiri on the summit of the Taurus (*Vol. XII, plate 680*).

²⁷ Capt. L. H. Luscombe; 14th Bn Clerk; of Geelong, Vic; b Geelong West, 18 May, 1891.

possibly on several sides, the natural difficulties which were still in front of the column at day-break were considerably greater than the sum of those encountered by any column on the night of August 6th.

From these facts it appears reasonable to conclude that, without complete success on the part of the Suvla force, the attainment of Hill 971 by Birdwood's left assaulting column was never within the range of human possibility even in those hours of August 7th when its objective may have been unoccupied except by fragments of the 14th Regiment. From the hour when the 4th Turkish Division reached the crest there was never the least chance that the 4th Brigade would succeed. Over and above these miscalculations by the higher staff, the starting-hour of Monash's brigade on August 8th was so late that, when the bombardment ended, the column had only covered a third—and that the comparatively level portion—of the distance to the proposed point of attack. Add to this the confusion caused by the fact that the whole terrain had been wrongly identified,²⁸ and that the column was proceeding along a spur which would not even have led to its objective. A partial realisation of some of these facts, and of the consequent waste of life,²⁹ rendered that morning's experience a heavy shock to the troops. Pope, always a father to his men, wrote of them on August 10th: "The boys were very worn and depressed," and, next day, "men on right section all miserably despondent, for which no reason exists." Godley on August 9th contemplated a possible renewal of the attempt, but it was never repeated.

²⁸ This mistake persisted for some time. Gen. Monash, when consulted next day, advised that, if 971 were again attacked, the same route should be taken which, he explained, had been across the Asma Dere and up the spur referred to in this chapter as "Alai Tepe." Godley's despatch, written a week later, contains the same misapprehension. The first implied discovery of the mistake appears in the messages sent by the King's Own on August 9. On that day this battalion, having through inexperience dug but shallow trenches, was being murderously enfiladed, losing two of its majors and 120 men. This fire was reported by the King's Own to be coming from Hill 100. But the staff of the 4th Aust. Bde. then believed that Hill 100 was within its own lines.

²⁹ The losses of the three battalions were heavy:—

15th Bn.—10 officers, 380 others.

14th Bn.—8 officers, 249 others.

16th Bn.—4 officers, 114 others.

The 15th, which had on Aug. 6 numbered 850, was now reduced to 280, and each of the others to about 500.

Meanwhile at Suvla on August 8th—the last day on which the two Anafartas, Tekke and Kavak Tepe, and the “W” Hills remained practically undefended by the Turks—General Stopford, influenced by the doubts of his subordinates, eventually decided to postpone until the morrow any attempt upon them. At nightfall the 7th and 12th Turkish Divisions from the north, at last arriving, occupied in great strength the area just east of those hills. In view of all these facts Liman von Sanders knew, upon August 8th, that Hill 971 was for the present safe.

CHAPTER XXIV

CHUNUK BAIR—THE CLIMAX IN GALLIPOLI


ON the morning of August 8th, while the 4th Australian Brigade was resuming its ill-fated advance upon Hill 971, the New Zealand Infantry Brigade renewed the attack upon the more vital objective of Chunuk Bair. It has already been stated¹ that on the night of the 7th the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, which had still two moderately fresh battalions, Wellington and Otago, had been reinforced by the 7th Gloucester and 8th Welch, Auckland Mounted Rifles, and Maoris. It was in the early hours of the 8th that the two latter reached Brigade Headquarters at the head of the Chailak Dere, close above which this assault, like all others on Rhododendron Ridge, was being organised.

The orders were that the 7th Gloucester and Wellington Battalions should form the first line, the 8th Welch the second, and the Maoris and Auckland Mounted Rifles the third. At 3 a.m. the Wellingtons and Gloucester were to commence their approach to the crest, Gloucester on the left directing themselves to the summit and northern slope of Chunuk Bair and the Wellingtons making for its southern shoulder. That is to say, Gloucester was to aim at part of the crest north-east of Rhododendron above the Aghyl Dere, while the Wellingtons were to occupy it south-east of Rhododendron, above the head of the Sazli. The 8th Welch were to follow, continually closing up to occupy the ground vacated by the first line; and the Maoris and Aucklands were similarly to follow the Welch. As soon as all three lines had gone forward, the Otago infantry were to move in rear of them to The Apex and occupy it as a reserve.


Colonel Malone, with the Wellingtons, was slightly late in starting. It was already almost dawn when he and his men, having traversed in column of fours the narrow saddle in front of The Apex, extended in platoons and passed above the heads of the Auckland Battalion holding the old Turkish trench at the Pinnacle. The shells of the warships, which

¹ See p. 651.

had been thundering against the whole line of heights from Baby 700 to 971, had just ceased. After Wellington passed, the Auckland infantry climbed out of their trench, straining their eyes in the dark to watch, if possible, the advance of the battalion up the slope ahead. At The Apex, and near brigade headquarters at the head of the Chailak, hundreds of eyes were anxiously scanning the same slope, expecting every minute to see the opening flashes of the Turkish fusillade which should sweep away the column as it had swept away Auckland on the day before. But not a shot was fired. The column moved straight up the slope, and




within a few minutes the leading platoons in close formation were seen moving northwards against the grey sky along the crest-line of Chunuk Bair. The first line disappeared over the summit. Some firing was at once heard. A mile and three-quarters to the south, in the old Anzac line, the observers of Caddy's (5th) battery also saw in the dawn what they took to be Turks upon the inland side of the crest of Chunuk Bair. The battery opened fire, but the troops on the crest immediately waved red and yellow flags—with which all assaulting columns had been provided in order to make their position plain to their own artillery. Only two ranging rounds had been fired by the battery, both falling short, and consequently no damage was done. Turkish troops were then observed moving up the inland side of Battleship Hill and firing upon the distant New Zealanders. Caddy's,



Phillips's, Browne's, and Trenchard's² guns opened upon these Turks, who thereupon retired. The four batteries endeavoured (as Trenchard wrote) "to block their retirement by a wall of fire." The enemy nevertheless withdrew, "suffering," according to Caddy and others, "fairly heavily."

The New Zealand infantry and some of the 7th Gloucester who accompanied them had thus at last reached part of the main goal of the offensive. They were on the crest of Sari Bair, commanding the rear of the enemy's position at Anzac and with observation over the whole width of the Peninsula and the straits. In the dim light they had reached the summit without a shot being fired at them. It is true that on the brow of the crest, immediately above the head of the Sazli Dere, they had walked on to a small trench with a communication trench leading back from it, in which was a machine-gun crew; but the machine-gunners were asleep. In a covered shelter were two sentries, who threw a couple of bombs and were instantly killed; six machine-gunners, including a German non-commissioned officer from the cruiser *Goeben*, were made prisoners. The communication sap had led to a shallow fire-trench dug along the crest of the range. In this, when Wellington rushed it, was a handful of the enemy, some of whom were killed, while others ran away; twenty in all were captured. The leading platoons of two companies—Wellington West Coast on the left, and Taranaki³ on the right—occupied the trench. From this they looked out over a gently-falling grassy hilltop, which dipped at a hundred yards' distance into steep and hidden valleys. Close to the right, a smooth shoulder—Su Yatagha—extended for a third of a mile inland.




² Trenchard was that morning in Caddy's and Phillips's observation-post, having been "blown out" of his own by Turkish shell-fire on the previous day.

³ According to another account Hawkes Bay was on the right. A few of the Auckland Mtd. Rifles, among whom was Q.M. Sgt. C. V. Bigg-Wither (of Auckland, N.Z.), also appear to have gone forward into this trench.

Far down on that flank were the distant lines and batteries of Anzac. Farther still, to the front beyond the foot-hills, there lay open to view two reaches of the Narrows near Chanak.⁴

An explanation of the absence of the enemy from the hilltop was soon learned from the captured machine-gunners. That part of the crest had been occupied⁵ by a portion of the 9th Turkish Division, which had marched from the south. But the leader—apparently the divisional commander, Colonel Kannengiesser—having fallen on the hill, the troops had during the night been either affected with panic or withdrawn by mistake.⁶ The 4th Turkish Division, however, north of Chunuk Bair, had not been withdrawn. As the dawn paled the 7th Gloucester, who debouched immediately after Wellington and extended to the north as Wellington had done to the south, became visible to the enemy on this flank. Whether they actually reached the northern slope of the summit, which was their objective, is uncertain.⁷ At all events, soon



⁴ See plate at p. 671; and Vol. XII, plate 52.

⁵ See p. 642.

⁶ Kannengiesser, on being wounded, handed over command of the 9th Div. to Hulussi Bey, who was also wounded shortly afterwards. According to the version given by Liman von Sanders and Major Prigge, he arrived at the head of his troops on Aug. 7 just as the Anzac troops were reaching the crest from their side. He was then wounded, and his troops retired, but presently rallied and drove their enemy from the summit. This is obviously incorrect, since Kannengiesser's troops were on the summit on Aug. 7, while the New Zealanders reached it on the 8th. Prigge (who wrote during the war and therefore partly with an eye to propaganda) in his later book changes the date to Aug. 8, but leaves the story unaltered. The version given in the second book (*Gallipoli*, pp. 95-100) may possibly have been inspired by Djemil Bey, whose part was ignored in the first (*Dardanellen Kriegstagebuch*, p. 98).


⁷ The 13th Div. diary and the Turkish accounts imply that the north of the summit was not reached. There was a tradition, however, at Anzac that part of the 7th Gloucester did reach it, and were shortly afterwards killed. That a small body of British soldiers attained this part of the crest either on Aug. 8 or 9 was conclusively proved by the equipment, jam-tin bombs, etc., found on the brow of the hill by the Aust. Historical Mission. Col. Hughes of the Imperial War Graves Commission, who thoroughly searched the ground, writes: "I found the remains of English regiments just to the north of where the New Zealanders were, on the western side, about 20 yards from the actual crest of Chunuk Bair. . . . They had been buried by the Turks in a trench . . . a couple of Gloucesters and Wilts; just below them, about 5 yards away, were some Royal Irish Rifles." Any British or N.Z. troops who were killed on the crest or eastern side of the hill would have been removed by the Turks, who buried a number of New Zealanders on the south-eastern side of Chunuk Bair.

after the start of the advance a machine-gun was suddenly turned upon them from the northern flank, which practically annihilated the two northernmost platoons. According to the account given by a German writer,⁸ the fire of the Turkish machine- and mountain-guns had been withheld by direct order of Djemil Bey, commander of the 4th Division, until the British troops had reached a particular white stone (one of a series of range-marks darkened on the farther side), which showed them to be 1,000 yards from the mountain-guns. Then Djemil gave the signal to open. The nearer troops were apparently annihilated, but other lines of British—probably part of the rear companies of the Gloucester, as well as the 8th Welch 400 yards behind, who, being the second line, were leaving The Apex a little after 4.15—endeavoured in the face of this fire to cross the narrow saddle. They were led by “young, athletic, and spirited officers,” and appeared to have “learned much during their short period of training.” But after endeavouring for a time to make headway they were driven into the shelter of ravines and washaways, and a number were eventually made prisoners in a Turkish counter-attack.⁹

The fire which had met the attack increased with daylight. Wellington, crossing the saddle in the dark, were not fired at. A little later the Gloucester also had passed it before they were seriously checked. But the Welch, emerging in the growing daylight, with the enemy already roused, were met at once by tremendous fire from the whole crest on their left and from Battleship Hill. The rear companies of Gloucester were checked not far from the Pinnacle. Here a New Zealand staff officer presently reached them with the news that Wellington had seized the summit at the head of the Sazli Dere. He ordered the Gloucester to wheel south and occupy the crest on the right of the New Zealanders. This they proceeded to do, crossing the head of the *dere* and occupying a line some distance to the south of

⁸ Maj. E. R. Prigge, *Gallipoli*, pp. 98-9. The narrative is obviously given at second-hand and is in many respects greatly exaggerated.


⁹ Prigge does not hide his admiration of the British regimental officer. He tells (*Gallipoli*, pp. 100, 101) of one elderly captain who at first, on being captured, would not answer a word to his interrogators. At last he became sufficiently communicative to say: “If a man has the misfortune to be taken prisoner, he must keep his mouth shut; so don’t ask me anything, for I will not answer.” On Liman von Sanders inquiring if he had any wish, he said he had lost his pipe, a friend of thirty years. On a pipe being accordingly procured from a German seaman, the old officer stopped it and began to inhale long draughts of smoke. “He had spoken,” says Prigge, “not one word.”



SARI BAIR, SHOWING THE POINT WHERE THE NEW ZEALANDERS AND 7TH GLouceSTER REACHED THE SUMMIT ON AUGUST 8TH

1—Advance of 4th Australian Infantry Brigade. 2—British and Indians near Hill "Q"
 3—Troops at The Farm 4—The Apex 5—The Pinnacle 6—New Zealand infantry
 and Gloucester at Chukuk Bair. 7—Lone Pine The established line is shown thus — — — — —

*Reproduced, by permission, from a model made by Mr Justice Ferguson
 Photographed by N.S.W. Government Printer*




THE NARROWS SEEN FROM THE EASTERNMOST POSITION ATTAINED BY THE NEW ZEALANDERS
ON CHUNUK BAR, 8TH AUGUST, 1915

*Genl Wm Memorial Official Photo No G1801
Taken in 1919*

To face p 671


Map No. 22



THE CAPTURE OF THE CREST-LINE AT CHUNUK BAIR BY WELLINGTON BATTALION AND
7TH GLOUCESTER AT DAY-BREAK ON 8TH AUGUST, 1915

British troops and trenches, red, Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

Wellington, on the shoulder of Chunuk Bair nearest to Battleship Hill. But the Welch on the narrow saddle in front of The Apex were shot down and scattered into the Aghyl and Sazli Deres. Two leaders, Majors Yates¹⁰ and Stevens,¹¹ managed to struggle through with a few men, Yates to a position 300 yards to the right of Wellington, and Stevens between the two. Four New Zealand machine-guns had also been sent forward from The Apex as soon as it was seen that the Wellington Battalion had reached the sky-line. On their way forward the gunners met the same fire which shattered the 8th Welch, and the guns themselves were struck in many places. But from the various parts which were carried through it was found possible to reconstruct for use in the advanced position one complete machine-gun.



Meanwhile on the crest at the head of the Sazli the Wellington Battalion had been endeavouring to dig itself a foothold. Malone had held the theory that any line upon the forward or eastern slope of the crest would necessarily be subjected to annihilating shell-fire. He was therefore determined to hold the inland slope with comparatively few troops, while his main body dug in slightly on the sheltered side of the crest. He had discussed the question with the brigade staff, which did not agree with him; but his strong will was not easily bent, and he had remained determined to place his main line in rear of the summit. Accordingly, while 100 men of the Wellington West Coast and Taranaki¹² companies held the Turkish line on the crest, the rest of Wellington—650 strong—dug in close to the brow behind them.

The Turkish trench upon the summit was almost straight, without traverses, and only two feet in depth. The Wellington

¹⁰ Lieut.-Col. R. P. Yates; 8th Welch Pioneers. Officer of British Regular Army; b. 2 June, 1871.



¹¹ Lieut.-Col. H. L. Stevens, D.S.O.; 8th Welch Pioneers. Officer of British Regular Army, of Isle of Wight, Eng.; b. Finchley, London, 7 Feb., 1873.

¹² According to another account, the Hawkes Bay Coy.

West Coast company, with some of the Gloucester on its left, began at once to deepen it. On the right the Taranaki¹³ men appear to have lined the open crest, which was there covered with low scrub. The ground, being stony, was difficult to dig, and the troops had barely made any impression upon it when, to their right front, on the eastward jutting arm of the summit (Su Yatagha) there appeared Turkish infantry advancing in formation. The New Zealanders opened fire at about 500 yards, but the enemy's advance then became hidden by the slope of the nearer crest, which would protect them up to

a point not twenty yards from the New Zealand position. A considerable part of the hidden slope, however, was exposed to the batteries at Anzac, which opened upon these Turks and caused a long delay before they reached the summit.

In the meantime, however, the 4th Turkish Division to the north of Chunuk Bair had discovered the arrival of Birdwood's troops on the south side of that summit, and, working up to the crest, opened fire at 4.40 a.m. on the forward line of New Zealanders. The line of the Taranaki company,¹⁴ which came first into their view, was at once shot down, or driven back upon the main line in the partial shelter behind the brow. On the other hand, a few of Wellington West Coast, being close beneath the actual summit, were more sheltered from the enfilade and held to the advanced trench. The main line of the battalion remained in its supporting position some fifty yards




¹³ ¹⁴ Or Hawkes Bay.

behind them, its centre being within thirty yards of the crest and its right even closer. On its extreme flanks the Gloucester (who at an early stage lost every officer, company sergeant-major, and quartermaster-sergeant) and some of the Welch endeavoured to extend it, slightly throwing back each wing. The bulk of the force was thus ranged around the spoon-shaped hollow in which the Sazli Dere ended on the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair. Only on the extreme left were a few of the Gloucester on slopes which fell into the Aghyl Dere, north of Rhododendron. Malone placed his headquarters in a support trench, the left of which was slightly sheltered by the end of Rhododendron.¹⁵

The troops on this more sheltered slope had not been digging for many minutes before they too were subjected to the enemy's fire. His artillery opened, and snipers, increasing on Chunuk Bair and Battleship Hill, began to shoot at the slopes which were respectively open to them—those on Chunuk Bair being able to fire upon the slopes near Battleship Hill and *vice versa*. Digging became almost impossible; the troops on the extreme flanks were killed or driven in, and Malone was almost at once completely cut off by rifle and machine-gun fire from any communication with the rest of his division, the nearest post of which was at the Pinnacle, 300 yards behind him. One signaller who tried to carry a line from the Pinnacle was shot when he had gone six yards.¹⁶

As the morning drew on, the Turkish force on the reverse side of the crest-line gradually worked up towards the summit, despite the fire of the batteries at Anzac. The position of the handful of Wellington West Coast on that side of the crest, overlooking the Narrows, had long since become desperate.



¹⁵ Rhododendron ended in a slight prominence running like a rib up the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair.

¹⁶ Efforts were nevertheless made with some success during the next forty-eight hours. Signaller C. R. G. Bassett (of Auckland, N.Z.) was awarded the Victoria Cross for carrying forward and repairing a wire on these exposed slopes.

They had fired at the distant enemy as long as they could see any; but, as the Turkish counter-attack approached, it became lost to sight behind the slope of the hill. It was not until several hours later that a shower of grenades from the slope fifteen yards in front of the trench announced that the expected assault was imminent. Malone appears to have regarded his advanced line as a covering party, whose duty was to give the main body time to dig in on the reverse slope; and an instruction is said to have been issued that, when it could hold on no longer, it was to fall back over the crest. That in any event was the reasonable course. The advanced party had no bombs, and could not fire over the curve of the hilltop without standing erect in its shallow trench, exposed from the waist upwards, a proceeding which meant almost certain death. Accordingly, after all but five men in the trench had been wounded, those five, including an officer, crept along the trench until they were separated by intervals of about thirty yards, and then dashed back towards the main line on the seaward slope. The officer and one badly-wounded soldier succeeded in reaching it; the three others were killed. When, after yet another long interval, the Turks began to crawl into the shallow trench filled with dead, dying, and seriously wounded men, they captured eleven wounded survivors of the Wellington West Coast company.¹⁷ With this forward trench lost, the New Zealanders no longer held a position overlooking the Dardanelles; but their main body still occupied the rear slope almost as close to the summit as were the trenches at Quinn's to the crest in front of them.

It was then nearly 9 o'clock. Until this time Malone's position on the reverse slope had only been attacked by continual shell-fire and by attempts of the enemy to establish himself on the crest on either flank, from which he fired into the troops clinging above the spoon-shaped head of the Sazli. Towards the end of the morning the Turks in the scrub on the southern shoulder, nearer to Battleship Hill, increased in numbers and endeavoured to surround the right flank of the New Zealand line. They were observed by Corporal


¹⁷ Maj. Waite in Vol I of *The New Zealand Official History (The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, p. 221)* states: "Into the trench several crept with their bayonets to kill the wounded. Fortunately a Turkish sergeant arrived and saved the lives of the wounded, who were carried off to the German dressing stations behind Hill Q"

Dempsey¹⁸ of the Wellingtons, who ordered his men to concentrate their fire upon the scrub, and so managed to check the enemy's encroachment. The attempts which from then onward were continually made by the Turks to work round one flank or the other were generally defeated by the fire of the New Zealanders on the flank opposite to them, from which they could always be seen.

But about 9 o'clock, the Turks having captured the West Coast company's trench upon the crest, began to attack Malone's main position from the front.

The frontal assault was made entirely with bombs. The procedure appeared to be for the enemy on right and left to open a tremendous fusillade while his bomb-throwers were creeping forward in the centre. A shower of grenades would follow, the bomb-throwers, however, not coming—except for a few moments here and there—into view of the men at whom they threw. Their fuses were mostly long, and the Wellington troops often had time to fling back the missiles before they exploded. It was estimated that before the end of the day almost every man in the battalion had thrown back at least one or two.


Several minutes after the commencement of each attack the bombing would slacken. Then Malone, himself the moving spirit of the whole defence, would order his men to charge with the bayonet. The line would rise over its low parapet, run forward a dozen yards, fire a volley—the Turks never remaining to meet them—and return to its trenches. The slender bomb-supply of the New Zealanders and of the British troops having soon been exhausted, there was no means of replying to the enemy's frontal attacks except by such rushes. The losses became heavy. The New Zealanders, who were widely deployed, did not suffer so severely as the troops of the New Army, who were half-dazed by the appalling



¹⁸ Cpl. D. G. Dempsey, Wellington Bn Labourer; of Eltham, N Z ; b. Christchurch, N.Z.. 20 June, 1886. Killed in action, 8 Aug., 1915

phenomena of this, their first engagement, and tended to crowd too closely together. Of the 7th Gloucester, with the exception of a handful on the right under Major Stevens of the 8th Welch, few seem to have survived; those who did were eventually placed singly among the New Zealanders. But Wellington also was now suffering such loss that every time when the men returned to their trench after charging to the crest, they had to clear it of the dead before they could enter it.

With his numbers so fast decreasing, it was necessary for Malone to look for reinforcements if he was to cling to his position. The third line of the original attacking column—the Maori contingent and the Auckland Mounted Rifles—had not yet come up. He therefore at a fairly early hour sent back Major Cunningham¹⁹ to ask that he should be reinforced. As a matter of fact the third line had not been sent forward until 9 a.m.; and when it then attempted to advance, the Maoris—who were on its left—veered, as the Gurkhas had done on the previous day, into the shelter of the Aghyl Dere, and thence clambered up to the British and Indian position at The Farm. The Auckland Mounted Rifles, however, dashed by “eights” across the narrow saddle to the Pinnacle; but near that point the whole regiment was pinned by the enemy’s fire into the shelter of a slight rise for some hours. Here, lying on the scrubby saddle, it was observed by the enemy’s artillery. Whenever a man stirred, two guns, firing at extreme range from the direction of Anafarta, were turned upon the saddle. By their shells Major Chapman²⁰ and several others were killed. At 1 o’clock, however, Major Schofield²¹ led the regiment in another advance



¹⁹ Lieut.-Col. W. H. Cunningham, D.S.O. Commanded 2nd Wellington Bn., 1916/18. Solicitor; of Wanganui, N.Z.; b. Wellington, N.Z., 24 Sept., 1883.

²⁰ Maj. F. Chapman; Auckland Mtd. Rifles. Farmer; of Opoitiki, N.Z.; b. Richmond, Surrey, Eng., 13 July, 1858. Killed in action, 8 Aug., 1915.

²¹ Maj. S. C. Schofield; Auckland Mtd. Rifles. Farmer; of Auckland, N.Z.; b. Thames, N.Z., 6 Apr., 1872.

towards the firing line. This was effected by crawling forward along the saddle, making gradually to its southern side so as to reach the edge overlooking the Sazli Dere, and thence dropping down into the head of the *dere*, in the shelter of which large numbers of wounded from the summit were now lying. There the regiment deployed and prepared to charge by half-squadrons up the remaining 200 yards of exposed slope to Malone's position.

While this reinforcement had been making its slow and difficult advance, the Wellington Battalion had for hours been engaged in one of the most desperate struggles ever fought by Anzac troops. The solitary machine-gun had been served until all its crew were killed or wounded. There were no bombs, and for rifle ammunition the troops had to rely upon what each man had carried and what they could get from the dead. A few brave men of the Auckland infantry succeeded in carrying forward two boxes of ammunition by the route followed by the Auckland Mounted Rifles—that is to say, by crawling over the scrubby saddle beyond the Pinnacle, with the Turks firing whenever a bush moved; thence dropping into the Sazli; and then attempting another dash up the hillside. But for practical purposes Wellington had been cut off. The troops were weary almost to exhaustion; only their unconquerable mettle caused them to rise cheerfully to every call made upon them. Malone, with Major Cunningham his second-in-command, Captain W. H. Hastings (who had strayed to this column by mistake), and some of the members of the battalion headquarters, had his position in the support trench, from the northern end of which he could overlook the slopes of The Farm. Again and again he gave the word for counter-attacks, and three or four times himself ran up to the line and personally headed the charge. His bayonet had been bent by a rifle bullet, a fact from which he drew an almost childish pleasure. When Cunningham told him that his place was not there, he answered with a grim fatherliness: "You're only a kid—I'm an old man—get out yourself!"


Several of the Turkish attacks seemed especially threatening, and the main difficulty for Wellington was to direct its fire so as to stem them. When fire was turned upon the front, the enemy crept forward on the flanks; when fire was switched to the flanks, a line of Turks crept up to the front. Each

time, as the New Zealanders rose to their feet and ran forward, the frontal enemy ran back. But once, at least, Malone thought the end had arrived. "Come on," he said to his staff, "they've done it this time—we may as well be in it." But the charge cleared them as before.

During the afternoon the word kept going round the line: "All right—hang on—the Gurkhas are coming."²² And support at last came to hand when, at 4 o'clock, Major Schofield with 130 of the Auckland Mounted Rifles charged up to the position. They found Wellington at the point of exhaustion. The firing line, only three-and-a-half feet in depth, was now so full of dead and dying that the men had to leave it and endeavour to scratch another trench immediately behind it.

The New Zealanders in the northern end of the position could now see Turks constantly reinforcing the southern portion of the crest. This, although Malone did not know it, portended the arrival of yet another Turkish division, the 8th, which had been taken from the line at Helles and hurried northward. And shortly after the arrival of the Auckland Mounted Rifles there began a very violent bombardment of the slope by Turkish batteries firing from the south. Most of the shell-fire had hitherto come from Anafarta and Abdel Rahman Bair. It appears to have been followed by a succession of attacks—hand-grenades coming over fifty at a time, the enemy getting out of their trenches and advancing with officers at their head, the New Zealanders shooting them as they rose. This effort of the enemy, like its predecessors, was beaten back. But, a shell bursting near his headquarters, the gallant Malone was killed.

The attacks delivered by the 64th and 25th Regiments of the 9th Turkish Division during the morning, and by the



²² See p. 682.


24th of the newly-arrived 8th Division in the afternoon, totally failed to drive Wellington from its foothold beside the crest of Chunuk Bair. The trenches were still held at dusk, when the situation became—as always in Gallipoli—much easier. The moment darkness fell, parties carrying bombs, water, and ammunition from the Chailak Dere, who during the day had not been able to go farther than the Pinnacle, reached the advanced position without hindrance. After dark the only reinforcement to suffer loss was the 4th squadron of the Auckland Mounted Rifles, which, after bringing up rations, was by some mistake ordered to charge through the left of the front line and suffered heavily; but when the last comparatively fresh units of New Zealanders—the Otago infantry and the Wellington Mounted Rifles—were sent up from The Apex to reinforce the worn-out troops, they reached the Chunuk Bair position by 10.30 without a casualty. The enemy was still occasionally attacking. Between 11 and 12 o'clock he made an attempt to steal down from Chunuk Bair north of the end of Rhododendron and thence to attack Wellington from behind. There was a shout of "Allah! Allah!" and a rush of Turks both from left rear and from front. The New Zealanders kept their heads, faced round and fired, and the assault melted.

It had not been intended to effect an immediate relief of the garrison. But when about midnight the Otago infantry and Wellington Mounted Rifles manned the front line, the assumption of the worn-out troops was that they were being relieved. None of the newcomers dreamed of gainsaying it; and the Wellington infantry, with a remnant of the 7th Gloucester and 8th Welch, were withdrawn. Of the 760 of the Wellington Battalion who had captured the height that morning, there came out only 70 unwounded or slightly wounded men. Throughout that day not one had dreamed of leaving his post. Their uniforms were torn, their knees broken. They had had no water since the morning; they could talk only in whispers; their eyes were sunken; their knees trembled; some broke down and cried like children.

But they had gained and held a foothold for their force on the summit of Sari Bair.²⁵ Liman von Sanders has

²⁵ See Vol. XII, plate 117.

said²⁴ that the first of the three crises of the offensive was reached when Kannengiesser's troops of the 9th Turkish Division barred the way to Chunuk Bair just as the New Zealand infantry were advancing against it on August 7th. The second, he says, was reached on August 9th, when the British advance was checked on the Anafarta Plain; the third on August 16th, when the British attack upon Kiretch Tepe was driven back. It is unlikely that history will support his judgment. The trench-line which Malone's force dug and held on August 8th on the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair can be seen to-day, only fifteen yards below the brow of the hill, and exactly fifty from the road which winds along the inland side of the summit.²⁵ So long as this position was maintained, the crest-line might be gained at any moment by an attack in sufficient force. The situation on August 8th was a critical one for the enemy. He had brought his last available division from Cape Helles, where only four were now left to face the British and French. One of its regiments, the 23rd, had not yet been thrown in, but the other had suffered heavily in the vain attempt to drive the New Zealanders from the heights. As a final measure von Sanders had on August 7th ordered Mehmed Ali Pasha, commanding on the southern side of the Dardanelles, to collect all battalions except those actually employed in the first line, and to send them with a few batteries to Chanak to be ferried on subsequent nights, across the straits. The whole garrison then remaining on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles consisted of three battalions.




Except for a few weak coastal outposts—which also were employed in the course of the next few days—the shore in the direction of Bulair was already bare of defence; and the garrison at Helles had been reduced

²⁴ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 110.

²⁵ The New Zealand trench can be discerned on the aeroplane photograph reproduced in the plate at p. 719.

to the lowest possible margin of safety. The three regiments so far employed upon Chunuk Bair, the 25th, 64th, and 24th, were weary and had suffered loss, and the New Zealanders had not been ejected. As Amin Bey²⁶ writes: "This offensive . . . made great progress up to the evening of August 8th. Chunuk Bair and the immediate neighbourhood passed into the hands of the enemy. The position of the Northern Group became critical, and counter-attacks delivered by night and day could not recover what we had lost." There was trepidation in Constantinople, and the army itself was alarmed.

During these days the Turkish regiments facing the old Anzac position were startled by shots coming from Chunuk Bair which began to fall among the stores, kitchens, waggons, and pack animals hidden behind Mortar Ridge and in Dik Dere. It was not known whether these were aimed or stray shots, but confusion arose, especially among the transport, and part of it prepared to withdraw. In short, the danger which von Sanders



feared on August 7th was even more threatening on the 8th. "If," he wrote,²⁷ "the enemy had succeeded in occupying the crests of these formidable heights, it would have been necessary for the whole (Turkish) front at Ari Burnu to fall back." Malone and his Wellingtons had opened for the Anzac commander one obvious opportunity—namely, to make use of the foothold gained during August 8th for launching a third powerful attack upon the crest. As has been explained, on the night of August 8th the position was such that troops and ammunition could be brought without the enemy's interference to within fifty yards of the crest-line of Chunuk Bair. Such hindrance as existed during the hours of darkness was all far in rear, in the narrow defile of the Chailak Dere, up which moved supplies and reinforcements for Chunuk Bair, while the wounded and the relieved troops passed down.

²⁶ Preface to *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, Turkish edn

²⁷ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 110.

On this day General Cox had divided his "central" force (the Indians and Cayley's 39th Brigade) into three columns, which attempted to advance at several points against the portion of the main ridge lying between Monash's objective on the left and that of the New Zealanders on the right. The northernmost of the three, consisting of the 14th Sikhs followed by the 5th Gurkhas, attempting to advance on the flank of Monash's brigade, was unable to cross the valley in its front. The Indian troops were also affected by the sight of the Australians, whom rumour had reported invincible, running back from the deadly surface of Yauan Tepe. The southernmost of the three columns, which should have climbed to Chunuk Bair north of the New Zealanders, failed to pass The Farm, since the British troops, though making their preparatory movements at the appointed hour, found it impossible to make headway through the gullies in the dark. In the centre, however, the 6th Gurkhas, with parts of the 9th Worcester and 7th North Staffordshire, succeeded in climbing up the gullies a few hundred yards north of The Farm and reaching by 9.30 a.m., not their objective—Hill Q—but an advanced position only 250 yards below the northern end of Chunuk Bair, where they continued to cling high on the slope almost under the muzzles of the Turkish rifles. As they had little chance of immediately gaining the crest, Cox at 2 p.m. recommended to Godley that they should entrench the line then gained, with a view to resuming the attack next day. This course was accordingly adopted.

The position at Suvla on August 8th has already been referred to.²⁸ Although the Turks were very little stronger than on the 7th; although General Stopford was thoroughly informed by aeroplanes of the enemy's weakness; and although a third British division—the 53rd—was about to land: nevertheless Stopford's force lay motionless, occupying almost the same ground as on the night before. Except that the nearer end of Scimitar Hill, connecting the Chocolate and "W" Hills, was now being held in the face of moderate opposition, no advance had been made, and even that gain was abandoned by order of the local staff before the day ended.

²⁸ See p. 665.

That morning Lieutenant-Colonel Aspinall²⁹ of Hamilton's staff, who had been sent by his chief to report on the situation, had found at Suvla the following position:—

We . . . gathered from the appearance of the place that the operation had been a complete success. The whole bay was at peace. The large stretch of water was crowded with transports and supply-ships unloading their stores without any interference by the enemy. There was no sound of firing on the shore; and all round the bay were clusters of naked men bathing. On the beach . . . hundreds of men were sitting resting under the cliffs, and I particularly noticed that an abundance of fresh water was trickling down the face of these cliffs from the grassy slopes above. . . . Finding no one in authority I pushed inland. There was still no sound of firing, and I felt more confident than ever that we must have reached the hills on the eastern side of the Suvla Plain. Shortly afterwards, however, I met the Chief of the Royal Engineers of the 11th Division. To my astonishment, this officer informed me that our front line was only a very short way inland, and that there were no signs of a fresh advance being ordered. . . . The corps commander . . . still had his headquarters on board H.M.S. *Jonquil*. . . . General Hammersley informed me that he had no orders to advance until next morning, and that he did not think it would be possible until more guns landed. . . . I then proceeded on board H.M.S. *Jonquil*. General Stopford greeted me by: "Well, Aspinall, the men have done splendidly, and have been magnificent." "But they haven't reached the hills, sir," I replied. "No," he answered, "but they are ashore!" I replied that I was sure the Commander-in-Chief would be disappointed that they had not reached the high ground covering the bay, in accordance with orders. . . .³⁰

It was, as a matter of fact, still possible—as it had been ever since the landing—to occupy those all-important heights, less than three miles distant, by simply walking up them. Though neither Stopford nor Aspinall knew it, the 6th East Yorkshire, then on Scimitar Hill, had actually sent, on its own initiative, an officer and a signaller to climb Tekke Tepe, which, as the acting adjutant, Lieutenant Still, afterwards wrote,³¹ "anyone with half an eye could see . . . was the key of the whole position." They found that commanding hill "empty" of the enemy, and this fact had been duly reported to the headquarters of their brigade.³²

The officers and men of the Navy, who from the covering ships had watched the operations, shared to the full Colonel

²⁹ Brig.-Gen. C. F. Aspinall Oglander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c. Officer of British Regular Army; of London; b Wrexham, N. Wales, 8 Feb., 1878.

³⁰ The report is given in full in *The World Crisis*, 1915 (pp. 445-6), by the Rt Hon. Winston S. Churchill.


³¹ Letter to Sir Ian Hamilton, quoted in *The Times*, 30 Oct., 1923.

³² A report, apparently forwarding the information brought back by this patrol, has been preserved. The actual summit of Tekke Tepe does not seem to have been reached, but "Nothing could be seen of any formed body of the enemy or any sign that the hill was occupied by him."

Aspinall's dismay at the lack of effort. From the flagship he telegraphed to G.H.Q.:

Just been ashore, where I found all quiet. No rifle-fire, no artillery fire, and apparently no Turks.³³ IX Corps resting. Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost. . . .

Such being the position on August 8th at Suvla and Anzac, there were made that afternoon or evening three crucial decisions. On the Turkish side Liman von Sanders, dissatisfied with the conduct of Feizi Bey, who had not yet even brought his 7th and 12th Divisions to the attacking point, removed him from their command and in his stead sent to Suvla the Turkish divisional general whom he most trusted, Mustafa Kemal Bey of the 19th Division, who till then had been opposing the attacks from the centre of Anzac. The northern front was made a separate command, known as the "Anafarta Group," including Chunuk Bair on the one flank and Kiretch Tepe, north of Suvla, on the other. The whole of the forces between those points now passed under Mustafa Kemal, who was at the same time raised to the status of Pasha. His immediate duty was to deliver the counter-attack with the arriving 7th and 12th Divisions, concerning which, as will be later explained, von Sanders entertained high expectations.



The second decision was that of Hamilton, who, not waiting for Aspinall's report, came to see for himself³⁴ the position at Suvla, and that afternoon personally ordered General Hammersley to advance an available brigade, the 32nd, to the top of the exceedingly important and still unoccupied height east of the Suvla Plain—Tekke Tepe. The third was that of Generals Birdwood and Godley to make use of the New Zealand foothold on the heights for the third, and perhaps the

³³ So far as Hamilton's staff could afterwards ascertain there were in the Suvla area on this day 7,000 Turks.

³⁴ The admiral, de Robeck, also had despatched a message asking Hamilton to meet him, but this was never received.

most promising, attempt to seize by further tremendous fighting the crest-line of Sari Bair. The opportunity which would exist during the coming night was obvious to all the Anzac commanders concerned. Not only were the New Zealanders practically on the crest, but the 6th Gurkhas and the British with them had managed further to improve their position so that they were within 150 yards of Chunuk Bair, the situation being then roughly as follows:—

Hill Q:


6th Gurkhas
9th Worcester
7th N. Staffs.

Chunuk Bair.
New Zealanders

The Farm:

10th Gurkhas
9th Warwick (6 coys.)
Maoris

Bottom of Aghyl Dere: 6th S. Lincs. and 9th Warwick (2 coys.)




- A yellow, steep cliff
B Chunuk Bair. held by NZ
C Comm. Trench held by NZ & spur held by NZ
(Rhododendron)
D Farm
E Gurkhas
F Eng. Col. XIII. Dn 2 bats working up thick scrubbed gullies
G Q Ridge Eng. Col. Olychus.
H Turkish Trenches
P P P Flags on hill showing advanced NZ position.

Sketch by P. F. E. Schuler (War Correspondent for the Melbourne Age) of the position on Chunuk Bair and Hill Q on August 8th. The view is from No. 3 Outpost. The sketch was made from memory on the same day.

As the British regiments up the spurs on the left had been reported to be suffering very severely, the 6th South Lancashire and the rest of the Warwick were sent to relieve them and hold on for the night. The 6th Gurkhas, 6th South Lancashire, and some of the 9th Royal Warwickshire were thus, during the night of August 8th, not far below the crest between Chunuk and "Q," while the 10th Gurkhas, the greater part of the 9th Warwickshire, and the Maoris were not much lower at The Farm.

Far down on the right, in the thick of Lone Pine, the Australian soldiers, inveterate optimists, buoyed themselves up with the notion of what was happening in the north. "On the left," wrote one private,⁸⁵ "the Indians are attacking with their knives, and they terrorise. Out on the flank an army landed, and cavalry and artillery are working right round to the rear." Then, after touching on the terrible sights behind the Pine—"They (the Turks) are putting up an obstinate fight for it, but I don't think they will last long when the New Army gets behind them."

⁸⁵ R. L. Donkin, 1st Bn, who was killed on Aug. 15 in the Pine.




POSITION ON SARI BAIR AT 5.30 A.M. ON 9TH AUGUST, 1915—THE CLIMAX OF THE CAMPAIGN IN GALLIPOLI

British troops and trenches, red, Turkish troops, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

CHAPTER XXV

CHUNUK BAIR—THE CLIMAX IN GALLIPOLI—*continued.*

IN his plan for the third attack upon Sari Bair Godley put aside the notion, which for a passing moment he had entertained, of renewing the assault upon Hill 971 itself. He restricted his aim to the heights between Battleship Hill and "Q." The forces already attacking that part of the range were to advance their positions—that is to say, the New Zealand brigade would extend its holding to the crest and lengthen it southwards towards Battleship Hill; meanwhile Cox's British and Indian brigades were to seize the summit immediately above them, between Chunuk Bair and "Q." At the same time a third and almost completely fresh force of British troops was to make the main assault along the crest between the two others, moving up during the night close behind the New Zealanders and, at dawn, attacking from that position northwards up the summit from Chunuk Bair to "Q." If this plan succeeded, the main range from the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair to the northern summit of "Q" would shortly after daylight on August 9th be in British hands.



The troops available for this new attempt were:

On the left, the troops of Cox's force, of whom the 6th South Lancashire, mingled with the 6th Gurkhas high on the slopes, were comparatively fresh.

On the right, General Johnston's New Zealand force, of which the Otago Battalion and the Wellington Mounted Rifles, having relieved the Wellington infantry during the night, would also be tolerably fresh.

For the central force, which was to make the main assault along the summit between the two others, Godley had his

existing reserve, two battalions of Baldwin's 38th Brigade,¹ which had been brought during August 7th to No. 2 Outpost. One of these had already been sent up the Chailak Dere during August 8th as reserve to the New Zealand force on Rhododendron, but had not been used. To fill the place of this battalion Godley had recalled from the far left one of the two original battalions of the left covering force, the 5th Wiltshire; Birdwood, who still had in reserve Cooper's² 29th Brigade of the 10th (Irish) Division, also sent him from Anzac two of its battalions, the 10th Hampshire and 6th Royal Irish Rifles. Brigadier-General Cooper accompanied them. The reserve under Baldwin thus consisted of the

6th E. Lancs. (38th Brigade),
5th Wilts. (40th Brigade),
10th Hants (29th Brigade),
6th R.I. Rifles (29th Brigade).

Godley decided to entrust to him the command of the main or central column in the forthcoming attack, and for this purpose ordered that the 6th Loyal North Lancashire, which was at The Apex supporting the New Zealanders, should again come under him.


This plan having formed itself in Godley's mind before midday on the 8th, he at once warned General Johnston at The Apex that Generals Baldwin and Cooper—both of the central column—would attend a conference at The Apex at about 3 o'clock. He added that either he himself or his chief of staff, Colonel Braithwaite, would be present. Johnston, who would also take part, was asked to prepare an observation-post from which they could look out over the country from Chunuk Bair to Hill Q, in which the central column was to operate.

In accordance with these arrangements the two British brigadiers reached Johnston's headquarters between 3 and 4 in the afternoon. They had already drafted the outlines of an


¹ The 38th Bde. originally included the 6th King's Own Royal Lancaster, 6th E. Lancs., 6th S. Lancs., and 6th Loyal N. Lancs. The 6th S. Lancs. had formed part of the reserve column under Col. Bald in the original advance; and the 6th King's Own had been sent by Godley to Cox to hold part of the trenches for Monash's brigade during its operation on Aug. 8.

² Brig.-Gen. R. J. Cooper, C.B., C.V.O. Commanded 29th Inf. Bde., 1914/15. Officer of British Regular Army; of Co. Sligo, Ireland; b. London, 18 July, 1860. Died, 13 May, 1938.

order by which their troops would form up behind the New Zealand brigade, with their left on The Farm, and then carry out the assault. But now, seeing the ground for the first time, they realised that it was impossible for such a movement to be carried out. Except for the narrow saddle leading forward from The Apex to the advanced foothold of the New Zealanders, the country between themselves and the range consisted of steep ravines, with corrugated scrub-covered slopes on which no advancing line could for half-a-minute retain formation "How on earth can we do it?" said one of them.




The one possible method was obvious to most of those on the spot. The assault could be made only if the battalions of the new force were marched up the Chailak Dere and right to the advanced New Zealand position, then at dawn turned to the north and straight up the crest of the range. This march would be possible if, after a certain hour, the Chailak Dere were kept strictly free from all down-traffic—if no troops, even wounded, were allowed to descend it, and the new battalions were then led up it in single file. Some of the New Zealand brigade at The Apex explained this to Baldwin and his brigade-major, and it was undoubtedly by this route that Godley and his chief of staff intended the advance to be made. But the two visiting brigadiers were to confer with General Johnston, and it was manifestly upon his opinion that they set most store. While waiting for Godley or Braithwaite to arrive, they went into Johnston's dugout to discuss the matter with him.



Johnston was an experienced soldier, who gave his life for his country just two years later in France. But, like many old soldiers, despite his bravery and capacity, he was completely unfitted by habit and physique for withstanding prolonged strain. After the tension of the first night's advance he had been left without relief at his headquarters, almost in the firing line, through another night and two days. By the afternoon of August 8th he was both mentally and physically incapable of affording that clear judgment and lucid exposition which were vitally required. Consequently the notion which he

imparted to Baldwin was that the latter should not follow the track of the New Zealanders to Chunuk Bair, but should diverge from it near the head of the Chailak Dere where it approached the Aghyl, climb over Cheshire Ridge, drop down into the Aghyl Dere, and then climb the far side to Chunuk Bair and "Q." This route, which no one had explored, appeared on the map to be the straightest and shortest, a fact



which impressed Baldwin—who, on the strength of Johnston's advice, was inclined to consider the other route unnecessarily circuitous. Some of Johnston's staff urged with all their force that the track by The Apex was nevertheless the only one practicable. Had either Godley or Braithwaite then arrived, their presence would assuredly have clinched the matter, since there is no question that they intended the assault to be made from immediately in rear of the advanced New Zealanders. To take advantage of that foothold on the summit was the essence of their whole plan. But a message was at that moment received from Godley saying that he could not attend, but that detailed orders would be issued direct to Baldwin. This appeared to make further discussion by the brigadiers unnecessary, since it was assumed that a route for the attack had been predetermined and would be disclosed in orders. The assumption appears to have been wrong. Godley seems to have depended on the conference of brigadiers at The

Apex to choose the route, and to have allowed Baldwin to follow his preference. Consequently the course laid down in Godley's order, issued at 7 p.m., was that which Baldwin had been led by Johnston to adopt—the "short" route through the Aghyl Dere. The direct results of that tragic mistake will be presently described. The sum of its possible consequences is beyond calculation.

Godley's plan was that this third attack should, as on the day before, be preceded by an intense bombardment of the summit, opening at 4.30 (a little later than on the 8th), and continuing for three-quarters of an hour. At 5.15 the three columns were to attack. The two on the flanks were already in position. The central, Baldwin's, advancing by the route described, was to deliver "the main attack, the other columns . . . joining in when No. 3 Column (Baldwin's) reaches the line which they hold." Such were the plans to seize the third and most promising opportunity upon Sari Bair.


The southern of the three "columns"—the New Zealanders—had to fight, though not severely, throughout the night for its position. The Otago infantry and Wellington Mounted Rifles, which composed it, after relieving the exhausted Wellington infantry and their British comrades, continued, so far as fighting would permit, the work of deepening the trenches. About 11 o'clock Colonel Moore of Otago was wounded, and the command passed to Colonel Meldrum of the Wellington Mounted Rifles. He had 170 of his own regiment, 400 Otago infantry, and a handful of newly-arrived reinforcements for the Wellington infantry who had been sent up at dusk carrying picks and shovels. Besides these there remained about 85 of the Auckland Mounted Rifles, of whom 248 had reinforced the Wellington infantry during the afternoon. The Aucklands fought on through the night and were relieved at dawn, when only 52, almost all slightly wounded, remained.³ Thus at dawn Meldrum had under his command some 600 men. The enemy, though not heavily attacking, had been constantly breaking into bursts of fire,

³ Only 27 could at first be mustered, but others rejoined later. The regiment had lost 5 officers and 69 others killed, and 5 officers (including Schofield) and 116 others wounded. Most of the loss had been caused by bombs. The officers killed were Maj. F. Chapman (of Opotiki, N.Z.), and Lieuts G. L. Brookfield (of Auckland, N.Z.), H. E. Winder (of Stratford, N.Z.), J. Henderson (of Kihū Kihū, N.Z.), and E. A. Jurd (of Kutarere, Bay of Plenty N.Z.)

either upon alarm or as a demonstration; once there had been a scuffle at the regimental headquarters itself, a party of the enemy having apparently crept round thither from Chunuk Bair in the dark.⁴

But about 4 a.m. the enemy launched a serious attack, and in this furious struggle Meldrum's force—that is to say, Godley's "right column"—was engaged during the hours fixed for the assembly and for the delivery of the British assault. During this time no British troops arrived in the neighbourhood, and no other fighting was taking place within sight. It may therefore be doubted if Meldrum's troops realised that they themselves were a "right column" participating in a third assault upon Sari Bair, or imagined their intended rôle to be anything except that of maintaining their desperately-attacked position near the crest.

One sign that a British bombardment was in progress they did, however, receive. About 5 a.m., while the Turkish attack upon them was still at its height, three high-explosive howitzer shells, coming from the right rear, burst among them, one exploding in the front trench on the left, wrecking the trench, and killing the gallant Major Statham⁵ together with his brother⁶ beside him, as well as Sergeant-Major Porteous⁷ and six or seven men. The shells almost certainly came from one of the howitzer batteries inside the old Anzac lines. Part of the New Zealanders on the left consequently broke, and ran back towards the second trench, fifty yards in rear. Some men also fell back from the right. The situation for a moment looked critical. But Colonel Meldrum of the Wellingtons with his



⁴ Capt. F. A. Wood (of Auckland, N.Z.) and Sgt J. E. Maloney (of Ohakune, N.Z.), both of the Auckland Mtd. Rifles, appear to have been hit in this tussle.


⁵ See p. 580.

⁶ Cpl C. H. F. Statham, Otago Bn. Sheep farmer, of Takapau, Hawkes Bay, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, N.Z., 23 Sept., 1892. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

⁷ Warrant-Officer A. W. Porteous, M.C., Otago Bn. Member of N.Z. Permanent Forces, of Oamaru and Dunedin, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, 23 July, 1875. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.


adjutant Captain Kelsall,⁸ and Major Elmslie, rallied the men. The brave Elmslie led forward a troop of his squadron to reoccupy the empty sector of trench. Before he could reach it he was hit by a bullet through shoulder and neck. He fell, picked himself up, gained the trench, and there, smiling at some of his men, "I'm afraid I can't help you much further, boys, but you're doing well—keep on . . .," he said, and died. Kelsall, leading back the men who had retired, also gained the trench, but was soon afterwards killed by a bomb. Both on right and left, however, the position was completely reoccupied. Such was the fighting in which Godley's "right column" was engaged when the hour fixed for the third assault on Chunuk Bair arrived and passed.

Of the "left column," under General Cox, the 4th Australian Brigade and its next neighbours, the 5th Gurkhas and 14th Sikhs, were not to engage in this third offensive. Only the two mixed bodies of British and Indian troops, which were already high up the mountain-side near The Farm, were to go forward. Of these the southern portion, consisting of the 10th Gurkhas and most of the 9th Warwick at The Farm (where were also the Maoris), did not succeed during the bombardment in approaching the summit of Chunuk Bair, which lay 300 feet above them and 300 yards away. But on two knuckles farther north the 6th Gurkhas and three companies of the South Lancashire, who had held through the night a position 150 yards from the crest between Chunuk and "Q," and only 50 to 70 feet below it, were in a more favourable situation. During the bombardment, which was a powerful one—the land batteries being assisted by the *Bacchante*, *Endymion*, a monitor, and three destroyers—the men of the



⁸ Capt V. A. Kelsall; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Palmerston North, N.Z., b. N.Z., 13 Nov., 1876. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

South Lancashire were placed in the Gurkha trenches, the troops of the two battalions being apparently interspersed. When the guns ceased, Baldwin's central column had not yet come into their view, and therefore (if their orders were literally interpreted) the moment had not arrived for them to "join in"; yet any protracted delay after the bombardment had ended would obviously be fatal. The mixed force was therefore led forward at 5.23 by Major Allanson of the 6th Gurkhas. The bombardment had achieved its purpose. The Turkish garrison had been withdrawn from the crest, which was reached by the climbing troops without any opposition.




Sketch made from Bauchop's Hill, showing position reached by Gurkhas and 6th S. Lincs. (marked Y). The position held by the New Zealanders was slightly to the right of the small x under the word Chunuk. (*From the diary of the Official War Correspondent, 11 Nov., 1915.*)

The portion of the summit which the Gurkhas and Lancashires had reached was a saddle, 600 yards in length, between the knolls of Chunuk Bair and "Q."⁹ Ahead of them was a deep valley, but to their right front, immediately inland of Chunuk, the ground sloped gently, until it fell into another ravine on the far side of which was Su Yatagha.¹⁰ On the slope immediately in front, perhaps 100 yards distant, was a body of Turks who had evidently withdrawn from the

⁹ The Aust. Historical Mission in 1919 found a few traces of British troops upon the southern half of this saddle, near Chunuk Bair. Col. Hughes of the Imperial War Graves Commission later discovered "English equipment and some buttons . . . also a Gurkha disc, just under the crest of Hill Q; but no badges, &c., of English units. Very few remains were found here."

¹⁰ See foot-note 26 on p. 343.

shallow unfinished trench on the summit, and were crouched down, waiting for the bombardment to finish. As soon as these saw the heads of the oncoming troops rising above the crest-line they began to retreat farther. The 6th South Lancashire and Gurkhas stood on the scratched-up parapet and fired into the backs of the fleeing enemy. Beyond, where the gentler slope dipped to the valley, was another body of 200 Turks, evidently the supports.²¹ Had any support-



ing British force been present at that moment to occupy the empty northern slope and summit of Chunuk Bair and pour its fire into the enemy attacking the New Zealanders, there can be little doubt that the whole Turkish line on the southern shoulder of Chunuk Bair also would have retired and left three-quarters of a mile of the crest-line open to Godley's troops.

But Baldwin's central column was nowhere to be seen; and at this moment five high-explosive shells, doubtless from the same source as those which had just burst among the New Zealanders, fell upon the Gurkhas and Lancshires cresting the hill. These projectiles seemed to burst where the shells of the naval bombardment had been bursting, and, either from the sound or from other signs, all realised that they were fired by the guns of their own side. There appeared also to be a cross-fire from the direction of Abdel Rahman Bair, on which were known to be Turkish guns and troops. Had the line been crouched in the shallow Turkish trench, it is probable that no man would have been hit; nor was the damage inflicted, though considerable, such as would normally drive troops from a captured position. But at the moment the notion was irresistible that the naval bombardment had not ceased, and that Allanson's men were being mistaken by their own side

²¹ The Gurkhas had similarly left their own supports—about forty men and two machine-guns—150 yards down the western slope of the hill.

for Turks. Under this, the most demoralising of experiences even for the best European troops, the Gurkhas broke, and with most of the South Lancashire fell back down the hill. After vainly endeavouring to prevent the retirement and to rally their men, the British officers of the Gurkhas, with two officers and a handful of men of the 6th South Lancashire, remained alone on the summit. But the Turkish supports on the edge of the farther slope had observed the incident. These now advanced. The handful of British, a dozen in all, stayed until the enemy was fifty yards distant. Lieutenant Le Marchand¹² urged that they should stay there and die in the trench, but Allanson told him that it was folly, and they therefore ran down the hill—too late to save several gallant lives. Le Marchand was killed, and every officer of the Gurkhas was hit. The Gurkha supports held firm, and the South Lancashires rallied at the previous position 150 yards down the hill. Only one event could at this stage have retrieved the situation. If Baldwin's five New Army battalions, which at 5.15 were to have launched the central attack, had at this moment appeared along part of the summit, there is no doubt that the Gurkhas and Lancashires would again have attacked and possibly regained the crest. But no sign of the five battalions could yet be seen.


Baldwin's force had during the previous day been assembled at No. 2 Outpost and in the Chailak Dere. In the afternoon the 6th Loyal North Lancashire had been moved, in case of emergency, up to The Apex, where at dusk it held the reserve trenches, since there were then no fresh New Zealand units left. The 10th Hants and 6th Royal Irish Rifles had left Anzac at 10 a.m. and marched first to No. 2 and thence to the Chailak, whither the 5th Wiltshire was also brought from Damakjelic during the day. The 6th East Lancashire had been at this rendezvous since the previous day. At dusk the four battalions in the Chailak¹³ were ordered to move up that *dere*. Baldwin had been told that the path would be strictly kept clear for him.

¹² Lieut. J. W. J. Le Marchand; 56th Rifles, Indian Army. Of Bedford, Eng; b. Gujranwala, Punjab, India, 30 Dec., 1887. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

¹³ That is to say, Baldwin's force, excepting the 6th L. N. Lances. at The Apex.

It has been explained¹⁴ that by a tragic miscarriage of Godley's original intention the route recommended to and chosen by Baldwin was not that leading to the advanced New Zealand position on Chunuk Bair, but an unexplored line leading into the Aghyl Dere. Godley's operation order laid down that the point of assembly for the column should be in the Chailak Dere near the head of Cheshire Ridge (that is to say, close to the neck separating the Chailak from the Aghyl Dere); and, in order that the column might be forced to diverge at this point from the track of the New Zealanders, and not follow the route to their advanced position, instructions were given to the New Zealand staff at The Apex to block the path up the Chailak at Cheshire Ridge, so that Baldwin's column would be diverted over that precipitous spur into the Aghyl Dere, thence to make its way up the side of Chunuk Bair. There being no other officer at The Apex available for barring the track, it was blocked by Johnston's signalling officer before the head of Baldwin's advancing column had approached that point.


So many of the leading participators in that famous night march are dead that its story may never be fully known. In spite of measures to keep the Chailak Dere free from down traffic, it appears to have been greatly congested by the passage of numbers of wounded. Consequently Baldwin's regi-



ments, which began their advance up the Chailak Dere at 8 p.m., were able to progress only at a snail's pace, with constant halts. At the foot of Cheshire Ridge the obstruction in the narrow bed of the ravine was so great that the head of the column was completely stopped. Baldwin thereupon personally forced his way through the press, and climbed to Johnston's headquarters where he obtained guides to lead the column to the Aghyl Dere by another route—probably

¹⁴ See pt. 689-91.

over Cheshire Ridge.¹⁵ The guides, however, lost their way. Baldwin then turned the head of the column back down the Chailak Dere, and guided it by an easier route over Bauchop's Hill into the Aghyl Dere. At 4 a.m., with dawn breaking, his leading battalion, the 6th East Lancashire, with the 10th Hampshire following, was at the bottom of the Aghyl Dere below The Farm. Farther back in the same valley were the 6th



Royal Irish Rifles, who had reached the valley by the route across Bauchop's. Thus at 5.15, with each of the flanking columns already on the ridge, near Chunuk Bair and "Q" respectively, the main force which was to have swept along the crest between them was still toiling up to The Farm.

Hours late, a brave, disjointed, pitifully ineffectual attack was made by Baldwin's force. At about 5.30 half the 10th Hampshire reached the line of Maoris and other troops near The Farm, and at about 8 o'clock attempted to reach Chunuk Bair by climbing, as they had been ordered to do, south of The Farm—that is, up the angle made by its junction with the side of Rhododendron. A hundred yards below the Pinnacle they were stopped by fire from the summit, and all day long attempted to dig in, suffering heavy loss from the enemy's rifles and from a murderous shrapnel-fire, which was continuously poured into all this end of the Aghyl Dere by Turkish guns near Anafarta.¹⁶ About the same time the 6th East Lancashire attempted to assault Chunuk Bair from The Farm directly beneath it, but were met by overpowering machine-gun and rifle fire. The commander, Colonel Cole-Hamilton,¹⁷ was mortally wounded, and the battalion was

¹⁵ The available records are at this point very vague and defective, and the story cannot be told with certainty.


¹⁶ If the "W" Hills had been taken by the Suvla landing force, it is improbable that these guns could have fired as they did.

¹⁷ Col. A. R. Cole-Hamilton. Commanded 6th Bn., E. Lincs. Regt., 1915. Officer of British Regular Army; of Beltrim, Co. Tyrone, Ireland; b. 1859.

unable to advance. The 6th Royal Irish Rifles now reinforced the troops at The Farm, which projected from the hillside like a terraced tennis-court or cricket-field; the British trench ran along the outer edge of the terrace, and here Generals Baldwin and Cooper with their staffs took up position. Lieutenant-Colonels Sutton¹⁸ of the 10th Gurkhas, Carden¹⁹ of the 5th Wiltshire, and Herbert²⁰ of the Maoris were also there. The Royal Irish Rifles suffered little loss in climbing to the position, but any attempt to cross the terrace was deadly. As they lay there, an order came to a company commander of the Rifles to advance over the terrace. "Surely you won't do it—it can't be done," said an officer of the Maoris who lay next him. "I'm going—I've been told to," was the reply. He led forward the men round him, and, according to the testimony of the Maori officer, none came back.²¹

No further progress was made. The only advantage gained by the attack seems to have been that the 10th Hampshire occupied part of the gap between the Pinnacle and The Farm.

Thus in Godley's third attempt upon Sari Bair the right (or New Zealand) "column" was throughout engaged in desperately resisting attack; the left (Gurkha and British) "column" reached the crest near "Q" with the enemy in full retreat, but was driven off by the shells of its own artillery; and Baldwin's central column, which, if it had been on the crest when the bombardment ended, might have restored the position, had been diverted into the Aghyl Dere, through whose depths at



¹⁸ Lieut.-Col. F. G. H. Sutton. Commanded 2/10th Gurkha Rifles, 1915/17. Officer of Indian Regular Army; b. 20 Feb., 1868.

¹⁹ Col. J. Carden, C.M.G. Commanded 5th Bn., Wilts. Regt., 1915. Officer of Northern Rhodesia Police; b. Kington, Warwickshire, Eng., 13 May, 1870. Killed in action, 9/10 Aug., 1915.

²⁰ Lieut.-Col. A. H. Herbert, D.S.O. Commanded Maori Contingent, 1915, Wellington Mtd Rifles, 1915/16; D.A.D.O.S., N.Z. & A. Div., 1916/18. Merchant; of Eketahuna, N.Z.; b. Berkshire, Eng., 4 Oct., 1870.

²¹ Bodies of men of the R.I.R. have been found by the War Graves Commission within twenty-five yards of the crest of Chunuk Bair, near the N.Z. position on the crest (see note on p. 669). They can only have come there by some such advance as that above described.

the crucial moment it was still toiling. The chance which had existed during the night of establishing and extending the British foothold on Sari Bair was undoubted. The occupation of the crest might have resulted in the falling back of the already shaken Turks from Anzac, the adherence of wavering Bulgaria,²² the forcing of the Dardanelles, the fall of Constantinople, the opening of the sea route to Russia, a comparatively early victory, and a complete alteration in the course and consequences of the war. Had General Godley—though he was under no moral obligation to do so—carried out his intention of being present in person at the preliminary conference, or had Johnston possessed all the physical and moral qualities required of subordinate commanders entrusted with the lives of men and with vital enterprises, the history of much more than that day's fighting might have been written differently. As it was, the outstanding chance of the campaign at Anzac²³—the opportunity which was open on the night of August 8th—passed without attainment.

The failure of the third day's attempt was evident to Godley at an early hour of the morning. Nevertheless, so long as the New Zealanders still kept open the way for an assault on Chunuk Bair, all chance was not yet lost. Birdwood and Godley had already turned their minds to the problem of a possible fourth attack; but, even had they realised how near to exhaustion were the enemy's reserves, how critical was his position, and how desperate was the final counter-measure which he was now preparing, the fourth effort could hardly have been delivered before the morning of August 10th. The reserve at Anzac had been more completely used up than the enemy's; only two battalions of it remained uncommitted—the 6th Leinster, which now, at 9 a.m., Birdwood sent to Godley to form the sole fresh reserve upon Rhododendron, and the 5th Connaught Rangers, who were still retained behind Lone Pine. Moreover it was clear that, even if the New Zealanders succeeded in holding out till nightfall, troops must be found to relieve them at dusk, since they were at the end

²² There seems to have been evidence that at this time any decisive success might have brought Bulgaria to the side of the Allies. The adherence of Bulgaria, if it had occurred before the actual forcing of the Dardanelles, would have made that event certain.

²³ The outstanding opportunity of the whole campaign was, of course, that offered at Suvla during the first forty-eight hours after the landing.

of their tether. Godley therefore, at 9 a.m. on August 9th, issued orders that the positions then held should for the present be consolidated; for better organisation he at the same time divided his line into two sectors, placing everything north of The Farm under the orders of General Cox, and The Farm, Chunuk Bair, and Destroyer Hill under General Shaw, commanding the 13th Division. Shaw, who until then, though present at No. 2 Outpost throughout, had only acted as a channel through which orders were passed to the brigades of his division in reserve, at once took over the responsibility for the arrangements upon Chunuk Bair.²⁴

About midday Hamilton, who had spent the morning endeavouring to galvanise life into the Suvla commanders, came to Anzac with the most dashing of sailors, Roger Keyes, both thoroughly dispirited. Clambering over the trenches at No. 2 Outpost Hamilton with Birdwood, Godley, and Shaw lunched on the top of that knoll, where, with "a grand outlook over the whole Suvla area and across to Chunuk Bair . . . we ate our rations and held an impromptu council of war."²⁵ Finding the Anzac generals as keen as those at Suvla were depressed, Hamilton offered Birdwood his last reserve, the 54th (East Anglian Territorial) Division. But Birdwood said that he could not undertake to provide water, at that moment, for additional troops. Not only was the supply afforded by his rickety pumping-engine precarious, but the effort to carry water up the entangled valleys to the new firing line was already overtaxing his troops. Birdwood and Godley at that time evidently intended to make their fourth assault on Sari Bair during the ensuing twenty-four hours, for Hamilton wrote: "These Anzac generals are in great form. They are sure they will have the whip hand of the Narrows by to-morrow." Nevertheless they "were keen . . . that the Essex (*i.e.*, East Anglian) Division should go to Stopford so that he might at once occupy Kavak Tepe and, if he could, Tekke Tepe. All that the Anzacs have seen for themselves or heard . . . leads them to believe that the Turkish reinforcements to the Suvla theatre


²⁴ The troops at The Farm, however, were still partly those of Cox's force, whose relief, though ordered, was not carried out; and Gen. Cooper, who was intended to take his two battalions of the 29th Bde. into reserve, was nevertheless still with them at The Farm on the morning of Aug. 10.

²⁵ The quotations are from Hamilton's *Gallipoli Diary*, Vol. II, pp. 80-1.

came over the high shoulder of Tekke Tepe or through Anafarta Sagir (Northern Anafarta) about dawn this morning . . ."²⁶

As a matter of fact the enemy, striving with every nerve to bring to an end what to him was a position of continuous danger, made on this day two counter-attacks. Of these the assault already mentioned, on Chunuk Bair, was one; but that seen passing through Anafarta and over Tekke Tepe was the principal. This was the belated offensive by the 7th and 12th Turkish Divisions which upon this morning came into action. Mustafa Kemal, to whose command they had been transferred, had reached the scene at 1 o'clock in the morning, and had found the divisions already moving to the attack. As the hour for the assault was then approaching, he made no change, and the operation continued on the lines laid down by his predecessor.

It thus chanced that, while the 12th Turkish Division under Salaheddin Bey was moving westward past Anafarta with orders to attack the southern flank of the Suvla force, General Stopford's even more belated effort was being made against Tekke Tepe and the "W" Hills. One battalion, the 6th East Yorkshire, with the 67th Field Company, receiving at dawn the order to seize Tekke Tepe, advanced towards that height, and Lieutenant-Colonel Moore,²⁷ Major Brunner,²⁸ Lieutenant Still,²⁹ and some thirty men had actually reached the top when they found that the 12th



²⁶ Hamilton realised that the Suvla fighting must now be more difficult. But he believed that "although a few Turks did pass over Kavak Tepe . . . probably one-half of the great crescent of hills which encircles the Suvla plain . . . still lies open to an advance"

²⁷ Lieut.-Col. H. G. A. Moore. Commanded 6th Bn., E. Yorks, Regt., 1914/15. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Misterton, Lincs., Eng., 28 Oct., 1864. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

²⁸ Maj. F. W. Brunner, p.s.c.; R.E. Commanded 67th Fld. Coy., 1914/15; b. Widnes, Lincs., Eng., 31 Jan., 1871. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

²⁹ Lieut. J. Still; 6th Bn., E. Yorks Regt. Secretary, Planters' Association of Ceylon; of Kandy, Ceylon; b. Horningsham, Eng., 6 Jan., 1830.

Turkish Division, coming through the opening at Northern Anafarta, had cut in between them and the rest of their battalion. None of the leaders of this small party got back.³⁰ The rest of the 6th East Yorkshire and engineers were driven back, as was also a supporting battalion on the northern flank, all three commanders being killed and the losses heavy. Two more British battalions, which were not yet beyond their starting-point, Sulajik, were held up. On the right five others, intended for the attack between Anafarta and the "W" Hills were, instead, forced to fight hard to retain a defensive position, the line eventually being somewhat forced back by bush fires. Six fresh battalions of the new 53rd (Welch Territorial) Division, which had been landed during the previous night, were sent to assist the British assault to push forward, but without success. The 53rd Division was then hurriedly reorganised during the night of the 9th³¹ into two brigades, but its attack upon Scimitar Hill (Hill 70) the next morning was driven off. This proved to be the last attempt, except that on August 21st, to capture the "W" Hills. Also on the 9th the Gallipoli *gendarmes* attacked the northern flank of the Suvla force and drove it along Kiretch Tepe. The Turkish staff, while satisfied with the general results of the 12th Division's attack, was disappointed that the Chocolate Hills were not also recaptured.

While the 12th Turkish Division was driving against the southern flank of the Suvla force, the 7th had been directed against the extreme northern flank of Anzac, the intention being to separate the two British forces and then to penetrate along the foreshore in rear of the Anzac troops, and, by reaching Damakjelic Bair and possibly Bauchop's, force Birdwood's troops to fall back hurriedly from the side of Sari Bair. The 7th Division, which was to effect the latter object, accordingly debouched along the Asma Dere and fell upon the three battalions holding the northern flank of the extended Anzac position—the 4th South Wales Borderers on Damakjelic near the sea, and the 13th Australian Battalion and 6th King's

³⁰ A few were captured, but Lieut. Still and two others alone survived the war.

³¹ It was on this night that Gen. Stopford, commanding at Suvla, received a letter from Hamilton's chief of staff, Gen. Braithwaite, expressing the opinion that six or eight battalions under a selected officer would be able to seize the "W" Hills, and the ridge connecting them with Northern Anafarta, and suggesting that Stopford's personal driving power was required in order to get the operation carried through.

Own Royal Lancaster farther inland. Here the Turks met with no success; indeed, as often happened when the troops of one side suffered a disastrous reverse and only in a few places succeeded even in approaching the line attacked, the higher commanders on the other side barely even heard of the assault or realised that it had occurred. But the attack was evident enough to the front-line troops. At 5.40 the King's Own reported that the enemy was assaulting their left and the right of the 13th, there being a gap between. At the same hour Colonel Tilney of the 13th reported Turks advancing on his left against the Borderers' outposts on Damakjelik. The Borderers drove off the enemy and counter-attacked with three platoons. The assault on the right of the 13th had also been "practically wiped out" by the Australians' fire.³² Defeated in his first attack, the enemy concentrated a murderous enfilade machine-gun and rifle fire from Alai Tepe³³ and Hill 100 against the shallow trenches of the King's Own. This battalion, which lost two of its majors and 120 men, called for artillery fire upon those points, but some confusion seems to have occurred in consequence of the mistake concerning the exact position of the 4th Brigade, whose staff still believed that Hill 100 was within their own lines. By the afternoon the King's Own had suffered so heavily that it had to be relieved by the 14th Australian Battalion. The 13th had lost Lieutenant McLeod³⁴ and 12 others killed and 15 wounded. The enemy, on the other hand, according to a Turkish staff officer, "lost very heavily in men," and the commanders of two of the three regiments of the 7th Division were killed; their graves lie side by side under the cypresses of Anafarta.³⁵

The Turkish commanders believed that the British flank had been pressed back by this attack, since their own troops traversed the low foot-hills at Hill 60 and found the stretch of plain between the Anzac and Suvla forces empty as far as the sea. But in reality these places had never been occupied by the British.

³² On this day one of Black's machine-guns was out of action, and he was urging that another should be obtained from the Navy to replace it.

³³ See p. 659 and foot-note 28 on p. 664.

³⁴ Lieut. J. K. McLeod; 13th Bn. Civil servant; of Newcastle, N.S.W.; b. Barrow-in-Furness, Eng., 21 Aug., 1888. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

³⁵ Mustafa Kemal, finding these regiments to have suffered in morale after the battle, asked Essad to send two of his own former subordinates of the days of the Landing—Zeki Bey and Hairi Bey—from the 57th Regt. to command them. Zeki took over the 21st, but Hairi was retained by Essad to command the 57th

Although only secondary to the counter-attack just narrated, the assault made that day by the force under Ali Riza Pasha³⁶ upon Chunuk Bair was a formidable one, and its efforts to dislodge the New Zealanders continued desperate. The assault delivered in the early morning of August 9th was carried out mainly with bombs, which fell continuously among the New Zealanders. On the flanks the enemy had to expose himself to throw them, individual Turks constantly running forward only to be shot down. A method which they also adopted was to wrap bombs in socks, with which the missiles could be slung forty yards or more. In front of the bomb-throwers had come two or three lines of skirmishers, who ran forward in open order and flung themselves down, the bombers then mostly throwing from behind them. As before, the Turkish lines on the right could be seen by the defenders on the left and *vice versa*, and the New Zealanders directed their fire accordingly. The Turkish artillery was active, but the Anzac guns laid the reverse slope of the hill under far more severe fire, causing the enemy to suffer heavily.

The pressure on the New Zealanders clinging to their foothold was nevertheless intense. Their main trench was now about five feet in depth, but casualties were so heavy that, to leave greater room in it, Captains Hastings and James³⁷ and many of their men got out and lay firing over the paradosses. Both these officers were mortally wounded, and, in addition to those previously mentioned,³⁸ Lieutenants Mackenzie,³⁹ Sargood,⁴⁰ and Waite⁴¹ were killed.

This early morning attack cost the garrison of the Otago infantry and Wellington Mounted Rifles half its strength. Consequently at about 7 o'clock, and again at 8, Colonel Meldrum sent a messenger to ask for reinforcements. No answer came, but at 10 o'clock a movement of troops was seen on the slope below. Meldrum sent the word round his line that reinforcements were coming, and at midday a major and

³⁶ The commander of the 8th Turkish Div., who was at this stage under Mustafa Kemal, charged with the conduct of operations upon Chunuk Bair.

³⁷ Capt. T. P. James; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Accountant, of Stratford, N.Z.; b. Stratford, 28 Aug., 1885. Died of wounds, 12 Aug., 1915.

³⁸ Maj. Statham, Cpl. Statham, and Sgt.-Maj. Porteous. See p. 602.

³⁹ Lieut. W. M. Mackenzie; Otago Bn. Sheep farmer; of Queenstown, N.Z.; b. Queenstown, 8 Aug., 1889. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

⁴⁰ Lieut. C. R. Sargood; Otago Bn. Warehouseman; of Dunedin, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, 31 Dec., 1893. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

⁴¹ Lieut. G. E. Waite; Otago Bn. Engineer, of Dunedin, N.Z.; b. Dunedin, 3 June, 1892. Killed in action, 9 Aug., 1915.

some fifty men of the 6th Loyal North Lancashire (the battalion at The Apex) reached the position. Of the company which had been sent forward, only part of two platoons had succeeded in getting through.


But the mere fact that reinforcements, however few, had arrived was greatly encouraging. Moreover, although the enemy continued to attack, never after the first three-quarters of an hour did he appear to fling his full strength into the onrush. Parties of twenty or so constantly attempted to charge the New Zealand line or to throw bombs and retire, barely a quarter of an hour passing without the Wellington on the left or the Otago on the right having to concentrate their fire upon the opposite flank to repel such an attack. But the New Zealanders faced every assault laughing and joking. With his troops in such spirit, and the enemy apparently tiring, Meldrum was confident that his line was safe. Consequently, when the handful of Loyal North Lancashire arrived, he sent back to say that, unless very heavily attacked, he could hold the position till dusk without further reinforcement.

Meanwhile at the brigade and divisional headquarters arrangements had to be made to relieve at nightfall both the troops upon Chunuk Bair and the Auckland infantry, which was still holding the advanced support-line at the Pinnacle. Upon inquiry from General Shaw in the afternoon, Meldrum stated that "two battalions" would be required for holding the position at Chunuk Bair when the New Zealanders left it. This was about double his own original strength, and therefore the difficulty, if any, would be to find place for that number in the narrow holding. During the night, however, they would have time to entrench. The two battalions which could most conveniently have been sent were the 6th Loyal North Lancashire (who had been in reserve all day at The Apex) and the 6th Leinster, which had been brought up the Chailak Dere at midday. By Godley's orders, however, the Leinster, being the one fresh reserved battalion, was not to be thrown into the fight if it was possible to avoid doing so. Shaw accordingly chose as the second relieving battalion the 5th Wiltshire, one of Baldwin's five, which, though it had been marching a great part of the previous day and night, had only been slightly engaged.

The relief was to begin at 8 o'clock, immediately after dusk. But at that hour General Johnston, hearing that the

Wiltshire, which had to come from the Aghyl Dere, could not arrive until 1 a.m., asked leave to use the 6th Leinster, which had already reached him. Permission was, however, refused. The 6th Loyal North Lancashire, under Lieutenant-Colonel Levinge,⁴² was therefore sent forward alone. This caused no present anxiety in the matter of numbers, since the battalion was stronger than the combined New Zealand units had been upon the previous night. It was nevertheless desirable that the second battalion should be there in time to dig itself trenches before dawn. As before, upon the fall of night, water, ammunition, medical officers, stretcher-bearers, all began to arrive at the advanced position, and about 11 o'clock all the New Zealand units were withdrawn both from Chunuk Bair and the Pinnacle. The Otago infantry had by this time lost 17 officers and 309 men. The Wellington Mounted Rifles, 183 strong the night before, now mustered 73. The Auckland infantry from the Pinnacle had lost 12 officers and 308 others. The New Zealand Infantry and Mounted Rifles Brigades, which on August 6th had marched out some 3,000 and 1,549 strong (exclusive of the Maoris) respectively now mustered 1,714 and 964. Both withdrew to the Chailak Dere.

That night the position at Chunuk Bair was entirely in the hands of the New Army battalions. Birdwood and Godley had by then given up the intention of renewing their assault on the following day, and the new garrison was for the moment to stand on the defensive. The Loyal North Lancashire held both the advanced foothold and the Auckland's old half-way position at the Pinnacle. The 6th Leinster occupied The Apex. During two nights Auckland had been extending the trenches at the Pinnacle, and on this



⁴² Lieut.-Col H G Levinge Commanded 6th Bn., Loyal N. Lancs. Regt., 1914/16 Officer of British Regular Army, b. 9 Sept, 1864.

night⁴³ a communication trench, though only two or three feet deep, was at last dug through from The Apex to the half-way position. A half-completed trench also led from the left of the Pinnacle down the steep slope of the Aghyl Dere towards the position of the 10th Hampshire near The Farm. The Pinnacle position was thus well on the way to become incorporated in the established line.

There was some anxiety after midnight in consequence of the non-arrival of the 5th Wiltshire. Eventually, at about 2 o'clock,⁴⁴ two-and-a-half companies of the battalion reached The Apex, and were thence guided by a New Zealander to the position on Chunuk Bair. Here Colonel Carden met Colonel Levinge of the North Lancashire. As all the trenches on Chunuk Bair were shallow, and the rearmost full of wounded, it was decided that the 5th Wiltshire should not occupy them, but should remain lower down in the spoon-shaped hollow at the head of the Sazli, near the point where the wounded were mainly collected. Here, having been told by the guide that they were in shelter, the Wiltshire waited; but at dawn they found themselves under a sniping fire, and consequently took off their equipment and began to entrench.

Although these new British battalions, one on the fringe of the summit and the other in rear in the Sazli, were waiting practically unmolested for the day-break, on the other side of the crest there was preparing a most formidable attack. The commander of the 8th Turkish Division, Ali Riza Pasha, who was charged with the conduct of the fight on Chunuk Bair, had been greatly perturbed by his inability to dislodge the invaders from their foothold beside the crest. Of the regiments of his division, the 24th had completely failed in its efforts on August 8th and 9th, and the 23rd was now the sole remaining Turkish reserve in the Peninsula. If it were thrown in and failed, the nearest unused troops would be a few "scratch" battalions—all that could be spared on the Asiatic shore—which had been hurriedly collected at the Narrows but not yet ferried across the straits.

⁴³ During Auckland's first night at the Pinnacle that position had been strengthened by a support trench and several saps.

⁴⁴ The times given by different authorities vary from 12 to 1.30


On the evening of August 9th Mustafa Kemal, whose counter-attack with the 12th and 7th Divisions on the flank had that day failed in producing the results hoped for, came to Chunuk Bair to study the position for himself. In contrast to Ali Riza's undisguised anxiety, he preserved a calmness which deeply impressed the Turkish staff. "Don't be anxious," he said, in a matter-of-fact tone, when appealed to. "The situation is not as grave as you think. I will come there and we will settle everything." Real reconnaissance was impossible. Kemal was actually in doubt as to the exact state of affairs on the seaward slope, and even as to the precise configuration of the western side of the range. He was not certain, for example, whether the far side of the crest was not in part sheer precipice. But the situation was too grave for paltering. He therefore decided to launch in one grand attack all the Turkish troops available in that sector, consisting apparently of either three or four regiments, including the last reserve in the Peninsula, the 23rd.⁴⁵ These were to advance over the crest at dawn next morning, August 10th, not firing a shot, but relying on their bayonets alone. Kemal accepted the chance that he might in places be sending his troops over slopes too precipitous to allow of effective attack.

Of the actual incidents of this famous assault few are recorded. At about 3 or 3.30 a.m. on August 10th, after a quiet night, some bombing began both at Chunuk Bair and at The Farm, and also, a little later, at the advanced position of the 9th Worcester below the crest between Chunuk and "Q." Probably a screen of the enemy's bombers was engaging the British garrisons while his main attack was assembling behind the summit. As daylight increased, the enemy's artillery shelled the position. There was a renewal of bombing, and the North Lancashire in the front trench at Chunuk Bair was firing sharply at the bomb-throwers, when over the crest came a line of Turkish infantry advancing with the bayonet. This was followed by other waves topping all


⁴⁵ Zeki Bey, who was sent by the Turkish War Office to Anzac in 1919 to assist the Aust. Historical Mission, stated that the regiments engaged in this attack were the 23rd and 24th of the 8th Div.; and the 25th and 64th of the 9th Div. The short *Turkish Official History*, however, says that the attack was ordered to be made by three regiments (of which the 23rd and 28th were two) besides "units on our left flank." Amin Bey mentions three regiments. The Turkish General Staff, in its replies to the Aust. Historical Mission, says "The 23rd and 24th Regts. of the 8th Div. and the 46th Regt. of the 13th Div."

parts of Chunuk Bair from its southern shoulder near Battleship Hill to its northern slope above The Farm.

No attack quite resembling this had yet been launched by either side in Gallipoli. The North Lancashire appear to have had no bombs with which to reply to the enemy's preliminary bomb-attack; but the New Zealanders camped in the Chailak heard a tremendous outburst of British rifle-fire. Then



the North Lancashire broke, both at Chunuk Bair and at the Pinnacle. A remnant appears to have stayed, and to have been bayoneted by the enemy.⁴⁶ When the 5th Wiltshire, who had been digging, saw the Turkish line descending upon their right, they also ran back, down the Sazli Dere. Four or five lines of the enemy, each following closely upon the other, had begun moving down the slope when the warships opened upon them, firing broadsides, the four or five shells from each ship bursting almost simultaneously on the seaward face of the hill. At the same time the Anzac batteries were heavily shelling the inland slope. With even more deadliness ten machine-guns of the New Zealand brigade, carefully posted about The Apex by Captain Wallingford, caught the Turkish lines as they swept down towards The Farm.



Under this tremendous fire, from front and rear, the oncoming waves were broken into fragments. But, as on

⁴⁶ Those watching from below could see little, except against the sky-line. At one point three big Turks were observed to run forward and bayonet a British soldier.

ST. Q. 61 and Bair
Car-105 NZ
& lanes.



SAME VIEW, SHOWING POSITION OF GOULEY'S THREE COLUMNS AT DAWN ON AUGUST 9TH
Reproduced by permission from a model made by Mr. Justice Ferguson
Photographed by V. S. W. Government Printer

Sazli Dere (S). Apex. Sazli Dere (N) Old No. 3.
Table Top Chalalak Dere.




Agthyl
Dere
Position of
The Farm

RHODODENDRON RIDGE FROM CHUNUK BAY, SHOWING THE APEX AND THE ROUTES OF
APPROACH TO IT

(For clearness some of the crests have been outlined.)

Ant. Her Memorial Official Photo No. G1922.
taken in 1919.




THE COUNTER-ATTACK BY MUSTAFA KEMAL PASHA ON SARI BAIR, AT DAY-BREAK,

TENTH AUGUST, 1915

British troops and trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

April 26th and 27th, the Turkish infantry exhibited admirable persistence. The attack is said to have been led to the crest by Mustafa Kemal himself, who received a shot through his coat,⁴⁷ and the movement over the crest itself continued long after 6 o'clock, detachments of a dozen at a time rushing across the sky-line and dropping down the slope towards The Farm. On Rhododendron small parties continued to trickle forward, and an hour later Turks even appeared close above General Johnston's headquarters at The Apex, where Captain Wallingford is said to have shot two with his revolver. The 6th Leinster and a company of Auckland infantry advanced with bayonets fixed, and relieved The Apex of any further threat. But the enemy had reoccupied the trenches at the Pinnacle, from which he commanded and partly enfiladed The Farm; and north of Chunuk Bair he was also working down several of the spurs from which his bomb-attack at 4.15 had dislodged the 9th Worcester. This forced back the South Lancashire from their position near the crest between Chunuk and "Q"; and, the position of Cox's other advanced troops on the neighbouring spurs being gravely threatened, they were all eventually withdrawn. South of The Farm, until about 9 o'clock, eighty of the 10th Hampshire⁴⁸ and 5th Wiltshire held to the slope below the Pinnacle, and at The Farm itself the Royal Irish Rifles



were still clinging to the hillside at 10.30. Here, shortly after day-break, General Baldwin, whose headquarters were practically on the lip of the terrace, had been killed. General Cooper, of the 29th Brigade, who succeeded him, had immediately been wounded through the lungs. Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford⁴⁹ of the Royal Irish Rifles, upon whom the


⁴⁷ Maj. E. R. Prigge, *Dardanellen Kriegstagebuch*, p. 99

⁴⁸ This regiment had lost 22 officers and 431 men.

⁴⁹ Lieut.-Col. E. C. Bradford. Commanded 6th Bn., Royal Irish Rifles, 1914/16. Officer of British Regular Army, of Buxted, Sussex, Eng.; b. Buxted, 6 Aug. 1871.

command fell, had no sooner been informed of the fact than he too was seriously wounded, as was his second-in-command. Their adjutant was killed. The brigade-major was shot through the face, both the remaining majors of the Rifles severely wounded, and Captain Nugent,⁵⁰ staff-captain of the 29th Brigade, killed while leading a charge against some approaching Turks. At 10.30, when the Rifles had lost almost all their officers, there appears to have been some falling back, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bewsher⁵¹ of the Hampshire, who, though wounded in the head, had taken command, decided that the place was no longer tenable. At the foot of the hill, however, Captain Street,⁵² staff-captain of the 39th Brigade, who was fetching up water and ammunition, and a New Zealand staff officer, Major Dodington,⁵³ re-formed the retiring men, and Street then led them forward. But he was killed near The Farm, and the troops withdrew to Cayley's headquarters near the easternmost fork of the Aghyl Dere.

Hearing of the threat to The Farm, Birdwood had sent forward at 7.45 his last reserve battalion, the Connaught Rangers, till then engaged in burying the dead near Lone Pine. By 11.40 the Rangers arrived at Cayley's headquarters. As it was reported that The Farm had not yet actually been reached by the enemy, they were ordered to reoccupy it. This they did without heavy loss. But as certain of the windings of the Aghyl Dere, up which their supplies must come, were now commanded by the Turks at the Pinnacle, and as the British and Gurkha battalions had that morning been ordered to withdraw from the side of the range farther north, it was



⁵⁰ Capt. G. W. Nugent; Royal Irish Rifles. Killed in action, 10 Aug., 1915.

⁵¹ Lieut.-Col. W. D. Bewsher, D.S.O. Commanded 10th Bn., Hants Regt., 1914/15. Officer of British Regular Army; of Southwick, Sussex, Eng.; b. 27 March, 1868.

⁵² Capt. N. K. Street; Worc. Regt. Officer of British Regular Army; b. 13 Aug., 1881. Killed in action, 10 Aug., 1915.

⁵³ Brig.-Gen. W. Marriott-Dodington, C.M.G., p.s.c.; Oxf. and Bucks. Light Inf. Officer of British Regular Army; of Combe, Dulverton, Somerset, Eng.; b. Combe. Dulverton, 24 Jan., 1871. Died 23 Apr., 1931.

realised that it was impossible to hold an advanced and isolated position at The Farm. Having remained till dusk to cover the collection of the wounded—during which process the Turkish machine-guns were silent—the Connaughts were at nightfall withdrawn by order.⁵⁴ The British retired to a line running across the lower hills at the foot of the range, with their right on Cheshire Ridge and The Apex and their left adjoining the 4th Australian Brigade.⁵⁵ The vacant Farm was some days later reoccupied by the enemy.

During August 10th the Turks—presumably of the 7th Division—had also renewed their assault upon the northern flank of Anzac. This attack had begun about 2.45 a.m. against the 16th and 13th Australian Battalions, but had been driven off. All day the 4th Brigade observed parties of the enemy moving past their front towards the sea. In the afternoon some of the enemy approached a gap in the line on the flank of the 13th, but they were easily checked. On the same day Hill 60, at the lower end of the level spur beyond the Kaiajik Dere, appears to have been definitely occupied for the first time by the 7th Turkish Division, which thus almost shut in the northern flank of Anzac.

To sum up the result of Mustafa Kemal's grand counter-attack—his troops had not succeeded, as was intended, in reoccupying Rhododendron and thus practically dividing Anzac from Suvla; and there seems to be no doubt that they had lost heavily. On the open mountain-side they had been completely exposed to the ruthless broadsides of the fleet and the massed machine-guns at The Apex. Their dead lay on the higher slopes as thickly as those of Baldwin's battalions lower down.⁵⁶ From 10 o'clock onwards their wounded could

⁵⁴ The losses of the 29th Bde. and its strength after the fight (both estimated at the time) were:—

	<i>Killed, wounded, and missing.</i>		<i>Strength after fight.</i>	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
10th Hants ..	22	508	5	382
6th R.I.R. ..	19	361	8	486
5th Conn. R. ..	8	105	18	831
6th Leinster ..	11	250	17	665
Bde. H.Q. ..	5	16	2	28
	65	1,240	50	2,392

⁵⁵ The line to which they retired is that shown thus: —. —. —. —. in the plate at p. 670

⁵⁶ The Turks lost, according to their official accounts, 9,200 men in the four days' fighting on Chunuk Bair and Hill 971; between 1,800 and 2,000 on the sector of the 19th Div. (Baby 700 and the head of Monash Valley); and 6,930 in the 16th Div., mainly at Lone Pine. Their total loss at Anzac is therefore placed at 18,000 as against 12,000 to 13,000 casualties on the British side.

be seen trying to crawl back uphill over the corpses of their comrades. But most of those who survived unwounded did not retire. On the contrary, they stayed on the seaward slopes and, at dusk, entrenched.

Thus was lost the precious foothold upon Chunuk Bair. The disaster seems to have been unavoidable. Even had Birdwood and Godley been supported by the proffered 54th (East Anglian) Division, and had they delivered their fourth attack before the dawn and already seized the crest, it is improbable that any troops who would have been available in that sector, with the possible exception of the weary New Zealanders, could have held the crest against that counter-attack. As it was, although the Turkish success was not as complete as Mustafa Kemal had desired, it was amply sufficient. The invader had been dislodged from every foothold near the summit. As von Sanders' "adjutant" records:⁵⁷ "On the evening of the 10th all the heights, with the exception of the insignificant elevation of Chocolate Hill, are firmly in the hands of the Turks." Both armies, exhausted, rested in their positions.⁵⁸



⁵⁷ Maj. F. R. Prigge, *Dardanellen Kriegstagebuch*, p. 99.

⁵⁸ It was not known at the time that a remnant of the 5th Wiltshire had, on being driven from Chunuk Bair, sought shelter lower down the Sazlı Dere. With them was one of their majors, who had been shot through the spine. They appear not to have known where they were, and one, climbing towards the N.Z. trenches on Rhododendron, was shot either by his own side or by the enemy. Consequently for a fortnight they lay hidden in the depths of the valley. Water was obtained from a spring and food from dead men's haversacks. The Turkish patrols twice came on them, and, according to the survivors, would neither shoot nor take them prisoner, but on the second occasion gave them some water. (On the other hand, the Australian scouts afterwards found some lying shot near their rough shelter by the creek-bed.) Their wounded officer died, and on Aug. 27, 63 of the 70 remaining (the numbers may be much exaggerated), being almost starved, decided to make a rush down the valley. They never reached safety, but it is recorded that on this day a post of the 8th Light Horse on Camel's Hump at the foot of the valley saw a body of "Turks" in no ordered formation coming down it. The 8th fired, and the "Turks" ran back. But Lieut. Mervyn Higgins, looking through his glasses, observed: "Those men have no arms." There can be little doubt that they were the Wiltshire and that they were afterwards shot down by the Turks near Snipers' Nest, where their remains subsequently lay thickly. Of the seven men who had not accompanied them, two made their way by an old Turkish trench to the position of the New Zealanders on Rhododendron. Capt. J. W. Greany of the Wiltshire, with N.Z. stretcher-bearers, at once went out led by a Wellington scout named Mahoney (of Raetihi, N.Z.), and carrying as guide one of the Wiltshire who was too weak to walk. In two nights they rescued the five others.

So ended the main thrust of the August offensive in Gallipoli. It came much nearer to final success than any other effort of the campaign. It is true that it formed only one half—though the more vital—of the total operation of which the other half ended in complete failure. Had that other—the offensive from Suvla—been conducted with even moderate energy, the heights of Kavak and Tekke Tepe, the “W” Hills, and Kamm Tepe overlooking Ejelmer Bay would unquestionably have been occupied. The plight of the enemy, already fighting for his life against the New Zealanders on Chunuk Bair, must then have become desperate. With British guns covering the Anafarta gap and peering into the rear of Abdel Rahman Bair, half the Turkish communications would have been dislocated, and the enemy's hold on Hill 971 rendered precarious. These were not fantastic anticipations, but developments which any commander would justifiably expect from the landing of 50,000 troops in almost empty and not impassable country. The reasons for the failure, which affected the fate of the Australian and New Zealand forces more profoundly than any other episode in the campaign, may be laid bare by future historians, probing unflinchingly for the causes. Many of the Anzac troops, on whom it left an enduring impression, attributed it partly to the senility of the leadership, partly to the inexperience of the troops, but largely to causes which lie deeper in the mentality of the British people. The same respect for the established order which caused Kitchener to entrust the enterprise to unsuitable commanders simply because they were senior, appeared to render each soldier inactive unless his officer directed, and each officer dumb unless his senior spoke. The men had doubtless the high qualities of their race, among them orderliness, decency, and modesty; they could follow a good leader anywhere as bravely as any troops in the Peninsula. But an enterprise such as that of Suvla demanded more than the ability to follow; it required that each man, or at least a high proportion of the force, should be able to lead; and the necessary quality of decision, which even a few years' emancipation from the social restrictions of the Old World appeared to have bred in the emigrant, was—to colonial eyes—lacking in the Suvla

troops.⁵⁹ Moreover a large proportion of the new force had come straight from the highly organised life in or around overcrowded cities, and as a result they lacked the resourcefulness required for any activity in open country. They lacked also the hardness to set a high standard of achievement for themselves, while that demanded of them by the regimental and brigade staffs was—to put it mildly—inadequate for one of the decisive battles of the war. Further, though many reports had been heard concerning the excellent physique of the New Army, the standard in that respect was very uneven. There were in reality two well-defined types, the officers as a class being tall and well developed, but a majority of the men cramped in stature, presumably as the result of life in overcrowded industrial centres under conditions not yet operative to any marked extent in the great cities in Australia.

Whatever, therefore, may have been the capacity of raw British soldiers in the great wars of the past, those at Suvla appeared to be naturally deficient in the qualities necessary for such an undertaking, and nothing but training and experience could have made up for their absence. The men consequently depended in an exceptional degree upon leadership. Yet the conduct of British troops on every front signally proves that those at Suvla would at least have followed if they had been well led. Complaints were afterwards heard from British sources concerning the regimental leading; but the British officer, whatever his defects, knew how to die. In the main the failure in leadership lay with the higher commanders, and for this the inveterate respect of the Regular Army for seniority was responsible. When the great effort in Gallipoli had failed beyond repair, younger and more vigorous generals were sent in plenty.

But despite the fact that success at Suvla Bay would have doubled the difficulties of the enemy opposite Anzac, and that it was the only condition which would have made possible the capture of Hill 971 itself; despite the failure of that entire

⁵⁹ The New Zealanders fighting on Chunuk Bair were in their antecedents separated from the men of the Suvla force at most by a generation—often by only a few years—of colonial life; most of the Australians, perhaps, by an additional generation. There is, of course, grave danger in generalisation, but, as a concrete example of the facts which created these impressions, the following incident may be given. In the excessive heat of those few days some of the new troops at Anzac filled their waterbottles with salt water. When an Australian private, speaking with what appeared to him to be ordinary decisiveness, told them immediately to empty them, they assumed that he was an officer, and readily accepted his leadership.

half of the offensive: yet the colonial and New Army troops at Anzac might still have carried the day. The vital objective, the actual crest at Chunuk Bair, was for several days within Birdwood's reach, and for a few hours actually in his hands. By fighting which was never surpassed—at Lone Pine, in the foot-hills, at Baby 700, and on the summit of Sari Bair—an opportunity was made for securing results perhaps unattainable in any other land-battles of the war. After several brave failures—none irretrievable until the advance from Anzac was for a second time barred by the greatest leader on the Eastern Front⁶⁰—that opportunity passed, never to return.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Of Mustafa Kemal's ability as a tactician the campaign afforded little opportunity of judging, but his determination, his directness, and the influence of his single-minded patriotism upon the best element in the Turkish officer corps, had a decisive influence on the campaign. Australian officers who faced him afterwards in Palestine found him a straightforward and honourable opponent. He was an admirer of the British and of their institutions, and himself created admirers among those British leaders who by the fortune of war were opposed to him.


⁶¹ The evacuation of the wounded during the Battle of Sari Bair was far more carefully planned than at the Landing. The lines-of-communication staff advanced its control to Anzac Beach (as being an advanced base) and placed Col. A. E. C. Keble, as A.D.M.S., in charge of the work there. But on the left flank the wounded were to be evacuated from a pier to be constructed near No. 3 Outpost. Here a serious break-down occurred. The pier was duly erected during the night and large numbers of wounded were brought down to the spot, but boats did not come to remove them. At daylight the pier and foreshore were in full view of the enemy at 1,200 yards, and the wounded began to accumulate in great numbers, lying on their stretchers in the half-shelter of the sand-hills and on the flat at the mouth of the Chailak Dere. Col. Manders (A.D.M.S. of the N.Z. & A. Div.) appealed to the naval authorities for barges. A few craft then arrived, but at 11 a.m. the Naval Transport Officer at the new pier was again without barges. All day the difficulties continued, the enemy shelling and firing at the position, and the crowd of wounded increasing. As many of the stretchers were not sent back to the firing line, the evacuation there also began to clog and wounded accumulated in the Chailak Dere, and, on Aug. 8, at the head of the Sazli. After dark it was found that the tide, slight though it was, prevented the warships' steamboats from reaching the pier, but a N.Z. dental officer, Capt. Finn, and the N.T.O., Lieut.-Commr. T. E. Greenshields (of Axminster, Eng.) were clearing the wounded in pulling-boats, and many were also sent along the beach to Anzac for evacuation. On Aug. 8 the numbers increased. Greenshields was killed, but Finn was still at work. Orders came from Anzac that no more stretcher cases were to be sent there, the accommodation being full. Manders (who himself was killed next day) ordered his ambulances to hold all the men they could, but the 13th and 16th (British) Casualty Clearing Stations which were to serve the northern area had not yet been established, and medical comforts were running out. The wounded, numbering about 2,000, lay all day in the excessive heat of the sun. These conditions gradually improved, but congestion still existed on Aug. 11.

CHAPTER XXVI

HILL 60


HAMILTON still maintained firmly the hope that the Suvla troops would be able to capture Tekke and Kavak Tepe. Birdwood also intended to make a further attempt upon Chunuk Bair; but, as the prospect of success there receded, the plan of occupying the Suvla heights increased in importance, for Hamilton hoped that from the hills north of Anafarta he might still obtain "an outlook, more distant, but yet an outlook, on to the Dardanelles." Moreover, unless those heights were occupied Suvla could never be a safe post. Hamilton told Stopford that he must "face casualties" in order to gain them while the chance still offered.

As the 53rd (Welch Territorial) Division had failed in an attempted advance in that direction on August 10th, Hamilton waited for the 54th (East Anglian Territorial) to come ashore on August 11th. By this time, however, Stopford had lost faith in the new troops. "They have no standard to go by," he complained. "I am sure they would not secure the hills with any amount of guns, water, and ammunition, assuming ordinary opposition." But since he had never seen the 54th in action, and since the flying corps reported that the ridge still appeared to be unoccupied and was certainly not entrenched, Hamilton spurred him to action, promising him a hundred picked Australians, New Zealanders, and Gurkhas to keep down the Turkish snipers, who, Stopford feared, would embarrass his troops. To enable this assistance to be given, the attack was postponed until the night of August 12th.¹



¹ A few Aust and NZ snipers were sent immediately to the IX Corps, and their number was within two or three days increased to a hundred. Their assistance was greatly valued. They returned to their own units at the end of the month.

6000 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 YDS



WIGHTMAN

ANZAC-SUVLA POSITION, 12TH AUGUST, 1915

British line, red: Turkish, blue Height contours, 50 metres



The Farm

CHUNUK BAIR, RHODODENDRON, AND THE FARM FROM CHIFSHIRF RIDGE

It was through a steep valley (not shown) in the immediate foreground instead of along the high spur on the right, that Baldwin endeavoured to advance with his brigade.


*Taken by Pte G. Dorenes, 1st Aust Rly Supply Detachment
Aust War Memorial Collection No A1029.*



AIR-PHOTOGRAPH OF SUMMIT OF THE MAIN RIDGE AT CHUNUK BAIR,
SHOWING THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THE NEW ZEALANDERS ON
AUGUST 8TH AND 9TH, AND THE REDOUBTS SUBSEQUENTLY BUILT
BY THE TURKS

*From British Air Force Photographs, taken about September, 1915
Aust War Memorial Collection Nos G1534a1 and ak*

To face p 719.



KEY TO PHOTOGRAPH ON OPPOSITE PAGE

On that day it became evident to Stopford that the 53rd Division was unequal to the task of clearing the enemy from some huts on the right flank of the 54th, an operation which must be performed before the attack could begin. This work was therefore allotted to the 54th as an immediate prelude to its main advance. The preliminary action, however, became more extensive than was expected; and, as the 53rd Division afterwards showed signs of being unable even to hold its existing position, the Suvla commanders became convinced that further action was impracticable. Hamilton reported to Kitchener that the generals were unfit for their task, and on August 15th Stopford and two of his divisional generals were recalled. Three commanders of recognised ability—Lieutenant-General Byng,² a well-known cavalry leader, and Major-Generals Maude³ and Fanshawe⁴—were at once despatched from France. In order to carry out the thrust from Suvla, which could not wait for Byng's arrival, Major-General de Lisle⁵ of the 29th Division was brought by Hamilton from Helles and placed in temporary command of Stopford's corps.⁶

De Lisle, a hard-grained, vigorous officer, reaching Suvla on August 16th, found such confusion throughout the area that he was forced to ask for three or four days to pull the troops together before he organised the offensive. Thus the attack originally planned for the night of August 12th was eventually ordered to take place at 3 p.m. on August 21st.

² F. M. Viscount Byng, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., M.V.O., p.s.c. Commanded IX Army Corps, 1915/16, XVII Army Corps, 1916; Canadian Corps, 1916/17; Third Army, 1917/19. Officer of British Regular Army; of Thorpe-le-Soken, Essex, Eng., b. Barnet, London, 11 Sept., 1862. Died, 6 June, 1935.


³ Lieut.-Gen. Sir Stanley Maude, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c. Commanded 13th Div., 1915/16; Tigris Army Corps, 1916, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 1916/17. Officer of British Regular Army; of London; b. Gibraltar, 24 June, 1864. Died of cholera, 18 Nov., 1917.

⁴ Lieut.-Gen. Sir E. A. Fanshawe, K.C.B. Commanded 11th Div., 1915/16, V Army Corps, 1916/18. Officer of British Regular Army, of Oxfordshire, Eng.; b. Clifton Hampden, Oxfordshire, 4 Apr., 1859.

⁵ Gen. Sir Beauvoir de Lisle, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c. Commanded 1st Cav. Div., 1914/15, 29th Div., 1915/18, XIII Army Corps, 1918; XV Army Corps, 1918. Officer of British Regular Army; of Guernsey, Channel Islands; b. Dublin, Ireland, 27 July, 1864.

⁶ Kitchener suggested to Hamilton that Birdwood, in whom he had great faith, should take control of Suvla as well as Anzac. This would have given him responsibilities in the northern area not altogether easy to distinguish from Hamilton's, to which probably neither he nor his staff could have afforded due attention. Hamilton rejected the suggestion. Birdwood afterwards expressed thorough approval of that decision.

Hamilton believed that the true northern flank of the Turkish army was still at Northern Anafarta. That is to say, he regarded the *gendarmes* and others who had been holding up the 10th Division on Kiretch Tepe as merely a detached force, connected with the main Turkish position only by a screen of snipers. In ignoring this force and seizing Kavak Tepe he would therefore be not only safeguarding the Suvla harbour, and gaining a possible outlook over the Narrows, but also incidentally striking at his opponent's flank, which he hoped to keep open until further reinforcements arrived from Great Britain. On the other hand Liman von Sanders, whose anticipation of his opponent's intentions at critical moments of this campaign was almost invariably wrong, imagined that Hamilton was endeavouring to turn the Turkish flank by attacking on Kiretch Tepe. The brave battalion of Gallipoli *gendarmes*, which on August 9th had resisted an attack by five battalions of General Mahon's force, was on August 15th again attacked frontally by the 30th and 31st Brigades, while the 162nd Brigade of the 54th Division advanced against its flank on the inland slope of the ridge. Von Sanders had, however, by that date sent to its support the only reserve which he could at that moment gather—all available portions of the 5th Division,⁷ and a few small detachments which had been guarding the coast at Ejelmer Bay. These, with the *gendarmes*, under command of the Bavarian Major Willmer, now faced the attack on Kiretch Tepe. The British succeeded in advancing half-a-mile,⁸ and held on through August 16th to most of the ground gained. Limon von Sanders saw in this attack a most



⁷ Two regiments of this division, the 13th and 15th, were until Aug. 10 engaged at Lone Pine. The 14th had originally faced the offensive in the foot-hills north of Anzac.

⁸ The coastal ridge consisted of two lengths of razor-back hill, the south-western of which was known as "Kiretch Tepe." The British advance on this day almost reached the north-eastern end of Kiretch Tepe; beyond that the north-eastern half of the same ridge still separated the British from Ejelmer Bay, three miles away.

dangerous threat to his northern flank. "If," he wrote afterwards,⁹ "the British on August 15th and 16th had obtained possession of Kiretch Tepe, the whole of the Fifth Army would have been outflanked." He sent thither by a forced march his last reserve, a number of battalions withdrawn from the southern side of the straits. The Gallipoli *gendarmes* had by then been practically annihilated, and their gallant commander, Kadri Bey, was mortally wounded, but the reinforcements succeeded in driving the British back to their original line.

Though this stiff fight was regarded by Liman von Sanders as one of the three crises of the offensive, it is not even mentioned in Hamilton's published diary. Its most important effect was that, in order to concentrate the troops which resisted it, von Sanders had been forced to leave the sea border nearer the head of the Gulf of Saros completely bare of defence, while on the southern side of the Dardanelles "there were left to protect the coast only three battalions and a few batteries."¹⁰ What would have been Hamilton's action had he been thoroughly aware of all this, it is idle to conjecture. But it is improbable that, during the days when de Lisle was reorganising at Suvla, any other effective action would have been taken.

The enemy defences confronting de Lisle were obviously very different from those existing when the attack on the hills near Anafarta was first ordered. The Turkish force at Anzac and Suvla had increased to about 75,000, of which 20,000 were apparently opposite Suvla and some 8,000 in reserve near Anafarta. The offensive still projected against Chunuk Bair would require additional troops from overseas.¹¹ But if the enemy's flank at Anafarta was to be found even partly open, the assault upon that objective could not be delayed; and Hamilton decided to undertake it with such troops as were available from his present army. His four divisions at Suvla now numbered fewer than 30,000 rifles facing 20,000 Turks;


⁹ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 114

¹⁰ So defenceless did this render that side of the straits that, to give the appearance of a greater force, the slender garrison was set to march by day in all possible directions where the Allies could observe them, and was brought back to its regular positions at night. (Liman von Sanders, *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 116.)

¹¹ Budwood had been ordered by Hamilton to undertake this further offensive "as soon as troops are reorganised and the difficulties of water-supply solved"


at Anzac 25,000 facing 47,000; at Helles 40,000 (23,000 British and 17,000 French) facing 26,000.¹² To give de Lisle sufficient striking force Hamilton had ordered part of the 29th Division to be transferred from Helles to Suvla, and had also sent thither the 2nd "Mounted" Division, fresh from Egypt, consisting of some 5,000 British yeomanry serving without horses. In order to bring the objective within the compass of this force, the notion of seizing Kavak Tepe itself was for the moment given up, and the whole blow concentrated upon the Turkish right near Northern Anafarta, the task being limited to the seizure of the "W" Hills and of Scimitar Hill, which connected them with the Chocolate Hills. The line on the plain to the south would move forward in conformity with this advance. Hamilton "could not," he explained to de Lisle, "afford to risk failure by trying to do too much."

At de Lisle's urgent desire the whole of the 29th Division was sent to him. As this stroke was to be delivered against a daily extending trench-line, the preliminary bombardment formed an important part of the plan. The Suvla artillery was being increased, and should by the date of the attack comprise fifteen batteries of field-guns, two of heavy and two of mountain-guns, two of 4.5-inch howitzers, and the two 5-inch Lowland howitzer batteries from Anzac. The assistance which the Anzac Corps was to give—since Birdwood had but few troops to spare—was to move up its left flank, between which and the Suvla force satisfactory connection had never yet been obtained. At dusk on August 11th, after Mustafa Kemal's attempt on the two previous days to drive a wedge between the two forces, the 6th Gurkhas (who had been brought to Damakjelik Bair) had thrown out near the foreshore some picquets which met troops similarly despatched



¹² The figures are from an estimate subsequently made by Hamilton's staff

from the right of the IX Corps. The point of junction was on the flats at Kazlar Chair ("Goose Meadow"), half-a-mile from Damakjelik and only a mile inland from the sea. It was desirable to advance the point of junction much farther inland. It is true that a daily messenger, and even, on one occasion, some batteries of artillery, were able to gallop along the fore-shore from Anzac to Suvla, depending on their speed to escape the enemy's machine-gun bullets. But three-quarters of a mile inland from the point of junction there lay in Turkish hands Hill 60, the low knoll forming the seaward end of the "Flat Hill"¹⁸ on which the 4th Australian Brigade had met with disaster on August 8th. This hill, though little more than a swelling in the plain, shut out the Anzac force from any real command over the Anafarta gap which lay beyond it. Moreover near its foot were two useful wells, Kabak ("Cabbage") Kuyu on the south and Susak (proper name) Kuyu towards the north. All these points, including Hill 60, could easily have been secured on August 7th, when the troops of the 40th British and 4th Australian Brigades had wandered over them, or even on the 8th. But an attempt by the 9th



Worcester on the night of the 12th to seize Kabak Kuyu, at the very foot of Damakjelik, had entirely failed in the face of heavy fire. It was eventually decided not to renew the attempt on either of the wells until such time as the whole flank should go forward and seize Hill 60. This was the minor operation which the Anzac Corps was to carry out as its part of the offensive of August 21st.

Thus—enumerating the divisions from the north southwards—the 29th was to seize the semicircular ridge of Scimitar Hill; the 11th was to attack the "W" Hills themselves and to advance across the plain south of them, its southern flank

¹⁸ See p. 659.


touching that of the Anzac troops and moving with them to Susak Kuyu;¹⁴ in rear of the 11th and 29th, the 2nd Mounted Division would be held ready as the main reserve; and south of the IX Corps Birdwood's troops would swing up over Hill 60 so as to incorporate the whole knoll and both wells in the Anzac line.

For this attack Birdwood could only provide a somewhat mixed force. In the Battles of Sari Bair and Lone Pine his losses had been 12,500, of which 5,500 were in the 13th Division. The casualties in the 1st Australian and N.Z. & A. Divisions had amounted to 2,500 and 3,300 respectively—figures not excessive when the nature of the fighting is considered. The old Anzac position was now being held by 10,500 men, and the new position, from No. 1 Outpost northwards, by Godley's force, numbering 13,000. The new front had been divided into two sections; that facing east along the foot-hills of the main range was held by General Shaw with most of the 13th Division and 29th British Brigade, besides the New Zealand Mounted Rifles; that facing north, next to the Suvla area, was held by General Cox with the Indian and 4th Australian Brigades and the 4th South Wales Borderers. Birdwood now transferred from Shaw to Cox the 29th (New Army) Brigade (consisting at the moment of two half-strength battalions—5th Connaught Rangers and 10th Hampshire) and the headquarters and two very weak regiments of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade. These movements, made on August 20th, provided sufficient force for the projected attack. Since the fighting on Chunuk Bair the mounted rifles had been holding an inner defence-line. The other troops had all been withdrawn, for at least a day during the preceding fortnight, from the front line into close reserve; but they had not regained any degree of freshness, although for the Australians and New Zealanders the relief afforded by the change from the old Anzac area into open country had been great. Sickness, which the excitement of the offensive had appeared to check, had increased as soon as there came a pause in the operations.

Cox decided to attack with all sections of his force. On the left, next to the British at Suvla, the 10th Gurkhas were


¹⁴ The second objective at this point was Dervish Ali Kuyu, 600 yards east of Susak.

to advance eastwards across the flats from Kazlar Chair to Susak Kuyu. The 5th Gurkhas would advance on the right of the 10th. Next to them on the south, in the right-angled bend where the line turned inland, the Connaught Rangers of the 29th (New Army) Brigade were to seize Kabak Kuyu. Next again to these the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, whose two regiments amounted to only 400 men, were to attack



north-eastward across the Kaiajik Dere and seize Hill 60. Farther inland, a detachment of 500 from the 4th Australian Infantry Brigade, supported by the 10th Hampshire,¹⁵ were to attack the Hill 60 spur just above the knoll itself, and connect with the existing line of the 4th Brigade. During August 20th arrangements were made by Godley and Cox for the protection of their troops by artillery fire. During the same day the staff of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps was endeavouring to make mutual arrangements with the Suvla staff for co-operation in the bombardment.

The Hill 60 spur—the “Flat Hill” of the Turks—is really a branch of the more extensive Damakjelik Bair on which lay the new Anzac flank. Except for a single stunted oak and a few mere bushes it was, like the rest of this country, bare of trees but clothed in dense, prickly scrub with a few patches of grass or stubble. Forking from the Damakjelik chain at a steep table-topped knob—Hill 100—it ran for nearly a mile parallel with Damakjelik. If a man rested his right forearm on a table, the hand flat and palm downwards, the projection of the elbow would represent Hill 100, the forearm the “Flat Hill,” and the hand itself Hill 60—which was only distinguished from the upper portion of the spur by a slight



¹⁵ The Hampshire was then 330 strong, with 5 officers, including the doctor.

indentation at the wrist and an almost imperceptible rise below it. Along the summit, from Hill 100 to the "wrist," ran several lines of Turkish trenches, the foremost almost fringing the slope. At the "wrist" this trench receded round the indentation—a little grassy gully—and then bent forward again to encircle the lower slopes of the knoll. It was this re-entrant which was to be attacked by the 4th Australian Brigade, while the mounted rifles assaulted Hill 60 itself lower down, and the Connaught Rangers Kabak Kuyu, which would be on the flat near the point of the "thumb." As Hill 60 was an important *point d'appui*, the Turks, according to their custom, were crowning it with a redoubt consisting of several concentric rings of trenches, but their digging had in parts been only begun, and few signs as yet showed through the dense scrub. From somewhere in the plain beyond there came a long communication trench, which crossed the summit of the hill near the "wrist," and was there knotted into the several trench-lines running down the spur.

The Hill 60 spur was separated from Damakjelik Bair—the Anzac flank position—by the straight narrow valley or glade of the Kaiajik Dere.¹⁸ The Turkish lines on Hill 100 (the "elbow") looked straight down the valley, and it was from three minor folds near the mouth of this gully that the Connaughts, New Zealanders, and Australians respectively were to start. One of the difficulties of the operation was that the Australians, who were nearest to Hill 100, would be exposed in crossing the valley to a deadly enfilade. In later years their passage would have been protected by a screen of smoke, but such devices were then unthought of in Gallipoli. But to assist their troops in the capture of what was evidently a fairly complicated trench-system Godley and Cox on August 20th worked out with Colonel G. N. Johnston, the commander of the New Zealand artillery, a plan of bombardment resembling—except in the restricted ammunition-supply—those employed in France. That is to say, the available artillery on that flank of Anzac, totalling thirty-two guns and howitzers, would muffle with shell-fire

¹⁸ This was the valley which Monash and his officers had believed to be the Asma Dere, one of several minor gullies near its mouth being mistaken for the Kaiajik. In the "situation-maps" used by the N.Z. & A. Div the line of the 4th Bde. was until Aug 18 shown as encircling Hill 100. See pp 652, 654, and 664

the whole front of the attack, as well as the Turkish positions on the "forearm" and at Hill 100. The preliminary bombardment would commence at 2.15; at 3 the infantry would attack, and the covering batteries would lengthen range.¹⁷

It was not, however, until late in the morning of August 21st, long after these orders had been issued by Godley to his artillery, that the army corps staff succeeded in coming to an agreement with that of the IX Corps concerning the assistance to be given by the Anzac artillery to the Suvla offensive. At the request of the IX Corps it was agreed that the bombardment of the Turkish trenches in front of the 11th (New Army) Division should be carried out by Godley's artillery, which was in a position completely to enfilade them. There could be no doubt as to the wisdom of assisting the all-important northern advance in so effective a manner. But, since the change would leave the Anzac troops to attack without bombardment, the time for their part of the assault was at the last moment¹⁸ postponed for half-an-hour. When at 3 o'clock the British assault started, the Anzac batteries were to "switch" on to the front of their own troops until 3.30, when this part of the line also would commence its attack.

August 21st, when after nearly a fortnight's quiescence the general battle broke out again, was like the days which preceded it brilliant and hot. At 2 p.m. the first guns opened,¹⁹ and half-an-hour later the main bombardment on the Suvla front commenced. The spectacle was one never before seen in the Anzac zone. The purpose of the attack was well known, and the troops watched eagerly for the British advance. A haze of dust and shell-smoke soon covered the plain, but at 3.15 the line of the advancing British was clearly marked by the puffs of the Turkish shrapnel in the air above it.²⁰ Unfortunately, however, the alteration in the hour of the Anzac assault forced the British to advance with their

¹⁷ Some of the guns were to suppress the fire of Turkish batteries on Abdel Rahman Bair and Hill Q. A battery of field-guns behind Lala Baba at the mouth of Suvla Bay was also to assist with fire in front of the junction of the two forces

¹⁸ The order was issued at 1.30 p.m.

¹⁹ See Vol. XII, plate 118.


²⁰ It was partly this shrapnel which caused a portion of the 11th Div to veer to its left into the amphitheatre between Scimitar Hill and the "W" Hills, and so wrecked the offensive.

right exposed instead of being in touch with the Indians. Although the Turks in many places left their front trench and ran back to a second line, a number who were entrenched near a poplar grove²¹ on the British right were not threatened, and held up that flank of the IX Corps in the Asmak creek-bed 400 yards from the starting point. Farther south the Indians, when they started forward at 3.30, were opposed by a hot fire of small-arms. Though this was not overwhelming, the advance was rendered difficult by the fact that the Gurkhas depended almost entirely upon the leadership of their white officers, who were easily picked out by the enemy and shot. The 5th Gurkhas on the right were thus held up. A portion of the 10th, however, under a white officer, succeeded in reaching their objective at Susak Kuyu, where they established an isolated post nearly half-a-mile to the right front of the IX Corps flank in the Asmak Dere, with the Turks near the poplars almost directly in their rear. On their other flank it was not till long after dark that they made contact with the Anzac force attacking Hill 60, half-a-mile to the south-east.

The forces attacking Kabak Kuyu, Hill 60, and the re-entrant above it—the Connaught Rangers (700 strong), New Zealand Mounted Rifles (400), and the detachment of the 4th Australian Brigade (500) respectively—were to charge north-eastwards from three minor gullies in front of the line.


As they climbed out at 3.20 into these valleys, they were seen by the Turks, who opened fire upon them. In the most northerly gully the Australians were visible to Turks near the Kabak Kuyu—which was merely a well in the bed of the Kaiajik Dere—and a certain number were hit by a desultory fire which continued upon them as they lay.

At 3.30 the word was given both to Australians and New Zealanders to "go." The Connaught Rangers were to start for Kabak Kuyu ten minutes later.



²¹ This was called by the Turks Kavaklar ("the poplars")

One of the actual results of the belated alteration in the orders to the artillery was that Hill 60 and its neighbourhood received practically no bombardment, but the enemy was thoroughly awakened. Severe opposition was therefore certain. The two New Zealand regiments—Canterbury Mounted Rifles under Major Hutton on the right, and Otago Mounted Rifles under Lieutenant-Colonel Grigor²² on the left—having a quarter of a mile to go and two minor ridges to cross before they reached the enemy, advanced in lines of successive troops. The first line of Australians, who had been warned by their commander that their only chance lay in advancing at top speed, endeavoured to cover the whole distance—at that point 200 yards—in one unbroken rush. The appearance at 3.30 of these various bodies of determined men rushing towards them through the scrub of the intervening ridges caused a number of Turks at that moment to leave their front trench along the “Flat Hill” and run back to defences in rear. Major Hutton was wounded in crossing the Kaiajik Dere, and Canterbury tended to make towards the left—that is, away from the enfilade; but at 3.45 a first small party of New Zealanders was seen charging up the slope of Hill 60 and clambering into the lowest Turkish trench near the point where it rounded the seaward end. The orders were to clear all trenches on the hill as far as the




The first attack by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles on Hill 60. (Drawn from memory, 2nd February, 1916, in diary of Official War Correspondent.) The view is from the old line of the 4th Brigade.

The size of the distant figures is much exaggerated.

plain on its farther side, and accordingly almost at once seven or eight New Zealanders were to be seen leaving the first

²² Lieut.-Col. R. R. Grigor, D.S.O. Commanded Otago Mtd. Rifles, 1915/16; 1st Anzac Mtd. Troops, 1916. Barrister and solicitor; of Balclutha, N.Z.; b. Inverlutha, N.Z., 25 Nov., 1872.

trench and pressing up the communication sap which led over the hill near the "wrist." About the same time, just east of the indentation at the "wrist," there appeared a number of the 4th Australian Brigade clustered in the scrub below the crest of the spur. Close in front of them, on the smooth field covering this corner, was the single bushy oak-tree²³ which had been given them for a guiding mark. Some distance beyond it,




through the field, lay the foremost of the three trenches which were their objective. In the meantime other parties of New Zealanders had reached the Turkish front trench at the lower end of the spur, in which, according to arrangement, two red flags were now flying to show that it was captured; and the Connaught Rangers in a keen charge had overwhelmed such Turks as waited for them at a Turkish post protecting the Kabak well,²⁴ and in the creek in the bed of the Kaiajik Dere which had served the enemy as a communication trench. There for the moment, as they had been ordered, the Rangers waited.

Thus by 4 o'clock the New Zealanders were in their first objective, but neither the Australian detachment on their right nor the Indians on their left had come up with them. General Russell, therefore, at that hour ordered the Australians to push forward on the right, and asked the 29th British Brigade (to which the Connaught Rangers belonged) to assist the New Zealanders on the other flank. On the left the result of this command was immediately apparent. The order had been given for one of the reserve companies of the Rangers to move forward, but all companies of the battalion were then much commingled at the Kabak well, and a mixed crowd,

²³ This can be seen in plate 119, Vol. XII. The photograph was taken at the time, from the Anzac line near the point from which the Australian detachment charged.

²⁴ This was probably merely a place for watering goats or sheep, and was situated where an old bridle-track from Australia Valley to the plain and Anafarta crossed the Kaiajik creek. Beyond the creek the road was for a short distance sunken, and slightly to its right was a hedge, affording fair cover at this corner of the knoll

excited after the previous charge, now swarmed forward with officers leading them. They were seen dashing up the seaward



Charge of the Connaughts on Hill 60, August 21st. (Drawn from memory, 2nd February, 1916, in diary of Official War Correspondent.) The view is from the old lines of the 4th Brigade. Beyond the scrubby ridge in the foreground lies (hidden) the Kaiajik Dere. The foremost figure on Hill 60 is probably a Turk.


end of the hill, the Turks running before them. This fine charge called forth the admiration of all who beheld it, and such a movement, if it had been concerted and delivered along the whole line of attack with the flanks well guarded, would probably have carried Hill 60. As far as can be ascertained it crossed the first trench on the western face of the hill, but, as it approached the summit, withered under fire poured upon it by the enemy. The losses were heavy, and no ground was gained. Other portions of the battalion, however, were led round more cautiously to the flank of the New Zealanders, whom they reinforced; they also filled part of the space between the left of the New Zealanders and the right of the Indian brigade, which was eventually brought by a circuitous route to a point near the western end of the hill. Elements of a line were thus established, connecting the left of the New Zealanders on Hill 60 with the 10th Gurkhas on the plain at Susak Kuyu.

The task of the Australian detachment on the right of the New Zealanders was one of much greater difficulty. The whole length of Turkish trenches from Hill 100 down the forearm of the "Flat Hill" commanded the opposite slope of the Kaiajik Dere, and the greater part of the Turkish garrison was neither threatened with any attack nor embarrassed by bombardment. The detachment was organised in three lines: first, 150 of the 13th Battalion under Lieutenant Ford;²⁵

²⁵ Maj. (temp. Lieut.-Col.) H. C. Ford, D.S.O.; 26th Bn. Temply commanded 45th Bn., 1917; 46th Bn., 1918. School teacher; of Goulburn, N.S.W.; b. Goulburn, 6 Dec., 1881.

second, 150 of the 14th under Major Dare; third, 200, drawn in equal proportions from the same two battalions, every man carrying a shovel or a pick. With this line was Major Herring, who commanded all three. They comprised most of the comparatively fit men of both battalions, the guarding of the old line being for the moment left to those who were on "light duty" through sickness.²⁶

It could not be expected that men as tried, sick, and battle-worn as were all the Anzac troops—but especially those of this brigade after the fighting of August 8th—would attack with the fire and persistence of well-rested units. Yet the Australian soldier, when serving under even moderately good leadership, never ceased to show an unexpected degree of resilience. On this occasion the greater part of the first line under Ford, though met with a torrential fire as soon as it crested the first minor spur, and though each man was



Advance of the Australian detachment, or 10th Hampshire, on August 21st. The troops are crossing the scrubby hill outside the old lines of the 4th Brigade. Hidden beyond this lies the Kaiajik Dere. (Drawn from memory, 2nd February, 1916, in diary of Official War Correspondent.)

weighted with fifty pounds of ammunition and equipment, nevertheless held on with its headlong rush until its members had either reached the farther slope of the Kaiajik Dere or lay killed or wounded on the slopes between. But the enemy's machine-gun and rifle fire had followed it across the first summit and down the southern side of the Kaiajik Dere.


²⁶ When picking up the wounded after the engagement, Capt. Loughran, medical officer of the 14th, found a man named Hartigan, whom he had marked for "light duty," lying out shot through the abdomen. When asked why he had gone with the attack, which he could have avoided, he replied: "If I had not stopped this, some other poor beggar would" (Hartigan was of Melbourne. He survived, and was subsequently wounded in France.)

Ford reached the farther slope with only half-a-dozen men. He presently found that there were another fifteen to his right and twenty to his left. Looking back, he could see the other slope of the valley sprinkled with the tumbled forms of his men, who lay thickly among the ledges of an old Turkish bivouac on to which they had rolled when hit.

Thus of the first line of 150 about forty had reached the slope below the oak-tree. The nearest Turkish trench was seventy yards distant across level stubble. To attempt to reach it with his present numbers was clearly hopeless. Ford therefore waited for his supports. At 3.45 the second line under Major Dare made the crossing in the same manner as the first. Again some forty men succeeded in crossing the Kaiajik Dere. Lieutenant Crabbe was killed in the gully, but Dare came through unhurt, and at once took charge of the party on the far slope. His numbers were still too small to attempt with the least hope of success the charge across the stubble. Only the arrival of the third party under Herring, or of the 10th Hampshire, which had been allotted to support this flank, might give the necessary numbers.

Such was the position when at 4 o'clock Russell sent to Monash his order that the Australians should push on. Herring's third line made more than one attempt to do so, but the men were heavily weighted with picks and shovels and barbed-wire. The effort failed, and he did not resume it until some hours after sunset. At 4.15 the 10th Hampshire also endeavoured to reach Dare; but, as they started, a single heavy shell chanced to fall among them, tossing men bodily into the air and confusing their effort. The same withering fire which had met the Australians swept away the remnant of the attack on the slope among the ledges, only one man apparently succeeding in reaching the detachment across the Kaiajik Dere. A few more big shells, dropping into the minor gully where the supports were lying, drove back part of them to the shelter of the old line.

Dare's party was thus completely cut off from reinforcement. He had seen the attempt of the Hampshire to reinforce him, and, since no further support came, decided to hold fast. He therefore ordered his men to fill the sandbags, of which each carried two, and to thrust them forward over the edge



THE KAIJAJIK DERE

The hill is outlined in ink, and the direction of the Australian detachment's attack is indicated by an arrow. The Turkish enfilade fire was sweeping down the valley and down the ridge on its right on which can be seen the enemy's trenches.

*Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. G2074
Taken in 1919.*

Hill 60

× Position of oak tree



Kaijajik Dere

THE KAIJAJIK DERE, SEEN FROM HILL 60

The reverse of the view given above. The Australian detachment attacked on August 21st across the valley on the right. On August 27th it attempted to charge up the re-entrant on the left. The New Zealand trench lay on the extreme left, just outside the picture.

*Aust. War Memorial Official Photos Nos. G2073a-b
Taken in 1919.*

To face p. 734.



ONE OF THE GAPS IN THE HEDGE THROUGH WHICH THE 18TH BATTALION
ATTACKED HILL 60

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1846
Taken in 1919

Abdel Rahman

Hill 971.

Hill "Q."



HILL 60 (SEEN FROM THE SEAWARD END OF DAMAKJELIK BAIR)
(For clearness the hill is outlined)

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1214

To face p 735

of the crest. By this means they established a parapet from behind which they could fire.

In the meantime, on the exposed southern side of the valley, a fire had been started by the shell which burst among the Hampshire. It was the practice of the Turks to cover their bivouacs with branches of cut scrub, and this dry tinder covered many of the ledges on which lay the dead and wounded of the Australians and the Hampshire. The flames, reaching some of the dead or wounded, ignited their clothing and exploded their bombs and rifle-ammunition, and thus pieces of burning cloth or wood were flung to other ledges, starting more fires.²⁷ Any wounded man who so much as stirred to crawl out of reach of the flames was instantly shot by the Turks.²⁸ The men with Dare were forced to look on helplessly at this dreadful scene, since any attempt to reach, or to move upon, the exposed slope meant instant death. Fortunately the position of the wounded on the crest was not so hopeless, since the smoke raised a screen behind which Captain Loughran,²⁹ the medical officer of the 14th, and Chaplain Gillison,³⁰ with Corporal Pittendrigh³¹ (also a minister of the church) and other stretcher-bearers were able to drag away any wounded in the neighbourhood who were in danger from the flames.³²

With the charges by the 10th Hampshire and the Connaught Rangers the attack upon Hill 60 died out. At 5 o'clock Russell received from the Australians the report—

Impossible to push on. Fire across wheatfield by Big Tree too hot. Am digging in:

²⁷ See Vol. XII, plate 119.

²⁸ While in many cases it must have been quite evident to the enemy that he was firing on wounded men, it is only fair to state that in the scrub on this slope were also unwounded soldiers, who during the rush had dropped behind bushes to take breath or for shelter, and who then, finding advance impossible, escaped death by crawling inch by inch to the rear. Although their action was probably entirely justified, these men were fair targets for the enemy. In many other battles this situation resulted in fire being turned upon the wounded.

²⁹ Capt. H. G. Loughran; A.A.M.C. Surgeon; of Kyneton, Vic.; b. Jolimont Vic., 26 July, 1880.

³⁰ Chap. the Rev. A. Gillison. Of East St. Kilda, Vic.; b. Baldernock, Scotland. 7 June, 1868. Died of wounds, 22 Aug., 1915.

³¹ Cpl. R. R. Pittendrigh (No. 896; 13th Bn.). Clergyman; of Lithgow, N.S.W.; b. Bathurst, N.S.W., 1883. Died of wounds, 29 Aug., 1915.


³² On the following morning, while Gillison was waiting to read the burial service over the bodies of some of those who had fallen in this action, he heard someone groaning in the scrub on the ridge in front of the old line. He had been warned against attempting to move in daylight on that ridge; but he went forward far enough to ascertain that the cry came from a man of the Hampshire, who was lying out wounded and was being troubled by ants. Gillison at once called Cpl. Pittendrigh and a man named Wild (of Hinton, N.S.W.) of the 13th Bn. The three crawled forward, reached the wounded man, and had dragged him for about a yard when a Turkish sniper opened and severely wounded both Gillison and Pittendrigh. Gillison died the same day.

and from the New Zealanders—

Have captured about 120 yards enemy trench and one enemy machine-gun, which we are using against Turks, but cannot push on. Men exhausted.

At the same hour the knot of trenches in the small grassy re-entrant between the Australian detachment and the New Zealanders, which had been empty since a small party of mounted rifles had pressed on through it an hour before, began to fill again with Turks, who were feeling their way cautiously back to their front line. The keen handful of New Zealanders had not been supported by their fellows, and had been cut off; only two returned, two or three having been killed and two or three captured. The machine-gunners of the 4th Brigade, under Captain Rose, perceiving on the far side of the "Flat Hill" a movement of the enemy and a continuous stream of men along the communication trench, turned their fire upon it, enfilading the sap and ripping its parapets into clouds of dust. A mountain-gun, which the commander of the 21st Indian Battery, Major Fergusson, had at that moment emplaced in a half-dug trench in the old 4th Brigade lines, was turned upon the same avenue, and burst shell after shell fairly in it. The movement by the enemy against the New Zealanders in their new position was thus greatly hampered; but, gradually filtering through the trenches like a slow stream of water through a winding gutter, he eventually reached their right flank, and at this point an exchange of bombs immediately began. At 7 p.m. Colonel Grigor, now commanding in the trench captured by the New Zealanders, reported that his men were being hard pressed with bombs.

When, therefore, night fell, Russell had a foothold, but only a foothold, on Hill 60. He hoped that by some means he would be able to carry the rest of the knoll during the night; but his immediate task, as



Position at night fall Aug 21

soon as darkness enabled the 10th Hampshire and other troops to move, was to ensure that his line should be a connected one. This was impossible on the right of the New Zealanders, since the indentation at the "wrist" of Hill 60—a space of 150 yards which could not at present be bridged—separated them from the Australian detachment. But that detachment was reinforced after nightfall by the 200 men with Herring, and at the same time the 15th Battalion began to dig a communication trench across the Kaiajik Dere from the old position to the new. Russell therefore had little fear for the safety of the detachment. The difficulty on that flank was that the Turks held the communication trench at the "wrist," leading direct to the right of the New Zealanders. This Russell did not attempt at the moment to remedy, but used the 10th Hampshire for filling up gaps on the left of the New Zealanders at the seaward end of the hill, where the 5th Gurkhas, arriving at dusk, had relieved a previously isolated detachment of the Connaught Rangers that had been holding a small farm at that point. The Hampshires now filled in the gap of 300 yards between this hut and the left of the New Zealanders. But at 10 o'clock, when a wild burst of firing broke out, it was observed that the nearest rifle-flashes to the north of the farm were 600 yards away. Lieutenant Saunders,³³ then in charge of the Hampshire, at once crept out across the plain and found that there were no troops between the farm and the post of the 10th Gurkhas at Susak well. The rest of the Indian brigade, brought up after dark, eventually filled this gap; but farther north the interval between the 10th Gurkhas and the flank of the IX Corps in the Asmak creek was not bridged, the Turks remaining throughout the night in occupation of the poplars. Both the Anzac and Suvla staffs appear to have believed that their line across the plain was continuous, but it was not known at Anzac whether the British attack upon the "W" Hills had been successful. The shells of both sides had started bush-fires in the Suvla area, causing a haze of smoke, and although lines of men had

³³ Capt. W. J. Saunders, M.C.; 10th Bn., Hampshire Regt. Of Winchester, Eng.; b. London, 27 June, 1874. (Lieutenant Kitchen of the Connaught Rangers with a party of that regiment assisted to hold the New Zealand trench against bomb attacks, this officer being especially prominent.)


constantly been seen advancing across the plain it had been impossible to observe their farther progress.

When personally inspecting his position after dark, General Russell appears to have realised that the foothold on Hill 60 could not be extended by the worn-out handful of mounted rifles who, with a sprinkling of British troops, were then holding the position. If the hill was to be captured before daylight, it must be done by fresh troops. A convenient starting-point for such an attack seemed to be afforded by the position of the Indian brigade, which was now holding a line along the seaward foot of the hill at right angles to the New Zealand trench. This place was easy to approach by the sunken road leading north from Kabak Kuyu, and the high scrub along the eastern side of that road gave cover behind which the assaulting troops could form up. They would then attack across the whole front of the New Zealanders, sweeping the hill and seizing its summit and all trenches up to and including those on the eastern side of the knoll facing the detachment of Monash's brigade at the "wrist." The main defects of such a plan were that the objective was very great; that the troops, if they pushed the attack as far as was intended, would be in grave danger of coming under the fire of Monash's detachment; and that during and after the attack their left flank would lie naked **on the northern slope.**

The trend of the defences on the hill was also—as is shown by the map issued (roughly reproduced in the margin)—imperfectly known; but the trench-system was not a simple one, and, since the assault was to be made at dawn,

the attacking troops could have no opportunity of studying their objective, but must seize it without reconnaissance. There would indeed be little more than time to get reserves into position before the assault must be delivered.

It required strong reasons to make such an assault without reconnaissance. But Russell and his immediate senior, Cox,



both careful and able officers, considered it "very necessary" to seize the enemy's long communication trench before the arrival of full daylight, and a recommendation to that effect was sent by them to Godley at 11.45, as soon as Russell returned from inspecting his position. Both officers knew that Godley had during the last few days received a reserve of strong and completely fresh troops. This was the 5th Australian Infantry Brigade, the first portion of the 2nd Australian Division to arrive at the front. Of the battalions composing it, the 17th and 18th had landed on August 19th, and had been followed on subsequent nights by the 19th and 20th and the 5th Field Ambulance. After bivouacking for a day in the old position near the foot of the Sphinx, the 17th and 18th, under their brigadier, Colonel Holmes, had been sent at dusk on August 20th to Bauchop's Hill, the 19th following at the same hour of the next night, and the whole brigade being allotted as reserve to General Godley. These troops came to the tired and somewhat haggard garrison of Anzac like a fresh breeze from the Australian bush. "Great big cheery fellows, whom it did your heart good to see," wrote an Australian. "Quite the biggest lot I have ever seen." As these men with well-rounded cheeks and strong limbs filed past the heights of which in Australia they had heard so much, they quietly but eagerly questioned other wayfarers as to the situation. They had not yet acquired the cynicism of old soldiers. In the quiet valley below Walker's Ridge some of their officers had spoken gravely to them of their high duty in the tests they were about to face.³⁴ These fine troops had made a deep impression upon all who saw them, and brigadiers, anxious to relieve or support their tired troops, looked eagerly towards "the new Australians." Godley, however, realised that the new units were entirely inexperienced—he also desired to employ the brigade later as a whole; until late in the night of August 21st, therefore, he was firm in the intention not to allow it to be drawn into the battle. But when at midnight he received the strong recommendation of Cox and Russell that the communication trench on Hill 60 should be carried at dawn, and that a fresh battalion should be used for the task,

³⁴ "I daresay I shall be one of the first to fall," said Lieut. Wilfred Addison.

he gave way. The 18th Battalion was ordered to move to Damakjelik Bair, where it would come under Russell's orders.

About dawn on August 22nd the 18th, after being led through the dark under a fire of stray bullets, and losing its way, reached the fold of Damakjelik from which the Connaught Rangers had moved out the day before.³⁵ The hour of its arrival was over-late for General Russell's purpose, but arrangements were hurried forward, and while they were being made the companies were told to lie down and rest. The colonel and company commanders were summoned to a conference with Russell's brigade-major, Powles,³⁶ who informed them that the battalion was to make an attack. By the light of a candle he then read them the order for the operation, and explained that they were to assault with bomb and bayonet only. Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman³⁷ interjected that they had no bombs; Powles could only reply that they must do the best that was possible without them. He explained the diagram of Hill 60 (of which he gave each company commander a copy), and added that, since dawn was then breaking, by the time they reached the position there would be sufficient light for them to see the lie of the ground. He then in person led the battalion over the crest of Damakjelik, down to the Kaiajik creek, and thence up again by the sunken road to the western foot of the hill, keeping as far as possible behind cover. The long line of troops followed, wondering what was the business in hand. The general impression was that they were being taken to man "the trenches," which they had never yet seen. Presently the sunken road led out into open flats, where a ragged hedge or belt of scrub continued along the right side of the track. Under cover of this was a line of Indians manning a newly-dug trench. Here the head of the battalion was halted. It was now 4.45 and almost full daylight. To the right, beyond the hedge, was a dark scrub-covered rise—its low summit only 400 yards away—which Powles pointed out as

³⁵ This was known as "South Wales Borderer Gully," and lay next on the west, to Australia Valley.


³⁶ Lieut.-Col. C. G. Powles, C M G., D.S.O., A D C A A & Q M G, Anzac Mtd. Div., 1916/18, subsequently commanding Central Command, N.Z. Military Forces Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Wellington, N.Z., b Wellington, 15 Dec., 1872

³⁷ Lieut.-Col. A. E. Chapman, V.D. Commanded 18th Bn, 1915. Police magistrate; of Sydney; b. Manning River, N.S.W., 6 Oct., 1869.

Hill 60. He explained to Captain Goodsell,³⁸ the commander of the leading company, that the company must now face east and attack the hill. The position of Monash's detachment had been explained to the company commanders, and the danger of clashing with it may have been recognised; for the objective now set before Goodsell was the summit, which, it was explained, he must under no circumstances overrun.

Goodsell's order to his company to fix bayonets, charge magazines, and extend into two lines was the first intimation to the troops that they were about to carry out an assault.

A few minutes later—about 5 o'clock—they charged, two platoons forming the front line and two others, under Lieutenant Leslie,³⁹ following immediately afterwards in support. As they scrambled through several gaps in the hedge on to a narrow belt of corn at the foot of the hill, they saw



in the scrub, 150 yards ahead, the parapet of a newly-dug trench from which Turks were retiring up the hill. Fire was opened by the enemy, but both lines quickly gained the trench, which proved to be a deep, almost straight, sap leading far down to the plain on the left. A number of the enemy were at the moment endeavouring to scramble out to the rear. These were shot, and, on the front of the attack, the trench was captured. The men settled into it, some of them taking out their pipes and none having any notion that they were intended to go farther. Goodsell himself knew that the objective was the summit, where one or possibly more trenches were now perceived to exist. But he seems to have been awaiting the

³⁸ Maj. S. P. Goodsell; 18th Bn Salesman; of Parramatta, N.S.W.; b. 17 July, 1878.

³⁹ Lieut. W. L. Leslie; 18th Bn Manufacturer, of Sydney; b. 25 Feb., 1888. Killed in action, 22 Aug., 1915.

arrival of other companies before attempting a further rush. While he waited, urgent messages for assistance began to come from the left of the line.

Inasmuch as there were Turks in the same trench beyond the left flank of the Australians, and as on that flank at least one communication trench led from it towards the east, a violent counter-attack upon that flank was only to be expected. Moreover it happened that at this juncture the enemy was pouring troops down the valley from Anafarta, and others could be seen leaving the summit of Hill 60 and running round to the northward. The left of the Australians was attacked with bombs, and at the same time a machine-gun on some slight eminence in that direction began to fire up the trench. The 18th had no bombs, and knew nothing of them. But a number of Turkish grenades were found in their sap, and by throwing some of these they won sufficient respite to enable them to pull down sandbags from the parapet and form a barricade, behind which for a time they successfully fought. A private named O'Reilly⁴⁰ climbed on to the parapet and, lying behind some sandbags until he was severely wounded by a bomb, shot steadily along the trench at the Turks, whose attention had been suddenly turned to supporting companies of the 18th that were now coming forward.

Major Powles appears to have sent the next company—Major McPherson's⁴¹—to follow Goodsell's. By this time, however, at least three machine-guns in the scrub on Hill 60 were directed upon the wheatfield at its foot; and a heavy enfilading fire was being poured in from the left by the enemy in a northward extension of Goodsell's trench, where a Turkish officer with drawn sword could be seen pointing out to his men the target at which they should fire. The left of McPherson's company, emerging through a large gap in the hedge, was broken while attempting to deploy. Other platoons issuing through openings south of it were met by tremendous fire, but a proportion crossed the field, finely led by some of

⁴⁰ Pte. Myles O'Reilly (No. 954, 18th Bn.). Farm hand; of Sydney, b. Parramatta, N.S.W., 1892.

⁴¹ Maj. T. R. McPherson; 18th Bn. Electrical engineer; of Sydney; b. Sydney, 25 Apr., 1887. Killed in action, 22 Aug., 1915.



MEN OF THE NEWLY-ARRIVED 19TH BATTALION WITH THE GURKHAS AT
DAMAKJELIK BAIR


Aust. War Memorial Official Photo No. G1215



THE *Southland*, SHORTLY AFTER BEING TORPEDOED

Lent by A. E. Barnard, Esq.


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NEW ZEALANDERS IN THE TRENCHES ON RHODOBENDRON, AUTUMN, 1915
Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1217a

their officers; among them was Lieutenant Wilfred Addison,⁴² who, with dying and wounded around him, and machine-gun bullets tearing up the ground where he stood, steadied and waved forward the remnant of his platoon until he himself fell pierced with several bullets.

Perceiving the difficulty of advancing under such an enfilade, Major Powles directed the next platoons to swing to the left and advance northwards or north-eastwards in order to subdue the fire from that direction. This attempt was quickly shattered. A part of the third company, under Major Lane,⁴³ advancing towards Goodsell's left, succeeded in reaching the same trench and pushed along it towards the east. These later lines, however, only reached the trench in fragments, and the situation of the left flank was desperate. From a point of vantage in a cross-trench the Turks were flinging bombs with impunity among the Australians. An unauthorised order to retire had been given to some of Lane's men, and in withdrawing over the open they had lost heavily. At 7 o'clock the battalion was urged by a message from



Russell to push on and seize the summit, but such an attempt would have been hopeless. Goodsell's left gradually withdrew southward along the trench. With such parts of the later lines as reached him he had extended farther to his right along the same sap and, finding there some of the Hampshire, discovered that he was actually in the trench which had been captured by the New Zealanders, and which encircled the lower slope of the hill. By 10 o'clock the remnant of Goodsell's men had retired along it until they reached the flank of the New Zealanders, where they remained, stubbornly holding fifty yards of the trench.

⁴² Lieut. W. E. Addison; 18th Bn. Bank accountant; of Sydney; b. Yass, N.S.W., 28 March, 1887. Killed in action, 22 Aug., 1915.

⁴³ Maj. C. H. D. Lane; 18th Bn. Electrical engineer; of Sydney; b. Bondi, N.S.W., 23 Feb., 1888. Killed in action, 27 Aug., 1915.

The attempt to round off the capture of Hill 60 by setting a raw battalion, without reconnaissance, to rush the main part of a position on which the experienced troops of Anzac had only succeeded in obtaining a slight foothold, ended in failure. Its initiation was due to the fact that Russell and his brigade-major, Powles, both careful and capable officers, lacked the realisation—which came to many commanders only after sharp experience—that the attack upon such a position required minute preparation, and that the unskilfulness of raw troops, however brave, was likely to involve them in heavy losses for the sake of results too small to justify the expense. Within a few hours the 18th Battalion, which appears to have marched out 750 strong, had lost 11 officers and 372 men, of whom half had been killed.⁴⁴ The action had been a severe one for all the troops engaged, the losses of the comparatively small force which attacked from Anzac amounting to over 1,300.⁴⁵ The flank had been brought up to Susak Kuyu, and a lodgment had been obtained in the enemy's strongly entrenched position at Hill 60. Slight though it was, this gain was the only one achieved on the whole battle-front. In the Suvla area the position at first secured by the 29th Division on the crest of Scimitar Hill was untenable, a brave advance by the reserve—the 2nd Mounted Division—availing nothing. On the plain the 11th Division was unable to maintain its unconnected line

⁴⁴ Not quite the whole battalion took part in this action. Two of the company commanders, Maj. McPherson and Capt. L. J. Banfield, and Lieuts. Leslie, Addison, J. A. Moore, and J. K. Donaldson had been killed, and Capt. A. McKean, Lieuts. B. H. McLachlan, A. J. Rafferty, W. R. C. Robertson, and R. E. Linklater wounded. (Banfield was of Ryde, N.S.W.; and Moore, Donaldson, McKean, McLachlan, Rafferty, Robertson, and Linklater of Sydney.)

⁴⁵ As far as can be ascertained the casualties were:

Gen. Russell's force:				Strength.		Loss.	
Unit.							
Australian detachment:							
Pt. 13th Bn.	250	..	103	
Pt. 14th Bn.	250	..	70	
N.Z.M.R. Bde.:							
Canterbury Regt.	200	}	209	
Otago Regt.	200			
29th (British) Inf. Bde.:							
10th Hants	335	.	134	
5th Connaught Rangers	700	..	198	
29th Indian Inf. Bde.	1,300	..	205	
Reserve:							
18th Aust. Inf. Bn.	750	..	383	
				3,985	..	1,302	

The full strength of the 18th Bn. was 1,004.

in the first Turkish trench. A barricade built across the Asmak creek-bed was blown down by the enemy, and the British flank was forced back to Kazlar Chair, from which it had started, 1,000 yards in rear of the Gurkha post at Susak Kuyu, the Turks still intervening near the "poplars." To fill this dangerous space, the 19th Battalion of the new Australian brigade was marched to the left and stationed near the gap. Cox reported that he believed the new line could be held, although the position on Hill 60 "cannot be considered satisfactory."

If the Battle of Sari Bair was the climax or the Gallipoli campaign, that of Scimitar Hill was its anti-climax. With it the great offensive ended. In the words of Kitchener's message received by Hamilton on July 11th:⁴⁶ ". . . . When the surprise ceases to be operative, in so far that the advance is checked and the enemy begin to collect from all sides to oppose the attackers, then perseverance becomes merely a useless waste of life." The attempt to prolong the offensive by driving through the flank of the enemy's now established trench-line had utterly failed; and Hamilton had not the troops, nor had all his troops the morale, necessary for a fresh attack. Birdwood, however, in agreement with his subordinate commanders, desired to strengthen his flank by capturing the summit of Hill 60, and he obtained leave to renew this effort on August 27th.⁴⁷

The two regiments of the mounted rifles, Otago and Canterbury, which had won the footing on the hill—together with a number of Maoris,⁴⁸ who had reinforced them, and the fragments of the 18th Battalion—were relieved on the night of August 23rd by the two remaining regiments of the Mounted Rifles Brigade, which had been brought into General Cox's area for the purpose.⁴⁹ The 4th Australian Brigade, which was equally weary, was strengthened by the addition of the 17th Battalion from the new Australian brigade. Except for a dangerous enfilade by a Turkish battery near Hill 971 on the main range, the New Zealanders at the foot of Hill 60 were

⁴⁶ See p. 440.

⁴⁷ This assault was at first projected for Aug. 25.

⁴⁸ See Vol. XII, plate 121.

⁴⁹ The Maoris, who during the later stages of this action had successfully garrisoned part of the Otago trench, were afterwards transferred from the mounted rifles to the N.Z. Inf. Bde.

not seriously disturbed.⁶⁰ The Turks were, however, at work nightly upon the upper part of the hill, and the New Zealand Howitzer Battery, which shot exceedingly well, was directed to hinder them by firing during the dark. It was decided that the attack should be made by the same units which had undertaken the previous assault. Repeated demands had, however, already been made on these troops. Moreover, the number of men who were being sent away through sickness was so great that general orders appear to have been issued to the medical service to exercise greater strictness. Accordingly the chief medical officer of the N.Z. & A. Division⁶¹ urged upon his subordinates that no man should be sent away who was fit, not to fight, but to stand in a trench and hold a rifle. A consequence of the sickness and previous losses was that the assaulting force—on this occasion 1,000 strong—was necessarily composed of numerous small detachments, each consisting of comparatively fit men from a number of regiments. The operation, which as before was to be directed by General Russell, was to be carried out by three bodies:—

Right Flank.

Detachment of 4th Aust. Inf. Bde. (under Col. Adams)—

14th Bn.	100	} (1st line)
15th Bn.	50	
13th Bn.	100	(2nd line)
17th Bn. (from new 5th Bde.)	100	(3rd line)
				<hr/> 350	

⁶⁰ On the night of Aug. 22, however, a strange incident occurred. About 11 p.m., the moon being up, some 300 Turks were seen coming out of the scrub in front of the left of the New Zealanders. It was supposed that they intended to surrender, and they were accordingly allowed to approach. It was then observed that they had their rifles slung round them, and that most of them carried two bombs attached to their belts. The New Zealanders and other troops signed to them to lay down their rifles and enter the trench. The enemy did not comply, and the proceedings were interrupted by shots fired by troops on the flanks who could not see what was passing and who caused the Turks once or twice to run away. At this stage, however, one of the enemy's officers ran forward and dropped into the New Zealand trench saying "Doctor!" About the same time Col. Grigor, commanding the N.Z. garrison, came to the spot and spoke to some of the enemy who were by then shaking hands with the men in the trench. Grigor, himself, a small man, took the hand of a big Turk who immediately began to pull him out of the trench. The New Zealander managed to struggle free and at once ordered fire to be opened. A few Turks were killed and the rest ran back into the scrub. The occurrence was interpreted by the staff as a treacherous ruse; but the captured officer, who proved to be an Armenian, stated afterwards to an interpreter that his battalion had captured three N.Z. prisoners, and its commander, thinking that more might surrender if given the opportunity, had instructed him to endeavour to induce their opponents to lay down their arms. This was undoubtedly the true explanation. A similar attempt was made at the same time in front of the 14th Sikhs.

⁶¹ Col. Beeston Col. Manders had been killed on Aug. 9 by one of the stray bullets which constantly fell at Godley's H.Q.

Centre.

Main portion of New Zealand Mounted Rifles (under Maj. Whyte)—⁵²

Canterbury and Auckland	..	150	(1st line)
Otago and Wellington	..	150	(2nd line)
18th Bn. (from new 5th Aust. Bde.)		100	(3rd line)

400

Left.

Detachment of 5th Connaught Rangers (under Maj. Money)⁵³—250.

Reserves were provided for the right and central forces, that in the centre being another 100 men of the 18th Australian Battalion.

As the attempt was certain to be met by heavy fire of all arms, General Russell, Colonel Monash, and all their officers, relying on the ability of colonial troops to find their way in the dark, favoured a night attack without bombardment. General Cox, however, decided to attack by daylight, having first crushed the opposition by an hour's heavy shelling. The available land artillery consisted of forty-five guns and howitzers, most of which were to bombard Hill 60 and the spur leading to it,⁵⁴ while the cruisers *Talbot* and *Grafton* and two destroyers, together with some of the land guns, covered the approaches and silenced the enemy's batteries on the main range. The bombardment was to commence at 4, the troops at 5 o'clock assaulting Hill 60 on three sides.


The course of the fight which followed—one of the most difficult in which Australian troops were ever engaged—was conditioned by the inaccuracy of the knowledge which the staff had so far succeeded in obtaining of the complicated defences of the hill. The simple method which was applied a few years later—that of sending an aeroplane to photograph the region from above—does not seem to have suggested itself, and the local staff based its maps upon what it could see from the front line on Damakjelic and from the Suvla area. But the hill was clothed with scrub four feet high, through which the trenches were difficult to trace. On the map which accompanied the orders issued by Generals Cox and Godley on August 26th they were shown as

⁵² Col. J. H. Whyte, D.S.O., M.C.; Wellington Mtd. Rifles. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Palmerston North, N.Z.; b. Wairoa, South Auckland, N.Z., 17 Dec., 1876.


⁵³ Maj. N. C. K. Money, D.S.O.; 5th Bn., Connaught Rangers. Officer of Indian Regular Army; b. Almora, India, 6 Dec., 1882. Died of wounds, 7 Sept., 1915.

⁵⁴ The howitzers were to fire 500 rounds of high-explosive at these positions.


in Map A in the margin. On that issued next day by General Russell to the leaders of his attacking force they appeared as in Map B. The central detachment was to attack from the sector marked "NZ," and moving across the open and through the trenches on its right was to capture "B₁," "B₂," "C," and all intervening trenches. The Connaughts on the left would start from the Indian line on both sides of "D," and proceed north-eastwards along it to join the New Zealanders at "C"—thus capturing "D-C," the same trench which the 18th Battalion had won and lost on August 22nd. The Australian detachment on the right would capture "A," "B₃," "B₂," and "B₁." The trenches on the hill at this time ran, almost certainly, not as shown in the maps of the staff, but as in Map C. During the bombardment, which opened at 4 p.m., all portions of the attacking force were brought to their starting positions. The detachment of the 4th Brigade was lined out partly in the small advanced trench beyond the Kaiajik Dere, but mainly to its left, in the *dere*



MAP A (copy of that issued on August 26).




MAP B (copy of that issued on August 27).



MAP C (compiled from aeroplane photographs taken in September, and from Turkish sources).

itself opposite the mouth of the small grassy re-entrant at the "wrist." The bombardment upon Hill 60 was heavy. But for some reason,⁵⁵ although General Russell had urged that special attention should be given to the trenches facing the Australian detachment, these were not bombarded. Only two shells of small calibre are said to have fallen upon them; so far, indeed, as this sector was concerned, the bombardment merely served to announce to the enemy that he was about to be attacked. While the men in the advanced trench awaited the order to charge, hostile rifle and machine-gun fire was tearing the parapet above their heads. When the whistle blew, and Captain Connelly⁵⁶ of the 14th led out the first line on to the wheatfield, it was at once swept away. Connelly, who had just returned from sick leave, was hit in three places and killed, and Captain Graham⁵⁷ wounded. Captain Cooper⁵⁸ with eight men got as far as a smaller oak-tree, growing near the larger one, and lay there in the shelter of a low hedge, eventually crawling back with a few survivors.

The line which attempted to charge up the little re-entrant was annihilated,⁵⁹ except on the extreme left near the New Zealanders; there a few men, swerving somewhat to their left, succeeded in reaching the point "B₁," on the extreme flank of their objective, and joined the New Zealanders.⁶⁰ Meanwhile the Turks, standing breast-high along their trench to shoot at the attacking party, had



⁵⁵ The available records give evidence of the fact, but throw no light upon the cause.

⁵⁶ Capt. C. E. Connelly; 14th Bn. Barrister and solicitor; of Bendigo, Vic., b. Bendigo, 29 May, 1885. Killed in action, 27 Aug., 1915.

⁵⁷ Capt. R. W. Graham; 14th Bn., Clerk; of Melbourne; b. Beechworth, Vic., 14 Nov., 1891.


⁵⁸ Capt. G. Cooper, M.C.; 14th Bn. Member of Aust. Permanent Forces, of Forest, Tas.; b. Birmingham, Eng., 1881.

⁵⁹ The Aust. Historical Mission in 1919 found the remains of Australian soldiers in this indentation at several points close to the Turkish trench, and a New Zealand (Hauroto) badge beside its parapet. Beside the burnt stump of the larger oak-tree an Australian had been buried, evidently by the enemy after the Evacuation.

⁶⁰ A short length of trench leading from "B₁" towards "B₃" was captured, and was eventually manned by some of these Australians together with the New Zealanders.

been observed by Captain Black of the 16th, who swept their parapet with his machine-gun, and one of Fergusson's mountain-guns burst shell after shell on the edge of the trench. But the assault by the Australian detachment had already completely failed, and, two-thirds of his men and all his officers, except Captain Cooper, being killed or wounded,⁶¹ Colonel Adams did not call upon his reserves. The fighting on the right flank therefore quickly ended.

In the centre, where the New Zealanders were to attack, the first line of the mounted rifles—150 of Canterbury and Auckland—had during the bombardment been lying in rear of the New Zealand trench. The moment the word was given they rose and went straight for the top of the hill. Although the bombardment upon this part of the front had been thorough, their line came at once under fire from Turks in a new trench which the enemy had dug across the hill parallel to the New Zealand trench and some seventy yards above it. This was known at the time as "No. 2 Trench."⁶² The Canterbury line bayoneted the Turks, and was just clearing the trench of the dead and débris when the second line, consisting of the Wellington and Otago detachments, came up. It assisted in clearing the trench, and then, in accordance with the plan, charged forward again to seize its objective—"C-B2." At forty yards



it was confronted with another trench, not "C-B2," but parallel to and slightly short of it. In the reports of the battle it was known as "No. 3 Trench,"⁶³ and, like No. 2, was shallow and

⁶¹ The officers killed were:—Capt. Connelly, 14th Bn.; Lieut. F. Gombert, 17th Bn. (Licensed surveyor; of Sydney). Wounded:—Capt. Graham, 14th Bn.; Capt. W. W. Coombs, 15th Bn. (Accountant; of Brisbane); Lieuts. A. N. Brierley, 13th Bn. (Accountant's clerk; of Sydney); M. L. Clarke, 13th Bn. (Architect; of North Sydney, N.S.W.); J. Annoni, 13th Bn. (Labourer; of Sydney); R. E. Pye, 17th Bn. (Grazier; of Sydney); R. C. Anderson, 17th Bn. (Bank clerk, of Sydney). The total losses in the 4th Bde (including a few casualties among men not actually engaged in the attack) were 154, and in the 17th Bn. 76—total 230.

⁶² The troops at the time called it "Blair's Trench," after Capt. Blair, the adjutant of the Canterbury Regt. It was afterwards named by the British "Grenadiers' Alley."



⁶³ It was afterwards called by the British "Turkey Trot."



HILL 60 (ANZAC), SHOWING THE POSITION ON THE NIGHT OF 27TH AUGUST, 1915

British trenches, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 10 metres.

unfinished. This, when seized, was found to be almost choked with Turks who had been killed in the bombardment. It was at first under fierce fire from "C-B2" on the right, from which the enemy had not yet been cleared, although other parties of the mounted rifles were, in accordance with their orders, bombing up through the maze of saps on that flank. A special party having been sent out to suppress this fire by clearing some of the saps, the Wellington Mounted Rifles attempted to charge to their final objective, the trench leading from "B2" to the point "C," at which they were to join the Connaught Rangers, and thus enclose the position. While wheeling to make this attack, Wellington was met by very heavy fire and suffered heavily, but some men appear to have reached point "C",⁶⁴ and bombing parties also began to fight through the trenches northwards from "B2" towards that position. Meanwhile the Connaught Rangers, attacking along the north-western side of the hill, had quickly seized most of the northern trench, "D-C," the leading party under Lieutenant Lewis⁶⁵ gaining the greater part of it in the first rush, and later lines (which lost heavily in crossing the open) gaining touch near "C" with a party of New Zealanders from the southern side.




Thus by 6 o'clock the hill had apparently been taken; but the process had been far more difficult than the inaccurate maps had led the staff to believe. It will be seen that between "B1" and "C" there existed, not the straight sap which was shown

⁶⁴ The records of the Connaught Rangers definitely say so, and the dead of both the Rangers and the New Zealanders could be seen next day lying near that point.

⁶⁵ Lieut. S. H. Lewis; 5th Bn., Connaught Rangers. Officer of British Regular Army; b. 29 July, 1890. Killed in action, 27 Aug., 1915.


on the maps, but a network of crooked trenches, four or five of which led into a nest of enemy works, and must therefore be blocked and held. This task would presumably be carried out by the third line of the central attack—100 men of the 18th Australian Battalion under Major Lane. But this line, starting from the open near the sunken road and coming up the lower slopes of the hill, had been met by the whirlwind of shrapnel and small-arms fire which the previous lines had aroused. The troops were inexperienced, and their progress slower and less effective than that of the mounted rifles. The gallant Lane with some of his men reached Trench "3," and was killed in the bomb-fighting which ensued near its eastern end. The reserve of 100 of the 18th, which had been held ready under Captain Goodsell in the Kaiajik Dere sap, was also sent up the hill immediately after the commencement of the attack. In the very heavy fire it became split up. Lieutenant Pritchard,⁶⁶ leading its first line, was at once hit, as were many of his men. Part of the company seems to have made no headway, but part after severe losses reached the left of Trench "2," a completely exposed position from which it was presently driven forward by enfilading Turkish shrapnel into the better protection of Trench "3." Shortly afterwards, in spite of the shell-fire on the approaches, large Turkish reinforcements could be seen arriving through communication trenches on the farther side of the hill. General Russell therefore ordered the mounted rifles to hold fast what they had won, and directed the rest of the 18th Battalion to move up into close reserve, and to send forward through the trenches another hundred men with picks and shovels and sandbags to assist the New Zealanders in consolidating their position.



⁶⁶ Lieut. H. R. Pritchard; 18th Bn. Clerk; of Sydney; b. Haberfield, N.S.W., 12 March, 1895. (Pritchard was returned to Australia and discharged. He subsequently re-enlisted as a gunner in the artillery, with which he served until the end of the war.)

But the Connaught Rangers had never been able to hold point "C" firmly, and—as happened to the 18th Battalion on August 22nd—the Turkish reinforcements, flooding into the network of trenches at that end of the position, began to bomb them back. The New Zealanders with whom they were in touch were only a few detached men, and were either killed or driven in. Major Money, commanding the Connaught detachment, appealed to Russell to reinforce him, making it clear that unless reinforced he could not hold his position. But Russell, having by then used most of the 18th Battalion in supporting the mounted rifles—who were equally hard pressed in the maze of trenches between "B1" and "Z"—had no other troops⁶⁷ to send him, and the Rangers were consequently by 9.30 driven back to their starting point at "D." For the second time this trench had been won and lost.

The situation now was that the New Zealanders held, besides their original position ("NZ"), the trench up the hill from "B1" to "B2," a portion—about 40 yards long—of "B1," and the right-hand portion of Trenches "2" and "3." In addition the trenches leading eastward from "B1-B2," and that which has been marked "Z" upon the maps, were secured for a certain distance, and were retained in spite of constant bomb-attacks. This could only be done by erecting in each of these avenues a second barricade in rear of that by which it was first blocked. From behind the rearmost barrier the garrison flung bombs into the space between the two, and thus succeeded in denying that space to the enemy and keeping him at a distance. But, while the right flank was thus firmly established, it was known that the left flank in both Trenches "2" and "3" was "in the air." Little was known of the




⁶⁷ The remainder of the 5th Connaught Rangers, forty-four men, were sent in to assist Maj. Money.

exact situation there even by the officers on the spot; yet it was evident that, from the moment when the enemy drove back the Connaught Rangers and reoccupied "C-D," the position of the left must be highly dangerous. For security "C-D" must be recaptured, so that touch might be gained along it with the troops in Trenches "2" or "3."

At 9 p.m., therefore, the 9th Regiment of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade was obtained by Russell from Cox "with a view to making a final rush for the remainder of the hill." The intention at first was that a body of the 9th should advance up "D-C" as far as "X," and there connect with another body of the regiment similarly advancing from Trench "2." The maps, however, were misleading, neither Trench "2" nor Trench "3" running precisely as shown in those that had been issued. No. 3 "petered out" into the scrub before reaching "C-D," and No. 2 connected with it only through a zig-zagged excavation. This contained pockets in which Turks were strongly established, almost in the heart of the New Zealand position, and from which they were throwing bombs into "2" and "3." To meet these bombs and the fire from "C-D," a part of the 18th Battalion (which by then constituted a large proportion of the garrison) deepened and manned an unfinished communication trench connecting "2" to "3," and held part of it as a fire-trench facing the flank from which this bombing came. The precise source of the bombing, however, was as unknown to those on the spot as it was to the staff.

Into this uncertain and excessively complicated position were led by night the detachments of the 9th Light Horse. The regiment was, comparatively speaking, intact, not having taken part in the actual charge at The Nek on August 7th. At 11.30 Major Parsons⁶⁸ with fifty men was guided to "D" with



⁶⁸ Col. H. M. Parsons, D.S.O., V.D.; 9th L.H. Regt. Grazier, of Victor Harbour, S. Aust.; b Inman Valley, S. Aust., 22 Mar., 1880

instructions to bomb up the trench towards "C," while Colonel Reynell with Captains Jaffray⁶⁹ and Callary,⁷⁰ Lieutenant McDonald,⁷¹ and seventy-five men were taken to the trench originally captured by the New Zealanders and directed to move across the open to the New Zealand position in Trench "2." The plan of attacking along Trench "2" had by then been abandoned, and Reynell's duty was merely to reinforce its garrison. The precise story of this night-operation will never be known; but it appears that the main party, after lining out in the scrub in front of the original "NZ" trench, charged over; the greater part, however, veering slightly to the left, reached not Trench "2" but a sector of "C-D," where they came upon Major Parsons in the act of bombing towards "C." Colonel Reynell thereupon at once altered the direction of the attack, and again led forward the main party towards the position in which—if they had existed—the trenches connecting "2" and "3" with "C-D" would have been found. A fierce fire was opened upon the party and bombs were thrown. The troops were consequently driven, or directed themselves, to the Turkish trench near "Y," and thus for the third time since August 21st this trench was entered, if not captured. It was afterwards reported that those who now occupied it were caught by a Turkish machine-gun which had been emplaced at "C" so as to sweep the trench. For the time being the fate of Colonel Reynell and most of his party was unknown. Lieutenant McDonald and four men managed to return along "D-C," which they found crowded with the dead and dying. The enemy counter-attacked along it, bombing Parsons back to "D." For the third time the trench was lost, but on this occasion Parsons succeeded in regaining eighty yards of it beyond point "D." Such was the position when daylight broke.


During August 28th the New Zealanders and the 18th Battalion were able to clean out and deepen their trenches. Slender barricades of sandbags were built at the left of the line

⁶⁹ Capt. A. J. Jaffray; 9th L.H. Regt. Farmer; of Wallacedale, Vic.; b. Hamilton, Vic., 4 July, 1883. Killed in action, 28 Aug., 1915.

⁷⁰ Capt. P. I. Callary; 9th L.H. Regt. Storekeeper; of Petersborough, S. Aust.; b. Petersborough, 21 July, 1886. Killed in action, 28 Aug., 1915.

⁷¹ Capt. J. M. McDonald, M.C.; 9th L.H. Regt. Civil servant; b. Semaphore, S. Aust., 24 March, 1890.

in Trenches "2" and "3," and the nature of the gap between those points and "C-D" became better understood,⁷² both by the garrison and by the staff. It was then decided to send forward parties from the end of Trenches "2" and "3" to seize—for the fourth time—a length of "C-D." A few bombers were to issue immediately before the attack and silence with bombs the dangerous Turkish machine-gun at "C." Meanwhile a larger bombing party would advance from "D" through the trench towards "C" in order to meet there the main assaulting parties. This time no attempt was to be made to capture the trench as far as point "C," but it was to be held for thirty yards east of "Y." A sap would then be dug from "Y" to the end of Trench "3," so as to obtain touch with the New Zealanders and round off the position.



At 4 p.m. General Godley visited the 10th Light Horse Regiment, then bivouacked at Damakjelik, and informed the officers that he wanted them to take a trench on the summit of Hill 60. "I know you will get it," he said. "It's the holding that is the difficulty." All the junior officers were then taken to a position from which most of the trenches on Hill 60 were visible, and the squadron leaders were guided across the Kaiajik Dere in order to see the position from Trenches "2" and "3."⁷³ About midnight the regiment, then

⁷² On this day Chaplain the Rev. W. Grant (of Gisborne and Wellington, N.Z.) of the mounted rifles and another chaplain went out over the low barricade in Trench "2" in order to reach a wounded man of the mounted rifles who was said to be lying farther along it. They bandaged several of the wounded Turks, of whom the sap was full, and then coming to a bend heard voices which Grant's companion believed to be those of the enemy. After lying still for a while Grant said, "We'll just see if he's here," and pushed round the corner. He was immediately shot dead by Turks beyond the bend.

⁷³ The situation was still so difficult to comprehend that some of the officers were in favour of further postponement. Russell, however, pointed out that this would give the enemy time to strengthen his position, and that it was better to attack without more delay.

consisting of 180 men organised in two squadrons, was led across the *dere* into Trenches "2" and "3." The troops were squeezed past the garrison to the western or left-hand end of each position. Captain Fry commanded the squadron in Trench "3," and Captain Robertson,⁷⁴ a Duntroon graduate, that in No. 2. The hour for the assault was 1 a.m., and about ten minutes beforehand Lieutenant Sanderson was hoisted out of Trench "3," followed by his four bombers, and after crawling in the supposed direction of the enemy's machine-gun at "C" lay still and waited. A few minutes later the first line under Fry was seen in the moonlight to rise from Trench "3" and surge silently forward. The line from Trench "2," however, cheered as it started. A machine-gun immediately flashed in the dark near point "C," and Turks in one of the trenches near "X" opened fire. Sanderson's bombers at once smothered the machine-gun with their bombs, killing its crew. The leading lines almost immediately reached "C-D," in which the greater part of the garrison was just scrambling to its feet. The Turks were bayoneted. Lieutenant MacBean,⁷⁵ who leapt in well ahead of his troop, ran along the trench followed by his men, shot a Turk, and was shot dead by the next one. But the required position east of point "Y" was swiftly gained. Almost at the same moment the other bombing party—a detachment of the 9th Light Horse under Lieutenant McDonald—came up the trench from point "D," advancing so rapidly that it narrowly escaped a struggle with the troops of the 10th into whom it ran. The second lines came across from Trenches "2" and "3," carrying tools and sandbags. Thus within a few minutes the full objective had been taken. The casualties so far had not exceeded twenty, and had occurred mainly in the second squadron.⁷⁶


The trench "C-D" was found to be in parts almost choked with Turkish dead, mingled with the dead of the 9th Light

⁷⁴ Brig H C H Robertson, D S O., p s c, G S O (3), Yeomanry Mtd. Div., 1917/18; A A G, A.I.F. in Egypt, 1919. Commands 19th Inf. Bde, A.I.F., 1940. Duntroon graduate, of Western district, Vic.; b. Warrnambool, Vic., 29 Oct., 1894.

⁷⁵ Lieut. C. H. MacBean; 10th L.H. Regt Farmer; of Claremont, W Aust; b. Melbourne, 1892. Killed in action, 29 Aug., 1915.

⁷⁶ Lieut. I. C. Burges (of Irwin, W. Aust.) and a number of men in this squadron had been hit by the Turkish machine-gun when it first opened

Horse.⁷⁷ Time being urgent, Captain Fry ran along the parapet, giving instructions to his men until some of them almost forced him to come down into shelter. His second line, under Lieutenant Throssell,⁷⁸ having arrived with their tools, a barricade was at once begun near a bend of the trench between "Y" and "C." During the building of this Throssell stood on guard. Shortly afterwards, as the Turks began to feel their way back along "D-C," he shot five in succession at this corner before the enemy ascertained the position of the Australians and began to bomb. Throssell and his men were still constructing the barricade, and attempting to set up a few yards of overhead cover in rear of it, when the bomb-fighting began. In this fight, for the first time in the campaign, an entirely adequate store of grenades had been supplied, some 2,500 having been brought up to Damakjelic beforehand, and two given to each man as he went. Thus from the first there was a good supply of grenades with the attacking force, and as soon as trench "D-C" was captured further provision could be made.



It was this bomb-supply alone that enabled a body of spirited and determined men—Corporal Ferrier,⁷⁹ Lance-Corporal Macnee,⁸⁰ Troopers McMahon,⁸¹ Renton,⁸² Sergeants

⁷⁷ The bodies of Col. Reynell and Capt Jaffray were found—Reynell lying in the open near "Y." The winding, unfinished trench between No 2 and "X" also proved to be almost full of Turkish dead. Chaplain Grant's body was discovered there.

⁷⁸ Capt. H. V. H. Throssell, VC; 10th L.H. Regt. Farmer, of Cowcowing, W. Aust.; b. Northam, W. Aust., 27 Oct., 1884. Died, 19 Nov., 1933.

⁷⁹ Cpl. S. H. Ferrier (No. 176, 10th L.H. Regt.). Landowner; of Casterton, Vic; b Carapook, Vic., 1879. Died of wounds, 9 Sept., 1915.

⁸⁰ Lieut. H. M. Macnee, M.C., D.C.M.; 10th L.H. Regt. Pearler; of Broome, W. Aust.; b. Fitzroy, Vic., 14 Feb., 1887.

⁸¹ Pte F. McMahon (No. 89, 10th L.H. Regt.). Teamster, of Perth, W. Aust., b Tongala, Vic., 1894. Killed in action, 29 Aug., 1915.

⁸² Pte. T. Renton, D.C.M. (No. 969, 10th L.H. Regt.). Miner; of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Liverpool, Eng, 1877.

MacMillan,⁸³ Henderson,⁸⁴ and others, with Lieutenant Throssell as their leader—to hold this exposed position during the violent counter-attacks which followed. From the time when the Turks began to return to their positions, Throssell and his men were employed almost continuously both in picking up enemy bombs and hurling them back at the Turks, and in throwing their own—which they were careful to do with a much shorter fuse.⁸⁵

Some time after the bombing had begun the Turks hurled at the barricade a large bomb which appeared to be a biscuit tin filled with explosive. It burst, blowing down the sandbags, and at the same instant a line of Turks, clearly visible in the moonlight, clambered out near “C,” beyond the barricade, and made a rush for the Australian trench. No machine-gun was at hand to resist this attack, but Throssell’s party and the garrison farther west met it with a shower of bombs and heavy rifle-fire, under which it melted away. About this time Lieutenant Leake,⁸⁶ son of a former Premier of Western Australia, was looking out to the north-east—the direction from which this attack came—when he was shot through the head from the rear. It was then realised that there must be Turks in the trenches to the south of “C-D” as well as to the east and north-east. For the moment, however, no open attack was made from that direction.

The first counter-attack had thus been repulsed. A new barricade had been partly built five or ten yards in rear of the first one, and, when driven from the first, Throssell and his men retired behind this and held it. A quarter of an hour after the first counter-attack a second shower of Turkish bombs came over, and a longer line of the enemy emerged, charging from the north-east. Again it was met with bombs and

⁸³ Sgt. J. L. MacMillan (No 5020, 10th L.H. Regt.). Grazier; of Metung, Vic; b. Morwell, Vic., 1873.


⁸⁴ Lieut. W. J. Henderson, D.C.M.; 10th L.H. Regt. Accountant; of Perth, W. Aust.; b. Hawthorn, Vic., 10 Oct., 1889. Died of illness, 9 March, 1921.

⁸⁵ The Anzac practice was, after lighting a bomb, to count slowly “one, two, three,” before throwing it. On this occasion the result was that no grenade thrown by the Australians was returned by the Turks.

⁸⁶ Lieut. G. A. Leake; 10th L.H. Regt. Solicitor; of Perth and Kellerberrin. W. Aust.; b. Perth, 10 July, 1887. Killed in action, 29 Aug., 1915.

rifle-fire; a few Turks almost reached the parapet, but the attack melted away. The gallant Fry, however, had been killed by an enemy grenade, and from this time onward Throssell was left in sole command of that end of the trench.

The bomb-fighting continued until shortly before day-break, when the third and most serious counter-attack was launched. On this occasion the enemy issued from his main line lower down the slope to the northward. As the Turks crept forward through the scrub before making their rush, their bayonets were seen; when they charged, although no machine-gun was yet available, their line was met with a hurricane of rifle-fire. Some of the 10th jumped upon the parapet, and at ranges of from ten to twenty yards just succeeded in overcoming the attack. A second wave was similarly repulsed. The Turks then attempted to charge from both front and rear. In the midst of the shouting which followed someone spoke the word "Retire." It was met by angry cries of "Who said retire?" The men held their ground, and five or six New Zealanders and men of the 18th Battalion on the southern side, observing the threat to the rear of the 10th, ran out into the open with a machine-gun and brought it to bear upon the enemy. At the same instant Lieutenant Kidd⁸⁷ had charged out in that direction with a dozen of the 10th. The Turks on the southern side, who were then lying down and flinging bombs behind the Australian barricade, ran back into their trench, and the third and most dangerous counter-attack ended. It had lasted for an hour. A fourth was made about 6 a.m., but without heart. The fighting then subsided. Throssell, twice wounded, was at the time holding his third barricade, having been forced to give up twenty yards of trench.⁸⁸



⁸⁷ This was Kidd's third heavy fight—the first being his sortie from Quinn's on May 30, and the second the charge at The Nek on Aug. 7.

⁸⁸ For gallantry during this fight Throssell was awarded the Victoria Cross

Ferrier, who was reputed to have thrown 500 bombs, was still beside him.⁸⁹ The position was maintained, and a connecting trench was shortly afterwards dug through to the New Zealanders.

Thus ended the action at Hill 60. Birdwood believed that the actual knoll had been captured, and so reported to Hamilton, who wrote: "Knoll 60, now ours throughout, commands the Biyuk Anafarta valley with view and fire—a big tactical scoop." As a matter of fact half the summit—or possibly rather more—was still in possession of the Turks. The fighting of August 27th, 28th, and 29th had, however, given the troops on the left of Anzac a position astride the spur from which a fairly satisfactory view could be had over the plain to the "W" Hills. The cost was over 1,100 casualties.⁹⁰ The burden of the work had been sustained by war-worn troops. The magnificent brigade of New Zealand Mounted Rifles, which was responsible for the main advances, had been worked until it was almost entirely consumed, its four regiments at the end numbering only 365 all told.⁹¹ The 4th Australian Infantry Brigade which, through defective co-ordination with the artillery,⁹² had been twice thrown against a difficult objective without a chance of success, was reduced to 968.⁹³

⁸⁹ Shortly afterwards Ferrier was attempting to throw back a Turkish bomb when it burst in his hand, blowing away the arm to the elbow. He walked to the medical aid-post, but died on the hospital ship. Macnee was twice wounded. Renton lost his leg. McMahon was killed.

⁹⁰ N.Z.M.R. Bde.	363
4th A.I. Bde. and 17th Bn.	230
18th Bn.	256
Connaught Rangers	(about)	150
9th L.H.	86
10th L.H.	63
				<hr/>
				1,148

⁹¹ Although the brigade had received several drafts of reinforcements, the Otago Mtd. Rifles, which fought throughout under Col. Grigor and Lieut. F. M. Twisleton (of Gisborne district, N.Z.), had on Aug. 29 only 4 officers and 56 men left; Canterbury had 2 officers and 35; Wellington 6 officers and 122; and Auckland 4 officers and 136.

⁹² Gen. Monash and the staff of the brigade had no responsibility for these arrangements.

⁹³ The 4th Bde. on Aug. 29 numbered—

Bde. H.Q.	20
Signal Section	26
13th Bn.	285
14th Bn.	192
15th Bn.	210
16th Bn.	235
				<hr/>
				968

The 5th Connaught Rangers had been reduced from 700 on Aug. 21 to about 250 on Aug. 29; the 10th Hampshire from 335 to 194; and the 18th Aust. Bn. from 1,004 to 386.

General Russell and his brigade-major, Powles, had worked untiringly, the latter personally guiding almost every attacking party to its starting point in the dangerous maze of trenches. It was not their fault that at this stage of the war both staff and commanders were only learning the science of trench-warfare. Had the experience and the instruments of later years been available, the action at Hill 60 would doubtless have been fought differently.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FATE OF THE EXPEDITION

THE story of the men fighting in Gallipoli is now caught up in the tempests of European politics at a time of peculiar stress. For two or three months their fate was buffeted between the sharply divergent interests of a dozen different Powers, and became incidentally subject to gusts and cross-winds arising from the intrigues of political parties and the varying ambitions of statesmen and generals. Among the conflicting influences of that critical period, amid much that now seems pitifully wrongheaded and futile and not a little that appears petty and selfish, the reader of current histories will perceive with relief two winds which blew true and constant—the endeavour of the people of France and England, and of the majority of their administrators, to see and do whatever was best and most honourable for the Allied cause, Unfortunately, through differences in national circumstances and temperament, those endeavours often tended in precisely opposite directions.

There was a traditional divergence of opinion between Britain and the Continental Powers concerning the usefulness of such enterprises as the expedition to the Dardanelles. Continental soldiers favoured a policy of concentrating all effort in the only blow which would kill an adversary—a home-thrust at heart or head. The policy of Britain, on the other hand, had often been to strike at the foe's outer limbs, a course which by means of her wide sea-power she was peculiarly able to take. While Continental theory—often with justification—was apt to regard these side-strokes as sheer waste of strength, Britain had found that for her forces—a small army and a great navy—such strategy was especially practicable. In the Great War the justification for measures of this sort was that, though they would not immediately kill, they might so injure as to turn the scale in the vital struggle long before it could be turned by what seemed the only alternative means—the final exhaustion of one side or the other. If the adversary's head and heart were so protected that attacks upon them could only succeed after years of effort and enormous losses on both sides, then there seemed every reason for attempting to

incapacitate him more swiftly by some adroit stroke at his limbs.

Such, in essence, was the policy of the British Government in 1915; and, although the staff of the British Army then in the main supported the Continental theory and urged the concentration of all possible strength upon an overwhelming blow in France, there can be little doubt that the Government's policy was justified. Not even with a far greater preponderance in numbers, and with infinitely more ammunition than the French and British possessed in 1915, would their armies on the Western Front have had any real chance of breaking through and "rolling-up" the German line. It was with the realisation of this fact that Churchill's nimble brain had perceived a vulnerable point in the outer limbs of his adversary—a spot in reality almost as vital as the heart—the point where the far-extended arm¹ of the enemy was preventing Britain and France from assisting their great ally Russia, and from which, instead, Germany herself was likely to reach out for her most cherished objectives—Baghdad and the way to Egypt, Persia, Afghanistan, and the farther East. If a successful stroke at that point would not immediately kill Germany, it would raise the Balkan States against her, crush Turkey, and revive Russia; the fall of Austria and then of Germany herself would probably follow. Rather than take the risk that this blow might not be delivered at all, Churchill's impatient desire—the father of his judgment—committed his country to delivering it at once under wrong conditions, and so attached to it the almost overwhelming disadvantage under which it laboured from the beginning. The task had thus been made infinitely more costly and difficult, but the result was still to be attained if only sufficient strength could be put into the attempt.

The British Government realised that by no possible use of the then available power could so great a result be obtained on the Western Front. Any attempt to break through the enemy's continuous line in the West would involve a frontal attack by an enormous force supported by a tremendous artillery. The notion of those who advocated this plan was that, a breach having been made in the German front, the

¹ It would, however, be unsafe to press this analogy of the heart and limbs to all its logical implications.

reserves would be put into it to "roll-up" the enemy's line in one direction or the other and, by cutting off part of his troops, or at least threatening their communications, force him into the evacuation of large areas of territory, if not into complete submission. This method was naturally favoured whole-heartedly by the French, a great part of whose country was occupied by the enemy. But the several experiments which had been made during the early summer—the battles in Artois—had completely failed to achieve the desired end. The losses had been enormous, but, though the enemy's line was at least once broken, his morale was not; a few determined bodies of German troops with machine-guns, although isolated, had proved able to bar the later stages of the advance. Commanders and staffs, however, always tended to believe that the supreme effort should be devoted to the theatre in which they were interested. The Allied commanders in France were convinced that an offensive in the West would succeed if supported by more artillery and ammunition, and if the front of the attack were widened. General Joffre therefore conceived the plan of launching in September—when the French ammunition factories would be reaching their full output—an attack upon a colossal scale in Champagne. His British colleague, Sir John French, was prepared to co-operate by undertaking an offensive on a larger scale than any hitherto launched by the British.

The generals in France, however, were alone in their optimism as to the results to be expected from this offensive. Concentration at the "decisive point" at the "decisive time" would unquestionably have been sound strategy; but the decisive time in France could not possibly occur in 1915. Though France might be ready for the offensive, it was certain that the British preparations would not be approaching completion. A gigantic effort in munition-making, corresponding to that undertaken by the French after the Battle of the Marne in 1914, had not been set on foot in the United Kingdom until after the fighting at Fromelles² and Festubert in 1915, when, upon the reconstruction of the Government, David Lloyd

² In this action, fought on 9 May, 1915, the British infantry were held up by uncut wire in front of the German trenches. Such actions emphasised the need for artillery and ammunition. The War Office had, it is true, already expanded the ammunition-supply to nearly twenty times its pre-war extent, nevertheless the most important national effort was not made until the summer of 1915.

George had been charged with this responsibility in the new Ministry of Munitions. The full output, by which the staff hoped to be enabled to pound its way through the German lines in the West, would not begin to be reached until the following year. Kitchener was therefore strongly opposed to the offensive projected by Joffre and French for September. He was convinced that to launch any serious offensive before Britain, France, and Russia could bring their full strength to bear would be a throwing away of the chances of success. Joffre vehemently differed. A conference was accordingly held at Calais on July 6th, at which Kitchener in "a meteoric moment"³ brought the French Government to his side and secured an agreement that no further serious offensive should be undertaken in the West until the spring of 1916. Thus in August Great Britain was still free to devote her main effort, as she had in reality done since April, to the thrust at the Dardanelles.

When the fighting at Suvla began to subside, the Government did not immediately realise that the August offensive in Gallipoli had completely failed. Even Hamilton, writing on August 17th that with his present troops he proposed "to seize Ismail Oglu Tepe and Anafarta Sagir at the earliest moment," was unaware how thoroughly and strongly he was hemmed in. Nevertheless he did recognise, what the Government apparently did not, that a fresh offensive would be necessary⁴ for the purpose of breaking out through the enemy's line. He telegraphed that, to bring the campaign "to an early and successful conclusion," 100,000 additional troops would be required.⁵ An even greater effort was at the moment undoubtedly within the power of Great Britain in consequence of the newly-settled policy for the Western Front.

During these very days, however, the policy adopted at the Calais conference was completely reversed.⁶ The

³ See *The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener*, p. 140, by Viscount Esher.

⁴ Apparently he intended, when reinforced, to make a further attack upon Kavak Tepe and also upon Hill 971.

⁵ He required 50,000 reinforcements and 50,000 in new divisions.

⁶ According to Winston Churchill, however (*The World Crisis*, 1915, p. 463), the French Commander-in-Chief, Gen. Joffre, had never intended to abide by the July agreement. "No sooner . . . had Gen. Joffre left the conference than, notwithstanding these agreements, he calmly resumed the development of his plans for his great attack in Champagne."

tremendous series of blows which was being dealt by German and Austrian armies against Russia caused the French Government to fear that, if the Allies deliberately remained motionless in the West, Russia, as in 1807, might make a separate peace. On August 20th Kitchener, who had been invited to Joffre's headquarters in France, agreed that the September offensive must, after all, be undertaken. It was to be on a scale "greater than anything ever before conceived."¹ The French had no less than forty divisions available, and immense quantities of ammunition had been hoarded since June. The British preparations of men and material were not nearly complete, but Joffre was confident of success. His optimism was not shared by Kitchener; but, if France were left to attack alone, her alliance with Britain would be strained. For political reasons, therefore, the British Government felt it impossible to refuse its help. Since no limit could be put to the requirements of an offensive on the Western Front, Hamilton's request for 100,000 men had to be definitely refused. On August 20th he was informed of the intended Western offensive, and was told that he "must understand that no reinforcements of importance can be diverted from the main theatre of operations—France."

The policy which initiated the Battles of Champagne and Loos therefore struck dead any immediate hope of successful attack in Gallipoli. It seemed to Hamilton, however, that the Government was further assuming that his army could hold on indefinitely without reinforcement. He therefore instructed one of the younger members of his staff, Major Dawnay, to draft a reply, which, though toned down by himself, was the most alarming that the Government had received from the Dardanelles. "Naturally I shall keep on trying to harry the Turks by local attacks," it said. But, after pointing out that sickness had been so heavy that there were only 50,000 men to hold the Anzac-Suvla front (over thirteen miles in length), "it appears inevitable," the reply concluded, "that within the next fortnight I shall be compelled to relinquish either Suvla Bay or Anzac Cove, and must also envisage the possibility of a further reduction of my front

¹ Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 1915, p. 463.

in the near future." The second withdrawal would be "into the original Anzac position."

Hamilton afterwards realised that his fears had been overstated in this telegram, but it gave, as was intended, a severe shock to the Government. The completeness of the failure at Suvla was now nakedly apparent. Although serious rifts were appearing in the Cabinet, the majority of Ministers had no intention of abandoning the Gallipoli campaign; the general feeling was that it must still be supported to the fullest extent which the needs of the offensive in France would permit. Meanwhile Hamilton also discovered that the strength of the reinforcements which were being sent to him was greater than he had imagined when his telegram was despatched,^a and on August 27th he informed Kitchener that this news altered the situation. That is to say, although his force, when so strengthened, would be insufficient to end the campaign before the winter, it could for the present maintain all three positions—Helles, Anzac, and Suvla. On the same day the Dardanelles Committee asked him to hold for the present the ground which had been gained. Yet the rough weather of autumn and winter was approaching, and it was recognised that an early decision was urgently needed.

At this juncture, when the impending offensive in the West was paralysing the campaign in Gallipoli, there came an offer of assistance from the very direction from which it was least expected. The French Government, which had appeared increasingly opposed to the commitment at the Dardanelles, and which had pressed Britain into the offensive in the West, inquired on September 1st whether Great Britain could supply the transport for four French divisions from Marseilles to the *Ægean*. The reason for this extraordinary change of policy could not even be guessed, but the British Ministry welcomed it as an almost miraculous deliverance from the gravest dangers then threatening. If France could spare four divisions for the Dardanelles, Great Britain would make a further powerful effort, and there was little doubt that the army now clinging to its hold on Gallipoli would quickly be enabled to reach its objectives—a

^a Various drafts and units amounting to 20,000 were at this time either on their way or about to proceed to him.

consummation which at one stroke would resolve the almost overwhelming difficulties then portending in Russia and the Balkans. Balfour, at the Admiralty, hurried to contrive the necessary transport for the French troops, who, it was ascertained, were to reach the Dardanelles in October. Kitchener went to France to obtain from the French Minister for War further information concerning the project.

The explanation of the proposed change in high policy then became apparent. The French general Sarrail, who was in high favour with the more advanced groups in French politics, and who till July 22nd had commanded the army defending Verdun, had on that date been deprived by Joffre of his command without the Government being first informed. In consequence of the strength of Sarrail's influence among the deputies, the French Government had found it necessary to seek at once for a suitable command to which he could be appointed, and, sharing the British fears about the Balkans, had cast its eyes upon the East. It happened that General Gouraud, commanding the French Corps at Cape Helles, had just been wounded. But Sarrail refused the offer of this position on the ground that he could not accept a command inferior to that of which he had been deprived. "His conditions for taking up the proffered post were that a separate 'Army of the East' should be formed, that he was not to be under the British Commander-in-Chief, and that he was not to leave France till he could sail with the reinforcing divisions."⁹ Briand, whose influence was strong in the French Government, had long advocated intervention at Salonica, and therefore favoured the "Army of the East." Sarrail had accordingly, on August 3rd, been gazetted to the command of an army so entitled—though it had as yet no troops—and had been asked to submit plans for its employment. As Joffre ruled out any enterprise from Salonica—which Sarrail first favoured—the schemes had to be confined to the Dardanelles. It had been decided that the army should consist of six French divisions, the two French divisions at Helles being added to the four to be sent from France. They would land during October on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles and march thence on Chanak in conjunction with

⁹ Sir Julian Corbett in the British Official Naval History, *Naval Operations*, Vol. III, p. 110.

renewed British attacks upon the Peninsula. The British Government agreed to send two British divisions from France to take the place of the two French divisions at Helles; and it also intimated that, if Sarraill operated south of the Dardanelles, it would be possible to agree to his main condition—that he should be in independent command.¹⁰

It seemed for a moment that the personal ambition of generals and the intrigues of politics, of which the lives of brave soldiers are too often the sport and their bodies the pawns, might in this case actually operate to save the Gallipoli expedition and shorten the war; but the hope was soon dimmed. Kitchener's visit to France in the second week of September disclosed that the proposals "were in a very indefinite state, owing apparently to a decision having been arrived at by the French Government without reference to their military advisers." Joffre disapproved of the whole plan, and insisted that no troops could be moved from the West until after the Champagne-Loos offensive, which would be launched on September 25th. Neither he nor Sir John French could name any precise date at which the troops for Gallipoli would be available. For a second time, therefore, the advocates of an early victory at the Dardanelles had to give way to those who pressed for the concentration of all possible strength upon the Western Front. The "Army of the East" might still proceed to the Dardanelles, but, with the date so uncertain, much might happen to prevent it. This was undoubtedly a disappointment to that section of the British Ministry—including Asquith, Balfour, Kitchener, and Churchill—whose keenest hope appears still to have lain in the chance of early success in Gallipoli.

The hope now was that Sarraill's army and the two British divisions might begin embarking in mid-October, in which case the whole reinforcement would probably be concentrated near the Dardanelles by the middle of November.

¹⁰ It is impossible not to contrast the attitude of Sir Ian Hamilton. On Sept. 17 he sent a telegram favouring on the whole the French plan of a separate attack south of the straits, and agreeing that it could be separately commanded. On the other hand, if the French force was to operate with the British from Suvla or Anzac, "I would ask the Allied Governments to make up their minds which general had the most daring, brains, and experience, and if it were the Frenchman I would serve under him loyally." The spirit of this offer appears to have pleased Lord Kitchener.

But this prospect was immediately threatened by a further change in the general outlook even more violent than that which followed the decision to launch the Western offensive.

From the early months of the year there had been signs that Bulgaria was tending to take part with the enemy. This country possessed the strongest of the small Balkan

armies; what was even more important, its territory lay between the Central Powers and their ally, Turkey. It was through Bulgaria that the eastern section of the railway from Berlin and Vienna to Constantinople mainly ran, a section of only 200 miles across north-eastern Serbia separating the Bulgarian and Austrian portions of the line. Till



now these neutral and enemy territories had barred the way for German troops and munitions to Turkey and the East. If Bulgaria joined the Central Powers, that way would quickly be opened; Turkey would be reinforced with German troops and artillery, and Germany would be assisted by raw material from Asia. Her path to Baghdad and to Egypt would be clear; and she would probably try to carry out the threat sometimes made by German publicists before the war—that she would raise the East against England, and strangle the British Empire at the Suez Canal. Shortly after the outbreak of war Bulgaria had secretly agreed with Austria not to enter any combination of powers against her. This did not, however, prevent her from actively bargaining with both sides, and each was endeavouring to secure her help. But the Allies could not induce Serbia to offer the full price which Bulgaria demanded, and in July there were signs that the German negotiations were meeting with more success. The price was mainly the cession of territory; and Bulgaria not only demanded its delivery beforehand—she was determined to safeguard her acquisition by joining only the winning side. The crushing victories of Germany along the Russian front on the one hand, and the almost total failure of the

Italian offensives on the other, therefore strongly influenced her towards the German side. It is probably to be taken as evidence of the power of the Dardanelles expedition to influence the course of the struggle that, so long as the Suvla offensive—a mere side-thrust by a few British divisions—remained undecided, Bulgaria did not conclude her negotiations. But, when once the result of that fighting became evident, further signs of her tendency towards Germany quickly revealed themselves. Yet even on August 27th Germany found it advisable to move one of her divisions from the Russian front to Orsova, near the Bulgarian frontier, in order to play, as von Falkenhayn states,¹¹ the “important part” of exercising “a favourable influence on the negotiations that were proceeding so well with Bulgaria.”

At this turning-point of the war, while the French Government and staff and a section of the British were pinning their hopes upon the “main theatre,” the action of the German General Staff, though in theory they adhered to a similar policy,¹² was almost precisely opposite. Although the chief-of-staff, von Falkenhayn, knew definitely that a tremendous offensive was impending in Champagne in the second half of September, and although he estimated that the Allies had now in France “a superiority of more than 700 battalions,” yet he held that German intervention in the Balkans was at this time an “incontestable necessity.” With definite knowledge of “the storm-cloud which was gathering on the Western Front,” he chose this moment for undertaking a side-stroke, with the object of determining the attitude of Bulgaria and so parrying the Allied side-thrust at the Dardanelles. Partly for this purpose, in spite of the protests of von Hindenburg and of the Austrian G.H.Q., who desired to see Russia “beaten to her knees,” the great general offensive against Russia had now to be abandoned, and “a defensive line . . . found which could be held with a minimum expenditure of men and munitions,” while

¹¹ *General Headquarters, 1914-16, and Its Critical Decisions*, p. 132

¹² Von Falkenhayn differed strongly from the German Commander-in-Chief on the Russian front. Von Hindenburg held that “the decisive battle in the West was the *ultima ratio*, but an *ultima ratio* which could only be reached over the body of a Russia stricken to the ground” (*Out of My Life*, p. 132). Von Falkenhayn, on the other hand, believed that “no decision in the East, even though it were as thorough as was possible to imagine, could spare us from fighting to a conclusion in the West” (*General Headquarters, 1914-16, and Its Critical Decisions*, p. 56)

nine German divisions were withdrawn—a few for the Western Front, the remainder to concentrate on the Serbian border. The defeat already suffered by Russia, von Falkenhayn argued, was sufficient to cripple and weaken her, provided that she could be kept isolated; if she once regained touch with her Allies, the whole effort would have been fruitless.¹³ It was therefore vitally necessary to keep her separated from them by securing the Dardanelles. Answering the Austrian protest, he wrote:

A reinforcement of the Kovno Group is certainly to be desired, but it is incomparably more important that the Dardanelles should be secured and, in addition, the iron in Bulgaria struck while it is hot.¹⁴

The withdrawal of German divisions accordingly continued. In addition, Germany at this juncture abandoned for the time being her "unrestricted" submarine campaign, not simply because its continuance would have brought in America, but because, as von Falkenhayn wrote after the war:¹⁵

If America had joined the Entente at this stage of the war it would have cost us at once the help of Bulgaria. The leaders in Sofia, with whom we had at this time just resumed negotiations, would never have made any agreement with us if America had ranged herself openly with our enemies. But, unless Germany gained the support of Bulgaria, it would be impossible permanently to keep the Dardanelles closed and Russia cut off.

The enemy, therefore, was at this time in no doubt as to the possible influence of the British side-stroke at the Dardanelles. The German G.H.Q. on the Western Front itself hurried forward the negotiations with Bulgaria, and it was there that, on September 6th, an agreement was signed. According to this six German and six Austro-Hungarian divisions were to be on the northern frontier of Serbia within thirty days, ready to advance into that country, while four Bulgarian divisions (almost double the German in infantry strength) were to be on the eastern border within thirty-five days. The Allies, acting in conjunction with the opposition party in Bulgaria, were still making strong efforts to draw that

¹³ See von Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters, 1914-16, and Its Critical Decisions*, pp. 151-159. "If the German front did not hold in the West, or the Dardanelles were lost, no advantage that could still be gained against the Russians was of any value."

¹⁴ *General Headquarters, 1914-16, and Its Critical Decisions*, p. 133

¹⁵ *General Headquarters, 1914-16, and Its Critical Decisions*, p. 158

country to their side when, in the third week of September, the existence of this treaty became known to them. Serbia, which had twice repelled invasion by Austrians earlier in the war, was now obviously threatened by overwhelming danger. By September 19th the bombardment of Belgrade had already begun. Only by one measure could Serbia possibly be saved. She had a treaty with Greece under which, if Serbia were attacked by Bulgaria, and were prepared to furnish 150,000 men, Greece was bound to assist her. The danger to Greece would obviously be very great, and the majority of the Greek people appear to have been against intervention—employing the argument that the treaty did not apply, since Serbia was attacked by Germany and Austria as well as by Bulgaria. But Venizelos, then Premier, was determined that, if the Allies would provide 150,000 men to take the place of the Serbians stipulated for in the treaty, his country should stand by her pledge. He succeeded in inducing the King of Greece to agree to mobilization of his army; and on September 22nd he asked if the Allies were prepared to send 150,000 men. The King consented to this action, merely stipulating that the British and French should send home troops and not colonials.¹⁶

As the great attack in France was to be launched three days later, the immediate despatch of 150,000 men was at the moment out of the question; and even if they could have been rushed to Salonica—the Greek port nearest to Serbia—the difficulties of communication would have prevented their being available in Serbia in time to save that country. All that they could effect would be to render Greece secure in the event of her coming to the assistance of Serbia according to her treaty. It should be borne in mind that throughout the negotiations this, and this only, was the purpose of the British Government in considering the Greek appeal—to determine the attitude of Greece. To give evidence of this desire it was decided that a small contingent should be immediately landed at Salonica. For reasons of time, such a contingent could only be taken from among the divisions at Gallipoli. But this withdrawal was intended solely as a temporary

¹⁶ *Venizelos*, p. 243, by Herbert Adams Gibbons. The restriction was probably aimed at the coloured troops

expedient. It is true that in the British Cabinet Lloyd George, Sir Edward Carson, and others were henceforth working for the abandonment of the Dardanelles in favour of a campaign from Salonica; but, until the final stage, the British policy was definitely in the opposite direction. No decisive success—not even an important military advantage—could be expected from any expedition from Salonica; the opinion of General Joffre upon that point was at this stage as clear as that of the staff at the British War Office, which never ceased to indicate the futility of the projected enterprise. It is true that civilian opinion among the Allies hoped to see Germany again cut off from the East by an Allied thrust through Serbia or Bulgaria. But the military difficulties of a line of communications through fifty miles of mountainous country were not realised by the general public, and those difficulties precluded any expectation of success at reasonable cost. The British contingent from Gallipoli, therefore, went to Salonica with one objective only—to induce Greece to stand by her treaty with Serbia. The majority of British Ministers believed almost as firmly as before that the one sure method, even at this late hour, of decisively turning the tables in the East was by carrying the Dardanelles expedition to success.

To meet an emergency, however, it had become necessary to obtain troops from Gallipoli. It occurred to Kitchener that they might be more easily obtained if Hamilton shortened his front, in the manner previously hinted at, by withdrawing from Suvla. But it may be doubted whether Hamilton himself had ever seriously contemplated that course, since Suvla offered both a possible starting point for the next offensive and a useful harbour for the winter; moreover its cession would be hailed as an important victory for the Turks. The withdrawal of the contingent for Salonica—the 10th (Irish) Division from Suvla, and one of French troops from Helles—was quietly achieved on September 30th without giving up any portion of the line. What Hamilton did necessarily abandon were the projected local operations for which he was at that moment preparing—an advance north of Suvla, and a night attack by the yeomanry on the Anafarta flat.

But though the two Gallipoli divisions were actually being withdrawn for Salonica, and though—to prevent the resignation of Venizelos—the British Government had agreed with the French on September 25th to promise a combined force of 150,000 men if Greece would mobilise to defend Serbia, yet it was by no means clear that Greece intended to take that step. The King agreed to mobilisation “only as a measure of precaution, not committing the country to participation in the general war.”¹⁷ As this was obviously insufficient for the Allies, the Greek Government was informed that Britain and France were prepared to arrange for the despatch of the large contingent on hearing definitely that it would be welcomed by the Greek Government. The same night a reply was received that Venizelos would “be pleased at the arrival at Salonica of any force of Allied troops, however small.” It was, however, added that the attitude of the King was doubtful. Upon this Britain again asked whether the Greek Government accepted officially the offer of troops and would welcome them on arrival. The answer, on September 25th, though professing that the King and his Ministers were now in agreement, went on to state that the King hoped that the Allied troops would not be sent to Salonica for the present, but Venizelos trusted that arrangements for their despatch would be pushed forward, and that they would be sent to Mudros or some other convenient base. Venizelos later suggested that stores and horses might be sent direct to Salonica and taken up-country by men in plain clothes, as if destined for Serbia.

The time at which these evasive replies were received was one of the most critical in the whole war. On September 25th the colossal offensive in Champagne and at Loos had been launched. In the East the invasion of Serbia was imminent, with all its probable but incalculable consequences, of which the pouring through of German troops and artillery to crush the Allied force in Gallipoli was only one. Greece and Roumania, mobilising on the two opposite borders of Bulgaria, might yet invade that country and so block the path from Germany to the East. But from Greece, which had called in the Allies, there could now be obtained nothing

¹⁷ The account of these negotiations is summarised from that of Sir Julian Corbett (*Naval Operations*, Vol. III, pp 155-163)

but what appeared to be shifty replies and evasions.¹⁸ These were not altogether unnatural, considering the position of this small people between the mighty sea-power of the Allies on the one hand and the tremendous military strength of the Central Powers on the other. The King seems to have been determined to ensure the safety of his country by remaining rigidly neutral; and it was obvious to those on the spot that the notion that they were being mobilised in order to fulfil treaty obligations to Serbia was most unpopular with at least a section of the Greek Army. Nevertheless, when the Allied troops began, on October 3rd, to disembark at Salonica, the intervention of Greece—with its possible consequences of saving Serbia and keeping blocked the German path to the East—appeared to be impending. Arrangements were being made for the co-operation of the Greek Navy with the British and French in the Mediterranean. In the Greek Parliament Venizelos, having on October 5th explained his policy of supporting Serbia if she were attacked, carried a vote of confidence. And then, at their very zenith, the hopes of immediate Greek intervention were shattered. When Venizelos went from the Parliament to the King, he was informed that in his speech he had gone too far, and that the King could not support his policy. Venizelos resigned.

¹⁸ If the account given by Dr. H. A. Gibbons in *Venizelos* is correct, there was some genuine misunderstanding, the Greek Government having only inquired whether the Allies would be prepared to send 150,000, and the action of the Allies in at once sending a smaller force greatly embarrassed Venizelos. To the Allies the ambiguous attitude of Greece, after calling them in, appeared almost beyond endurance. The British Government repeated again and again its request for a clear intimation as to whether or not the 150,000 troops were really desired; Venizelos replied (1) on Sept. 27—that they should come at once, but that the King was to know nothing officially and would make a formal protest; (2) on Sept. 28—that the Greek Government thought there was no present need to avail itself of the British offer of troops; (3) on Sept. 29—that no notice was to be taken of the message of the 28th, and that the real message was that of the 27th, asking the Allies to act. At the stage when this fairly satisfactory assurance was received, the withdrawal of the contingent from Gallipoli—the 10th and one French division—began. But the staff officers who were now sent to Salonica to arrange for the arrival of the troops found the Greek officials almost openly hostile. It appears that Venizelos had suddenly become suspicious of the intentions of the Allies (*Naval Operations*, Vol III, p. 160). On the following day, however, the French admiral reported that the French cruiser on the spot had informed him that these difficulties had completely disappeared. The British and French troops were accordingly instructed to sail from Mudros to Salonica. During that night a signal came from the British cruiser *Doris* (which was now at Salonica) to the effect that Venizelos had refused to permit any landing of troops or laying of anti-submarine nets. The French transports were therefore intercepted by the *Doris* and turned back to Lemnos, where the British troops were also held up. Later, when his suspicions had been allayed by assurances from France and Britain, Venizelos agreed that the troops should be disembarked at Salonica, Greece making a merely formal protest. As the situation had become almost intolerable, the Allies accepted this arrangement, and on Oct. 2 written permission for the landing was given by the Greek authorities at Salonica. The small contingent from Gallipoli began at once to disembark.

The outlook which faced the Allies at this moment was very black. The Battles of Champagne and of Loos (which, if they had succeeded, would, as Kitchener said, have restored everything, including the Dardanelles) had been fought, and, after beginning with more than any previous success, had ended in bloodier failure. The cost in casualties was 45,000 to the British and, it is said, over 200,000 to the French. It gradually became realised, not only by the military leaders but by the people, that their armies had gained a few miles on limited sectors only to be held up exhausted in positions tactically worse than if the offensive had never been undertaken. It is true that the official *communiqués* and the censorship at first hid the true extent of the failure, and that military apologists tended more and more to the theory that success in the war would only be attained by attrition of the enemy's strength—a method crudely described as that of "killing Germans." To many thinking men both in the army and among the public this theory appeared the last resort of unimaginative generalship. It substituted for the finesse of strategy a game which could be played by its dullest exponents—a process which amounted to little more than the fighting of battles so that lives were exchanged for lives. Its object apparently was that, since the Allied peoples were numerically superior to those of the enemy, their preponderance should be proportionately increased by the exchange. A time would thus eventually come when, a sufficient number of the men of both sides having been put out of action, and the wealth of the opposing countries sufficiently worn down, the Allies, with what remained to them of each, would win the war. The adequacy of the military guidance which seemed to find in this clumsy bludgeoning the only alternative to murderous attempts to break through was becoming more and more questioned, both in France and England.

Discontent was also growing against the political leadership. That the Balkan States had failed to support the Allies, and one of them had actually joined the enemy, was attributed to blunders in diplomacy and foreign policy. Not altogether with justification, the Allied Governments were saddled with the blame of ruining Serbia; and public opinion in England

was inclined to side with that of France in a dangerous divergence of opinion which arose at this juncture between the two Governments.

It happened that, on the very day on which Venizelos resigned, the British and French Governments had decided at a conference in Calais that arrangements for paying the price of that intervention—in other words, for sending the 150,000 troops—should now be made. Great Britain was to contribute three divisions from the Western Front; France was to contribute General Sarrail and his "Army of the East." No sooner had this been settled than the only object of the British Government in providing the troops vanished: Greece was not coming in. From that moment the majority in the British Cabinet, with their eyes on Gallipoli and Egypt, endeavoured to disentangle their precious divisions from an enterprise which they were convinced must be entirely futile. On the other hand a wave of enthusiasm "to save Serbia" was sweeping the French people. The notion that the two great nations should allow their small ally, Serbia, which was fighting so bravely, to be overwhelmed by her colossal opponents without apparently reaching out a hand to her was insupportable to the French nature. It availed nothing to argue that the sending of troops to Salonica was an utterly useless gesture. The feeling in France was so keen that it would have wrecked any Government which attempted to withstand it. The same sentiment was strong in the British people, especially when it became known that the Allies had held back Serbia from attacking Bulgaria in September, when she could have done so at an advantage.

In the British Cabinet the Salonica party was now making its influence strongly felt. The evacuation of the Peninsula suddenly became a matter of public discussion. In the House of Lords on October 14th the question was raised as to whether the present was not the moment for withdrawing from the Dardanelles. Lord Lansdowne answered for the Government that he must naturally refuse to give an indication one way or the other. But, though he could not publish the fact to the enemy, the majority in the Cabinet was still opposed to the abandonment of the Peninsula. The anticipated consequences provided almost overwhelming arguments against it—the heavy loss, the disastrous lowering of

British prestige throughout the East, the immediate release of most of the Turkish Army to threaten Egypt, the shock of opinion in Australia and New Zealand. It was true that, if Hamilton's army attempted to winter in its present positions, the outcome might be even worse. That army would be spending its strength in fighting the weather, to say nothing of the enemy; it might be cut off by rough seas from its supplies, and crushed by the German forces and artillery which would almost certainly be brought against it. Even the possible disasters of evacuation might be better than such a result. But why incur disaster when the enormous advantages of securing the passage of the Dardanelles might still be within grasp, if only the "Salonica divisions" could be allotted to secure them? A spectacular stroke in the East was desperately required, and it was at this juncture that the Cabinet, against the original advice of the British staff, authorised the rash advance in Mesopotamia towards Baghdad. The same staff, when, in the vain hope of securing unity in the Cabinet, the question of the employment of the surplus divisions was referred to it, recommended strongly against Salonica and in favour of Gallipoli.¹⁹ Asquith, Kitchener, and the majority of the Cabinet were, to the last, believers in that campaign; Churchill still worked desperately for it, though with diminished influence.

But at this crisis the Prime Minister could have sent the "Salonica divisions" thither only at the cost of breaking up his own and the French Ministries,²⁰ and straining to the limit the alliance with France. Another course was open. As Egypt would soon be threatened, it was common ground to all parties that the troops would at an early date be required somewhere in the Near-Eastern theatre. It was therefore decided on October 9th to send six divisions from France to Egypt "without prejudice" to their ultimate destination. By the time they arrived, affairs might have so shaped themselves that all parties would be able to agree as to where they should be employed. It was also resolved to send to that theatre a specially selected officer to advise the Government

¹⁹ This was subject to its opinion—in the light of later events scarcely comprehensible—that everything should be concentrated on the prolongation of the Battle of Loos, from which the staff considered decisive results might be obtained (Winston Churchill *The World Crisis*, 1915, p. 476).

²⁰ See Mermeix—Joffre, *La Première Crise du Commandement*, p. 89

as to the course to be adopted. At the same time Hamilton was asked for his estimate of the probable losses which would be entailed in a carefully carried-out evacuation of the Peninsula.

Hamilton, however, was determined to have nothing to do with a policy of evacuation, and his reply was so framed as to make it obvious. His own opinion was that it would cost from 35 to 45 per cent. of his force; but the estimate of his General Staff was 50 per cent., and, as that figure was the higher, he adopted it. "It would not be wise," he wrote, "to reckon on getting out of Gallipoli with less loss than that of half the total force as well as guns, which must be used to the last, stores, railway plant, and horses. . . . One-quarter would probably get off quite easily, then the trouble would begin."²¹

The confidence of the Cabinet in Hamilton's leadership had during the previous fortnight been seriously shaken by an outside agency. A "flow of unofficial reports," as Kitchener described them to Hamilton on October 4th, had been pouring into the War Office, all in much the same strain, and all adversely criticising the work of the Headquarters Staff in Gallipoli. As a matter of fact Kitchener's colleagues in the Cabinet had long been chafing at the meagreness of the information which he vouchsafed to them as to the true progress of the campaigns, and were growing exceedingly restive at his somewhat "Oriental" manner in pronouncing upon military issues. Kitchener for his part had become less communicative, finding that vital information given by him in confidence to Ministers had leaked out; and a sense of loyalty tended to make him resent any criticisms against his generals. His colleagues, however, were not deaf to current rumours that British leadership in France and Gallipoli had been flagrantly defective, and were consequently eager to seek information from returned war-correspondents or any other semi-independent source. In the middle of September there had arrived in London a young but prominent Australian journalist, Keith Murdoch, who on his way to England had been permitted by Hamilton to pay a short visit to Anzac in furtherance of certain inquiries into postal matters which he had been commissioned by the Australian Government to

²¹ He added that with good luck the loss might be considerably less; on the other hand, with raw troops at Suvla and the Senegalese at Cape Helles, there might be "a veritable catastrophe."

make. He was a man of forceful personality, combining keen love of power with an intense devotion to his country and countrymen. Reaching the Dardanelles full of enthusiasm, he had been shocked at hearing, from Australians and British alike, bitter criticisms against the staff and its conduct of the campaign.²² On reaching London he at once had long and intimate conferences with practically every important Cabinet Minister except Kitchener, and, besides making a forcible statement of his criticisms, urged the opinion, which he had formed at the Dardanelles, that the troops should be withdrawn. The Minister of Munitions, Lloyd George, was quick to see how these opinions could be used to support the contentions of the Salonica party. A strongly-worded letter which Murdoch had written to the Prime Minister of Australia was accordingly forwarded on September 25th by Lloyd George's advice to Asquith, who had it printed as a state paper and circulated to the members of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Although the picture given in this letter was undoubtedly overcoloured, and some of its statements were not facts, it did contain important truths. There existed in the force a suspicion that Hamilton and Braithwaite pulled different ways. Moreover the muddled work of the lines-of-communication staff at Lemnos, and such sharp contrasts as that between its excessively comfortable life on the *Aragon* and the situation of the nurses and patients of No. 3 Australian General Hospital, sleeping on the ground and feeding on "bully beef"²³ only a mile or so away, had caused the whole staff to be regarded with bitter and not altogether undeserved dislike. Hamilton himself was little known by the troops, and was not generally blamed for the disappointments of the campaign; the majority attributed the failure to the strength of the enemy and to the want of effort at Suvla. But there was a feeling that the

²² These criticisms were partly those of Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, the most brilliant of the war correspondents, with whom he became acquainted at Imbros. Bartlett was bitterly critical of the conduct of the expedition. Previously, when on leave in England, he had pressed the advisability of an attack upon Bulair, and he now asked Murdoch to carry to the Prime Minister an uncensored letter containing a strong criticism of Hamilton and his staff, in whom, he stated, the force had no trust. The existence of this letter becoming known to Hamilton, it was taken from Murdoch at Marseilles, but was nevertheless forwarded to England, where it possibly accentuated the effect of other criticisms.

²³ The hospital had been warned not to land as the authorities were not ready for it; but its O.C., hearing that there were sick and wounded ashore, pressed so urgently to be landed that he obtained permission to do so in spite of the difficulties. The navy came to the hospital's assistance with a few luxuries of food and ice.

Commander-in-Chief lacked strength and was unduly swayed by his chief-of-staff, against whom much bitterness was rife.

The first result of this letter had become evident when Kitchener, after confidentially informing Hamilton of the currency of criticisms against his staff, added: "the War Office also doubts whether their present methods are quite satisfactory." Kitchener suggested that Major-General Kiggell²⁴ (afterwards Haig's chief-of-staff in France) should be sent out to take the place of Braithwaite. Hamilton, however, refused to sacrifice (as he wrote afterwards) "the man who stood by me like a rock during those first ghastly ten days." But the confidence of the Cabinet had been shaken, and, when on October 11th Hamilton's estimate of the probable losses in an evacuation showed that he refused to consider the matter with an open mind, it was decided to recall both him and his chief-of-staff. In his stead, General Sir Charles Monro,²⁵ the officer who was to report on the situation in the East, was given the command. Until his arrival Birdwood was to act in his place.

Hamilton left Imbros on October 17th. Several of the qualities indispensable for the success of the great enterprise he had possessed in a marked degree—daring, loyalty, and that rare and precious gift of imagination, in the absence of which the difficulties of Gallipoli could never have been overcome, though with it they were not insuperable. The fact that his successor reported that there was space neither for reinforcing divisions nor for guns merely proved that Monro lacked Hamilton's resourcefulness. Hamilton had not only the vision to grasp the possibilities of a great project; he had always the courage to endeavour to make his dreams come true. He was ready to face difficulties and to accept risks from which men of less spirit would have turned away. He was prepared to carry out with a minimum of support the task allotted to him. But, though clever and courageous, he lacked a certain element of solidity which is essential to true greatness in a commander. His character was no firm base for an expedition such as that to Gallipoli. A certain artistic

²⁴ Lieut.-Gen. Sir L. E. Kiggell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., p.s.c. C.G.S., British Armies in France, 1915/18. Officer of British Regular Army; of Glin, Co. Limerick, Ireland, b. Ballingarry, Co. Limerick, 2 Oct., 1862.

²⁵ Gen. Sir Charles C. Monro, Bt., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., p.s.c. Commander-in-Chief, India, 1916/20. Officer of British Regular Army; b. 15 June, 1860. Died 7 Dec. 1929.

sensitiveness—often noticeable in the extreme importance which he attached to press utterances—appeared to rob him of the power of driving (or at least of overriding at the proper moment) less active-minded subordinates with whom he was on terms of friendly intimacy. Hamilton's army always looked beyond him to Kitchener as its main support. But Kitchener was perplexed by a multitude of political difficulties, and, despite his loyalty to the army in Gallipoli, there was justification for Hamilton's complaint: at the cost of a tenth of the lives and of the ammunition that were wasted in the Battles of Loos and Champagne the Dardanelles could have been won. At the least, an advance of several miles would have been effected, as it was in the West; that achievement, entirely valueless in France, would have secured in Gallipoli the main objective of the campaign.

Hamilton's successor was of a different type. He had commanded the Third Army in France, and is said to have shared to the full the orthodox military opinion that effort should be concentrated in the "main theatre." He had now been instructed to advise the Government whether, on purely military grounds, the Peninsula should be evacuated or another attempt made to carry it.²⁶ To anyone holding Monro's military opinions there could be little doubt, even before he saw the Peninsula, as to the decision by which he could best serve the Allied cause. To such an one the Gallipoli campaign presented itself simply as an unjustifiable diversion of strength and effort. On October 30th, three days after reaching the Dardanelles, he visited the headquarters at Suvla and Anzac. He was especially impressed by the narrowness of all the positions as compared with the depth which was available in France; after a series of short interviews with the corps, divisional, and brigade commanders, he returned to Imbros, and next day telegraphed

²⁶ Kitchener also obtained Birdwood's opinion on this point during the fortnight before Monro arrived. Birdwood stated that on the Peninsula itself a flank assault and surprise were now both impossible. Rapid progress was therefore out of the question, although, if two additional good divisions were sent out, an advance could be made against the heights north of Anafarta with good prospect of capturing them and the "W" Hills. An effort could at the same time be made to gain Chunuk Bair—chiefly by mining. The best plan, however, would be to endeavour merely to hold the Turks on the Peninsula, and to land "a really large force" south of the straits to march upon Chanak.

a recommendation for the evacuation of the Peninsula, giving as his reasons:

. . . We merely hold the fringe of the shore and are confronted by Turks in very formidable entrenchments, with all the advantages of position and power of observation. . . . Since the flanks of the Turks cannot be attacked, only a frontal attack is possible, and no room is afforded on any of the beaches for the distribution of additional divisions should they be sent, nor is there sufficient space for the deployment of an adequate force of artillery. . . .

He referred to the belief that heavy guns and ammunition were being sent to the Peninsula by the enemy, to the uncertainty of the weather, and to the grave daily wastage of men through sickness. Accustomed to the conditions of the Western Front, he was impressed by the absence of rear areas in which troops could be rested and trained—

The corps and divisional commanders . . . do not possess the opportunity or time, as they now stand, to create the force into a reliable fighting machine.

And again—

With the exception of the New Zealand and Australian Army Corps, the troops are not equal to a sustained effort.

“On purely military grounds, therefore,” he wrote, “I recommend the evacuation of the Peninsula.” He could not at the moment give any definite estimate of the losses which would be incurred in a withdrawal, but he seems afterwards to have estimated that they would amount to about a third of the force.

Sir Charles Monro's decision was courageously stated, and, believing as he did “that another attempt to carry the Turkish lines would not offer any hope of success,” he could arrive at no other. But to Kitchener the pronouncement came as an overwhelming shock. He at once telegraphed to Monro, asking if his corps commanders were of the same opinion as himself. To this Byng and Davies,²⁷ at Suvla and Helles, gave affirmative answers. Birdwood agreed “regarding the grave disadvantage of our position and the extreme difficulty of making any progress,” but opposed evacuation because the Turks would look on it as “a complete victory,” and he feared the result in India, Egypt, and Persia. Maxwell, who telegraphed independently, urged the same view.

²⁷ Gen Sir F. J. Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., p.s.c. Commanded VIII Corps, 1915/16, Military Secretary, War Office, 1916/19. Officer of British Regular Army; of Elmley Castle, Pershore, Worcestershire, Eng.; b 3 July, 1864.

Kitchener's own view, and that of almost every British officer whose service had been in the East, was that of Birdwood and Maxwell. His whole heart was set against evacuation. But while Birdwood believed that the force could hold on through the winter, Kitchener doubted if it could withstand an offensive reinforced by German troops and ammunition. His one hope was that a successful offensive in Gallipoli might still be possible. It might be difficult to find the necessary troops. Great Britain was being slowly but surely forced by France to throw her reserves into the Salonica campaign instead of Gallipoli. It was true that the last hope of obtaining the support of Greece had disappeared. In a final grand effort to secure the assistance of Greece and Roumania, Britain had promised to provide—by herself, if necessary—"in the Balkan theatre, not including the forces already in Gallipoli, an army of at least 200,000 men," including "a number of our best and most seasoned divisions." Neither country came in, and the original reason of the British Government for sending troops to that theatre therefore completely vanished. But in France, on October 29th, the most ardent advocate of that expedition, Briand, became head of the Government. Sarraill was already in Salonica; and Joffre, who appears to have been not insensible to political changes, came to England and "pledged his military judgment" in favour of its necessity and practicability,²⁸ threatening to resign his command of the French Armies if the British Government carried out its decision to send the divisions to Egypt. To this threat the Government yielded to the extent of consenting to the despatch of the divisions to Salonica for the purpose of safeguarding the communications of the French, but not, as yet, to their being launched upon any expedition based upon that port. The possibility of using the Salonica troops in Gallipoli had therefore not entirely vanished, and such a reinforcement as had been offered to Greece and Roumania might yet win the Dardanelles.

At this critical juncture there came from a new direction a proposal which again instantly changed the outlook. Leaders of what may be called the "younger" school of naval officers at the Dardanelles urged a step which had never yet been

²⁸ See *The World Crisis*, 1915, p. 478, by Winston Churchill.

attempted—a simultaneous “full-dress” attack by both fleet and army. Although Admiral de Robeck had refused to risk a further naval attempt when it had been suggested to him by the Admiralty after the August offensive, it was no secret that his chief-of-staff, Commodore Roger Keyes, believed that a proportion of the fleet could force its way into the Sea of Marmora, leaving the minefields swept and the forts destroyed. Keyes and his staff had elaborated in minute detail their plan, which included the use of smoke-screens and mine-bumpers. De Robeck was not convinced that any ships would get through, or that, if a few old battleships did reach the Marmora, they could bring about any decisive result. Keyes, on the other hand, was confident that they could cut off the Turkish army in the Peninsula from supplies, a result which would inevitably lead to success. When, therefore, talk of abandoning the expedition became current in Press and Parliament, he could no longer endure inactivity, but asked to be relieved of his appointment in order that he might return to England and lay his scheme before the Admiralty. De Robeck most generously gave him full permission to proceed thither and state his case, at the same time intimating that, if the plan were adopted, some other Commander-in-Chief must carry it out, since he himself would not undertake it.

Keyes reached London on October 28th. He was then a comparatively little-known and junior officer, but his enthusiastic advocacy of the naval attack, which he himself proposed to lead, more than half-convinced his hearers. The War Committee,²⁹ when it met on November 2nd to consider Monro's advice and the opinions of his corps commanders, had before it Keyes' proposal also. Kitchener, who dreaded to give the order which might consign to destruction half the men whose endurance he so deeply admired, grasped eagerly at Keyes' suggestion. His own trusted lieutenant, Birdwood, was strongly against evacuation. In a moment of inspired resolve he determined that those two keen spirits, with his own full-hearted support, should in one more vigorous effort carry the enterprise to its goal. Under his influence the Committee postponed its judgment, but asked that he himself

²⁹ This body now took the place of the War Council and of the Dardanelles Committee in the conduct of Britain's part in the war.

should go to the Dardanelles to advise. He telegraphed to Birdwood:

Very secret. You know the report sent in by Monro. I shall come out to you; am leaving to-morrow night. I have seen Captain Keyes, and I believe the Admiralty will agree to making naval attempt to force the passage of the straits. We must do what we can to assist them, and I think that as soon as our ships are in the Sea of Marmora we should seize the Bulair isthmus and hold it so as to supply the Navy if the Turks still hold out. Examine very carefully the best position for landing near the marsh at the head of the Gulf of Xeros, so that we could get a line across the isthmus, with ships at both sides. In order to find the troops for this undertaking we should have to reduce the numbers in the trenches to the lowest possible, and perhaps evacuate positions at Suvla. All the best fighting men that could be spared, including your boys from Anzac and every one I can sweep up in Egypt, might be concentrated at Mudros ready for this enterprise. There will probably be a change in the naval command, Wemyss being appointed in command to carry through the naval part of the work. As regards the military command, you would have the whole force, and should carefully select your commanders and troops. I would suggest Maude, Fanshawe, Marshall, Peyton, Godley, Cox, leaving others to hold the lines. Please work out plans for this, or alternative plans as you may think best. We must do it right this time. I absolutely refuse to sign orders for evacuation, which I think would be the gravest disaster and would condemn a large percentage of our men to death or imprisonment. Monro will be appointed to the command of the Salonica force.

Monro, who had gone to Egypt to confer with Maxwell concerning the effects of the evacuation, was accordingly transferred to the Salonica command, which was made a separate one, that of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force being transferred to Birdwood.

But immediately after he had sent his telegram Kitchener learned that the naval attack was not likely to be authorised. With the prospect thus again entirely changed, he telegraphed:

I am coming as arranged. . . . The more I look at the problem the less I see my way through, so you had better work out very quietly and secretly any scheme for getting the troops off the Peninsula.

In the meantime a further complication had occurred. In sending the first telegram Kitchener had acted without full knowledge of Birdwood's views. The latter, although he opposed the evacuation of Gallipoli in consequence of its probable effect in the East, had nevertheless always objected to any plan of attacking Bulair, which under Keyes' scheme would now become his rôle. Moreover he was sensitively concerned at the manner in which his old friend and chief had deposed Monro in his favour, seeing that that general had

merely honestly formed and stated his opinion. He therefore immediately telegraphed his strong objection to the Bulair proposal, at the same time expressing his hope that Monro would be left in command.³⁰ Birdwood no doubt rightly assumed that, although Monro was strongly opposed to the campaign, he would nevertheless, if it were decided upon, wage it with all his strength. Yet Kitchener might for the last desperate phase reasonably desire to have in command on land as on the sea a leader whose whole heart was apparently in the continuance of the campaign. Generous as Birdwood's attitude was, he was afterwards criticised—not perhaps without some justification—for allowing a personal consideration, however unselfish, to sway a critical decision in the world-struggle. He suppressed the telegram from the War Office; but Kitchener continued him in the command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force until he had seen him at Lemnos, when he followed his advice and verbally instructed Monro to resume control of all British troops in the Mediterranean east of Malta, except those in Egypt. The Salonica force then again became part of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, which was divided into the "Dardanelles Army" under Birdwood and the "Salonica Army" under Mahon. G.H.Q., at which were Monro and his chief-of-staff, Major-General Lynden-Bell,³¹ was henceforth situated at Lemnos.

On his way from Marseilles to Lemnos in the cruiser *Dartmouth* Kitchener endeavoured to think out the whole matter of the evacuation. Before he had left London, says his biographer,³² "candid friends had . . . hinted to him that some of his Ministerial colleagues would be content to see his chair empty or otherwise filled, and would rejoice in any incident—or accident—which might prolong or perpetuate his absence." This was true: Ministers were fretting under his taciturn domination; the Cabinet, as a whole, appears to have hoped that he would stay in the East, and in France it was assumed that he had been removed from power. Some of

³⁰ The wording ran: "I sincerely trust that Monro will be left in command here. He has already established confidence in those who are under him, and his experience in France would be invaluable."

³¹ Maj-Gen Sir A. L. Lynden-Bell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., p.s.c. C.G.S., E.E.F., 1916/17. Officer of British Regular Army; of Kent, Eng.; b Brookhill House, Co Wexford, Ireland, 2 Jan., 1867.

³² Sir George Arthur, *Life of Lord Kitchener*, Vol III, p 185

his colleagues believed that he was clogging the direction of the war, and the most brilliant of them had not hesitated to describe him to a war correspondent as "a dull old man." He possessed, nevertheless, real greatness, and the judgment of the majority of the people and of the army, which placed him head and shoulders above almost all other Ministers, was not without a sound basis. Slow of thought, more intuitive than logical, he could yet see big truths; and, when he saw them, he acted with a simple directness which bore down all opposition. Though, when he deemed it to be a duty, he could act ruthlessly, he nevertheless possessed a fathomless sympathy and loyalty, as well as that single-minded humility in service which marks the greatest men. At this crisis of his career, whatever his colleagues might be thinking or intriguing, he had no thought for himself. He was consumed solely with a sense of duty to his country and of responsibility for the men in Gallipoli whose fate lay in his hand. "I pace my room at night," he told the Prime Minister, "and see the boats fired at and capsizing, and the drowning men." "Perhaps," he remarked, when the Cabinet had leaped at the suggestion that he should go to the Dardanelles, "perhaps, if I have to lose a lot of men over there, I shall not want to come back."

Kitchener reached Lemnos on November 10th, and at once conferred with Monro, Birdwood, M'Mahon (the High Commissioner of Egypt), and Maxwell. On the question of evacuation his mind appeared to be open. He asked Birdwood whether, with his present force, he could successfully drive through the enemy. Birdwood answered that with three or four additional divisions he could do so, but not with less. Kitchener at that moment believed such a reinforcement unobtainable, and de Robeck seems to have convinced him that nothing could be hoped from a naval attempt. The prospect of a successful offensive seems therefore to have been given up, and the question was whether the force could hold on, and, if so, whether it would be serving the Allied cause as usefully in Gallipoli as if it were employed elsewhere. After inspecting the Helles position on November 12th from a point above the beach, he came on the two following days to Anzac and Suvla. Though it was guessed that he was in

the Mediterranean, few at Anzac anticipated any such visit. Yet when from a picket-boat at the North Pier there climbed Birdwood's small form, together with a tall, spare, somewhat ungainly figure under a blazing red cap-band, and the two at the head of a small staff came walking down the jetty, the men nearest to the shore at once realised who was the visitor. By the time he arrived at the beach a small crowd had collected. Some Australians—no officer leading them—called for a cheer, and at the sound the semicircle of yellow heights round the Sphinx became peopled with the distant figures of men, who came hopping down over the scrub, straight for the pier-head. The red cap was rapidly closed in among them. As he spoke to one after another, they again and again cheered him spontaneously. In the great simple man there was something closely akin to the big men who gathered round him; and they gave him a reception such as they accorded to no other man during the war—unless it were to Birdwood, when he went through their ranks in Egypt after the end of the campaign. He said simply: "The King asked me to tell you how splendidly he thinks you have done—you have done splendidly, better even than I thought you would."

Under Birdwood's guidance he went with long strides straight up Walker's Ridge by the dusty semi-precipitous road to Russell's Top, Sir John Maxwell and the staff trailing behind him out of breath. Reaching the summit without a pause, he spoke to the brigadiers, and then surveyed The Nek and seaward spurs from a quiet front-line position about sixty yards from the enemy's trench, and from the naked top of Bully Beef Sap looked out over Pope's, Quinn's, and the Pine, across the plain of Maidos to Kilid Bahr and the hills of Asia. Birdwood, though never at ease until he had brought Kitchener back into safety, had fulfilled a wish of his heart in showing his old chief the Anzac position. To Kitchener the day was one in a lifetime. "There are moments in K.'s life which I like to remember . . .," wrote one of his biographers,³³ "the tone of his voice when he spoke of 'Birdie';³⁴ the joy of battle in his eyes as described by one who saw him in the front trenches at Anzac. . . ."

³³ Viscount Esher, in *The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener*, p. 218

³⁴ The universal nickname of Gen. Birdwood.

When he saw for himself the positions in Gallipoli—which, at least at Anzac, appear to have been far more elaborately fortified than any part of the British line in Flanders—he became convinced that they could be held against the Turks, and that if Turks alone had to be faced a mere passive wintering in Gallipoli might be justified, since the threat to Constantinople tied down “practically the whole Turkish army” in front of the capital, and therefore defended Egypt. But the way was now open from Berlin; and he felt that, “if Germany sent a German force to attack,” the lines were not deep enough and must ultimately collapse. In accordance with his own orders, evacuation was then being prepared for; and, having seen the positions, he agreed with a view expressed by Birdwood, that with suitable weather, “which may be expected until about the end of December,” the troops would carry out this task with less loss than was previously estimated. He therefore concluded that it would be wisest to abandon the Peninsula and to defend Egypt by attacking the Turkish communications at some other point. As the most suitable objective for this purpose General Monro appears to have suggested Ayas, near Alexandretta, where the sole line of railway to Palestine and Baghdad ran close to the sea.⁸⁵

It was this notion of simultaneously striking at the Turk elsewhere which reconciled to the evacuation Birdwood, Maxwell, and Kitchener himself, whose chief fear was for British prestige in the East. De Robeck considered the naval difficulties not insuperable. The generals on the Peninsula, the admiral, the High Commissioner, the Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, and Kitchener himself were thus agreed upon a plan. Two divisions were to be thrown ashore at Ayas; when once it had been seized, the evacuation of Gallipoli could begin. The recommendation was telegraphed to the War Committee.

But the British Ministry had been confronted by a further trouble. The Greek Government had so completely changed its attitude that the new Premier, Skouloudis, was threatening to disarm and intern the whole of the French and British divisions which the previous Government had invited to

⁸⁵ Some of its tunnels were not yet complete

Salonica. Scattered as the Allied troops were, they would probably have been unable to resist effectively. In the midst of the tense anxiety created by this threat, and freed from Kitchener's dominating presence, the War Committee was in no mood to initiate new oversea expeditions. Moreover the General Staff³⁶ recommended against the project in a document which, after contending that 160,000 men would be required at Ayas, and that Egypt could best be defended on the line of the Suez Canal, set forth its real objection—that Great Britain must retain the power of concentrating her utmost strength in the "main theatre" at a favourable moment. These views were passed to Kitchener, and pending his reply the War Committee took no action on his plan, except to retain in Egypt one division which was about to leave for Salonica.

The contention that Egypt could best be defended on its own border was demolished by the reply which Kitchener instantly despatched. But at that distance his influence upon the War Committee was comparatively slight, and at the same time the attitude of Greece had become so threatening that Britain and France resolved to deliver an ultimatum, to be supported by a concentration of the fleet at Salonica. On November 15th the Committee decided that Kitchener's plan should be referred to a conference with the French to be held in Paris on the 17th.³⁷ That conference, as it was natural to expect, decided against the proposal: the two divisions to which Kitchener was looking for the stroke at Ayas were to go to Salonica; the question of abandoning Gallipoli was to await Kitchener's final report.

At the time of these events Kitchener had for a few days been diverted from his main mission in order to interview the King and Premier of Greece. The results appear to have been complete; from that time all threats of interneging the Salonica troops ceased, and the attitude of Greece became entirely neutral. At this juncture he heard that the plan of attacking at Ayas simultaneously with a withdrawal from the

³⁶ Sir Archibald Murray was then Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

³⁷ Two changes of especial importance were made during Kitchener's absence at the Dardanelles: a joint War Council (British and French) was established, of which this was the first meeting; and Sir John French was informed that he was to be recalled from the command of the British Armies in France, his place being taken by Sir Douglas Haig

Peninsula had been rejected. He accepted the decision, and accordingly again discussed with the admiral and generals at Lemnos the question of evacuation without any such counter-vailing blow. His outstanding conviction still was that, sooner or later, German troops and ammunition reaching the Peninsula would crush any Allied force that attempted to winter there. This consideration alone drove him reluctantly to the conclusion—which, he informed the War Committee, embodied “the considered opinion” of all those present at the conference³⁸—that “the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac should be proceeded with.” “Cape Helles could,” Kitchener added, “. . . be held for the present.” The evacuation would result in the necessity of concentrating all efforts upon the defence of Egypt from Egypt. On the following day (November 23rd) the War Committee, after considering this telegram, decided to recommend to the Cabinet that not only Anzac and Suvla but Helles also should be evacuated.

But the decision of the Lemnos conference called forth a strong protest from the naval leaders at the Dardanelles. De Robeck, who was just departing on a short leave for urgent reasons of health, protested that “he could not understand it”; and his temporary successor, Admiral Wemyss, a whole-hearted believer in the plan of forcing the straits, made a still stronger representation. He pointed out that embarkation at that season involved extreme risks. A heavy storm had just swept away most of the piers. The beaches were all under registered artillery fire. He concurred with Monro in estimating that 30 per cent. of the troops must be lost. He therefore begged that, before such a disaster was accepted, one more effort should be made by the fleet to force the Dardanelles. He added that he was sure Monro would be willing to co-operate by an operation on the Peninsula.

This confident and forceful message so impressed the War Committee that it was decided to refer it to Cabinet at the same time with the Committee's own recommendation for complete evacuation. As it was now certain that Sarraïl's force, which had advanced into Serbia, would have to retire, and as the majority in Cabinet did not intend to leave

³⁸ Vice-Admiral de Robeck, however, left the conference when he found that only military questions were being discussed

the British contingent at Salonica merely to stagnate round that seaport, the future employment of that contingent was uncertain. Kitchener, who had returned to London unexpectedly on December 1st, had visited Salonica and come back convinced that the force at that place was useless, and must be withdrawn. The Government consequently realised that troops might be available for a further thrust in Gallipoli—at any rate for so improving the Suvla position that the place might be held during the winter. At the same time a foretaste of bad weather had visited Gallipoli, and the enormous numbers of men incapacitated by exposure had shown what it would mean to attempt wintering there in the existing positions. Eventually the Cabinet postponed the decision until a further projected conference with the French should have been held at Calais on December 5th, when the future of the Salonica expedition was to be decided. Meanwhile Kitchener telegraphed to Monro an urgent inquiry whether, if four divisions were sent to him from Salonica, and if the navy co-operated in a big operation, he could make sufficient ground at Suvla to enable the place to be retained during the winter. Monro replied that the most that could be hoped would be an advance of a few hundred yards. In this Birdwood supported him, though Byng held that a more extensive advance was possible. The General Staff was meanwhile making preparations for the removal of the British troops from Salonica to Gallipoli.

Kitchener was now back in his old chair, and he, Asquith, and Balfour appear to have gone to the meeting of the Allied Council at Calais determined to stand on their country's clear right to withdraw from Salonica. A predominant motive was their anxiety concerning the defence of Egypt. On the other hand the fate of Briand's Ministry depended on the decision, since it could not survive the withdrawal of the French troops from Salonica, which must have followed. Political circles in France were even busy with speculation concerning the probable retirement of the President, Poincaré. In order to ensure that Joffre should speak with more authority, and "to interest him directly" in the Salonica expedition, his command was enlarged on the day before the conference to include all the French armies, that of

Salonica among them. "But," says the French historian,³⁹ "despite all efforts Briand could not overcome the resistance of Kitchener, who went so far as to say that he would rather resign than furnish troops for the expedition into Macedonia." The result was a compromise; Britain announced to the French Government that it was her desire to evacuate Salonica, but for the moment no action was adopted to enforce that resolve.

The Allied Council of December 5th had therefore reached no decision determining the fate of the force at the Dardanelles. But a conference of the British and French military staffs held next day at Paris, at which Sir John French represented Great Britain, resolved unanimously in favour of organising the defence of Salonica and totally abandoning the Peninsula. Its decision was the death-blow to the Gallipoli expedition. Orders were sent next day to evacuate Suvla and Anzac as soon as possible. Helles was for the present to be retained.

This order came as a surprise to the naval staff at the Dardanelles. The preparations for transferring troops from Salonica to Suvla had given rise to the belief that the Government had adopted Admiral Wemyss's advice and rejected General Monro's. The hopes of the naval leaders were high. British submarines had almost stopped the enemy's sea-traffic in the Marmora. The *Agamemnon*, *Endymion*, and a monitor had on December 2nd broken the Kavak bridge, near the head of the Peninsula, thus disturbing the enemy's land communications also. Moreover the morale of the Turkish Army, which had suffered heavily in the recent blizzard, was known to be lower than hitherto. Wemyss and Keyes were also confident of support from Monro, who, apparently believing that his own advice had been overruled, loyally "declared his determination to do all in his power to make the new offensive a success."

When, therefore, on December 8th the order arrived to proceed at once with the evacuation, the naval Acting-Commander-in-Chief could not permit it to pass without one more gallant effort. To him it appeared equivalent to a confession that the Allies, bankrupt in strategy, were falling back on the dreadful policy of a war of exhaustion—the

³⁹ Mermeix—Joffre, *La Première Crise du Commandement*, pp. 89-90.

policy of "killing Germans." He therefore again besought the Admiralty to grant permission for a naval attempt. His request was refused, and on December 12th he telegraphed that he bowed "with the greatest regret and misgiving" to the final order from the Admiralty.

As for the projected withdrawal of the British from Salonica, the decision had no sooner been reached than every possible agency was employed to have it revoked. The Russian, Italian, and Serbian representatives at the staff conference in Paris urged that Salonica should be held, and the Czar of Russia made the same appeal in a personal telegram to King George. It happened that in the second week of December the Bulgarians succeeded in forcing the French, and the 10th British Division which was supporting them, into general retreat. Among the French deputies there were not wanting some who were ready to accuse Britain of deliberately betraying Sarrail's force, and the French Government was being charged with weakness in dealing with England. To avoid a threatened rupture of the Entente, the British Government sent Kitchener and Sir Edward Grey to remain in Paris until an understanding was definitely established. They found themselves forced to yield to the warmth of French popular feeling. Thus the breach was healed; but a large British force was tied almost uselessly⁴⁰ to Salonica for the remainder of the war.

⁴⁰ The feeling of the German staff towards the Salonica enterprise appears to have been one of complete satisfaction at the tying down of so large a force of the Allies. Germany did not want an Allied withdrawal from Salonica, which would have freed Bulgaria from direct danger. "The Entente troops that would be released in this way would be available for employment in other theatres of war, while the Bulgarians would not. . . They were not fitted for such employment, nor was their Government bound to supply them. . . If the Bulgarians kept strong detachments of the Entente forces occupied . . . they would be rendering a great service . . . One could justifiably hope that the Entente would not, by a voluntary evacuation . . . expose themselves to a second severe moral defeat such as they had just suffered at the Dardanelles. On the other hand we had no need to fear a defeat. . . The lie of the ground was extraordinarily favourable to defence. . ." (Von Falkenhayn, *General Headquarters, 1914-16, and Its Critical Decisions*, pp. 190, 191)

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE AUTUMN

NEEDLESS to state, a great part of the events related in the last chapter was at the time unknown to the naval and military commanders-in-chief at the Dardanelles. As soon as Hamilton realised that he could not be reinforced after the fighting at Hill 60, his pre-occupation was—first, to readjust and organise his line; second, to rest those of his divisions which were worn out; and, third, to prepare for a further offensive—if not general, then local—so as to maintain the “offensive spirit” in the troops.

The orders for a readjustment of the garrison were issued as soon as the main offensive ended—that is to say, after the Battle of Scimitar Hill. The 13th Division,¹ which had so far fought under Birdwood, was to be returned to its proper corps at Suvla, the 54th (East Anglian Territorial) being transferred to Anzac in exchange. The move began on the night of August 28th, two battalions of the 13th marching from Anzac to Suvla, and two of the 54th the other way. The territorials were at once put into the line at Hill 60, a proportion of the mounted rifles and light horse remaining with them for a week until they were well settled in the position. At the same time General Godley, who had been controlling the “Force attacking Sari Bair”—that is to say, all the Anzac troops north of the old Anzac position—reverted to the command of the N.Z. & A. Division, which was given the sector next south of the 54th, facing Sari Bair. The old front of the N.Z. & A. at Walker’s Ridge, Russell’s Top, and the head of Monash Valley was to be taken up gradually by the 2nd Australian Division as it arrived from Egypt; indeed, as early as August 26th, the newly-arrived 20th Battalion had

¹ Then holding the sector facing Chunuk Bair and Hill Q. Gen. Maude had just taken command in place of Gen. Shaw, who had been invalided.

CHAPTER XXVIII


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begun to take over from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade the trenches facing The Nek,³ and on the 28th the command on Russell's Top was assumed by General Holmes. The Anzac line, including its new extension to the north, would then be held, from north to south, by four divisions—the 54th, N.Z. & A., 2nd Australian, and 1st Australian. The sectors were—



NEW NUMBER OF SECTOR. ³	SECTOR.	COMMANDER.	TROOPS (LEFT TO RIGHT).
No. 4	Hill 60 (<i>i.e.</i> , flank of Anzac, facing N.E. and E.).	Major - General F. S. Inglefield. ⁴	29th Indian Bde. (Susak Kuyu). 54th Division (Hill 60, and Damakjelik Bair to fork of Aghyl Dere).
No. 3	Sari Bair (<i>i.e.</i> , facing E., opposite the main range from Chunuk Bair to Rhododendron, Nos. 1 and 2 Outposts).	Major - General Sir A. J. Godley.	N.Z. & A. Div. (as under): 4th Aust. Inf. Bde. (lower— <i>i.e.</i> , north—Cheshire Ridge). N.Z.M.R. Bde. (upper — <i>i.e.</i> , south—Cheshire Ridge). N.Z. Inf. Bde. (The Apex). 3rd A.L.H. Bde. (edge of Rhododendron above Sazli Dere, facing Battleship Hill). 1st A.L.H. Bde (No. 1 Outpost. Camel's Hump, Destroyer Hill, and picquet in Sazli Dere).

³ The light horse regiments had thus been made available for the fighting at Hill 60.

⁴ The sectors were at first numbered from 1 to 6, of which 1 to 4 were the original sections of the old Anzac position. See note on p. 44.

⁵ Maj.-Gen. F. S. Inglefield, C.B., D.S.O., p.s.c. Commanded 54th Div., 1914/16. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Devonport, Eng., 6 Dec., 1855. Died 22 July, 1930.

NEW NUMBER OF SECTOR.	SECTOR.	COMMANDER.	TROOPS (LEFT TO RIGHT).
No. 2	Old Anzac Left Section (ex- cluding Nos. 1 and 2 Out- posts). Old Anzac Left Central Sec- tion.	Major - General J. G. Legge.	2nd Aust. Div.
No. 1	Old Anzac Right Cen- tral Section. Old Anzac Right Sec- tion.	Major - General H. B. Walker.	1st Aust. Div. (in- cluding 2nd A.L.H. Bde.).

This arrangement was, however, largely modified by the employment of brigades of the strong and fresh 2nd Australian Division to relieve tired troops of the 1st Australian and N.Z. & A. Divisions, whose "sick-returns" were at this stage so high as to cause some perplexity. It happened that at the beginning of September one of the consulting physicians of the British Army, Lieutenant-Colonel Purves-Stewart,⁵ had been brought from England to advise concerning the sickness of Hamilton's army. He was at once impressed by a marked difference in the proportion of the sick in the three areas of the Peninsula, the numbers evacuated through illness during those weeks being:—

AREA.		PERCENTAGE EVACUATED SICK. Week ending Aug. 28.		Week ending Sept. 5.
Helles (about 26,000 troops)	..	4.4	..	5.1
Suvla (about 36,000 troops)	..	1.9	..	1.7
Anzac (about 30,000 troops)	..	6.6	..	7.5

He accordingly visited the three areas, but directed special attention to the Anzac troops, among whom sickness had reached the highest proportions. As a commission on epidemic diseases was already at work, he left to it the examination of those who were actually sick and the inquiry into sanitation, and confined himself to examining the troops who were supposed to be well—that is, who were on duty at the moment of examination. Between September 11th and 13th he medically sounded in the trenches 104 men from among the units which had been longest at Anzac, and checked his observations by testing 50 others from battalions of the 2nd Division which had landed not more than eight days

⁵ Col. Sir James Purves-Stewart, K.C.M.G., C.B.; R.A.M.C. Consulting Physician to H.M. Forces in Mediterranean, 1915/18; of London; b. Edinburgh, 20 Nov., 1869.

previously. The result of this test was set forth in his report to the Commander-in-Chief:—

The contrast between the old and the fresh troops was striking. The newly-arrived men were of splendid physique, in the pink of condition, active and alert. The older troops were emaciated in 77 per cent. of cases, and nearly all of them showed well-marked pallor of the face. There was no sponginess of the gums or other signs suggestive of scurvy. Sixty-four per cent. of these men were suffering from indolent ulcers of the skin, chiefly of the hands and shins. . . . A large proportion, 78 per cent., had occasional diarrhoeal attacks, but not enough to put them on the sick list. . . .

Most striking of all was the rapidity and feebleness of the heart's action, tachycardia being observed in 50 per cent. of the old troops. . . . The rapidity . . . could not be ascribed to sudden exertion, for each man was examined at his post, laying aside his rifle for a few minutes for purposes of medical investigation. Nor was it due to emotional disturbance, for notwithstanding the frequent impact of bullets and shells on the adjacent sandbags the pulse-rate did not momentarily become accelerated. Seventy-four per cent. of these troops suffered from shortness of breath, a condition which was conspicuously absent in the fresh troops.

The spirit and morale of these soldiers, whether of the old or newly-arrived troops, were excellent. Not one man hinted at the slightest inclination to be relieved from trench duty.

Herewith I subjoin a statistical table of my observations:—

—	Rapid, feeble heart, 90 and over.	Shortness of breath.	Emaciation.	Sores on skin.	Diarrhoea.
<i>Old troops.</i> —104 men from 7 battalions (average stay in Anzac—125 days)	52 (50 per cent.)	77 (74 p.c.)	80 (77 p.c.)	67 (64 p.c.)	81 (78 p.c.)
<i>Fresh troops.</i> —50 men from 2 battalions (average stay in Anzac—6 days)	Rapid, but not feeble 10 (20 per cent.)	none	none	4 (8 p.c.)	7 (14 p.c.)

The foregoing facts are significant, especially if it be borne in mind that they refer, *not to sick men*, but to men on active duty.

Purves-Stewart's conclusion was that the troops who had been in the Anzac trenches for a long period would be no longer equal to a forced march, or a long uphill charge, and that if pneumonia broke out during the approaching rainy season the mortality among them would probably be abnormally high. His opinion was that they could no longer be regarded as first-class troops. He therefore suggested that those who had been at Anzac continuously for four months or longer should be withdrawn from the Peninsula and given

abundant sleep and generous diet. "The ordinary rest-camp, with the usual games and other amusements, is unsuitable. Most of these men are too tired to play football, cricket, &c." He did not favour leave to Alexandria or Cairo, but suggested "a voyage to Australia and back, with a week or two on furlough in their own homes." For the fresher troops

who are at present physically fit, an important factor in maintaining their health would be the establishment of canteens, where the soldier might supplement his diet by minor luxuries of his own choosing.

It is rather as evidence of the condition of the old defenders of Anzac than for its actual influence on the course of events that this report is quoted. Before it was received most of the tired brigades were already resting. The 6th Brigade (of the 2nd Division), which was being introduced by instalments into the line at the time of Purves-Stewart's visit, had relieved the 1st and 2nd at Lone Pine and as far north as Courtney's, and the 7th had been sent temporarily into the N.Z. & A. Division's area, where it relieved three brigades—the New Zealand Infantry, 4th Australian, and New Zealand Mounted Rifles.⁶ The relieved brigades were brought to Mudros and stationed in camps on the western side of the harbour.⁷ After resting for a day or two they began light training for two hours each morning.⁸ In the afternoons cricket and football matches were played between the units and sometimes with the ships of the navy, while many of the officers and men walked to the neighbouring villages or across the hills to the natural hot springs at Thermæ. They bought fruit, and occasionally poultry, from the Greeks, and a certain amount of beer was to be had at the military canteens. A certain supply of "comforts" was available, presented by the people of Australia, and, for the sick, Red Cross stores in fair quantity.⁹ In some brigades the brass bands were

⁶ The 6th Bde (3,970) was far stronger than the combined 1st (1,290) and 2nd (1,812), and the 7th (3,908) than the N.Z. Inf. (959), 4th Aust. Inf. (906), and N.Z. M.R. (289). At Lemnos the M.R. Bde was transported from the steamer to the shore in a single barge.

⁷ The drafts of fresh reinforcements for the resting Aust. brigades were during this period sent direct to Anzac, where they were trained in the Reinforcement Camp, and joined their units on the return of the latter.

⁸ The N.Z. Mtd. Rifles, however, being joined at Mudros by over 1,000 reinforcements, formed practically a new brigade, and was trained for six hours daily. On returning to Anzac in November it was treated as a raw unit, its men being at first placed for experience among those of the N.Z. and 4th Aust. Inf. Bdes.

⁹ Steps were by this time being taken for the better regulation of these supplies and their disposal. On the s.s. *Borda*, however, a riot was caused among the troops by the discovery that goods labelled "a present from the people of Queensland" were being sold to them in the canteen. Such miscarriages seldom, if ever, occurred later in the war.

re-established, and the concert party of H.M.S. *Agamemnon* visited the troops—their first experience of a type of entertainment which in later years had a recognised place in the military system. Under these conditions the men's health rapidly improved. Nevertheless their normal strength did not return as quickly as had been hoped. At the end of September, after a four days' inspection, Lieutenant-Colonel Hearne,¹⁰ then acting as chief medical officer of the 1st Australian Division, reported:

The men on the whole show definite evidence of improvement in their general condition, but many are still very weak and listless, and many also have very bad teeth and would soon become casualties from sickness . . . as soon as placed upon a biscuit diet.

Making a careful classification of 3,263 men, he reported that 1,609 should be ready to return in four weeks, but 1,604 would not be fit in less than eight weeks, while 50 should never return to the front.¹¹ These facts were represented to the lines-of-communication authorities, with the result that it was not until the end of October and beginning of November that the troops who had left Anzac in September returned thither. Their arrival released for rest a further instalment of the old Anzac troops—the 3rd Infantry Brigade, portions of the light horse, the Indian mountain batteries, and others. But Ryrie's 2nd Light Horse Brigade, which had completed before any others the digging of its winter quarters, elected by a general vote to stay in its lines at Anzac rather than to take its rest and hand over its quarters to other troops.¹²

During the months when the greater part of the N.Z. & A. and 1st Australian Divisions were at Lemnos, the main defence of Anzac, from Lone Pine to The Apex and Cheshire Ridge, rested upon the very strong units of the 2nd Australian Division, only the extreme north being held by the 54th (East Anglian Territorial), and the extreme south by the 1st

¹⁰ Col. W. W. Hearne, DSO A D M S., 5th Aust. Div., 1916/17. Medical practitioner; of South Melbourne; b. Bega, N.S.W., 7 Feb., 1871. Killed in action, 17 Oct., 1917.

¹¹ Of those classed unfit for eight weeks no less than 607 required "extensive dental attention, 409 being "bad" dental cases

¹² "A change," wrote Lieut.-Col. Wilson of the 5th, "meant that on our return we should probably have to dig a fresh set of dugouts and collect a fresh lot of camp equipment. The opinion was almost unanimous that it was not worth subsequent inconvenience. Later on in the year this opinion changed, but we did not get the offer repeated." The main cause of the change of opinion was a growing bombardment by the enemy's "broom-stick" bombs, of which on one day no less than 200 are said to have fallen in the brigade's area

Australian Divisions respectively.¹³ The commander and staff of the N.Z. & A. still controlled The Apex and Cheshire Ridge sector, but their front-line troops were entirely those of the newly-arrived 7th Brigade. Behind it what was practically an inner line was held by the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades,¹⁴ which, like the 2nd, had in August been strengthened by the 11th and 12th Regiments of the dismembered 4th Light Horse Brigade.¹⁵ The inner line of the old Anzac position was held by the 13th Light Horse Regiment, originally of the 4th Brigade, but now allotted as divisional cavalry to the 2nd Australian Division.

The 2nd Division came to Anzac under a commander and staff who thoroughly knew that position. General Legge, when relinquishing on July 26th the command of the 1st Division in order to organise into a division in Egypt the 5th, 6th, and 7th Infantry Brigades, had taken with him among others the following officers:—

Major Blamey (from 1st Div. Gen. Staff), to be A.A. & Q.M.G.¹⁶

Major Gellibrand (from 1st Div. Admin. Staff), to be D.A.A. & Q.M.G.

Lieutenant-Colonel Elliott, R.E. (from staff of 1st Div. Engineers), to command engineers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sutton¹⁷ (from 3rd Field Ambulance), to be A.D.M.S.

The Defence Department in Melbourne telegraphed that it could not supply officers to staff the division, but suggested that they should be obtained from units then in Egypt or

¹³ The 1st Aust. Div. during these months comprised only the 3rd Inf and 2nd L.H. Bdes.

¹⁴ These brigades occupied No. 1 and Old No. 3 Outposts, Camel's Hump, Destroyer Hill, Rhododendron (but not The Apex), and Table Top. Part of this line was, strictly speaking, not an inner position, but it was unlikely to be attacked until The Apex had been taken by the enemy. The 1st and 3rd Bdes. held these positions from the end of the August offensive until the Evacuation; but from Oct onwards they were allowed to send away batches of men to rest at Lemnos.

¹⁵ The 4th L.H. Bde. had been broken up in Egypt and was not re-constituted until Feb., 1917, when the 4th, 11th, and 12th Regts. were combined under a new staff. It then formed part of the Imperial Mtd. Div.

¹⁶ Legge had asked for Col. T. H. Dodds, then Adjutant-General in Melbourne, as his A.A. & Q.M.G., but the Defence Department, being very short of experienced staff officers, could not then spare him. The position was then allotted temporarily to Maj. Blamey, who had originally been appointed as second General Staff officer upon Legge's staff.

¹⁷ Col. A. Sutton, C.B., C.M.G., A.D.M.S. and Aust. Div., 1915/17. Medical practitioner, of Brisbane, b. Egham, Surrey, Eng., 25 March, 1863. Died 15 Apr., 1922.

Gallipoli. It was, however, not yet easy to obtain in the A.I.F. officers with the requisite experience of "general staff" work.¹⁸ For the "operations" and "intelligence" branches, therefore, General Legge secured in Egypt three British officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Gwynn¹⁹ (formerly Director of Military Art at the Military College, Duntroon) becoming chief of his staff.

The elements from which Legge had to construct his division were the three infantry brigades then training under General Spens, the corresponding field ambulances and companies of transport, and three sections of signallers; but there were lacking three field companies of engineers, all the artillery of a division, part of the signallers and transport, and the divisional cavalry. When the decision to create the division was first made at Anzac, Legge had submitted a scheme for making good the deficiency. The breaking up of the 4th Light Horse Brigade enabled its 13th Regiment to be assigned to the 2nd Division as cavalry, and its signal troop and transport were also taken over. Legge brought from Anzac a headquarters staff for his divisional engineers, as well as the staff of two field companies. The rank and file of the engineers were easily provided by the 5th and 6th Infantry Brigades, in which qualified tradesmen were found in plenty, each battalion of the 5th Brigade furnishing forty-one men—that is, a section—for the 4th Field Company, and the 5th Field Company being similarly formed from the 6th Brigade. In the meantime it happened that the Defence Department in Melbourne had, independently of Legge's efforts, cabled to the British Government an offer to raise in Australia most of the troops necessary to complete the division, including three field artillery brigades (without, however, the normal brigade of howitzers). The offer had been accepted, with the result that some of the units improvised by Legge were being duplicated in Australia. The Defence Department was raising, for example, three field companies and a headquarters of engineers, and the necessary transport

¹⁸ Maj. Blamey, however, an Australian officer of high attainments, was at first appointed G.S.O.(2), but did not act in that capacity, being transferred to the control of the "A" and "Q" branches.

¹⁹ Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles Gwynn, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c. B.G.G.S., XXII (II Anzac) Army Corps, 1916/19. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Ramelton, Co. Donegal, Ireland, 4 Feb., 1870.

and signal units.²⁰ But, as it was unlikely that the troops from Australia could arrive in time to accompany the 2nd Division to the front, Legge continued to raise and train his own units—with the exception of the artillery, which he had no means of forming.²¹ From August 2nd to 7th the men for his two “improvised” engineer companies were being collected; and when on August 9th they began training, the 2nd Division—except that it had no artillery—was practically complete. Its training, however, was far from finished. The infantry brigades had arrived in Egypt at midsummer, when outdoor training between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. was almost impossible. Most of the battalions had completed only their elementary field-training, and the brigade staffs were inexperienced. The officers of the 6th Brigade, which had been longest in Egypt,²² had received some instruction in staff work. Legge, who was an administrator of first-rate capacity, at once undertook the training of his division; but within a fortnight, on August 11th, the Egyptian War Office received from Hamilton an urgent request for the “brigade . . . most advanced in training.” Legge sent the 5th, whose commander and staff, as well as a large proportion of the men, had already served in New Guinea. On August 22nd Hamilton telegraphed for another brigade, and the 6th was despatched. Two days later came a further message asking for the 7th Brigade and, if they were sufficiently trained, the 13th Light Horse and the two engineer companies. It was added that Legge and the staff of the division should now be sent. As a matter of fact, one section of the 4th Field Company had already gone, and had been in action, together with the 18th Battalion, at

²⁰ There were thus formed the 4th and 5th Fld. Coys. in Egypt and 4th, 5th, and 6th Fld. Coys. in Australia. The original 5th Coy. (that formed in Egypt) was six months later designated the 8th, and that raised in Australia as the 4th became the 7th.

²¹ It had originally been proposed that one brigade of the 1st Div. Artillery should be allotted to the 2nd Div. This transfer, however, was not effected—probably because, after the failure of the Aug. offensive, the 2nd Div. was not in the near future to move and act as a self-contained force. To render it eventually self-supporting the War Office was asked to supply its proper lines-of-communication units—a field bakery, field butchery, sanitary section, infantry base-depôt headquarters, and five depôt-units of supply.

²² The battalions of the 6th Bde, disembarked on June 10 and 12, the 17th Bn. on June 12, and the remainder of the 5th Bde, between July 23 and 26. Of the 7th Bde., two battalions, the 27th and 28th, disembarked on July 6 and 2 respectively, and part of the 26th Bn. on June 30, the rest of the 26th and the 25th did not reach Cairo until Aug. 5.

Hill 60. The remainder of the 4th and 5th Field Companies left Cairo on September 3rd.²³

The voyage of the divisional headquarters and of the 6th Brigade was now interrupted by the first torpedoing that occurred to any transport carrying Australian troops. On the morning of September 2nd the *Southland*, carrying General Legge with his staff, the 21st Battalion, a company of the 23rd, and a few "details" of British artillery and yeomanry, was on her course under a clear sky with a fresh breeze about forty miles south of Lemnos, no other ship being in sight and the only land visible being the Greek island of Strati. At 9.43 those on deck saw in the water on the port side the wake of a torpedo that was travelling apparently straight for the bow of the ship. As they watched helplessly, it reached the side and there followed an explosion which blew a hole, forty feet by twelve, on the water-line below the bridge. A number of deck stanchions were driven through the opposite side of the ship, creating a hole there also. Several men were killed, and an officer of the 21st (Captain Langley²⁴) who was sitting on the forward hatch was thrown into the air and fell through the hatch into the bilge. The sound of water rushing into the ship could be heard, and she heeled somewhat to port, her bow also dipping.²⁵ A second torpedo passed harmlessly astern. At the same instant whistles were blown, and the crowded troops, who on the previous day had learnt their boat-stations, began to run to them without disorder, and stood quietly awaiting directions. The ship's captain, Kelk, with chief officer Jones and second officer Robertson, superintended the lowering of the boats; but, as that operation commenced, some of the stewards and stokers, breaking from control, took up a position near the water-line and began to rush at each boat as it was lowered. Shortly afterwards, as a boat containing a number of troops and the headquarters of the 6th Brigade reached the water, they clambered into and

²³ Their respective commanders—Maj. S. F. Newcombe, R.E.; and Maj. V. A. H. Sturdee of the 2nd Fld. Coy., from Anzac—joined them at this time. Newcombe had been serving on the intelligence staff of the Egyptian War Office, being distinguished for his work and travels among the Arabs.

²⁴ Lieut.-Col. G. F. Langley, D.S.O. Commanded 1st Anzac Camel Bn., 1916/18; 14th L.H. Regt., 1918. High-school teacher; of Mansfield, Vic.; b. Port Melbourne, Vic., 1 May, 1891.

²⁵ See plate at p 742; also Vol XII, plate 134.

capsized it; another was upset by bumping into the overturned boat; and a third, containing clerks and other personnel of divisional headquarters, was upset by the releasing of a rope while it was still in the air. Since only a portion of the crew now remained aboard, the ship's officers were forced to carry on their work mainly by means of the troops; these under their own officers were maintaining perfect discipline, either standing quietly at their stations or, as ordered, steadily lowering and manning the boats.²⁶ Unfortunately, in order to free certain boats after launching, some of the "falls" attaching them to the davits had been cut,²⁷ with the result that the ship's officers had to improvise means of lowering the remainder. Volunteers dived into the water to right one of the boats and secure the severed "falls," and by following every instruction the greater part of the troops had been transferred to boats and rafts, which were standing off from the ship, when about 11 o'clock a yellow funnel appeared on the horizon, and half-an-hour later the hospital ship *Neuralia* rushed up, pushing masses of white foam before her bows. Her decks were crowded with crew and nurses, all in life-belts in case a torpedo might be launched at her. The 400 men who, with General Legge and his staff, were still in the *Southland* were transferred to the *Neuralia*, which also picked up some of those in the boats. Other ships, arriving later, rescued the remainder. In the *Southland*, which was then dependent upon the holding of one bulkhead, Captain Kelk had asked for volunteers to stoke the ship, if possible, into port. Accordingly Lieutenant Pearce²⁸ of the 21st Battalion, with five other officers and twelve men from that and other units, stayed in the ship and, though


²⁶ The spirit of the men on the crowded decks at this time may be illustrated by a remark made to Maj. F. W. D. Forbes (of Melbourne) of the 21st by one of the men, formerly a bullock-driver from the Otway Ranges, who was in the ranks near him. "I can't swim, sir," he said, "but this is the best chance ever I had of learning." The ship at one time gave a sudden lurch to starboard, but no men left their places or attempted to jump overboard, and, though rafts were moored alongside with no one watching them, they were unoccupied until the order was given to man them. Among the officers then on deck was Capt. Langley, who, as has been related, had at first been thrown into the bilge but had been rescued. He continued to direct his men, both on deck and in their life-boat, until they were picked up, when he collapsed. Others who had been severely injured by the explosion were sent away among the first, Capt. J. P. Fogarty (of Kew, Vic.), medical officer of the 21st, arranging this and also clearing the sick bay.

²⁷ There is some evidence that the crew was not in every case responsible for this.

²⁸ Capt. J. W. Pearce, M.C.; 21st Bn. Mine manager; of Ballarat, Vic.; b. Ballarat, 9 Feb., 1886. Killed in action, 4 Oct., 1917.

she was fourteen feet down by the bows, brought her successfully into port²⁹ Thirty-two Australians lost their lives, most being drowned. Among them was Colonel Richard Linton, commander of the 6th Brigade, whose boat had been overturned.³⁰

The headquarters of the 2nd Division arrived at Anzac on September 6th, and by the 8th was established on terraces in Rest Gully.³¹ On that day General Legge became responsible for the proper front of his division—from Wire Gully to Walker's Ridge—as well as for Lone Pine and the front facing the Jolly, which were taken over in order to afford rest to part of the 1st Division. For a similar reason the 7th Brigade a few days later took over the line at The Apex and Cheshire Ridge under the control of General Godley and the staff of the N.Z. & A. Division. The infantry of the 2nd Division was then disposed from left to right as follows:—



Under N.Z. & A. Division—

- 7th Bde.: 25th Bn.—Lower (Northern) Cheshire Ridge.
- 27th Bn.—Upper (Southern) Cheshire Ridge.
- 28th Bn.—The Apex.
- 26th Bn.—In reserve.

Under 2nd Aust. Division—

- 5th Bde.: 20th Bn.—Russell's Top.
- 19th Bn.—Pope's.
- 17th Bn.—Quinn's.
- 18th Bn.—(Only 350 strong after Hill 60)—in reserve.

²⁹ When the call for volunteers was made, someone asked the chief engineer of the *Southland*: "Is it good enough?" "I don't give it much chance," was the reply, "but I've a wife and kids and it's good enough for me." The troops immediately volunteered for duty. During part of the journey Pearce was given charge of the engines.

³⁰ Col. Linton was in the water for an hour and a half before he was picked up, exhausted, by one of the boats. He opened his eyes and said: "Good boys! Good luck, boys!" but died two hours later on board the French destroyer *Massuo*.

³¹ See *Vol. XII*, plate 135.

Under 2nd Aust. Division—

6th Bde.: 21st Bn.—Courtney's and line facing German Officers'.

22nd Bn.—Line facing Jolly.

23rd Bn. & 100 men 13th L.H.	} relieving each other every 48 hours—Lone Pine.
24th Bn. & 100 men 13th L.H.	

With the exception of the 18th the battalions were all practically at full strength, and, though for the most part not fully trained, were entirely adequate for the tasks of Anzac. The only serious weakness lay in the senior officers, a proportion of whom were unfitted by age, physique, or temperament for service at Anzac. General Holmes, however, who now held the combined command of Russell's Top and Monash Valley, afforded a striking example to the contrary. An experienced administrator, in civil life the Secretary of the Sydney Water Board, and a militia officer of long and keen service, he possessed also fine moral qualities, transparent sincerity, energy, and courage. From the first he regularly visited every point of danger in his lines—the crater at The Nek from which his bomb-throwers kept up a duel with the Turks, the empty gully beyond the last wire entanglement in Monash Valley³² where the patrols of the two sides were now occasionally meeting. The other brigadiers—Colonel Burston of the 7th Brigade (an ex-Lord Mayor of Melbourne) and Colonel Spencer Browne,³³ of the 6th (formerly a leader-writer on a Brisbane newspaper and an officer of distinguished service in the South African War)—were unable, in spite of their plucky efforts, to endure the physical conditions of Anzac, and were quickly superseded by younger men, Lieutenant-Colonels Gwynn (Legge's first chief-of-staff) and Paton. Several of the senior regimental officers were gradually replaced by more suitable men, while Holmes as far as possible began to staff his battalions with young officers of high fighting qualities.

³² This position was called "Hinton's Post" after Lieut. Hinton of the 2nd L.H. Regt., who held it during the Turkish attack on June 30.

³³ Maj.-Gen. R. Spencer Browne, C.B., V.D. Commanded No. 2 Command Dépôt, A.I.F., 1916/17. Journalist; of Brisbane, Q'land, and Appin, N.S.W.; b Oaklands, N.S.W., 13 July, 1956. (Col. Spencer Browne came to Egypt in command of the 4th L.H. Bde., but after its dissolution was brought to Anzac to fill the vacancy caused by Col. Linton's death.)

For the reasons given in the preceding chapter, during the last four months of the campaign there occurred no heavy fighting in Gallipoli. Although a combined thrust from Suvla towards Kavak Tepe, and from Anzac to Chunuk Bair, was continuously prepared for, the actual efforts were practically restricted to those of trench-warfare. The artillery at Anzac was increased to 109 guns, including the 17th Siege Battery of four modern 6-inch howitzers, two of which, emplaced far north in Taylor's Hollow, henceforth formed part of the main defence of Lone Pine. During the same months the sniping was rendered even keener than before by the provision of telescope-rifles, magnifying sights, silencers for fitting to rifle-muzzles, and a locally-invented device (known as the "Wallaby sniping cage") for clamping down rifles to fire on fixed targets. The operations of the Anzac troops in the open were, however, confined to mere movements of scouts and patrols.³⁴ From Rhododendron and Cheshire Ridges and other positions on the northern front this patrolling was carried on with great daring, especially in the Sazli ravine. The light horse scouts, creeping by night through the scrub amid many relics of the lost Gurkhas and Wiltshire,³⁵ frequently encountered the patrols of the enemy. Although the aim was to get out earlier than the enemy scouts, lie quiet, and secure information, fighting was sometimes unavoidable. Thus Sergeant Wilson,³⁶ leading a patrol of the 9th Light Horse, came suddenly upon a party of Turkish scouts, who fired, wounding him. He shot one, bayoneted a second, and with a bomb wounded a third who was fleeing, and was then helped back to Rhododendron Ridge by his men. In the more dangerous sector of Russell's Top Lieutenant Bailey³⁷

³⁴ At Helles a successful minor advance was made (on Nov. 15) under cover of naval fire. At Suvla the yeomanry carried out a highly successful raid. At Anzac the line was extended for 120 yds. south of Chatham's Post, and some ground was stolen at Lone Pine; but these advances involved no open assault.

³⁵ See note on p 714.

³⁶ Lieut. G. R. Wilson; 11th L.H. Regt. Drover, of Adelaide; b. Torrensvile, S. Aust., 2 July, 1882 [Other fine scouts of the same brigade were Cpl. C. B. Rickard (of Northam, W. Aust.), 10th L.H. Regt.; and Sgt. F. J. Linacre (of Gisborne, Vic.) and Cpl. J. Fryday (of Taranaki, N.Z.) of the 9th Regt.]

³⁷ Lieut. J. C. Bailey; 20th Bn. Builder; of Brisbane, b. Drayton, Q'land, 31 Oct., 1881.

and the scouts of the 20th Battalion explored No-Man's Land at The Nek. On at least two occasions this was effected in broad daylight by means of the covering fire of the garrison, which carefully shot down all Turkish periscopes in the sector while Sergeant Vince³⁸ and Corporal Brennan³⁹ crept forward to the enemy's parapet and examined such trenches as were within view. In the narrow No-Man's Land at The Apex scouts of the 7th Brigade frequently crawled by night to within a few yards of the enemy's line.⁴⁰ In bush scouting at least the Turk was equally daring. Thus in the Sazli Dere an Australian scout, a good bushman, who was lying out only twenty yards in advance of the trenches and with a mate not far away, was found stabbed through the heart, with his skull broken in.


During these months, however, the serious offensive action of Birdwood's force was not on the surface, but underground. The resumption of an active offensive, which, as has been mentioned, was always in prospect, could not be undertaken at Anzac by the ordinary means. At all vital points the enemy's defences were too strong by both nature and fortification, and they were constantly being strengthened. Birdwood therefore decided that the best chance of successful assault lay in undermining them. Accordingly there was commenced in September a comprehensive scheme for tunnelling beneath the enemy at The Apex, The Nek, Pope's, Quinn's, Courtney's, German Officers', Jolly, Lone Pine, and Ryrie's Post. The most ambitious proposals were those of General Legge. He proposed not only to undermine the hostile works at Lone Pine by sinking a shaft sixty feet in depth and thence driving galleries to points beneath the enemy's rear trenches; but also to effect the passage of The Nek by means of two spacious

³⁸ C.S.M. C. H. Vince, M.M. (No. 1033, 20th Bn.). Builder and contractor; of Sydney, b. Stepney, London, 1881.

³⁹ Sgt. H. Brennan, D.C.M. (No 503, 20th Bn.). Engineer, of Sydney, b. Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, 1888. Killed in action, 6 Apr., 1918.

⁴⁰ The N.Z. infantry and the 28th Bn. began the scouting at The Apex. Later Lieut. J. E. Nix (of Charters Towns, Q'land), Sgts. H. Morrison (of Dalby, Q'land), A. V. Bracher (of Brisbane), and others of the 25th Bn. made bold reconnaissances there, and Lieut. H. H. Page (of Sydney) and Sgt. Bracher at Russell's Top.


galleries, dug at a very deep level, and so directed as ultimately to emerge in rear of that key-position. Both passages were to be wide enough to admit of troops marching through them two abreast. This proposal, though opposed by the chief engineer of the division, was considered of sufficient importance to be referred to G.H.Q., and was approved of by Birdwood on September 21st. The undertaking was to be kept as far as possible secret, and formed no part of the regular mining scheme on Russell's Top, but was carried out by Captain Arnall⁴¹ of the 19th Battalion with a special party of miners from the infantry. In order to safeguard the secret it was never specifically mentioned in the daily reports or correspondence. But many of the troops of the 2nd Division were nevertheless aware of the plan, and some critics, putting it down as a wild venture, gave the tunnel the nickname of "Arnall's Folly" by which it was generally known. Nevertheless by the beginning of December it was approaching the line of the Turkish trenches at The Nek, when picking was heard which made it appear likely that the enemy had anticipated the work or else was digging a similar tunnel. The sound, however, proved to be that of the picks in one of the low-level galleries of the regular Australian mining system far above. The workers in the higher gallery had heard those in Arnall's, and, being ignorant of its position, had judged that the sounds came from an enemy mine and were digging to meet it.



The underground fighting at Anzac during this stage was keen and close. It may be briefly illustrated by describing the course of events at Lone Pine and Russell's Top respectively. At Lone Pine, when the 1st Australian Division on

⁴¹ Maj. H. F. Arnall; 2nd Pioneer Bn. Area officer; of East Maitland, N.S.W.; b. Truro, England, 10 May, 1871.

September 12th handed over the position to the 2nd Division,⁴² the Turks had established a new line, in most parts twenty to thirty yards distant from the Australian posts, but at some points separated from them only by a barricade. A Turkish attack was not much feared, except at the weakest points, which were: in the south—the south-eastern angle of the position (Tubb's Corner) where the Turkish lines at the head of The Cup ran close; in the north—the posts at the head of the three old projecting saps originally held by Lloyd, Mackay, and McDonald.



⁴² The narrative of events at Lone Pine after the great attack of Aug. 6 to 10 ended, and while the position was still held by the 1st Div., is as follows:—

By Aug. 12, the trenches having been cleared of between 400 and 500 dead, it was possible to improve the defences by constructing snipers' posts and deepening the saps. A beginning was made with a new front line (Troop Lane) joining Sasse's with the three old communication trenches in which had been Lloyd's, Mackay's, and McDonald's Posts. The throwing of bombs at almost all the posts was continuous during the dark hours; but the advanced positions were lightly held, with the reserves close at hand under bomb-proof cover, and casualties were therefore few. The trenches were constantly bombarded by a 75-mm. and other field-guns.

Aug. 14.—At 6.30 p.m. the Turkish artillery sharply bombarded Lone Pine. Immediately afterwards the enemy was seen by the observers of the 1st N.Z. Bty. on Russell's Top to be crowding his front trenches. The battery, as had often occurred during the Lone Pine fighting, was at once turned upon this target. All was then quiet until shortly after midnight, when a bomb-attack was made by the Turks against both the 5th Bn. in the southern section of Lone Pine and the 1st in the central section. In the southern the Turks attempted to seize the position but were beaten back. In the central the post of the 1st Bn. in Lloyd's Trench (Sap A) and the trenches around it were heavily bombed. Through the smoke of the Australian bombs thrown in reply could be seen the enemy's bayonets as the Turks leapt over the open from one old trench to another. The N.C.O. in charge at Lloyd's—one of the finest in the 1st Bn., Sgt. Kavanagh—and a dozen men were killed or wounded. Word had been sent to ease out along the trench, which was thus too thinly guarded, and the Turks seized Lloyd's Trench. A cry for officers being raised, Capt. Jacobs, after arranging for a supply of grenades, bombed along the trench with Lieut. F. L. Flannery (of Sydney) and drove the enemy out. The Australian casualties numbered 31. Sgt. Freame was among the wounded.

Aug. 20.—The enemy concentrated his efforts on digging and covering his new front line.

Aug. 22.—The Turks, after bombardment, attempted to render Sap B (Mackay's Trench) untenable by destroying the barricade. This sap, which protruded farthest and was consequently most subject to attack, was held by the light horse squadron supplementing the infantry garrison in the Pine. On previous days the 7th L.H. had bombed the enemy to a distance from the barricade by blowing in part of his head-cover and raining bombs into the open. On Aug. 22, however, when a squadron of the 4th Regt. was holding the post, the enemy, apparently firing along the sap with a machine-gun, cut down with bullets part of the barricade before the garrison realised what was his purpose. A second barricade was then constructed five feet in rear of the first, and the space between the two was filled in with earth. As the Turks were heard mining, a tunnel was begun from Sap C (McDonald's) to protect Sap B.

These were now known as Saps "A," "B," and "C" respectively. The old Traversed Trench, which formerly led from Mackay's (Sap B) to Lloyd's (Sap A), had been roofed by the Turks with heavy timber about August 20th; and before the 1st Division handed over to the 2nd, the enemy, by tunnelling from various old trenches close to the Australian front line, had begun to threaten its weak points both at Tubb's Corner and at Sap B. To meet this danger defensive tunnels were commenced. The course of the fighting which ensued was as follows:—

Sept. 11.—A Turkish mine-tunnel from the direction of Jacobs's Trench was approaching the southern flank of Lone Pine so closely that a counter-mine was fired by the 2nd Field Company, blowing an opening into the enemy's gallery. When the tamping was removed, shots were exchanged. Each side barricaded its tunnel and posted sentries.

Sept. 12.—Units of the 1st Aust. Div. were withdrawn from Lone Pine, the defence of which was henceforth entrusted to the 2nd Div., the 23rd Bn. alternating every 48 hours with the 24th, each supplemented by about 100 of the 13th L.H. Regt. Half of the 4th Field Company under Capt. Barber⁴³ replaced the 2nd Field Company.


Sept. 21.—One of the Australian tunnels for the protection of Sap B broke into a Turkish gallery. Another enemy tunnel was broken into near Jacobs's. In the struggle at Sap B, the Turks seized the hole connecting the galleries, but two days later their sentry was killed or driven away by a number of bombs which were thrust down the gallery on a small trolley and then electrically exploded. The tunnel was thus recovered. In consequence of the position of the Turks in numerous old works round the Pine, the attempt of the Australian miners to establish a protective "envelope" of galleries failed.

Oct. 4.—The enemy sharply bombarded the Lone Pine position for an hour, from 9 to 10 a.m. As there were indications of a pending attack, the 17th British Siege Battery at Taylor's Hollow was asked to turn its fire upon the front of the Pine. Several shells were placed upon the enemy's position. A few Turks afterwards came up Sap C (McDonald's) and tried to dislodge the parapet. Two were shot, and the attempt withered.

Oct. 17.—Enemy mines were almost beneath the south-eastern angle (Tubb's Corner) and Sap B. Near the former the Turks exploded a mine between a high-level Australian gallery and a low-level one. The upper gallery was destroyed and a sapper killed. The low-level mine was fired next day, destroying the Turkish gallery. At Sap B on Oct. 18 an enemy tunnel reached a point almost beneath the barricade. A small countermine was unsuccessfully fired. Larger charges were therefore placed in two neighbouring mines, the garrison was withdrawn from the barricade, the head of the sap was blown in, and the enemy works were destroyed.

⁴³ Col C. S. Barber, M.C., V.D.; 4th Fld Coy. Engrs. Mining engineer, of Melbourne; b Melbourne, 6 July, 1888.

Oct. 19.—It was decided to establish a new firing line across the interval between Sap A (Lloyd's) and Sap B. To make sure that the area was not undermined, two galleries were tunnelled eastwards. On Oct. 26 that nearest to Lloyd's drove into a Turkish tunnel. The hole was for the moment closed up again; but, seeing that this Turkish gallery must be captured if the new line was to be dug, Capt. Barber the same night ordered it to be reopened and enlarged for reconnaissance. While attempting to carry this out the sappers were fired on. A small charge was therefore placed above the hole and exploded without tamping, enlarging the opening into the Turkish mine. The entrance was then again blocked for several days in order to allow a new tunnel to be dug beneath the enemy's work so as to break up into it. On the night of Nov. 6 the lower tunnel was ready, and, as Lieut. Carr⁴⁴ of the 24th Bn. at a pre-arranged moment looked through the hole in the roof of the Turkish tunnel, he saw Capt. Barber with an electric torch emerging through the hole in its floor. An exploration of the enemy's galleries at once began, and showed that a system of tunnels existed, all eventually leading to a large trench, eight feet wide and covered with heavy "six by eight" timber. The existence of this covered gallery had been known, since its timbers could be seen on the surface. It led from Owen's Gully, and at one time the enemy used to penetrate through it into the space between Saps A and B, and bomb from there. The story of the August fighting at Lone Pine was unknown to anyone then in the garrison, but this trench was none other than the old Traversed Trench which had been held on Aug. 6 and 7 by Mackay, Scott, Howell-Price, Osborne, and their men.



The section of the old trench which the exploring party now entered was about 25 yards long, the ends being blocked by the breaking-down of the roof through howitzer shells. A sentry was placed at the north-eastern end, and a barricade was pluckily built there by Corporal Graham⁴⁵ of the engineers, using the old timbers. The Turks who were beyond the next bend contented themselves with building a barricade near Graham's. An attempt on Nov. 7 to drive the Australians from the position by bombing failed.

The old trench had been used as a base for Turkish mining against Sap B, and Graham with Lieut. McGregor⁴⁶ of the 23rd, on exploring the tunnels, found several which led round to rejoin it at points beyond the Turkish barrier. Crawling down one towards its opening McGregor saw, close in front of him, the legs of some of the enemy's garrison. In the daylight at the end of another was a Turkish sentry with his rifle across his knees. Steps were accordingly taken

⁴⁴ Capt. G. M. Carr, M.B.E.; 24th Bn. D.A.A.G., A.I.F. Dépôts in the United Kingdom, 1918/19. Architect; of Sydney; b. Fitzroy, Vic., 10 Jan., 1888.

⁴⁵ Sgt. D. Graham, D.C.M. (No. 4082, 4th Fld. Coy. Engrs.). Sheet metal worker, of Sydney; b. Whitburn, Linlithgow, Scotland, 1877.

⁴⁶ Capt. H. A. McGregor, M.C., 23rd Bn. Tea planter; b. Cork, Ireland, 25 Oct., 1888.

50 25 0 50 100 150 FT



British works, red; Turkish, blue. Height contours, 2 metres.

to barricade this communication and undermine the Turkish post, which on Nov. 14 was blown up by a charge of 250 lb. of ammonal. The Traversed Trench, officially named "Barber's Gallery," was held by the Australians until the Evacuation.⁴⁷

On Oct. 20 work upon the scheme of deep-mining at Lone Pine for offensive purposes had been begun. The miners, after sinking their shaft 60 feet, worked forward until on Nov. 28 they were beneath their own high-level system. It was then remarked that the sound of picks in the deep galleries was so clearly heard that there would be no chance of the deep work escaping the enemy's notice. It was therefore abandoned.

At Russell's Top the fighting was, if anything, still closer. Here the front line was protected by a fairly deep "envelope" gallery, which ran slightly in advance of and parallel to it, having been dug by the New Zealand engineers and the light horse before the fighting of August. From the envelope projected a few short low-level tunnels, and from the trenches above there led forward several high-level galleries, which had been hastily extended before the attack of August 7th upon The Nek in order that, if it succeeded, they might be converted into communication trenches.⁴⁸ They were consequently in parts only six inches below the surface. The enemy's galleries were in some places close to them. This was the situation when the 2nd Division became responsible for the sector, and, on September 16th, one of the new field companies—the 5th, under Major Sturdee⁴⁹—took over the mines, one of its four sections working there and the three others at Pope's, Quinn's,⁵⁰ and Courtney's respectively. A new scheme of mining had already been discussed by General Legge and his chief engineer, Colonel Elliott. The subsequent course of the mining operations at Russell's Top was as follows:—

Sept. 16—Captain Cutler⁵¹ commenced a survey of the mining system and trenches on the Top. It was decided to tunnel a new and better firing line.

⁴⁷ The continuation of Woods's Trench, beyond the Australian barricade in it, was several times entered through tunnels. But it lay too close to the new firing line to be used by the Turks, and was filled only by the bodies of men killed in the Battle of Lone Pine.


⁴⁸ Immediately before that attack the 71st (New Army) Fld. Coy. took over the work. On the northern side of The Nek the Turkish galleries were then very close to one of the shallow tunnels, and consequently, on the night before the assault, a charge had to be fired in the most prominent central low-level gallery (L7). During the following month the only engineers on Russell's Top were a section of the 71st Fld. Coy.

⁴⁹ Lieut.-Gen V. A. H. Sturdee, C.B.E., D.S.O., p.s.c. C.R.E., 5th Aust. Div., 1917/18; G.S.O. (2), G.H.Q. British Armies in France, 1918; Chief of the General Staff, Australia, 1940. Officer of Aust. Permanent Forces, of Melbourne, b. Frankston, Vic., 16 Apr., 1890.

⁵⁰ The Quinn's mines had been in charge of Lieut. the Hon. R. T. R. P. Butler, R.E. (afterwards Capt., D.S.O., M.C.).

⁵¹ Maj. R. V. Cutler, M.B.E., M.C. Commanded 4th Fld. Coy. Engrs., 1916/17; 2nd Fld. Coy., 1918/19. Engineer; of Melbourne; b. Clifton Hill, Vic., 1 Nov., 1892.

Early October.—The mining galleries were systematically renumbered, the old surface-tunnels being designated (from left to right) H4, H3, H2, and H1, and the mines leading out of the low-level gallery L11 to L2. General Legge had proposed that the enemy's front trenches at The Nek should be seized by digging through to them and then attacking with bombs. For this purpose on Oct. 16 it was decided to push forward three high-level mines (H4, H3, and H1), which would form the communication trenches, and to keep three low-level mines (L11, L8, and L5) below and ten feet in advance of them in order to protect them.⁵² At this time the mines on Russell's Top, with the exception of Arnall's, were being worked by 15 men of the engineers, with 26 miners from the infantry, and 56 men for such work as carrying away the earth.



End of October.—Turkish mining was heard at the end of all three high-level tunnels. It appeared to be below their level, but above that of the lower tunnels. A Turkish gallery which thus lay between H4 and L11 was blown in, but in the process part of the shallow roof of H4 was shaken down, and the enemy by throwing large bombs at night into the cavity increased the breach. They similarly broke in with bombs the roof of H1, which had been timbered.

Nov. 7-9.—H1, H3, and L6 all broke at different points into the same Turkish gallery, apparently a section of the Turkish "envelope."⁵³ In H1, when the picks went through, work was at once stopped and a sentry posted. During that night the sentry heard the Turks shovelling earth, and threw a bomb which stopped their work. By next day each side had constructed in its tunnel a barricade, over the top of which the respective sentries were firing shots through the hole. It was decided to blow the Turks away by thrusting a charge of gun-cotton through the opening and exploding it in their gallery. To do this, Lieut. Small,⁵⁴ carrying the explosive on his back, crept forward to a position near the hole; waited until the enemy had fired a shot through it; and then, trusting that another shot would not immediately follow, lit the fuse and lowered the charge through the hole into the enemy's gallery, and withdrew. The gun-cotton duly exploded, but increased the size of the hole—a result which was not desired. Small therefore repeated the process and exploded another charge.

It was on this day (Nov. 9) that the miners in H3 broke into the same Turkish gallery. Small at once visited the place, and obtained from the infantry garrison two sentries whom he posted behind a barricade near the hole. The sentries presently reported that the flicker of a light had appeared at the opening, and that the enemy

⁵² The high-level mines were 6 ft high by 3 ft. wide, the low-level 4 ft. by 3 ft.

⁵³ In L6 the breach was an old one which was reopened on Nov. 7 by Lieut. Small, who then explored part of the Turkish work.

⁵⁴ Lieut. F. T. Small; 5th Fld Coy Engrs. Engineer, of Blackall, Q'land, b Brisbane, 4 May, 1889.

had evidently been examining it. Small hurried thither; as he sat in a corner watching the opening, a revolver was fired through it, the shots striking the tunnel wall. In the Australian gallery was a heap of loose earth forming a low natural barricade. Small graded this down so that a bomb placed upon it should roll down the slope into the hole, and then, leaving the sentries to keep guard, went off to his other work. For some reason the sentries, who were drawn from the 26th Bn., which was then new to the post, withdrew for twenty yards along the tunnel. A complicated situation followed, in which the local staff gained the impression that the enemy had captured the head of the tunnel. Small, however, working with an officer of the infantry, built a barricade, and then pushed it forward until the whole tunnel had been regained.

It was now determined to fire a tamped charge in the tunnel. Before this could be done, it was necessary to clear away the heap of loose earth near its end. Accordingly on Nov. 10 L/Cpl. Moy⁵⁵ crept forward and, working for six hours in the dark within a few feet of the hole, scraped the earth clear. By this time Small, who was worn out, had been relieved by Capt. Cutler, and he, going forward with Moy, placed the explosive at the end of the gallery. The Turks could be heard scratching at the other side of the wall of earth, which was only a foot in thickness. The mine was fired, and for the time being sealed the hole; but the thin roof of the Australian gallery was shaken in, leaving it open to the air. On the following day Moy went out to this section, now open to the sky, to clear away the debris of the explosion and discover the result. The work was especially dangerous since he was close to the trenches of the Turks, who, possibly observing that work was being done, from time to time threw bombs into the opening. Moy had been at work for four hours when he was caught by one of these grenades and mortally wounded.

Meanwhile on Nov. 10 it had become necessary to explode a third small charge in the southern high-level tunnel H1. Capt. Cutler effected this by crawling over two Australian barricades, the enemy meanwhile firing over their own barrier. Three days later the task had to be repeated. On this occasion Cutler and Small, who had returned to duty, crawled over the Australian barricade to a heap of earth seven feet from the Turks' barrier, over which the enemy was firing. Lying behind the loose earth, they managed—by throwing stones to their right and flashing a torch in that direction—to attract his fire to that side of the tunnel. They then cautiously pushed the charge over the debris on the left. It took them another fifteen minutes to get the explosive into such a position that they could light the fuse and retire. The explosion which followed caused the roof to fall in. Ten yards of the gallery thus became untenable, and had to be given up to the enemy.

Nov. 20.—The Turks were mining so close to the lower gallery L5 (which protected H1) that it was decided to put an end to the trouble by firing a very big charge in L5. Accordingly 500 lb. of ammonal were placed in it and were exploded next day. A party of the 26th Bn. lay out in dead ground on the edge of this crater, and on Nov. 23 killed or wounded with bombs several of the enemy who came out to occupy it.

⁵⁵ L/Cpl. J. Moy (No 4426, 5th Fld. Coy. Engrs.). Sawyer; of Daylesford, Vic.; b. Adelaide, 1884. Died of wounds, 13 Nov., 1915.

Meanwhile on Nov. 18 the Turks had fired a mine near another shallow tunnel (H4), killing 2 Australians and wounding 3. The Australians cleared away the débris, and then pushed forward a barricade into the Turkish tunnel in which this mine had been fired. There the enemy built a barricade facing them, and for several days firing continued between the two, Lieut. Bailey of the 20th shooting two Turks with his revolver, and three others being hit with bombs. The enemy took advantage of the "Silent Battle"⁵⁸ to sap out to this crater and occupy it. The Australians, in reply, began to undermine him, and the work was in progress when orders for the Evacuation arrived.⁵⁷

The underground fighting at Lone Pine and Russell's Top was no closer than at Quinn's or Hill 60, and at Courtney's, German Officers', and The Apex it was at times equally keen. As a result, by the middle of November the Anzac mines were either approaching or else actually beneath the enemy's trenches at most of the vital posts of his line. The position was then such that, if all the mines had been exploded simultaneously, there could undoubtedly have been administered to him a shock only comparable to that inflicted upon the Germans two years later by the firing of the mines at Messines. A general attack launched at the moment of the explosions might have met with important success; but, although as a feint or a subsidiary attack such a stroke might have been invaluable and almost decisive, it could not crush or pierce the Turkish Army unless supported by strong reserves; and these never came to Gallipoli. It is true that the troops, always optimistic, lived upon rumours such as the report that 500,000 Russians were about to deliver a counter-blow parrying the German stroke through Serbia. Some based hopes upon schemes that appeared more fantastic still—such as a rumoured plan of seizing Achi Baba by means of armoured "land-battleships," which, it was said, were being built in England.⁵⁸ A scheme for flooding and washing away the enemy's trenches by means of a stream of water directed at high pressure from a nozzle was suggested by Captain Abbott⁵⁹ and other Australians experienced in mining. This was referred by Hamilton to his chief engineer. A proposal more

⁵⁸ See pp. 842-5.

⁵⁷ The mines prepared for use at the Evacuation were Arnall's two tunnels and L11 and L8 (the low-level galleries originally dug to protect H4 and H3 respectively).

⁵⁸ This rumour almost certainly had reference to the "tanks," although they were not brought into use until twelve months later.

⁵⁹ Capt R. H S Abbott; Permanent Supernumerary List. Engineer, of Bendigo, Vic: b. Bendigo, 12 Jan., 1884

frequently discussed in the trenches was that, during one of the storms which in the autumn swept occasionally over the Peninsula, and which always temporarily rendered the enemy inactive and less vigilant, the whole line should deliver a preconcerted assault by simply walking over the Turkish trenches. Birdwood himself was half-attracted by the notion, but the condition of some of his troops after bad weather made its adoption impracticable.

In the absence of adequate reserves, plans of offensive action were necessarily restricted to schemes that might appear fanciful, but little real apprehension was entertained of a Turkish attack. It is true that the unit commanders of the 54th Division were not in all cases confident that they could hold out if seriously attacked, but it may be doubted if there was any real ground for anxiety. The light horsemen occupying the inner line of defences had no doubt whatever as to the result of any Turkish incursion. "I hope they'll try it," said Colonel Glasgow to a friend. "What would it matter if 1,000 or 2,000 Turks got through? What would it have mattered at Pope's? We should simply have captured or killed the lot." The artillery at Anzac was increased in September to 92, and in October to 109 guns, and now included four modern 6-inch howitzers of the 17th (British) Siege Battery. As for the enemy, he showed no tendency to attack; all indications pointed in the other direction. Every night his working parties were out in front of the trenches erecting wire entanglements against possible assault by the Anzac troops. On Russell's Top and elsewhere the enemy appeared to be filling in his front trench with barbed-wire and withdrawing to his support line.⁶⁰ Along the main range his breastworks were being extended in line after line. A ledge—sometimes assumed to be a sunken road, but in reality a wide trench filled with barbed-wire—became apparent encircling the summit of Chunuk Bair. Strong redoubts were established on the other main crests.⁶¹ In October the intelligence staff at G.H.Q. prudently warned all troops that a fanatical attack

⁶⁰ Part of the secret sunken trench in front of the Jolly was observed by a patrol about this time. At the Jolly it was this trench, and not his regular front line, that the enemy was filling with barbed-wire. The Australians were not fully aware of this, and, had they attacked, would have been met by a most formidable obstacle.

⁶¹ These and the ledge encircling Chunuk Bair are clearly illustrated in the plate at p. 719.

might be made upon them during the Mohammedan feast of Bairam, which lasted from the 18th to the 20th of the month. But the celebration was marked in a different fashion. The 'Turks opposite Quinn's and near German Officers', who among themselves were receiving visits and exchanging presents, ceased hostilities and, making signs from their parapet, threw cigarettes to the men of the 17th and 21st Battalions—who flung cigarettes and "bully beef" in return.⁶²

The impression generally received during the autumn was that the enemy's morale had somewhat declined. This seems to have been partly due to the fact that, as soon as he had defeated Hamilton's August offensive, Liman von Sanders received from Constantinople orders to send back to Thrace the fine units of the Second Army which had been previously lent him. Their place was largely filled by troops of Arab extraction from the First Army, in whose courage and training Liman von Sanders had little confidence.⁶³ By wedging in among them the first-rate battalions of the Constantinople Fire Brigade, he strengthened them for defence, but "they could not be used for attack." Although, therefore, von Sanders would have liked to undertake at least local offensives, he had not the power to do so. Nor was the gas attack, of which the British staff was rightly apprehensive, ever launched by the enemy. A few German shells or bombs containing "tear gas," which caused the eyes to water, and was intended to

⁶² At Quinn's these overtures occurred on three days. (On previous occasions notes had been thrown into that post. One received about the time of the Battles of Loos and Champagne ran: "Congratulate you on having killed 20,000 Boches.") On the first morning at about 8.30, after making signs from their trenches, the Turks threw out a cigarette-case. An Australian climbed out and brought it in. On the packet (*see plate at p. 399*) was scrawled: "Prenez avec plaisir; à notre héros ennemis" (Turkish soldiers' French for "Take, with pleasure; to our heroic enemy"). Another was inscribed: "Notre cher ennemi" ("our dear enemy"). It is said that a third was inscribed "Envoyez milk" ("send condensed milk"), and that when "bully beef" was thrown to them a message was flung back, wrapped round a stone, "Bully beef non." At 9.15—possibly on the approach of one of their officers—the Turks called out "*fini*," and waved the Australians down. A note was, however, thrown over which (on being translated) read: "Dear Australians, the penknife which you threw over has fallen behind our parapets. Will you let me get out of the trench at this time to-morrow to fetch it?" Another note was to the following effect: "Do you know how far it is to Constantinople? We hope to see you there one of these days." Next day a similar fraternisation occurred, a Turk being allowed to climb out and get the pocket-knife. This day an interpreter was present to speak to the enemy, and an officer of the 17th was on the parapet. An unpleasant situation nearly arose when the latter picked up a linen packet which proved to contain a bomb. It was, however, presently seen that the fuse was burnt out, and that the bomb must have been one thrown previously by the enemy, who often wrapped them in this manner. The higher authorities were always suspicious of such overtures, and by the third day orders had arrived that they were not to be permitted.

⁶³ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 123.

hamper observation, were thrown into The Apex and Brown's Dip, and on the southern flank; the chemical which they contained was the only "gas" used by either side at Anzac.⁶⁴


Between the end of August and the last week in November the only occasions on which the enemy at Anzac showed any aggressiveness were when he made some local advance in answer to a previous movement by his opponents. When, for example, on the evening of November 9th the 16th Battalion endeavoured unsuccessfully to steal from him a knoll known as "Hackney Wick," on the lower spurs of Hill Q,⁶⁵ he forthwith occupied and fortified the knoll far more strongly than before. Similarly on November 15th, when the 54th Division exploded a large mine beneath his front trench at Hill 60, although the Turkish garrison was destroyed, the enemy at once occupied the mine-crater, obtaining a somewhat better command than that afforded by his previous position.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ It was suspected that a different gas was on one occasion employed by the enemy in the mines at Helles, where lachrimatory (i.e., "tear") gas was also employed by him. Information had been received that the Germans were determined to introduce gas into the Gallipoli fighting, and the increasing use of tear bombs was thought, probably rightly, to prelude its employment. In case the Turks made a gas attack the British had at the Dardanelles a sufficient supply of poison gas to enable them to retaliate by discharging it on a 1,000-yards front for half-an-hour. They were not, however, tricked into using it in reply to the enemy's tear bombs. In some reports references are made to a number of Australians who were "gassed" on the Peninsula. These, however, were men who were injured by the poisonous gases following the explosion of some of their own mines. If a mine, when fired, did not break through satisfactorily to the open air or to the enemy's workings, the poisonous gas left by the explosion remained in the tunnel, endangering the life of anyone who entered it. For example, on Oct. 29, in order to make sure that a working party might safely enter Tunnel C2, in which a mine had just been fired, Lieut. F. D. A. Bowra (of Perth) of the 4th Fld. Coy. went down the rope ladder in the shaft leading to it. He had warned Lieut. E. T. Bazeley (of Nagambie, Vic.) of the 22nd Bn. that there might be danger from poisonous gases, and as he did not return Bazeley and a man named Currington (of Annandale, N.S.W.) went down with a rope. They found Bowra collapsed, but before they could rescue him both were overcome. Bazeley had barely strength to climb the ladder; Currington began to climb and fell back. Maj. Newcombe and Lieut. Thom were summoned from the 4th Coy.'s H.Q., and Thom, refusing to be tied to the rope, went down, but collapsed before he could save Bowra. The gas was now coming up the shaft. Cpls. J. A. Park (of Sydney), C. F. Mills (of Sydney), W. Bowden (of Geelong, Vic.), J. Shaw (of Kalgoorlie, W. Aust.), and others went down, but Thom, Bowra, Currington, and two other men of the 22nd, Pte. W. B. S. Good (of Wonthaggi, Vic.) and Pte. G. Stelling (of Essendon, Vic.) died, and Col. G. C. E. Elliott, chief engineer of the division, Maj. S. F. Newcombe, and twelve others were seriously "gassed." (Currington had five brothers serving at the war.) A similar accident had occurred shortly before in a mine-gallery at Russell's Top, where an officer of the 5th Fld. Coy., Lieut. E. J. Howells (of Camberwell, Vic.), became unconscious, but was dragged out by Cpl. J. H. Precious (of Melbourne), who himself collapsed just as he reached safety. Both survived.

⁶⁵ The assaulting party was checked while crawling along the razor-edge leading to its objective.

⁶⁶ The 54th Div. had been preparing for some months an attack upon Hill 60, to be delivered immediately after the explosion; but the mines, which were dug by the Welch Horse, were endangered by the approach of the enemy's tunnels and had to be prematurely exploded.

It was the activity of the light horse at the opposite end of Anzac which occasioned the sharpest fight that occurred during this phase of the campaign. Early in the morning of August 23rd Ryrie's 2nd Light Horse Brigade had carried out with brilliant success the raid which had originally been planned for the night of August 6th.⁶⁷ It was possibly this or a subsequent encounter on October 9th⁶⁸ which stimulated the enemy into a further encroachment along the seaside ridge, on which his nearest post was till then the Bird Trenches, 300 yards south of Chatham's. Between the two, but somewhat nearer to the Turks, there existed in the seaside ridge a small but pronounced dip into which neither the light horse at Chatham's nor the enemy at Bird Trenches could see.⁶⁹ During the night of October 24th the Turkish working parties were observed advancing from the Bird Trenches, and by their persistence when fired on it was evident that the enemy had determined to extend his defences so as to reach the northern side of this depression. The light horse




⁶⁷ See pp. 487-8, 496 The raid had been then countermanded; but after the Battle of Scimitar Hill a demonstration was required in order to test a report that the enemy was withdrawing troops from the southern flank of Anzac. Accordingly the 5th L.H. Regt. undertook what would later have been called a "trench-raid" against the Bird Trenches—on the seaward ridge south of Chatham's. Occasionally between midnight and 3 a.m. the destroyer *Colne*, which was maintaining the usual watch on that flank, bombarded the Bird Trenches, keeping them under her search-light. At 3.30, just after the set of the moon, Maj. Midgley with one squadron went south from Chatham's along the ridge towards the Turkish post. To cover Midgley, Maj. H. H. Johnston (of Casino, N.S.W.) with another squadron worked along the coast-line and lay down opposite the Bird Trenches, facing inland. Midgley's squadron was within a hundred yards of the same trenches when a Turkish sentry fired at it. The squadron kept low and crept forward to within fifteen yards, when the sentry fired again. At this stage—about 4.15—the destroyer, by arrangement, bombarded the trench for five minutes. Midgley's squadron then hurled a volley of some forty bombs and rushed the position. The enemy garrison, about 100 strong, had left the trench in order to shelter from the destroyer's fire. The trench was seized, and about thirty of the enemy were shot. Before daylight the enemy's reserves began to approach, and the light horse, after firing upon them, withdrew without any serious casualty.

⁶⁸ On this day an Arab deserter of the 77th Regt. endeavoured to make his way from Gaba Tepe along the beach to the Anzac lines, but was wounded before reaching them. At nightfall a party of the 5th Light Horse under Lieut. Brundrit went out to bring in the man, successfully drove off a Turkish detachment which was approaching for the same purpose, and rescued the deserter.

⁶⁹ See plate at p. 272.


were already tunnelling towards the same point, but their gallery had not yet covered two-thirds of the distance. The work therefore now became a race to anticipate the enemy. It was intended that, when the tunnel reached a point 100 yards south of Chatham's, a number of small rifle-pits should be opened up from it on the inland face of the ridge, just north of the depression. But the work was only nearing completion when on November 3rd the breaking-out of fresh enemy earthworks on the southern side indicated that the enemy's final rush to secure the depression must be imminent. It was accordingly determined that the northern side must be occupied by the Australians during the ensuing night. Fortunately on the rear or seaward slope of the hill there existed some old unoccupied Turkish works, comprising three unconnected sections of trench. It had been intended to make use of them as a second avenue of communication to the new position; but, even if the rifle-pits were not ready, it would be possible by cleaning out and connecting the first two sections of the old Turkish works to establish a new post 120 yards south of Chatham's and within bomb-throw of the depression. Accordingly after dusk on November 3rd the work was begun by parties under Major Midgley, a covering detachment under Captain Brundrit⁷⁰ lying in front. The Turkish working parties could be heard not a hundred yards away, but there was no interference. By daylight the post on the seaward slope had been established, and was held by thirty-four men. The tunnelled rifle-pits on the inland slope were, however, not yet ready.

It seems to have been 11 o'clock in the morning of November 4th before the enemy realised what the light horse had done. His reply was then immediate. He opened at once



⁷⁰ Capt. T. J. Brundrit; 5th L.H. Regt. Accountant; of Brisbane, b. Brisbane, 15 Oct., 1882. Killed in action, 8 Nov., 1915.

with artillery and broomstick bombs, and, after dark, crossed the dip, and between 8.30 and 11.30 under cover of machine-gun fire four times attacked the light horse position with bombs. A few Turks reached the parapet, but were killed.⁷¹ The enemy, however, had carried forward sandbags, and had established on the same knoll as the light horse two breastworks, twenty and seventy yards respectively from the new position of the light horse. General Ryrie⁷² at once informed the 5th Regiment, which was holding the post, that the breastworks must be captured with the bayonet if necessary. Such an operation would, however, be difficult and possibly expensive. The 5th, which during the night threw 500 bombs, was keeping the enemy at the nearer breastwork inactive, while Ryan's⁷³ "catapult-battery"—six large cross-bows flinging small bombs by means of india-rubber slings—kept down the fire of the Turks on Holly Ridge. Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson⁷⁴ assured the brigadier that he had the Turkish position under control by means of bombs. Ryrie, trusting his two leaders on the spot, Wilson and Midgley, in a highly difficult situation, exercised his judgment for a second time⁷⁵ in favour of avoiding what seemed unnecessary loss. The decision was justified by the result. A company of the 11th Battalion was brought up next day as a reserve, but the enemy made no further attack. On November 5th the light horse opened up the tunnelled fire-pits, and two nights later,



View southwards along the summit of Harris Ridge from the new Australian position, 5th November, 1915. 1. Turkish breastwork, seventy yards distant. 2. Turkish breastwork, twenty yards distant. 3. Bird Trenches. The sandbags in the foreground are British. (*From the diary of the Official War Correspondent.*)

⁷¹ A disaster was nearly caused by a lighted grenade falling into a tray of bombs in the Australian trench. Sgt. J. E. Orr (of Mount Morgan, Q'land) seized the tray and threw it clear of the trench.

⁷² Ryrie had been severely wounded by a shell on Sept. 29, but had just returned from hospital.

⁷³ The battery was commanded by Sgt. P. F. Ryan (of Melbourne).

⁷⁴ Brig.-Gen. L. C. Wilson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. Commanded 3rd L.H. Bde, 1917/19. Solicitor; b. Brisbane, 11 July, 1871.

⁷⁵ See pp. 487-8.

protected by artillery fire,⁷⁶ seized the third section of the old Turkish trench on the seaward slope, and from that position bombed the enemy finally out of the more advanced barricade.⁷⁷ The farther breastwork was partly demolished on November 14th by a gun of the 6th Battery, which was fired by Lieutenant Dodd⁷⁸ and Sergeant Croft⁷⁹ from an open position at Brown's Dip, Major Stevenson⁸⁰ in the advanced light horse trenches directing the deflection, with his own shells just clearing his head. The bare foothold which the enemy retained appears to have been of no use to him. By their digging the light horse had long since made the right flank absolutely secure. Their snipers regularly shot down every periscope and smashed in every loop-hole within 400 yards of their line. Their commander was as stout as his men, and at no time did Birdwood or his staff have the least apprehension concerning that corner of the position.⁸¹

Such was the fighting at Anzac during the period from August 29th to November 24th. During the same time, chiefly through sickness, great changes occurred in the staff. That of the original 1st Australian Division had by the beginning of November been largely transferred to the A. & N.Z. Army Corps and to the 2nd Division. Birdwood's chief-of-staff, Skeen, was sent away on September 9th ill with enteric fever, and replaced by C. B. B. White. As has been already related,⁸² Major Griffiths was brought to Corps Headquarters to deal with matters concerning the personnel of the A.I.F., while Colonel Howse, after continually urging the obvious need for one responsible authority to control the medical organisation

⁷⁶ An urgent call by the light horse for artillery fire was answered in two minutes by fire from the 9th Bty., A.F.A., and very soon after by the 5th (Lowland) Howitzer and 17th Siege Batteries.

⁷⁷ Capt. Brundrit was killed while emptying his revolver at fifteen yards' range into the enemy's riflemen.

⁷⁸ Maj. A. W. Dodd, D.S.O., M.C. Commanded 6th Bty, A.F.A., 1916/18. Clerk; of Melbourne, b. Melbourne, 12 Aug., 1894.

⁷⁹ Capt. C. W. Croft, M.C., M.M., 102nd Bty, A.F.A. Coachsmith, of Melbourne, b. Prahran, Vic., 28 Jan., 1888.

⁸⁰ Lieut.-Col. G. I. Stevenson, C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 3rd (Army) Bde, A.F.A., 1917/18. Public accountant; of Melbourne, b. Glasgow, Scotland, 8 March, 1882.

⁸¹ The new position, thenceforth the southernmost in the Anzac Line, was called "Wilson's Lookout." In the fighting connected with its capture, between Nov. 4 and 9, the Australian losses were 14 killed and 67 wounded. Besides the 5th L.H. Regt., the 4th, 6th, and 7th of the same brigade, and a company of the 11th Bn. were involved, either as reliefs, working parties, or reserves.

⁸² See p. 418.

at Anzac, was himself appointed D.D.M.S.—a position which he soon vacated on receiving the appointment of D.M.S., A.I.F.⁸³ Thenceforward it was with White, Howse, Griffiths, and (in later years) Colonel Dodds as his advisers that Birdwood administered the Australian Imperial Force.

On October 16th, after Hamilton had been recalled, Birdwood for the time being left the corps in order to act as Commander-in-Chief at Imbros. In his absence the Anzac command devolved nominally upon the senior divisional commander,⁸⁴ but was in reality mainly borne by White until November 25th, when Birdwood was given the Dardanelles Army, and, moving to his headquarters at Imbros, passed to Godley the command of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. White, Carruthers, Lesslie, and most of the heads of the corps staff remained with Godley at Anzac. Birdwood's new army staff was built up mainly with officers who, like its chief, Colonel Aspinall, had been allotted from G.H.Q., but also partly with members—mainly subordinates—of his old staff. Birdwood himself, in spite of his promotion, could hardly tear himself away from his daily tour of the front line and his intimate personal touch with the men. As an army commander he constantly inspected one or other of his fronts, visiting Anzac, for example, on December 2nd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 11th.

Upon Godley's transfer to the corps, the N.Z. & A. Division was given to Brigadier-General Russell, who was temporarily succeeded in the command of the Mounted Rifles Brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel Meldrum.⁸⁵ The 54th Division was, during General Inglefield's absence, commanded by Brigadier-General Hodgson⁸⁶ of the Eastern Mounted Brigade, a leader afterwards associated with the light horse in Palestine. In the 1st Australian Division General Walker was, on September 29th, half-buried by a shell which burst in his dugout, and a fortnight later was severely wounded by a machine-gun

⁸³ That is, Director of the Medical Services of the A.I.F. His previous position (D.D.M.S.) was Deputy-Director of the Medical Services of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps.

⁸⁴ Usually Godley, but, when he was absent from Anzac, Legge.

⁸⁵ The command of the N.Z.M.R. Bde. was eventually given to Brig.-Gen. E. W. C. Chaytor.

⁸⁶ Maj. Gen. Sir Henry W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O. Commanded Imperial (afterwards Aust.) Mtd. Div., 1916/18. Officer of British Regular Army; of Sussex, Eng., b. London, 29 June, 1868. Died 5 Feb., 1930

when visiting a loop-holed gallery in the cliff at the southern end of Silt Spur. His place was taken by Brigadier-General Hobbs of the divisional artillery. Within a few weeks both Hobbs of the 1st and Legge of the 2nd Division had been sent away sick, and the end of November found the two Australian divisions commanded by Brigadier-Generals Chauvel and Holmes respectively.

CHAPTER XXIX


THE ONSET OF WINTER

WHILE the British Government was unable to sanction either an advance or a withdrawal, the Allied army in Gallipoli was faced by a danger more serious than any that emanated from the unaided Turks—the menace of winter. The opinions of experts differed as to the date when adverse weather must be expected; but the best forecast appeared to be that, though rain and storms might occur at any time from the end of August, the real difficulties would not commence until about the end of the year. After that time, unless the position at Suvla Bay had been improved by driving back the enemy, the landing of stores and troops might be possible only on a comparatively few days in each month, and the sick and wounded might have to be retained on the Peninsula for a fortnight at a time. It was therefore necessary not only to increase the storage of water and supplies, but to construct hospitals. In addition, roads must be made, since the beds of the gullies which in most places had served the purpose would be frequently flooded. It seemed likely that tracks used for mule-carts or other wheeled traffic must be paved either with stone or wood. Winter quarters for the troops must be constructed, for which timber and corrugated iron would be necessary. Even where the shelters were made underground, a certain amount of timber would be required for shoring up the roofs and sides. In most parts of Anzac the gravel and clay walls of the trenches had so far stood without revetting, and even the tunnels (except in a few cases) had been entirely untimbered. But in the deep and narrow saps and shelters of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade on the southern flank there occurred dangerous falls of earth, which gave warning that the walls could not always be trusted to stand unsupported.

A very large traffic in stores and supplies would therefore have to pass through the Anzac landing-places. These had been much extended after the launching of the August offensive. From the moment when the seaward foot-hills

north of Anzac had been cleared of the enemy, it became for the first time possible to use as a port the bay and beach north of Ari Burnu. It is true that an enemy post still existed on an almost inaccessible knoll known as "Snipers' Nest," half-way down one of the razor-backed seaward talons of Baby 700, and that Snipers' Slope (the lower part of the seaward side of Baby 700), still almost untrenched and covered with thick scrub, overtopped the stretch of beach and foreshore immediately north of Walker's Ridge. That reach—between Walker's and No. 2 Out-post—being within easy range of the enemy's snipers and machine-guns, could never to the end of the campaign be safely traversed by day; all traffic, except during the dark hours, had therefore to move through the communication sap.¹ But south of Walker's Ridge the foreshore was screened from all enemy positions except the look-out at Snipers' Nest. The extreme southern corner of North Beach, including the northern side of Ari Burnu,² was visible to the enemy in that post.

On the launching of the August offensive a rudimentary pier was run out from the centre of North Beach, which had the great advantage of being out of sight of the Turkish artillery-observers at Gaba Tepe. Consequently, when on the 8th the Olive Grove guns fired upon a barge-load of urgently-needed mules which was being brought into Anzac Cove by day, the lighter was towed round the point to the North Beach, and unloaded. From that time this beach was increasingly used; and since it possessed a few hundred square yards of comparatively level hinterland, almost completely protected by the semicircle of precipices on either side of the Sphinx,³ it was chosen for the site of the main dépôt of reserve stores and




¹ During the operations in Aug. a New Army battalion, which was being hurried forward by day from the Anzac reserve, was by mistake led across this space. It accomplished the passage by rushes, suffering some casualties. At night, however, the open road was always in use.

² Snipers' Nest and the view obtained from it are shown in the plate at p. 834.

³ See plate at p. 866; also Vol. XII, plate 154.

supplies for the winter. More than once suggestions were made that the inconvenient observation-post at Snipers' Nest should be captured. Within a week of the arrival of General Holmes at Russell's Top the scouts of the 20th Battalion climbed to within forty feet of the place; since it was strongly held, they were unable to approach it more closely. Cruisers and land-artillery on several occasions shelled it, blowing away part of the narrow summit, and the 3rd Light Horse Brigade on Table Top had a machine-gun which swept the parapet of its communication trench. But General White, when he became chief-of-staff of the army corps, resisted all proposals to attack it. It was useless for purposes of offence, and was thoroughly commanded for defence. Previous experience showed that any action against it would only cause the enemy to believe that he was threatened and to fortify the seaward slope of Baby 700 higher up—most of which he had fortunately left intact, but from which, if he once entrenched it, he would hamper the traffic along the beach and in the harbour far more seriously. He was therefore allowed to retain his look-out to the end of the campaign.

The August offensive had also made possible the use of a small area of foreshore three-quarters of a mile north of North Beach—the limited area covered by Nos. 2 and 3 Outposts. Those knolls were not as lofty as the heights protecting Anzac Cove; but during the August offensive they became a miniature Anzac, their seaward slope being crowded with the headquarters' offices of the N.Z. & A. and 13th Divisions and the bivouacs of the ordnance, transport, and other personnel. The activity around Godley's headquarters during August equalled that of Anzac Beach. It is true that the hospital pier constructed near by proved useless.⁴ But on the narrow flat between the two Outposts and the shore there arose advanced dumps of supplies of fodder, beside which lines of mules



⁴ See foot-note 61 on p 717.

were picqueted.⁵ Immediately after the offensive there had been landed the tent sub-divisions of most of the field ambulances. Under Gallipoli conditions the ambulances always tended to develop into small hospitals, and several of them with the 16th (British) Casualty Clearing Station clustered against the slope of the Outposts and of the two foot-hills farther north. The importance of the new headquarters could not long escape the enemy's observation. Two of his aeroplanes flew over the area on August 29th, and on the following afternoon a 5.9-inch howitzer at the Olive Grove, after lengthening its range gradually along the beach, found the crowded angle between the Outposts and then dropped twenty-seven shells into the headquarters and dépôt, killing 6 men of the 13th Divisional Headquarters and wounding 24. During this and subsequent bombardments shells were thrown into the hospitals, by which patients lying in the tents were killed; but crowded as they were between ordnance stores and headquarters' offices—or, as at Taylor's Hollow, wedged between batteries of artillery—the medical units could not and did not accuse their enemy of a breach of the rules of war.

The discussion of preparations for the winter began before the Battle of Scimitar Hill. As a convenient dépôt for supplies it was resolved to make use of Kephalos Harbour in Imbros; and so that Suvla might be provisioned from Anzac or *vice versa*, it was at first intended to lay a light 2-ft. 6-in. gauge railway between the two. Such a railway would have been excessively vulnerable.⁶ Two motor-lorries, however, which were landed on September 15th with some heavy artillery, were run along the foreshore⁷ to supply with ammunition their two batteries, one at Taylor's Hollow and the other in the sand-hills half-way to Suvla. The comparative success of this experiment appears to have caused Birdwood to decide that instead of a railway a road should be made to the left flank, and transport carried on by motor-lorries at night. Later both proposals were rejected by G.H.Q. It was then decided

⁵ See Vol XII, plate 125

⁶ It would, for example, have required a two-span bridge over the Sazlı creek bed, which might easily have been destroyed. Trains could only have run at night

⁷ One, however, broke down through sand working into the gears

to provide communication with each flank of the Anzac position by extending a short tramway which by then connected Anzac Cove with the dépôt at North Beach.⁸ In addition, for the conveyance of supplies direct from the foreshore to the heights, there were to be erected two "aerial rope-ways," such as are often used in quarries and open workings, one from North Beach to Russell's Top and the other from Shrapnel Gully up Bridges' Road towards the head of Wire Gully.⁹ To ensure a supply of drinking water when the weather made it impossible to pump it from the barges, a plant was to be installed for condensing from sea-water 20,000 gallons daily. In addition a machine for boring deep wells was to be procured. The existing jetty at North Beach (known as "Williams' Pier") was to be lengthened and provided with a tramway; and a second pier (afterwards called "Walker's," apparently from its proximity to Walker's Ridge) was to be constructed on its northern side. On September 8th, at a conference of the Director of Works (then General Lotbinière) with Brigadier-General Williams¹⁰ (then Chief Engineer of Anzac) and other authorities concerned, it was further decided to strengthen with concrete the head of Watson's Pier.¹¹ For the reception of sick and wounded at times when their evacuation was impossible through rough weather, the medical authorities at G.H.Q. decided to provide hospital accommodation of 1,000 beds. Colonel Howse, however, pointed out that this number was insufficient, and, when he became chief medical officer of the army corps, decided without further authority to arrange locally for 2,000.¹²

The preparations in prospect were thus very extensive. Upon the launching of the August offensive the area of Anzac Cove and North Beach had been allotted to a special commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Young,¹³ as Commandant of the

⁸ A special tramway corps was formed.

⁹ This decision was arrived at on Aug. 21. In wet weather the clay of Anzac was so slippery that the ascents to Pope's, Steele's, and some other posts became very difficult. Ropes (not to be confused with the projected "rope-ways") were fixed, by which the troops helped themselves up.

¹⁰ Maj.-Gen. Sir Godfrey Williams, K.C.I.E., C.B.; R.F. Officer of British Regular Army; of Llangibby, Mon., Wales; b. Bitton, Somerset, Eng., 31 Dec., 1859.

¹¹ Subsequent endeavours to do this proved ineffectual.

¹² The 1st Aust. Stationary Hospital, under Maj. H. A. Powell (of Kadina, S. Aust.), and 1st A.C.C.S. were eventually stationed in tents inshore of the southern end of North Beach (see plate at p. 866), and the 16th (British) C.C.S. farther north on the side of Walker's Ridge.

¹³ Col. F. De B. Young, C.M.G., p.s.c. Officer of Indian Regular Army, b. 11 March 1865. Died 1 Nov., 1920.




LORD KITCHENER (LEFT) INSPECTING ANZAC FROM RUSSELL'S TOP
Beside him is General Birdwood

Admiralty Official Photograph
Aust War Memorial Collection No G5730

Ari
Burnu

Snipers'
Nest



THE TURKISH VANTAGE-POINT AT SNIPERS' NEST, AFFORDING A VIEW
OF NORTH BEACH

Taken by Printing Section G.H.Q. M.E.F.
Aust War Memorial Collection No G14429

To face p 834



ANZAC IN THE STORM. NOVEMBER, 1915

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1250

To face p 835

"Anzac Advanced Base," and from that time onward the troops who carried out the work of the beach were under the command of the officer holding that post. For directing this work Birdwood's staff was still responsible. One of the first problems of the Anzac base was to obtain the labour necessary for carrying out the programme of works. The divisions forming the garrison, being for the most part fully occupied first in digging the new trench-line, and later in excavating their winter quarters, could not easily spare men on the beaches. For such tasks on the Turkish side bodies of Greeks or Armenians were employed. On the Helles beaches the British used a proportion of hired Greek labour, and an effort was now made by the lines-of-communication staff to obtain a corps of Maltese for Anzac. The men were raised, but on reaching Mudros a large number were found unwilling to face the danger. Some 200, however, under Captain Stivala and four other Maltese officers, volunteered to undertake the service, as did about the same number of an Egyptian labour corps. But neither Maltese nor Egyptians proved well suited for working under the conditions of Anzac. The following personnel was eventually obtained at various times for the work of the Anzac base:—

Sept. 10 & 21	..	Anson Battalion (Roy. Nav. Div.)	..	84
Sept. 15	..	Part of 37th Fortress Coy., R.E.	..	54
Sept. 20	..	1st Essex Garrison Bn.	..	207
Sept. 21 to 28	..	Egyptian Labour Corps	..	221
Sept. 28	..	Maltese Labour Corps	..	212
Nov. 8	27th Labour Coy., A.S.C.	..	539

This labour was not adequate for the works in hand, especially as winter approached and the weather grew more severe and the work heavier and more pressing. The Egyptians could not work in the cold, and the British labour company consisted of men who, though their spirit evoked the admiration of the other troops, were hardly fitted for the work at Anzac. Recruited in Great Britain from those who were over age or otherwise incapable of more active service, they had expected to be employed in the docks at Alexandria or in similar surroundings.¹⁴ At Anzac their hardships were

¹⁴ They were usually known by such nicknames as "The Daddies" or "The Old and Bold."


unnecessarily increased by the fact that both they and the Maltese were thoughtlessly allotted camp-sites on the northern side of Ari Burnu, in full view of the enemy post at Snipers' Nest. Here, housed in tents or in shallow shelter, they were subject to the fire of a machine-gun which played every night on the tracks and bivouacs in this area. During their first night two men are said to have been killed by this fire, and on subsequent nights others were hit.¹⁵ In spite of this special provision of labour the full quota for the works at the Anzac base was seldom if ever available. At the end of October the Chief Engineer, then Brigadier-General Lesslie, asked that working parties from the divisions should again be employed on the engineering works, and his request was acceded to.

By these measures the preparation against winter was gradually effected. Its urgency was emphasised when, on the night of October 8th, the first serious storm descended on the Peninsula. Instead of blowing—as almost always before—from the land, the wind came from the south-west. In Anzac Cove the seas washed over the piers. A lighter moored to the southernmost jetty eventually broke through and carried away thirty feet of it. Another lighter broke through Watson's Pier, and tore away not only forty feet of trestle construction but also the two main suction pipes through which water was pumped from barges to the shore-tanks. One full and one empty water-boat were driven ashore. The supply of water to Anzac from overseas was thus temporarily cut off. The tanks at Anzac at this time were capable of holding about 80,000 gallons, of which nearly 50,000 would be contained in the main reservoir on Plugge's. The old Anzac wells, with the exception of that at No. 2 Outpost, were practically dry, and at the date of this storm the total storage was 46,800 gallons. The troops were placed on a half-gallon ration, and next day repairs were effected which allowed a little water to be pumped. Nevertheless by October 11th the storage had fallen to 24,000 gallons.¹⁶ The supply then began to overtake the demand, and a somewhat critical situation was surmounted.

¹⁵ On Nov. 19 at least one man of the 27th Labour Coy was killed and four wounded by a single shell when at their midday meal.

¹⁶ It was suspected that the order to reduce the ration had not been duly carried out. At a later stage locks were placed on the water-cocks.

It was remarked that in the storm of October 9th the shelter accorded by Ari Burnu, slight though it was, almost completely protected Williams' Pier, giving some hope that it might be possible to use North Beach as a harbour during rough weather. Accordingly at a second conference concerning winter preparations, which was held after this storm, it was decided to ask the naval authorities to sink a ship south-west of the pier-head to serve as a breakwater. On October 26th the old steamer *Milo* was grounded in the required position. The breakwater thus partly formed was to be completed by sinking two lighters between the *Milo* and the shore,¹⁷ and the old steamer was also to be connected with the beach by building another pier. In the meantime a line of pipe and hose was run out to her, enabling the water-barges to lie safely under her lee and deliver their supply to the Anzac tanks.





The same storm caused Birdwood to urge all his divisions to press on with winter preparations in the inland areas. Drains were made to carry rain-water away from the trenches and roads.¹⁸ Roads were cut along the valley-sides so as to be clear of the expected torrents in the stream-beds. Everywhere the units began to dig their winter quarters. It is true that the timber and corrugated iron needed for this work had not arrived; but the first organized raid by German submarines—which between September 28th and October 11th had sunk eighteen ships in the eastern Mediterranean—made it inadvisable to wait any longer. Some of the 3rd Infantry Brigade were already living in small caves or dugouts excavated by themselves and unsupported by timber, and Birdwood accordingly urged that shelters of this type should be dug in the

¹⁷ This was never done, but the shelter given by the *Milo* was nevertheless invaluable. (See plate at p 866; also Vol XII, plate 149.)

¹⁸ The straight, deep channel which was dug in Monash Valley in order to take the place of the old stream-bed, then used as a road, was still effective in 1919.

trenches throughout the Anzac area. The roofs of these chambers were to be a few feet below the surface, and they were to be large enough for five or six men.

About the same time the progress of the German invasion of Serbia caused the staff to realise that more artillery and ammunition would shortly reach the Turks, and that an attack preceded by heavy bombardment might have to be faced. In preparing for such an attack the problem was to ensure that the troops should be kept alive during the preliminary bombardment, and, when it ended, should be able quickly to man their trenches and thus meet the enemy when he came forward. For this purpose the excavation was also begun of dugouts of a much deeper and larger type, to be approached from the firing line by a tunnelled stairway of twelve or sixteen steps. The roof of the chamber was to be at least eight or nine feet below the surface. A few of these were already being constructed when on October 24th a warning telegram was received from Lord Kitchener.



As owing to operations in Serbia more ammunition may be made available for the enemy's artillery in Gallipoli, you should study very carefully and carry out defensive works and communication trenches on the lines of those that have successfully resisted German artillery in France, so as to be prepared to resist increased bombardment of your positions. My advice is dig.

In publishing this to all troops Birdwood also expressed his own hope that the work then in hand would be pressed forward "until we are immune from the effects of any

bombardment, however severe." Kitchener's advice strongly impressed both staff and troops with the notion that they must bring their defences up to what they imagined to be the standard adopted on the Western Front. The impression was deepened when General Monro, coming straight from France, during his short visit to Anzac on October 30th informed the staff that the deep shelters then being dug at Anzac were inadequate. On the Western Front, he said, nothing less than from twelve to sixteen feet of head-cover was considered sufficient; and for safety every deep shelter must have several exits. The defences of Anzac had till then been regarded as something of a pattern for Gallipoli, and by the orders of G.H.Q. visiting parties from Suvla and elsewhere had been shown on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays round the trenches and underground firing line. But the plan of the deep shelters upon which the troops had lately begun to work was at once changed, and deeper dugouts were commenced throughout the area. In the interior of Rhododendron Ridge the 3rd Light Horse Brigade excavated a barracks with cook-house, sleeping galleries, and nine separate entrances. In Cheshire Ridge Monash's 4th Australian Brigade, now returned from Lemnos, began a system of twenty-two galleries leading through the interior of the hill, with entrances from the bivouacs in rear and exits into the firing line on the summit or forward slope.¹⁹ At Quinn's and elsewhere there were driven through from the rear slope of the firing line tunnels with recesses for sleeping quarters. Early in November the first deep shelter was completed in the lines of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, and by the beginning of December there existed at the majority of posts a certain amount of shelter which would have been proof against almost any bombardment. Monro's warning of the inadequacy of shallow cover proved to be only too well justified. But six months later, when some of the divisions from Gallipoli took their place on the British front in France,

¹⁹ See Vol. XII, plate 140. The mining was done by small parties working four-hour shifts so that work should be continuous day and night. Each company drove its own tunnel, supplying its own miners, and the sleeping recesses on either side of the tunnels were to be cut by the men who would occupy them. The work was popular, since the miners were under cover from rain, snow, and wind, and when not on duty their time was their own.

they found nowhere any system of deep shelters approaching in thoroughness that which they had left in process of completion in Gallipoli.²⁰

This work was in progress when rough seas again occurred. Between these disturbances the weather remained to the last almost invariably fine, with many glorious days of blue sky and bright sunshine; and in the stormy intervals the wind was seldom more than a half-gale. But on October 27th the sea became sufficiently rough to stop the pumping of water from the barge, and by the 29th the reserve ashore had sunk to 29,000 gallons. Six lighters and a paddle tug were driven on to the Beach, but little damage was done to the pier.²¹ The weather then cleared until November 14th, when a half-gale began to blow from the south-west. Fortunately it dropped on the 16th sufficiently to allow pumping, but blew again heavily next day. The troops at The Apex and on other heights round the position hardly realised that anything unusual was occurring—the breeze seemed fresh, and far down on the sand they could see three thin lines of glistening breakers. Yet in Anzac Cove this change in the weather made almost a clean sweep of the piers. Their wreckage strewn the Beach. A few big barges butted one another, as each wave washed them higher on the sand. The piles of Watson's Pier remained, but its planking had gone. North of Ari Burnu, however, though the waves had broken the back of the *Milo* and swept in masses of foam over Williams' Pier, both the ship and the jetty stood fast. At 9.30 a.m., when the wind had first freshened, most of the lighters and small craft had been sent off to Imbros, where, it was believed, a safe harbour had been made by sinking the old Orient liner *Oruba*²² and two other ships as a breakwater. Thus, though the boat which was carry-

²⁰ These dugouts were almost entirely unsupported by timber, since practically none was to be had at Anzac. Nevertheless, in 1919, such of the deep galleries as were examined by the Aust. Historical Mission were still in existence, although local falls of earth had occurred in them. The absence of timber was probably due to the sinking of storeships by German submarines. One timber ship, the *Omonia*, a three-masted schooner, had also been sunk by the Turkish guns on Sept. 20 when being brought to North Beach. In the storm of Oct. 9 she broke up, and a large part of her cargo drifted ashore at No. 2 Outpost. For nearly a month after that date little timber, and only 1,050 sheets of corrugated iron reached Anzac. At the end of Oct. another 1,000 sheets of iron were landed. On Nov. 9 some 10,000 sheets, 300,000 feet of timber, and 2 tons of nails, 36 barrels of cement, and a few other stores came to hand.

²¹ See Vol XII, plate 144.

²² The *Oruba*, rigged as a "dummy" battleship or battle-cruiser, had been employed in the eastern Mediterranean throughout the campaign.

ing the Christmas mail from Anzac to Australia foundered, and a tug and several lighters were driven ashore at North Beach, yet on November 18th (when the weather cleared) the small craft immediately returned from Imbros, and traffic was resumed at Williams' Pier. The repairing of the works in Anzac Cove was somewhat hampered by enemy gun-fire. A hostile aeroplane came over Anzac after the storm to observe the damage, and, doubtless as the result of its observations, the Olive Grove guns bombarded the Beach at intervals night and day for the next forty-eight hours.

It was during the week following this storm that there took place at Mudros the conference of Kitchener and other leaders which recommended to the British Government the evacuation of the Peninsula. Although few on the Peninsula even knew that a conference was being held, and its subject-matter and results were not made known to anyone except the three corps commanders and their chiefs-of-staff, yet it was apparent to the staff at the several beaches that some drastic change of policy had occurred. Orders arrived forbidding the landing of further supplies of food. No engineering stores were to be brought ashore, except those required for the repair of the piers and other works of similar urgency, and all plant or machinery of especial value was to be withdrawn. An incidental consequence was that the boring machine for deep mining, which after a month's delay had on November 23rd commenced to work in Shrapnel Gully and had excavated a hole twelve feet deep, was on that day ordered to be dismantled and shipped away.²³ Two days later instructions arrived for the removal of the condensing plant which was being installed on the Beach. In this case, on the night before the order was received, two of the four boilers were damaged beyond repair by shells from the Olive Grove. The dismantling of other parts of the plant, however, was forthwith begun. The material of the aerial rope-ways, which had arrived on November 8th at Lemnos, and for which sites had been chosen and

²³ The machine had originally been placed on a site chosen by an expert, Mr Beeby Thompson, and was in charge of two civilians, Messrs. Carson (an American) and Allen. Its derrick, however, had been seen by the enemy from the Chessboard and shelled. The machine was then removed to another site, but work was suspended until certain tools could be procured. These arrived on Nov. 22, and on the next afternoon the machine started work. At 6.15 p.m. the order arrived for its removal.

were being prepared at Russell's Top and Bridges' Road,²⁴ was never landed.

To those on the Peninsula who were charged with carrying them out some of these orders appeared to point unmistakably to a policy of evacuation. Further directions for the withdrawal of the Maltese Labour Corps and the whole of the 54th Division seemed to have the same significance. Nevertheless other reasons were possible, even for the withdrawal of valuable stores. It might be that they were urgently required at Salonica, or were to be kept in better cover during the winter. As for the troops, the effect of the storms on the beaches had afforded a good reason for reducing to a minimum the number of men to be fed and supplied. There were also rumours of the establishment of large rest camps on the islands, containing proper winter quarters to which half the present garrison of the Peninsula was to be withdrawn for rest. Few of those who were engaged in the Dardanelles Campaign could bring themselves to the belief that the great enterprise would really be abandoned. The general opinion, therefore, was that the withdrawals were merely preparatory to a defensive winter campaign.

White, however, had received from Birdwood, immediately after the conference of November 22nd, a telegram indicating clearly what the decision was,²⁵ and instructing him to "inform General Godley and start future plans accordingly." The secret measures which followed are related in the next chapter; but one step of great importance was forthwith adopted with the full knowledge of the troops. It seemed to White that, in the event of evacuation, the most dangerous moment must occur when the enemy remarked the silence caused by the withdrawal of most of the troops. He therefore at once determined to accustom the Turks to periods of silence. It was obvious that they must by now be watching for signs of a withdrawal, since—apart from its obvious possibility—it

²⁴ It had been decided to erect two additional ropeways at Pope's and Courtney's. After the war ropeways were actually installed at Anzac by Lieut.-Col. Hughes of the Imperial War Graves Commission for the transport of material to the Anzac cemeteries.

²⁵ The telegram, sent from the *Lord Nelson*, began: "General Birdwood for General White—My views unlikely to be accepted"

had been the subject of discussion in the House of Lords. Moreover, early on the night of November 22nd a body of fifty Turks had rushed down from the Pinnacle towards The Apex, evidently in order to discover whether the line at this advanced position was strongly held. They had been easily beaten off by the New Zealand infantry,²⁶ but their action seemed to prove that they were curious and watchful. White now determined, by arranging for a two days' cessation of fire along the whole Anzac front, to teach the enemy that silence along the firing line did not mean withdrawal. The cessation was to commence forthwith—at 6 p.m. on November 24th. The enemy was to be fired on only if he attacked or threatened to do so, or offered an exceptionally good target. All normal sniping and artillery fire was to cease.

The immediate effect upon the enemy of the "policy of silence" (known afterwards by the troops as the "Silent Stunt" or the "Silent Battle") was—

Night of Nov. 24.—Enemy showed no curiosity.

Nov. 25.—Quinn's.—At 6.45 a.m. twenty Turks came out of their trenches by some exit, invisible to the Australians, behind the broken, up-turned earth of the mine-craters in which the remains of their old front line now lay. Sixteen stayed at their front line, while the other four boldly walked to Quinn's. Here they were faced by the sloping screens of wire netting erected against bombs. They dragged back and cleared two sections of the screen, the sentries of the 17th Bn. calmly watching them. A machine-gunner in Steele's had his gun laid on the Turks, but in consequence of his orders would not fire. The four intruders flung bombs through the gap in the screen, wounding four of the 17th. No bombs, however, were thrown in reply. One Turk then jumped into the trench, and, with great bravery, strode firmly along it past the four wounded men into the dark passage of a bomb-proof shelter. There a sergeant of the 17th lunged at him with a bayonet. The Turk seized it, but was bayoneted at the second attempt, and was at the same moment shot by a corporal coming up behind him. The remaining Turks were driven away with bombs.

The enemy during the day threw into Quinn's a message in French, doubtless endeavouring to discover whether the post was occupied. The message (translated) was: "My dear Australian, how do you do? We hope that you are in good health. Always the best. Reply

²⁶ The saddle between the Pinnacle and The Apex, over which the enemy had to move for 60 yards, was only some 75 yards in width. It was commanded by four N.Z. machine-guns which were always in position at The Apex, and seven others mostly on the flanks or in rear. The enemy was seen climbing out over his parapet, two machine-guns at once opened on him, a third joining in shortly afterwards, while the N.Z. rifle-fire was also heavy. The Turks rushed down, threw some twenty bombs, and immediately ran back. None of their dead were visible next day, but it is believed that loss was inflicted.

if you please." It was signed "Soldas Turgo" (bad French for "Turkish soldier").

Remainder of line.—The enemy appeared to be rendered nervous by the absence of fire.

Gun Ridge.—Turks could be seen in the distance collecting firewood.

Night of Nov. 25.—Southern flank.—All the Australian patrols met Turkish patrols, and bomb-fighting ensued.

Lone Pine.—The enemy was seen anxiously watching over his parapet. A few Turks came into the open, and two approached the barricade in Sap C (McDonald's) and were shot.

Johnston's Jolly.—A patrol of ten came out as far as the Australian wire entanglement. A machine-gun then fired upon them, and they retired. The body of one of their number was hanging on the wire next day.

Nov. 26.—Gun Ridge.—Turks were walking about freely, collecting firewood.

Chessboard and Main Range.—The enemy appeared to be making observations of Monash Valley. His snipers, lying out and firing with impunity, made movement in parts of Anzac difficult.

Night of Nov. 26.—In the early hours of Nov. 27 the enemy sent out reconnoitring parties from almost all his positions.

South Flank—Ryrie's Post.—At 5 a.m. fifty Turks advanced from their position at the southern end of Holly Ridge towards the left of Ryrie's. The men of the 7th Light Horse allowed the enemy to come on until he began to throw bombs, when they opened heavy fire, practically annihilating the party; 21 Turks were killed and some 20 wounded. The latter were allowed to crawl or be assisted back to their trench.

Leane's.—At 3 a.m. twenty Turks approached the parapet and threw bombs, but were easily driven off by the 1st Bn.

Silt Spur.—At 3 a.m. fifteen Turks came up Cooe Valley and threw bombs at the 5th Bn., but did not press their reconnaissance.

Lone Pine.—The enemy bombed and sniped more actively. A few patrols came into the open and were fired on, three Turks being killed.

Wire Gully.—A patrol of ten came up to the head of the gully; there it was fired on, and retired, leaving behind one killed and one wounded man.

Quinn's.—Four times in the night small parties of Turks emerged and endeavoured to approach Quinn's, one attempt being preceded by heavy bombing. On each occasion they retired as soon as fire was opened or bombs thrown.

Pope's.—At 10 p.m. a small party attempted to approach the left of the post. Shots were fired and it withdrew.

Russell's Top.—The enemy profited by the silence to dig a new forward trench near the seaward slope of The Nek.

Hackney Wick (between the two branches of the Aghyl Dere).—The Turks put out wire entanglements.

During the 26th orders were issued that the policy of silence should be continued for a third day, ending at midnight on the 27th. The troops were then to be more than normally active. On the 26th the weather had changed, growing cold

and rainy, and on the 27th the rain became heavier. The effect of the silence upon the enemy was—

Nov. 27.—Southern flank: Gun Ridge.—Turks gathering firewood.

From Hill Q to Chunuk Bair.—The enemy appeared to be crowding his front trenches as if preparing to attack. Accordingly at 1.30 p.m. the guns of the N.Z. & A. Div. and of the cruiser *Grafton* were turned heavily upon them. All divisions were warned from Anzac H.Q. that there were signs that the enemy might attack during the following night.

Night of Nov. 27.—Rain and, later, snow were falling. Along the greater part of the line the enemy made no reconnaissance, but was engaged in putting out barbed-wire.

Apex.—At 3 a.m. on Nov. 28 some fifty Turks began to descend from the Pinnacle over the snow. The N.Z. patrol, which lay out every night in front of The Apex, fired on them, and they immediately retired.

The "Silent Battle" ended at midnight on November 27th. It had imposed considerable strain on the troops, but of the value of its results there can be no doubt. The Turkish staff was perplexed, some officers holding that the Anzac troops were concentrating their attention on preparations for the winter, while others maintained that the silence might indicate a partial withdrawal—that is to say, an abandonment of certain advanced and exposed positions. But the parties sent out to test this theory came up everywhere against an impassable defence. The Turkish staff seems finally to have concluded that the silence indicated a desire on the part of the Anzac troops to make their winter preparations without disturbance from the enemy. As the Turks were engaged upon the same task, this explanation appeared a probable one.

It happened that the question of winter preparations—for the recommendation to withdraw had not yet been approved by the British Government—was abruptly thrust before both sides by the weather which marked the close of the Silent Battle. The rainstorm of November 27th was followed in the night by a short blizzard of snow, and then by two days and nights during which a freezing wind blew.²⁷ At Anzac on the night of the 27th waterproof capes and india-rubber boots, in sufficient quantity for most of the troops actually on duty, were sent to the trenches; the troops suffered comparatively little harm, even though the 7th and 8th Battalions (which had just

²⁷ During Nov. 28 the thermometer did not rise above freezing-point, and at night showed 7° of frost.

returned from Lemnos) were bivouacking in the open, under no better shelter than each man could improvise with his waterproof sheet.²⁸ A small general "issue" of rum was authorised. But for most Australians on this occasion the real antidote to the bitter weather was probably their intense interest at their first sight of snow. At Lone Pine the sentries with white flakes on their caps and overcoats, and icicles hanging from the "overhead traverses" beside them, looked out on a scene reminding them of Christmas cards received from the "Old Country." "Look at those trees, mate," said a sentry opposite Owen's Gully. "The snow looks beautiful on the leaves, don't it?" Next day, when Anzac lay white, there was much snow-balling behind the lines.

At Anzac this storm caused many cases of frost-bite, and filled with water seven feet in depth the easternmost communication trench to Hill 60. At Suvla, where the troops were more exposed, its ravages were in many ways as severe as those of a great battle. The first rush of rain-water from the hills filled some of the trenches with a torrent, and drowned a number of men. Parts of the front line had to be for a time abandoned or held only by means of patrols. The enemy did not take advantage of this; indeed the bodies of dead Turks and of mules washed down one of the creek-beds through the British lines proved that he was suffering in the same way. But the loss caused among the Sulva troops by the freezing wind was alarming. The figures collated by the medical authorities at G.H.Q. were:—

Numbers evacuated between Nov. 30 and Dec. 8—					
Helles.	Anzac.	Suvla.	Total.		
1,459	3,246	11,086	..	15,791	
Of these the following were cases of "trench-feet"—					
Helles.	Anzac.	Suvla.	Total.		
138	414	4,243	..	4,795	
Deaths from exposure—					
Helles.	Anzac.	Suvla.	Total.		
—	1	204	..	205	

Among the shipping the storm played such havoc that Vice-Admiral Wemyss was driven to doubt whether the operation of withdrawing the army could be undertaken without excessive risk. The damage was not at first apparent at Anzac. When

²⁸ See Vol. XII, plate 146.

the wind first sprang up, blowing from the south-west, all the craft usually in harbour had been sent as usual to Imbros for safety; and, though part of the decking was swept from Watson's Pier, and Walker's Jetty at North Beach was completely demolished, nevertheless Williams' Pier was not affected, the breakwater ship *Milo* still protecting it.²⁹ By November 28th the wind had veered to the north-east, and since it was then blowing from off the shore the harbour became smooth. By the 29th the piers were ready to be worked, and the engineers were waiting for the return of the small craft—and especially of the water-barge, which was urgently needed, the reserve of water having fallen to 33,500 gallons. But no craft arrived. The north-east wind, harmless to craft at Anzac, blew straight into the harbour at Imbros. The middle steamer of the breakwater had been destroyed, and every small boat sunk or swept ashore.³⁰ The water-steamer had been driven on the beach, and to the appeal for water army headquarters could only reply that the Anzac force must rely on its own wells and, if necessary, re-erect the condenser and the boring machine which six days earlier it had been ordered to pull down. The ration issued for this and the following days at Anzac was nominally two pints for the day; but it was actually, in many cases, a cupful of water morning and night, and none at midday. On the morning of November 30th, although the day was glorious, the sky blue and the sea smooth, no craft at first appeared, and the beaches were still idle. About 11 a.m. a dinghy, the only boat available, took General Godley and his staff to a tug which had arrived to carry him to a conference with General Birdwood and Admiral Wemyss at Imbros. The water in the pipes ashore had frozen; many bursts had occurred, and before the reserve could be replenished it had fallen to 27,750 gallons.³¹

These storms seemed to prove what had always been contended by the naval authorities—that Imbros could not be used as a naval station in the winter. Moreover the excessive

²⁹ The *Milo* was still in position after the end of the war (See Vol I, plate at p. 250)

³⁰ See Vol XII, plate 145

³¹ It was now decided to connect the Anzac pumping-station with the wells at No 2 Outpost, which were the best at Anzac. The work had been begun when the Evacuation was ordered.

casualties far more than made up for the sudden decline in disease which had occurred as soon as the cool weather set in,⁸² and caused anxious fears as to the future. The storms did not, however, determine the answer to the still open question whether the Peninsula should be abandoned. On the contrary, as has been seen, a proposal for a vigorous offensive was at this moment being discussed in England and at the naval headquarters at the Dardanelles.


Such was the position of the Allied army at the beginning of December. On the Turkish side the situation had changed in one important respect—the route from Berlin to Constantinople was now open. In November the first instalment of ammunition from the Central Powers reached Gallipoli; and on the 15th of that month an Austrian battery of four 9.5-inch howitzers arrived and was emplaced on the heights near the Anafarta gap, a position chosen with the special intention of bringing fire to bear upon the Chocolate Hills. The enemy's artillery had already increased its activity in the middle of October, possibly employing shells from the factory newly-established in Turkey under Captain Pieper.⁸³ But it was not until the end of November that the arrival of ammunition had any serious result.

At 9 a.m. on November 29th, thirty-three hours after the ending of the Silent Battle, a number of flags—some white, others black or red—were observed to be flying at intervals on the parapets of the enemy's support trenches along the whole of the Anzac front from Russell's Top to Lone Pine. They seemed clearly to foreshadow a bombardment by the enemy's artillery; but, as soon as the white flags—ordinarily the sign for a parley—were observed, a message was sent to General White for instructions how they should be dealt with. The answer, in the circumstances, was that they should be shot down as soon as possible. At 9.10, however, the enemy began to bombard the sector opposite the flags, mainly with heavy howitzers firing from some unknown emplacement to the east or north-east. Although shells fell upon Russell's Top,

⁸² Dysentery and enteric had greatly decreased. A form of jaundice was, however, prevalent.

⁸³ It was, however, estimated by Gen Cunliffe Owen (B.G.R.A., Anzac) that the enemy was still firing only one shell to fifteen which were fired against him.

Courtney's, and the front opposite the Jolly, the main target appeared to be Lone Pine. There it happened that the relief of the garrison, which took place every two days, was about to begin, and at 10 a.m. the 24th Battalion commenced to pass through the saps leading to the Pine, in order to relieve the 23rd. It was upon the old No-Man's Land, through which these saps ran, that the enemy's artillery at first ranged, and the approaches had consequently become blocked. The guns then shortened their range on to the Australian position in Lone Pine, breaking down and in places almost completely filling parts of the front line at the centre and northern end of the position. All the three communication trenches to the Pine were almost completely blocked. But the 24th gradually made its way through into Lone Pine, in which the 23rd was standing fast expecting attack, and during the next few hours the position was held, under conditions imposing very heavy strain, by mixed troops of the two battalions.



It was the first occasion upon which Australian infantry in trenches were subjected to heavy modern bombardment. The enemy's guns, opening at 9.10 upon the area in rear, quickly shortened range and for two hours and a half flung their heavy shells—including some of about 8, 9, and 12-inch calibre³⁴—into the crowded area of Lone Pine. At 11.40 the fire ceased, but recommenced at 11.55 and continued until shortly after 12.15. The saps at Lone Pine formed a network more closely woven than any that Australian troops afterwards occupied, and, as the sector was an exposed one, they had been deepened, in accordance with the principle generally adopted at Anzac, to seven or eight feet. For the same reason many of them had been left narrow. Further, to gain protection, some of the approaches and trenches had been tunnelled after the Anzac

³⁴ The ammunition had almost certainly come from Germany or Austria, but the available evidence makes it improbable that the newly-arrived Austrian battery was employed

fashion, with the roofs either just beneath the roots of the grass or at most two to three feet below the surface. These deep saps and shallow tunnels had always given excellent protection against bullets and field-artillery; now that they were bombarded by heavy guns, they proved merely a dangerous trap. The sides and roofs were blown in, burying numbers of the garrison. In the 24th Battalion fourteen men were thus suffocated. The divisional sanitary officer, Major Miller Johnson,³⁵ who had been inspecting the Pine when the bombardment started, and who had at once established an improvised aid-post, was smothered, along with the men whom he was tending. And although, by the vehement efforts of their comrades, and especially of a stretcher-bearer named Kirby,³⁶ many were dug out while still alive, and a proportion of these remained at their posts, the nervous shock seldom left them quite uninjured. The strain upon the garrison was very great. It was naturally anticipated that the enemy would attack, and Lieutenant-Colonel Knox³⁷ of the 23rd at 10.30 ordered all ranks to stand-to, and inquired who was in charge of the respective sections. The answer was: "No. 1—Captain Kennedy,³⁸ 23rd Battalion; No. 2—Lieutenant Akeroyd,³⁹ 24th Battalion; No. 3—Major Manning, 24th Battalion; No. 4—Captain Beith,⁴⁰ 23rd Battalion." It was on Manning's sector towards the northern end of the Pine that the main force of the bombardment fell. Part of the front line was almost entirely filled in; the men in Barber's Gallery (the old Traversed Trench) were completely cut off. Manning was wounded, and the casualties numbered 130.⁴¹ Colonel Knox,

³⁵ Maj. F. Miller Johnson, 6th Fld Amb. Medical practitioner; of Albert Park, Vic.; b. Hobart, 2 Apr., 1863. Killed in action, 29 Nov., 1915.

³⁶ Sgt. S. H. Kirby, D C M. (No. 3150, 12th Fld. Amb.). Salesman; of Melbourne, b. Balwyn, Vic., 1891.

³⁷ Col Hon G H Knox, C M G, V D. Commanded 23rd Bn, 1915/16, No. 1 Command Dépôt, A I F., 1916/18. Orchardist; of Beaconsfield Upper and Ferntree Gully, Vic.; b. Toorak, Vic., 17 Dec. 1885.


³⁸ Capt. A. H. Kennedy, 23rd Bn. Late Lieut. (retired) The King's Own Royal Lancaster Regt., land-owner; of Dandenong, Vic.; b. Ulverston, Lancs., Eng., 27 Oct., 1878. Died of wounds while prisoner of war, 26 Aug., 1916.


³⁹ Capt. G. W. Akeroyd, 59th Bn. Clerk of Courts; of Melbourne and Swan Hill, Vic.; b. Bendoc, Vic., 10 May, 1888.

⁴⁰ Maj D Beith, D S O; 23rd Bn. Railway clerk; of Ballarat, Vic.; b. Ballarat, 21 Feb., 1890.

⁴¹ In the 24th, Lieuts A C. Fogarty (of Kew, Vic.) and W. S. Finlay (of Hawthorn, Vic.) and some 20 men were killed, and Maj. Manning, Lieuts G. Beith (of Ballarat, Vic.), P. G. Denton Fethers (of Melbourne), C. M. Williams (of Melbourne), J. H. Fletcher (of Eaglehawk, Vic.), and about 50 men were wounded. In the 23rd, 11 men were killed and 40 wounded. Behind the lines Capt. H. F. Green (of Daylesford and Prahran, Vic.), attached to the 6th Field Amb. was working beside a patient at the table in the dressing tent when he was killed by a fragment of shell from the Olive Grove.

MAP





WIGHTMAN

THE EVACUATION OF ANZAC—POSITION AT 1.30 A.M., 20TH DECEMBER, 1915. IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE DEPARTURE OF THE "C" PARTIES

The times shown are those at which the last of the "C" parties were to leave. (British troops, &c., red Height contours, 25 metres.)

who had been through his trenches encouraging the men—"Now, boys, it's the 23rd and 24th together"—had been duly relieved by Colonel Watson of the 24th when, about 12.15, the enemy was reported to be massing. But the infantry of the 2nd Division was absolutely determined to hold the position which the 1st Division had won, and, although communication with the old Anzac line had been almost severed, it is doubtful if an enemy attack would have made any headway. None was delivered. The bombardment merely served to warn the Anzac staff that the shallow tunnels and dugouts of Anzac were a dangerous form of defence.

Such was the position at the beginning of December. The troops in Gallipoli were then still facing the prospect of winter. So far as anyone knew—except the army and corps commanders and one or two of their intimate staff—the question of evacuation was a purely academic one. To provide for the remote chance of its being ordered, a period of complete silence was observed in one part of the line or another almost every night. The troops at Anzac were strongly confident in themselves, in spite of the fact that a great part of their earlier defences had been proved unsuitable to withstand weather or bombardment, and although there was insufficient timber and iron for their proper reconstruction. In November German submarines, in a second raid, had sunk in the eastern Mediterranean forty ships. The *Orange Prince*, carrying 700 oil stoves ordered for the winter, had been lost. But a small canteen had been established by the Y.M.C.A.,⁴² and a more elaborate one organised by the 1st Division was about to land. An increase of Red Cross and other comforts had been foreshadowed by the visit of the respective commissioners, Adrian Knox⁴³ and H. E. Budden,⁴⁴ with an instalment of supplies at the beginning of October. A magazine containing literary and other contributions sent in from every part of Anzac was being compiled, and was to be printed in Athens and sent as a

⁴² The units had for some time past been allowed to send representatives to purchase stores at a canteen dépôt in Imbros. The Y.M.C.A. at Anzac maintained only a scanty supply, and that under great difficulties. Lord Kitchener when at Anzac was pleased to see this canteen in existence, and asked a man of the 7th Bde. what could be bought there. "Nuts," said the soldier. "Yes, but what else can you get there?" repeated the Field-Marshal. "Nothin'," was the reply.

⁴³ Rt. Hon. Sir Adrian Knox, P.C., K.C.M.G., K.C. Barrister; of Sydney; and subsequently appointed Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia; b Sydney, 29 Nov., 1863.

⁴⁴ H. E. Budden, Esq., C.B.E. Architect, of Sydney, b Rockley, N.S.W., 11 Aug., 1871.

New Year "souvenir" to friends at home.⁴⁵ At the very end of November came strong rumours that the policy of holding the front lightly and sending part of the troops to Imbros had suddenly been reversed, and that the greatest possible force was to be maintained on the Peninsula.⁴⁶ The 54th Division, though its place in the line had been taken by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Eastern Mounted Brigade under General Hodgson, had been prevented by the storm from leaving Anzac. Orders were now issued that two of its brigades should act as reserve to the N.Z. & A. Division, and that the third should form the reserve of General Hodgson at Hill 60.

⁴⁵ The last day for the sending in of contributions was Dec 8. *The Anzac Book* was printed in London early in 1916, and was probably the most notable "trench" publication.

⁴⁶ At Suvla also there were at this juncture marked evidences of indecision. A ship came to the bay to be unloaded. When her cargo was partly discharged orders arrived to reload her. This was done, and she sailed only to return a few days later. For the second time discharging was begun, and again it was countermanded and the cargo was replaced in her.

CHAPTER XXX

THE EVACUATION

THE true meaning of the events which were so puzzling to some of the staff on the Peninsula would have been plain had they been aware of the decisions made at G.H.Q. and of the measures that followed. The original outline of a plan for the evacuation of the whole army from Gallipoli appears to have been produced by a small committee of naval and military officers working at Mudros during Lord Kitchener's visit.¹ The draft, which is signed "G. F. MacMunn,² Colonel; F. H. Mitchell,³ Captain, Royal Navy; C. F. Aspinall,⁴ Lieut.-Colonel," is dated November 16th, and was adopted by the conference on November 22nd.

As the recommendation to evacuate had not yet been approved by the Cabinet, provision was made for the possibility of its not being eventually approved. This was done by dividing the operation into three stages, of which the first or "preliminary" stage could be undertaken before definite sanction was received. In this stage the garrisons would be reduced to the numbers required for a purely defensive winter campaign. The process was a reasonable one if the force was to winter in Gallipoli, and the troops need therefore, during this stage, have no notion that a total evacuation was contemplated. The second or "intermediate" stage would commence as soon as word was received that the policy of withdrawal was approved. In this stage the force and material would be reduced until there remained only a bare sufficiency to enable the positions to be held for a week against attack. In the third or "final" stage this diminished garrison was to be withdrawn with the greatest possible speed, no special effort being made to save any more material. The strength of the garrison suggested for the final stage was

¹ Birdwood, as Commander-in-Chief of the M.E.F., had already been instructed on Nov. 4 by Kitchener—and on Nov. 6 by the Prime Minister—to prepare "in concert with the naval authorities and your staff . . . in the utmost secrecy a complete plan for evacuation if and when it should be decided upon."

² Of the Quartermaster-General's branch at G.H.Q. (Lt.-Gen. Sir G. F. MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., p.s.c. Insp.-Gen. of Communications, Mesopotamian Exped. Force, 1916/19. Officer of British Regular Army; of London; b. Chelsea, London, 14 Aug., 1869.)

³ Admiral F. H. Mitchell, C.B., D.S.O.; R.N. Commanded H.M.S. *Bellerophon*, 1917-18. Of Emsworth, Hants, Eng.; b. Shoeburyness, Essex, Eng., 10 Jan., 1876

⁴ Of the General Staff at G.H.Q.

based on the assumption that, during a week of rough weather, when embarkation would be impossible, it might "be continuously attacked by superior numbers." To ensure a safe defence during such a period it was estimated that there must be retained two rifles per yard and one-third of the present artillery, together with a proportion of men of the other services. As the length of the fronts were—Suvla, 11,000 yards; Anzac, 11,000 yards; Helles, 7,000 yards—the minimum numbers for the last stage would be 26,000 each at Suvla and Anzac, and 18,000 at Helles. The authors of the plan therefore suggested that the reduction of the force should proceed by the following steps* :—

<i>Suvla</i> —	Men. ⁶	Animals.	Guns.
Force before Evacuation commenced ..	50,807	3,000	91
To be reduced in preliminary stage to	43,160		
To be reduced in intermediate stage to	25,753	1,000	40
<i>Anzac</i> —			
Force before Evacuation commenced ..	41,218	2,368	105
To be reduced in preliminary stage to	35,786		
To be reduced in intermediate stage to	26,195	500	40
<i>Helles</i> —			
Force before Evacuation commenced ..	42,697	9,219	197
To be reduced in preliminary stage to	29,139		
To be reduced in intermediate stage to	18,556	1,000	60

During the intermediate stage a vessel to receive guns, another for animals, and a third for stores, would lie nightly off each area. No definite length of time would be fixed for this stage, but, as soon as it was completed, the final garrison would begin to embark as rapidly as the combined naval and military staffs could accomplish it. The navy appears to have had available thirty-four⁷ motor-lighters for transferring men from the piers to the troopships, and by employing these and all other available small craft it was estimated that the remaining troops could be moved from Helles, Anzac, and Suvla in four nights. It was urged, however, that in consequence of the approach of rough weather a decision

⁶ There were, at the time the plan was drawn up, 134,722 Allied troops on the Peninsula, with 14,587 animals, and 393 guns.

⁷ Two slightly different sets of figures are given for the men. Those reproduced here appear to be the more detailed. For the preliminary stage, corps commanders were asked to state how many animals could be spared for evacuation; the plan did not provide for the sending away of any guns.

⁸ Six of these were to be devoted to the evacuation of wounded. A few—not included—were possibly to be retained at Mudros, since the number mentioned in a later memorandum is 37, which was said to be exclusive of some undergoing repair.

should be arrived at without delay; and that steps should be taken to prevent leakage of the news, whether through spies or correspondence.

As soon as the conference of November 22nd ended, the heads of the various branches of the staff at G.H.Q. began at once to put into effect the plan for the preliminary stage. The Deputy Quartermaster-General on November 23rd telegraphed to Birdwood's army headquarters at Imbros:

Ample room will shortly be available at Mudros for brigades to rest. Please inform I.G.C.* as to numbers you can send on and on what date.

The Deputy-Director of Supplies and Transport telegraphed:

Owing to requirements at Salonica impossible at present to send supplies forward. Issue of bread and fresh meat is to be made at Anzac and Suvla alternate days only. . . .

Concerning ammunition the Quartermaster-General's branch telegraphed:

Owing to sinking of ships and consequent shortage of ammunition at Salonica it is proposed to send some from Peninsula.

Birdwood's staff forwarded these messages to the corps at Anzac and Suvla, at the same time asking for an immediate estimate of the number of troops who could be spared, and ordering that specified quantities of ammunition should be made ready for sending to Mudros that night.

These telegrams initiated the preliminary withdrawal of troops and material from Suvla and Anzac. The pretence which the messages contained was not, of course, intended to mislead Generals Godley or Byng or their chiefs-of-staff; but it was essential to deceive the numerous officials through whose hands the orders, or those consequent upon them, would pass. Secrecy concerning the true meaning of the movement was one of the foremost essentials for success. There would otherwise be the gravest risk that enemy agents, who abounded in Egypt and in the



Pretended winter rest camps

* Inspector-General of Communications


islands, might gain foreknowledge of the withdrawal through the careless conversation of the sick or wounded coming from the Peninsula, or of the men of the garrison as they were withdrawn. On the Peninsula the pretence contained in the orders duly achieved the desired result. It gradually became understood by most of the troops that guns and ammunition were to be sent to Salonica, and that all units which could be spared were to be withdrawn to winter rest-camps in the islands. The same secrecy was not, however, achieved at either Army or General Headquarters.

The authors of the plan drafted at Mudros did not attempt to determine the tactics by which the crucial operation—the final withdrawal—should be carried out. On this matter the corps commanders, who were on the actual ground, were therefore immediately asked to forward their views. At Anzac Godley, who only that day assumed command of the army corps, wisely entrusted the devising of the scheme entirely to his chief-of-staff, himself, however, closely examining the plans before taking the responsibility for their adoption. In a few matters, sometimes of importance, the new corps commander differed from his chief-of-staff, but was almost always brought to his view, and, having been convinced, assumed responsibility for the scheme and fought staunchly for it in subsequent conferences with the other commanders.

The plan of evacuation immediately submitted by White was based on his belief that the operation at Anzac could only be made practicable by deceiving the enemy to the very last. If the force had been withdrawing from a normal position, the procedure adopted would probably have been to deal first a heavy blow at the enemy either on or near the Peninsula, and then withdraw the troops before he had time to recover. Such was possibly the lesson to be drawn from the retirement from Corunna in 1809, since the enemy (as Sir C. E. Callwell has pointed out⁹) had on that occasion "been very roughly handled before the troops took to their ships, and was hardly in a position to molest the embarkation." Moreover in normal conditions the actual movement to the rear would be carried out by preparing and occupying successive positions, one behind the other, and then withdrawing the foremost troops through the second position, and so forth, until the army was clear.

⁹ *The Dardanelles*, p. 278.

But the position in Gallipoli was far from normal, although at both Helles and Suvla, where the occupied territory extended for several miles in rear of the troops, it approximated to normal conditions more nearly than at Anzac. At Anzac the outstanding feature of the situation was that, while some of the Australian and New Zealand posts were, as the crow flies, over two miles from the beaches where most of the troops must embark, the centre of the enemy's line, at The Nek, was within 800 yards of the chief embarkation point at North Beach. In their present position the Turks could not see the North Beach piers; but, should anything be done which would give the enemy foreknowledge of the intention to withdraw, he had only to force his way for 300 yards along Russell's Top in order to look down on the boats being filled 500 yards away and 400 feet below him. An



example of what might happen, if such a thrust were made during the final stages, is afforded by the affair of St. Cas in 1758 (cited by Callwell), "when half the force that had been left by General Bligh as rear-guard to cover the embarkation of the remainder was either killed or taken during a final sanguinary struggle on the beach."¹⁰ In the special circumstances of Anzac, therefore, the only chance of avoiding a bloody contest in the final stage seemed to lie in keeping the enemy until the very end ignorant of the withdrawal. This would obviously be impossible if the final retirement were carried out by withdrawing the garrison at different stages to successive positions. On the contrary, however, many troops were withdrawn from the area in rear, the front line must be held to the last by at least sufficient men to prevent the enemy from discovering the secret.

If such deception was to be successfully imposed on the Turks at Anzac, two other conditions appeared vital. First, the final stage of the withdrawal must be cut as short as

¹⁰ *The Dardanelles*, p. 278

possible—two nights was the longest period that could be contemplated without extreme anxiety. Second, the final abandonment of the front line at Anzac and Suvla must be practically simultaneous, since any earlier withdrawal at Suvla would place the last portions of the Anzac garrison in the utmost peril. From the moment when, on November 22nd, he received Birdwood's warning of the imminence of the operation, White realised the necessity for simultaneity. Telegraphing the same day, he urged it upon Birdwood, and as the scheme developed he succeeded, after a sharp conflict in opinion, in getting the pivotal principle of the Anzac plan adopted by the Suvla corps also.

White's scheme, which was completed and despatched to army headquarters on November 27th, set forth the proposed operation in detail. During the intermediate as well as the preliminary stage¹¹ the force would be reduced upon the pretext of going into winter quarters, until there remained 22,000 men and 30 guns, a figure slightly lower than that previously suggested. Almost to the end of these two stages, which should occupy ten days, the maintenance of secrecy would be absolute; but when they were nearly completed the commanders of the divisions would be informed secretly what was in contemplation, and given clear instructions. For the final stage there were three essentials—first, provision by the navy of sufficient small craft to enable it to be completed in two nights, which would necessitate the trebling of the craft then at Anzac; second, the holding, till the last moment, of the existing line, the troops in it being gradually thinned during the two nights, and "extended in the fire-trenches . . . actively employed at firing from various places—but not wildly."

The flanking destroyers will go on with their normal routine; and hospital ships should be retained in position. During the last days the offing must have a normal appearance of trawlers, lighters, &c

As to the third essential—"complete co-ordination and synchronising of all movement with the IX Corps"—it was suggested that on the last night the movements to embark should "be begun by a pre-arranged communication between the Rear-guard Commander Anzac, and IX Corps." The mechanism of retirement on the two last nights would be

¹¹ White combined them as the "first stage . . . in which time was not a vital factor"

simple. The final garrison of the line would represent—in skeleton—that which had been previously holding it, the skeleton of each unit still holding the unit's old front, and retaining its organisation; so that to the very last orders would be communicated from the main headquarters on the Beach along the usual signal wires,¹² through the skeleton headquarters of brigade and battalion to the companies holding the line, even though each company might then be represented by only half-a-dozen men. The authority on the Beach would thus to the end be in communication, along a well-known system, with a garrison perfectly well acquainted with its front, whose disposition would be well known, not only to the staff, but, in a general way, to the majority of the troops. The scheme did not, however, involve the retention to the last of unwieldy staffs, most of the headquarters being whittled down at the last to some capable officer with a couple of signallers. Thus, towards the end of the operations on the first of the two final nights, the corps commander and staff would withdraw, handing over the central control on the Beach to a selected general of one of the divisions—to be known as the "Rear-guard Commander." The other divisional commanders and the personnel of their headquarters would embark on the same night, each, however, leaving behind some senior staff officer to represent the divisional headquarters. These officers would be attached to the staff of the Rear-guard Commander, who would thenceforth deal through them with the brigadiers. Such would be the organisation of the force of 10,000 which would remain at day-break on the final day. That night this remaining garrison would be withdrawn in three instalments, machine-guns remaining as late as possible. The brigadiers would embark before the end, leaving, however, a representative at brigade headquarters, under whom the battalion commanders, each with a handful of his unit holding the sector, would constitute the final parties. In the final retirement these staffs and their troops would remove their telephones and quickly withdraw. "So that all fire may not cease suddenly," it was added, "arrangements may be made for connecting cartridges to fuse-lengths at various places."

¹² Some special telephone lines were eventually laid, but the organisation was practically unchanged.

Such, in non-technical language and brief outline, was the Anzac plan despatched to Imbros on November 27th. It happened that on the following day Birdwood received from Admiral Wemyss a request for a conference, at Imbros, with all the corps commanders—to which meeting Birdwood asked them to bring their plans, based on that drafted at Mudros, which had been secretly communicated to them. At this conference, which took place on November 30th, several vital decisions were made. Under the Mudros plan all the available small craft were to be employed, and none kept in reserve against the chance of damage by shell-fire, bad weather, or accident. This, in the view of the military and naval commanders and their staffs, might seriously endanger the success of the whole operation. All were therefore agreed that the right course was to evacuate Anzac and Suvla first, and Helles at a later date.¹³ A scheme was drawn up for the allotment of shipping to Anzac and Suvla during each stage, it being proposed to apportion ten motor-lighters to each, while ten would be held in reserve at Imbros and seven at Mudros. At Anzac the North Beach piers would be chiefly used, but Watson's must also be repaired. A new pier was to be constructed from the shore to the sunken steamer *Milo*. As far as it affected these plans, White's scheme was entirely accepted.

It was also agreed that the final stage must not extend beyond two nights. As to the tactics for the final stage, however, there was at first strong disagreement upon two important points. The naval staff maintained that it was necessary for ships to move to their stations by daylight, since the night did not afford sufficient time for the completion of the movement. This was strongly resisted by Generals Godley and Byng, and in the end the navy agreed to undertake movement, if possible, only at night. The second disagreement was in regard to the possibility of deceiving the Turks. General Byng believed that there was little chance of effecting this, and was consequently opposed to White's plan. Birdwood, however, adhered to it, thus making such deception the vital principle of the operation.

That principle had also for a moment seemed to be endangered by a suggestion from an even more influential

¹³ Some of the piers at Cape Helles had also been so destroyed by the recent storm that doubts were expressed whether "W" Beach could be used in the near future for embarkation.

source. General Monro, apart from sending to Birdwood and each of the three corps commanders a secret copy of the Mudros plan, had left the planning of the operation entirely to the Dardanelles Army. At an early stage, however, he asked that there should be considered—first, the practicability of organising in each area a system of defensive mines to cover the withdrawal of the troops; second, the advisability of adopting an active offensive attitude to deceive the enemy regarding the British intentions. The reply from Anzac, drafted by White, was that—although in certain carefully selected positions the explosion of mines might assist by forcing the enemy to be cautious—the Anzac commander was “entirely averse to a course of action which would tend to disturb the normal night conditions. It is upon the existence of perfectly normal conditions that I rely for success.” The objection to adopting an offensive attitude was the same. “Even now I am ordering periods of quiescence in order to accustom the enemy to them. . . . For a final operation I feel that we should do the utmost to avoid alarming the enemy in any way.” Byng’s reply to Monro’s suggestion was that he was already organising a system of defensive mines; but that, under the conditions which at Suvla had followed the blizzard, the delivery of an attack would be a difficult matter, and the probable result, in his opinion, not worth the cost. A summary of these opinions and of the decisions of the conference at Imbros was forwarded by Birdwood on December 1st to Monro, who accepted the conclusions. From that time onwards the military part of the operation was planned and carried out entirely by the Dardanelles Army.

In forwarding this communication to Monro, Birdwood wrote: “I am ready to begin the intermediate period at Suvla and Anzac immediately your orders are received and the necessary sea-transport collected.” As the end of December was almost certain to usher in a period of violent storms, there was urgent reason for hastening the decision. Moreover on December 21st the moon would be full, a condition which it was desirable to avoid. But the question involved wider issues than those apparent on the spot; and it was during the week which ensued that the British Government, then in conference with the French, was fighting its last battle for the withdrawal of the British contingent from

Salonica. It seemed possible that this would end in the sudden reinforcement of the Dardanelles Army and the delivery of the final combined attack which was being urged by Admiral Wemyss. On November 26th and the following days Monro was forced, first to warn the Gallipoli commanders not to proceed too fast with the preliminary evacuation of troops and material, and eventually to countermand it, except in the case of part of the force already under orders to withdraw. A certain amount of material had even to be taken back to the Peninsula. Monro's position at this stage was not an easy one, since Admiral Wemyss, who was urging on the Government a plan precisely opposite to his own, was in close conference with Monro's subordinates over the plans of the Evacuation. On December 5th Monro issued an order which was passed by Birdwood to the corps commanders:

The Commander-in-Chief, M.E.F., has directed that questions relating to military policy and operations are not to be discussed with the naval authorities without his expressed permission.

The indecision at this period, and the effects of the storm, resulted in a slowing down of the preliminary stage of the Evacuation. But between December 3rd and 7th the Essex Garrison Battalion and the 54th Division, which had been already ordered to move, were sent away from Anzac. Up to the morning of December 8th the result of the preliminary stage at Anzac, as far as the troops were concerned, was:

CASUALTIES.					
Date.	Arrivals.	Killed.	Sick and wounded evacuated.	Troops withdrawn.	Remaining strength.
Nov. 22	16	4	3	—	41,724
23	2	2	310	1	41,413
24	6	2	67	218	41,132
25	61	10	256	—	40,927
26	447	5	145	6	41,218
27	—	10	—	—	41,208
28	—	6	—	—	41,202
29	—	21	—	—	41,181
30	—	35	478	—	40,668
Dec. 1	9	12	535	—	40,130
2	67	10	728	30	39,429
3	—	5	357	2,380	36,687
4	27	7	162	501	36,044
5	4	18	350	10	35,670
6	1,211	8	—	609	36,264
7	28	3	52	503	35,734
8	277	—	—	—	36,011

The force at Anzac had been reduced since November 22nd by 5,713 men and 12 guns. At Suvla during the same time 6,001 men and 12 guns had been sent away.

At 9.30 a.m. on December 8th Birdwood received from G.H.Q. Lord Kitchener's telegram:

Cabinet has decided to evacuate positions at Suvla and Anzac at once. Helles will be retained for the present.

He at once sent to Anzac and Suvla a secret order for the commencement of the Evacuation. That despatched to the chief-of-staff at Anzac consisted of two telegrams:

O631 (received 9.42 a.m.). Decipher O632 yourself.

O632 (received 10.56 a.m.). Cancel my OB542. Intermediate period is to commence at once. Ships now being collected. Detailed instructions and programme of shipping allotted to you follows. Chief wishes arrangements made if possible for saving all howitzers and heavy guns.

At Anzac the sole recipients of this order were Godley and White. The measures prescribed for the "first stage" of White's scheme—involving the utmost secrecy, and explaining the withdrawals as intended "to minimise water and supply difficulties"—were at once put into effect. The navy during this stage would, according to the plans made by the joint staffs at Imbros, have three ferry steamers for troops and, if possible, a vessel for animals, another for guns, and a third for vehicles, off Anzac nightly, with possibly ten motor-lighters to work between them and the shore. This should allow of the embarkation on most nights of some 3,000 troops, 10 guns, and a proportion of animals and vehicles. Of the 97 guns then at Anzac¹⁴ it was proposed to take away 79, in two instalments: at the earliest moment, 34, which could be withdrawn without materially affecting the strength or nature of artillery fire; towards the end of the intermediate stage another 45, which could be less easily spared. A careful calculation had been made showing what proportion of troops should—and could safely—be withdrawn from each division. Most of the non-combatant units were first despatched, the Egyptians and Maltese and the British labour company being sent away at the first opportunity. Colonel Howse, who had

¹⁴ There were at Anzac on Dec 8, 36,011 troops and 97 guns. On Nov 22 there had been 109, but seven 18-pdrs. of the 1st Aust Div had been embarked on the night of Nov. 23, ostensibly for Salonica; and four 60-pdrs. (really belonging to the IX Corps), which used to fire from a very exposed position among the sand-hills halfway to Suvla, had been moved by the IX Corps. One 18-pdr of the N Z & A Div. had been withdrawn. The details concerning the Anzac guns were elaborated by the chief artillery officer on Birdwood's staff, Brig.-Gen. Cunliffe Owen.

returned from Egypt on December 8th, was at once taken into confidence. Resuming his position as D.D.M.S., Anzac, he arranged that even the slightly sick should, if possible, be at once sent away, and that part of the hospitals¹⁵ should be withdrawn, leaving, however, all tents standing.¹⁶ He also made a clean sweep of most of the field ambulances, ordering four of them to transfer their patients to the casualty clearing stations, leave their tents, unostentatiously pack their equipment, and carry it to North Beach ready for embarkation on the morning of December 11th. A similar order was issued on December 12th to the remainder;¹⁷ but they were instructed to leave behind a small proportion of stretcher-bearers, and in the tents was placed a supply of splints and bandages. Parties were to remain with the tents to give the appearance of their being occupied. As for the fighting troops, there were simply issued without further explanation daily orders to one or another of the divisions, directing it to lighten its numbers by way of preparation for the winter. The first such orders were:

December 8. N.Z. & A. Division.

1. Please take the necessary steps to prepare for embarking at short notice the following guns of your Division:—

Two (2) 4-in. guns.
Three (3) 6-in. howitzers.
Six (6) 5-in. howitzers.
Eight (8) 18-pr. guns.

2 They should be loaded in the above order.

3. Guns will be accompanied with their proper proportion of personnel.

4. This order is consequent upon the receipt of instructions to send away any guns which can be spared.

C. B. B. WHITE, G.S.

December 10. 1st Australian Division.

1. I am to say that the Army Corps Commander desires you to reduce your actual strength by roundly 2,000 men. This is in consequence of the adoption of a policy of reducing the Anzac garrison to a minimum to facilitate supply and reliefs during the winter.

¹⁵ There were then at Anzac the 1st A.S.H., 3 casualty clearing stations, 14 field ambulances, and an advanced-dépôt of medical stores. In order to clear the sick from Anzac Howse had to place aboard the hospital ship 240 patients in excess of the number permitted by G.H.Q. This involved no special hardship to the sick, such as had occurred at the Landing. When the medical authorities of the Lines of Communication at Mudros protested, he replied: "Very sorry, but it was absolutely essential to clear. Will fully explain later."

¹⁶ See Vol. XII, plate 154.

¹⁷ See Vol. XII, plates 148-149.

2. The details as to how the 2,000 men are to be made up is left to you to determine, and the principle governing their selection will be the retention of the maximum number of effective rifles.

3. Please furnish your proposals hereon to-day. The men will probably be required to embark on the night of the 11th. . . .

Orders followed, day by day, for the removal of troops or guns—

Date of order.	Division.	To send away—
Dec. 8 ..	N.Z. & A. Div. ..	"At short notice" 19 guns (mainly 5- and 6-in. howitzers)
Dec. 10 ..	1st Aust. Div. ..	Night of 11th . 2,000 men 15 guns (some 5- and 6-in. howitzers)
Dec. 11 ..	2nd Aust. Div. ..	Night of 12th and possibly 13th 3,300 men
Dec. 12 ..	N.Z. & A. Div. ..	Nights of 13th and 14th 2,750 men
Dec. 12 ..	Gen. Hodgson's command (i.e., extreme left sector, held by Indian and Eastern Mtd. Bdes.) ..	Night of 14th .. 1,300 men
Dec. 12 ..	1st Aust. Div. ..	Nights of 14th and 15th 10 guns
Dec. 13 ..	N.Z. & A. Div. ..	Nights of 14th and 15th 10 guns
Dec. 15 ..	1st Aust. Div. ..	Nights of 16th and 17th 9 guns
Dec. 15 ..	N.Z. & A. Div. ..	Nights of 16th and 17th 15 guns


Baggage was brought down to North Beach during the day, and hospital gear was occasionally sent away during daylight.¹⁸ But the movements of troops, wherever they might be visible to the enemy, took place entirely after dark. "Last night," wrote an Australian,¹⁹ in his diary on December 11th, "I went down to see the beginning of the sending away of the British Labour Corps and Egyptians and Maltese. Flares were burning on Williams' Pier and Walker's Ridge Pier. Baggage was piled on the wharf—mostly field ambulance; four gun-teams made their way through the crowd out towards the left; ammunition was being carried in on gharries and taken on to the pier or stacked on the beach. The Egyptians

¹⁸ See Vol. XII, plate 148.

¹⁹ His impression was that the garrison was being "lightened" for the winter.

can do nothing without shouting at the top of their voices. . . . One lot was jabbering down the valley on its way to the North Beach. . . . Truck-load after truck-load of warm winter clothing was being sent running down the little railway on to Williams' Pier."

The first impression of any eye-witness was that such activity must attract the attention of the enemy. An especial danger-point was the foreshore immediately north of the old Anzac position, where all troops, guns, and material withdrawn from the left half of the occupied area had to pass along the flats beside the sea within 700 yards of any Turkish patrol or listening-post on Snipers' Nest or Snipers' Slope. Here the enemy doubtless heard almost nightly the jingle of the convoy of mule-carts bringing ammunition from the left along the open road across the flats. But a similar convoy had passed nightly for months, taking supplies out to the flank; and there was nothing to tell the enemy that the carts which had previously gone out loaded were now loaded on the return journey. Troops and led mules always went through the long sap. In the diary already quoted there is a description of their movement through this area on the night of December 15th:



In passing through the sap my way was blocked by a number of mules coming out of the valley north of No. 1 Post. They were the mules of the 21st Indian Mountain Battery. At once I thought—"My goodness, if the Turks don't see all this as it goes along they must be blind." But as I went along behind them I began to notice how silently these mules behaved.²⁰ They had big loads, but they were perfectly quiet. They made no sound at all as they walked except for the slight jingle of a chain now and then. . . . I doubt if you could have heard the slightest noise at 200 yards. . . . Even on these moonlight nights I myself could not tell at 200 yards whether a mule was loaded or not, or indeed whether a column of mules was a column of animals or men. I doubt if at 1,000 yards you could see them at all—possibly just a black serpentine streak. . . . I followed them

²⁰ The gun and ammunition mules of the Indian batteries had been carefully trained




NORTH BEACH, SHOWING AREA WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN OVERLOOKED BY THE TURKS IF
THEY HAD CAPTURED RUSSELL'S TOP

The steamer is the *Milo*, sunk for a breakwater

*Admiralty Official Photograph
Aust War Memorial Collection No G502*

To face p 866



LIEUTENANT-COLONEL C. B. B. WHITE, WHO DRAFTED THE PLANS FOR THE EVACUATION
(Photograph taken at Anzac, May, 1915.)

*Taken by Lieut. R. G. Casey, 1st D H Q
Ausl War Memorial Collection No. 4877*

to Walker's Pier. They went quickly and . . . when I arrived, (were) going aboard a lighter down a horse-gangway, very quietly. Only one or two people on the pier. . . . Alongside Williams' Pier was a motor-lighter crammed up with the baggage of the Indian battery. Underneath it (i.e., the baggage) were two or four guns, some New Zealand and some Australian. They were quite hidden by the baggage. In the offing were two fair-sized transports and several trawlers, and the lighter came and went in a very neat way.

Undoubtedly some of the noises of the anchorage were audible to the Turks, but there is no evidence that they could ever see the transports at their berths at night.²¹ The Turkish Army had known for months past from the newspapers that an evacuation was being discussed, and, according to one account, the general impression was that it would be attempted. There were, however, many who believed that an attack was imminent, while still others argued that the British would simply go on digging, and would remain for the winter. "The possibility (of evacuation)," says Liman von Sanders,²² "had of course been kept in view at Fifth Army Headquarters, and all commanders had been accordingly directed in writing to exercise particular watchfulness in this direction." Observers were ordered to keep a count of the number of ships seen—apparently by day—but no definite conclusion could be drawn from their observations.²³ The troopships had disappeared by the morning, and the appearance of the anchorages was precisely as usual. At Suvla during the daylight hours barges were intentionally employed in bringing guns, troops, or material from the ships to the shore; and at Anzac orders were given that the few small drafts of reinforcements which arrived during this period should land during daylight. There were Turkish officers who believed that especial activity of some sort was occurring; but opinion was divided as to whether troops were being landed or taken away.

²¹ At Anzac the moon was probably never behind the larger ships. When it was bright, it is possible that near the hour of moon-set the Turks on Snipers' Slope may have been in a position to see the occasional movement of small craft across its pathway in the water close to the shore. The available evidence, however, is all to the contrary.

²² *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 127

²³ The Turkish officer responsible for this statement also said that it was sometimes suspected that the ships which could be seen (probably in the harbour at Suvla) went away during the night, and that those which were in the same berths next morning were not identical with the ships which had been there at nightfall. From this somewhat simple observation it seems certain that the enemy had no conception of the ceaseless movement which occurred at night in the anchorages throughout the campaign.

Should the Turks discover the withdrawal, the immediate consequence—and the one at this stage most to be feared—would be heavy shelling of the Beach. The Olive Grove batteries, it is true, were the only ones which could well be brought to bear on the foreshore and piers, but they were amply sufficient to render the beach of Anzac Cove impassable except at heavy cost, even at night. Watson's Pier had been so exactly registered that the enemy could burst his shrapnel over it whenever he chose, and since the storms the shelling had greatly increased. Accordingly, in the early days of the withdrawal—on December 6th and 10th—the Olive Grove area was at White's request subjected to two naval bombardments. In the second—which was the heaviest that occurred at Anzac—the guns of the 8th and 9th Batteries and Australian Heavy Battery²⁴ also took part, the 18-pounders helping by the bursts of their shells to guide the ships' gunners. In less than half-an-hour the cruisers *Bacchante*, *Theseus*, and *Grafton*, and the monitors *Earl of Peterborough* and *Humber*, threw 620 heavy shells into the area occupied by the enemy batteries, the *Bacchante* afterwards standing close in to Gaba Tepe in order to fire at the observation-posts. The area was filled with dust and smoke, and horse teams were presently seen struggling southward with what appeared to be two heavy howitzers. It is true that within three minutes of the end of the bombardment a Turkish gun somewhere in the shelled area flung in obvious defiance a few shells at the Beach; but it was not firing from any of the previously known emplacements, and, though it frequently opened again on subsequent days and nights, its aim was at first very inaccurate, and only gained precision during the last few days of the occupation. It was also not until the very last that the enemy began regularly to shell North Beach, probably ranging on the tips of the masts of the breakwater-ship *Milo*, which were visible from Snipers' Nest. The result was that, although he had long since rendered Watson's Pier too dangerous to be used by day, it was not till a few days before the Evacuation that he ever hit Williams' Pier. Moreover in his method of shelling the

²⁴ The Heavy Battery, 1st Aust. Div., was an improvised battery of three guns—two old 6-in. howitzers and the still older naval 4.7-in. gun—manned by marines and Australians, and commanded by Maj. C. G. N. Miles, R.A.F.A. (of Brisbane).

Beach the enemy betrayed no knowledge or suspicion of what was occurring there. It is true that he fired at night more frequently than of old, the gun in the Olive Grove sometimes flinging a few shells at half-hour intervals from dusk till dawn. But this procedure was obviously due to an increased supply of ammunition, and not to a discovery of the withdrawal.

Nor, until the intermediate stage had been nearly half-completed, did the Anzac troops themselves realise that an evacuation was in process. Until three or four of the more important movements had already occurred, the explanation which accompanied them was accepted as the true reason. Birdwood and Godley in their almost daily visits to the line explained to the various commanders the new "winter" policy of lightening the garrison. The divisions had been ordered to send staff officers to the islands to prepare for the reception of the troops. The writer of the war diary of the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade noted on December 10th that the brigade was being sent to Imbros, "where camp for extra troops to be established." On the following night the brigadier, General Forsyth, when he went aboard the small transport *Abbassieh* and found that the captain had orders to proceed to Mudros, protested that the brigade had been ordered to Imbros, and sent a message to the headquarters of his division asking for confirmation of his statement. But no answer came back, and the brigade was duly ferried to Mudros. It is true that rumours were afloat at Anzac before December 12th. An artillery officer of the 1st Division, who had been sent to Mudros to obtain canteen stores, returned with the report that more than one senior officer had advised him not to purchase anything for Anzac, as the place was going to be evacuated. The same advice was given at Mudros to a warrant-officer. Colonel Bessell-Browne of the artillery notes in his war diary on the 11th: "It appears that the move is one of evacuation." But improbable stories were always legion at Anzac, and many who heard such reports were at first sceptical. "On account of the endless rumours that were always afloat," wrote afterwards a sergeant of Monash's brigade, "I dismissed the matter at the outset as highly improbable. To my way of thinking, it seemed incredible that, after effecting the costly landing at Anzac (followed by

the less important one at Suvla) and driving the Turks so far inland, such a thing as an evacuation could be seriously considered by any level-headed person." As always in the Australian force, the majority of men formed and maintained their individual opinions on the subject, but the staffs of brigades and battalions, engrossed in the urgent tasks of draining the trenches or securing a little precious timber to shore up weak places in the deep shelters, had little time to listen to "furfies." The 2nd Battalion on December 12th was still improving its deep bomb-proofs and draining and flooring the trenches with tins; the 3rd on that day and the next, although the news was by then widespread, commenced work on new underground chambers. On the night of December 13th some of the departing troops, knowing (as it was afterwards explained) no especial reason for secrecy, raised cheers as they were leaving.²⁵ Orders were issued on the following day that all embarkations in future were to be made in absolute silence; there was to be no smoking or striking of matches; and all rum and other alcoholic liquors in possession of units were to be at once destroyed.²⁶

On the afternoon of December 12th, in accordance with the scheme, divisional commanders were summoned to General Godley, and their chief staff-officers to White, and were given in secret a full and clear explanation of the plan. They were told that they might take into confidence their brigadiers and brigade-majors. The detailed plan of operations for the final stage had by then been practically completed. This had been effected to a great extent at a further conference at Imbros—suggested by Admiral Wemyss as soon as the Evacuation order came to hand—to co-ordinate finally the naval and military arrangements. The conference had met on December 9th, there being present on this occasion only members of the staff—Captains Mitchell and Lambert²⁷ and Commander

²⁵ It was explained afterwards that they were under the impression that they were bound for Salonica. The precious battery of modern 6-in. howitzers from Taylor's Hollow was certainly supposed by many to be leaving for that destination. As a matter of fact it was taken to Cape Helles.

²⁶ In spite of this order isolated cases of drunkenness occurred in the 1st Div. on the night of Dec. 17—probably through some quartermaster or his men having saved part of the liquor from destruction. On account of the extreme risk involved, it was ordered that all liquor, except that in the casualty clearing stations, should be poured out on the ground or into the sea.

²⁷ Rear-Admiral R. C. Kemble Lambert, D.S.O.; R.N. Of Lincoln, Eng. b. 1874.

Lambart²⁸ of the navy, Brigadier-General MacMunn (then head of the quartermaster-general's branch of Birdwood's staff), Colonel Aspinall and several other officers of the Dardanelles Army, and Brigadier-Generals Reed²⁹ of the IX Corps and White of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps. The main object of the conference was to complete the programme (provisionally drawn up on November 30th) of nightly embarkation in lighters and troop-carriers. The chief difficulty was that the destruction of the breakwater at Kephalos made it dangerous to concentrate the motor-lighters at Imbros, and it was upon these invaluable craft that the rapid transfer of troops from the shore depended. No old ship suitable for filling the gap in the breakwater was available. A special block-ship had, however, been sent for, by the sinking of which the breakwater would be repaired by December 19th. The small craft for the final stage could then be accommodated at Imbros, and the final stage of the Evacuation, commencing that night, could be complete before day-break on December 21st. Allowing a third of the lighters to be retained in reserve at Kephalos, only 10,000 troops could be removed from each area in one night. The maximum number of troops to be left at daylight on December 19th at Anzac and Suvla would therefore be 20,000 at each place. As the transport arrangements for the intermediate stage would allow the surplus troops and guns to be removed before then, December 19th and 20th were provisionally fixed upon as the final days. These dates being recommended to Birdwood, although the nights would be practically those of the full moon, he accepted the risk as being less than that of rough weather, which every day's delay made more probable. After the conference the naval authorities decided that the importance of the operation would justify them in restoring the breakwater by sinking a collier full of coal.³⁰ This was done and, the weather continuing perfect, Birdwood was enabled on December 12th

²⁸ Capt. Hon L. J. O. Lambart, D.S.O.; R.N. Of Sherborne, Dorset, Eng.; b. Wheathampstead, Herts, Eng., 16 July, 1873.

²⁹ Maj.-Gen. H. L. Reed, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., p.s.c. Commanded 15th (Scottish) Div., 1917/19. Officer of British Regular Army; b. Monkstown, Co. Dublin, Ireland, 23 May, 1869. Died, 7 March, 1931.

³⁰ This was so skilfully carried out that it was found possible afterwards to refloat the collier, saving both the vessel and her cargo.

to issue an order to the corps commanders advancing the final stage by one day.

It was at this final conference that a difference between the plan of the IX Corps and that of the A. & N.Z. Army Corps became markedly apparent. At Suvla it was still proposed to carry out the final retirement by withdrawal to successive positions—a proceeding which, as has been explained, might place the last troops at Anzac in extreme peril. The proposal was therefore strongly opposed by White, who finally declared that, if at Suvla troops were not to be maintained in the front line until the last moment, it would be impossible to leave Anzac troops in distant positions on the left, such as The Apex and Damakjelic Bair; and that he must therefore advise an immediate withdrawal practically to the old Anzac position as it was before August. This argument the Suvla staff accepted, though with some hesitation. Believing this point in White's scheme to be vital, Godley afterwards begged that a definite order should be issued upon it. Birdwood was alive to its importance, and impressed his wishes upon Byng, who in consequence duly laid down that the front line should be occupied to the last. The co-operation of the two corps was further strengthened by a suggestion (made with that intention) that the northernmost troops of Anzac should embark at one of the Suvla piers. Birdwood directed that the time for the withdrawal at the point of junction must be mutually agreed upon by the two corps commanders. The troops to be so embarked were the 1/4th Gurkha Rifles from Susak Kuyu, and the hour agreed on by Byng and Godley was 1.30 a.m.—which was made by Byng the hour for the final retirement from all parts of the Suvla front.

Upon the basis of this agreement and of the naval arrangements which crystallised at the Imbros conference, White drafted the final order for the operation at Anzac. This document, which was afterwards often referred to—by those whose duty had been to act upon it—as a model of clearness and succinctness, set forth in two short appendices the naval arrangements for the two last nights. Those for Anzac, drawn up by Captain Boyle⁸¹ of the *Bacchante* and Captain

⁸¹ Admiral Hon Sir Algernon Boyle, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.; R.N. Fourth Sea Lord 1920/24; of Castlemartyr, Co. Cork, Ireland; b. London, 21 Oct., 1871.

Staveley,³² the Naval Transport Officer at Anzac, both of whom worked throughout in close touch with White, were simple. Opposite North Beach and Anzac Cove (the latter being now known for clearness as "South Beach") were to be established the usual four berths (known as "N1," "N2," "S1," and "S2") for transports. To these there would come at 7 o'clock—immediately after dark—certain vessels which would anchor, and wait to receive each its specified number of men. As soon as any ship had received the number of lighter-loads (400 men) or half-loads (200) which made up her total, she would sail for Mudros. At 10 p.m. a second batch of ships would arrive to receive other loads, and at 1 a.m. a third. The transports would mainly be small passenger steamers, but with the first lot would come an old battleship, H.M.S. *Mars*, which, her guns having been removed, was employed as a troop-carrier. The programme for each of the three divisions of ships was condensed into a simple formula, that for the first batch being:

To anchor by 7 p.m.—

	Berth on plan.	Ship.	To take—	
North Beach ..	<i>Mars</i> ³³ ..	<i>Mars</i> ..	2,000	} 2,800
	N2 ..	<i>Ermine</i> ..	800	
South Beach ..	S1 ..	<i>Abbasieh</i> ..	1,200	} 1,900
	Berth marked "Trawlers 1st Night" }	5 Trawlers ..	700	
				4,700

The second batch of ships, coming to the berths from which these sailed, would take 3,200 and the third 2,800, making 10,700 in all for the first of the two final nights.

The military programme was reduced to a form equally simple. In brief, it provided a time-table, not unlike those of peace-time, by which the divisional commanders were informed that so many lighters (or other craft) for so many men would arrive at specified piers at certain hours of the night, and would depart an hour later; the time-table further showed the route which the troops of any division were to proceed to their pier. For example, the military arrangements for the first

³² Admiral C. M. Staveley, C.B., C.M.G., R.N. Senior Officer of a detached squadron in Northern Aegean, 1916/18; Chief of Staff, The Nore, 1918; b Darmstadt, Germany, 3 Apr., 1874. Died, 27 May, 1934.

³³ The *Mars*, on account of her deep draught, occupied a special berth.


batch on the first night—corresponding to the naval time-table just set forth—were:

Place.	Transport.	Time.		Nos.	Units.	
		arr.	dep.			
N. Beach	5 motor-lighters	6 p.m.	7 p.m.	1,650	2nd Div.	2,000 } 2,800
	2 motor-lighters	7 p.m.	8 p.m.	350	Base	
				800	N.Z. & A.	800
S. Beach .. (Watson's Pier)	3 motor-lighters	6 p.m.	7 p.m.	1,200	1st Div.	1,900
	12 cutters	Between 8 and 11 p.m.		700	2nd Div.	

(The routes which the troops of the respective divisions were to take to their piers were shown in an additional column.)

Each divisional commander was thus given all the necessary information on which to frame the main part of his order to his troops, the guiding principle being laid down for him in the first paragraph of White's order: "A gradual reduction from our present fire-trenches—the times of withdrawal being determined by the times at which troops will be required to embark and the distance from the place of embarkation."

In two important respects the programme on the second night was different from that of the first. In order to save time, the last parties on the extreme flanks would not be brought to the Anzac piers, but would embark at points close to their respective positions, five small jetties being run out after dark on the last night from the mouth of the Asmak Dere, and two from Brighton Beach. These troops were to be embarked in cutters which would be towed by small steamboats. At a short distance from the shore the men would be transferred to trawlers, which would then tow the cutters and steamboats back to Imbros. The naval staff, which desired to make operations of the first night an exact rehearsal of those of the second, would have preferred to have carried out this flank-embarkation on the first night as well. But the risk of bringing the boats on a clear night so close to Gaba Tepe appeared to White too great to be incurred except at




the last moment. The naval rehearsal, however, was contrived by arranging that the trawlers and cutters on the first night should take some of the troops from Watson's Pier.

The other respect in which the second night's operation would differ widely from that of the first was in the withdrawal of the final parties. The method set forth in White's original plan—a thinning out in three stages, leaving at the last only skeletons of the units, but the old organisation remaining intact—was adopted almost without alteration. The successive echelons on this night were to be "A" Party consisting of 4,000, "B" Party 4,000, and "C" Party 2,000. "A" would be withdrawn at dusk, and "B" between 9 and 11 p.m. It followed that from 11 o'clock onwards the defence of the whole Anzac area would fall upon 2,000 men. Out of these a garrison had to be provided to man an Inner Line of Defence which it had been decided to establish at No. 1 Outpost, Walker's Ridge, Plugge's Plateau, and MacLagan's Ridge. Against the chance that some part of the force might still be ashore when daylight broke after the second night, there was to be prepared at Plugge's—and stocked with ammunition, food, and water—a "keep" in which those left behind might defend themselves until further endeavours had been made to take them off. The garrison of the Inner Line would be 275 strong, comprising:

N.Z. & A. Division	75
2nd Aust. Division	125
1st Aust. Division	75

Deducting also the staff and the party on the Beach, there would remain less than 1,500 men holding the 11,000 yards of the Anzac front line. It was the problem of the withdrawal of these last troops that had determined the principle laid down in the first paragraph of the order—that the hour of withdrawal must depend upon the distance from the point of embarkation. The distant posts on the two flanks would



thus first be abandoned, the hour of withdrawal becoming gradually later towards the centre, where the line was closer to the main points of embarkation. The actual hour, all along the line, was left to the divisional commanders to determine, precisely as for the other parties, the only added condition being: "The final evacuation of the front trenches on the right flank will not begin before 2 a.m., nor on the left before 1.30." The final party of a unit, however, need not be withdrawn in one body; provision was made for subdividing the "C" parties, "active, gallant men" being chosen to cover the retirement of the remainder. The method eventually adopted by most units except those on the extreme left flank was to subdivide the "C" parties into three generally equal echelons numbered "C1," "C2," and "C3."³⁴ Thus the 24th Battalion's "C" party—9 officers and 94 men (including 20 machine-gunners)—would hold Lone Pine from 11 p.m. until 2.15 a.m., when "C1" (4 officers and 26 men, including all the machine-gunners) would leave; at 2.45 2 more officers and 34 men would withdraw. Three officers and 34 men would hold the position for fifteen minutes longer, and then depart, leaving Lone Pine unoccupied. Similarly, for the last forty minutes of their occupation, Pope's and Quinn's would be held only by a third of their respective "C" parties—Pope's by an officer and 10 men of the 19th Battalion, and Quinn's by 2 officers and 21 men of the 17th.

The withdrawal of the troops from the Anzac lines during the two final days would thus be accomplished in the following stages (the order is from north to south):

First Night.

Unit.	No. of men.	Begin to withdraw.
20th Indian Bde ..	200	8.30 p m.
Eastern Mtd. Bde.	42	8.30
N Z M.R. Bde. ..	500	9.30
4th Aust. Inf. Bde.	623	0.00
N.Z. Inf. Bde. ..	555	8.50
3rd A.L.H. Bde. ..	160	11.00
1st A.L.H. Bde. ..	327	9.45
5th Aust. Inf. Bde.	1,194	5.20
13th A.L.H. Regt.	310	5.20
6th Aust. Inf. Bde.	1,645	6.30
2nd Aust. Inf. Bde.	1,035	5.35
1st Aust. Inf. Bde	763	5.15
2nd A.L.H. Bde. ..	369	5.30

³⁴ Several units divided their "C" party into four or more echelons. Thus, the last party of the Canterbury Bn was divided into four, and that of the 7th Aust. Inf Bn at Silt Spur into eight.

Second Night.—"A" and "B" Parties.

Unit.	No. in "A" Party.	Begin to withdraw.	No. in "B" Party.	Begin to withdraw.
29th Indian Bde. ..	270	5.30 p.m.	300	8.30 p.m.
Eastern Mtd. Bde. ..	230	5.30	300	8.30
N.Z.M.R. Bde. ..	280	5.30	160	9.35
4th Aust. Inf. Bde. ..	400	5.35	255	9.30
N.Z. Inf. Bde. ..	340	5.25	303	9.00
3rd A.L.H. Bde. ..	100	5.30	60	9.40
1st A.L.H. Bde. ..	133	5.45	104	9.45
5th Aust. Inf. Bde. ..	703	5.20	300	11.30
6th Aust. Inf. Bde. ..	100	5.20	1,006	10.15
7th Battalion ..	230	5.15	94	9.35
1st Aust. Inf. Bde. ..	752	5.15	282	9.35
2nd A.L.H. Bde. ..	218	5.30	120	9.30

"C" Parties.

Position.	Unit.	No. in party.	Time of withdrawal.	
			First party.	Last party.
Susak Kuyu Hill 60	to { 4th Gurkhas ..	50	1.30 a.m.	
	{ 5th & 6th Gurkhas	130	1.30	
	{ Welch Horse ..	42	1.35	
Hill 60 ..	{ Norfolk Yeo. ..	24	1.40	
	{ Suffolk Yeo. ..	24	1.40	
	{ Wellington M.R.	34	1.40	2.00 a.m.
Kaiajik Dere ..	{ Otago M.R. ..	34	1.42	2.2
	{ Canterbury M.R.	34	1.45	2.5
Warwick Castle ..	16th Bn. ..	91	1.35	1.55
Aghyl Dere ..			1.45	2.5
Durrant's Post ..	13th Bn. ..	75	1.55	2.15
Cheshire Ridge ..	Canterbury Bn. .	44	1.50	2.15
The Apex ..	Wellington Bn. .	67	2.10	2.15
Rhododendron ..	8th L.H. Regt. and others ..	38		2.15
Destroyer Hill ..	1st L.H. Regt. ..	15		2.35
Russell's Top ..	20th Bn. ..	100	2.45	3.25
Pope's Hill ..	19th Bn. ..	30	2.00	3.15
Quinn's Post ..	17th Bn. ..	50	2.00	3.15
Courtney's Post ..	18th Bn. ..	50	2.30	3.5
MacLaurin's Hill	21st Bn. and 13th L.H. Regt. ..	20	2.15	3.00
Opp. Jolly ..	22nd Bn. ..	60	2.15	3.00
Lone Pine ..	24th Bn. ..	103	2.15	3.00
Silt Spur ..	7th Bn. ..	106	2.20	2.50
Black Hand ..	2nd Bn. ..	64	2.20	2.50
Wheatfield ..	3rd Bn. ..	66	2.20	2.50
Leane's Trench ..	1st Bn. ..	90	2.20	2.50
Poppy Valley ..	4th Bn. ..	34	2.20	2.50
Ryrie's Post ..	{ 7th L.H. Regt. ..	28	2.20	2.30
	{ 5th L.H. Regt. ..	28	2.20	2.30
Chatham's, & Wil- son's Lookout ..	6th L.H. Regt. ..	51	2.20	2.25

(In nearly all cases the times shown in the above tables are those at which the parties would leave the trenches. Where the available records do not contain this information, the times of forming-up at rendezvous are given.)

The navy was accordingly prepared to take off the troops as follows:—

	FIRST NIGHT.			SECOND NIGHT.		
	First embarkation.	Second embarkation.	Third embarkation.	First embarkation (A parties).	Second embarkation (B parties).	Third embarkation (C ₁ , C ₂ , & C ₃ parties).
Troops ashore at the commencement of embarkation ..	20,700	16,000	12,800	10,000	6,000	2,000
To be removed during embarkation ..	4,700	3,200	2,800	4,000	4,000	2,000

During these stages the command of the troops on shore would gradually devolve as outlined in White's first scheme. As Rear-guard Commander—the officer to whom General Godley would hand over control towards the end of the first night—was chosen General Russell of the N.Z. & A. Division. To represent the divisions on his staff there were eventually chosen³⁵:—1st Division, Colonel Glasfurd; 2nd Division, Major Jackson;³⁶ N.Z. & A. Division, Captain Melville;³⁷ northern section of the line, Lieutenant Buxton.³⁸ During the last day Russell would control through the brigadiers the 10,000 men left in the line. After the brigadiers had withdrawn with the "B" parties, he would, if all went well, hand over the command to Colonel Paton, who, with Major Wisdom³⁹ of the 5th Brigade as his staff-officer, was appointed to command the Rear Party. From that moment until the Evacuation was complete Colonel Paton, through the "C" party commanders (who would have succeeded the brigadiers), would control the force at Anzac.

As to other arrangements—although deep mine-tunnels had by then been driven under many of the enemy's most

³⁵ Maj. W. R. Pinwill, of the N.Z. & A. Div., acted as Russell's staff-officer, while Capt. W. H. Hastings remained at N.Z. headquarters near No. 3 Outpost.

³⁶ Maj.-Gen. G. H. N. Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c., Border Regt. Officer of British Regular Army; of Winchcombe, Gloucs., Eng.; b. Winchcombe, 20 Dec., 1876.

³⁷ Maj.-Gen. C. W. Melville, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c. Commanded 1st N.Z. Inf. Bde., 1917/19. Officer of N.Z. Staff Corps; of Lanarth, Bournemouth, Eng.; b. 5 Sept., 1878. Died Sept., 1925.

³⁸ Capt. E. H. Buxton, Suffolk Yeomanry. Of Fritton, Great Yarmouth, Eng., b. Fritton Hall, 27 Sept., 1880.

³⁹ Brig.-Gen. E. A. Wisdom, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., V.D. Commanded 7th Aust Inf. Bde., 1916/19; subsequently Administrator of former German territory in New Guinea. Of Cottesloe, W. Aust.; b. Inverness, Scotland, 29 Sept., 1869.

important positions, White and Godley were loth to allow them to be charged, feeling that the Turk would be put on the *qui vive* by any explosion occurring before evacuation was complete. As Birdwood, however, directed that particular attention should be paid to their employment, the first orders issued at Anzac were modified to allow of all mines along the centre of the front being charged ready for firing in case of emergency. But Godley ruled that, with the exception of one group, they must not be fired unless the enemy had actually begun to attack, and then only on the command of a senior officer. The exception was the mines at The Nek, the explosion of which at the very end of the operation might prevent the enemy from following up the retirement. Discretion was therefore given to the Rear-guard Commander to order this group to be fired after the last of the garrison was clear. The mines charged were:

			No. of gallery.	Charge.**
Russell's Top	L11	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
			L8	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
			Arnall's	2 tons
Pope's	8	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
Quinn's	18	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
			36A	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
Courtney's	D25B	1 ton
			D9A4	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
			D26E	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
			D3	2 tons
Opposite Johnston's Jolly	C7	2 tons
			C38	3 tons
			C2	1 ton
			C5	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton
Lone Pine	Two mines	$\frac{1}{2}$ ton each

As the more distant positions—The Apex, Rylie's Post, and Hill 60—would be vacated at least three-quarters of an hour before the centre of the line, the mines at those places were not charged.

The medical orders for Anzac, drawn by Howse in accordance with the decisions of Birdwood and the Admiral.

** Most of these mines being deep, the average charge was necessarily far heavier than that previously adopted at Anzac. The Lone Pine mines were at the end in charge of Lieut W R Gilchrist (of Cremorne, N.S.W., afterwards killed at Bullecourt), and those opposite the Jolly in charge of Lieut C Carre Riddell (of Melbourne).

were so devised as to ensure that only the normal hospital ship need appear off Anzac until the operation was ended. They provided that no attempt was to be made to evacuate seriously-wounded men on the last night. Two casualty clearing stations, the 1st Australian and the 13th British, were to remain to the last, and, if necessary, would stay behind. Men wounded during the day might be evacuated to the hospital ship in the ordinary way; but any who were seriously wounded during the night would be taken to the dressing station, made as comfortable as possible, and then left. Red Cross flags would be hoisted after dusk on the last night over all hospital camps. The seriously wounded would be collected next day, after the Evacuation, and if casualties were numerous the commander of the casualty clearing stations, Major Campbell,⁴¹ must apply to the enemy commander for stretcher-bearers. A letter (which had been already drafted in French) would also be presented, asking the Turkish commander-in-chief to allow both the wounded and the medical personnel to be taken off by British hospital ships.

The particular methods adopted during the last days for carrying out these orders and for deceiving the Turks differed in each quarter of the line, the divisions being in general merely guided by a series of memoranda issued from time to time to them by White. In the 1st Australian Brigade, for example, from the day when the order was received General Smyth and his staff were constantly experimenting by nightly marching men and officers of the last parties along the tracks which they would have to take to the Beach.⁴² By similar means all the divisions ascertained the exact time which would be taken in reaching the piers, and thus drew up the marching orders for their parties.

The instructions given to divisional generals and brigadiers on December 12th were intended to be secret. But by that time rumour of the truth was fast spreading, and much could be seen to confirm it. Since December 3rd Australian engineers had been engaged in making a number of light pile and trestle piers. On the 9th they began the foot-bridge to

⁴¹ Lieut.-Col. R. D. Campbell, D.S.O.; A.A.M.C. Medical practitioner; of Hobart; b. Glasgow, Scotland, 20 July, 1875.

⁴² In order to mislead any of the enemy who might be observing, these parties usually went to the Beach before dawn and came back by daylight.

the *Milo*,⁴³ and on the 12th a party under Sergeant Foulsum⁴⁴ commenced the highly dangerous task of repairing Watson's Pier. On December 11th all engineers were withdrawn from work on the winter shelters, and next day the charging of the mines was begun. Large working parties of infantry commenced work upon the new Inner Line on Walker's Ridge and elsewhere. The news was thus known with certainty to the whole force before the evening of December 13th.⁴⁵

It came as a shock to the troops at Anzac, affecting every man deeply but each differently, according to his nature and his views concerning the campaign. To some the abandonment of the attempt, after so great an effort and the loss of so many lives, was a heart-breaking disappointment. A proportion both of officers and men—Birdwood among them—would rather by far have blown up the mines and made a dash at the enemy in the hope of breaking him even at that stage. To others the bitterest part was to realise that all the elaborate defences, in which they had expected to brave out both the winter and the onslaught of German artillery, were to be abandoned without a struggle. The majority of the front-line troops at Anzac were at this stage firmly convinced that the enemy also was withdrawing troops. "We'll find presently that he's clearing out too," was a not infrequent comment. The impression generally received was that many of the Turks opposite them were beaten men.⁴⁶ On the other hand there were many among the troops who held

⁴³ See Vol. XII, plate 149. This pier was finished on the 15th, three days earlier than had been anticipated. All this work on the beach was done by part of the 2nd Fld. Coy.

⁴⁴ Lieut. W. C. Foulsum, D.C.M.; 1st Pioneer Bn. Engineer fitter; of Melbourne; b. Ballarat, Vic., Nov., 1892.

⁴⁵ The effort to maintain secrecy after Dec. 12 was derided by a good many. How necessary it was, nevertheless, may be judged from a passage from the diary of an Australian then at Imbros: "Dec. 13. This evening 'X' (an officer's batman of the old Regular Army) came in from a field below our cottage, where the Greek labourers and some Tommies have been picking up stones all day. 'I hear they're going to leave Suvla, sir,' he said. 'The officer down there said they were making this camp for the headquarters of the IX Corps.' I said, 'No, they aren't, X—it's for a hospital for the Indians.' 'Oh, but he says that's wrong, sir—he says its for the H.Q. of the IX Corps.' I thought," writes the diarist, "it was a case for a downright denial when a chatterer like X got hold of it, so I said. 'Well, I happen to know that the troops are not leaving Suvla; they are taking some of them away—that's all.'" But the diarist adds that the same evening the chatterer was heard telling the news to a mate in a loud voice all the way up the road to camp. Three days later, in order to meet the danger of news spreading from the camps at Kephalos to Panagia and the other Greek villages in Imbros, and thence to the mainland, Birdwood seized on the excuse of a supposed occurrence of small-pox at Panagia, and prohibited any one from passing into or out of the military zone. It was also arranged that a naval patrol should prevent any small Greek craft from leaving the island during the final days.

⁴⁶ That such impressions were sometimes of value was constantly proved in the Aust Corps in 1918.

that persistence in the campaign might be a useless waste of strength. And though the men of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps were not of the sort that would readily accept failure in a fight once undertaken, this view was at least as common as any other; objection to the plan was frequent, but not general. But the consideration which did go straight to every man's heart was the tragedy of confessing failure after so many and well-loved comrades had given their lives to the effort. The men hated to leave their dead mates at the mercy of the Turks. For days after the breaking of the news there were never absent from the cemeteries men by themselves, or in twos and threes, erecting new crosses or tenderly "tidying-up" the grave of a friend. This was by far the deepest regret of the troops. "I hope," said one of them to Birdwood on the final day, pointing to a little cemetery, "I hope *they* won't hear us marching down the *deres*."

Most officers and men, although not now expecting casualties such as those first estimated,⁴⁷ believed that a large part of the rear-guard would probably be killed or captured. Yet from the moment when the scheme of retirement became known the officers of every unit were besieged with men begging to be members of the last parties. The general order, however, was that the personnel of those parties must be obtained by selection of the most active and suitable, not by volunteering. Nevertheless many demanded inclusion almost as a right—"I was here at the beginning and I have a right to stay to the end"; when refused, they asked to be paraded before their commanding officers, and to be informed what they had done to debar themselves from inclusion. The eventual selection, in most instances, was well done, and the last parties at Anzac included a high proportion of men afterwards to become well known both in the A.I.F. and in Australia.

The days which followed the first issue of instructions were fully occupied with preparing the divisional arrangements. Guns, regimental baggage, reserve units, and the non-fighting personnel of units in the line were to be sent away nightly. A detachment under Captain Kirke,⁴⁸ one of the officers of Colonel Paton's Rear Party, was clearing

⁴⁷ For example, Hamilton's estimate—"half the total force."

⁴⁸ Capt. E. W. Kirke; 18th Bn. Law clerk; of Manly, N.S.W.; b. Dubbo, N.S.W., 28 Oct., 1887. Killed in action, 4 Aug., 1916.

the old trenches and forming the keep on Plugge's Plateau. An intermediate line of strong-points—only to be used if the front line was broken—was prepared from Russell's Top to M'Cay's Hill. Two mines were laid down inside the lines on the tracks down Walker's Ridge and along Russell's Top respectively. General Monash arranged that every man in the last parties of his brigade should be given a card setting forth his exact duty on the last night—where he was to be, what he was to do, what route he was to follow to the beach. Throughout the divisional areas rendezvous were selected. Special tracks were chosen, out of sight of Gaba Tepe, to be marked with salt or flour and tins; special marks—such as a "white light in a biscuit-box, with a red light over it"—were placed by night at important intersections and junctions of paths, and traffic officers, orderlies, and police were told off to be stationed there on the final nights. By experiment on one of the earlier nights the 1st Infantry Brigade found that the boots of men withdrawing in large parties made what was considered excessive noise. In the 2nd Division, therefore, whose lines in places touched those of the enemy, it was ordered that the last parties must wear socks or sandbags over their boots; in the 1st Division this precaution was adopted for all parties. In the closest positions, such as Lone Pine, torn-up blankets were to be laid on the floor of the trenches in order to muffle sound. Hard earth on the tracks was broken up with picks, and soft soil sprinkled through the trenches. All piers were carpeted with sacks, and the tram-rails on Williams' Pier were taken up.

Experiments were also being made in attaching to rifles various devices that would fire them after the last man had left, and so conceal the final retirement. The simplest arrangement for this purpose was invented by Lance-Corporal Scurry⁴⁹ of the 7th Battalion. A weight, attached to the trigger, was suspended in such a way that it would be released through the overbalancing of a certain tin. Above that tin was placed another tin containing water, but pierced with a small hole. When sufficient water had trickled from the upper into the lower tin, the latter overbalanced, and fired the rifle. The time occupied depended on the size of the hole, but was

⁴⁹ Capt. W. C. Scurry, M.C., D.C.M., 58th Bn. Modeller; of Melbourne, b. Melbourne, Oct., 1895.

generally about twenty minutes. Other devices were contrived with fuses, or with candles and string, and practically every unit arranged that on the final night a few rifles should be fixed in its trenches to be fired by one of these methods after the last men had left.

During the last week at Anzac almost every thought and action was tested by the rule of "normality." Too much activity was regarded with as much general disfavour as too little. In the endeavour to educate the enemy to look upon a cessation of fire as "normal," the 1st Division actually arranged for a period of silence from 2 to 2.15 a.m. on the last night but one. Partly in order to avoid abnormal proceedings, White was averse from making any undue effort in the final stage to save or destroy material. Until the last the stacks of provisions must be left to outward appearance unchanged, and there must be sufficient guns to keep up more or less normal fire from the usual positions. At a stage so critical the saving of material seemed to him a matter of trivial importance compared with the successful withdrawal of the troops. Birdwood, on the other hand, though he realised that it was to some extent unavoidable, hated to leave material in the enemy's hands. He was not satisfied with the order issued at Anzac that the remaining guns should be "disabled," but directed that breech-blocks and sights must be saved, and every gun "so completely blown to bits as to ensure its worthlessness to the enemy even as a trophy." It was accordingly arranged that engineers on the last night should fix charges to all the guns, and, with artillery officers, should remain to light the fuses after the last parties of the infantry were clear of the gun-positions. The explosions, however, were not to be louder than the report of a gun firing.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Several measures suggested by other staffs, which threatened to break the normality of the final stage, were successfully avoided. Gen. Byng, fearing for his right flank, asked to have three warships stationed close inshore during the final night, in order to protect it if necessary with their gun-fire. Gen. Godley, however, pointed out that such a proceeding might be dangerous, and Byng agreed to their being stationed farther out. (On the final night Byng asked after dark that the monitor *Sir Thomas Picton* should be moved close in. This was done at 8.45 p.m., the ship standing in close to the shore near the transports lying off Anzac.) Again, on Dec. 17 there was received from the D.M.S., M.E.F. (who apparently had been kept in ignorance of the arrangements) an urgent memorandum which appeared to foreshadow that extra hospital ships and hospital carriers would be rushed to the Peninsula. At Howse's suggestion Godley at once replied asking that no other than the normal hospital ship should be stationed at Anzac, and that no hospital carriers should arrive before the Evacuation was complete. In order that everything should happen as normally, the hospital ship lying off Anzac on Dec. 17 was, although almost empty, relieved that evening by another hospital ship, the normal period of her stay having elapsed.

An event which for a moment appeared likely to put the enemy on the *qui vive* was an accident which occurred at the very end of the intermediate stage. At 1 o'clock on the morning of December 18th, through some cause never ascertained, the central block of the large supply-dump on the foreshore at North Beach caught fire.⁵¹ The conflagration, feeding on thousands of cases of biscuits, bacon, and tinned meat, and on drums of oil, quickly enveloped the whole stack. The sky reddened, and a gun in the Olive Grove began to fire. There was a moment of keen anxiety, since any general burning of stores might have suggested to the enemy that an evacuation was in process. The desultory nature of his shelling, however, made it seem clear—as was the case—that he supposed the blaze to have been caused by the fire of his own guns, and that he was merely shelling the spot in an endeavour to increase the conflagration. General Lesslie, as always, went to the centre of the trouble ~~on the~~ beach and, working with a company of the 21st Battalion, some light horsemen, and other bystanders, succeeded in confining the fire to a single stack.

The intermediate stage closed at day-break on December 18th. In ten nights the garrison had been reduced as follows:

CASUALTIES.

Date.	Arrivals.	Killed	Sick and wounded evacuated.	Troops withdrawn.	Remaining strength.
Dec. 8	277	4	558	4	35,445
9	71	6	—	—	35,510
10	132	8	400	649	34,585
11	80	5	596	2,091	31,973
12	—	4	900	2,125	28,944
13	—	3	240	2,363	26,338
14	—	4	271	2,346	23,717
15	—	—	201	1,061	22,455
16	—	3	249	717	21,486
17	—	2	143	1,064	20,277

On the morning of the 18th there remained ashore only some 20,200 troops, 19 of the older guns,⁵² and such gun-ammunition as was actually at the battery-positions. The old 4.7 naval gun of the Australian Heavy Battery, already condemned as

⁵¹ See Vol XII, plate 157.

⁵² Only one of the guns—the 12-pdr. anti-aircraft—was in good order.

useless, had been blown up by the engineers.⁶³ All bombs—except “jam-tins”—in the reserves had been removed; all “used” rifles; practically all mule-carts, wheels, and pack-saddles; all mules, except a few left for the purpose of being shown on the tracks visible to the enemy. There had been taken away one of the pumping-engines, the electric-light plant from the newly-built corps headquarters,⁶⁴ all unused uniform clothing, 8,000 pairs of boots, 16,000 flannel shirts, 10,000 pairs of puttees, and large amounts of other material. Good clothing and comforts had during a few days been “issued” as freely as possible to the troops. Old clothing had been torn up. No attempt had been made to remove tinned meat, biscuits, or similar supplies, and, though the troops had been living on reserves of these, large dumps remained. There being sufficient water in the tanks by December 18th, pumping was stopped and the remaining machinery broken up. The deep-mining plant, though on the Beach ready for shipment, was broken up on the receipt of information that no lighter was available.

⁶³ See *Vol. XII, plate 151*. This gun was manufactured in 1896, and is now in the Australian War Memorial Collection.

⁶⁴ Corps H.Q. had in Nov. been removed from Anzac Gully to neatly-built huts on terraces at the head of “New Zealand Gully,” i.e., the northernmost gully running off Anzac Cove. Bridges’ first H.Q. had been at its foot.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE FINAL STAGE

DECEMBER 18th, the first of the two final days of the Evacuation, dawned quietly. The slight haze caused by the fire added to some fog in the morning made the atmosphere less clear than usual. On this day the actual front was still held in fair strength, although precautions had to be taken in most of the trenches to ensure that the usual number of small fires for cooking were lighted. Inside the lines, however, the Anzac area appeared uncannily deserted.¹ Accordingly, wherever the beach tracks were visible to Gaba Tepe a few mules were continually led round to preserve the appearance of activity. On the short stretch of Artillery Road near Brown's Dip Colonel Cass had placed "three or four men to hang round. . . . They should (said the 1st Brigade orders) be obviously loafing and smoking." The enemy observed this movement and shelled the road.² In the valleys behind the lines of the N.Z. & A. Division military police were employed in seeing that the usual fires were lighted, and here also the enemy shelled the gullies in consequence. In the old Anzac area, where old orders and other papers were being everywhere destroyed, the incinerators were burning more actively than usual.³

Until the afternoon, in most sectors, the men who were to form the first party were on duty in the trenches. During the afternoon they were relieved by men of later parties, and formed up in rear of the trenches, ready to move. At 5.15, when dusk was fast closing in, the first parties began to file down their several valleys and tracks towards the beaches. While they were on their way there was heard an approaching aeroplane, which passed low down over some of the columns; but it was only a British machine returning to Imbros from the patrol which, at Birdwood's request, was being continuously maintained during the two final days.⁴ Traffic

¹ See Vol. XII, plate 156.

² See Vol. XII, plate 152.

³ See Vol. XII, plate 155.

⁴ To avoid giving the enemy a clue to the reason for this activity, unwonted at Anzac, machines were not to remain over the lines, but were to be in the neighbourhood ready to repel enemy aircraft. A second aeroplane was always on the aerodrome at Imbros ready to start on receiving a wireless message that an enemy machine was in sight.

officers, lights, and orderlies at road intersections guided the parties to the two beaches; there the embarkation officers took control. At Anzac Cove ("South Beach"), where shelling from the Olive Grove was always to be feared and on this night occurred as usual, the troops as they arrived were packed into Anzac Gully, where they were opposite the end of Watson's Pier and at the same time to some extent sheltered from the Olive Grove battery. The lighters were arriving so quietly that their movement up to the pier could not be heard even by staff officers in charge of the troops just across the Beach; but as each lighter arrived word was given from the pier, and men were sent forward in tens with twenty yards' interval between the parties. The men were told not to hurry. Each as he walked along the jetty threw into the water the two bombs which he carried. The steadiness, silence, and general order were perfect.

Shortly after the movement of troops from the line had commenced, the transports began to approach, steamed to their berths close to the shore, and anchored. On the last two nights it was, as a matter of fact, not possible for the navy to confine all the preliminary movements to the dark hours; in order to arrive in time some of the ships had to begin moving from Imbros, or its neighbourhood, while it was still fairly light.⁵ But the rattle of anchor-chains which had often marked the arrival of a steamer off Anzac was not heard this night, the anchors being not let go but lowered. An eye-witness in the *Grafton* has left a record of the scene:

5 p.m. Nothing (*i.e.*, nothing abnormal).

6.45 p.m. *Mars* passes steaming quickly close in towards fire (*i.e.*, the remains of the fire on North Beach).

8.30 p.m. *Mars* passed us with 2,000 troops on board. . . . Moon behind clouds. Beachy was not shelling—at any rate, till 8 o'clock. The ordinary rattle of rifle-fire comes from the direction of The Nek. . . . The big whale-like shape of Sari Bair against the faint misty sky. A fire or two burning steadily. One of our field-guns at Suvla is firing. The rattle from Anzac is like a low-crackling fire; that at Suvla like a kettle of water boiling. A bomb has flashed on The Nek—then a dull report. This ship is at anchor on a perfectly silky sea. A destroyer is moving across the surface of it—very slowly, like a black cat—about 200 yards to port. I can hear the rustle of her bows moving thro' the silky water. A bomb at Hill 60.

⁵ See Vol. XII, plate 158

It is about 9 o'clock. An ideal night for the job. No ships (only a few lights) visible at Suvla. One ship about a mile on our port beam. Barely a wrinkle on the water. Soft air from the north. Moon at present quite invisible. The wash of the destroyer has been lapping against our side like the wavelets on the edge of a pond.

10 p.m. Three ships just gone in. Twelve cutters should be leaving Watson's.

10.35 p.m. Five trawlers coming out with cutters in tow. . . .

The night's programme was carried out with almost exact precision at both Suvla and Anzac. The first two instalments of troops were embarked more quickly than had been anticipated, but it was decided at corps headquarters to adhere to the time-table. At 11 p.m. General Godley handed over command on shore to General Russell, and embarked in the sloop *Heliotrope*. With him was White, who for the past ten days had exercised almost single-handed control over the movement at Anzac. Godley as corps commander had keenly studied the plans put forward and, after assuring himself of their soundness, fought tenaciously for them in conference at Imbros. He had also exercised rare judgment in allowing a wide discretion to his subordinate. But it was White whose vision—combined with an unfailing sense of proportion and a power of lucid explanation and courteous insistence in conference—influenced probably more than any other human agency the tactics by which the Evacuation, not only at Anzac and Suvla but also at Helles, was carried out. At Anzac throughout the operation almost all reference on important points was to him. From morning till late at night he was at his telephone, explaining whatever was not understood, unruffled, courteous, quiet in voice, showing always an inexhaustible patience in dealing with men less quick in perception. As chance had it, in his war service this operation was to be the only one which gave him a wide field for ingenuity; and with this triumph in the field—and with the reorganisation of the A.I.F. during the following months at the base—his name will probably be most generally connected.

The last day found 10,000 men still at Anzac under the Rear-guard Commander and, subordinate to him, the brigadiers. The enemy had so far shown no suspicion of the withdrawal. A short period of silence, similar to one which two nights before had drawn heavy fire from the enemy, evoked this

morning no special response. At 9.45 shells from a 12-inch gun or howitzer began to fall at intervals in rear of Lone Pine, at Russell's Top, and near Courtney's. A solitary field-gun on Russell's Top barked in retaliation, and at once drew fire from two Turkish batteries on Gun Ridge. When an enemy 75-mm. battery fired thirty rounds into an empty gun-pit of the 1st Australian Battery on Plugge's, the 5th Battery with its one remaining gun replied. During the day The Apex was shelled by the enemy with 8-inch and Hill 60 with 9-inch projectiles. Heavy bursts of similar shell could be seen at intervals on Lala Baba, near Suvla Bay. The shelling at Anzac caused at first some anxiety, lest it might be a prelude to an attack; but by the enemy's practice it appeared that he was registering targets for future bombardment.⁶ Martyn's Lane, one of the main communication trenches to the 400 Plateau, was broken down, and one of the deep shelters was damaged; but the area was so empty that no casualties were caused at Anzac.⁷

On this day care had to be exercised along the whole line to show the normal number of periscopes. Fires were kept going. In the lines of the 4th Brigade and elsewhere a semblance of trench-digging was kept up by men who shovelled loose earth on to the parapet in certain places, as though they were improving the defences, and let it fall back again into the trench. As before, men were stationed to loiter in Artillery Road.⁸

Throughout the day a proportion of the men were engaged in burying ammunition and bombs (usually in the latrines), destroying with pick-axes tins and cooking-pots, sawing through the wheels of limbers, and pouring caustic soda on the tarpaulins. Where bivouacs were covered with blankets or waterproof sheets, these were to be left; but as far as possible the men's blankets were to be saved, being taken away by the earlier parties this night, which would also carry the

⁶ The shells which fell on the 400 Plateau do not appear to have been those of the Austrian battery; but they contained a powerful explosive.

⁷ At Suvla one of the piers was damaged, but was repaired by the Royal Australian Naval Bridging Train. At Anzac one shell penetrated a shelter containing a number of men, but failed to burst.

⁸ It is a curious sidelight on the character of the troops that, although on ordinary occasions they were only too careless in exposing themselves to view, and though they were now eager to serve with the Rear Party, accepting the prospect of heavy fighting, they nevertheless tended more than usually to keep under cover, through a natural desire to avoid the risk of being killed on the last day of the campaign.

packs of the men in the last parties. At midday Birdwood came ashore and went round the lines. At 2.15 there broke out at Helles a tremendous bombardment preceding the feint attack delivered by the 52nd (Lowland Scottish) Division. As sometimes happened, the rifle and machine-gun fire in the southern area could be heard clearly from the right of Anzac. It continued at intervals until long after dark. About 3.30 an enemy airman flew over Anzac but observed nothing unusual.

At dusk, as on the previous night, the withdrawal began. The instructions were that it was now to proceed as far as possible, even if the enemy attacked, and that once a party had left the line it was not to be turned back except by order of the Rear-guard Commander himself. But the Turks still showed no suspicion of what was happening. Early in the night a report was received that an enemy party was moving down Malone's Gully near The Nek, but patrols found no trace of it.⁹ Scouts sent out by General Monash reported that the enemy could be heard busily engaged, as usual, in erecting wire-entanglements. When the "B" parties were embarking, as there had been so far no casualties, Russell ordered the personnel of one of the two remaining casualty clearing stations, the 13th British, to leave also.

The whole circumference of the Anzac line was now held by less than 1,500 men under the "C" party commanders. In the Inner Line on Plugge's Plateau was Colonel Lamrock of the 20th,⁹ with flanking troops on MacLagan's, Walker's, and No. 1 Outpost. With the "B" parties had gone a large proportion of the machine-guns, and the last catapults and trench-mortars. Since dusk seven of the nine guns and howitzers of the N.Z. & A. Division had been removed; the two others, together with the remaining nine of the 1st Australian Division, were now being dismantled, and explosives were being fixed in their muzzles.¹⁰

Until the "B" parties had gone there had been, in the estimation of many commanders, a fair chance of beating back

⁹ Col. Paton, commanding the Rear Party, had now moved to the Rear-guard Headquarters on the Beach. (Brig.-Gen. J. Lamrock, C.B., V.D. Commanded 20th Bn., 1915/16. Race club secretary; of Sydney, b. Kurrajong, N.S.W., 25 Dec., 1859.) Died, 19 July, 1935.

¹⁰ Col. Bessell-Browne, who under the Rear-guard Commander controlled the artillery of the 1st Div., was of opinion that some of the Australian guns could be saved, and applied for permission to attempt it. Gen. Russell, however, in view of their distance from the Beach and their inaccessibility, wisely refused permission.

an attack unless it were general or made in great force. In the moonlight the enemy's troops would have been observed as soon as they left their trench, and would have been met by fire from a great number of machine-guns all in a state of instant readiness. Although the area behind the lines was entirely empty, the front would have presented resistance at least strong enough to dishearten any merely probing attack, and cast doubt on any report of the Evacuation which might have reached the enemy. But once the "B" parties had gone the fire of the garrison could impede no serious attack. The only hope would have lain in the firing of one or more mines. The skeleton garrison and quota of machine-guns now remaining in the line could at most force caution on the enemy patrols, or baffle a feeble reconnaissance. Their main duty and their only chance of success—though a strong one—lay in deceiving the enemy by keeping up the appearance of a normal night.


For perfect success this pretence had to be maintained for the next four-and-a-half hours. During the first hour-and-a-half the whole length of the Anzac-Suvla line was held, though only by one man to every seven or eight yards. But these troops moved from loop-hole to loop-hole, keeping up the normal firing and bombing. To the "C" party commanders were coming, every quarter of an hour or so, reports from the different parts of their trenches. "Everything normal." "Nothing special to report." "Turks firing as usual." At 11.10 General Russell signalled to the corps commander in the *Heliotrope* "Very quiet. Turks busily engaged digging and erecting wire." At 1.30 he handed over command on shore to Colonel Paton and embarked, having previously given instructions that the mines at The Nek were to be fired when all the garrison was clear. At the same moment from the extreme left of the Anzac line and from the whole of the Suvla front the final retirement began.

At 1.30 the operation entered on a critical stage, for from this hour the whole of the Suvla front line and a gradually increasing portion of the front at Anzac became vacant.¹¹ At

¹¹ An important mistake in the orders of the 1st Aust Div was discovered early on the morning of Dec. 19. Through an error in copying the army corps order, the "C" parties of the division had been directed to embark at Watson's Pier instead of at North Beach. The mistake was discovered through a chance remark of the naval transport officer at South Beach after the last parties of the previous day had left.

Suvla, where the British trench-line was, in general, fairly distant from that of the enemy, and where, moreover, the tension was never extreme,¹² the chance of discovery was probably less and the danger which would result from it was not so great. But the main Anzac trenches in five important sectors ran within bombing distance of the enemy's. At several positions the posts of the two sides were within less than twenty yards of each other, sometimes in the same trenches, and in nine different sectors the rival mining systems were actually in contact. At 1.30 the last party of the Indian brigade from Susak Kuyu to Hill 60 closed down its telephones and withdrew, leaving the line empty, the 4th Gurkhas moving off as arranged with the southern flank troops of the IX Corps. At 1.40 the last of the Eastern Mounted Brigade abandoned Hill 60, and, together with the 5th and 6th Gurkhas, made for the piers which a few New Zealand engineers had placed in position after dark at the mouth of the Asmak Dere. At the same hour the last of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles began to leave the trenches along the Kaiajik Dere and make southwards on their two-mile march to North Beach. At 1.55 the "C3" party of Monash's 4th Brigade withdrew from Warwick Castle above the Aghyl Dere, and at 2.5 from Beck's Bluff. By 2.15 Cheshire Ridge and The Apex were abandoned. Shortly afterwards all troops from Rhododendron and the whole area north of it were moving at a fast but steady pace down the deep, empty valleys towards the coast, each northern sector contributing its quota, which fell into place in the small column or followed it to the sea.

Except for the rifles which had been left at a certain number of points to fire automatically, the whole northern half of the Anzac trenches was now lifeless; at The Apex the empty fire-bays were within sixty yards of the enemy's,



¹² The Turks always regarded the Suvla area as restful compared with Helles and Anzac.

opposite the Jolly.¹⁵ Ten minutes later, at 2.55, Quinn's and Pope's were abandoned to the enemy. Russell's Top was the only front-line post now held. As the parties wound along the valleys to the beaches there were heard occasionally the explosions of the charges by which the guns on the deserted hills were destroyed.

The enemy's action continued to be that of a normal night. Every two or three seconds there were heard the rifle shots of his sentries, near or distant, and occasionally the thud of a bomb. Colonel Paton accordingly at 2.52 ordered the greater part of the garrison of the Inner Line on Plugge's and MacLagan's Ridge to withdraw, and at 2.57 the remainder. At 3.8 he called in the covering party of the 1st Light Horse Regiment from No. 1 Outpost. At 3.14 the last sector of the Anzac front line, on Russell's Top, facing The Nek, was abandoned. At 3.25 the last men on Walker's Ridge, except those appointed for firing the mines, withdrew. At 3.30, the whole garrison being believed to be clear of the hills,¹⁶ Major Fitz-Gerald¹⁷ of the 20th gave Lieutenant Caddy¹⁸ of the engineers the order to fire the mines at The Nek—those in L11 and L5, followed less than a minute later by that in Arnall's Tunnel.

At this moment the last of the "C" parties were waiting at North Beach for the final motor-lighter, which was rather long in arriving. The beach was being lightly shelled; those on the shore attributed the shelling to the noise caused by blowing up the guns. The tremor of the ground caused by the mine explosions was followed by a low roar. Those on the ships saw for an instant a brilliant glare reflected on

¹⁵ The 21st had in its lines several rifles which were to be fired by weights released through the burning of fuses. Since the fuses were found to burn too quickly, shreds of web-equipment were substituted, but at 9 p.m. Capt. B. O. C. Duggan (of St. Arnaud, Vic.) found that the material had become wet with dew. He then experimented with fuses of tow. These he found to act well, and accordingly fitted the rifles with them. The last party should have left at 2.40, but the lighting of the tow fuses was not completed until a few minutes later. The last of the 21st then withdrew, leaving the rifles to go off at different times, from twenty minutes to an hour later. In some places one or two bombs were left with long fuses, to explode a short while after the garrison had withdrawn. It was generally found, however, that fuses gave off too much smoke to be suitable for use on such an occasion.

¹⁶ Owing to some fault in the telephone line, however, the message to withdraw did not get through to No. 1 Outpost until after the mines on Russell's Top had been blown. The rear party of the 1st L.H. Regiment, which included a picked squad of the 12th L.H. under Lieut. C. M. Fetherstonhaugh (of Coonamble, N.S.W.), hurrying through the sap, came out opposite the pier to find the Russell's Top party, which was intended to be the last, just ahead of it.

¹⁷ Maj. (temp. Lieut.-Col.) R. F. Fitz-Gerald, D.S.O.; Aust. Corps Cyclist Bn. Commanded 24th Bn., 1916/17. Station manager and accountant; of Sydney. b. Orange, N.S.W., 23 Apr., 1880. (He took command at Russell's Top at midnight when Col. Lamrock took over from Paton on Plugge's.)

¹⁸ Maj. J. P. Caddy, MC; 15th Fld Coy Engrs. Mining engineer, of Sydney. b. Sydney, 25 Aug., 1882.

the rolling under-surface of two low clouds of dust and smoke. After a moment of silence there broke out a rattle of musketry, which quickly spread along the Turkish line, until firing was continuous along the whole of the old Anzac front.

The last medical personnel of the 1st Australian Casualty Clearing Station had been by then ordered to embark. At 3.30 Paton gave to the remaining signal station at North Beach the word to telephone to the wireless operators—who were then alone on South Beach—an already prepared message for transmission to Godley: "Evacuation completed. No casualties left ashore. One sent aboard." Captain Watson of the 2nd Divisional Signal Company, however, found that the telephone line was dead. He therefore ran across Ari Burnu to South Beach, and breathlessly ordered the naval wireless operators, A. W. Herbert and A. E. Jones, to send a shortened message: "Embarkation completed," and then ran back with them to North Beach, arriving to find the troops all on the last lighter, and Captain Littler standing by it on the pier. At about 4 a.m. the lighter sailed, but Paton with his staff officer Wisdom, Captain Staveley, Littler, and one or two others of the staff waited for ten minutes on the beach in case stragglers might arrive. As none came, at 4.10 they embarked in Captain Staveley's steamboat, the last to leave being the seaman who cast off the line holding the boat.

On shore one man had been wounded, and a light horseman in one of the boats was hit by a stray bullet from the fusillade caused by the explosion of the mines. The evacuation of Suvla was completed with equally small loss at 5.10 a.m., the withdrawal of the parties from the left on Kiretch Tepe having taken slightly longer than had been estimated. The huge dumps of supplies beside Suvla Beach were set on fire by two engineer officers at 4 a.m. and were blazing fiercely while the last boats were leaving. Before dawn a small naval steamboat moved along the coast, the officer calling out in case any straggler had been left ashore. None, however, remained¹⁹

¹⁹ One of the "C" party of the 13th Bn—Pte. F. Pollack (of Sydney)—narrowly escaped being left behind. He had obtained permission for special reasons to have a rest in his dugout, having previously arranged with his mates to call him before they left. They, however, understood him to refer to a different dugout, and, having thoroughly searched the one in which he usually slept and found it empty, assumed that he had gone on to the beach. Pollack, waking later, found the area silent. He went along the trenches, but they were empty. Running to the shore, he found no sign of movement until at North Beach he came on men embarking on one of the last lighters, and went with them.

When the fusillade which followed the mine explosions died down, the Turks were to all appearances still unaware of what had happened. The observer aboard the *Grafton* notes:

3.35. Firing still heavy right to extreme right. "Beachy" burst a shell over Artillery Road.

3.40. Dull sound as of guns being blown up.

3.45. . . . Flashes of rifles on Snipers' Nest.

3.46. Heavy machine-gun action.

4.0. Fire at Anzac has almost ceased except a few flashes.

4.26. Firing fairly constant.

5.0. Turks still firing. No one ashore. Machine-gun going every now and then.

5.15. Turks still sending an occasional sniping shot at our trenches. Little Table Top light still burning.

5.40. Turks still sniping at Anzac.

6.0. Turkish fire has practically ceased, except . . . shots from near Nek (or) No. 1 Post. Pier lights and Table Top (light) still burning.

But it was the explosion of the mines at The Nek—completely destroying the enemy's front line, killing seventy men, and forming two large craters—which in fact first led to the enemy's discovery of the Evacuation. During its final stage he had been as unaware as previously of what was occurring. "The intention of evacuating the Peninsula," says Liman von Sanders,²⁰ "was naturally not known to us, and did not become so even to the very last moment" It is true that either the Turkish staff or individual commanders observed isolated signs which might or might not be taken as evidence that abnormal operations were occurring. Two days before the Evacuation, for example, the Allied air force was observed to be acting more vigorously than before, especially in bombing rear areas. Moreover "it had no doubt struck one or other of our artillery commanders," writes von Sanders, "that different enemy batteries had not been shooting at all in the last few days, or had fired with only one gun. No essential importance had been attached to this fact, and it had therefore not been reported to headquarters. On previous occasions it had frequently happened that batteries ceased fire for one or two days when they changed their position." If the bombardment was increasingly undertaken by the ships, this did not appear to the Turkish staff to be an abnormal

²⁰ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 127.

circumstance, since they believed that it always occurred when British batteries moved to new emplacements. In November there had been days of suspicious silence at Anzac. But the strong reconnoitring parties sent out on that occasion had everywhere come up against tough opposition. During December the Anzac miners could be heard apparently tunnelling towards the Turkish trenches.²¹ The tents and huts in all the British hospital and other camps remained standing. "Probably this more than anything else," says von Sanders, "concealed the intention of evacuating the Peninsula." In addition, the British appeared to be engaged in improving their defences by erecting barbed-wire entanglements.²²

As the available evidence did not point to an evacuation, the commander and staff of the Fifth Turkish Army had been devoting almost their whole attention to two objects, first, the digging and draining of positions for the winter; and second, the preparation, under instructions from Germany, of the heavy offensive which Lord Kitchener and others apprehended.

At the end of November, 1915 (writes von Sanders²³), a beginning was made at Fifth Army Headquarters with the preparation of a plan for a violent and extensive attack. The purpose was to break through one portion of the enemy's Ari Burnu front and the neighbouring right flank of the Anafarta front, and thereby to compel a retirement on to the outer wings of these two fronts. Reinforcements for this purpose were promised by the Turkish Second Army Headquarters. Technical troops for the same purpose were to be despatched from Germany. As representatives of the (Supreme) German Army Command there came to Gallipoli Col. von Berendt, Lieut.-Col. Klehmet, and Major Lothes, in order to undertake the necessary reconnaissances and to make all preparations. The divisions allotted for the offensive were taken out of the front line one after another and trained for the attack in the practice-trenches laid down behind the front.

Close secrecy was preserved—a wise precaution, since deserters, particularly from Arab regiments at Suvla, were till the last coming daily into the British lines and telling

²¹ As a matter of fact most of the mines were during the last week being charged with explosives, but miners were employed in tapping with the back of their picks or by other means in order to induce the enemy to believe that they were still picking. In later years, as mining-warfare developed, this ruse could not always be safely employed, since the sounds could be recognised and distinguished from those of true picking.

²² In the Karajik Dere sector Zeki Bey's regiment had a machine-gun specially placed to fire on the wiring parties, and it was their persistence which convinced Zeki Bey that the rumours of intended evacuation were groundless. His machine-gun was firing during the final night.


²³ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, pp. 125-6



ANZAC BEACH IN 1910

The concrete structure on the right is part of the condensing plant which was pierced by a shell from the Olive Grove batteries

Anzac War Memorial Official Photo No G1784



A CIGARETTE CASE THROWN OVER IN NOVEMBER BY THE
TURKS AT QUINN'S

The inscription is the Turkish soldiers' French for
"Take, with pleasure To our heroic enemy" (It has
been necessary to retouch this photograph which was
indistinct)

Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1345.

The Cup

Beacon



Owen's
Gully

Johnston's Jolly

LONE PINE IN 1910 (FROM THE JOLLY), SHOWING THE CUP AND
OWEN'S GULLY

The monument was raised by the Turks at the point where the Lone
Pine attack was stopped. The mounds on the extreme right are heaps
of brushwood piled up after the Evacuation and intended to be used
for warning-fires in the event of a further landing

*Aust War Memorial Official Photo No G1753
Taken in 1910*

To face p 899

everything they knew.²⁴ In the rear areas ammunition was already arriving, the cases being labelled in such a way that only those who could read the cipher knew what it was. The commanders of various sectors on the front, including that at Hill 60, had been directed to study the ground in order to ascertain the best points for attack and to submit their appreciations; but none except the highest authorities knew where the main thrust was to be made, and, among those who were aware of the preparations, it was thought unlikely that they would be complete before the last week of January. The Austrian howitzer battery, which since the end of November had accurately registered the Chocolate Hills (which were to be the central objective) as well as Lala Baba and some targets on Sari Bair,²⁵ was on the morning of December 20th to destroy an obnoxious battery of British guns on the Suvla plain.

Some account of the events on the Turkish side that night can be derived from the writings of Liman von Sanders, and from the accounts given by the Turkish General Staff, and Zeki Bey as its representative, to the Australian Historical Mission. According to Zeki Bey the sound of the bombardment at Cape Helles during the afternoon had suggested to enemy officers that something unusual might be occurring at Anzac and Suvla. Moreover, just before dusk, it was observed that there was an unusually large number of steamers at Imbros; it was reported that there were thirty-five, and that they were emitting much smoke.²⁶ Observers were instructed to keep an especially keen look-out. "A thick fog," says Liman von Sanders, "lay over the Peninsula and coast."²⁷ The fire on the front was as strong as usual until midnight, when it became somewhat weaker." Lights were observed near the shore—apparently at Suvla—which gave some of the enemy's subordinate commanders the impression

²⁴ The arrival at Anafarta of the Austrian guns and the fact of their being emplaced were thus reported to the British, but no valuable information was obtained of any coming offensive.

²⁵ Observation-posts for this battery were said to exist on Chunuk Bair and Abdel Rahman Bair, and at three or four other points.

²⁶ See *Vol. XII*, plate 158.

²⁷ This description of the thickness of the fog is probably somewhat exaggerated. To observers on the ships there appeared to be a slight haze, through which large objects were plainly visible throughout the night at a distance of half-a-mile. At dawn next morning the shore, trenches, and figures of the enemy were plainly visible to those in the warships. The smoke of burning stores may have created some haze in Suvla Bay.

that a fresh landing of troops was being made. Shortly before dawn the whole Turkish garrison was startled by the explosion of the mines on The Nek. The first impression of the enemy was that this was the signal for a British attack. None followed, however. The Turks had a standing order that if a mine was blown its crater must immediately be seized. Accordingly the commander of a company which was lying in support advanced his men on his own initiative to the craters, and met with no opposition. The trenches, however, were so completely destroyed as to be unrecognisable, and, according to one account, some of the troops, losing their way, wandered into part of the Australian line and found it empty. Upon their reporting the fact to their officer, he took steps to confirm the statement. The news was reported to the 19th Division, which at 4.30 sent on the information to the headquarters of the Ari Burnu zone, and also ordered its own troops to enter and occupy the positions on their front—Russell's Top, Pope's, and Quinn's. The burning of the stores at Suvla had by then given additional evidence of the retirement. The enemy commander opposite Anzac²⁸ issued at 6.40 a.m. an order for all his divisions to attack.

The result was that, three hours after the last of the Anzac troops had embarked—when the transports carrying them were already hull down or out of sight—men and officers of the warships which remained off the shore observed Turkish shrapnel bursting over the old Anzac line.²⁹ The diary already quoted states:

6.45. Olive Grove and other batteries opened heavy bombardment on Anzac position—very wild. Shells bursting all over position.

7.5. Signal to *Grafton*: "All ships to prepare to open on mule carts and stores (*i.e.*, those abandoned by the A. & N.Z. Army Corps). As all wounded have been evacuated firing can be made without danger."

Bombardment (by Turkish guns) still going on. Very high.

At 7.15 (enemy's) shelling stopped and crowds of Turks could be seen running all over our trenches. We are going to fire on stores on beach.

The point where the attacking Turks were actually seen was on the sky-line from Wire Gully to Bolton's Ridge. They

²⁸ Ali Riza Pasha now commanded at Ari Burnu. Essad Pasha had taken over the command of the First Army at Constantinople in place of Field-Marshal von der Goltz who had been sent to Mesopotamia.

²⁹ For an actual photograph of this bombardment, taken from H M S *Grafton*, see Vol. XII, plate 159.

appeared to have advanced from Lone Pine and the Jolly. On reaching the Australian trenches they ran along the parapet, first one and then another peering down into the empty trenches. Captain Grace³⁰ of the *Grafton*, leaving other ships to fire on the stores, turned his 6-inch guns upon the enemy, bursting two or three salvoes along the parapets near Brown's Dip. The Turks at once disappeared in the maze of trenches.

Liman von Sanders, doubtless misled by reports from his subordinates, believed that his troops followed on the heels of their opponents and came in contact with them both at Anzac and Suvla. His account³¹ is that when, after the first discovery, the 19th Division felt its way towards the enemy trenches,

scattered shots were fired, but then they also ceased. The trenches were occupied by the Turks. Report was made to the higher commanders in the front-line zone. Naturally some time elapsed before the latter arrived, and orders were given for a farther advance, since no definite orders had been circulated for this eventuality, and all attempt at observation was rendered impossible by the fog. Wherever tracks led through the enemy trench system there were obstacles to be removed. At different points contact-mines exploded as the men passed over them, and caused confusion and losses. By this means also the last detachments of the retiring enemy had been able to gain a start in time. During the advance, the fire from the ships swept the ground which the Turks had to cross. Although the distance to the coast was only short, nevertheless the descent in the dark foggy night was made a very difficult matter by reason of the abruptly descending rocky shore ranges. When the foremost troops reached the shore, the enemy had vanished. Immediately the ships turned their fire on the beach.

The retirement on the Anafarta (i.e., Suvla) front was carried out in similar fashion, except that here, owing to contradictory reports, several cases of clashing occurred in the giving of orders. As the flash of red lamps was seen on the coast at several places where the fog did not lie so thickly, some of the subordinate commanders suspected another fresh landing. It was under influence of this uncertain feeling that the first report reached me at the Headquarters camp shortly before 4 a.m. I immediately gave the order for the general alarm and for the summoning up of all reserves, including the cavalry. Every detachment had to move directly forward in its own sector to the shore. But orders are not as quickly transmitted as one hopes, especially when it is a case of using two different languages.

The troops of the Anafarta group came upon whole fields of contact-mines in the more open terrain before them, and these caused many casualties in this part. At different places near the coast short

³⁰ Admiral H. E. Grace, C.B., R.N. (a son of the late Dr W. G. Grace, of Downend, Glos., Eng.); b 1876. Died 19 March, 1937

³¹ *Fünf Jahre Türkei*, pp 127-130

exchanges of rifle-fire occurred with the rearmost detachments of the enemy, *e.g.*, in the case of the 126th Regiment of Turkish infantry. But here also the enemy had been able to embark with losses hardly worth mentioning.

Actually, if any shots met the advancing Turks, they were nothing more than the final discharges of the few rifles which were left to fire automatically. At both places the retiring troops were clear long before any of the enemy approached the beach; and, though at Suvla some thought that they heard the distant explosion of a contact-mine somewhere in the deserted lines, nowhere was any touch established with the enemy during the withdrawal. At Anzac some of the troops had left in the trenches traps suggested by their individual ingenuity—such as a spade handle apparently stuck into the ground by some member of a working party, but actually attached to a bomb which would explode if the handle were interfered with. Here and there, on the other hand, both at Suvla and Anzac men or officers had left in their dugouts a meal ready prepared for an enemy for whom many of them entertained a chivalrous regard. According to some accounts not many of the enemy were caught by the traps.

The British squadron off Anzac fired at the Turks and the stores until 7.37, when, a submarine having been reported, all warships except two or three specially protected cruisers headed for Imbros. Anzac Beach was again bombarded by the enemy about 11 a.m., the first Turkish troops appearing there shortly afterwards. Instructions are said to have been previously given by the Turkish commanders that any British wounded were to be carefully protected, and only the front-line companies of the Turks were ordered to enter the Anzac area, but towards evening other troops made their way thither, and the large stores on the beach and elsewhere were looted.

Much importance was attached by the Turkish command to the question whether their opponents were driven by pressure into a hurried evacuation, or whether it had been deliberately planned. Some copies of orders which were discovered²² "in the camps" threw little light on the question, but the amount of the abandoned stores was taken as evidence of hurried departure.

²² Special instructions had been given that no papers were to be left for the enemy, but the exact fulfilment of such an order was rarely obtainable

An enormous amount of war stores of every kind had been left behind by the English on their retirement. In the space from Suvla Bay to Ari Burnu five smaller steamers and over sixty boats were left on the beach. Narrow-gauge railways, telephone stores, barbed-wire and entanglement material in very great quantities, also heaps of tools of every sort, dispensaries, many medical stores and drinking-water clarifiers were found. A great quantity of artillery and infantry ammunition, also whole rows of waggons and limbers, had been left behind, likewise small arms of every sort, chests of hand-grenades and machine-gun barrels. Many dumps of tinned rations, flour, provisions, and piles of wood were found. *The complete camp tentage of the enemy had been left standing and was sacrificed!* . . . Several hundred horses, which had not been able to be embarked, lay dead in long rows.³⁸

The meals specially left for the Turks appear to have been noted as further proof of hurried departure.

How suddenly the order to evacuate must have been given for the last troops left on the Peninsula was evidenced by the fact that in several tents freshly served up food was still on the table.

It was evident to von Sanders that the Evacuation of Anzac and Suvla "had been prepared with extraordinary care." Its "very skilful preparation and execution" had "prevented early recognition of the process in the Turkish front line." The only actions on the part of the Allies which appear to have attracted the attention of the enemy were, as it turned out, precisely those few departures from the normal which Godley and White had considered dangerous. The feint at Cape Helles, intended to divert the enemy's attention, aroused some suspicion. The abnormal number of patrolling aeroplanes, and the appearance of ships off Imbros before the light had completely faded, were noted by the Turks as significant. The firing of the mines at The Nek led to the actual discovery of the retirement.

Even if the Turks had discovered the intention to evacuate, the knowledge would have availed them little unless they had known precisely how to use it. Had they concentrated their shelling nightly on the beaches, smashing piers and small craft and killing the troops, the result might have been disastrous to their enemy. But to follow him up and crush his rear-guard on the beaches was impossible unless they discovered, or

³⁸ Those animals which had to be used to the last were mostly killed on the last evening; a few, however, were simply turned loose, in spite of orders to the contrary. The guns left behind at Anzac numbered eleven, comprising (of 1st Aust Div) four 18-pdrs., two 5-in howitzers, one 12-pdr. anti-aircraft gun, one 3-pdr Hotchkiss gun, one 4 7 naval gun; (of the N.Z. & A Div) one 5-in howitzer and one 3-pdr Hotchkiss. With the exception of the anti-aircraft gun, all were worn out and practically valueless.

hit upon by accident, the precise time of his final withdrawal. Had they attacked too soon, they would have met a garrison strong in machine-guns and every man with finger on trigger, more expectant than at any previous time in the campaign. Even had they discovered the retirement on the last night, while it was actually progressing, the mere maze of the Anzac trenches formed an obstacle which would probably have caused them several hours' delay. Orders had previously been given that, if at any time the British were found to be retiring, they were to be attacked with vigour; but the problem for the local Turkish commanders was not an easy one. Were they to precipitate their regiments in the dark upon an unknown position full of wire, unknown trenches, and possibly mines? They would not at first be able to ascertain whether the whole position had been abandoned, or whether the retirement was only local, and their enemy still holding a position farther back. If the troops attempted to throw themselves on the British rear-guard, heavy loss might be incurred. There was, moreover, a distinct danger that the advancing Turks might meet and fight with each other. These were difficulties which caused Turkish regimental commanders deep thought, and which could only have been overcome by careful previous preparation, and the provision of a scheme of general attack ready to be put instantly into effect at any moment. No such scheme existed. Consequently even so vigorous a commander as Zeki Bey had decided, after deep consideration, that if a retirement were discovered he would confine his immediate action to a demonstration of rifle-fire—which, he thought, might possibly have detained the last parties of British and complicated their task. The orders to the Anzac troops, however, were that, even if they were attacked, the last night's retirement must be carried out, if possible, according to programme. It would have been exceedingly difficult for them to disengage themselves if actual fighting was in progress when the appointed hour arrived. Nevertheless, with a rear-guard so well selected, and with an enemy perplexed by the dark and by the labyrinth of unknown trenches and tracks, there would probably have been a chance of success even in so difficult an operation.

The danger against which forethought and careful planning would have availed little was that of rough weather.

The three Anzac divisions—which were taken straight from the Peninsula to Lemnos—had hardly settled into their respective camps when, at 1.20 on the morning of December 21st, the wind changed and the island was swept by a violent dust-storm. General Birdwood subsequently expressed the opinion that if the Evacuation, as originally intended, had been still in process that night, some 3,000 men would probably have been still ashore at daylight, and the loss incurred by such a remnant must have been considerable.

On the enemy's side his garrison at Suvla and Anzac came under strong criticism from its comrades at Helles for allowing the British to slip away so easily. The retort of those in the northern area was: "Very well—you now know that there will be an evacuation at Helles. Let us see what steps you propose to take there." The Evacuation of Helles was ordered by the British Government on December 28th, and was discovered by the enemy to be in progress during the first week in January.³⁴ General Birdwood had long before decided that in the withdrawal from Helles the final stage must be carried through in a single night, that of January 8th (or the first subsequent night of fine weather) being eventually chosen. The Turks, having discovered some preliminary movement, opened on January 7th the heaviest bombardment laid down by them on the British front line, and after exploding two mines endeavoured to attack the left of the British line. The assaulting division was the 12th, one of those which had been undergoing special training for the intended offensive at Anzac and Suvla. But the story of the losses from contact-mines and other traps at Suvla and Anzac had spread through the Turkish army and had strongly affected the morale of the soldiers. Their officers could hardly induce them to leave their front trench, and the few who made the attempt were at once shot down by the waiting British. The failure left the enemy dispirited. As usual, the measures adopted by von Sanders evidenced a lack of insight. On January 8th his artillery, which on the previous day had wasted several thousand rounds in the British front line, fired hardly a shell at the beaches, where

³⁴ The enemy's airmen reconnoitred very boldly at this time, in spite of the superiority of their opponents, but von Sanders implies that the discovery was made by observers on the ground.

the effect might have been disastrous to the British; and that night, in spite of increasing wind and the grounding of the last lighter at Gully Beach, the final garrison was withdrawn and embarked before daylight. Although von Sanders had ordered his troops to be especially watchful, and special provision had been made for swiftly following up a retirement, the troops themselves were not eager, and the first intimation to most of them seems to have been the blowing up of two magazines by the British after the Evacuation was complete.⁸⁵

Thus ended the great effort of the Allies on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Turkish Empire, coming gratuitously into the war⁸⁶ in order to serve a German end—the separation of Russia from her Western Allies—had given to those Allies the fullest moral right in their attempt to seize the Peninsula and force the Dardanelles. Never during the war was tenser effort concentrated—or so momentous an issue fought out—in so narrow a theatre; never in history was a campaign richer in pure heroism and conscious self-sacrifice. During a great part of 1915 what would happen in Gallipoli was the foremost concern of the Western Powers. Yet the hillsides consecrated by such a wealth of devotion had now been abandoned. The empty trenches, and the graveyards among which the enemy wandered,⁸⁷ were all that remained on the Peninsula of such a sum of bravery.

⁸⁵ The account of this night's operations given by Liman von Sanders was doubtless based on reports from his divisions, which claimed to have caught up with the retiring British and to have fought them. This statement is entirely false.

⁸⁶ Turkey allied herself with Germany only on 28 July, 1914

⁸⁷ After the evacuation of Anzac and Suvla part of the Turkish troops there, and most of the guns, were moved to Helles. The remaining troops were ordered to fortify the abandoned areas and Gaba Tepe against any further landing. The object was possibly as much to employ the soldiers as to defend the positions. After the abandonment of Helles part of the Turkish force was sent to Thrace. An offer made by Enver Pasha to send a number of divisions to assist the Central Powers was refused, the German G.H.Q. considering it wiser to employ them in threatening Egypt, and upon other enterprises in the East. A garrison was, however, still maintained in Gallipoli. Several long-range cannon were mounted at Helles, and a naval 5.9-in. gun on Baby 700. The graves do not appear to have been desecrated during this period, except that all wooden crosses were taken for firewood. The only signs marking some of the cemeteries were thus lost to the Turks, and later, when the returning villagers looted a number of the graves, they were unable to find many of the graveyards. Several cemeteries containing make-believe graves were prepared by the Turks in order to deceive commissioners sent by the Pope to inspect the cemeteries. After the war, however, Col. Hughes (formerly of the 1st Fld Sqn., Engrs.), who was in charge of the Imperial War Graves Commission's work in Gallipoli, had no difficulty in discovering all cemeteries and, by means of charts and records, identifying practically every grave. In consequence of the great historical interest of Anzac, it was decided not to concentrate the graves but to leave most of the cemeteries in their original positions, while many of the unburied remains discovered in forward positions, such as Baby 700, were interred in the neighbourhood in which they were found.

Of the four phases of the campaign—the dash of the first landing, the attempt to reach Achi Baba, the thrust north of Anzac, and the long anticlimax which ended in the Evacuation—only one had brought the expedition within measurable distance of decisive success. Although it has often been claimed that both at the Landing and in the thrusts for Achi Baba an additional division or even brigade would, at certain junctures, have turned the scale and secured victory in the campaign, it is doubtful if any judicially-minded student will come to such a conclusion. Landing under the fatal disadvantage imposed upon it by the previous attempt to force the straits with the fleet alone, the army in April required double its existing strength if it was to attain the gigantic objectives set before it. In May, June, and July, the effort to reach Achi Baba never came near complete success, and, even if it had done so, would have entailed no result approaching a decision. But in August the British command, employing a rare imagination in the use of its reinforcements, seemed for a few days within sight of victory. On that occasion the chance was lost, not through lack of sufficient numbers, but through the hesitation of certain leaders, and a lack of vigour in some of the troops.

In the final phase, the heavy reinforcements necessary if there was to be a chance of decisive success were denied to the expedition through political complications. It may be doubted whether, at the date of the Evacuation, any such chance remained. The prospects of breaking through³⁸ must not be judged by the situation at Anzac alone. Such conditions as the existence of a whole line of mines under the enemy's centre, of deep defences against bombardment, and above all of overflowing confidence in the troops, were not common to the three sections of Birdwood's army or to their respective areas. Both at Helles and Suvla doubts were expressed by commanders whether their troops—always excepting the 29th Division—would hold fast if seriously attacked. The fine stubbornness of the 52nd Division at Helles, when counter-attacked after its feint on December 19th, makes it doubtful whether the opinion was well grounded. But it is beyond question that a great part of the army in Gallipoli was in no fit state to launch an offensive.

³⁸ The attack would possibly have been made in conjunction with a naval attack in the straits

Nor could a defensive campaign have been wisely undertaken during the winter. Even at Anzac the shelter from weather was—through lack of material—insufficient. The energy of the force was already being largely expended in fighting the climate rather than the enemy. Inasmuch as a great part of the Turkish Army was about to be concentrated for an attack, the safety of Egypt would probably have been for a time assured; and there was little fear that Turkish troops supported by their existing artillery, even with a small force of Germans,³⁹ could seriously break the line of defence, at least at Anzac. The morale of the Turkish infantry appeared at this time so defective that it may be doubted whether even the picked and specially trained divisions would have fulfilled their leader's expectations. But though, as was probable, the great Turkish attack might prove indecisive, it was not to be supposed that the High Command in Germany would have allowed the failure to stand. The crushing of the Allied army in Gallipoli, isolated and impeded by winter, was an aim too attractive to be readily given up. It cannot be doubted that further instalments—possibly of troops, certainly of guns, trench-mortars, and ammunition—would have been despatched by the Central Powers to Gallipoli.

If such action had been taken, it is unlikely that the British positions in Gallipoli would have remained tenable. No deep shelters which it was possible to devise could have enabled the garrisons at Quinn's, Courtney's, or Steele's to retain those positions if heavily fired upon by powerful trench-mortars. At any one of them a systematic bombardment would quickly have erased all trenches in the narrow foothold; and in rear of them no alternative line existed. In this as in many other matters Kitchener had grasped the main outstanding fact that, despite all the care devoted to fortifying the Allies' positions, they could not be held if the Germans supplied the Turks freely with artillery. That consideration of itself made the Evacuation a necessary measure.

The Dardanelles Expedition thus failed to gain the end for which it had been undertaken. It was not indeed without

³⁹ According to Liman von Sanders (*Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 125) not more than 500 Germans had reached the Peninsula at the time of the Evacuation. The most active section of them was probably a small corps of machine-gunners formed from the crew of the *Göeben*.

valuable results. By forcing the Turks to concentrate the greater part of their army in front of the threatened capital, Hamilton's army had effectively defended Egypt. Russia had received assistance far greater than that for which she had asked. Moreover the wearing down of Turkish fighting power had begun. But it is difficult to believe that these results alone would have justified so great an expenditure of lives and effort. The real stake—the opening of communication with Russia, the crushing of Turkey, and the securing of allies in the Balkans—was worth playing for, provided that it was attainable by the means employed; but nothing could justify the initiation of the enterprise by means which could not attain its goal.

The effect of the Evacuation upon opinion in the East seems to have been largely mitigated by the brilliant success of the operation. Members of the British Government, as well as a great part of the British nation, waited with deep anxiety for tidings as to the manner in which the withdrawal would be regarded by the people of Australia and New Zealand. For eight months their most intense feelings had been centred upon Anzac. Every man, woman, and child was tied to those few acres of Turkish hillside, either by personal affection and interest or by a new-born pride in their nation. Not only had the Landing brought the name of their countries into the mouths of all the world, but in the subsequent operations—which were peculiarly suited to their capacities—the Australian and New Zealand forces, small though they were, had played a part which might have gone far to mould the issue of the war. For several months the interest of the whole world converged upon these oversea soldiers and upon the British and French beside them. Not until 1918 did the troops of any Dominion again have an opportunity of exercising so direct and powerful an influence on the course of the struggle.

The Australian force had lost in all 26,094 men in Gallipoli, and the New Zealanders 7,571; of the Australians 7,594 were killed, of the New Zealanders 2,431.⁴⁰ There were few people in Australasia of whom some near relative or close friend did

⁴⁰ The total British loss was 119,696, and that of the French 27,004. That of the Turks is given by Liman von Sanders as about 218,000, some 66,000 of these being killed (*Fünf Jahre Türkei*, p. 135).

not lie on those hillsides abandoned to the enemy. The shock of the news of the Evacuation was, it is true, tempered by intense relief at the absence of loss. Yet even had the casualties been severe, there is little reason to believe that the reception of the tidings would have been in any way different from what it was. Neither among the troops nor among the people was there a moment's doubt as to their attitude towards the British Government and people. It was one of loyal partnership in an enterprise, and of complete trust. If Australian troops had been sacrificed in Gallipoli, so—and equally freely—had British and French. If the expedition had been undertaken in error, and the British Government had found it advisable to withdraw the troops, no one in Australia would question the wisdom of the action. The sense of the people was strongly averse from any idle bickering while the great struggle was proceeding. Criticism of the British Government was sharply resented in Australia. The subsequent inquiry by a Royal Commission into the conduct of the campaign was not approved by general opinion; in some quarters objections were urged to Australia's being represented. The same qualities that invariably led the Australian soldier to stand by his mate caused the Australian people to give unswerving loyalty to its partners in the struggle. The failure of the Dardanelles Expedition made it evident that the war must be longer and more difficult than had been generally imagined; but the difficulty of the common task tended, as always, to draw closer to each other the several branches of the British people. Anzac now belonged to the past, and during the war all energy was concentrated on the future; but the influence of the Gallipoli Campaign upon the national life of Australia and New Zealand had been far too deep to fade. Though the expeditionary forces of the two Dominions were only in their infancy, and afterwards fought with success in greater and more costly battles, no campaign was so identified with them as this. In no unreal sense it was on the 25th of April, 1915, that the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born. Anzac Day—a national celebration held on the anniversary of the Landing—is devoted to the memory of those who fell in the war.

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